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COPY NO. 3

J.C.S. 1844/242
2 December 1957
Pages 4178 - 4201, incl.

(LIMITED DISTRIBUTION)
 (397)

MEMORANDUM BY THE DIRECTOR, JOINT STAFF,
 for the
 JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
 on

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COPY NO. 7

ATOMIC ANNEX TO THE JOINT STRATEGIC CAPABILITIES PLAN (JSCP)(U)

- References: a. J.C.S. 1823/139 +
 b. J.C.S. 1844/237 +
 c. J.C.S. 1844/238 +
 d. J.C.S. 2012/54 +

1. On 9 October 1957, the Joint Chiefs of Staff directed* 1
 that an Ad Hoc Committee undertake a study of all factors 2
 pertinent to atomic weapon planning, with the view towards 3
 preparing appropriate guidance for commanders of commands 4
 established by the Joint Chiefs of Staff for the preparation 5
 of the atomic annexes in support of JSCP for the period 6
 1 July 1958 - 30 June 1959. It was further directed** that 7
 the revised guidance incorporate appropriate instructions 8
 specifically related to: 9
- a. Employment of surface burst versus air-burst 10
 techniques. 11
 - b. Overbombing/underbombing. 12
 - c. Employment/constraint with respect to radiological 13
 fallout. 13
 - d. Target selection. 14
 - e. Damage criteria. 15
 - f. Assignment of target responsibility. 16

No copy being

* SM-723-57 (Rev.); see Decision On J.C.S. 1844/237
 ** See Enclosure to J.C.S. 1844/237

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2. Attached for your consideration is the proposed 1
guidance* prepared by the Ad Hoc Committee. The proposed 2
guidance contains several divergencies.** 3

3. It is recommended that the Joint Chiefs of Staff, after 4
resolution of the divergent views, approve the new guidance* 5
and direct the Joint Strategic Plans Committee to include 6
it in the Atomic Annex to the JSOP for 1 July 1958 - 7
30 June 1959. 8

4. No recommendation is made as to the distribution of 9
this paper to commanders of unified or specified commands. 10

* Enclosure hereto
** For statement of basic issues underlying divergent views,
see the Annex hereto

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E N C L O S U R E

ANNEX "C" (ATOMIC) TO JOINT STRATEGIC CAPABILITIES
PLAN FOR THE PERIOD 1 JULY 1958 - 30 JUNE 1959

1. Purpose. The purpose of this Annex is to:

a. Provide guidance for the conduct of atomic warfare and for the preparation and coordination of atomic annexes to plans for accomplishment of tasks assigned in the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP), 1 July 1958 - 30 June 1959.*

b. Allocate atomic weapons to commanders for the period 1 July 1958 to 30 June 1959.

2. General. The use of atomic weapons by U.S. military forces will be authorized under conditions of general war, and may be authorized for conflict short of general war.

a. Conflict Short of General War. During a period of cold war, the Sino-Soviet Bloc regimes can be expected to continue to prosecute through various means an expansionist policy detrimental to the security of the United States and its Allies. Military operations short of general war become the more likely form of conflict during this period because of the mutual deterrence to general war resulting from the possession by both sides of the capability to destroy each other even after a surprise attack. However, there will always be the danger that general war might grow out of conflict short of general war. Since a basic aim of U.S. military policy is to deter the Sino-Soviet Bloc from using its military power, it is essential that during the period of cold war or military conflict short of general war the atomic capability of the United States:

* See Enclosure "B" to J.C.S. 1344/233

*Not after war
has started.*

- (1) Deter military aggression in any form.
- (2) Deal swiftly and decisively with any military aggression short of general war in which the use of atomic weapons is required and on a scale best calculated to achieve U.S. objectives and deter expansion into general war.
- (3) Maintain readiness to carry out general war tasks.

b. General War. General war may be initiated by the USSR with an atomic onslaught with little or no warning, or it may result from hostilities short of general war. Regardless of the manner of initiation, atomic weapons will be used from the outset. If general war develops from conflict short of general war, or after a period of increased tension or strategic alert, a significant degree of mobilization, deployment, and commitment of resources may have been achieved. Such measures might not improve our deployment posture for general war, but can in other respects be expected to lead to a more advanced state of alertness and preparedness to withstand a large-scale atomic attack. However, since the conditions under which general war would be initiated cannot be predicted, atomic planning must be sufficiently flexible to provide for any situation from a posture of minimum readiness to one of maximum readiness.

3. Objectives. Plans for atomic operations will be in consonance with and in furtherance of the military objectives, the strategic concepts, the brief of plan of action, and the assigned tasks contained in the basic plan.*

a. Operations Short of General War. In military operations short of general war, atomic weapons, when authorized, will be

* See Enclosure "B" to J.C.S. 1844/238

b. Initial M [redacted] [redacted] The elements of the military target system—atomic, tactical, and vi support—are almost the same as last year, except for stronger v to define the vital resources as those which "immediately and di contribute to initial operations.

[redacted]

Annex

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to Intelligence and Security Operations Undertakings. Introduced the alternative concept of population targeting, a concept bound to become unquestionably primary in two years or so, and generally consonant with the "minimal target system" study. This concept is not ideally worded, in that it allows enemy atomics to be targeted along with population. There is little chance, in this contingency, that any would be "profitable". In some cases it might be advantageous to strike airfields within easy range of the U.S., particularly if a population center could be bought at the same time. The atomics ought at least to be second priority, but were bought here with a later proviso that the total program for this alternative would be limited to that which would be within the capabilities of the "limited forces expected to be immediately available for employment," pointing toward an "alternative" target list much smaller than the total of all targets.

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used as required to achieve national objectives. Atomic operations will be planned against targets that contribute directly to the enemy military effort in the area of aggression or against targets that constitute an immediate threat to friendly forces in the area.

b. Initial Phase of General War: Primary Undertakings.

Plans will be formulated to carry out the following primary initial phase undertakings in order of importance, but not necessarily in order of accomplishment:

(1) First priority will be accorded to the reduction of enemy atomic delivery capabilities to the extent necessary to eliminate the threat of atomic attacks on U.S. and Allied territories and forces.

(2) Second priority will be accorded to the retardation or halting of the operations of enemy land, naval, and air forces to prevent overrunning of large areas of Allied territory, and to insure continued freedom of U.S. and Allied action on and through the seas.

(3) Third priority will be accorded to denying the use of principal enemy war-supporting resources which can immediately and directly contribute to the enemy's capability to conduct initial military operations.

c. Initial Phase of General War: Alternative Undertakings.

To provide for general war initiated under conditions wherein the initially available U.S. forces are expected to be insufficient for successful accomplishment of the above undertakings, plans shall also be formulated to carry out the following alternative initial phase undertakings:

(1) First priority will be accorded to the destruction or neutralization of enemy atomic delivery capabilities to the extent profitable, and to the destruction of government controls and population centers to the extent necessary to neutralize the capability of the USSR to exploit their initial success.

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Enclosure

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d. Subsequent attacks to finish the job. If initial phase succeeds, subsequent attacks probably be limited to support of the land and sea but, however, to cut the great bulk of industrial targets a priority status where SAC now puts them as part of his

4. Concept of limited destruction in this paragraph important to the concept we have argued in the evolution of paper: reasons why best programming is not necessarily maximum destruction without limit. We recognize the requirement to use best weapons against each target system, but hold that useless expenditure simply wastes firepower which could be better used with targets, or which may be needed later. We have also held that although vast civil destruction will be an inevitable and necessary product of an effective U.S. assault, civil destruction is not an element of U.S. policy until necessary; that unnecessary civil destruction does not contribute to, and in fact militates against achievement of post-war conditions favorable to the United States.

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This is the philosophy behind our side (the left side) of the committee. View "B" is that of the Air Force member alone (6th committee). The split on page 3, regarding use of surface-bur additional arguments by both sides on the same subject.

5. For conflict situation requires the for very close control of atomics.

(2) Second priority will be accorded to the retardation or halting of the operations of enemy land, naval, and air forces to prevent overrunning of large areas of Allied territory and insure continued freedom of U.S. and Allied action on and through the seas.

d. Subsequent Phase of General War. Subsequent to successful completion of the above undertakings, atomic operations, as necessary, will be concentrated on selective destruction of remaining enemy war-supporting resources and the conduct of follow-up land, sea, and air offensive operations to achieve the military objectives stated in the basic plan.

4. Concept of Employment. In general, the employment of atomic weapons will be designed to accomplish military objectives with the maximum over-all effectiveness tempered as feasible by provision for (1) adequate but not excessive weight of attack, (2) retention of adequate reserves, (3) avoidance of preventable waste,

VIEW "A"*
Reduction
(4) avoidance of such civil destruction and civilian casualties [as may be without military purpose]

VIEW "B"* *(over 2/15)*
MF 11 3/11
Delete

to the same compatible with accomplishing military objectives.

and (5) constraints outlined in paragraph 10.

a. In conflict short of general war, it is expected that Presidential authority to expend atomic weapons will be granted to commanders concerned when required by the particular situation. Because of the limited nature of the action and the extreme importance of preventing such a conflict from expanding into general war, a very close supervision of atomic weapons employment will be exerted by the Joint Chiefs of Staff or higher authority. In developing

* For statement of basic issues underlying divergent views, see Annex hereto.

b. Relates to ~~existing primary and~~ Phase operations to be conducted concurrently, regardless of priority. JCS to monitor

Annex

c. The conditions under which the Alternative Initial Takings will take precedence:

(4/87)

(1) Where preparedness is ~~not~~ it is expected primary undertakings could not shift to the Alternative Undertakings

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contingency plans, commanders should therefore make adequate provision for a high degree of centralized control of weapons expenditures. Specific guidance for particular contingencies will be provided on a case-by-case basis.

b. In the initial phase of general war, an intensive exchange of atomic blows is foreseen in which a premium will be placed on speed and decisiveness of attack. The earliest possible reduction of the enemy's atomic delivery capability will be of paramount importance. Accordingly, attacks will be programmed primarily to deny the enemy the use of his air base structure and other atomic delivery systems, and to neutralize his ability to resist penetration of his airspace. Concurrently, there will be a need to retard such enemy forces as pose an immediate threat to U.S. and Allied forces, and to deny the enemy the use of war-supporting resources which make an immediate and direct contribution to his ability to conduct initial military operations. These latter targets, while not of the same importance as those comprising his atomic delivery capability, should be programmed for concurrent attack provided this does not detract from the quick and decisive reduction of the greater threat. During the initial phase, the Joint Chiefs of Staff will continuously review the results of these operations and will direct such modifications to planned operations as they deem necessary.

c. The foregoing concept is intended for implementation under all circumstances permitting a reasonable probability of its successful completion. Under any condition, the following apply:

(1) Where the status of preparedness of U.S. forces is so limited as to indicate that the U.S. atomic capability could not possibly achieve the military objectives through the primary initial phase undertakings in event of a Soviet surprise attack, then the alternative initial phase undertakings (subparagraph 3 c) will apply to forces which can be immediately employed.

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Page 4
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(2) Otherwise,
programming.

and discont

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(3) Commanders to keep JCS constantly informed of current preparedness and capability, and JCS to decide which undertakings-- Primary or alternative--currently apply in preparation for sudden war.

Army and Navy regard this subparagraph as one of the most important in the paper. It is surprising that Air Force bought this wording.

4. d. Subsequent phase operations to be conducted as prescribed by the JCS (or by whatever next-in-line exerts necessary authority). Note that bonus effects from initial phase strikes are to be considered in subsequent phase programming. This is the only definitive treatment of bonus effects in the paper. We feel that past guidance has been in error on bonus effects, that they can affect programming only where clear assumptions can be made as to which weapons are dropped first-- in this case, initial phase weapons being assumed dropped.

Annex

Page 4
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5. Targets. A list of targets for Primary Initial Phase programming, i.e. the elements of the primary target system. The list is much more definitive than last year, and excludes nearly all industrial targets from high priority programming.

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
(2) Upon attainment of a condition where the foregoing status of preparedness no longer applies, the primary initial phase undertakings (subparagraph 3 b) shall take precedence and programming for the alternative undertakings shall be discontinued.

(3) Each commander shall keep the Joint Chiefs of Staff informed as to his current condition of preparedness and resulting capability. This shall be accomplished by reference to various conditions of preparedness which shall be described in each atomic annex. Each annex will also indicate those targets which are proposed for attack under each condition. The Joint Chiefs of Staff will direct whether the primary or the alternative initial phase undertakings shall currently apply, and the commanders will maintain a corresponding state of preparedness.

d. In the subsequent phase of a general war, atomic operations will be conducted as prescribed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff as a result of their review of initial phase operations. These operations will be pointed toward such further reduction of enemy military, economic, and industrial strengths as necessary to accomplish the military objectives. To the extent practicable, weapons will be programmed separately for the subsequent phase operations and will be considered as part of commanders' reserves for initial phase operations. Since large bonus destructive effects are expected as a result of the initial phase attacks, these effects will be taken into account in planning attacks for the subsequent phase.

5. Targets. A list of the targets which should be programmed for attack to carry out the primary undertakings in the initial phase of general war is set forth below:

a.



50X5, E.O.13526

In the split [redacted] at [redacted] to authorize [redacted]

[redacted] We have been unwilling to concede this, simply because there is nothing about the TDI classification of secondary importance which would demand early attack. If there were, the facility should be classed as primary. There are, in fact, no definitions in the TDI at all as to the meaning of primary or secondary.

What is there about secondary facilities that justifies early attack? Air Force should be asked to say. If they say these facilities support "Air Armies", this is not sound; it simply means they are 3rd or 4th echelon with regard to flight-line support, and not important to initial operations. Note that of [redacted]

Annex

Page 8

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
(The TDI is an extremely dangerous document on which to hang definitions of target importance. Although all commanders have agreed to use it, it is controlled by Air Force and responsive to SAC doctrine. We watch it carefully to determine whether targets are being upgraded in importance to fit SAC desires. We have suspicions but as yet little concrete data. We do know, informally, [redacted]

6. Targets for Altern. [redacted] targets are to be picked from both the initial [redacted] and the subsequent Phase List—a weakness which may tend to condone the construction of another "Air Power Battle" unlimited target list by SAC. To offset this, [redacted]

[redacted] and the [redacted] would program us to be limited to our small force capabilities.

50X5, E.O.13526

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50X5, E.O.13526


6. Targets for Alternative Undertakings. Targets which should be programmed for attack to carry out the alternative undertakings in the initial phase of general war will be selected from the target categories listed in paragraphs 5 and 7.

* For basic issues underlying divergent views, see Annex hereto

7. Targets for the Subsequent Phase. (Both) War
categories listed here are those identified by SEE
over-all Soviet economy.

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
In this respect, targets selected from the categories listed in paragraph 7 should be chosen with a view to causing maximum disruption to



50X5, E.O.13526

7. Targets for the Subsequent Phase. Those targets which should be programmed for attack in the subsequent phase of war include the following:

a.



b.

50X5, E.O.13526

8. Criteria for Programming and Employment of Weapons.

a. General. Weapon programs shall be developed by first, selecting an optimum "Bomb Release Line"(BRL) program for each target or target complex; second, assigning allocated weapons to each DGZ within the limits of applicable constraints (paragraph 10); and third, applying operational factors to increase assurance of delivery. Optimum BRL programs shall be selected on the basis of the following:

(1) Planning CEP's shall be appropriate to the respective delivery systems.

[REDACTED]

8.a.(2) In the split-up page, we hold that [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] By definition, "moderate" requires major repair before a structure can be used for the purpose intended. "Severe" requires reconstruction. Since we are talking about MSR which are no threat in themselves, and since damage to people, power, and transportation will add to structural damage and prevent repair, [REDACTED]

Annex

Page 2
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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

8.a.(3)

[REDACTED] The word "clearly" is included because overall effects are not subject to definitive analysis, and are important only when obviously so. The paragraph is an important improvement, even with the words "in the judgment of the commander", which constituted the proviso under which the Air Force bought it.

(2)


(a)

50X5, E.O.13526

* Does not apply to cratering of runways; see subparagraph
8 a (4)

** For basic issues underlying divergent views, see the Annex
hereto

50X5, E.O.13526



50XS, E.O.13526

* For basic issues underlying divergent views, see Annex hereto

8.b. (Criteria for [redacted] This Initial Phase targeting to previously specified damage criteria.

Annex


The split on page 11 (bottom) represents continued Air Force effort to allow Initial Phase programming to spread out to include low priority targets without limit. Unless View "A" is bought, keeping minor targets out of Initial Phase strikes, the concept of two target lists will become meaningless and the old "Air Power Battle" will be condoned.

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
VIEW "A"*

VIEW "B"*



50X5, E.O.13526

b. Initial Phase of General War.



50X5, E.O.13526

Conc

* For basic issues underlying divergent views, see Annex hereto

50X5, E.O.13526

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9. Information for JCS Review: Specifies the data on optimum and actual weapons programs to be included in the annexes. As previously explained, this is another important improvement.

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VIEW "A"

VIEW "B"

50X5, E.O.13526

c. Subsequent Phase of General War.

50X5, E.O.13526

9. Information for JCS Review. After review of commanders' atomic annexes, the Joint Chiefs of Staff will adjust allocations for achievement of the best possible over-all U.S. atomic plan. To provide information on which to base this adjustment, atomic annexes shall indicate the following for each target or target complex:

- a. The optimum BRL program (regardless of allocations).
- b. The optimum total program, including the weapons required to compensate for operational factors (regardless of allocations).
- c. The actual BRL program based on allocated weapons.
- d. The actual total program, including the weapons to compensate for operational factors.


Annex

9. e. Assessment of Anticipated ... only requirement for
commanders to estimate the over-all result of ... warfare. In the
present form, it asks for data which no commander could predict without
considering all attacks by all commanders. This annex is not the place
for it, and approval is not recommended.

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Example;



50XS, E.O.13526

* For basic issues underlying divergent views, see Annex hereto

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10. Constraints.

50X5, E.O.13526

Annex

This paragraph is agreed, sound, an

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
much improved.

50X5, E.O.13526


(4/93)

VIEW "A"

VIEW "B"



10. Constraints.



The following

are currently considered satellites of the USSR and China:

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EUROPEAN AREA


Albania	Hungary
Bulgaria	Poland
Czechoslovakia	Rumania
German Democratic Republic	

PACIFIC AREA

North Korea	North Vietnam
-------------	---------------

In order to accomplish the above, the following constraints are specified:

a.



50X5, E.O.13526

Annex 11. Coordination. General guidance, somewhat
shortened and clarified.

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TAD 870

11. b. Duplication. A [redacted] which recognizes the value
of planned duplications as well as the accompanying undesirability of
executed duplications.

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b.

50X5, E.O.13526

11. Coordination .

a. To maximize over-all effectiveness and unity of effort, commanders will coordinate atomic annexes to prevent unnecessary duplication of effort, to avoid mutual interference and to provide for mutual assistance in those areas where possible. These areas should include the following:

- (1) Reconnaissance
- (2) Diversionary plans
- (3) Electronic countermeasures
- (4) Search and Rescue
- (5) Joint use of weapons storage facilities
- (6) Joint use of airfields and bases for staging and emergency purposes
- (7) Timing and weight of effort under various degrees of warning
- (8) Conformity with constraint criteria
- (9) Target priorities

b. Duplications. Because of requirements inherent in commanders' assigned tasks, it will frequently occur that more than one commander will program attacks on the same

12. Contents similar to page 100.



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or adjacent targets, in order to increase the assurance that important targets are effectively attacked. Duplications in programming should, however, be held to only those important targets where one commander cannot rely on another for early attack or when combined effort is agreed to because of operational and other considerations. Special pre-D-day planning and coordination measures will be required to minimize waste of effort, interference between forces, and the possibility of exceeding constraint limitations. Accordingly, pre-D-day planning and coordination shall emphasize the following:

(1) The prevention of programmed duplications becoming operationally executed duplications through the rapid exchange of information regarding strikes against duplicated targets. Procedures should be adopted whereby, in situations of higher than normal alert, up to the moment strike intentions are kept filed on duplicated targets.

(2) The briefing of air crews flying strikes on duplicated targets to conduct reconnaissance and exercise judgment, as feasible, as to the need for actual delivery.

c. Coordination agreements will be regarded as commitments by the commanders concerned until revised by mutual agreement.

d. Conflicts which may arise and which cannot be resolved through coordination will be referred to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

12. Content. Atomic annexes will contain the following information:

a. General statement and textual discussion of:

(1) The commander's mission, tasks assigned in the basic plan, and geographic area of responsibility.

(2) The relationship of the commander's mission and assigned tasks to the prescribed undertakings, and the concept for completing the undertakings.

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(3) Target selection criteria consonant with assigned tasks.

(a) Fixed targets.

i. Selection criteria.

ii. Justification.

iii. Reconnaissance requirements.

iv. Assumptions regarding the identification of unlocated fixed targets.

(b) Fleeting or mobile targets.

i. Selection Criteria.

ii. Justification.

iii. Reconnaissance requirements.

iv. Assumptions regarding the location and identification of fleeting or mobile targets.

(c) Target priorities.

(4) Weapon system selection criteria.

(a) Damage criteria.

(b) Assumed delivery accuracies of available delivery systems. Planning CEP's in SM-8-55* will be used, as practicable; when other CEP's are used, atomic annexes should so indicate and justify.

(c) Compatibility of weapon selection and selected delivery systems with the target systems.

(d) DGZ attack priorities.

(e) Full discussion of operational planning factors and their influence on programming.

(5) Unconventional warfare weapon requirements criteria in consonance with DM-717-54.**

(6) A discussion of the time phasing of attacks during the initial phase of general war.

* Appendix to Enclosure "A" to J.C.S. 1823/189
** Enclosure "B" to J.C.S. 2012/54

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Enclosure

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(7) The various planned conditions of readiness and corresponding capabilities to carry out the primary and alternative initial phase undertakings for general war.

(See subparagraph 4 c (3).

(8) Constraint policy.

b. Two separate target-weapon-DGZ lists arranged in target complex order and indicating attack priorities. One list will indicate the targets selected for attack to carry out the primary initial phase undertakings, and one will indicate the targets selected for attack during the subsequent phase.

c. Indication of targets and weapon programs to carry out the alternative initial phase undertakings.

d. Designation of DGZ's for which weapons or delivery means or both will be furnished by other commanders.

e. Designation of those DGZ's on which one or more weapons will be delivered in support of another commander (such weapons will be charged against the allocation of the supported commanders).

f. Designation of:

(1) All targets which, as a result of coordination, are agreed as commitments by one commander to another.

(2) All targets for which delivery of scheduled weapons is contingent, in whole or in part, on reconnaissance.

g. Full description of targets to include:

(1) Major complex TDI reference number.

(2) Sub-complex TDI reference number.

(3) Attack priority.

(4) B.E. number

(5) Geographic coordinates in latitude and longitude (degrees, minutes and seconds).

(6) Accounting line number for JCC reporting.

h. Weapon reserve policy.

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JCS 1844/242

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Enclosure

13. Implementati ... of Sanders' annexes is blank. This paper is supposed to be ... but will clearly be about a month late. The normal due date for submission of annexes is 1 May. It should probably be delayed to 1 June, and the effective date for the annexes put off to 1 August. This may be addressed when the paper comes back up with allocations included.

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1. In accordance with paragraph 9 an indication for each target of:

- (1) The optimum BRL program.
- (2) The optimum total program.
- (3) The actual BRL program.
- (4) The actual total program.

i. A tabular summary of the planned commitment of allocated weapons to the target categories described in paragraphs 5 and 7. This summary should indicate planned commitments by weapon type, yield, and delivery means and the likely commitment of weapons held in reserve.

13. Implementation. Commanders will submit coordinated annexes by (date) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for review. Each commander will be prepared to orally brief his annex for the Joint Chiefs of Staff and to explain those portions which the Joint Chiefs of Staff may question. At the conclusion of the review of all annexes, the Joint Chiefs of Staff will make such adjustments in allocations as they consider necessary in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 9 above. For planning purposes, the Joint Chiefs of Staff presently intend that the provisions of this annex will, with the exception of changes to accommodate variations in the stockpile, remain effective through FY 1960, unless revision is required because of changes in the basic plan.

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(499) Note that [redacted] their own annexes. to the JCS and [redacted] occur at the World-Wide Coordination Conference in February, or possibly after the annexes are finally submitted.

Note also the expressed intention to keep this guidance in effect for two years. The committee is unanimous in this respect. Perhaps a better review of annexes can be accomplished next Spring if the whole subject of review can be kept from losing value because of expiration of a time limit.

ADDITIONAL CONTENTS

A. The deliberations of the committee have revealed a number of important areas in the field of weapons effects and damage criteria, where present standards are incomplete or inconsistent. These are:


- (1) Inconsistencies in existing planning manuals.
- (2) Effectiveness of programming for denial of airfields, particularly:
 - (a) The relative advantages of surface-burst vs. air-burst.
 - (b) The results expected from high surface-burst (partial fireball contact) on runways.
 - (c) The extent of effective runway denial, beyond the crater itself, resulting from surface-burst.
- (3) The cumulative damage, on typical structures, expected from the overlapping effects of multiple detonations.

Some of (1) may be taken care of by the new WSEG task of preparing an atomic weapons planning manual, which we will monitor. Air Staff intelligence, who produces the PVTM planning manuals, informally assured the committee they would correct some inconsistent data now included. We shall have to see. The remainder will have to be taken care of by separate action.

Consist

B. The job of producing adequate guidance is not complete until the matter has been examined, and if necessary resolved, that the new guidance is uniformly interpreted by the Services and by all the Unified and Specified Commands. This guidance is improved but still untested. We thought last year's was clear, until the chips were down. The Chief of Naval Operations has said that the JCS originally intended that this guidance should be briefed to the commanders, using examples of specific targeting for clarity. No action to this end is in progress.

This committee could well be assigned responsibility for assuring uniform interpretation of its product. If the committee were to prepare a briefing for the commanders, to be presented at the WRCC or sooner, it would have to develop uniform interpretation between Services in the course of preparing the briefing. The committee generally regarded this task as fruitless at this time, maintaining that the Services will fight as they see fit when the annexes come in, regardless of [redacted]



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A P P E N D I X

WSEG STAFF STUDY NO. 46*

STUDY OF IMPLICATIONS OF RADIOLOGICAL FALLOUT
(Control of Radiological Fallout in Fringe Areas)

* Not reproduced herewith; on file in Joint Secretariat

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Appendix

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