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E.O. 13526, SECTION 5.3(b)(3)	_
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4 Nov. 1975

Mrs. Davis,

Re Senate Staff Committee Report on Chile

I am impressed by the work done by the Committee staff--they have pulled together a cogent report from a mass of facts.

But I am stunned at the potential damage to U.S. interests should this material be made public as an official document.

In general: How can they equate this study with the legal requirement of the Director of Central Intelligence to protect intelligence sources and methods?

Why is it necessary to name names? The story could be told in generalities—a large newspaper, a major political party, a political splinter group, etc.
But throughout the paper names are named. In fact, sometimes specific individual agents may be identified—e.g., IV,7—"a Radical journalist and who joined with others who are identified on 2 June to organize the Legion of Liberty; IV,19—

Specific individuals who took risks to collaborate with us in clandestine endeavors which our policy makers deemed were in our national interests are going to be subject to public exposure and worse. It is not cloak-and-daggerish to suggest that some lives could be in jeopardy.

And what about the impact on our efforts elsewhere in the world? Can we expect to attract the collaborators we need to conduct clandestine operations if they see that their names and roles may be publicized by the Congress? And what about other places where leaders are looking for "paper tigers" to bash around and seek this material to claim that a newspaper in their country is "obviously" being supported by CIA (or a rival politician--Australia today, for example--or military group, etc.) because here is an official document of the Congress which describes this as one of CIA's methods.

The Committee study clearly says it is describing CIA methods—it uses that label. It also exposes individuals and groups. On IV,18 it describes in some detail and if one misses the correct identification, well, more details are offered on page IV,20—and while the study notes that "Unconfirmed charges of CIA involvement were made," the study proposes to correct that by confirming that CIA was indeed involved.

On page V,2, the study philosophically notes the fact "That The United States was involved has been taken for granted in Latin America for many years." Again, it proposes to remove all doubts by offering confirming evidence, naming names, telling who got the money and how much!

On page V,4 it throws some tar on _______ too, but notes on page V,6 that CIA faces a difficult situation in talking about relations with multinational corporations for fear it "may reveal sensitive sources and methods."

INC

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E.O. 13526, section 3.3(b)(1)

E.O. 13526, section 3.3(b)(1)



In short, I think we should take every step possible to support CIA's position that this material should \underline{not} be discussed in public session, and that it should \underline{not} be published.

The DCI says this material remains classified. To give it public exposure could endanger the lives of individuals who cooperated with us, affect our foreign relations not only with Chile but with other nations, and would be a serious and harmful blow to future clandestine and covert action operations of our government.

I have marked in red on the pages with clips the various identifications which I believe should be protected. Stating this information in generalities would not detract from the conclusions of the study or its purpose of analyzing the system. There would still be sufficient details to support the conclusions.

E.O. 13526, section 3.3(b)(1)	Not all its employees were witting of				
CIA support, but all will be tainted if this connection is confirmed by this Congressional publication. We hurt the innocent as well as the "guilty." And whatever it did for us in Chile, it also did many good things elsewhere and yet each and every employee [E.O. 13526, section 3.3(b)(1)]					
is going to be tainted. Exposure could ruin careers, destroy the economic well being, or worse, of many individuals. And the fact remains, that in					
spite of <u>charges</u> that CIA	E.O. 13526, section 3.3(b)(1)				

If we are ever going to fight against release of classified information which would damage oug foreign policy and national security interests, this is the time.

Rob Roy Ratliff

