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popular participation. Such a move would strike at the weakest spot on the Democracy Party armor since, despite its long roster of members, its only real strength at present lies in the likelihood of government manipulation in its favor. A test of how the CVN intends to deal with the non-Communist opposition will come in the June 1974 province and city council elections. If the government manipulates these elections to deny the opposition a "fair" share of valued local positions, then the CVN risks pushing many opposition cadre out of the existing system and possibly into attempts to form a "third force" which could endanger the fundamental anti-Communist unity which so far prevails. If, however, the opposition is allowed to run in reasonably fair contests, then the present state of political peaceful co-existence can continue in MR-1 and the Democracy Party will have more time to grow into a strong and positive local political force.

END SUMMARY.

The Political Tradition of MR-1: Military Region I traditionally is considered to be the area in Viet Nam with the highest degree of political consciousness. The five northern provinces are strongholds of both the Dai Viet and the Vietnam Quoc Dan Dang (VQDD) the center of much An Quang Buddhist support, and in many places the site of an entrenched Viet Cong infrastructure. In a great many families a tradition of party identification runs back for several generations. Of that portion of the population which is attracted to political involvement, a greater percentage is probably already involved in political or quasi-political groups in MR-1 than elsewhere. Individual members of these groups are frequently members of the administration or of the armed forces or of elected councils, but the groups themselves are, to a greater or lesser extent, the political "outs" and as groups have a natural hostility to the "ins," which is to say, the CVN. Given this situation, one might suppose that the establishment of a new government-sponsored political party would be more difficult in this area than in any of the other Military Regions in Viet Nam.

The Influence of the Commanding General: A second consideration is that the Commanding General of MR-1, Lt. General Ngo Quang Truong, does not personally engage in political party affairs. His predecessor, Lt. General Hoang Han Lam, was a member of the Dai Viet party, was sensitive to local party configurations, and kept lines of communication open to the VQDD and other groups in MR-1. Truong, however, rose to his present

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position through talent and application and disdains the attempts of officers to substitute political influence for military skill. Also, he is reputed to believe strongly in the ideal of a non-political professional army and therefore does not wish to see the officer corps divided by allegiance among various nationalist political parties. Therefore, although not insensitive to political matters, Truong has yet to engage his influence in the Democracy Party. He realizes that the mayor of Da Nang and the province and district chiefs have certain unavoidable Party roles to play, and he does not hinder them. But whatever political tasks MR-1 Headquarters is required to perform are, according to some reports, left to his deputy, Major Gen. Hoang Van Loc.

The Establishment of the Dan Chu Party: Under these circumstances the establishment of the Dan Chu (or "Democracy") Party structure (overt and covert) on a solid organizational basis throughout MR-1 is an accomplishment of some significance. Except in Quang Tri Province where, in part because of a certain administrative confusion caused by the displacement of much of the province population during the invasion of 1972, the Dan Chu Party is still in its infancy, the Party has recruited cadre and members enough to qualify as by far the best organized political force in the region. Dan Chu Party leaders now claim over 135,000 members in MR-1, or about four percent of the estimated total population. All of this has been accomplished since the formal opening of Party activities in Quang Nam on December 15, 1972.

The Red Channels: The success of such an effort has been almost entirely dependent on the fostering of the Party by CPN officials working primarily through the Party's covert organization. In every province the province chief is the head of the covert branch, and Party vigor varies noticeably according to the talent of the province chief and his interest in Party work. One reason that the Party is not nearly so well established in Quang Tri as elsewhere is that the former province chief, Col. Ho Hai Viet, had nothing but disdain for the Party, and his replacement, Lt. Col. Do Ky, does not appear to have given it much attention. On the other hand, the structural strength of the Party in Quang Nam and in Da Nang is primarily a reflection of the interest of the previous province chief and then mayor, Col. Le Tri Tin. In fact, Tin achieved at least an unofficial position of some influence over Dan Chu affairs throughout MR-1. This position of region-wide coordinator has been vacant since his departure.

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The Blue Channel: The overt structure of the Dan Chu Party in Military Region I is in every case headed by either the Educational Service Chief (Quang Nam, Quang Tin and Quang Nam) or by someone with ties to the teaching profession. This dependence on educators for cadre is an example of a weakness on the overt side. Like most of the other groups from which cadre are drawn, the teachers are generally both politically apathetic and subject to government pressure. It is this latter which had led most of them to join the Party and the former characteristic which makes the overt Party so much weaker than its numbers would indicate. In effect, the overt side of the Party in MR-1 consists of government officials who are members almost as officials, lower level government employees and dependents for whom membership is a sort of job insurance or at least a means of satisfying one of the desires of their superiors, and a small group who have joined for a variety of reasons without any real pressure to do so. In some cases, Party rolls have been filled out with members so nominal that they were reportedly unaware that they had been inscribed. In this mixture the percentage of members truly and energetically dedicated to whatever it is that the Democracy Party represents is small.

The Effect on the Older Parties: All political parties in Viet Nam suffer from the lack of a distinctive program. But the traditional nationalist parties had in their youth the appeal of a program of national independence. Their transition to a middle-aged cynicism and an appeal as well-developed political machines has been a gradual thing. A basic problem of the Democracy Party is that it has been middle-aged from its birth and has never had a distinctive political philosophy. In MR-1 it competes with the Dai Viet Party and the VNQDD branches directly as a political machine, and although the Democracy Party has reserved most of the places at the public trough, the opposition can still tug the strings of personal loyalty and collect some payment for past favors done. For this reason at least, the effect of the Dan Chu Party on the older parties has not been so severe as one might suppose. Village council election returns so far show a heavy Dan Chu Party tide and in the elections held during the summer of 1973, the Dan Chu Party took about 75 percent of the seats (see Da Nang A-34), but many of these elected were "hyphenated" candidates with local support from, and primary loyalty to, the older parties. In every province the older party structures remain intact and some of their offices remain open. But the Dan Chu Party is a step to encourage the effort to form political unions. The local Social Democratic Alliance leaders maintain that their confederation will remain intact and will, in MR-1, meet the qualifying deadline of April 14, 1974. The opposition parties have also apparently successfully infiltrated at least the overt Dan Chu structure. Furthermore, the Democracy Party has, as yet, had little success in attracting major opposition party figures to join its ranks.

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The enrollment of government officials in the Democracy Party has, however, caused an unknown number of civil servants and military men formally to forego earlier allegiances and has prompted the political choice for others who might have been attracted to another nationalist party. In this sense, the requirement for Democracy Party membership is like the requirement to sign the Thirty-Nine Articles. Although it does not fill the church with confirmed believers, it reduces competition from heterodox sects. If the Church of England is the Tory Party at prayer, then the Democracy Party is the GVN in a political campaign.

The Buddhist Factor: If the Democracy Party does not yet pose a mortal danger to the older nationalist parties in the area, leading Dan Chu cadre have themselves voiced the concern that they would be threatened by a potential Buddhist political movement. No one in MR-1 has forgotten the strength of the struggle movement in 1966, and the An Quang Buddhists face the constant temptation to attempt to concentrate their influence (which is great in MR-1) into a political party. This would be particularly dangerous for the Dan Chu because as the government party, it would be the automatic target of An Quang Buddhist opposition. Such a move might not only attract a sizable percentage of Dan Chu membership, but also it would set up a dichotomy in which the Dan Chu Party would be seen by many as the Catholic party, a view already held by some Buddhists in MR-1. An even greater danger is that the Buddhists would form the core of a "third force" effort which would attract many of those non-Communist oppositionists that the Dan Chu Party threatens to freeze out of a political role.

Prospect: The question now is whether the Democracy Party will continue to function in some sort of democratic system (acceptably democratic, at least, in the Vietnamese context), or whether the GVN will use its power to attempt to fracture the nationalist opposition so that the Democracy Party is left as the only legal non-Communist political movement of any significance.

The first test of President Thieu's immediate intentions may come in the June province and city council elections. If the election law permits the old-line nationalist party members and Buddhist activists to run candidates and if they are allowed to compete in reasonably fair contests

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against Democracy Party candidates, then the present state of peaceful coexistence between the "ins" and the "outs" should continue. Such a decision will buy more time for the Party to increase its appeal to the non-Communist party cadre, Buddhist activists, and the population at large. If this road is taken, the Party may be able to sink popular roots deeper into the political soil of MR-1 and thus acquire a long-term strength that its recent forced growth has denied it.

On the other hand, a manipulated Democracy Party sweep of local positions in the June elections will further strain relations between the CVN and its non-Communist opposition. Elsewhere in Viet Nam it may be that such a widened split on the local level would be a slight boon to the government for the advantage of consolidation of control, either simply to make the government's task easier, or to conduct a more effective political struggle with the Viet Cong. In traditionally politicized MR-1, however, a higher price will be paid. The commitment of the Buddhist activists and the roots of the older parties are strong enough that the CVN will risk pushing a significant number of political cadre out of the existing system and possibly into attempts to form a "third force" in which they could see themselves as playing important roles. However disgruntled much of the opposition may be, there really are only two political sides in MR-1 today. The government enjoys the grudging support at a fundamental level of all the significant non-Communist political elements. But once this dichotomy is destroyed, there will be increased possibility for effective Communist agitprop, and a greater temptation for the CVN to repress the political opposition. The result will be a serious weakening of the local CVN position.

In MR-1 to date the Democracy Party serves primarily as an instrument of government control. Its membership has been garnered by pressure or appeals to self-interest rather than by a political program (unless it be a general desire to support the government against the Communists), and much of the membership could melt away as easily as it was gathered. In its present form the Party risks the alienation from the government of many old-line nationalists. It has yet to develop a program that will attract their active support. Nor has it demonstrated a means to change itself into an organization with widespread appeal. Nonetheless, to date the Party has improved the position of the Thieu government in MR-1 by providing a local focus for government supporters and tightening its control of the administrative apparatus. Since almost all of its defects are the inevitable result of the manner and rapidity of its creation, one should not assume that they cannot be remedied by forceful but prudent

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reform. If this occurs, and if the government will set some narrowest limit to electoral manipulation in the Party's favor, then the Democracy Party may yet grow to be a strong and positive political force in MR-1, able to work with the local political grain rather than against it.

Enclosures:

1. The Democracy Party in Hoa and Thua Thien Province
2. The Democracy Party in Quang Nam Province
3. The Democracy Party in Da Nang City
4. The Democracy Party in Quang Ngai Province
5. The Democracy Party in Quang Tin Province

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SUBJECT TO GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION
SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652
AUTOMATICALLY DOWNGRADED AT TWO
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THE DEMOCRACY PARTY IN HUI AND THUA THIEN PROVINCE

1. Summary

Five months after its formal establishment, the Democracy Party in Hui and Thua Thien is beset by serious problems and shows limited potential for becoming a viable political force. The membership is a hodge-podge of old political hacks, venal opportunists, semi-literates, unwilling recruits, opposition party agents and a smattering of true believers of uneven capability. The Party has attracted no significant political grouping and is virtually ignored by military leaders. There is dissension at the provincial leadership level and apathy at the village and hamlet level. The Red or covert channel functions only in classifying citizens according to political tendency, while the Blue or overt channel has no control over the mass membership. The Party claims more than 43,000 members in the province and 8,000 in Hue City but active members number no more, and probably less, than committee membership down to the village level. Attempts to collect dues are half-hearted and only partially successful. Training programs for cadre, political indoctrination and social welfare projects exist only in the press of the Party charter. End Summary

2. The Membership

The political configuration of Hui City and Thua Thien Province is set in a con- crete of An Quang Buddhist influence and the traditional oppositionist parties whose existences are considered ends in themselves by the party leaders. In order to make inroads on the existing order, to attract the uncommitted but politically interested elements, and to control a large membership, a new political movement would have to be exceptionally strong. The Democracy Party, as a party of the Administration, was at a disadvantage from the outset in an area traditionally distrustful of the central government. The strategy employed to build a strong party was to recruit, forcefully if necessary, a massive membership to demonstrate broad support and to weaken other political groups; then to control the membership through the government apparatus, including the police and the Rural Development Cadre. The methods of recruitment not only aroused widespread resentment, but opened the doors to a host of undesirable elements. The Party rolls have swollen to around 33,000 but, except for a sprinkling of motivated adherents who are becoming increasingly disillusioned, the bulk of the membership is apathetic if not outright hostile. The Party, having recruited unselectively, now finds itself heavily infiltrated by Revolutionary Dai Viet and VNQDD spies. (One district committee chairman complained recently that it is impossible to discuss anything sensitive because if more than three members gather, one is bound to be an agent of another party.) The Province Chief has been urged to expel disloyal elements (most of whom have already been identified) but he has vetoed any purge which would drastically cut membership figures and mortally wound the Party.

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3. A measure of the prevailing apathy is the low percentage of members who pay the monthly dues of 20 piasters. By the admission of the Province Committee Chairman and several district chairmen, Party cadres are lax in collection and when they do knock on doors, they are turned away more often than not. In Hue's First District in October, for example, only 200 of a 2,000 total membership showed up.

4. Leadership and Organization

The Party is organized into the "Red Channel," which is supposedly covert and is an overlay of the DRV administrative system, and the parallel "Blue Channel," which is overt and has the Party committees at each level as its backbone. The Province Chief, Colonel Ion Dat Khien, oversees both channels, but according to Party leaders directly below him, he has been doing so with a minimum of zeal. He rarely attends the two-hour Sunday meetings of his deputies in the Red Channel and the province and city committees. The Deputy Province Chief, Ho Van Cuong, and the Deputy Mayor, Tran Ba Thuyet, preside in his absence. Col. Khien has made no move to replace the city committee chairman, Nguyen Dinh Nam, who ignores the Party and prefers to spend weekdays in Da Nang. When Nguyen Chau, a favorite of the Province Chief, pocketed Party funds which he was given to publish a weekly Party newspaper called "Thuan Hoa," Col. Khien looked the other way and the paper folded after a few issues. The Province Chief has neglected to build a Party training center as ordered several months ago. Why there are no funds for construction and no instructors to staff such a center. Similarly, for reasons of insufficient funds and lack of qualified personnel, Khien has failed to establish a political indoctrination program or the "special action teams" which were supposed to revitalize the Party. The Province Committee Chairman, Mr. Ho Log Dan, reportedly has brought these deficiencies to the attention of presidential political advisor Nguyen Van Kham, who as a native of Hue takes special interest in the Democracy Party's development in Thua Thien. The fact that Khien is not one of Kham's favorites does not bode well for the Province Chief.

5. Below province level, the district chiefs are in charge of the "Red Channel" with from 8 to 10 cadres under their direct control. These cadres in turn supervise from 60 to 80 others who are charged with proselyting for the Party and organizing cells to control inter-family groups. The quality of organization varies considerably from one district to the next, but in any case, real control over the population is limited. The Red Channel does function to the extent of gathering intelligence about other party members and in classifying the population according to political tendencies, but no effective use is made of the information gathered. Underground cadres of opposition parties are identified but none have been purged. Viet Cong sympathizers are fingered but the information rarely reaches the Province Police Chief, Major Lion Thanh. When Major Thanh (who dutifully switched from the Revolutionary Dai Viet Party to the Democracy Party in early 1973) was asked by the reporting officer if the covert

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element of the Democracy Party could function effectively against Viet Cong infrastructure, he responded that the Party is so corrupt and so heavily infiltrated itself that it is useless as an intelligence arm.

6. The average member of the province and city committees which head the "Blue Channel" of the Democracy Party is regarded as either corrupt, an opportunist, politically naive, or all three. The exceptions to this generalization are the province chairman and former deputy province chief Ho Ung Sen who has prestige and ability, Nguyen Dinh Nam, the inactive chairman of the city committee; and Nguyen Nhu Minh, the deputy city chairman who is a former Viet-Minh and is suspected by some of his colleagues of being an active member of the National Liberation Front. Several committee members told the reporting officer that they have neither the interest nor the time to do more than attend weekly meetings. One committee member in charge of women's affairs observed that outside of the meetings there is nothing to do anyway.

7. With a view towards giving the Party respectability, the control of the "Blue Channel" at the district level has been taken over from the military district chiefs and handed over to civilians who are appointed chairmen of the district party committees. This step has actually weakened the Party organization. When the district chief was in charge of all Democracy Party activities, he had the means to ensure public participation in meetings, rallies and any Party programs. In general, the civilian chairmen are teachers, doctors, engineers, civil servants or old men. They lack leadership or organizational ability and have no way to command popular cooperation. In Quang Dien District, the chairman is a public health service employee who cannot write his name or speak Vietnamese correctly. In Phong Dien District, Huong Thuy, Phu Loc and Huo's Third District the chairmen are weak. In Hue's First and Second Districts, in Huong Tra and Phu Tho Districts the chairmen are capable and respected but receive no support from their respective district chiefs.

8. As a result of this weakening of the Party command structure, those who joined the Democracy Party simply to avoid harassment now feel free to ignore Party activities. The active membership throughout the province is therefore no more, and probably less, than the number of committee members down to village level.

9. Attitudes of Other Groups

The Democracy Party has made no progress in garnering support from the important elements of the population. Party leaders acknowledge that the Democracy Party is virtually ignored by the military. Brigadier General Le Van Thanh, former First Infantry Division Commanding General and former Thue Thien Province Chief, in discharging his duty to bring the Party to the attention of his men told them that joining was purely a voluntary matter as far as he was concerned. It was rumored that this soft approach to recruitment came to the attention of President Thieu and contributed to Gen. Thanh's recent removal as First Division

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Commanding General. Then described the Democracy Party to the reporting officer as lacking ideology or leadership. 1 Corps Forward Commanding General, Lt. General Lam Quang Thi, who believes that the country can expect leadership and discipline to flow only from the military; considers the government party to be the wrong approach toward unifying the people. The Airborne Commander, Brigadier General Le Quang Luong, has made no serious effort to organize his men on behalf of the Democracy Party.

10. The Democracy Party has no chance of appealing to the An Quang Buddhist Association which has consistently opposed the Party and has been outspokenly critical of its recruiting techniques as being oppressive of the people. Labor unions are under the influence of the farmer-worker Party and nominally under the Social Democratic Alliance. Democracy Party efforts to woo labor's support have so far been successfully resisted, although the chairman of the Social Democratic Alliance, Dean Long Lap, claims that many Democracy Party agents have infiltrated his party.

11. The intellectual community, particularly University of Hue professors, has given the Democracy Party the cold shoulder. There is an antipathy between the professors and the Province Chief dating back to the spring of 1972 when the Province Chief appeared on Hue television to rail against the intellectuals for fleeing Hue during the invasion of Quang Tri. The Deputy Province Chief tried to enlist the support of University professors several months ago but only four out of twenty contacted agreed to act as observers, and none of those agreed to participate as members. Only Rector Le Thanh Minh Chau has agreed to act as an advisor to the Central Committee, but even he declined to participate at the local level.

12. Opposition parties initially viewed the Democracy Party as a serious threat but have since taken a calm, detached posture as the Party's real weaknesses have emerged. The Revolutionary Dai Viet Party leader, Le Dinh Cai, still cries in anguish and threatens demonstrations over government repression of his party, but he points out that the flow of Dai Viet members to the Democracy Party has reversed. He also notes with accuracy that although the new Rural Development Cadre Chief is a loyal Democracy Party member, the Revolutionary Dai Viet Party still exerts more control over the cadre than does the Democracy Party. Mr. Tran Tan Viet, an articulate spokesman for the Viet Nam Quec Don Dang/Vu Hoang Khanh, considers that the Democracy Party has held only two important gatherings in its history. The first was to proclaim the Party's establishment and the second was to rejoice over the Party's victory in the Upper House election of August 1973. Mr. Viet expresses the widely held view that the Democracy Party's "paper" victories in this year's village council elections made no appreciable change in the power structure of the countryside which is still controlled by the An Quang and the Revolutionary Dai Viet Party.

13. The most optimistic of the Democracy Party supporters and leaders contend that the Party has been building its strength slowly and has now reached a stage

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of consolidation during which the weak and the disloyal will be weeded out. However necessary such weeding may be, there is still no solution to the problem of finding more than a handful of leaders not yet committed to other parties and of stimulating a degree of popular support. Until now, the Democracy Party in Thua Thien has not shown a potential for becoming a viable political force or an effective vehicle for carrying out any future political struggle with the National Liberation Front.

BIOGRAPHIC NOTES ON PROVINCE AND CITY COMMITTEE MEMBERSPROVINCE COMMITTEEHo Van Dan - Chairman

Former Deputy Province Chief of Thua Thien and father of current Deputy Province Chief, Ho Van Cuong. Former teacher. He is a respected notable and probably the only member of the Province Committee with prestige and qualifications. He accepted the position reluctantly but has been promoting the Party with energy. He and his son are at odds with the Province Chief over party affairs. Dan has the ear of presidential political advisor Nguyen Van Ngan. Dan is about 45 years old.

Phu Do Van Minh - Deputy Chairman

Chief of Province Health Service. No previous party affiliation. A good professional man but not a politician or a leader.

Nguyen Van Lay - Deputy Chairman

Teacher and principal of Quang Bue High School, Hue. No previous political experience. Joined the Party to keep his position.

Nguyen Chau - Member in charge of operations

Teacher at Quang Bue High School, lecturer at Hue University. Chief speech-writer for former Province Chief Le Van Thoa and for the current Province Chief until 1972. Wrote the speeches for the ceremony establishing the Party and gave one himself. He is a Confucian with a reputation for making improper advances toward his female students. A favorite of the present Province Chief. Chau was recently given Democracy Party funds by the Province Chief to publish a weekly Party newspaper. Chau pocketed the money and the paper folded after a few issues. The Province Chief took no action, to the dismay of other Party leaders. Chau appeared on Hue television with Le Dinh Cai (Revolutionary Dai Viet Party) to rally ANVN forces during the 1972 invasion. The Province Chief is indebted to him for not leaving Hue during that crisis. Mr. Chau joined the Party to maintain his good relations with the Province Chief. About 38 years old.

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Nguyen Thang - In charge of Party organization

Educational inspector. Dai Viet Party member until 1971. Described as an opportunist by other Democracy Party opportunists.

Ng Dang Lu - In charge of training programs

Former Public Works Service Chief, engineer. Corrupt and wealthy. Siphons off CVN materials to An Quang pagodas in an effort to win Buddhist backing for a future Lower House candidacy.

Hoang Van Minh - Treasurer

Businessman who worked his way up from a newsboy and is now allegedly engaged in smuggling, black market rice, gold, illegal lotteries and owns shares in Hue's Huong Giang Hotel. Told the reporting officer there is no money in the Party's treasury so he has nothing to do and little interest in the Party.

Major Phan Van Bang - In charge of war veterans, widows and orphans

Le Thi Thuy Loan - In charge of women's affairs

Principal of Dong Khanh Girl's High School. Former Dai Viet Party member in Noi An, Quang Nam. Strong personality, well respected but not interested in the Democracy Party. Joined to safeguard her position.

Le Vinh Kien - In charge of teachers, students

Principal of Nguyen Tri Phuong High School. No political experience.

Dr. Phan Van Cien - Advisor

Director of Hue Nursing School. Divorced his first wife, and married the Director of the Nursing School and replaced her. During the recent outbreak of hemorrhagic fever, while he was Chief of the Pediatric Section of Hue Central Hospital, he enriched himself by requiring parents to bring their children first to his private office and pay a "referral" fee before he would treat suspected cases at the hospital. For this he was removed from the staff of the hospital after a Ministry of Health investigation and earned deep enmity among the Hue population.

Nguyen Van Chinh - Advisor

Druggist. Ran for Lower House in 1971 and lost. Has a reputation for incessant gambling and black marketing of drugs to cover his losses.

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CITY COMMITTEE:

Nguyen Vinh Nam - Chairman

Former principal of Quec Huc High School. Poor boy who made good by gaining a reputation as a scholar which in turn enabled him to marry above his station. He is close to the Province Chief but has a bitter political enemy in Ho Ung Dao, Province Chairman. Nam and Dao were both proposed as senatorial candidates in the August 1973 election, but partly because of their enmity, presidential advisor Nguyen Van Ngan hand-picked a compromise candidate for the "White Elephant" slate, Ngan's old professor Nguyen Quoi, Dean of Faculty of Letters. Nam is a capable man but ignores the Hue Democracy Party. Told the reporting officer he is too busy for the Democracy Party and wants to resign as city chairman.

Dr. Nguyen Van Vinh - Deputy Chairman

Director of Hue School for Blind-Deaf. A Catholic from the Phu Cam Catholic colony in Hue. Married the daughter of a rich construction contractor. Joined the Democracy Party to protect his financial interests.

Nguyen Thanh - In charge of operations

Manager of Water Works. Said to be worth several hundreds of millions of piasters from various windfalls including selling U.S. military excess property to the GVN and from little side deals such as selling GVN rice to U.S. military installations before 1972. Joined the Democracy Party to protect his financial interests. Plans to build a cement factory in Huong Tra District. He rents his house to the Party as province headquarters. A powerful man.

Nguyen Huu Minh - Deputy Chairman

Principal of Nguyen Du Private High School. Chairman by default since Mr. Nam ignores the Party. Classmate of General Vo Nguyen Giap at prestigious Thanh Long Lycee, Hanoi. Former Viet-Minh. Founded his own private high school since his credentials were not accepted for teaching in SVN public schools. In 1972, his high school was raided and several teachers arrested as Viet Cong. A teacher at the school and others believe that Minh is a member of the National Liberation Front, that he built the school with National Liberation Front money since he had none of his own and that the high school is still a base for local Viet Cong who meet there every day.

Nguyen Huu Minh - In charge of operations

Teacher and principal of Huong Bao High School.

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To Ban Quy - In charge of training programs

Public Works Chief for Hue, engine

Nguyen Tam Cao - Treasurer

Public Works employee. Simple minded follower.

Major Van Dinh Phung - In charge of war veterans, widows and orphans

Tran Thi Nien Mich - Women's affairs

Principal of Dong Khanh Girls High School in the Citadel. Had associations among students and teachers who were active in the 1966 "Struggle Movement" in Hue. Was persuaded to join the Democracy Party by some of her husband's business associates as a possible means of landing assistance. No interest in the Party.

Nguyen Duy Chac - In charge of teachers and students

Principal of Nam Nghi High School. Graduate of Hue University.

Leu Son - Advisor

Pharmacist, the richest one in Hue. Hopes to see the Democracy Party as a stepping stone to an elected position such as Lower House deputy. No previous interest in politics. Comes from a poor family. His father was a scrupulously honest village chief which leaves the question of how he got to be the richest druggist in Hue. He is a friend of presidential advisor Nguyen Van Ngan.

Tran Van Kinh - Advisor

City Councilman. Former Chief of Hue's First District. Supported for city council election by the Revolutionary Dai Viet and the Buddhists. When the Buddhists displaced the Revolutionary Dai Viet in dominating the Council, Kinh bolted that party. He was a civil servant in the French colonial administration.

Nguyen Tri Nam - Advisor

Retired ARVN major. Served as a Citadel guard during Bao Dai's reign. Director of Youth Affairs in Hue during Dien regime. Part owner and manager of a Chinese hotel in Da Nang. He made a great deal of money during the 1972 offensive by renting rooms to refugees.

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SECTION II

Below is a
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THE DEMOCRACY PARTY IN QUANG NAM PROVINCE

SECTION I - QUANG NAM BACKGROUND

Quang Nam is considered by its inhabitants to have a particularly glorious and intriguing history. It was the cradle of the anti-colonial movement in its part of the country, and it may be said that everyone in the province has some political allegiance: Communist, Dai Viet, Khao La, Cong Heng, most prominently the VNQDD, and now the Democracy Party. It is an interesting note that Quang Nam was picked by President Thieu to be the "experimental plot" for the establishment of the Democracy Party, since the first official opening ceremony for the Party in a province was in Quang Nam on December 15, 1972. The feeling apparently was that if one could make it Quang Nam, one could make it anywhere.

The political background of Quang Nam is to some degree a reflection of its inhabitants. They have the reputation of being extremely argumentative, stern and tough and at the same time provincial, bucolic, and semi-sophisticated. From the reporting officer's four years experience in the three other military regions, he can substantiate the general presence of these traits.

From the record, it appears that the Democracy Party in Quang Nam has made a solid and productive effort. Party organizers have created in all districts local Party headquarters; their cadre work in harmony with directives from above and, so far as the core intent of the Party is concerned, they have generally fulfilled their promises to Saigon. The Party can offer the fact that 17,000 of the population are listed as members and that the results of the village elections were, with the exception of Duy Xuyen, as good or better than might have been expected back at the beginning of the year. In a word, the Party's structural apparatus is in place. Quang Nam is a rough political nut to crack, but, on the face of it, things appear to have been accomplished on schedule in Noi An and Thung Duc.

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
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SECTION II - ORGANIZATION

Below is a schematic showing the official Provincial Command Structure of the
Democracy Party in Quang Nam.



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The Party structure as outlined in the preceding diagram is real enough. However, the function of that official organization is one more of support than of command, more of recommendation than of decision. The real power in the Party lies in other hands, starting with those of the Province Chief. It may be stated that the basic organization from the Province Chief on down throughout the chain of command, both civilian and military, follows very closely that diagram of CPM supervision and control which already exists.

The Assistant Province Chief, Mr. Le Thuong Dyon, is the general head of all civilian Party activities in the province. He does not as yet command the respect and possess all the authority which is his by virtue of his position, both because his personality does not command it, and because he is relatively new to Quang Nam. For this reason, Mr. Kieu as the official Party head and possibly Mr. Duoc and Lt. Chac (the Public Relations Commissioner and the Standing Committee Commissioner) seem to have more say in Party circles than might otherwise be expected. The former Assistant Province Chief, Mr. Nguyen Chi Thiep, who got his local training in Party activities from the then Province Chief, Col. Le Tri Tin, was the principal civilian organizer for the Party in the province from the crucial initial period until his dismissal last spring. What strength the Party now has in Quang Nam is primarily a result of the efforts of Col. Ho who is quite politically minded and who treated the organization of the Democracy Party in Quang Nam with a healthy priority and respect.

On the military side, it is not the Assistant Sector Commander who wields the gavel, but the Chief of Staff, Lieutenant Colonel Nguyen Hong Son. He is a fine organizer, and his energy is apparent in all Party activities. He is, of all the military officers in the province, certainly the most deeply involved in Party functions, activities and organization. (It was rumored that due partly to his Party record, his name came under some considerable review as a possible replacement for Col. Vu Hien Phuc when the latter was removed from the office of province chief last spring.)

Continuing on down through the districts and villages, the lines of communication and functions of the Party follow very closely the command lines under province and sector. It is estimated that of the 114 villages, only a handful of the 114 village Democracy Party chiefs are not, in fact, the now-acting village chiefs. In the districts in all cases, the real head of the Party is the district chief. In most cases, he activates Party functions in parallel with his position. Only in the case of Hue Yang and Hien Du (for different reasons) are the district chiefs possibly not the principal agents of Party functions. In all the others, they certainly are. A parallel situation is found in the province services where of the twenty odd services only one of that number of service chiefs is thought not to be a Party member. The one where the Don Chu Party has yet to make an impact is in the Province Council, where only one of the 11 members is a card-carrying Democracy Party member.

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This organizational structure has, of course, great immediate advantages, especially in the area of initial building and recruitment, but as the situation is now, it is precisely that organizational structure which is the Achilles Heel of the Party (see Section VI below).

SECTION III - STRENGTH AND PUBLIC ATTITUDE

Certain facts indicate very well the strength, and the flavor of that strength, of the Democracy Party in Quang Nam.

Officially province Party membership is 17,000. (The population of the province is 538,000.) Of that figure of 17,000, perhaps at a maximum only 3,500 are "civilian" -- that is to say, at a minimum 80% or 13,500 are government employees (Rural Development Cadre, civil servants, teachers, and the like). Another figure which is particularly important, and which is correspondingly more difficult to assess, is the percentage of those Party members who have joined for reasons other than Dan Chu political inclination. A reasonable estimate would be from 50 to 80 percent. (This analysis is based partly on the accepted rule that in most cases if one wants to run for local office, e.g. village council, then one had better sign up.) Because of the many cases of partial allegiance of one sort or another, it is estimated that not less than 50% of the total membership are merely nominal members. This is due in part to the fact that most government employees automatically become members by virtue of their position.

As can be deduced from the little sketch of the history and character of the Quang Nam population, the Party has (outside of this cadre structure) a momentous task to perform if it wishes to involve politically the provincial population in general. Local popular interest and involvement in Dan Chu Party activity (insofar as it can be distinguished from the activity of the CVN) is minimal.

SECTION IV - ACTIVITY

As an example of Democracy Party activity in Quang Nam, the reporting officer offers Que Son district.

This district is historically the cradle of Viet Nam Quec Dan Hung (VNQDH) strength in Quang Nam. The principal political leadership which led Quang Nam to its position of prominence as a stronghold of VNQDH power in the early 60's came primarily from Que Son, with Duy Huyen playing a secondary role. With that statement as background, how can one rationalize the sweep which the Democracy Party made in the village elections in Que Son, a sweep which saw a higher percentage of Democracy Party councilmen elected than in any other district holding elections except for Thuong Dai (the latter because of its size and geographical structure must remain a singular case)? One reason has been the census of so many of the former VNQDH cadre to other districts or to areas outside of the pro-

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vice. Que Son was one of the areas of the province hardest hit by the war, even prior to 1972. Due to the impact of the war, refugees fled on more than one occasion, the most recent being that of the spring of 1972. These events have had a severe influence on the inter-familial social and political structure of the area. Together with this, of course, is the fact that a great many families have not returned. For all its wealth in rice land and its historical importance politically in the province, Que Son has become the problem child of the province, the center of military attention, yet confusingly or haphazardly organized socially. Even now it remains in a very unstable state of flux and disarray. Que Son is redefining itself, rebuilding itself, oh, how slowly.

Into this disarray comes the intent of the province to establish the Democracy Party in the spring of 1973. Major Lu is the District Chief, a former comrade of Col. Tin, and a fine organizer. He is saddled with the job of investing into the village administrative structure of Que Son the Party structure. Not particularly the doctrine or the ethic, just the structure. The rest will follow, so it is hoped. In the spring of 1973, four village elections were scheduled and held in Que Son. It is crucial to remember that at this time in Que Son, the district was undergoing one of the most upheaving social and political events which it had seen in some time (the return of some 20,000 Que Son'ers to their "Que Huong"). This is close to one-third of the entire population of the district. Among the effects, the most important is that the district chief had by action and by default a degree of control unparalleled in his term. The task was to reestablish Que Son as a political entity, specifically through the election of village councilmen. The local rule followed was that no "old timers" would be allowed to run. Therefore, the decision was made to use the candidacy of, for example, some Regional Forces (RF) and Popular Forces (PF) and other local cadre to run and thereby join the village councils. They were young, vital, and reliable, but as yet totally untested in areas such as administration and political affairs. This scenario was followed with some alacrity and skill, and the results were predictable long before the votes were in. Most candidates were hand-picked; all those who were, won. (This is not to say that 100% of the council members elected fall into this category, but given the number who were, the intent was plain.) This is, in part, a resume of the 1973 village council elections in Que Son. That district had certain built-in factors of local social disarray and non-political cohesion which assisted the district authorities in organizing the Party. But it should also be stated that province-wide over one-third of the populace is now living somewhere away from where they lived eight months ago or eight years ago. So Que Son is not totally singular in this respect. The political manner of organization which was so evident and successful in Que Son can be seen in most other areas in Quang Nam. The methodology for investment of Democracy Party cadre into the village council in Dai Lac, for example, may not have been as straight-forward, nor as obvious (and in fact was not so successful), but the general method was similar.

The activity of the Party in Quang Nam is not now principally bent on political proselytizing. Nor can the result of Party activity be seen in normal local

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Party projects, for the demands of the structural organization and the lack of presently assigned Party assets deny this. What the Party activity is bent on and has been continually for the past several months in Quang Nam is the simple extinction of political opposition existent in official CVN cadre positions. This point is further brought home by the fact that in the districts and also at the provincial level of late very little regularly scheduled activity has been evident. Numerous cadres report that they have never even met in a meeting or received any instructions or pep talks at all. It is not an overstatement to say that since the completion of the village council elections a very minimal amount of political activity has occurred. This is not to disregard the Upper House election, but that was, for all intents and purposes, an ordination rather than a political wrestle, and elicited little public attention other than the formal voting process.

SECTION V - MILITARY ATTITUDE

Military involvement on the individual level is primarily found in the officer and NCO ranks, but principally in the former. Almost without exception, officers report that they object not to the Party, but to the fact that their involvement in it has been considered a sequel to their very position as an officer. Promotions, assignments, transfers and the like are to a good extent seen to be dependent upon Party involvement, loyalty, and activity. It would be impossible to give a general assessment of the actual personal dedication which the officer and NCO ranks have for Party involvement. Most judge this to be an added assignment rather than a commitment, for this hesitation to overcommit oneself to the government party pervades the military ranks as well as the civilian. Joining the Party is something which may be of advantage and is not lightly disregarded. But, then, there is usually present the feeling that really, one is a soldier, and the matter of Party involvement is something which, while if not transitory, certainly cannot be a matter of vital importance to one's life and career (or so they seem to hope).

SECTION VI - PROBLEMS FACING THE PARTY

There are at present two major problems facing the Democracy Party in Quang Nam. The first is organizational, the second, attitudinal.

On many levels severe criticism has been encountered of the Democracy Party and the manner by which it has been organized. It is felt that it has bound itself in by making almost all the Party spokesmen, both official and covert, those persons who presently fill structurally parallel CVN positions. This is the reality in the vast majority of cases. (Only recently, it seems, has the Party come to the decision, for example, that the village Party chief will be elected by his fellow Party members in that village. There are a very, very few cases where the village chief is not the Party head. It is stated by Party spokesmen that things are changing and that now the village Party head will not automatically lose that position simply because he leaves the position of village chief.) This general criticism is one that Party spokesmen usually treat

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frankly. They state that the Party is working to change this strict nature of designation of Party officials. They likewise, with good logic, state that it was a necessary step which had to be taken during the founding stages of the Party for lack of any reasonable alternative.

The second problem, which may be more acute in Quang Nam than elsewhere, is the public aversion to the Democracy Party, which is rampant. This is partially due to the fact that Quang Nam has been so politicized for so long, and the Democracy Party will continue to be stifled by this local, rich political bias. In concert with this attitude is the inherent reserve, the fear of overcommitment to a government party on the part of the people, for that lesson was taught once before, back in 1961.

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Enclosure 3, Page 1THE DEMOCRACY PARTY IN DA NANG CITY

The Democracy Party in Da Nang is primarily the construction of the previous mayor, Col. Le Tri Tin, who came to Da Nang in December 1973. Tin devoted a considerable amount of his time and energy to party work and he extended his influence in Democracy Party affairs throughout MR-1. The Da Nang branch of the Party has remained generally unchanged in structure and personnel since his transfer to be Special Assistant to the Minister of the Interior in July, 1973. Since that time, the Da Nang Party appears to have lacked real organizational leadership.

Executive Committee: Pham Spoc Vinh, a 38 year-old school teacher and member of the city council, is chairman of the Executive Committee of the Da Nang Democracy Party. Vinh is thought by some to be corrupt and by most to be at best a mediocre political leader. At the beginning of his term he was quite active and braggad of his importance and the hours he devoted to Party work. Now, however, he attempts to downplay his Party position. SLY sources report that he may shortly be replaced as chairman both because of his corruption and because of his lack of discretion in discussing Party matters (FVG-2519). In any case, Vinh now takes pains to impress one with the fact that his real claim to importance does not lie in his Democracy Party position.

The other members of the Executive Committee are prominent members of the Da Nang official community. That Doan Nga, the first Vice-President, is Chief of the Education Service. Dr. Ha Thuc Lo, the second Vice-President, is Chief of the Health Service and is a civil servant of excellent reputation. Ho Duc Lang, is Chief of the Economic Service. Mai Loan Triet is Chairman of the Da Nang City Council. Vo Cong, Chief of the Open Arms Service, has a good reputation as a civil servant and is thought to be an honest believer in the current regime. Tran Van Tho is a former Vietnamese Information Service Chief. Nguyen Trong is Vice Chairman of the local Red Cross. Nguyen Bao, Chief of the Youth Service, is credited with having joined the Party for motives of political idealism. Mrs. Nguyen Khac Dieu Lien, is the principal of a girls high school and the wife of the former MR-1 Deputy for Administration (Nguyen Van Dat) who was captured by camp forces during Tet 1968 in Hue. She is said to be personally non-political, but was pressured into joining because of her husband's former position.

A few of the ten members of the Executive Committee appear to believe in the value of the Democracy Party in rallying support for the government to which they are attached by principle, but most of the members seem to have joined out of opportunism or pressure and none to the reporting officer's knowledge had achieved any significant degree of political influence before. Politically, they are creations of their Party, and not the reverse.

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Overt Membership: The Party Chairman claims a total overt membership of 14,000 in Da Nang. Most of these are civil servants or dependent on the government or wish to become so. Three of the Executive Committees are connected with education, and a considerable percentage of the total membership are school teachers. The Chairman estimates that of all the teachers in Da Nang, fifty percent (or about 900) are members. A well-informed Da Nang high-school teacher has said that he believes over ninety percent of the teachers in state schools to be members. That would account for at least 1,700 members. From several conversations it appears that almost all teachers who have joined have done so because of mild pressures from their superiors. Since the Party makes few demands and since membership might help ensure job security, few have resisted the invitation. Like the teachers, the great part of the membership appears to be politically apathetic, although many doubtless had some ties to older (now technically illegal) nationalist parties.

Covert Membership: The covert branch of the Democracy Party in Da Nang is, as presumably elsewhere, the controlling branch. According to an SRV source (PCV 1504) the covert branch had 892 members as of July, almost all of which are serving in the Army. The covert leadership is responsible for what successes the Party can so far claim -- the successful manipulation of the August Senate election and the August election of Democracy Party figures to the leadership of the City Council (PCV 1501) despite the fact that only 3 of the 12 members belonged to the Democracy Party.

The covert side is led by a "military committee" consisting of the mayor, Col. Dao Trong Tuong; the deputy mayor, Nguyen Thoa Tach, reputed to be much tougher and certainly older (he is 36) than his boyish, open appearance would lead one to suppose; the three district chiefs of the city; and a recording secretary. However, the covert side has lacked a vigorous head since the departure of Col. Tin and his replacement by Col. Tuong. When questioned, Tuong strongly denied any position of responsibility in the Party. He expressed some unhappiness with the burdens that politicians of all sorts lay on him. In this last he seems sincere, and he is reputed to make only a minimal contribution of his time to Party activities.

The attitude of the mayor and other senior army officers is doubtless influenced by the example of Lt. General Ngo Quang Truong, Commanding General of MR-1. Truong has a reputation for being a non-political, professional soldier who has risen to his present position because of talent and hard work rather than because of political influence. He does not encourage

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his officers to engage in politics and they presumably know that their refusal to do so will not gain him disfavor. Those who work in Da Nang are presumably especially influenced by his presence there.

Problems and Prospects: The Democracy Party in Da Nang is well established but not yet deeply rooted. It suffers from the fact that its membership is composed of a large number of people of indifferent devotion to the Party and unwilling in general to sacrifice greatly for its ends. The leadership is not qualified to inspire much change in this respect. The Party presents some potential threat to other political organizations in Da Nang, but at present that threat is not in most cases an actual one. No important figures with a political following in Da Nang have joined, either to get on the bandwagon, or because they find the program an attractive one. At present it is perhaps enough that the Party has been created and members enrolled, but until a vigorous leadership is restored to inspire, discipline, and perhaps weed the membership or to ensure that active participation brings some reward besides the occasional opportunity to abuse one's official position, the Party will be far less powerful than its size and backing would suggest.

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Enclosure 4, Page 1THE DEMOCRACY PARTY IN QUANG NGAI PROVINCE

The inauguration of the Quang Ngai branch of the Democracy Party in February 1973 was the biggest event in Quang Ngai since the Presidential elections. Since then the Party has concentrated on fleshing out the organizational structure, recruiting members and winning village and Senate elections. In all these endeavors the Party has done extremely well. As the organization charts show, the Democracy Party has organized and staffed all 10 district committees, 115 village committees (out of 130 villages) and 330 hamlet committees (out of 499 hamlets). At province level they have organized special organizations for the labor and education sectors, important targets for recruitment. The next order of business will be the organization and staffing of teams at the hamlet level, roughly equivalent to the cells in Communist organizations.

At present the Party claims a membership of 21,906. By district this breaks down as follows:

Binh Son	1900	Duc Pho	1200
Son Tin	4135	Ha To	985
Tu Nghia	4315	Ninh Long	1500
Nghia Hung	4226	Son Ra	1166
Ho Duc	1605	Tra Bong	1874

According to Mr. Phan Van Chat, the young teacher who is the Chairman of the Party, the Democracy Party in Quang Ngai is not interested in swelling its ranks with members just for the sake of numbers. He said he expects the membership to stabilize somewhere between 21,000 and 25,000.

While there were some grumblings in the early phases of recruitment that anti-rusting and threats of loss of job were common, practices such as these have become less frequent as it became evident that the Party would reach its membership goal without resorting to such tactics.

While the Democracy Party does not seem interested in a mass membership, this does not mean that the membership is therefore composed of enthusiastic, fanatic believers in democracy or the Democracy Party as the means of national salvation. On the contrary, the main motive for joining the Party seems to be self-aggrandizement or at the least self-interest. The Party is widely believed to be the Party of the government and its membership bears this out. The backbone of the Party is those persons dependent

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on the government for a livelihood -- civil servants, teachers, village and hamlet officials. In some districts farmers appear to make up the largest percentage of Party membership (Nghe Hanh, for example). This statistic is misleading since many of these farmers were recruited by the village chiefs on orders from above. Some farmers were astonished when told they were listed as Party members. Apparently in these cases the village chief had "recruited" them into the Party without their knowledge.

While the screening of members of the new illegal parties has not prevented these Party members from joining the Democracy Party (especially at the village and hamlet levels and where the Party feels it is in its interests) it has effectively made recruiting of experienced political leaders at the higher levels difficult. Many members of all the old line parties have joined the Democracy Party, but few leaders have actively participated and no leaders of the old line parties hold positions of power or prestige in the Party. Those who nominally are Democracy Party members have been relegated to, or have chosen to assume, positions as "advisors".

The absence of old time leaders in the power structure of the Party reflects the prevalent cool attitude of these leaders toward the Democracy Party. There is little envy or resentment toward the Party among these political leaders. Instead there exists a recognition of the need for greater cooperation and integration during the impending political struggle against Communism, laced with feelings which range from indifference or watchful waiting to cold cynicism about the viability and survivability of the Democracy Party in Quang Ngai. Many old time leaders look askance at the neophyte leaders of the Democracy Party and have bluntly stated their belief that many "converts" to the Party did so out of self-interest, not conviction, and therefore their allegiance to the Party is suspect. One old-time leader fears that the Party can and will easily be infiltrated by the Communists.

Most of the leadership of the Democracy Party, like its membership, is drawn from the ranks of those who previously have not been politically active. With a few exceptions (e.g. chairman of Nghe Hanh and Hu Duc District Committee), all the District Party chairmen or vice chairmen are young teachers; most of the Provincial Executive Committee are also young professionals. It is widely believed that the previously apolitical Mr. Chet

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accepted the position of Chairman of the Democracy Party because with it he gained the post of Chief of Education in the Provincial Government, not because of his deep faith in the Democracy Party. For a young man just in his thirties, that would seem to be quite an inducement.

There were indications that there was displeasure with the leadership of Mr. Chat recently resulting in rumors that he would be replaced by the When La leader Ho Ngoc Can. However, the Province Chief recently brought back word from Saigon that Mr. Chat is to remain in his position.

It seems evident that the provincial Dan Chu party leadership is heavily dependent on direction from Saigon. For example, the momentum of the Party has slowed since it has attained its goal in regard to membership. The leaders seem to be waiting for further instructions from above on what to do next. The leadership has confined itself to recruitment and organization, having done precious little outside of these activities to sell itself to the citizenry at large.

The attitude of the military leadership in Quang Ngai is ambivalent toward the Party. On the one hand, some see the need for a governmental party as outlined by President Thieu; on the other hand, they have the normal military disdain for civilian organizations and retain a vague feeling of mistrust that the Party may become a rival for power in the future.

The Democracy Party in Quang Ngai apparently has everything going in its favor. On paper it is well-structured and in practice it is the best organized South Vietnamese political group in Quang Ngai, with contacts down to the hamlet level. Its recruitment has progressed well, at least statistically. It has shown that it is capable of efficiently organizing election campaigns, albeit with the massive backing of the government. However, being the government party is its greatest handicap. As presently organized and led, it is a structure imposed from above without grassroots support, an organ of control, not of two-way communication between the government and the people. It is peopled by self-serving individuals, not dedicated political cadre. At best it serves as an umbrella organization for those beholden to the government, those who see it as the only existing hope for the survival of South Viet Nam, and even possibly for Communist sympathizers who may see it as a manipulable means of "reconciliation" on favorable terms in the future.

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
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
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DEMOCRACY PARTY DISTRICT EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE



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THE DEMOCRACY PARTY IN QUANG TIN PROVINCE

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If numbers A the name of the game, the Democracy Party in Quang Tin would be measured a smashing success. With a population (439,000) @ (only 40 percent of Quang Ngai) it had recruited more members (28,628) as of October 20, 1973. Moreover, more than 3,000 new members were added to the rolls in the two or three months preceding that date.

District committees have been organized and staffed in all five districts. Four of the five chairmen are teachers who have never involved themselves in politics before; the other is a male nurse. Village committees have been organized in all 60 villages and 268 out of the 343 hamlets in Quang Tin. Membership by district is as follows:

Van Ky	8420
Thang Binh	9157
Ly Tin	6637
Tien Phuoc	3224
Hoa Duc	1190

According to Mr. Nguyen Tri Tai, Chairman of the Quang Tin Democracy Party, his goal is to recruit as much of the voting population of Quang Tin as possible. While acknowledging his inexperience in politics, he believes that the energy and enthusiasm of the predominantly young Democracy Party members and the rightness of the cause of the Party in uniting the country to fight against the Viet Cong will win over the people of Quang Tin. Mr. Tai is also Chief of Education, a post he gained when he became chairman of the Democracy Party. He has been a teacher since he graduated from the University of Hue, having served as a professor in Hue and Qui Nhon before coming to Tam Ky about six years ago. Prior to assuming the Party Chairmanship, he, like most other leaders of the Party, was apolitical.

As in Quang Ngai most of the provincial executive committee and the District chairmen are teachers. While competent, none of them appear to have the experience or the personal prestige and leadership qualities to become a political leader in his own right. For example, the First Vice Chairman, Mr. Tran Van Thanh, is a young man in his thirties, born in North Viet Nam, and a career bureaucrat. He served in the Finance Service in Pleiku before coming to Tam Ky a year ago. He has become a close lieutenant of the Province Chief. Mr. Nguyen Kinh, the Second

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DEMOCRACY PARTY DISTRICT EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE

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Chairman

Special Group

Chief Sergeant

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Vice Chairman, is another young man from Tam Ky. He was previously the elementary school principal with no previous background in politics. Mr. Tran Thanh Nghia, the Secretary General, is another career bureaucrat who came to Tam Ky from Saigon about 4 years ago. He is presently the Economic Service Chief and is also close to the Province Chief.

Mr. Tai is widely regarded as a figurehead chairman, with little knowledge of what is going on in the Party. The recognized Party Chief is Col. Dao Hong Kuan, Province Chief of Quang Tin Province. He has placed his trusted lieutenants in key positions on the Province Executive Committee. Unlike in Quang Ngai, the Province Chief has taken a personal command and interest in the progress of the Democracy Party in Quang Tin. Though it is difficult to assess the true feelings of Col. Kuan toward the Dan Chu Party, he supports it 100% because he is a sincere and loyal follower of President Thieu.

As in Quang Ngai the major part of the recruitment effort, which remains the principal activity of the Party, is done through the government apparatus at district and village levels. The Rural Development Cadre, 80% of whom are reportedly Democracy Party members, are the cutting edge of the Party in Quang Tin. The membership of the Party is larded with those who depend on the government for their livelihood or support and the followers of local village and hamlet chiefs.

Military officers in Quang Tin are reluctant to discuss the Party with foreigners. They beg off any discussion by saying that they are apolitical. However through what guarded statements that they make one senses that many have the normal military contempt for civilian organizations and some are vaguely apprehensive that it is a threat, a possible competitor for power in the future.

Like the Democracy Party in Quang Ngai, the Party in Quang Tin screens former members of the old line parties to determine their true loyalties before admitting them into the Party. This screening, plus the coolness in general of the old line political leaders, has led to the situation where no prominent political leaders are in positions of power in the Party at the Province or district level. There are but a few at the village level, although the Dan Chu Party certainly has not been hesitant in allowing members of other parties to join its ranks following the screening process.

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The attitude of the opposition leaders is one of jealousy and envy at the recruiting success of the Party, but they have been skillfully disarmed by the Province Chief who has not pushed them so hard that they feel the need to resort to violence. They have voiced concerns over the tactics of overzealous Party members in recruitment and in campaigning during the elections, but they have not retaliated. In the June 1973 v. Village elections, for example, the full weight of the government apparatus, including the supposedly nonpolitical village PP platoons, was put behind the Democracy Party. However a line was drawn against physical harassment by the police. The elections were non-violent. The Democracy Party won a majority on every major Village Council contested.

The opposition leaders since have not done much to compete against or to counteract the efforts of the Democracy Party. They seem resigned to the fact that the Party is a lasting feature of the political landscape and probably the dominant force until and unless Saigon seems otherwise. These leaders seem to be waiting for something to happen. Some have indicated that they are awaiting signals from their leaders in Saigon that President Thieu has agreed to allow greater freedom for a true opposition party to be formed and to contest the Democracy Party openly. They have made no significant efforts to organize themselves into one or the other of the legal opposition groups.

Conclusions:

What holds true in Quang Ngai applies to Quang Tin. One added ingredient in the development of the Quang Tin Democracy Party is the personal interest and guidance of the energetic Province Chief of Quang Tin. However, the same deficiencies noted in Quang Ngai -- lack of grassroots support and lack of deep political commitment by the cadre -- hold true in Quang Tin. With another less enthusiastic Province Chief, the Party would probably survive but would lose much of its vitality. With strong political groups in existence who have shown local leadership when CUV leadership was weak in the past, the long-term viability of the Democracy Party as a political force is debatable. In the opinion of the reporting officer, unless the Democracy Party transforms itself into a disciplined, committed political organization it will not be able to compete successfully with the other side.

Quang Ngai/POL:Koyashida

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QUANG TIN DEMOCRACY PARTY
PROVINCIAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE

<u>POSITION</u>	<u>NAME</u>	<u>OCCUPATION</u>
Chairman	Mr. Nguyen Tri Tet	Education Service Chief
First Vice Chairman	Mr. Tran Van Thanh	Finance Service Chief
Second Vice Chairman	Mr. Nguyen Kinh	Teacher
Secretary General	Mr. Tran Thanh Nghia	Economic Service Chief

DISTRICT EXECUTIVE COMMITTEES

LAM KY DISTRICT

Chairman	Truong Quang	Teacher
Vice Chairman	Lo Kinh	Notable

TRANG BINH DISTRICT

Chairman	Tran Quang	Teacher
Vice Chairman	Nguyen Hue Huong	Notable

LY TIN DISTRICT

Chairman	Lo Vu	Teacher
Vice Chairman	Vu Minh	

TIEN PHUOC DISTRICT

Chairman	Vu Chau Lam Nguyen	Barber
Vice Chairman		

SONHONG DISTRICT

Chairman	Dang Van Thanh	Teacher
Vice Chairman	Trung	Teacher

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