

FRANK CHURCH, IDAHO, CHAIRMAN
JOHN G. TOWER, TEXAS, VICE CHAIRMAN
RUFUS A. BART, MISS.
WALTER F. MONDALT, MARI.
WALTER D. HULLASTON, KY.
ROBERT MORGAN, N.C.
BART HART, CALIF.
HOWARD H. BAKER, JR., TENN.
BARRY GOLDWATER, ARIZ.
CHARLES MC C. MATHIAS, JR., MD.
RICHARD S. SCHWEIKER, PA.
WILLIAM G. MILLER, STAFF DIRECTOR
FREDERICK A. O. SCHWARTZ, JR., CHIEF COUNSEL
CURTIS W. BROTHERS, MINORITY COUNSEL

NLF MR Case No 09-03 AL
Document No 20

United States Senate

SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 11, 97TH CONGRESS)
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

~~SECRET~~

October 17, 1975

REVIEW STAFF
75-3274

DECLASSIFIED UNDER AUTHORITY OF THE INTERAGENCY
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION APPEALS-PANEL.
E.O. 13526, SECTION 5.3(b)(3)
ISCAP No. 2010-004, document 20

Mr. Seymour Bolten
Review Staff
Central Intelligence Agency
Langley, Virginia

Dear Mr. Bolten:

This letter is intended to confirm our telephone conversation of last night. The Committee would like to invite Bill Nelson and Ray Warren to testify in Executive session on October 28, 1975 on Chile. We would appreciate it if Mr. Nelson could make a short presentation -- 15 to 20 minutes on the range of CIA covert activities in Chile from 1964 until the present.

More specifically, the Committee would like Mr. Nelson to highlight the following activities:

- (1) The 1964 election effort
- (2) The support given in the period 1964 to 1970 - congressional and municipal candidates as well as anti-Communist propaganda and institution-building projects
- (3) The 1970 election effort
- (4) Track I and Track II (September 4 - November 4, 1970) efforts to prevent Allende's accession to the Presidency
- (5) Covert action activities from 1970 to September 11, 1973, including contacts with the Chilean military
- (6) Covert action and liaison relationships from September 11, 1973 to the present.

Oct 20 8 34 AM '75

~~SECRET~~

Photo Copy
from
Gerald R. Ford Library

Mr. Seymour Bolten
Page Two
October 17, 1975

~~SECRET~~


I also attach a list of specific projects (Attachment A) that Messrs. Nelson and Warren should be prepared to discuss in detail during the Executive session. They should also be prepared to submit descriptions of these projects for the record.

Finally, in preparation for the open hearing scheduled for the week following the Executive session, I submit as Attachment B a list of "facts" on the Chilean case study which we would like declassified. We would like the Agency's views and comments on these facts as soon as possible. If the statements are not accurate please advise us. If the Agency has objection to release of these facts please so state the reasons for such objection.

We look forward to seeing Messrs. Nelson and Warren on October 28. The session will be at 10:00 a.m., and we will advise you as to the location.

Many thanks.

Sincerely,



William B. Bader

Attachments
"A" and "B"

~~SECRET~~

Photo Copy
from
Gerald R. Ford Library

ATTACHMENT B

FACTS TO BE DECLASSIFIED FOR PUBLIC HEARINGS ON CHILE

1. The Central Intelligence Agency, acting under programs approved by the Special Group, spent nearly \$3,000,000 in covert efforts to insure the election of the Christian Democratic candidate in the 1964 Chilean Presidential elections.

2. In 1970, the 40 Committee--the Special Group's successor--decided not to support a single candidate in the 1970 Presidential elections. Rather it decided that the CIA should undertake propaganda and other covert activities designed to prevent the election of the leftist candidate, Salvador Allende. \$425,000 was spent on that effort, in addition to on-going Station activities.

3. Allende was the narrow victor in the September 4 elections. Because no candidate received a majority, the Chilean Congress was to vote between Allende and Jorge Alessandri, the conservative runner-up, on October 24. During the interim, the CIA undertook two lines of activity designed to prevent Allende from becoming President. One line was approved and coordinated by the 40 Committee. It included propaganda, contacts with members of Frei's cabinet and the use of military aid as an inducement to the Chilean military. It also included a 40 Committee authorization of funds to attempt to influence the outcome of the Congressional vote. It was, however, determined that the money could not usefully be spent, and it was not.

At the President's request, the CIA opened a second track of activity. This became an attempt to induce the Chilean military to stage a coup before Allende could be voted into office by the Chilean Congress. The CIA passed weapons to one group of Chilean military officers who plotted a coup. However, that group was apparently not the group which carried out the kidnap attempt in which the Chilean Chief of Staff, General Rene Schneider, was fatally wounded. The CIA knew of the latter group's plans but several days before had tried to discourage it from carrying them out.

4. Between Allende's inauguration in November 1970 and his overthrow and death in September 1973, the CIA spent over \$6,000,000 in support of opposition political parties and media. Included in that support were limited amounts of money for private sector organizations. Proposals for support of private sector organizations suspected of involvement in strikes or for direct support of strikers were rejected. At the same time, the CIA remained in contact through third parties with a right-wing terrorist organization, Patria y Libertad. The CIA also passed considerable money to the conservative National Party, whose right-wing members were known to have links with Patria y Libertad.

Photo Copy
from
Gerald R. Ford Library

Attachment A
to Select Committee letter
to Seymour Bolten
October 17, 1975

LIST OF PROJECTS FOR DISCUSSION IN EXECUTIVE SESSION - CHILE

Withheld from public release
under statutory authority
of the Central Intelligence Agency
FOIA 5 USC §552(b)(3)

- (1964) Major political action project supporting Frei.
- (1964-1965) Political action to support selected candidates in 3/65 congressional elections.
- (1965-1971) E.O. 13526, section 3.3(b)(1)
E.O. 13526, section 3.3(b)(1)
(One of two projects already reviewed in detail from budget standpoint)
- (1962-1974) Financial support to splinter groups of Radical Party.
- (1968) Influence Frei government through cabinet minister.
- (1969-1974) Major propaganda campaign, national and international; support for El Mercurio.
- (1971-1974) Financial support to Partido Nacional.
- (1970-1974) Financial support to Christian Democratic Party.
- (1973-1974) Financial support to private sector groups opposing Allende.
- (1962) E.O. 13526, section 3.3(b)(1)

E.O. 13526, section 3.3(b)(1)

Photo Copy
from
Gerald R. Ford Library