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16 January 2003

NOTE TO: The National Security Advisor
FROM: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT: Revised Papers on Iraq

Condi: Here are the three modules you requested: Iraq's WMD, its ties to terrorism, and its human rights record.

We are still locating and checking out material for graphics and display. As in earlier drafts, we've noted the places where something might be needed to illustrate a point. Once you've had a chance to react to this, we can narrow down and close in on the graphics and display items. You'll see that there are probably more suggestions here than anyone will actually be able to use.

The papers are still classified. George and I have underway an assessment of what collection might be lost from release of these various pieces of intelligence. We want to be able to give you a considered risk assessment to help with the cost/benefit calculation once we know what it is proposed to release.

You and Steve Hadley have the only copies of the papers outside of CIA.



John McLaughlin

cc: Steve Hadley

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underreported the amounts by claiming high production failure rates and lost time due to equipment breakdowns. Iraq declared that it produced over 8,000 liters of anthrax. UN experts assessed, based on its estimate of the capacity of available equipment, that the total anthrax production should have been between 22,000 to 39,000 liters. To make matters worse, UN inspectors discovered evidence of anthrax in two fermentors and a mobile storage tank at a plant Iraq had not included as contributing to its total production. Production from this facility would add to the total, but this fact was not declared by Iraq to this day.

- Baghdad still has not explained serious discrepancies between the amount of BW growth media it procured before 1991 and the amount of finished agent it declared—or could have made using the media. Iraq claimed that a large amount of media was lost in failed production runs or was stolen from the high-security BW facility at Al Hakam and other sites, but these claims were never supported by documentary evidence or interviews.
- Iraq claimed that it produced four aerosol spray tanks by modifying Mirage F-1 fuel drop tanks. The Iraqis never provided credible evidence that they destroyed these tanks, and Iraqi personnel admitted to UN interviewers that Iraq intended to produce at least twelve others. Iraq declared that these tanks were for dispersing BW agent and that it had even flight-tested one with an anthrax simulant in January 1991. This technology would be critical in developing similar tanks for manned or unmanned aircraft that could be used to deliver biological agents to other countries. An Iraqi military officer, Brigadier Mujahid Saleh Abdul Latif, who was involved in a related project to convert a MiG-21 aircraft into an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV), declared to UN inspectors in October 1995 that the tanks were intended to be mounted on the MiG-21 UAV. In its December 2002 declaration, Iraq is attempting to rewrite history by claiming that this admission was made in error and that the projects were never related.
- Iraq claimed it destroyed 157 aerial bombs it had filled with BW agent, but never provided the United Nations evidence to confirm this destruction despite the inspectors' considerable efforts to obtain it.

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[redacted]
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(c)

- Most of the key nuclear materials scientists were assembled in the Al Raya State Company.

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E.O. 13526, section 1.4(c)

Saddam has repeatedly praised members of his nuclear establishment—what the Iraqi press has called his “Nuclear Mujahidin”—in public statements since 1998. We find these exhortations troubling, particularly as Saddam has called upon these individuals to help drive the enemy back across the Atlantic. Combining all this evidence, it is difficult to conclude anything other than that Saddam continues to pursue nuclear weapons.

~~(TS)~~ [redacted] Delivery Systems. Now, missiles and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). Iraq maintains a small but growing missile force and several development programs, including for a UAV that can deliver biological warfare agents. Baghdad’s UAVs could threaten Iraq’s neighbors, forces in the Persian Gulf, *and if brought close to, or into, other countries, their homelands as well.*

- Serious and continuing gaps in Iraqi accounting to the United Nations and numerous intelligence reports over the past decade from sources inside Iraq and others that have escaped indicate that Saddam retains a covert force of up to a few dozen Scud-variant SRBMs with ranges of 650 to 900 km. In fact, Iraqi companies in early 2002 were trying to buy propellant handling trucks and propellant handling equipment designed to handle specialty oxidizers for the Scud missile system. It seems implausible that Saddam’s agents

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would risk purchasing equipment related to Scud propellants unless they have Scud propellants to store.

- Admittedly, before they left in 1998, UN inspectors were never able to find these missiles and they probably will not find them now. Our sources over the years paint a picture of a covert missile force constantly transported on civilian trucks to continually change their hiding places around Iraq.

E.O. 13526, section 1.4(c)

Iraq also has deployed its new al-Samoud and Ababil-100 SRBMs, which have been [redacted] flying beyond the UN-authorized 150-km range limit. In fact, UNMOVIC Executive Director Dr. Hans Blix in his report to the UN Security Council on 19 December said that Iraq admitted in its semi-annual declarations submitted in October 2002 that it has flight-tested al-Samoud variants to ranges exceeding 150 km on 13 occasions, with one missile flying 183 km. This information was not included in the 7 December declaration, which claimed that all ballistic missile activity fell within proscribed limitations.

Withheld from public disclosure as provided for in 50 U.S.C. 403(g) section 6, the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949.

E.O. 13526, section 1.4(c)

~~CPS~~ [redacted] We have information [redacted] that Saddam intended to admit to only 20 to 30 percent of proscribed activity in order to keep evidence of additional activity hidden. Iraq has admitted to some wrong doing in its declaration, admitting to illicitly purchasing material for its missile program and even modifying the al-Samoud SRBM and apparently flying it beyond 150-km. The other 70 to 80 percent of what they are hiding is what really concerns us. [redacted] that they are hiding extended-range al-Samoud SRBMs capable of flying 300-km.

E.O. 13526, section 1.4(c)

- Iraqi engineers that produce al-Samoud SRBMs [redacted] that complete extended-range al-Samouds were hidden with military units around the country and other components were hidden elsewhere—all before UN inspectors arrived in Iraq.
- Here you can see activity during November that shows material being removed from al-Samoud production facilities. This activity ended before inspectors began their work on 27 November. [IMAGE of Wazeriya, Ibn al-Haytham, al-Samoud Factory]

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(S) [redacted] E.O. 13526, section 1.4(c) [redacted] that have described the removal of solid-propellant missile parts that were removed from production facilities in mid-November to keep them hidden from the United Nations.

E.O. 13526, section 1.4(c)

(S) [redacted] Iraq is also working on more advanced engines for new liquid propellant missiles. A few years ago Saddam had a small, secret team of rocket scientists design a liquid-propellant engine similar to the Scud engine—possibly for a 1,200 km range missile. We know this because an Iraqi missile engineer from that team escaped the country and shared this information. This is similar to the kind of work Iraq was doing before the Gulf war to develop an engine based on the Scud, using high-energy rocket fuels to power a long-range missile. Not surprisingly, Iraq has built an engine test stand larger than any it has ever had, including the Scud test stand dismantled by the United Nations. Although the old test stand recently appeared to inspectors to be in disrepair, there is no conceivable reason for Iraq to have such a large test stand if not to test engines larger than UN resolutions allow.

(S) [redacted] E.O. 13526, section 1.4(c) [redacted] Iraqi procurement agents are seeking large quantities of high-energy rocket fuels that cannot be used in any known Iraqi missile. Saddam may claim that these new fuels are intended to enhance his allowed systems, but those systems have *already* exceeded UN range restrictions. We're more concerned that Saddam has resurrected his pre-Gulf war plans for a long-range missile powered by an advanced liquid-propellant engine. All the pieces of the puzzle are there: design a large engine, build the test stand, and buy the special new fuels needed to test it.

E.O. 13526, section 1.4(c)

(S) [redacted] Iraq continues to hide its involvement with North Korea as well. [redacted]

[redacted] since fall 2000 between Iraq and North Korea's primary ballistic

E.O. 13526, section 1.4(c)

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missile and military export organization—the same organization that has sold ballistic missile technology to Iran, Syria, Libya, Pakistan, and most recently, delivered Scuds to Yemen. We do not know what level of cooperation may have evolved, but [redacted] that Iraqi missile specialists traveled to Pyongyang in 2001 to meet with this organization.

(S) [redacted] Iraq also is working on a long-range, solid-propellant missile. We know [redacted] [redacted] that Iraq a couple of years ago was producing large-diameter motor cases. These motor cases are about twice the diameter of Iraq's UN-authorized Ababil-100. [GRAPHIC comparison of Ababil-100, Badr-2000, and large-diameter motor cases] No mention of these in his declaration either. Saddam has built the infrastructure he needs to continue developing this larger missile. [redacted]

[redacted] In fact, weapons inspectors had dismantled those buildings during the 1990s because they were designed to produce motors for the Badr-2000, a prohibited missile.

(S) [redacted] Saddam also did not declare his effort to develop UAVs for long-range delivery of chemical, or more likely biological, weapons—something he has worked on for at least a dozen years. This effort has included the MiG-21, an aircraft called the L-29, and an assortment of smaller UAVs. [VIDEO TAPE of the Mirage F-1 BW spray test using tank intended for MiG-21 UAV.]

(S) [redacted] Saddam claims the L-29s were to be converted to UAVs so they could be used as air defense training targets—in other words, Iraqi fighter aircraft could practice shooting them down as if they were attacking enemy forces. But like so many of his claims, this one is transparently misleading. The L-29 is much slower than most of the modern aircraft that Iraq would face in an air-to-air battle today, and the radar cross section does not resemble any likely Iraqi air defense threats. Iraq only has a handful of the L-29 UAVs, so any live training would be short-lived as the targets would presumably be destroyed quickly. If Iraq does not intend to shoot them down on the other hand, why the need for an unmanned aircraft—a manned aircraft could simulate an attacker as well if not even more effectively.

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E.O. 13526, section 1.4(c)

(S) We are concerned that the L-29 UAV program includes the aerial BW spray system Iraq was working on just before the Gulf war. [PHOTO] The photo on the screen shows an Iraqi army aviation helicopter carrying an aerial spray apparatus. The piece of equipment was developed by the same organization that built the L-29-based UAV. Note the two tanks used for the spray apparatus. Now note the L-29's auxiliary fuel tanks. And the atomizer used on this apparatus is of the same type that Iraq converted for spraying biological agents in the late 1980s.

- Iraq's "Full, Final, and Complete Declarations"—recall that the Iraqis issued several, each subsequent one revised after Baghdad was caught lying—admit the production in 1988 of aerosol generators, another critical component of BW agent aerial dissemination.

E.O. 13526, section 1.4(c)

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(S) [redacted] The intelligence on UAV programs is extensive, convincing, and recent. [IMAGES of UAV] [redacted] E.O. 13526, section 1.4(c) [redacted] Iraqi procurement agents and a variety of vendors since 2001 shows Iraq is procuring equipment in violation of UN sanctions for dozens of small UAVs. We and our allies have now identified over two dozen such procurement agents around the world who are attempting to procure this UAV-related equipment for Iraq. [redacted] E.O. 13526, section 1.4(c) [redacted] Iraq possesses from 16 to 20 "cessna-sized" UAVs that are neither aerial targets nor for reconnaissance. If they do not claim them to be for these missions, what are they for?

(S) [redacted] E.O. 13526, section 1.4(c) [redacted] It shows hundreds of UAV-related items—including autopilots, large UAV engines and global positioning system payload triggers— [redacted] E.O. 13526, section 1.4(c) [redacted]

(S) [redacted] Our concern has been deepened by our discovery that the customer for this UAV equipment, [redacted] E.O. 13526, section 1.4(c) [redacted] approved in mid-2001 an acquisition list that included topographic mapping software for the United States. While we don't know the intent behind this purchase attempt, this software can only be used in the United States and could be used to plan routes for the UAV's guidance system.

- [redacted] E.O. 13526, section 1.4(c) [redacted] Iraq considered its UAVs to be important strategic weapons that would be used to stop an allied advance, and that some of the UAVs were loaded with chemical materials. [redacted] E.O. 13526, section 1.4(c) [redacted] the effort put into UAV procurement suggest some UAVs are of very high strategic importance to the regime.
- [redacted] E.O. 13526, section 1.4(c) [redacted] reported in December 2002 that small unmanned airplanes filled with chemical agents are being prepared to be used against a specific province if it is lost to the opposition.

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- In the late 1990s, [redacted] E.O. 13526, section 1.4(c) [redacted] a test of spray nozzle equipment on UAVs—one of many intelligence indications that they are being developed to spray BW or CW, not simply to conduct reconnaissance as Iraq has claimed.
- Some of these UAVs also far exceed the 150-kilometer limit the UN has put on Iraqi delivery systems.
- Indeed, our technical systems show irrefutably that on June 27, 2002 one of the small UAVs flew approximately 500 kilometers in the racetrack pattern depicted on this map. This test, as well as four other flight tests which occurred since November 2001, of course, was not included in Saddam's declaration. In fact, the furthest range Saddam declared for his UAVs was 80 km, far short of its 500-km demonstrated capability. Nevertheless, 80 km is still sufficient to provide a standoff BW delivery capability.
- Numerous documented cases of lying like this leave us no choice but to question everything Saddam says about his weapons programs. In so many instances he has told us something that we know beyond doubt to be false.

E.O. 13526, section 1.4(c)

~~(TS)~~ [redacted] Further evidence of Iraq's interest in lethal unmanned aerial vehicles can be seen in other procurement activities.

E.O. 13526, section 1.4(c)

- A [redacted] firm in 2000 approached the Iraqis with a long list of military technologies for sale. The Iraqis expressed interest in the proposed co-development of the [redacted] land-attack cruise missile. Subsequently, the [redacted] gave Iraq officials over 200 pages of detailed preliminary design information and drawings for this missile and the associated launcher. Although the Iraqis declined in 2001 to pursue acquisition of this system from the

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E.O. 13526, section 1.4(c)

[redacted] Baghdad's possession of this documentation gives them enough information to produce the missile, assuming it receives foreign assistance. Computer modeling indicates a [redacted] would have the potential to deliver a 500 kg payload within 50 meters of a target 1200 km away.

- Intelligence reporting indicates that [redacted] was assisting with Iraqi attempts to convert the MiG-21. [redacted] there is an ongoing program to use the technology developed as part of the L-29 program to convert MiG-21 aircraft into remotely-piloted vehicles. [redacted] Iraq's goal was to take aircraft of all types—including MiGs, Sukhois, F-1s and L-29s—that are too old for pilots to fly safely and convert them into such vehicles. [redacted]

E.O. 13526, section 1.4(c)

- [redacted]
- [redacted] the Iraqi intelligence service was attempting to increase the range of Iraqi MiG-21 aircraft in order to use them as cruise missiles armed with CBW weapons. [redacted]
[redacted]

~~(S)~~ [redacted] **Thwarting Interviews.** On a related topic, you may have noticed that the United States has stressed the importance of inspectors being able to carry out interviews of Saddam's scientists outside of Iraq. As demonstrated during the 1990s, out-of-country interviews are one of the inspectors' most powerful tools in learning about Saddam's capabilities and intentions. Now that UN Security Council Resolution 1441 provides for such interviews, Baghdad *publicly* says its scientists are free to leave Iraq, but intelligence from multiple and highly reliable sources tells us the regime has taken steps to *intimidate* its WMD experts:

- [redacted] E.O. 13526, section 1.4(c) if scientists travel outside Iraq at the behest of inspectors, they will be considered spies, and dealt with accordingly. In Iraq, that means torture and death, perhaps for one's family as well.