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FROM : Amconsul, DA NANG DATE: February 5, 1975

SUBJECT : NVA/VC "Liberated Areas" in Military Region I of the Republic of Viet Nam

REFS : **LIMDS** **SECRET**

CAN THO A-010, 8/10/74	FVG 4595, Feb-May, 1973
DA NANG A-18, 5/3/73	FVG 4652, 5/30-7/18/73
DA NANG A-37, 7/19/73	FVG 4672, Jul-Aug, 1974
DA NANG A-58, 10/11/73	FVG 4686, Jun 1973
DA NANG A-14, 8/21/74	FVG 4691, 8/1-15/73
DA NANG 989 (Tel), 8/5/73	FVG 4694, 6/16-8/16/74
DA NANG 717 (Tel), 1974	FVG 4781, 9/25-10/12/73
FVG 2500, 7/28/73	FVG 4863, 12/26-28/73
FVG 2508, 7/28-8/8/73	FVG 4911, 2/14/74
FVG 2514, 8/20-21/73	FVG 4928, 2/8-23/74
FVG 4430, 8/73	FVG 4937, 3/5-16/74
FVG 4529, 5/8/73	DA NANG RLO: 01240/DN 7 Nov '74
FVG 4546, 5/14/73	01243/DN 7 Nov '74
FVG 4552, 5/16-18/73	01397/DN 22 Nov '74
FVG 4561, Apr-May, 1973	01245/DN 11 Nov '74
FVG 4578, 5/2/73	9/74 Hamlet Evaluation System Report

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LIMDS/CONTROL DISSEMINATION

Summary. Approximately 197,000 people, or 6% of the population of the Republic of Viet Nam's Military Region I, live in NVA/VC-controlled civilian settlements that might be classified as "liberated areas." These settlements vary considerably in size, population, life style, and viability, from large lowland areas in Quang Ngai to small Montagnard hamlets in western Quang Nam to the occupied portion of Quang Tri

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Province now effectively incorporated into the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam.

The NVA and VC have been unsuccessful in attracting large numbers of civilians to move voluntarily to live in these "liberated areas," and in converting contested zones into populated areas under their control. In the northern two provinces, the relatively fixed military contact line and the lack of cultivable land under NVA/VC control discourage population shifts. In Quang Nam and Quang Ngai, large numbers of people previously displaced from their villages attempted to re-establish themselves in previously contested areas, becoming thus exposed to increased VC political and military activity. Few of this number were brought decisively under VC control, even though many of the settlements were abandoned in 1974 under VC military pressure. Approximately 20,000 people were captured by the NVA/VC in Quang Nam during the attacks on Thuong Duc and Duc Duc Districts; as in Quang Tri in 1972, large-scale military operations have proven to be the best means for the NVA/VC to gain control of population.

In Quang Ngai lowland "liberated areas," two of which have over 10,000 population, have developed without the occupation by main-force NVA units. The depth of VC penetration of that province, the long history of revolution there, and the continuing military pressure being brought to bear by the Communist forces, suggest that Quang Ngai is vulnerable to possible expansion of these "liberated areas" which would bring additional population under NVA/VC control. End Summary.

I. Introduction. This report examines the VC/NVA "Liberated Areas" in MR-1. It focuses on the development by the Communists of inhabited civilian areas and the problems these areas will present to the GVN. The general definition of a "liberated area" developed by Can Tho in A-010 will be used: a "liberated area" is a populated area "having no permanent GVN military or governmental presence in the form of outposts and offices and into which GVN troops do not venture while on operations but which has some type of VC or NVA static presence." Contested areas--either leaning to the GVN or to the NVA/VC--will not be called "liberated areas" and will not be examined in this report.

GVN civilian influence must be excluded from a "liberated area." Rural Development Cadre, hamlet officials, and similar cadre should not be able to enter these areas; the only governmental presence should be Communist.

Normal military security operations should also not enter a "liberated area." For purposes of this study, there cannot be Regional Force, Popular Force or Police outposts in inhabited "liberated areas." Entry

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into a "liberated area" by GVN security forces on special operations does not, however, cause a "liberated area" to be excluded from this study.

The presence or absence of a People's Revolutionary Committee is weighed differently here than in Can Tho A-010 in determining "liberated areas." Many of the "liberated areas" dealt with in this paper are firmly secured either by distance from GVN lines or by a fixed front line. Intelligence is in many instances too sparse to determine definitively whether or not a People's Revolutionary Committee exists in a village; it would be safe to assume that in such areas such committees do and will exist as long as NVA/VC policy is to govern through such committees. Conversely, many lowland areas still considered contested may have village-level revolutionary committees, especially in Quang Ngai Province. Thus, the presence or absence of a Revolutionary Committee will be given much less weight than the permanence of NVA/VC control and the exclusion of the RVN governmental infrastructure.

This conservative approach does not deny the security problems throughout MR-1--especially the continuing bitter contestation of nearly all of Quang Ngai Province and the Communist political and guerrilla presence in many parts of Quang Nam Province. Excluding contested areas permits focusing more clearly on those areas in which the Communists could reasonably believe they have a permanently secured population whose political action they incontestably control.

2. Current "Liberated Areas" are listed below.

<u>AREA NO.</u>	<u>PROVINCE*</u>	<u>DISTRICT*</u>	<u>ESTIMATED POPULATION**</u>
1.	Quang Tri	Huong Hoa, Gio Linh, Cam Lo, Dong Ha, Trieu Phong	68,000
2.	Thua Thien	Nam Hoa (A Luoi and A Chau)	10,000
3.	Thua Thien	Nam Hoa (Nam Dong)	5,000
4.	Quang Nam	Hieu Duc (Trung Mang)	1,000
5.	Quang Nam	Thuong Duc (Loc Thanh Village)	15,000
6.	Quang Nam	Thuong Duc (Ben Giang, "Khu Hoa Binh" and neighboring areas)	2,000
7.	Quang Nam	Thuong Duc (Scattered Montagnard settlements)	15,000

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8.	Quang Tin Quang Nam	Hiep Duc, Thang Binh Duc Duc, Qua Son (Settlements along the river valleys extending from Hiep Duc north and east into Quang Nam	30,000
9.	Quang Tin	Hau Duc (old), Tien Phuoc, Tam Ky	5,000
10.	Quang Tin	Hiep Duc (Montagnard settlements including Kham Duc)	5,000
11.	Quang Ngai	Son Tinh (west of Q.L.1)	15,000
12.	Quang Ngai	Son Ha (Settlements on upper Tra Khuc River)	500
13.	Quang Ngai	Ba To	4,000
14.	Quang Ngai	Minh Long, Nghia Hanh	8,000
15.	Quang Ngai	Binh Son, Son Tinh (east of Q.L.1)	2,500
16.	Quang Ngai	Duc Pho	10,000
17.	Quang Ngai	Mo Duc	1,000
		Total	197,000

* Provinces and Districts are referred to here by the GVN names. Villages and hamlets may be identified by VC names, which will be clarified in the textual description of each settlement, below.

** Both individual and aggregate population statistics are based upon the most reasonable estimate of knowledgeable persons, supported by what documentation is available.

These "liberated areas" can be identified by number on the map in Annex B to this airgram.

3. Population. According to the September, 1974 edition of the Hamlet Evaluation System (HES), the Republic of Viet Nam's Military Region 1

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has a population of 3,378,381 persons. The estimated 197,000 persons living in NVA/VC-controlled "liberated areas" thus comprise approximately 6% of the population of the region. Below is a table listing the five provinces of this region, the total population of each, the number of persons estimated by the Hamlet Evaluation System to live in Category V (Viet Cong controlled) and Category N (Non-Related) areas:

PROVINCE	TOTAL	POP. LIBERATED AREAS	V AND N POP. ON HES
Quang Tri	231,428	68,000	@32,000
Thua Thien and Hue	804,867	15,000	@ 4,800
Quang Nam and Da Nang	1,063,024	73,000	@28,700
Quang Tin	437,937		@ 3,000
Quang Ngai	841,125	41,000	@37,000
Totals:		196,000	105,500

The Hamlet Evaluation System determination of population of Viet Cong and Non-Related Hamlets does not correspond with estimates of population in this paper. Several reasons account for this: The HES focuses on the pacification problem of securing inhabited areas, rather than estimating population in relatively inaccessible areas; the dynamics of the HES may place some "liberated areas" in D or E Categories (indicating greater security); finally, one or both sets of statistics may be unreliable. It is worth noting, however, that HES statistics most closely approximate those of this report in Quang Ngai Province, where "liberated areas" are developing in areas which are comparatively well-known, more densely settled, and where population can be more accurately estimated.

4. Geography. The percentage of land under NVA/VC control is considerably greater than the percentage of population under their control. Military Region I has an area of approximately 2,700,000 hectares of which perhaps 75-80% is under Communist control. Most of the NVA/VC-controlled land is mountainous, with little agricultural potential. The principal lowland rice-growing areas under NVA/VC control are in Quang Tri Province and Quang Ngai. Other valuable agricultural land under NVA/VC control is in the upland river valleys of Quang Nam and Quang Tin.

Although the mountain areas offer little agricultural potential, they provide the NVA and VC with the basis for a secure road and trail network

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that links North Viet Nam with the various settled areas and provides a system of transportation and communication for military operations. This interior mountain area provides a strategic base to support the development of "liberated areas" along its eastern fringe, i.e., in the lowland areas.

5. Economy. The economy of the "liberated areas" is based primarily upon the small amounts of cultivatable land available in each settlement. The hill road network linking north and south carries some staple food supplies and consumer items among the regular truck traffic. "Liberated Areas" located near GVN market towns, however, reportedly purchase many necessities and small luxuries in these markets.

Economic interdependency of GVN-controlled and NVA/VC-controlled areas is most prominent in Quang Ngai Province, where trade between the two zones is considerable. Southern Duc Pho District is a major transit point for truckloads of goods, sometimes transported all the way from Saigon, destined for Communist markets, according to the Quang Ngai Province S-2. Vietnamese intelligence reports suggest that each market town along Q.L.1 in that Province is a source for foodstuffs, small consumer items, batteries, etc., to be carried to Communist areas by lambretta, honda, or individuals on foot. A rice dealer in Son Tinh District told the Consulate General's Quang Ngai Province Office Director that he could make more money in one month selling to the VC that he could in a year of legal sales.

The overland supply route to Son Ha District from Son Tinh District illustrates this interdependence. Provincial Route 5 linking these two district capitals is cut by an area of Communist control in western Son Tinh District. The NVA/VC permit transit of various goods in both directions, after payment in tax, and have tried to channel some of this trade to a market near Ba Gia in Son Tay Village. This trade reportedly is both engaged in and indirectly encouraged by soldiers of the Ranger, Regional Force, and Popular Force units of both Districts. Without this open land route, Son Ha's 15,000 population would have to depend on air transport for transportation of all supplies.

The NVA and VC reportedly depend upon GVN-controlled areas to supply much of the rice needs. The extent to which the NVA/VC are successful in gathering or buying rice varies from province to province and from harvest to harvest. An SRF report in early 1974 (EYG 4928) suggested that the VC acquired 15 to 20% of both rice crops in GVN Quang Nam Province in 1973. A September 1973 report (EVC 4781) claimed the NVA/VC were acquiring approximately one-fourth of Quang Tin's rice crop.

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GVN rice-control operations at times have affected NVA/VC acquisition efforts. In 1973, the NVA reportedly considered shifting acquisition efforts from Quang Ngai to Quang Tin because of GVN rice control efforts. It should be noted, however, that harvests during 1973 were very poor, with comparatively little local rice available. GVN control of rice imports would have made the total rice control program more effective.

Significant trade between the two sides reportedly also occurs in southern Quang Tin Province (Ly Tin District), in Quang Nam (where NVA/VC cadre from Hiep Duc and surrounding areas travel to GVN market towns to buy goods) (FVC 4863) and at Phu Loc and Phong Dien Districts in Thua Thien (a knowledgeable Vietnamese businessman in Da Nang claims large amounts of pharmaceutical supplies cross to NVA/VC lines near Phu Loc).

6. Population Dynamics - Quang Tri and Thua Thien. In northern MR-1, the bulk of the population currently under NVA/VC control was captured during the 1972 Easter Offensive, when several districts in Quang Tri Province were overrun. Additional large increments are derived from the indigenous hill population of areas under VC control and groups of North Vietnamese brought south to resettle. Very few of the population living in GVN-controlled areas of the northern two provinces have crossed to live in NVA/VC areas since the ceasefire; very rarely a family with land in NVA-controlled Quang Tri may cross the lines to return home; in Thua Thien Province there has been very little population shift since the ceasefire.

Several factors contribute to this stability in Quang Tri and Thua Thien. First, the fighting in 1972 gave those who wished to live in NVA/VC-controlled areas a chance to cross over at that time. Second, a rigid, clearly defined military contact line in Quang Tri and Thua Thien makes it difficult for large numbers of people to cross the lines undetected. Third, except for occupied Quang Tri, the NVA and VC control only limited amounts of cultivatable land. The irrigatable lowland rice-producing areas upon which the traditional Vietnamese economy is based are almost entirely controlled by the GVN; agricultural opportunity in the NVA/VC-controlled hill areas is limited. Additionally, the lowland rice areas are the "Que Huong" (native land) of most of the population; the familial links to the home village discourage crossing to VC lands to live.

7. Population Dynamics: Quang Nam, Quang Tin and Quang Ngai. South of the Hai Van Pass, a fixed military contact line exists only in those few areas, such as the approaches to Duc Duc and Thuong Duc District towns in Quang Nam, where recent combat operations have taken place. In

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most of Quang Tin and Quang Nam Provinces, the GVN-controlled and NVA/VC-controlled areas meet in a wide "no-man's" land, a contested zone occupied by small Territorial Forces units or VC local guerrilla units. Scattered sections of these areas are cultivated. According to the Consulate General's Province Office in Hoi An (Quang Nam) many families work these otherwise abandoned lands in the daytime, returning to secured settlements at night. SRF and Defense Attache reports suggest other plots represent VC production areas, planted by various Provincial and District level forces to provide food. (FVG 4737) Specific areas where production sites have been reported include parts of Hieu Duc, Dai Loc, Duy Xuyen and Que Son Districts in Quang Nam Province, and western Thang Binh District in GVN Quang Tin Province.

This underutilized, semi-abandoned land at one time, of course, supported a large rural population, most of which moved to Da Nang, district towns, or more secure neighboring villages during the war years. Under the current depressed economic conditions, there is considerable motivation for these people to seek to return to their traditional farms; as many as 300,000 people have been displaced from their land in Quang Nam alone during the war. In July 1973 villagers from contested areas of Duy Xuyen and Dien Ban Districts of Quang Nam applied for permission to return home; they asked for GVN forces to protect them, but said if this was not possible they would return anyway and make an accommodation with the VC. (FVG 2500) Some were permitted to Return-to-Village; a few returned without permission. (FVG 2508) A group of approximately 9,000 residents of VC-controlled villages in Que Son District disappeared from GVN control and are believed to have returned to their villages.

Similar population pressure exists in Quang Ngai, where from 40 to 50% of the 800,000 population is believed to be displaced from their native villages because of the war. As in Quang Nam, small numbers of people risked the return to native villages without waiting for GVN permission to relocate; one such known settlement was located near a Territorial Forces firebase-cum-command post in eastern Binh Son District.

In Quang Tin, population pressure was less intense, as a greater proportion of the population was employed in government-related jobs in and around Tam Ky. Nonetheless, small groups of persons returned to isolated villages in southern Tam Ky District and western Thang Binh District.

Thus, in Quang Ngai and Quang Nam, large numbers of displaced persons created an unstable population from which the NVA/VC might reasonably have expected to draw considerable numbers of people to areas they controlled.

8. NVA/VC Inducement Policy: The NVA/VC adopted policies to encourage civilians to return to insecure or VC controlled areas. In addition to

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propaganda appeals, the NVA/VC offered returnees in both Quang Nam and Quang Ngai rice allowances, loans to establish farms, prospects for educating children in North Viet Nam, use of farming implements, and even grants of livestock. In addition to the established settlements listed below, smaller, more exposed settlements appeared in Que Son, Duy Xuyen, Duc Duc, and Dien Ban Districts of Quang Nam and were identified in parts of Mo Duc, Duc Pho, Binh Son and Son Tinh Districts of Quang Ngai.

9. Struggle for Contested Areas. Prior to the ceasefire, the GVN military command encouraged the expansion of areas of control of the territorial forces, thus bringing a GVN military presence to many areas hitherto considered contested, such as eastern Binh Son and Son Tinh Districts of Quang Ngai, parts of Duy Xuyen, Dien Ban and Dai Loc Districts of Quang Nam. The subsequent Resettlement and Return-to-Village Programs of the GVN thus allowed people to return to areas that had a GVN military presence rather than an area dominated by VC guerrillas. The presence of these security forces did not prevent regular access to the population by the VC, especially at night time, and large numbers of the population were more exposed to NVA/VC propaganda and political activities than they had previously been. The presence of the GVN security forces did, however, prevent the NVA/VC from completely consolidating political hold on the populations that had returned to these areas.

In late spring and early summer of 1974 the NVA/VC apparently undertook the elimination of the GVN military presence in these RTV and Resettlement areas. In Son Tinh and Binh Son Districts of Quang Ngai and in Dien Ban and Duy Xuyen Districts of Quang Nam several positions of territorial forces guarding RTV and resettlement sites were overrun. As before, most of the population fled again to more secure GVN areas, although small numbers were seized and kept by the NVA/VC. The destruction of the RTV and Resettlement Sites failed to "liberate" significant numbers of people, but repeated population displacement put further strains on the GVN administrative structure and economy.

10. GVN Attempts to Eliminate "Leopard Spots". A series of ARVN operations early in 1974 attempted to clear and pacify small Communist-held areas behind GVN lines in lowland Quang Nam and Quang Ngai. Target areas included coastal villages in Mo Duc, Duc Pho and Hieu Nhon Districts, an island village in Duy Xuyen, and a contested area in western Dien Ban. These were areas long held by the Communists and most contained a small civilian population. The operations in Hieu Nhon and Duy Xuyen are considered to have been successful, as the GVN forces were able to clear the small VC units and to date prevent their return. In Mo Duc and Duc Pho, NVA/VC forces have been able to re-establish themselves and are keeping pressure on the RF and PF holding the area. The operation in Dien Ban was abandoned after regimental-sized counterattacks by the NVA/VC.

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Provincial authorities in Thua Thien Province area also concerned with the existence of a small VC/NVA base area in northern Phong Dien District. (Da Nang 0717, NOTAL) To date there have been no signs of civilian presence in the area, and territorial forces are undertaking operations to clear out this base.

11. The NVA Reaction: Summer 1974. Although the GVN was able to reduce these NVA/VC "Leopard Spots," there were also pockets of GVN-controlled population within easy reach of the NVA/VC. In May 1974, the isolated village of Ky Tra in southern Tam Ky District, Quang Tin Province, with a population of 5,000, were taken by the NVA/VC. In July 1974, the NVA/VC launched a larger-scale campaign, which began with the capture of 12,500 people in southern Duc Duc District, and continued with the seizure of Thuong Duc District capital in August. In Quang Ngai, the NVA/VC overran Minh Long District and recaptured the entire Cong Hoa Valley in Nghia Hanh District, the northern part of which had been captured by the GVN in 1973.

I Corps Commanding General LTC Ngo Quang Truong has said he believes the attacks on Duc Duc and Thuong Duc were retaliation for ARVN pacification campaigns and were aimed at acquiring population. The NVA/VC Summer-Fall Campaign may reflect their growing conviction that military operations offer the only prospect of significantly increasing the population under their control, at least in Military Region I.

12. Conclusions. The development of NVA/VC "Liberated Areas" in MR-1 is less a problem of the economic, demographic and political development of already "secured" areas than a facet of the political and military struggle for control of population. "Liberated Areas" in northern MR-1 have not attracted large numbers of people; in the northern four provinces the bulk of the population in "Liberated Areas" has resulted from large military operations. In Quang Ngai Province, 1974 has brought a rapid expansion of "Liberated Areas" in the north of the province, that, linked to the difficult military situation in that long-troubled province, presents the possibility of additional shifts of population to NVA/VC control.

GVN Return-to-Village and Resettlement Programs in 1973 apparently were effective in controlling the pressure for population to return to abandoned areas, and to prevent this population from coming under NVA/VC control. The destruction of this program in Quang Ngai by NVA/VC campaigns in 1974 may have resulted in some small numbers of population staying in VC-controlled areas, and in the long run might encourage larger numbers of people to

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live in "liberated areas". The most successful technique for expansion of "liberated areas" remains military operations, and it is possible that the Communists may resort to this technique more frequently during the coming year.

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ANNEX A

This annex describes the "liberated areas" in MR-1.

1. "Liberated" Quang Tri - The Southernmost Province of the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam.

The 1972 Easter Offensive and subsequent operations left in Communist control all of Gio Linh, Cam Lo, Huong Hoa and Dong Ha Districts, and the western portion of Trieu Phong and Hai Lang Districts. A stable contact line between the GVN and Communist forces, has been established and is generally defined as:

1. From Coast at YD 3866 to Song Thach Han.
2. Along South bank of the river at YD 3356, (except for two NVA Bridgeheads west of Quang Tri City to YD 2635).
3. Then Eastward along Mai Linh-Hai Lang border to YD 3544.
4. Then to YD 4635 at Thua Thien border.

Population: It is generally estimated that 60,800 residents of formerly GVN controlled areas of Quang Tri remained in Communist hands following the 1972 Easter Offensive campaigns. (The September 1974 HES estimate 68,652 inhabitants of areas clearly controlled by the Communists.) The occasional returnee or rallier sometimes can give insights to population estimates in given areas. Below is a District by District tabulation of Quang Tri's population, first with the HES estimate of Communist controlled population, and then other estimates:

<u>DISTRICT</u>	<u>HES</u>	<u>OTHER</u>
Mai Linh	1000	---
Trieu Phong	9100	A. Returned POW Doan Van Sung, 21/10/73 - 18,000 pop. B. Rallier Le Kec 10/9/73- 41,000
Hai Lang	None	Returnee Sung - 50 families in Hai Son
Cam Lo	13,060	One settlement of 3000 is claimed. No further info.

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Dong Ha	12,490
Huong Hoa	14,600
Gio Linh	18,402

Further disagreement regarding NVA/VC policy towards resettlement of the captured population exists. Apparently some segments of the population were sent north to other NVN Provinces following the 1972 campaign, while other villages were allowed to remain in place. With the ceasefire, however, an apparent deliberate policy decision was made to resettle as much of the population as possible in Quang Tri. An ARVN I Corps staff study suggests the movement of people under this Return-to-Village Program was completed by April 1974, when the NVA/VC began to focus on re-establishing the political apparatus in the villages. According to a returnee, NVA/VC policy called for return of people to their native villages, where possible. People from RVN-controlled areas, of course, could not return to their que huong; people from Quang Tri City reportedly settled in Dong Ha District town (see below); people from Hai Lang were sent to various places in Gio Linh, Trieu Phong and Cam Lo Districts. Ralliers report the composition of the population is heavily skewed towards elderly and females. Relatively few youths - male or female - are reported in these resettled villages of Quang Tri, perhaps both because ARVN mobilization had called many youth from their villages before they were overrun and because of subsequent NVA mobilization.

In addition to returning Quang Tri residents to their provinces, certain categories of North Vietnamese may also be sent to Quang Tri. One report claims wives and children of NVA soldiers, along with other unspecified residents of Quang Binh Province are being resettled in lowland areas of Trieu Phong District. A rice allowance reportedly was provided returnees - 15 kg's per month for persons over 16 years old and 10 kg's per month for younger people - was provided by the North Vietnamese government; the allowance was begun in July 1973 and continued at least until April 1974, according to a returnee.

Administration. Dong Ha has been established as the capital of occupied Quang Tri Province, and is used as a "showpiece" for the so-called "liberated areas". Little is known about the provincial administrative apparatus. Village government reportedly involves a People's Revolutionary Committee and a village guerrilla unit (or self-defense unit); each hamlet reportedly has a hamlet administration and a hamlet guerrilla unit. Additional administrative controls include (1) people's organization, which organizes people according to age and sex; and (2) labor service organization, the basic unit of which in rural areas is a "cultivation group" of approximately

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100 persons. (Labor service gives the worker "points" which can be used to earn rice.)

Government Services. Information on government services is sketchy. A Quang Tri Provincial hospital has been reported on the site of the old CVN Dong Ha District hospital. Other technical cadre are believed to have assisted the villagers to resettle, and there are reports of the NVN government making available small quantities of farm machinery. According to CVN sources, each village has established an elementary school and each district a high school, with teachers provided from North Viet Nam.

Agricultural Potential. The NVA/VC ended up with the bulk of the most productive land in Quang Tri. The most productive rice land, in the coastal area of northeastern Trieu Phong District (East of Q.L.1 and North of Quang Tri City), was cut by the ceasefire line. Cam Lo has two important agricultural areas. The best land is found in Cam Nghia and Cam Tinh Villages (formerly the exiled seat of Huong Hoa District); potentially productive but requiring irrigation is the area near Cam Lo District town, on a tributary of the Cua Viet. Huong Hoa District can support some rice growing but has considerable potential for fruit growing and other horticultural endeavors. With manpower and proper irrigation, "liberated" Quang Tri could be productive beyond the needs of its present civilian population. Reports during 1973 indicated severe rice shortages, due both to the droughts and to the difficulty of re-establishing people on the land. A July 1974 rallier reported, however, that the April 1974 rice crop in Trieu Phong was sufficient to allow part to be sold to NVA military units in the area.

Communications. Dong Ha has developed as the hub of the transportation network in Quang Tri and as a major point of entry for supplies and personnel destined for NVA/VC units and areas in South Viet Nam. Dong Ha is served by road from North Viet Nam (Q.L.1) and offers harbor for light draft coastal shipping. To the west, Khe Sanh is linked by road both with Dong Ha and with the trail network through Laos. From Khe Sanh, the new Communist Highway 14 feeds into the hill areas of the southern provinces.

2. Thua Thien Province

The fixed line of military confrontation found in Quang Tri extends through Thua Thien Province, becoming unspecific only in the mountainous areas in the southern portion along the Thua Thien-Quang Nam border. This line roughly follows the ridge line of the second range of mountains west of Q.L.1, leaving almost no coastal plain area in uncontested NVA/VC control. One hamlet far upstream on the Song Truoi River in Phu Loc District, Nam Pho Can of Loc An Village (YD 960050), is given a "V" rating on the

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HES, lying behind the contact line. There are, of course, security problems throughout the province, perhaps especially so in Phu Loc District, but only in this hamlet with a population of 200 (estimated) is NVA/VC control undisputed.

The potential area for establishing NVA/VC civilian settlements in Thua Thien is limited primarily to the A Luoi-A Shau Valley in the west of the province, the Nam Dong area in the southwest.

A Shau (YE 5084) and A Luoi (YD 3901) are important base areas linked with each other, staging areas in Laos, and other NVA/VC areas by roads. Maintenance of these roads - requiring constant labor - are undoubtedly an important reason for establishing settlements in these remote regions. According to a SRF report, North Vietnamese civilians, formed into "assault groups", including males and females, had arrived in Thua Thien to assist the NVA in road construction but thereafter to settle in the area and raise crops. The same report said that the Thua Thien Provincial Committee had ordered subordinate units to release Montagnards from daily labor and allow them to settle in fertile areas, i.e., A Luoi, A Shau and Nam Dong.

Estimates of the civilian population of the NVA/VC-controlled areas of Thua Thien cannot be considered accurate. An indication might be taken from the Hamlet Evaluation System which carries an estimate of each village in the abandoned areas; the HES total population of these villages has been estimated at 17,000.

The "liberated areas" in Thua Thien lack scope for development. Agriculture capability is limited; population must remain small. These areas are best seen as dependent upon the military bases and lines of communication. NVA/VC-controlled Thua Thien is not a political and economic rival "liberated area" to the GVN-controlled part of the province.

3. Quang Nam

Permanent, civilian occupied "liberated areas" in Quang Nam are limited to settlements in the river valleys and along the NVA/VC lines of communications. Most prominent of these are western Que Son, southern Duc Duc District, and the Khu Hoa Binh at Pen Giang, described below. Although the NVA/VC have been able to retain political infrastructure and guerrilla strength in some lowland areas, they have been unable to establish and maintain permanent civilian settlements in the coastal plain.

Since the ceasefire, Quang Nam has seen the loss of approximately 20,000 people to NVA/VC control as the result of NVA/VC attacks on Thuong Duc

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and Duc Duc Districts. The Province Office in Quang Nam also estimates that as many as 9,000 persons may have voluntarily returned to family lands in Que Son District under NVA/VC control; this would be one of the largest voluntary losses of population to NVA/VC control in MR-1.

The NVA and VC attempted to establish resettlement sites in the lowland plains in southern Duy Xuyen, southern Duc Duc and western Dien Ban Districts. Only those behind NVA/VC "lines", so to speak, have flourished, those in western Que Son and southern Duc Duc, for example.

NVA/VC settlements in Quang Nam are described below.

Trung Mang. The Trung Mang area near ZC 1566 is being developed by the Quang Da Special Zone Provincial Committee as a settlement area. This is an isolated valley approximately 15 KM west of Da Nang City, protected by very difficult terrain. A Communist document dated July 1974 (Da Nang RLO 01243/DN) indicated Hoa Vang VC District cadre were assigned the task of resettling villagers from GVN areas in Trung Mang; this would involve various stages of organization, including building food storage facilities, a school, and a bus station. This report claimed 45 villagers had already been taken from Hoa Binh Village, Hoa Vang District. Da Nang RLO 01194 (22 Oct 1974) reported a refugee area with 50 housing units.

In addition to the attempts to encourage Quang Nam residents to settle in Trung Mang, consideration has reportedly been given to resettling some Montagnards from North Viet Nam (Thai, Meo, and Man) there (see FVC 4694, 14-16 August 1973). Cadre support might include older students from North Viet Nam and engineering assistance.

VC Loc Thanh Village, Dai Loc District (ZC 080518 to 015510). Returnee Le Van Tran, who escaped from NVA/VC control after being captured at Thuong Duc in August 1974, reports civilians settled at Loc Thanh, a village of ten hamlets stretched along the Song Vu Gia and Song Boung west of the old Thuong Duc District town. This village includes an area called Thanh Ny, an important staging and transit point. Rallier Tran reports a Village Headquarters and Village Committee at ZC 05503. A complete system of population control has been instituted, with indoctrination courses conducted by TDY cadre from Dai Loc District, passes required for travel between hamlets, organization into cells led by politically reliable cadre, People's Intelligence system, security check points, etc. Much of the population consists of persons captured at Thuong Duc in August 1974, with whom are mixed many old VC families to strengthen political control of the new population.

Housing at Loc Thanh is largely thatch and bamboo, built by the resettlers with little help from the NVA. A rice allowance was given by the VC and

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tools and seeds were "loaned" to get agricultural production started. Bulldozers were provided to clear land for planting of sweet potatoes, manioc and corn. Loc Thanh also contains a market which sells foodstuffs and various consumer items of Japanese, Communist Chinese, and Taiwanese manufacture, brought by trucks from NVN.

Several escapees from this area have reported morale to be low in these mountain river settlements, with barely enough to eat and lack of medical personnel and equipment to treat malaria and other diseases. This may be the result of the temporary strain on the economy caused by the sudden influx of the people seized at Thuong Duc. The food supply situation may ease as the captured are put to productive use and other economic adjustments may be made.

Ben Giang 'Khu Hoa Binh' YC 9735: Reports over a period of time indicate the VC are developing Ben Giang and surrounding areas as a "peace area" (Khu Hoa Binh), with the purposes of "enhancing the position of the Communists for future elections, decreasing requirements for supplies to be shipped from North Viet Nam by establishing farming and horticultural cooperatives, and providing a readily accessible manpower pool." (FVG 4653/ FVG 4573) Ben Giang reportedly was to be developed by the Quang Da Special Zone Province Committee. Ben Giang lies along old Q.L. 14 at the confluence of the Song Giang and Song Cai Rivers in south central Quang Nam. SRF reports indicate Ben Giang is intended to be an important crossroads in the network of roads linking North Viet Nam, Laos, and VC-held areas in the RVN. Located at a point where a very serviceable road crosses tillable rice land, Ben Giang, as is Thanh My, could become a small agricultural settlement. Different reports have suggested the following categories of people have been or would be resettled in Ben Giang: NVA/VC followers driven from Dai Loc, Duc Duc and Duy Xuyen Districts by ARVN Pacification Programs, relatives of VC soldiers and cadre, and relatives of North Vietnamese cadre assigned to the Quang Da Special Zone. Initial plans reportedly called for NVN specialists to provide specialists in rice cultivation, horticulture, land reclamation, and public health to Ben Giang, as well as to set up a medical center and maternity dispensary. The development of the area would be along the lines of an Agricultural Cooperative as established in North Viet Nam. Population is estimated at 2,000.

Montagnard Hamlets in Quang Nam. While Montagnard society is peripheral to the principal military and political struggle being waged among the Vietnamese population, the hill people are present in sufficient numbers to warrant mention here. The primary source for information on Montagnard hamlets in Quang Nam is rallier Pham Phu Ngan, who escaped to the GVN

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in June 1973. Other SRF and DAO reporting occasionally mention Montagnard hamlets in passing, usually in connection with road construction.

According to rallier Ngan, defoliation operations in the mid-1960's forced the Quang Da Special Zone VC Organization (a provincial-level VC organization with responsibility for northern GVN Quang Nam Province and Da Nang City) to resettle the Montagnard population in western GVN Quang Nam Province, in VC Lam Son Province. By 1970 the Montagnards had been forced into hamlets for collective farming, and were complaining of a declining living standard. With the ceasefire, more land was made available for clearing, but production was taxed at a rate of 2/3 of whatever was produced.

Ngan said that the VC Tay Giang District was organized into three villages, each with subordinate hamlets, each hamlet in turn containing about 20 families. Hamlets were governed by a People's Revolutionary Committee; these cadre were largely Montagnards, some of whom had gone to North Viet Nam for training. District and Village-level People's Revolutionary Committees were also reported. Each hamlet is reported to have a school, and some Montagnard students were reportedly sent north to study during 1972 and 1973.

The Consulate General's Province Office Director in Quang Nam estimates 15,000 Montagnards may be living in NVA/VC-controlled areas of Quang Nam.

Hiep Duc, Que Son and Nong Son. Hiep Duc District town in northern Quang Tin Province is a VC settlement and logistics area, out of which extend settlements along river valleys flowing into Que Son and Duc Duc Districts of Quang Nam Province. These areas will be treated together in this section, even though a GVN provincial boundary separates Hiep Duc from its northern suburbs.

Hiep Duc was seized by the Communists in 1972, and has as the principal settlement a cluster of seven villages on the river valley near the District seat: Son Tu, Son Hiep, Son Phuoc, Son Tan, Binh Son and Son Binh villages. Quang Tin Province authorities claim approximately 1,000 persons reside in Son Tan Village (AT 8524). A returnee reports (RLO 0011/DNG) that a small VC population lives in each of Son Hiep, Son Binh and Son An, with each village having a small market selling staples and a few consumer items. An SRF report (FVG 4591) suggests a long-range NVA/VC effort to increase agricultural production in Hiep Duc. The amount of tillable land, however, is not great.

Ralliers also report some of the population captured in the Nong Son area of Duc Duc was resettled near Hiep Duc, while others were scattered in hamlets along the Thu Bon River Valley leading into Duc Duc. Generally,

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the less reliable the population was (from the VC point of view) the further away from GVN lines it was resettled. In each of the villages, People's Committees and People's Organizations reportedly have been established and labor groups organized. Youth were recruited into guerrilla organizations. Each village has a medical aid station, although medicines are in short supply. Primary schools are being constructed.

The provision of relief supplies to the people in Que Son closely followed the pattern of distribution of supplies in Thuong Duc. Small amounts of rice and seed were given. Plowing machines and tools were provided; a plot of land was given each family, who was encouraged to plant potatoes. A small store in each village reportedly provides salt, cloth, toothpaste, etc. At the present time, according to ralliers, 65% of the captured population is unable to get rice to eat and subsists on potatoes and manioc.

Calculation of the size of the population controlled by the VC in this area is difficult. Over 20,000 people have been taken from GVN lines in 1974 alone from Que Son and Duc Duc Districts, but these reportedly have been settled in many different areas in Quang Nam and Quang Tin. These, with others, probably total at least 30,000.

4. Quang Tin Province

The economic geography of Quang Tin Province contrasts with that of other MR-1 provinces, making the "liberated areas" in that province special prizes for the NVA/VC. Whereas elsewhere the base for agricultural production is the lowland coastal plain, the most fertile riceland in Quang Tin lies in the Piedmont river valleys in Hiep Duc, Hau Duc, and Tien Phuoc Districts. It has been estimated that 80% of the fertile river land is under NVA/VC control. The principal GVN holdings of river valley land is near Tien Phuoc District seat; agricultural land in lowland Quang Tin, controlled by the GVN, is among the least productive in MR-1.

The most important "liberated areas" in Quang Tin Province are (1) Hiep Duc (described in connection with settlements in Quang Nam); (2) Tra My (old GVN Hau Duc) and nearby areas in Tien Phuoc and Tam Ky Districts.

GVN Quang Tin Province was created from Quang Nam Province in 1962. In the NVA/VC administrative structure, VC Quang Nam Province has jurisdiction over GVN Quang Tin Province and the southern portion of GVN Quang Nam; the settlements in NVA/VC controlled areas of Hiep Duc, Duc Duc and Que Son are closely related, even though a GVN provincial border separates them.

Tra My (GVN Quang Tin Province, VC Quang Nam Province). A large settlement in Quang Tin Province, made up of small inhabited areas in 10 villages ranging from western Tien Phuoc District to eastern Hau Duc District.

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and southern Tam Ky District, is centered on the important communications center of Tra My, the VC name for the old GVN Hau Duc District Capital. Quang Tin provincial officials estimate 5,000 people live in these areas, stretched along river valleys and lines of communications running east and north from Tra My. Phuoc Chau village is the largest populated settlement. The most recent addition to NVA/VC-controlled area was the village of Ky Tra, seized by the NVA/VC in May 1974.

Tra My is at the northeast end of the cinnamon growing area along the Quang Tin--Quang Ngai border, and has some quite good rice land (see introduction to Quang Tin, above). It is also an important transit point for consumer goods and foodstuffs purchased in Quang Ngai Province and being supplied to NVA/VC forces and settlements elsewhere in MR-1. The amount of arable land available in these ten villages is sufficient to support the relatively small VC civilian population and provide some small amounts of rice for NVA forces.

Cinnamon. A profitable economic activity controlled by the NVA/VC at Tra My is the harvest, processing and export of cinnamon from growing areas in Tra Bong District of neighboring Quang Ngai Province. Cinnamomum cassia grows in an area 6 kilometers west-northwest of Tra Bong District Headquarters, centering on Nui Gio at HS 2/5905, and extending approximately four kilometers east and west and one kilometer north and south from this point. The majority of the growing area is under firm NVA/VC control. NVA/VC cadre reportedly supervise the gathering of cinnamon bark by the Cua Montagnards, who then take it to the Tra Bong cinnamon market (Tra Khuong Village) where it is sold. The 1973 Tra Bong District Chief estimated that only 15-30% of the cinnamon was marketed through the Tra Khuong market, the rest being marketed directly by the NVA through the port of Dong Ha (Quang Tri) to NVN and overseas. Large quantities of cinnamon are capable of being grown in this area: it is estimated that at least 300 metric tons were exported in 1965. Estimates of the number of Cua Montagnards living in NVA/VC-controlled zones and dealing in the cinnamon trade vary considerably, from 2,000 (estimate of the former Quang Ngai Ethnic Minority Service Chief) to 15,000 (that of a former Tra Bong District Chief). Cinnamon trade also reportedly finances much of the VC purchase of rice and other supplies from lowland Quang Ngai.

Montagnards in Quang Tin. Vietnamese provincial authorities estimate approximately 15,000 Montagnards live in Quang Tin, of whom only approximately 900 live in GVN controlled areas. The Province's Ethnic Minority Service estimates 11,650 members of the Katu tribe live throughout Tam Ky, Hau Duc and Hiep Duc Districts, and approximately 3,000 Jeh live near Kham Duc in far western Hiep Duc District. Kham Duc is reported by GVN provincial authorities to be the administrative center for the Montagnards, who reportedly are used by the Communists to repair roads and carry supplies.

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5. Quang Ngai

The development of NVA/VC "liberated areas" in Quang Ngai has been almost as successful as in Quang Tri. In Quang Ngai the inland river valleys have been turned into a maze of roads and agricultural settlements. Most importantly, the NVA/VC have been able to maintain control over several areas within GVN "lines". These are generally areas of long NVA/VC control, in which a large agricultural population has been thoroughly penetrated by the Communist infrastructure. These areas are protected both by very good provincial and local forces and by the reserve of NVA in the hills, which can be counted upon to keep the ARVN sufficiently occupied to forestall successful pacification attempts.

Rural Quang Ngai, where it has not been "liberated", is everywhere seriously contested, with a firm VC infrastructure in place. The "liberated areas" considered here are the ultimate result of a long revolutionary struggle in Quang Ngai.

Son Tinh District. The largest NVA/VC civilian settlement in southern MR-1 consists of eight villages in western Son Tinh District: Son Tay, Son Dong, Son Luc, Son Kim, Son Nam, Son Phuong, Son Tra and Son Bac Villages. GVN sources informally (and conservatively) estimate that approximately 10,000 civilians live in this area east of the mountains, north of the Tra Khuc River, west of the railroad right-of-way, and south of the Tra Bong River (BS 4988 to BS 5889 to BS 5879 to BS 4779). This includes a lowland area of over 100 square kilometers. The Hamlet Evaluation System estimates the population of these villages as approximately 23,000; of this number 5,000 in far eastern Son Kim Village may be affected by GVN security operations and government activities, and constitute a "grey" border area to the hard-core "liberated" villages. A system of roads leads into this area from the hills, although the GVN-held Tra Bong District blocks the most direct road from the northwest to this area. The integrity of this area is broken only by the presence of two ARVN and RF fire bases which are maintained by helicopter resupply. The units on these bases make little attempt to secure the surrounding country-side but are intended to be a barrier for any possible main-force NVA thrust towards Son Tinh District town and Q.L.1.

The heart of this "liberated area" is Son Kim and Son Loc Villages, which have been NVA/VC-controlled since the early 1960's. The period of smallest NVA/VC-controlled area perhaps was early 1974, when GVN troops had pushed control of Province Route 5B along the Tra Khuc almost to where the road and the river turned down towards Son Ha District, and when territorial forces routinely operated for a short distance west of the railroad right-of-way. NVA/VC operations which began in May 1974 and continued through October 1974 forced the ARVN 68th Ranger Battalion in the southwest to stop

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their road clearing operations and assume essentially defensive positions on firebases in Son Ha and Son Tinh. To the east, several hilltop outposts east of the railroad were overrun in September and retaken by ARVN in late October. During the early autumn NVA/VC forces regularly mined the Tra Bong-Binh Son road to the north of this area, sometimes interrupting ARVN resupply of Tra Bong District by that overland road.

This area is also the staging and resupply area for the 30th and 40th VC Provincial Force Battalions who split their operations between this area and that east of Q.L.1

GVN Village governments for these villages are in exile near Son Tinh District, near which approximately 10,000 persons from these villages live in resettlement camps. GVN cadre do not venture into the VC-controlled areas, which lack any GVN civilian governmental presence whatsoever.

Binh Son District. A small VC enclave exists in Binh Nam Village in eastern Binh Son District (BS 696861), a hilly area relatively secure from GVN penetration used as the forward base for operations of at least two VC Provincial Battalions and two independent companies in eastern Binh Son and Son Tinh Districts (united in VC Dong Son District). At the time of the ceasefire, both NVA/VC forces and ARVN were spread thin over several adjoining villages; a series of ARVN clearing operations, construction of ARVN and Territorial Force outposts, and implementation of a GVN Return-to-Village Program re-established GVN presence in the outlying areas; the NVA/VC, however, retained Binh Nam as a core for their base area. As late as June 1974, two battalions of the 6th Regiment sweeping through Binh Nam found little but holes, bunkers and a hospital complex, but suffered considerable casualties themselves to mines and booby traps.

In the summer of 1974, two ARVN battalions were deployed elsewhere; the NVA/VC struck out of Binh Nam and destroyed the GVN's Return-to-Village Program in the eastern part of the Binh Son and Son Tinh District. GVN maintained control of a small strip of land along Q.L.1, a bulge of territory east of Son Tinh District Town (towards Nui Thien An), and the villages in the far north of eastern Binh Son District.

Most of the population of the seized area fled to GVN control. An unknown number of people stayed behind. Visual reconnaissance by air of eastern Binh Son and Son Tinh now reveals many scattered small huts. Twenty to thirty large fishing boats operate in now-VC-controlled An Hai in Binh Duc Village; smaller fishing "cockleshells" are seen along the entire coast. GVN intelligence reports suggest the NVA/VC have several "points of entry" along this coast for waterborne traffic transhipped in small boats from Ly Son Island. Considerable tracts of recently cultivated land are visible. The total population of these eastern areas could be as high as 2,500.

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It should be noted that since October 1974 three separate GVN multi-battalion attempts to retake territory captured by the NVA/VC have failed. The newly formed 912 Regional Force Mobile Group in its first operation attempted to move into the southern portion of the NVA/VC-controlled area; after two days without contact it was hit by a multi-company ambush, suffered heavy casualties to its key battalion and was forced to withdraw. Later two battalions of the 6th Regiment of the ARVN 2nd Division suffered heavy casualties in northern Binh Son and were withdrawn to Cr 1st for refitting. Most recently, two Ranger battalions who replaced those of the 6th came under heavy attack and had to be replaced in this front line. The NVA/VC forces securing eastern Binh Son and Son Tinh are among the best of a very good NVA/VC force structure in Quang Ngai and will not be easily driven from the areas they control.

If the NVA continue to control these areas, they will very likely increase in population. Tens of thousands of people who formerly lived in villages in this area controlled by the VC are currently living hand-to-mouth existences in the district capitals and along the lines of communications. A realistic alternative for them might be to accept the NVA/VC's offer of land and security and return to their native villages.

Minh Long District. Minh Long was captured by the NVA in a four-hour assault late in August 1974. At the time of the attack, the Minh Long population was approximately 16,000, of which 9,000 have returned to GVN lines. The remaining persons have reportedly been kept in Minh Long as production cadre and some sent to farm and work in the neighboring Cong Hoa Valley (see below).

Cong Hoa River Valley, south Nghia Hanh District is a very fertile agricultural valley. Long held by the Communists, the northern portion was retaken by the GVN in a series of operations in 1973 but was overrun again by the NVA in 1974. The Cong Hoa Valley has considerable agricultural potential; accordingly many people from less fertile Minh Long District have been resettled in the Cong Hoa along the Song Ve River in the past three months. The NVA have secured the hills surrounding the Cong Hoa, but can also use it as an approach route for any future attacks into the lowland areas of Quang Ngai.

Upper Tra Khuc River, Quang Ngai Province: The Son Ha District Chief has identified a small civilian settlement 15 miles upstream on the Tra Khuc River from his headquarters. He reports approximately 50 houses, with the residents of the area engaged in road repair and farming. While little more is known about this settlement, it appears to resemble similar areas in Quang Nam and Quang Tin where civilians are settled in arable land along lines of communication.

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Ba To District and Environs. Ba To, a fertile river valley strategically located in south-central Quang Ngai, serves both as a major staging area for NVA main-force units and as a model "liberated area" for North Vietnamese propaganda, having been cited in several English and Vietnamese language radio broadcasts heard in Quang Ngai. GVN sources estimate the civilian population of Ba To to be approximately 4,000 persons, divided between Ba Thach and Ba Thuan Villages. Ba To was previously populated by Montagnards, some of whom fled when the district was overrun. While Ba To has some arable land that makes it a moderately productive agricultural location, its real value lies in its strategic position. Ba To has developed into a sizable base area as well as a civilian settlement, and can be used (as it was in the summer of 1974) as jumping-off points for NVA/VC attacks in other areas of Quang Ngai and in northern Binh Dinh Province.

Duc Pho District. Approximately 11,000 persons live in three different VC-controlled areas of the Duc Pho District in southern Quang Ngai. The largest number lived in a lowland area between the hills and Q.L.1 including parts of Pho Trang, Pho Hiep, Pho Nghia and Pho Thach Villages in the south-western part of the district. GVN outposts are maintained on hills surrounding this area, which itself is subjected to only occasional sweeps by GVN military forces. The second area, lying east of Duc Pho District town in Pho Thanh Village, has approximately 2,100 inhabitants. The third is north and west of the district town in Pho Nghia Village.

These agricultural communities are very productive, densely populated by natives of the area (as opposed to Communist cadre resettled from other areas) and are a firm base for NVA/VC military and political penetration of neighboring villages. The approaches to these areas are protected by a complete people's security system, including checkpoints and mine fields; Pho Thanh, for example, is ringed by a series of PF and RF outposts, but these forces have not run operations into Pho Thanh for several months. All indicators suggest a complete NVA/VC governmental and political structure has been established in each of these areas.

Western Mo Duc District. A small settled area of approximately 1,000 persons lies under NVA/VC control in Duc Son Village in western Mo Duc. According to Province officials, family of cadre live in this settlement.

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
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ANNEX B

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"LIBERATED AREAS"
in GVN Military Region 1

~~AS~~ Inhabited areas under
NVA/VC Control




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
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
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




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
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