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NLF MR Case No. 03-15

Document No. # 7

ISCAP Appeal 2011-001

OKINAWA

CALENDAR OF DOCUMENTS

(Asterisks indicate documents of special importance)

Our No.	SecDef Contr Nr	Date	Document, Subject & Content
1	X-0850	20 Feb 69	<p>Memo from SecDef to the President: <u>Okinawa Bases and Forces</u>. Responds to questions asked at meeting 27 January. Notes that these are JCS answers and that definitive DoD policy will be provided through an NSC study in progress. Consequently, SecDef comments are not provided. Questions answered include size of forces in Okinawa, reason for being there, future needs for the bases etc.</p> <p><u>Attachment</u>: Note to SecDef requesting transmittal from JCS to President and noting that ISA has not commented yet.</p>
2	X-1383	19 Mar 69	<p>Memo from SecDef to Chairman, JCS: <u>Degradation of nuclear capability in the event of denial of Ryukyu bases and alternate arrangements for nuclear weapon deployments</u>. Lists a series of questions regarding impact of loss of storage rights for nuclear weapons on Okinawa -- either permanently or with right of reintroduction in an emergency. Requests that data be prepared indicating contingency possibilities, costs of alternate strategies and amount of degradation of the overall posture if Okinawa were lost.</p> <p><u>Attachment</u>: ISA memo stating problem and requesting draft memo be signed by SecDef.</p>
*3	X-1617	29 Mar 69	<p>Memo from Chairman, JCS to SecDef: <u>Japan Policy as pertains to Okinawa Reversion issue (NSSM-5)</u>. Fundamental military questions related to reversion include unrestricted access and freedom of action in the use of our Okinawa bases and the storage of nuclear weapons. Okinawa is the most important US military base system in the western Pacific. Loss of the bases could jeopardize military capability and suggest to potential enemies a change in US intentions. Nuclear weapons are the most crucial</p>

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issue and there is no way to effectively replace the broad general storage capability on Okinawa. In addition to reducing strategic and tactical capability in the Pacific, reaction times would be increased and air defenses of the islands would be worse. Recommend that DoD policy be to insist on special agreement with GOJ insuring unimpaired rights to use our facilities and bases.

- *4 X-2297 1 May 69 Memo from Chairman, JCS to SecDef: Degradation of nuclear capability Responds to SecDef memo of 19 March. Restates JCS position and provides study of impact of loss of Okinawa with and without reentry rights. Concludes that loss of storage rights would have an adverse effect.
Attachment: JCS study.
- 5 X-2707 22 May 69 Letter from SecDef to Secretary of State requests concurrence in assigning the Army the task of studying the civil and administrative aspects of any agreement to return administration of the Ryukyus to Japan.
Attachment: ISA memo transmitting draft of above.
- 6 X-3140 11 Jun 69 Letter from SecState to SecDef concurs with 22 May letter, notes that State has set up its own study group, and suggests that an interagency study group be set up shortly.
- 7 X-3810 12 Jul 69 Memo from Chairman, JCS to SecDef: Senior Uniformed Representation on the US Okinawa Negotiating Team. Because of strategic implications of the Okinawa negotiations, military representation of the team, in addition to existing representation on the Washington-based interdepartmental group, is necessary to adequately represent defense interests and improve communication of information to DoD. Recommends appointment of flag representative ASAP and copy of memo to State Dept.
- *8 X-4046 24 Jul 69 Memo from Chairman, JCS to DepSecDef: Okinawa Negotiating Strategy. Suggests that negotiations related to Okinawa are being hurried too much and that US, as in past negotiations, is not getting quid pro quo

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for the concessions it is making. Urges that US slow down negotiations, determine concessions in military and non-military areas that it wants if it is to give up some rights on Okinawa, and postpone the meeting of the heads of state until a later time so that all issues can be resolved before their meeting. Requests meeting to discuss this subject.

9 X-4078 28 Jul 69

Letter from SecDef to Sec State requests military representation on Okinawa negotiating team. Letter is substantially similar to 12 July memo to SecDef from JCS.
Attachment: ISA memo recommending against senior military representative at this time.

10 X-4783 6 Sep 69

Memo from SecNav to SecDef: Post-project 703 Marine Forces on Okinawa. Notes that Navy has been requested to provide new troop strengths and assignments as well as costs based on changes in Vietnam and deactivation of the 5th Marine Division. Requests that Marine Corps strength of 19,000 for Okinawa and that a Division be approved along with other assignments in the Pacific so that studies can be completed.
Attachment: 5 Sep point paper on above subject.

11 X-4898 13 Sep 69

Letter from SecDef to Sec State advises that he is approving transfer of a Division headquarters and a Marine Regiment to Okinawa to bring strength to one Division there -- approximately the same as pre-war levels.

12 X-4897 13 Sep 69

Memo from SecDef to SecNav: Marines on Okinawa. Approves decisions requested in SecNav memo of 6 September subject to President's final concurrence in Vietnam redeployments.
Attachment: SA memo recommending Marine plans and providing background data.

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- *13 X-6126 8 Nov 69 Memo from Chairman, JCS to SecDef: Okinawa Reversion. Restates JCS and USG positions and concerns and expresses view that negotiations are not moving satisfactorily or accomplishing US objectives. Feels that agreement prior to "summit" meeting is imperative. Recommends that 1) State be informed that essential military elements of NSDM-13 have not yet been adequately guaranteed and firm assurances of continued rights to use Okinawa are essential and 2) that all final agreements and statements be completed in time to be reviewed by the NSC prior to the "summit" meeting. Particular concern about assurance of free use for conventional military forces and reentry rights to nuclear weapons are expressed.
- *14 X-6257 18 Nov 69 Memo from SecDef to White House Staff (Kissinger): Okinawa Reversion. Passes along JCS recommendations outlined in 8 November JCS memo to SecDef.
Attachment: ISA memo providing draft for White House.
- *15 X-6571 3 Dec 69 Memo from White House (Kissinger) to SecDef: Okinawa Reversion. Acknowledges 18 November memo and indicates that JCS points were given "careful weight" in discussions with Prime Minister Sato.
- 16 X-3370 18 Jun 70 Memo from Chairman, JCS to SecDef: Japanese Assumption of Defense Responsibilities in the Ryukyus. Discusses several specific problems related to negotiation for the reversion of Okinawa to the Japanese. Recommends approval of the CINCPAC plan for deployment of the Japanese Defense Force after reversion and suggests that negotiators attempt to separate transfer of Naha port to the GOJ from lump sum payments related to reversion.
- 17 X-3685 7 Jul 70 Memo from SecDef to Chairman, JCS acknowledges 18 June memo and indicates it will serve as basis for additional instructions to negotiators.

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- 18 X-3856 9 Jul 70 Letter from Sec Treasury to SecDef points out need to identify \$200 million of construction projects on Okinawa in the next 7 years to use up Japanese lump sum payment without getting into disagreement about agreement language.
- 19 X-None 23 Jul 70 Letter from SecDef responds to Chairman, House Armed Services Cmte letter asking about statements made in Japan that USG planned large construction expenditures in Okinawa. SecDef acknowledges that some statements were made inadvisedly, states that the statements were badly misconstrued, and indicates that the only construction underway or being approved is minor and necessary and that all other items are currently being held up as requested by the committee.
Attachments: Chairman Rivers' letter dated 7 July.
ISA memo transmitting SecDef reply (16 July)
New York Times article
LA letter acknowledging Rivers' letter
- 20 X-6179 12 Nov 70 Memo from Chairman, JCS to SecDef: Japanese Assumption of Defense Responsibilities in the Ryukyus. Recommends that plan submitted in 18 June memo be given to Japanese for inclusion in the budget plans, that US services occupy facilities to be vacated until reversion or relief, and that US negotiators need to work out arrangements with GOJ for funding costs during transition period and for facilities to be shared by both US and GOJ forces.
- 21 X-0263 21 Jan 71 Letter from SecDef to Sec Treasury comments on the lack of progress in working out arrangements for the US to realize \$200 million in savings as a result of Japanese payments. Suggests discussions with Japanese Vice Minister at meeting here next week.
- 22 X-0325 23 Jan 71 Letter from Sec Treasury to SecDef acknowledges 21 January letter, regrets inability to meet to discuss the issues, and agrees to try to make progress in meeting with the Vice Minister.

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*23 X-0508 3 Feb 71

Letter from Sec Treasury to SecDef reports on conversations with the Vice Minister and notes items requiring further action by DoD, State, or Treasury. Items noted include 1) studying the feasibility of including a treaty clause calling for a \$100 million cash payment if Japanese can get legal authority for it and 2) desire of the Japanese to spend some of the money for moving US housing and buying NIKE missiles even though these are not within the letter of the agreement. Notes that an additional meeting is scheduled in Tokyo 17 February.

*24 X-0690 16 Feb 71

Letter from SecDef to Sec Treasury indicates that the proposed cash settlement is acceptable to DoD, that the NIKE purchase and housing relocation are not acceptable because they do not provide net benefit to DoD, that DoD would consider reimbursement of labor and severance costs or, failing that, of O&M costs under certain conditions, and that the balance of the \$200 million is assumed to come from reimbursement of facilities maintenance costs and Japanese assumption of Master Labor contract administration providing certain assumptions are correct.

Attachment: ISA transmittal memo for above.

25 X-0819 19 Feb 71

Memo from ASD(ISA) to SecDef: Memorandum for the President on Okinawa Reversion. Attaches draft memo to President from SecState suggesting Okinawa reversion be considered a treaty and submitted to the Senate for advice and consent. Suggests SecDef concur (he did).

Attachment: State Department coordination memo.

*26 X-1580 7 Apr 71

Memo from SecDef to Service Secs and Chmn, JCS: Japanese Assumption of Defense Responsibility for Okinawa. Approves plans submitted 12 November '70 outlining facilities to be turned over to Japan and details certain exceptions, negotiating positions, etc. States that payments by Japan are to provide net benefit to DoD and that any construction or relocation projects, whether or not related to reversion must be processed through normal channels for FY 1973 and are subject to Congressional approval.

Attachment: ISA memo transmitting above for signature.

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- *27 X-2321 14 May 71 Letter from SecDef to Sec Treasury reiterates DoD position that \$200 million payment must produce net benefit to USG and states that proposed terms as regards \$65 million to be spent only on relocation responding to Japanese political needs do not meet these criteria. Points out that US position requires these funds be allowed to be spent for facility maintenance, that projects Japan wants the US to agree to would involve substantial penalties even including the \$65 million, and that we have already given GOJ valuable facilities as a gesture of good will. Suggests that the time has come to hold firm to the original negotiating position.
- 28 X-2260 14 May 71 Memo from SecDef to SecAF and Chmn, JCS: Transfer of Facilities to GOJ in conjunction with Okinawa reversion. Responds to memos from addressees requesting guidance on disposal of personal property. Indicates guidelines for release are included in attachments to his 7 April memo and that release of property is the responsibility of Service Secretaries with inter-Service coordination to be handled by the unified commands.
Attachments: ISA memo transmitting above.
26 February memo from SecAF requesting guidance.
- *29 X-2584 28 May 71 Memo from Chmn, JCS to SecDef: Okinawa Reversion: Japanese Assumption of Defense Responsibilities. Concurs in proposed DoD-Japanese Defense Force agreement on Okinawa specifying Japanese responsibilities, forces and other commitments. Notes that there are substantial benefits to USG from this agreement. Recommends approval of the agreement and that a request be made to the Sec State that a government-to-government affirmation of the agreement between the two defense agencies be prepared.
- *30 X-3675 9 Aug 71 Letter from SecDef to Secretary of the Treasury explains that elections are scheduled to be held in November, 1971 for the Chief Executive and members of the Legislature of the Ryukyus. Notes that these officials have requested that elections be deferred and their terms extended until reversion sometime in 1972. Suggests

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that this would have value to USG in eliminating a potentially controversial campaign, that the officials would prefer it so that they can spend more time on reversion matters, and that the Japanese are agreeable. Requests that the Secretary of the Treasury concur in the recommendation which requires amending an Executive Order.

31 X-4140 8 Sep 71

Memo from ASD(ISA) to SecDef: Transmittal of Okinawa Reversion Agreement to the Senate. Transmits copies of draft memo from Secretary of State to President to be used in submitting the agreement to the Senate. Requests that SecDef indicate concurrence in the letter and a proposed Presidential message to the Senate. (He did).

*32 X-5584 24 Dec 71

Memo from SecDef to the President: Issue of Nuclear Weapon Removal from Okinawa. Japanese desire public statement by President that no nuclear weapons are stationed on Okinawa at time of reversion. SecDef suggests such an assurance is not necessary and would establish a dangerous precedent. Suggests several oblique ways of accomplishing the same thing without a Presidential statement. Also suggests no weakening in USG position on inspection but notes that there are ways to demonstrate removal without allowing formal inspection.

Attachment: Briefing memo from ATSD (AE).

33 X-2366 13 May 72

Memo from SecDef to Service Secretaries and Chmn, JCS: Discontinuance of US Administration of the Ryukyu Islands. Formally points out that all US responsibilities in Okinawa end at 0000 hours, Tokyo time on 15 May 1972, and that treaties with Japan will apply in all later relations there.

Attachment: ISA memo transmitting above.

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