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Africa Review (U)

15 February 1991

Declassified Under Authority of the
Interagency Security Classification Appeals
Panel,
E.O. 13526, sec. 5.3(b)(3)
ISCAP Appeal No. 2012-122, document 1
Declassification Date: July 22, 2022

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ALA AR 91-005
15 February 1991

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Africa Review (U)**Articles****Somalia: The United Somali Congress
Takes Over for Now** CIA Statute

The capture of Mogadishu last month by United Somali Congress (USC) rebels ended President Siad's 21 years of misrule, but an extensive, ethnically based civil war is likely to continue. USC leaders in Mogadishu have established an interim government and are trying to organize a conference of clan and rebel leaders later this month to discuss a democratic government and the economic benefits of a unified Somalia. Ethnic factionalism continues to divide the three main insurgencies, however, and the interim government will have difficulty overcoming longstanding separatist desires by some of the clans. CIA Statute

To the Victor Go the Spoils?

After nearly four weeks of fighting between the Hawiya-dominated USC and Siad loyalists from his Marehan clan, earlier this month Siad fled Mogadishu to the southwest—his ancestral home—accompanied by an armed retinue. The rebels quickly named Mogadishu businessman, Ali Mahdi Mohamed, as president, and subsequently announced a cabinet drawn mostly from the moderate political wing of the USC, the so-called Manifesto Group.¹ This moderate faction of the USC currently dominates the provisional government; leaders of the USC military wing remain on the periphery, and diverse reports suggest they have had significant disagreements with the moderates in the past. CIA Statute

The two other rebel groups, the northern, Ishaak-dominated Somali National Movement (SNM) and the southwestern, Ogadeni-based Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM), played no role in the final liberation

¹In May 1990 about 100 Mogadishu-based businessmen and politicians belonging to the USC signed a manifesto calling for Siad to step down. CIA Statute

Somalia's Parliamentary Experience

In the unlikely event the current regime overcomes threats from remaining Siad loyalists, wins the support of rival USC factions, and reconciles ethnic groups distrustful of Hawiya intentions, it probably will attempt to establish a constitutional, parliamentary system of government. Early public statements by the new President cited the pre-Siad constitution as his model. Somalia's previous democratic experiment, however, generated a multitude of political parties, indecision by the legislature, and finally Siad's 1969 military coup. We doubt that a political system that failed in the 1960s can produce a stable regime in a country now deeply fragmented by ethnically based armies that do not trust each other. CIA Statute

Until 1969 Somalia had a multiparty parliamentary system based on the 1960 independence constitution. Democratic government degenerated in its final years into corruption and the demands of competing lineage interests, however, culminating in the assassination of President Shermarke in 1969 and Siad's rise to power. Ethnic divisiveness was a significant factor in the failure of Somalia's democratic government. In the 1969 election—the country's last effort at a multiparty election—64 parties, only three of which were nationwide, fielded some 1,000 candidates. (U)

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On the Periphery of the World Economy

With few natural resources and an undeveloped infrastructure, Somalia has one of the world's poorest economies.

- *About 70 percent of the population lives at subsistence level; two-thirds raise livestock for a living and 15 to 20 percent farm settled landholdings.*
- *The dependence of Somalia's workforce, its limited manufacturing sector, and its export activities on livestock raising makes the economy highly susceptible to drought.* CIA

The economy shows little promise of sustained growth or progress toward self-sufficiency, despite nine years of IMF reform programs backed by substantial Western aid. Siad's policies were intended to ensure the loyalty of his key supporters, and in our view the economy paid a high price for his rigid adherence to this political agenda.

- *Friction with donors over Mogadishu's spotty record on reforms interrupted the flow of vital aid.*
- *Poor infrastructure, a failing educational system, and an outmoded bureaucracy have impaired Somalia's ability to absorb and use aid.*
- *The Marehan-dominated bureaucracy's blatant corruption alienated private and foreign investment, perpetuating Somalia's reliance on a fragile pastoral economy.*
- *Even if sustained peace emerges, any leader would need to mitigate the effects of the clan-based system of political patronage, the associated statist economic policies, and the dominance of the military to provide any chance for sustained economic development.*
- *Living standards, meanwhile, will fall further as Mogadishu is unable to cope effectively with population growth, employment of youths, and an educational system inadequate even by Third World standards.* CIA

of the capital and have so far enjoyed little influence with the provisional government. Both groups almost immediately denounced the Mahdi presidency, but more recently they have moderated their public statements and appear willing to negotiate with the USC on drafting a new constitution. SNM and SPM leaders almost certainly intend to press for greater authority during these negotiations, and the SNM particularly is concentrating on liberating most northern areas still in the hands of Siad loyalists to secure control of its clan areas CIA Statute

The Situation in Mogadishu

Although fighting in Mogadishu subsided with Siad's departure, Mahdi's provisional government apparently has had difficulty controlling the looters, deserters, and armed bandits roaming free in the capital. Refugees continue to flee to neighboring countries. 25X1

25X1 some of the ministers just appointed to the provisional government have fled Mogadishu out of concern for their personal safety. The new government is making public appeals for order and restraint by armed citizens, and 25X1 the national police are cooperating with regime attempts to restore order. The regime, however, probably will try to use its disorganized rebel forces to crack down if the violence continues CIA Statute

Armed rebel groups and Siad loyalists still operating in the countryside also pose a threat to peace in the capital. Siad refuses to 25X1 leave the country. 25X1 and he continues to try to rally enough troops to drive the USC

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from Mogadishu. 25X1 he may be assisted in such an effort by Somali Patriotic Movement military commander Omar Jess, 25X1 25X1 whose troops are close to the capital. 25X1 the interim government is attempting to induce Omar Jess to join the new regime. If an opposition force is assembling, the ill-disciplined USC fighters in Mogadishu might have trouble repelling an organized pro-Siad counterattack. CIA Statute

Challenges Ahead

Restoring order in Mogadishu is only the first of many daunting challenges facing the Mahdi government. Regaining control over the countryside and jump-starting the depressed economy are even more difficult tasks. Somalia's economy has been at a virtual standstill for more than a year; about two-thirds of the population live at bare subsistence levels. Economic aid from Western donors has all but ceased in recent years as security problems mounted, and government resources have been squandered on the military's futile efforts to defeat the various rebel movements. Humanitarian aid is desperately needed, but the fighting has left few institutions or personnel in place to help administer Western aid, if donors resume their assistance. The interim government has asked Washington to channel humanitarian assistance via Djibouti. CIA Statute

If Somalia is to survive as a unified nation, the new regime needs to organize political institutions that encourage Somalia's warring clans to cooperate

peacefully. 25X1 a delegation from Mogadishu recently visited Djibouti to seek advice on how to establish a stable government in a country with many ethnic divisions. The interim regime has already called a conference of rebel and clan leaders for 28 February to discuss forming a new constitution. 25X1 a delegation traveled to Berbera to persuade SNM leaders to participate in the conference. CIA Statute

Somalia's Interim Leadership

President Ali Mahdi Mohamed

Financier, vice-president of political wing of rebel United Somali Congress in Mogadishu in 1989-90 . . . supported both armed conflict, negotiations to remove Siad, 25X1 . . . detained briefly last May after signing widely disseminated manifesto criticizing Siad, calling for caretaker government to restore human rights, public order . . . had medical training in Egypt and Italy (1963-66) . . . elected to Somalia's People's Assembly in late 1960s . . . detained when Siad seized power in 1969 . . . after release in 1977, spent several years in hotel business . . . member, moderate Abgal Hawiye clan from central Somalia . . . about 50. CIA

Prime Minister Omar Arteh Ghalib

Experienced, popular politician . . . appointed by Siad in January in final effort to save regime . . . long career in government before imprisonment without trial in 1982 for plotting to overthrow Siad; death sentence in 1988 commuted to house arrest . . . earned education degree in UK in 1951 and taught for a decade, later served as counselor of UN mission; Foreign Minister (1969-76); Higher Education and Culture Minister (1976-78); and vice-chairman, People's Assembly (1978-1982) . . . member, Somalia's second largest clan, the Ishaak . . . age 60. CIA

We believe the Mahdi government will find no easy answers to Somalia's problems: Somali society and political groups are deeply fissured along clan and sub-clan lines, and most prominent leaders have narrow support bases within their own ethnic groups and little authority with the numerous armed factions. Somalia risks disintegrating as a nation, with regimes in Mogadishu simply one of numerous players on the country's political landscape. CIA Statute

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~~Secret~~**The Good News—A Better Crew in Mogadishu**

In our judgment, the leaders of the new regime, who appear more committed to reconciliation and consensus as the basis of a new government than most factions that had opposed Siad, stand the best chance of establishing a durable peace in a united Somalia. Mogadishu's radio broadcasts have been highly conciliatory, and President Mahdi has promised to resign if representatives to the clan conference in the capital do not support him. The prominent Somali businessmen and intellectuals in the cabinet, who advocated peaceful political change during Siad's last months in power, are among the most

educated and moderate Somalis. Their influence with the USC military leadership is limited, however, and they will probably have difficulty controlling fighters more used to violence than political compromise. Indeed, during Siad's last days, a cease-fire arranged by Manifesto Group leaders was ignored by USC armed combatants. 25X1

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South Africa: White Support for de Klerk Rises

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White support for President de Klerk—and presumably his bold reforms—rose in late 1990, according to private South African opinion polls, probably reflecting growing resignation to change among whites. Three different polling organizations reported increased support for de Klerk among both English speakers and Afrikaners. Nonetheless, polls also indicate that whites, particularly Afrikaners, feel pessimistic about 1991, a year in which the government has announced plans to repeal the remaining legal “pillars” of apartheid and during which it hopes to begin formal negotiations with blacks on a new constitution. White support for the reform program will probably fluctuate in the foreseeable future—as it has over the past year—in response to changes in the level of political violence, economic performance, or other factors affecting white security and lifestyles. CIA Statute

NP Recouping Some Support

Some whites who initially felt alienated by the bold reforms de Klerk announced in February 1990 may have returned to the ruling National Party (NP). Polls conducted by an independent market research group showed that last February 41 percent of white men preferred to see de Klerk as leader while 27 percent preferred Andries Treurnicht, leader of the rightwing Conservative Party (CP). By October, de Klerk was favored by 53 percent of this group, while support for Treurnicht dropped to 18 percent. De Klerk’s successful state visits overseas and the possibility that international sanctions may be eased against South Africa have undoubtedly contributed to growing white support. CIA Statute

Domestic political factors have played a role as well. As the government is not required to hold an election before March 1995, and the CP has been unable to gain any seats through by-elections, the ability of the right wing to play a proactive role is circumscribed. Moderate whites probably increasingly accept that no long-run alternative exists to reform, and view the CP

as offering only vague promises of a “white homeland.” As a result, the CP has probably begun to lose some of its recent converts. CIA Statute

Outlook

De Klerk’s resurgent popularity, while gratifying for the NP, may prove temporary, particularly after the bold reforms de Klerk announced in this year’s opening speech to Parliament. Pessimism among whites, coupled with wide swings in support for the government noted by the polls, suggests de Klerk will have to continue to work tirelessly to bring his constituency along as the reform process unfolds.¹ His failure to announce reforms of the Internal Security Act, which grants the security forces sweeping powers to quell unrest, suggests that de Klerk remains concerned about taking actions that might further erode the white community’s confidence that he will protect their interests. The CP, while not an electoral threat to the government, at least for the next several years, will continue to offer safe haven to whites shaken by de Klerk’s bold maneuvers. CIA Statute

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¹For more information see “De Klerk Leads Nationalists to Uncertain Future”, 28 September 1990. CIA Africa Review, ALA AR 90-022. CIA

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South Africa: De Klerk Clears the Way for Interim Local Governments CIA Statute

President de Klerk's recently announced plan to allow local white and black leaders to negotiate a new system of local government and establish interim structures reflects a significant compromise between Pretoria and the ANC on a divisive issue that had threatened to block progress in talks with the ANC. Both Pretoria and the ANC were forced to bow to pressure from black civic associations, which have campaigned since last year for the abolition of South Africa's racially segregated local governments, widely considered illegitimate and corrupt. Despite opposition from these associations, the ANC has agreed to let discredited black town councilors participate on Pretoria's side in talks on the future of local government. CIA Statute

Black Local Authorities: Separate But Not Equal
From its inception, the black local authority system has lacked legitimacy among the majority of township residents. Former President Botha set up black local authorities, township councils parallel to white town councils, in urban areas in 1982 to create a cadre of compliant black officials with whom Pretoria could pursue its agenda of limited racial reform. Many township officials took advantage of their positions to enrich themselves, undermining some township fiscal bases in the process. For example, black town councilors privatized township liquor stores, formerly a major source of tax revenues, assuming personal ownership in many cases. Meanwhile, Botha's relaxation of controls restricting black urbanization allowed township populations to grow rapidly and conditions to deteriorate. CIA Statute

Most townships have suffered from a critical lack of funding, poorly developed infrastructure, and weak tax bases. Apartheid residential restrictions have raised the costs of transport, housing, and services to township residents by forcing them to live long distances from city centers, where most jobs are located, and where taxes collected from industrial and commercial

enterprises defray some of the costs of utilities and infrastructure for whites. Botha established multiracial regional service councils to redistribute some tax revenues from white neighborhoods to black townships to counter this bias, but because council representation is determined according to the amount of bulk services a community purchases, white town councils have had near complete control over how local revenues are spent. CIA Statute

Civics Seek Collapse of Black Local Authorities
Black civic associations throughout the country have launched rent boycotts, involving nonpayment of rent and public utility charges, to force the collapse of the black local authority system, to pressure Pretoria to abolish racially segregated local government, and to focus attention on deteriorating socioeconomic conditions in the townships. Rent and utility fee boycotts spread from 10 townships in February 1990 to some 55 by July, causing Pretoria's budgetary allocations for the townships to dry up by mid-year. Council attempts to pressure residents to resume payments by temporarily cutting off services—electricity and water, for instance—were almost always unsuccessful. Protests calling for the resignations of all black councilors, attacks on individual councilors and their property, and the disorder generated by service cutoffs have led some 40 percent of South Africa's black councilors to resign, so that many councils can no longer function. CIA Statute

¹ In the East Rand Regional Services Council, for instance, the 19 black, Colored and Indian local authorities have a combined voting power of 22 percent, while the 13 white local authorities hold 78 percent of the vote. The redistribution of municipal revenues that has occurred to date has only marginally decreased white voting power. CIA Statute

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~~Secret~~***The Postapartheid City***

A variety of interest groups have begun to present ideas on what the postapartheid city should look like, but no consensus has formed yet. A recent Urban Foundation-sponsored report by the Private Sector Council on Urbanization, a coalition of business leaders, stated that the removal of racially based legislation is a prerequisite for a new urbanization policy, and that urbanization will be progressively dominated by the interests, needs, and numbers of black South Africans, according to press reports. The council advocates nonracial intercity development, increasing residential density in urban areas, and creating multipurpose development corridors connecting previously segregated parts of South African cities. Press reports say Pretoria is considering a tax on vacant urban land to pressure developers to build more housing or sell to others who will, but has yet to announce when such a tax might be instituted. CIA Statute

The Urban Foundation proposals are in broad agreement with the thinking of some civic members, who believe that population densities in both white and black areas will have to increase in the future to lower the per capita cost of services in all residential areas. These members have begun to identify vacant land in white areas between existing townships and city centers for future low-income residential development. Some civic members have criticized the Urban Foundation, however, for favoring a deracialized apartheid that allocates residential space according to class and income. They worry that Pretoria will buy off the civics, most of whose members come from more permanently housed communities—as opposed to the rapidly growing squatter settlements on the fringes of many townships—by transferring ownership of rental housing to current occupants. This could entrench relatively conservative blacks in the civics, whose demands are likely to be more easily met than those of the tens of thousands of squatters who live in makeshift shacks with no services. CIA Statute

Meanwhile, private housing developers are rapidly pulling out of black townships because of violence and the politicization of mortgage payments as part of the rent boycott campaign, increasing the pressure on Pretoria for a government-sponsored solution to the housing crisis. Black opposition plans to sponsor land invasions by squatters onto white-owned land were indefinitely postponed earlier this year after government ministers agreed to stop destroying existing squatter settlements, according to press reports. Recent press reporting suggests, however, that the civics may adopt this tactic at the local level to keep pressure on Pretoria and nearby white councils to improve township conditions. CIA Statute

The boycotts have drawn neighboring white city councils into the conflict at the local level, leaving them the options of confrontation or negotiation. Black town councils normally collect utility fees from township residents to pay for bulk services provided by nearby white councils, but boycotts have forced white city councils to either pay for township services, cut them off, or persuade residents to resume payments. In some townships where services have been cut off, violence, mass demonstrations by blacks in white areas, and black consumer boycotts of local white businesses

have resulted. As sewage and refuse have piled up, health conditions in the townships have worsened, raising white concerns that contaminated water supplies will spread disease from black townships into white residential areas. CIA Statute

Some white city councils have entered direct negotiations with the civic associations, which, in most cases have insisted that township rent and utility fees

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Maintaining de Facto Residential Apartheid

De Klerk's local government strategy appears designed to neither promote nor prevent racial integration, but to remove the legal machinery of apartheid-mandating segregation—the Group Areas Act and the Land Acts, among others. National Party members and South African academics, meanwhile, reassure anxious whites by pointing to the "American system" as justification for maintaining de facto local residential segregation through zoning laws and local ordinances specifying, for example, that no more than one family can occupy a dwelling. CIA Statute

Although Pretoria has removed all references to race in its most recent report on local government models, it hopes to entrench a system that is weighted to favor those with greater economic clout, an approach that some have characterized as "deracialized apartheid." Pretoria has offered four possible local government options for local negotiating groups to choose from:

- *Separate local authorities: Various communities would set up separate local authorities—presumably to be defined geographically, but in effect probably racially—with the stipulation that they be financially viable, unlike most black townships today.*
- *Local services councils: Independent local authorities would elect members from their own ranks to local services councils on the basis of their financial contributions, much like the existing regional services councils.*
- *Community government: Joint local authorities would be established, with the option of setting up neighborhood management committees to decide on matters of neighborhood interest only.*
- *The simple majority model: Minority protection in this model would be by proportional representation and the division into wards by financial criteria.* CIA Statute

be cut and that municipal tax revenues be redistributed. In the negotiations which ended the Soweto rent boycott in September 1990, for example, the Soweto Civic Association pressed for an "apartheid discount" based on its analysis of how apartheid policies affected urban income distribution. The study concluded that black townships were subsidizing white residential areas. The negotiations led to government agreement to write off some \$300 million in accumulated arrears. Further, both sides agreed to establish a metropolitan chamber with representatives from various Johannesburg white, Colored, Indian and black local governments to discuss nonracial, democratic approaches to metropolitan development planning and government. CIA Statute

De Klerk Clears the Way for Local Negotiations
The collapse of many black town councils and progress in some local negotiations probably convinced de Klerk to compromise and clear the way for negotiators to

establish interim local government structures. De Klerk announced in his speech to Parliament on 1 February that Pretoria would allow the creation of joint administrations—even to the point of merging currently segregated local authorities into a single body with a unified tax base—as long as the various authorities agreed to merge voluntarily. In talks with the ANC in January, Pretoria compromised on its insistence that existing local governments remain in place until national talks are completed in exchange for an agreement that black councilors be able to participate in local talks.^{25X1} The ANC insisted, however, that black councilors participate only on the government's side. CIA Statute

De Klerk is trying to forge a compromise to satisfy demands from disparate groups on local talks and the future status of local government. De Klerk explained

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that his aim is merely to remove legal impediments to local initiatives already under way, and that any structures established will be interim arrangements, presumably to be supplanted after agreements are reached at the national level. The ANC has asked the civic associations not to negotiate any binding agreements, however, fearing they might sacrifice long-term goals for short-term gains. Some opposition leaders are concerned that the civics are not qualified to negotiate successfully with white municipalities and might be outmaneuvered. 25X1

25X1 The ANC does not control the civics, and they are likely to press for tangible gains at the local level from the negotiations process. 25X1 suggests that white councils in many larger cities are ready to negotiate local government changes, but that whites in smaller cities and rural areas are more hesitant. De Klerk's insistence that parties join negotiations voluntarily will preclude many conservative white town councils from negotiating with blacks. CIA

On the issue of elections, De Klerk remains at odds with the ANC, which believes any new local government system must be based on nonracial municipal elections. It also insists that such elections can only be held after a new electoral system, including demarcation of constituencies, has been negotiated at the national level. De Klerk wants local negotiating groups to resolve the crisis in local government by using a consensual approach, with an implicit veto for whites on any major changes. De Klerk outlined in May 1990 options for local negotiating groups to choose from, ranging from racially segregated councils with adequate fiscal bases to integrated, nonracial metropolitan structures. Cabinet Minister Viljoen has said, however, that Pretoria was not ruling out the possibility that local elections could take place before the national negotiations are completed, 25X1 CIA

Outlook

Local negotiations to end the rent and utility fee boycotts, generally considered a prerequisite for talks about restructuring government at the local level, will probably proceed fitfully. Black civic associations will be hard-pressed to persuade boycotters, many of whom have not paid rent for months or even years, to resume

payments. In areas where conservatives dominate white town councils, any talks that take place are likely to be especially contentious; conservative white councilors may also try to use service cutoffs and the collapse of black local authorities to feed township violence and disrupt national-level negotiations. CIA Statute

Both Pretoria and the ANC will probably continue to support local negotiations as a way of including their supporters and rivals at the local level in the negotiations process and building support for further national level compromises. Although the local negotiations have just begun, they may help to build trust among rival groups and expose divergent interests to their rivals' thinking firsthand. Both Pretoria and the ANC probably hope establishing more legitimate local governments will help reduce the incidence of violence in the townships. Pretoria may even try to channel increased social spending through local negotiating groups in an effort to build support for consensual decisionmaking and increase the impact of local development efforts by encouraging community cooperation. CIA Statute

Pretoria, the ANC, the civics, and many whites probably agree that over the long term, post-apartheid government policy will have to redress past neglect of black residential areas. The issue of how tax rates and spending will be determined, however, is at the heart of negotiations at the national level, with Pretoria advocating consensual powersharing and most blacks in favor of majority rule. Most white town councils will probably be reluctant to accept major changes in the local government system, or a substantial redistribution of local tax revenues, until the outlines of government at the national level are negotiated. In the next few months, progress in local talks will probably be limited to areas where liberal white town councils are willing to talk with the black civics and are ready to divert some tax revenues into township development voluntarily.

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Ethiopia: Talking About Peace in Eritrea, Thinking About War (U)

Although President Mengistu and the Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF) have agreed to a second round of US-sponsored peace talks this month, both sides appear more interested in winning US support than making concessions to end the nearly 30-year-old Eritrean conflict. Each side is still determined to gain the upper hand on the battlefield before taking negotiations seriously. In addition to military action, in early January an EPLF hit team assassinated a prominent Muslim Eritrean who supported efforts to keep Eritrea united with Ethiopia. Addis Ababa and the EPLF have recently agreed, however, to procedures that permit the World Food Program (WFP) to deliver food to needy Eritreans on both sides of the battlelines through the port of Mits'iwa—almost a year after its capture by the EPLF. Nevertheless, we believe that more political cooperation between the regime and the EPLF will be needed if large amounts of food assistance are to flow through Mits'iwa on a regular basis. If, as we expect, fighting picks up later this month, the Mits'iwa relief operation probably will be jeopardized, putting up to 2 million Eritreans at risk to drought and famine.¹ CIA

On The Peace Front

With a lull on the battlefield, Mengistu and the EPLF have agreed to a second round of US-initiated and observed peace talks in Washington on 19-20 February.² The first round of preliminary negotiations in Washington last October failed to move the Eritrean peace process forward, in our view. During those talks, the government's negotiating team—reflecting Mengistu's determination to preserve "national unity"—offered the insurgents a vaguely defined federated

¹For additional information on the prospects for fighting in Ethiopia see Ethiopia: Military Showdown in the North? (U) on page 15. CIA

²Some minor skirmishing and artillery duels have continued on the three main fronts around Asmera at Ginda, Dekemhare, and Keren. The EPLF continues to shell Asmera's airport, but with less intensity than in late December and early January. CIA

status for Eritrea Province with significant powers reserved for the central government in Addis Ababa. The rebels, however, rejected that offer as not fundamentally different than previous government proposals of limited autonomy for Eritrea. They reiterated their longstanding demand for a UN-supervised provincial referendum offering a choice between independence and some form of genuine autonomy or federation within Ethiopia. CIA

Addis Ababa Still Wants It All. We have no evidence that Addis Ababa is considering meaningful political concessions during the coming peace talks. In our view, Addis Ababa's main interest in the negotiations is to appease Washington, which has made a renewal of full diplomatic relations and new economic support to Ethiopia contingent on a serious regime effort to resolve the Eritrean war peacefully. We believe that Mengistu has no intention of conceding Eritrean claims to self-rule and probably believes that the Ethiopian military sooner or later will gain the upper hand and pressure the insurgents to accept his regime's "unity" agenda. Mengistu apparently believes that the international blockade of Iraq has cut the EPLF off from its main source of supplies and will enable the Ethiopian military to deal effectively with the rebel threat. 25X1

25X1 Iraq has not been a major supporter of the Eritrean insurgents, who have relied mostly on arms captured from the government and financial contributions from Eritreans living overseas to sustain their military effort. CIA Statute

Addis Ababa may hope that the EPLF ultimately will compromise on their demand for self-determination if the Ethiopian military can hold the besieged Eritrean capital of Asmera and its vital airport.³ 25X1

³Mengistu's Asmera-based troops were cut off from supply except by air when the EPLF siezed the Red Sea port of Mits'iwa in February 1990. (U)

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ALA AR 91-005
15 February 1991

~~Secret~~**Background on the EPLF**

The Eritrean rebellion began in 1961 when Emperor Haile Selassie abolished Eritrea's UN-sanctioned federated status that was established after Italian colonial rule and absorbed the region into Ethiopia. The Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF) and its eventual successor, the Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF), have consistently put Eritrean independence on their political agenda; the EPLF seeks a plebiscite that could pave the way for Eritrean independence. After nearly 30 years of conflict, Eritrea has effectively become a stable power center independent of Addis Ababa, with government forces holding only Asmera and its environs and the Red Sea port of Aseb. The EPLF enjoys the strong support of a majority of Eritreans, and has built an array of industrial, educational, health, and military facilities as well as an extensive road network. CIA

Support Base

The EPLF draws its members from all parts of Eritrea Province, whose 3.2 million people are divided about equally between lowland Muslims and highland Christians. The first Eritrean group to challenge Haile Selassie's rule in 1961—the ELF—was largely Muslim, but suffered from factionalism. The EPLF, founded in 1970, grew rapidly with Christian support and by 1981 had expelled its Muslim rivals. The group's support base remains predominantly ethnic Tigray—the Christian, Tigrinya-speaking population of the south-central highlands. Many of these people were driven into rebellion largely by Mengistu's harsh rule over Eritrea in the 1970s and 1980s. The Tigrays, Eritrea's largest ethnic and cultural bloc, also dominate the EPLF leadership. The EPLF's military prowess, commitment to individual fighters, and unity, however, have won it substantial numbers of Muslim recruits. CIA
Statute

Ideology

The EPLF's ideology is rooted in Marxism. 25X1
25X1 *The leadership claims that after liberating Eritrea it will allow open political and mixed economic systems.* 25X1

25X1 Addis Ababa is trying to encourage Washington and other nations to pressure the EPLF into accepting Ethiopian territorial integrity. In our view, however, the fairly self-reliant Eritrean rebels are insulated from outside pressure. The Mengistu regime, moreover, believes that Ethiopia's strong support for the US-led coalition against Iraq will shift US and other international support to Addis Ababa's side in the Eritrean war. CIA Statute

Eritreans In No Compromising Mood. The EPLF, also interested in securing US diplomatic and other support, is trying to appear open to US peace efforts. Nonetheless, 25X1 the battle-hardened Eritrean rebels will not bend on their demand for a referendum. Moreover, we believe that as

long as Mengistu retains power there is little chance that the EPLF will reconsider its position. The Eritreans view Mengistu as untrustworthy and will not consent voluntarily to an Eritrean government in which his regime retains any political control. CIA Statute

In addition, the EPLF is apparently confident that it can halt any government military offensive and that it will ultimately force Mengistu to surrender Eritrea. Eritrean insurgent leaders almost certainly hope that a planned increase in military activity this month by the loosely allied Tigray People's Liberation Front, which controls territory less than 100 kilometers north of Addis Ababa, will bolster the EPLF's prospects for a military success.

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25X1 *The EPLF's relations with the Soviet Union are hostile at best, largely because of continued Soviet support to the Mengistu regime. The insurgents finally offered this month to release three Soviet POWs captured at the battle of Afabet in early 1988.* CIA Statute

Military Force

The EPLF has a force of up to 65,000 capable and well-disciplined fighters. 25X1
25X1
25X1

Although the Eritrean population is heavily dependent on international food aid, the rebel's military machine is built mostly on captured military equipment and contributions from Eritreans living overseas. CIA

Addis Ababa claims that the EPLF receives substantial Arab backing, but the EPLF's refusal to cooperate with rival Muslim Eritrean oppositionists based in neighboring Sudan has alienated Arab states and limited their support. The rebels depend on logistic support from bases in Sudan and probably buy arms in the thriving Middle East arms market. 25X1
25X1 CIA

The Eritrean insurgents cooperate militarily with other Ethiopian rebel movements—most important, the militarily effective Tigray People's Liberation Front and its insurgent allies—as they attempt to destabilize Addis Ababa. 25X1
25X1 CIA Statute

A successfully coordinated rebel campaign would hamper the regime's ability to reinforce the garrison at Asmera and could lead to its surrender. CIA Statute

official to cease his "anti-Eritrean activities." We have no indication that Hussein or other recent victims of EPLF hit squads received such notice. CIA

Underscoring EPLF confidence and determination to gain their independence, on 10 January an EPLF hit team in Asmera assassinated Hussein Ubeid Mubarek, one of the most prominent Muslim Eritreans advocating national unity. 25X1

Mits'iwa Relief Operation Demonstrates Uneasy Cooperation

Hussein was an English teacher at Asmera University, a deputy in the national Shengo (Parliament) in Addis Ababa, and a member of the regime's delegation to the failed Nairobi peace talks sponsored by former President Carter in November 1989. The EPLF's clandestine radio claimed responsibility for the murder, describing Hussein as a "criminal and enemy servant." CIA Statute

Despite EPLF hit teams and military tensions in Eritrea, WFP relief food has begun to flow through the rebel-held port of Mits'iwa this month.⁴ The government and the EPLF dragged their heels on agreeing to the Mits'iwa relief operation for several months, even though food stocks probably were dwindling for both sides in Eritrea. Addis Ababa was opposed to granting

The rebel radio has also broadcast a list of other Eritreans targeted for assassination. The EPLF has assassinated several prominent Eritreans who have supported the regime in the past few years. On at least one occasion, the EPLF claimed it warned the targeted

⁴Western donors consider the port to be the most efficient channel for supplying Eritrea's emergency food needs to civilians on both sides of the Eritrean war. The Mits'iwa relief operation is supplemented by the UN airlift of food aid from the Ethiopian Red Sea port of Aseb to Asmera. The airlift has been delivering about 140 metric tons of food per day to Asmera, but is due to be terminated this month. Donors estimate that some 330,000 to 375,000 metric tons of food aid will have to be delivered to Eritrea this year to prevent widespread starvation. CIA

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legitimacy to the EPLF's control of Mits'iwa by allowing international food aid to pass through the port. While the EPLF touted its willingness to allow food to pass through Mits'iwa on to government-controlled Asmera, it insisted on limiting the government's involvement in the operation to underscore Eritrean control over the port. After several months of negotiations and considerable pressure from aid donors, the government reluctantly agreed to the EPLF's procedural demands. CIA Statute

The Eritrean Relief Association (ERA), the relief arm of the EPLF, began distributing food aid on its side of the battle lines on 12 January after relief supplies arrived in Mits'iwa by ship from neighboring Djibouti. 25X1
 The first WFP relief trucks traveled down the mountainous road from government-controlled Asmera to the rebel-held port on 17 January. After loading over 800 metric tons of US wheat, 45 trucks returned to Asmera on 19 January. Since that time, more than seven truck convoys have traveled the Asmera-Mits'iwa route, bringing at least 6,000 metric tons of food to Asmera. CIA Statute

Relief trucks traveling from Asmera to Mits'iwa have been at great risk negotiating the kilometer-wide "no-mans-land" between government and rebel lines east of

Ginda, 19 kilometers northeast of Asmera. The road is littered with grenades, unexploded shells, and shrapnel, 25X1
 Defensive trenches reportedly run down to the road and mines, trip-wires, and other explosive devices are along both sides of the road. Artillery and small arms fire have continued along the ridge lines as the trucks have moved through the buffer zone. CIA Statute

Outlook

In our view, the limited compromises made by Addis Ababa and the Eritrean insurgents in support of the Mits'iwa relief channel are unlikely to be matched in the peace process. We believe both sides probably prefer to continue fighting rather than give ground on their fundamental and deep political convictions on Eritrea's status. For those at risk of starvation in Eritrea, an outbreak of serious fighting probably would threaten the critical Mits'iwa relief operation. CIA Statute

CIA Statute

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Ethiopia: Military Showdown in the North? (U)

After several months of small-scale combat in Eritrea and skirmishing in northern Shewa Province, the Ethiopian armed forces and their two main rebel opponents—the Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF) and the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF)—appear headed for major fighting. 25X1

25X1 CIA Statute

In our judgment, the rebels' best recipe for a successful campaign is a coordinated, multifront offensive that ties down the Ethiopian Army and prevents Addis Ababa from shifting combat units between EPLF and TPLF fronts. If such a rebel offensive is launched, we believe the decisive battles could take place in northern Shewa, where a breakthrough against the relatively untested government troops could lead to an assault against Addis Ababa. We believe, however, that if the rebel attacks are uncoordinated and are centered on one front at a time, the Ethiopian military has a good chance of withstanding the offensive. The Ethiopian High Command could concentrate its numerically superior forces by shifting troops from quiet areas to the active front. In addition, air assets could be used to greater effect—sorties could be concentrated, thus decreasing fuel and ammunition expenditures—if the rebel attacks are not coordinated. CIA Statute

Rebel Planning

25X1

25X1

25X1 defense planners in Addis Ababa believe the Tigray rebels are massing troops near Alem Ketema, about 125 kilometers north of the capital, for an offensive slated to begin no later than March. CIA Statute

The insurgents appear to be brimming with confidence as they plan their offensive. 25X1

25X1

25X1

the morale of the TPLF troops is high because they believe they soon will be engaged in the "final" action to end the long civil war. In addition, the Tigrays reportedly have used the recent lull in the fighting on their front to reinforce and resupply their troops, refine their internal organization, and expand their influence in the areas they now occupy. CIA Statute

The Government's Position

Although the insurgents generally hold the tactical initiative, the Ethiopian military, in our view, is far from a spent force. 25X1

25X1 during the last half of 1990 the Ethiopian armed forces made some modest gains, including:

- The regime's success last summer in blunting a major rebel push at Dekemhare in Eritrea.
- The government's continued ability to raise new recruits to replace combat casualties.
- The appointment last summer of more competent field commanders.

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- The maintenance of the aerial resupply link to the 2nd Army at Asmera that has thwarted EPLF efforts to compel the garrison's surrender. CIA

The High Command also has used its most potent weapon—airpower—to good effect despite fuel and pilot shortages. 25X1

25X1 25X1
 25X1 last October in northern Shewa Province, for example, several hundred TPLF troops were killed by government airstrikes. More recently, Air Force bombing was successful in mitigating rebel artillery that had been shelling the Asmera airbase with increasingly accurate fire. 25X1
 CIA Statute

Rebel and Government Options

25X1
 [Large redacted area]

CIA Statute

The rebels have a number of options for carrying out their offensive, but we believe that simultaneous attacks in Eritrea and northern Shewa offer the best chance for success. Such an offensive, in our view, would tie down the Ethiopian Army and drastically hamper its ability to transfer units from quiet areas to more threatened sectors. The Army's use of such "fire brigade" tactics last year helped it beat back uncoordinated rebel attacks on widely separate fronts. The simultaneous, multifront offensive scenario would also, in our opinion, make it difficult for the High Command to concentrate its airpower on any one front, and rapidly deplete the Air Force's already scarce fuel and ammunition reserves.

CIA Statute

If the insurgents adopt such a coordinated approach, we believe their main thrust will be in the northern Shewa region. The 80,000 government troops there—while outnumbering the TPLF by about 2 to 1—consist largely of raw recruits who have seen little combat and who are not especially well-entrenched defensively. Substantial rebel pressure on this front could result in a breakthrough or a retreat by the untested troops, either of which would leave the approaches to Addis Ababa open to insurgent forces that already are operating, in some instances, within 100 kilometers of the capital.

CIA Statute

In our judgment, a major rebel push in Eritrea is less likely to achieve a decisive victory. The 60,000 EPLF troops are outnumbered by about 3 to 1 and would be assaulting well dug-in defenders, a costly step they have so far avoided. 25X1 the military situation along the road between Asmera and Mits'iwa as reminiscent of a World War I landscape, with defensive trenches and minefields on both sides running right down to the main road. Ethiopian troop morale, moreover, has been on the rise during the past several months, and 25X1 the Army in Asmera has enough food and ammunition to sustain operations, has created a mobile reserve force of some six infantry divisions, and has stockpiled 2 million liters of aviation fuel. CIA Statute

In addition, we cannot rule out the possibility of a government offensive, either to defeat one or both rebel groups or to preempt an insurgent assault. Although we have no hard evidence indicating the High Command is planning such a move, 25X1 rumors over the past several months have suggested that the armed forces were contemplating an offensive. Moreover, Mengistu almost certainly remains vexed over the loss of Mits'iwa last year and is anxious for its recapture. 25X1

25X1

25X1

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In recent years the government has been singularly unsuccessful in conducting major offensive operations. Indeed, at Barentu in 1985, and again at Afabet in 1988 and Inde Selassie in 1989, large-scale Army attacks quickly bogged down because of a combination of poor tactical planning and effective rebel ambushes and defensive countermeasures. The government's failures have in turn led to insurgent counterattacks, breakthroughs, and a general rout of Army forces. CIA

month. 25X1
25X1

As a result, we believe both sides will seek some battlefield success as a means of enhancing their bargaining positions. CIA Statute

CIA Statute

The next round of heavy fighting in Ethiopia's civil war is likely to be launched to coincide with the new round of talks between the government and the EPLF this

¹The Ethiopian Government has, at various times, offered some ill-defined limited autonomy for Eritrea or federated status for the province, with the central government retaining substantial powers. The EPLF has remained unwavering in its demands for a provincial referendum, or plebescite, in which Eritreans choose their own destiny. CIA

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Mozambique: Emerging Multiparty Democracy (U)

Domestic politics have been in a state of flux over the past 18 months, and will probably remain so at least until the first multiparty election planned for later this year or next year. Under the leadership of the Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (FRELIMO), Mozambique was a single party Marxist-Leninist state from independence in 1975 until parliament's ratification of a new democratic constitution sanctioning a multiparty system last November. CIA Statute

The Road to Political Reform

President Chissano assumed power following former President Machel's death in a plane crash in October 1986, and almost immediately began to shift from hardline rhetoric toward more pragmatic politics. Chissano probably hoped to move away from some of the unpopular policies the government adopted at independence in an effort to broaden FRELIMO's base of support; FRELIMO membership has not increased significantly since 1975 and remains at about 1.5 percent of the population. In addition, Chissano may have hoped that by lowering FRELIMO's socialist profile he could isolate RENAMO—the anti-FRELIMO insurgency fighting the government since 1977—from its traditional backers in South Africa and the West who supported the rebels in part because of their purported opposition to Marxism. Moreover, he almost certainly sought to undermine RENAMO's vaguely democratic and pro-Western political agenda by preempting the calls of its leader Dhlakama for a multiparty system. Finally, Chissano probably hoped political reform would attract additional Western aid and foreign investment to help shore up Mozambique's failing economy and heavily indebted government. CIA Statute

At FRELIMO's Fifth Party Congress in July 1989 the Central Committee formally endorsed Chissano's reform program. The party:

- Dropped all references to Marxism-Leninism.
- Redefined itself as a party that seeks to express the will and feeling of all the people, rather than as a vanguard party.

- Legalized religious institutions, inviting Moslem and Christian leaders to join FRELIMO.
- Began the revision of the constitution to include presidential elections and the separation of party and state.
- Directed that foreign policy be based on Mozambique's national interests, rather than on the world labor movement, as in the past. CIA Statute

Last August the Central Committee endorsed Chissano's proposal to move to a multiparty democracy and announced that Maputo would hold direct presidential and parliamentary elections. At that time, Chissano called for the renovation of the FRELIMO party, and noted that his move to abolish Mozambique's one-party state was part of an international trend toward democracy. Partially in an effort to keep RENAMO off balance during peace talks in Rome, Maputo moved quickly to draft legislation to provide for competing parties, and encouraged opposition groups to join the electoral process as political parties. CIA Statute

FRELIMO will probably undergo significant changes before the elections. The Central Committee will meet in extraordinary session next month, and a Party Congress is likely to follow later in the year. Government and party executive positions—which coincided when Mozambique was a one-party state—will be separated in a multiparty system, and FRELIMO's Mass Democratic Organizations, such as women's committees and labor unions, have largely severed their ties to the party in an effort to establish themselves as independent interest groups. Nonetheless, most of Maputo's single-party power structures remain in place, and FRELIMO leaders do not appear to know how to restructure the government to provide for a multiparty system. CIA Statute

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Political Parties Likely to Participate in National Elections

FRELIMO (Front for the Liberation of Mozambique)

Although the FRELIMO party will enter Mozambique's first multiparty elections encumbered by major ideological splits and a top-heavy bureaucracy, it is likely to win the presidency and a majority in parliament. FRELIMO will probably win the election because it has access to government funding, enjoys name recognition, and has a well-established network of party activists extending down to rural districts and neighborhoods. Moreover, Chissano remains popular and is widely credited with improving living standards—at least in the cities—and trying to end the war. ^{25X1} FRELIMO plans to streamline its organization in anticipation of a competitive political environment, and has warned of impending deep staffing cuts. FRELIMO leaders will probably continue to try to change their image by disassociating themselves from Marxist rhetoric. CIA Statute

RENAMO (Mozambique National Resistance)

Whether RENAMO will enter the electoral process in time to participate in the first national elections is unclear. The insurgency has never enunciated a clear political agenda and has derived most of its popular support from its standing as the only alternative to a FRELIMO government. While RENAMO is an effective and well-organized fighting force, it lacks a political hierarchy and has made only a nominal attempt to govern civilian populations in rebel-held areas. RENAMO leader Dhlakama's vague calls for multiparty democracy and freedom of speech and religion have been overtaken by government reforms. CIA Statute

UNAMO (National Union of Mozambique)

Originally a small breakaway faction of RENAMO, UNAMO currently commands several hundred combatants fighting RENAMO in Zambezia Province under the leadership of Jimo Phiri. In an effort to weaken RENAMO and divide the opposition, Maputo ^{25X1}

New Constitution

By ratifying a new constitution last November, the government effectively undercut RENAMO's key political demands for multiparty democracy. RENAMO leaders have denied the legitimacy of the constitution because it was unilaterally proclaimed by FRELIMO. Despite such objections, RENAMO officials have so far been unable or unwilling to formulate a counter constitution. The new constitution enshrines certain individual rights such as the right to strike, religious freedom, freedom of speech and press, and presidential and parliamentary elections through direct universal suffrage. The constitution also grants all citizens the right to form and join political parties, and Chissano has added publicly that RENAMO may also form a party if it renounces violence. CIA Statute

Although the new constitution represents a significant step toward democracy, it retains clauses that could

potentially limit fundamental rights and undermine its basically democratic orientation. For example, the constitution does not limit the number of presidential terms, although terms have been curtailed to five years. While the constitution guarantees the right to own private property and asserts that the economy is based on the market, land remains the property of the state. In addition, broadcast media will continue to be state-owned, and a press law will regulate press freedom within strict parameters based on national security interests. CIA Statute

Laws Governing Multipartyism

The Popular Assembly in December passed the political party law that controls the registration and rights of political parties. To register, a party must present 100 signatures from each province; an outline of the party

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helped to develop its political agenda. ^{25X1} UNAMO's platform remains vague, however, resting on a program for "peace, prosperity, and democracy." ^{25X1} the UNAMO representative in Maputo, Joao Camacho, is an aggressive fundraiser who has requested money from most Western embassies in Maputo. CIA Statute

MONAMO/CUNIMO (Mozambique National Movement/Committee for Mozambican Unity)

MONAMO is a longstanding group of intellectuals organized under the leadership of self-exiled lawyers Maximo Dias and Domingos Arouca in Lisbon. The party has published a carefully crafted political program, proposing a "democratic, nonracial, and antitotalitarian government," and has written its own version of the constitution. It is the only party that maintains strict neutrality on ethnic and regional matters. MONAMO merged with CUNIMO—a smaller exile group based in eastern Germany—in November 1990. CUNIMO's membership is primarily from Tete Province, and its politics rely on charges of FRELIMO ethnic and regional discrimination. ^{25X1} this group may have significant trouble developing a political organization in Mozambique after years of exile. CIA Statute

PALMO (Liberal and Democratic Party of Mozambique)

The PALMO emerged in September 1990 when the group's manifesto began mysteriously to circulate in Maputo. Founded clandestinely last year by a group of mid-level intellectuals—businessmen, lawyers, and university professors—PALMO espouses an antiwhite, anti-Asian program, and probably hopes to gain support by capitalizing on anti-FRELIMO sentiment. PALMO's Maputo representative and one of the group's founding members, Martin Bilal, has widely distributed his party manifesto, and claims that PALMO has already collected "almost all" of the signatures necessary to register as a political party. While wary of PALMO's racist political agenda, most observers in Maputo believe that this platform could gain some measure of popular support. CIA Statute

program, organization, and rules; its financial accounts; and a logo. Registered political parties have the right to field candidates and participate in the government when elected. Moreover, they may raise funds, hold property and operate businesses, as well as freely disseminate information, divide or unite with other parties, and create social organizations. Political parties will receive central government funding proportional to their representation in the national legislature. ^{25X1} CIA Statute


Nonetheless, some provisions of the political party law give incumbents significant advantages. Party leaders must present birth certificates and records demonstrating residence in Mozambique—an obvious impediment to exiled political hopefuls, as well as to RENAMO members living in the bush. The law does not address party funding for the first general elections

when all incumbents, of course, will be FRELIMO members. Furthermore, parties may not be based in regional, religious, or racial groups, thereby eliminating, for example, a Christian Democratic or fundamentalist Moslem party, as well as parties with an overtly racist platform; such a provision could also be used against RENAMO, whose backing is primarily among the Ndau in central Mozambique. All political parties must eschew violence, which presupposes a cease-fire and probable integration of RENAMO forces into the Mozambican Army before RENAMO can participate in elections. CIA Statute

FRELIMO's electoral law, which probably will be passed by late March, is likely to come under heavy criticism from RENAMO because it was unilaterally

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In a multiparty system, identification between state and party will disappear; although party structure is likely to change dramatically, state structure will probably remain largely intact. CIA

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promulgated without input from the rebels or other emerging political parties. In principle, opposition parties will be able to read and amend the electoral law before it becomes final, but the closely held 150-page document has not yet been circulated, and it will probably not be open to modification after receiving Central Committee approval in early March. Although

25X1 the government delegation took a copy of the draft to peace talks in Rome in January to discuss with RENAMO, 25X1 the two sides did not engage in political discussions. Maputo is not likely to delay passing the law to accommodate potential RENAMO concerns, and RENAMO itself appears unable to formulate alternative language. CIA Statute

Outlook

While Maputo may not be fully committed to the implementation of democracy, Chissano is likely to continue the process so long as liberalization preempts RENAMO's anti-Marxist stance and attracts increased foreign investment and assistance. While Maputo is clearly willing to allow the insurgency to enter the

electoral process on the government's terms, FRELIMO is unlikely to make significant concessions to ensure that the rebels participate in the first elections. The government's political reform program has attracted increasing international aid and support and FRELIMO almost certainly believes—correctly in our judgment—that it has a negotiating edge over the rebels. CIA Statute

The war will continue to undercut the government's efforts to promote democracy. In the absence of a cease-fire, the possibility of a free and fair election in Mozambique is remote as each side vies for control over population and territory to strengthen its own constituency. Moreover, RENAMO has been the primary organized opposition to FRELIMO for 14 years, and if the rebels refuse to enter the political process, or are left behind, the legitimacy of elections will be undermined. CIA

CIA Statute

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Zambia: Views on Iraq—More Than Meets the Eye CIA Statute

Although Zambia's criticism of US efforts to expel Iraq from Kuwait underscores President Kaunda's peculiar brand of personal diplomacy, we judge his views also reflect longstanding political, military, and economic ties between the two countries. We believe that Zambia will continue to play an obstructionist role in resolving the Gulf crisis. CIA Statute

Critical of Coalition Actions

Since Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in August, and especially since the initiation of coalition military operations on 16 January, Zambia has stood out in Sub-Saharan Africa as a critic of US policy in the Gulf. 25X1

25X1

Kaunda 25X1

told a senior Iraqi official, who was visiting Lusaka as President Saddam's special envoy, that Zambia did not dispute Iraq's historical claim to Kuwait. 25X1

25X1 In addition, in his opening address to Parliament in October, Kaunda gave tepid support for the UN resolutions calling for Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait. He criticized the deployment of US troops to defend Saudi Arabia as an escalation of the crisis. Moreover, during his trip to Baghdad on 10-11 January, Kaunda failed to criticize Iraq's invasion of Kuwait and said that the United Nations, not the United States, should have taken the lead in finding a negotiated solution to the crisis, as the United States was a belligerent in the dispute. CIA Statute

Since the outbreak of hostilities between coalition forces and Iraq, Lusaka has been a regular public critic of the coalition's efforts to free Kuwait. Zambian Government-owned media have increased both their defense of Baghdad and attacks against the United States. These include:

- Kaunda's claim that allied forces were carrying out the mass murder of thousands of innocent children in Iraq and Kuwait.
- An editorial in the government-controlled newspaper that declared, "We are still disgusted at the treacherous aggression launched by the United States and its unprincipled allies in the guise of the United Nations to protect their material interests in the Middle East."
- A Zambian television broadcast on Iraq that supported Baghdad's historical claim to Kuwait and asserted that the West perpetuated the existence of Kuwait to destroy Iraq's economy and destabilize its political system. The program alleged that Iraq's invasion was meant to extend military assistance to Kuwait. CIA

Kaunda's World View

Kaunda's criticism of the United States is partially motivated by his world view. He deeply believes that regional conflicts are the result of superpower, mostly US, manipulation. 25X1 In addition, Kaunda often portrays himself as a leading world peacemaker, and he has sought to interject himself into diplomatic efforts to solve the Iran-Iraq war, the Palestinian issue, and conflicts in southern Africa. Kaunda often tries to use his self-image as a leading world diplomat to bolster his domestic political support. Facing a difficult political challenge in national elections this summer, Kaunda may be attempting to raise his international profile in an effort to boost his electoral prospects. CIA Statute

The Lusaka-Baghdad Connection

Zambia and Iraq have long had close political, economic, and military ties, which probably helps

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account for Lusaka's criticism of US Gulf policy. In the mid-1980s Zambia took an active role in defending Iraq against international charges of using chemical weapons on Kurdish dissidents and worked to block an investigation by the UN Security Council, of which it was a member. 25X1 In 1987, Zambia and Iraq established ties between their youth leagues, as well as communication links between their national news services. 25X1 Last summer, Kaunda used his relationship with Saddam to gain the release of a British nurse held in Baghdad as a spy, turning her over to the British ambassador before the international press in Lusaka. CIA Statute

Bilateral military relations blossomed over the past decade as Iraq provided Zambia with important arms and training, filling critical needs of Lusaka's armed forces. For example, in 1987, Iraq reportedly gave Zambia six MiG-21s—doubling Lusaka's operational inventory of such aircraft. 25X1 25X1

25X1 Iraq also provided about a dozen Soviet light tanks to the Zambian Army, thereby supplying about half of Lusaka's armored capability. 25X1 25X1

25X1

CIA Statute

While Zambia relies heavily on Western economic aid, Lusaka has made several important commercial deals with Iraq. In 1989, the two countries signed a \$20 million deal for Zambian copper in exchange for Iraqi oil as well as medical and agricultural training. Last summer, Baghdad agreed to reschedule a portion and cancel the balance of Zambia's small bilateral debt. 25X1 CIA Statute

Outlook

We believe that Zambia will continue to be recalcitrant over the Gulf. The combination of Zambia's significant links to Iraq and Kaunda's personal predilections makes it unlikely that Lusaka's views will become notably more compatible with coalition policies. Nonetheless, Zambia's inclinations alone probably will not prompt other African states to criticize the allies. Lusaka may, however, participate in attempts by other states allied with Baghdad to promulgate Iraqi propaganda and diplomatic themes in an effort to weaken coalition actions. CIA Statute

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Uganda: Relations With Neighbors Nosedive CIA Statute

In our judgment President Museveni's increasing fear of an attack from neighboring countries, accompanied by hostile charges levied against Kenya and Rwanda, is a direct result of his own mounting domestic problems. Unable to regain control over his Army, which was shaken late last year after thousands of ethnic Rwandese soldiers deserted to take up arms against Kigali, Museveni's grip on power may be slipping. 25X1 Kampala recently transferred nearly 100 members of the elite, heretofore trustworthy, Presidential protection unit after they were implicated in a failed attack on Museveni's motorcade. In addition, 25X1 Museveni, faced with an upsurge in long-running rebel activity in northern and eastern Uganda—dozens of soldiers have been killed in recent weeks—is increasingly concerned over numerous reports of mutiny and desertion in Ugandan Army units. CIA Statute

Museveni worries that neighboring countries are supporting his domestic opponents or are planning to invade Uganda themselves and set up a puppet regime—an understandable fear since Tanzania installed Obote and the Israelis and British are widely rumored to have put Amin in power. Late last month, for example, Museveni was convinced that a cross-border attack by Ugandan rebels would be followed by a three-pronged invasion of Uganda by Kenyan, Zairian, and Rwandan troops. 25X1

Kampala deployed some troops and antiaircraft batteries to the Kenyan border, and 25X1 25X1 Uganda is building defensive fortifications on its side of the border. CIA Statute

Museveni Stuck on Rwanda Tarbaby . . .
The Tutsi invasion of Rwanda last October generated allegations in the region that Museveni actively supported the rebels. Although Museveni has

repeatedly denied foreknowledge of the invasion or subsequent resupply of rebel forces, Kigali has ridiculed his claims of innocence and argued that rebels repeatedly mount attacks from Ugandan territory. Rhetoric between the capitals continues to be caustic. CIA Statute

The large rebel attack along the northwestern edge of Rwanda's border with Uganda recently has almost certainly renewed Kigali's concern that Museveni is bent on overthrowing President Habyarimana. Museveni argues that he has been wrongfully accused and claims that Kigali is supporting Ugandan rebels. The border situation has become increasingly volatile. Museveni has deployed antiaircraft artillery to the border in response to the persistent violation of Ugandan airspace by Rwandan surveillance aircraft. Shooting down intruding aircraft would prove Kigali's culpability. Several Ugandan villagers have been injured in cross-border attacks by Rwandan military units pursuing rebels, and at least one Rwandan soldier was recently killed after Ugandan Army units returned fire. CIA Statute

. . . While Tensions with Kenya Rise
Uganda's relations with Kenya have alternated between civility and belligerence, with Museveni and President Moi each worried that the other supports his opponents. Moreover, Museveni has long believed that Moi and Zaire's President Mobutu are plotting together to destabilize his regime. Museveni's fear has escalated because Kenya and Zaire—the latter sent troops to help Kigali fight its rebels—publicly supported Habyarimana and initially accepted Kigali's claim of a Ugandan conspiracy to overthrow the Rwandan regime. More recently, Museveni claimed that Ugandan rebels, loyal to former President Obote, were planning a massive cross-border attack from Kenya with Nairobi's complicity. CIA Statute

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ALA AR 91-005
15 February 1991

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In recent weeks the verbal mudslinging between Nairobi and Kampala has become more shrill and mutual accusations increasingly serious. Nairobi has denied any hostile intent toward Uganda and accused Museveni of massing troops on the border for offensive, not defensive, purposes. Senior Kenyan officials—taking their lead from Moi—are charging that Kampala, in collaboration with Libya, has been training Kenyan dissidents for subversive operations against Moi. The Kenyan press, moreover, claims that the Ugandan Army plans to invade and annex parts of Kenya in order to satisfy Museveni's territorial ambitions. One recent editorial in a government-sponsored Kenyan newspaper warned Museveni that "If he goes too far, the neighbors will attack Uganda . . . Their patience may be running out." Kampala, for its part, remains steadfast in its original charges that Nairobi is assisting Museveni's opponents, claiming that Nairobi's "hysterical rhetoric only illustrates the mentality of an unbalanced regime."

CIA Statute

Will Cooler Heads Prevail?

We believe that none of the neighboring countries sees it in their interest to initiate armed hostilities, but Moi and Habyarimana probably will continue to blame Museveni for many of their problems. Such heightened tensions and deep-rooted mistrust may lead to limited border skirmishes between security forces. Museveni has previously issued low-key responses to rhetoric from neighboring leaders and used backchannel communications on "security problems" to defuse bilateral tensions. We are concerned, however, that if he becomes overwhelmed by his domestic problems and has difficulty coping with what he considers are unfounded allegations against him, Museveni will become less than conciliatory. In such circumstances, Museveni might easily perceive certain events—such as the recent movement of Libyan dissidents to Kenya—as further evidence of Nairobi's hostile intentions. CIA Statute

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Tanzania: Outlook for Reform CIA Statute

President Mwinyi's reelection last October to another five-year term gives him the opportunity to enact much-called-for but controversial political and economic reforms. Although the ruling party, Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM), further undermined the public's declining faith in Tanzania's one-party system by its heavyhanded manipulation of the election, Mwinyi apparently retained his popularity with Tanzanians who hope he can address the country's economic and political problems. Mwinyi is unlikely to carry out significant political changes, however, despite his public calls for democratization, because stalwarts in the CCM will strenuously resist even minor political reforms that deprive them of their long-held privileged position in Tanzanian society. If Mwinyi implements only a handful of relatively minor reforms in the next few years, he runs the risk that Tanzanians may lose faith in his promises, while party stalwarts criticize him for raising public expectations unnecessarily. CIA

A Disgruntled Populace

The poor voter turnout in the presidential and parliamentary election in October probably reflects growing disillusionment among Tanzanians with the ruling party and the one-party system. After over 25 years of "African Socialism," per capita incomes are still stuck at poverty levels, spot shortages of food and basic goods persist, and, 25X1 corruption is endemic and oppressive. Not surprisingly, Tanzanians were apathetic about voting—less than half the voting age population cast ballots, 25X1 25X1 in what they saw as a predetermined election. Party and government officials threatened civil servants with dismissal if they did not register to vote and withheld rationed goods from others lacking registration cards. 25X1 election officials skewed voting by "helping" illiterate voters mark their ballots and "losing" ballot boxes that favored the wrong parliamentary candidate. Indeed, only 33 members of Tanzania's 241-seat parliament lost their seats to political newcomers. Nevertheless, 25X1 according to the official tally 25X1

25X1 Mwinyi, the only presidential candidate, won an overwhelming percentage of the votes cast—probably because of his vigorous campaigning during the election in which he crisscrossed Tanzania calling for reform of the political system. As a result, 25X1 Mwinyi is seen as being on the side of the man in the street and in the village, and against the stale, corrupt, and oppressive CCM party cadre. CIA

The most serious protests against the election occurred in Zanzibar and Pemba, two islands approximately 25 miles from the mainland that comprise a semiautonomous region of Tanzania. Predominantly Muslim with strong pro-Arab sentiments, Zanzibaris have long resented mainland control over their islands' politics. The presence of government security on election day, however, prevented any outbreaks of violence. Many protesters were arrested for failing to register to vote, and 14 opposition leaders were held without charges for almost six weeks, 25X1

25X1 They were released only after numerous demarches from Washington to the Zanzibari President. CIA

Mwinyi on Reform

Mwinyi has tried to win public support with statements outlining his plans for political reform and by allowing greater freedom in the government-controlled press. Articles debating the pros and cons of a multiparty system have been appearing in Tanzanian newspapers for months. Mwinyi said that Tanzania will make the transition to multiparty democracy within the next two to three years, 25X1 Many Tanzanians expect the next presidential election in 1995 to be a contest between different parties CIA

Nonetheless, we believe Mwinyi is reluctant to carry out political reforms that would lead to genuine opposition. He has said, for instance, that he intends to remain "in

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full control of the process" of transition to a multiparty system. ^{25X1} Mwinyi is variously described as someone easily influenced and weak-willed, lacking self-assurance when challenged. As CCM Chairman, he is all too aware of the party's resistance to political reforms. Although he now wields more influence as both President and party chief, the quiescent Mwinyi prefers to avoid confrontation. We believe he would be unlikely to meet the challenge from the vested political interests and an entrenched bureaucracy, especially to promote political reforms to which he is not fully committed. ^{CIA Statute}

Mwinyi is likely to make some changes at the margin, however. For example, he merged the regional and district CCM positions with the regional and district government posts. ^{25X1} thus eliminating a costly and redundant feature of Tanzania's political system. A report from a government-sponsored working group on reform says Mwinyi will ask CCM Secretary General Kolimba to completely restructure the party, modifying or abandoning its socialist aspects and removing political commissars from the armed forces. Streamlining bureaucratic inefficiency and overhauling an outdated party structure are only the first steps in the sweeping political changes that many Tanzanians hope Mwinyi will eventually make to end the political monopoly of the discredited CCM. ^{CIA Statute}

Mwinyi has demonstrated a commitment to moving Tanzania from a statist economy toward a more competitive free-market economy. ^{25X1} In our judgment, Mwinyi may realize that the prospects for his presidency and stability in Tanzania depend on improved living standards. He has established a commission to look into reforms in the monetary and banking system that proposed reducing the government's role in controlling and managing the economy. ^{25X1} Private shareholders are to gain up to 75 percent control in government-owned commercial banks, and private local and foreign development banks are to be encouraged. Earlier last year the Tanzanian parliament took a step toward developing local capitalism by passing a new national investment promotion policy. Moreover, ^{25X1}

Economic Reforms - The IMF's Agenda for Tanzania

^{25X1} he IMF is pushing Tanzania to adopt a number of reforms to increase the economy's efficiency, including:

- Open up the banking sector to foreign banks.
- Decrease government financial support to parastatal companies.
- Raise prices for producers of export crops.
- Devalue the exchange rate to levels closer to a market-determined equilibrium rate. ^{CIA Statute}

^{25X1} Mwinyi remarked during a recent speech that "nationalization" should be barred from the Tanzanian vocabulary. ^{CIA Statute}

Party Opposition to Change

The party bureaucracy will certainly resist most political and economic reforms. Party stalwarts, who continue to adhere to Nyerere-style socialism, wield significant power in both the government and the party. Minister of Information Mkapa, for example, who was a Nyerere crony and a vitriolic anti-West gadfly in his previous post as Foreign Minister, is now CCM Chairman of International Affairs. Former CCM Secretary General Kawawa now holds the less prestigious title of party Vice Chairman, but some of the secretary general's responsibilities moved with him. Former Prime Minister Warioba—reportedly Nyerere's nephew—remains in the cabinet, although he now has somewhat less influence as the Minister of Regional Administration and Local Government. ^{CIA Statute}

As CCM Chairman, Mwinyi is well aware of the party bureaucracy's opposition to reforms, and we believe Mwinyi has concluded that the government bureaucracy must be streamlined and the archaic CCM modernized. He excluded party officials from the working group on multiparty democracy, for instance, because he "knows

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what their conclusions would be," 25X1
 25X1 Although the relationship between the party and government is not clearly defined, the CCM still has primary responsibility for formulating national policy. 25X1 he CCM has yet to outline its future role in managing the economy, for example, and this probable antireform policy position is likely to stifle change. CIA Statute

Outlook

We believe Mwinvi's statements to the Tanzanian public 25X1 belie his reluctance to implement reforms. In our judgment, he will probably continue to speak publicly on reform and multipartyism to assuage his disgruntled populace, but will actually carry out only minor changes. Even though he is more willing to push for difficult economic reforms, the ambitious changes recommended by his presidential commission require financial and manpower resources that Mwinvi's government probably does not possess. CIA Statute

Although some senior government officials pushing for reform belong to a working group on multiparty democracy, we believe that most officials will resist changes, and Mwinvi will be unwilling to confront them. Public pressure for political change is likely to escalate, and protests on Zanzibar may become more explosive, but the Tanzanians' political passivity suggests that widespread demonstrations are unlikely to materialize. In our judgment, if the economy continues to grow modestly, Mwinvi will be able to control the pace and scale of reforms, and multiparty proponents are unlikely to threaten his rule. We also believe, however, that Mwinvi has raised expectations in favor of reform to such an extent that he could not now reverse course and return to the policies of African socialism founded by former President Nyerere. CIA Statute

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Senegal: Casamance Discontent A Long-Term Challenge ^{CIA Statute}

Recent government efforts to subdue rebels seeking independence for Senegal's southern Casamance region, an area ethnically and religiously distinct from the rest of the country, have had some success, but tension between Dakar and the local population is unlikely to subside any time soon. Although the separatists are divided over tactics and do not enjoy widespread popular support, repressive measures by security forces have led to a backlash of hostility toward the government. In addition, local resentment brought on by years of official neglect virtually guarantees that demands for greater autonomy from Dakar will continue to enjoy strong support in the Casamance even if the government succeeds in eliminating the armed element of the separatist movement. ^{CIA Statute}

Government Making Some Progress . . .

Dakar's security measures to counter a major upsurge in separatist guerrilla activity—focused in Ziguinchor, one of the Casamance's two regions—have been partially successful. Despite persistent attacks by the Movement of Democratic Forces in the Casamance (MFDC) that have left more than 31 civilians killed and 118 wounded during the past year, most Senegalese security officials reportedly believe that the military situation is now under control. Dakar sent reinforcements to the Casamance to counter anticipated violence as the MFDC's seventh anniversary approached in early December; the group's failure to stage a major attack was seen as a government victory. Dakar currently has six battalions deployed in the Casamance, including elite units of the Air Force and Navy. As a result of the crackdown, 236 local residents are awaiting trial for separatist-related activities in the past year. In addition, Dakar has pressed The Gambia and Guinea-Bissau—previously accused of supporting the guerrillas—for joint patrols and military cooperation to prevent separatists from operating across their borders. Finally, the regional administration has established defense committees in each Casamance village charged with keeping the guerrillas out. ^{CIA Statute}

In addition to military measures, the government has begun a public relations campaign to undermine the separatists' political and financial support and reduce MFDC civilian membership. ^{25X1} Local National Assembly deputies, representing both the ruling and opposition parties, were sent into villages to emphasize the criminal nature of MFDC activities and underscore the infeasibility of independence for the Casamance. A well-publicized offer of amnesty in June to MFDC members not previously implicated in violence reportedly resulted in hundreds of membership cards being turned in to local officials; government claims to possess secret MFDC membership lists undoubtedly prompted much of the cooperation. The semiofficial press has also run prominent articles on the success of the amnesty program, the terms of which President Diouf reiterated in his New Year's day address. ^{CIA Statute}

. . . Against a House Divided

Divisions within the separatist movement and the increase in its use of violence and intimidation tactics in the past year have undermined much of its support. ^{25X1}

^{25X1} the MFDC's military wing has split into three loosely organized groups of 10 to 15 members that disagree over strategy and whose activities are largely uncoordinated. The lack of a unified MFDC leadership has hindered the governor's ability to negotiate a settlement and made separatist attacks much more difficult to anticipate. ^{CIA Statute}

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~~Secret~~**Repression Fuels Antigovernment Sentiment**

Despite the progress in quelling separatist activities, security force repression has angered the local population, which generally favors greater autonomy instead of independence for the Casamance. 25X1

25X1 Dakar failed to take advantage of growing local antipathy toward the MFDC's use of violence, pursuing a military course instead of political proposals that might have won support for the government. Security forces reportedly deliberately chose fear and intimidation tactics—like those the guerrillas had initially used to coerce the local population—to persuade civilians to end their support for the separatists. Large-scale arrests and interrogations, indiscriminate searches, and periodic burning of huts, however, have inspired a backlash of hostility against Dakar and caused some residents to flee to The Gambia and to northern Guinea-Bissau. In addition, government claims that all civilians killed so far in clashes have been either separatists or MFDC sympathizers probably have undermined Dakar's credibility with the local population. CIA Statute

The security crackdown in the Casamance, home to approximately 15 percent of Senegal's 7.75 million people, is only the most recent bone of contention between Dakar and the isolated region, which is separated from most of the country by The Gambia. Residents believe the region has long been neglected by the government, which instead has channeled development funds to more politically important areas. Many blame the government for high taxes, corruption, and bureaucratic controls that have compounded unemployment and economic stagnation in the

Casamance, Senegal's richest agricultural region. Diouf has sought to counter discontent and alienation from Dakar by including two representatives from the Casamance in his cabinet. 25X1

25X1 Ziguinchor residents have resented Dakar's imposition of regional officials who are chosen primarily for their ethnic background and do not necessarily enjoy the support of the local political power structure. In addition, hostility still lingers from the early 1980s, when Ziguinchor's appointed governor and mayor arranged for the sale to northern developers of lands traditionally held and worked by the area's majority Diola ethnic group. CIA Statute

Outlook

Prospects for peace in the Casamance will depend largely on Dakar's willingness to consider political solutions instead of harsh military tactics. Security forces probably will be unable to eradicate completely the armed MFDC groups, who can easily blend into the local population and are more familiar with the terrain. Moreover, Dakar's efforts so far to undermine civilian support have depended more on intimidation than on winning genuine acceptance of the government position, raising doubts about the actual impact they have had on support for the MFDC. The widespread desire for more autonomy in the Casamance—if not for outright independence—will almost certainly remain strong and provide fertile ground for rebel recruitment until Dakar more effectively addresses the longstanding grievances of the local population. CIA Statute

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
Indian Ocean Islands: Mixed Reactions to Gulf War CIA Statute

Public reactions to the Gulf war from the Indian Ocean islands of Mauritius, Madagascar, Seychelles and Comoros reflect the region's diverse religious beliefs and political leanings. Although most islanders condemn Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, many also oppose a military solution to the crisis. As citizens of nonaligned countries, islanders often advocate the demilitarization of the Southwest Indian Ocean. Mauritians, who continue to lay claims to Diego Garcia, object that the US military facility on that island is supporting Operation Desert Storm. CIA Statute

Seychelles—Support for the Coalition

The overwhelmingly Christian, pro-West Seychellois unanimously condemn Saddam and support Operation Desert Storm. 25X1

The war has so **dominated** public consciousness—and the government-controlled media—that a rumor that the US Embassy was running live television coverage of the conflict drew Seychellois to the US cultural center to sit for hours waiting for the phantom broadcast. Despite the government's socialist leanings and its one-party system, 25X1 local support for allied forces reaffirms 25X1 that Seychellois genuinely like Americans. CIA Statute

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Mauritius—Concerns Over Diego Garcia

The diverse independent press in Mauritius—a democratic nation comprised of more than 50 percent Hindus, 30 percent Christians, and 17 percent Muslims—has generally displayed subdued pro-Iraqi sympathies. 25X1 Although some editorials condemn the Iraqi invasion of

Kuwait, most commentaries also deplore the use of military force to resolve the crisis. Articles singling out the United States for criticism have appeared in a radical Muslim paper. (U)

Many editorials—and two attempted demonstrations—have focused on the US Navy support facility on Diego Garcia, a Mauritian-claimed, UK-administered island 1,180 miles northeast of Mauritius. Mauritian officials claim that in 1965 they were forced by London to cede the island to hasten Mauritian independence from the United Kingdom. Britain built defense facilities on Diego Garcia and subsequently established a joint defense agreement with the United States for their use. 25X1 a 22-group Antiwar Committee, which has long been the seat of opposition to the US base on Diego Garcia, planned a protest in front of the Embassy last month, but Mauritian authorities refused to issue them a permit. 25X1 a Muslim group carrying anti-US and some pro-Palestinian signs demonstrated for approximately 20 minutes in front of the Embassy. (U)

Madagascar—Calls for a Peaceful Settlement

No war-related demonstrations have been reported on Madagascar, a nonaligned state that has recently relaxed press restrictions and allowed legal opposition parties. Christians and Muslims are both minorities in a population that follows traditional animist beliefs. Most press commentary initially supported the coalition forces, but more recent editorials are calling for negotiations to end the war peacefully. Nonetheless, the Malagasy press almost unanimously condemns the Iraqi invasion. 25X1 Madagascar's independent press opposed Saddam's actions but were concerned that a lasting peace be established after the fighting ends. CIA Statute

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~~Secret~~**Comoros—Muslim Ties Surfacing**

Public sentiment in Comoros, an Islamic republic that is overwhelmingly Sunni Muslim, has been more strongly antiwar and anti-US than on the other islands. A group of some 60 high school students held two low-key pro-Iraqi demonstrations, but another group demonstrated in support of Kuwait. 25X1

25X1 Comorans in general sympathize with the plight of Kuwait, but disagree with using military force to end the crisis. In one of the oddest war-related demonstrations reported in the Indian Ocean Islands, 25X1 a small flock of sheep wandered the streets of one Comoran island town carrying signs around their necks protesting the war. CIA Statute

Although the protests are basically antiwar, an undercurrent of anti-West and anti-US sentiment runs through much Comoran press coverage and public sentiment. 25X1

Comorans feel tugs of Muslim brotherhood toward Iraq, even though they support Kuwaiti sovereignty. The

Cadi of Moroni, a judge in an Islamic court, even said that Americans are "killers," and the US objective is to destroy Islam. CIA Statute

Outlook—An Ambivalent Public

In our judgment, citizens of the small nonaligned island nations in the Indian Ocean are torn between fearing the aggressive behavior of any large militaristic nation like Iraq, and their general distrust, rooted in a colonial past, of Western interests. The islands' governments have supported the coalition in the Gulf, and although small-scale antiwar or even anti-US demonstrations may occur, public protest is unlikely to change their position. Moreover, most governments, reflecting the region's history of instability, still maintain tight control over their populations, and will not allow protests to become large or unruly. CIA Statute

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Burundi: Striving for Ethnic Harmony and Political Reform

CIA Statute

Reforms adopted under Burundi's National Unity Charter have resulted in the dissolution of the ruling party's central committee, inaugurated public debate on multipartyism, and prompted new cooperation among opposition groups, but President Buyoya probably hopes to parlay his personal popularity into continued political control. The Charter, first outlined in a May 1990 address by Buyoya, was adopted by the ruling National Unity and Progress Party (UPRONA) at an extraordinary congress in December and approved by a national referendum on 5 February. It calls for an end to the longstanding enmity between the majority Hutus and the minority but dominant Tutsis. Ethnic tensions exploded in 1988 into tribal massacres that left some 5,000 dead and created some 50,000 mostly Hutu refugees in neighboring countries. The Charter also sets the stage for further political reform, the repatriation of Burundian refugees, and a transition to a more democratic, civilian-led government. The Military Committee for National Salvation, through which Buyoya has ruled since seizing power in a coup in 1987, already has been replaced by an ethnically balanced and broadly based civilian authority chaired by Buyoya.

CIA Statute

While the Charter's guidelines on ethnic harmony and respect for human rights received unanimous support, delegates to UPRONA's congress were divided over the issue of political pluralism. Those strongly in favor of continuing a one-party system were mainly rural delegates. ^{25X1} much of the rural population associates the post-independence ethnic massacres of the late 1960s and early 70s with the turbulent political atmosphere—and multiparty system—that preceded them. Other elements favoring the status quo are hardline Tutsis, many of them members of the military, and a vocal faction of UPRONA party stalwarts who see their privileged positions threatened by an end to the party's monopoly of power. Forces favoring a multiparty system include Hutu activists, a handful of small prodemocracy political groupings that have sprung up since Buyoya embarked on his reform

program, the Hutu refugee community abroad, and a majority of educated Tutsis and Hutus. The new civilian-led central committee is charged with creating new political, social, and economic institutions and laws and the drafting this year of a new constitution for approval by a national referendum, probably in 1992.

CIA Statute

Amid growing speculation that Buyoya intends to adopt a multiparty system and is positioning UPRONA to assume a predominant role, the factionalized opposition is exploring ways to increase its domestic support.

^{25X1} the most radical opposition group, the outlawed Party for the Liberation of the Hutu People (Palipehutu), is considering an alliance with other opposition elements in an effort to drop its Hutu ethnic identification and create a broader opposition front—even though Hutus comprise 85 percent of the population. Taking advantage of Buyoya's public call for the return of all refugees, several Palipehutu activists have returned to Burundi. At least one Palipehutu member was among the delegates to the December UPRONA congress, attending as a representative of Burundi's refugees abroad. ^{25X1} other opposition groups expect the popular Buyoya to be UPRONA's candidate in any future presidential elections and are willing to consider Palipehutu overtures for the creation of an opposition coalition united behind a single presidential candidate, such as a Hutu government minister. Representatives of the Front for Democracy in Burundi, for example, claim that while they would not expect a coalition to defeat Buyoya, the effort would establish the legitimacy of opposition participation in the political process. CIA

The President's program of ethnic and political reform has co-opted much of the opposition's democratization platform and made other key aspects of it—such as ethnically based politics—increasingly untenable. Buyoya probably calculates that many Hutus want to

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avoid another round of ethnic bloodletting and will support his reforms. Opposition groups, while still outlawed, are trying to broaden their appeal and position themselves for a future role by moderating their demands. Although the more open political atmosphere has allowed for some expression of dissenting views, the opposition has focused its criticism on the government rather than the popular Buyoya, calling for a rapid transition to majority rule. CIA Statute

Buyoya, the primary force behind Burundi's move toward more democratic government, is proceeding cautiously and using the party as the instrument for change. He may calculate that reform is necessary to satisfy key Western patrons, especially former colonial power Belgium, but probably is seeking a power-sharing formula that would satisfy the demand for political pluralism without necessarily resorting to multipartyism or majority rule. As he broadens participation in

UPRONA and emphasizes public debate, the President probably will reassure his Tutsi supporters and counter hardline resistance by pointing to the continued role of the military in the new Central Committee and stressing continued reliance on UPRONA as the "pillar and shield of Burundian unity" and "the surest path to development." Buyoya also will almost certainly keep a close eye on the timing of any future elections—carefully left open so far—to maximize his personal popularity and continued UPRONA party, and Tutsi, hegemony. By raising expectations of more fundamental change, however, Buyoya risks disappointing the Hutu majority and inflaming ethnic tensions. CIA Statute

CIA Statute

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Briefs****Nigeria****Rescheduling Debt** CIA Statute

Nigeria recently negotiated a Paris Club rescheduling of \$3.2 billion in official debt falling due before the end of March 1992, helping to ease the return to civilian rule scheduled for late 1992. Development aid loans were rescheduled over 20 years with a 10-year grace period, and commercial credits over 15 years with an eight-year grace period. 25X1 Creditors rejected Lagos's appeal for debt forgiveness, citing Nigeria's recent oil windfall from the Persian Gulf crisis, but gave it repayment terms for lower middle income countries. To qualify for the rescheduling, Nigeria had earlier reached agreement with the IMF on a \$449 million standby facility, but as in the past it almost certainly will not draw on the standby because of domestic political sensitivities. Lagos probably believes the Paris Club rescheduling will put pressure on foreign bank creditors to reach agreement soon on a London Club rescheduling of commercial bank debt. Nonetheless, the payment of more than \$250 million in interest arrears Nigeria has accumulated since Lagos unilaterally cut the interest rate it honors remains a sticking point, according to press reports. President Babangida's military regime is committed to easing the debt service burden on Nigeria's \$35 billion foreign debt to reduce financial constraints on the civilian government that will take control in 1992. CIA Statute


Guinea**Backsliding on Environmental Protection** CIA Statute

The World Bank's threat last month to cut off \$31 million in funding for three development projects unless Guinea curbs overfishing in its territorial waters underscores the pressure on African governments to sustain environmental protection programs. Illegal fishing and the excessive sale of licenses are causing the overfishing. 25X1 and may be the result of corruption among Guinean officials, as well as pressure to increase government revenues. Conakry has the resources and has shown that it can police its waters. The Guinean Navy has two working ships and the Ministry of Fisheries has about \$1 million available for current operations from previously collected fines. In the first half of 1990, Guinea seized 20 ships for illegal fishing and collected \$8 million in fines. In previous years, before the fisheries protection program established formal cooperation between the Navy and the Secretary of State for Fisheries, only a few ships were seized and little revenue was realized from fines. Guinea probably will take steps to improve its performance—the government reportedly takes the Bank's threat seriously—but corruption is likely to remain an impediment to effective environmental protection efforts. CIA Statute

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
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