


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Update on European Views of German Unification  
and the Two-plus-Four Dynamic

Summary

The strong plurality garnered by the CDU-led (conservative) Alliance for Germany in the 18 March East German election has strengthened Kohl's ability to set the pace of unity and deal with the Four Powers as well as with the smaller West European states. France and the UK had probably hoped that the East German SPD would do well enough in the election to take some of the wind out of Kohl's sails and slow down what they see as a rush toward German unity. They are now putting the best face on what is widely seen as a major victory for the Chancellor and appear resigned to unification under Article 23 over the next year or so. East Europeans, too, are hoping for a drawn-out unification process; the Poles, in particular, fear that accelerated unification would damage their interests, and they will maintain pressure on the Allies to protect Polish equities. Most Europeans will look to the United States to rein in the Germans if the pace picks up too much or if Kohl begins to veer away from his public commitment to the Alliance and his recognition of the Oder-Neisse border with Poland. CIA Statute

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## The View from Bonn and Berlin

Christian Democratic dominance in both German capitals assures a concordance of views on many issues--particularly on the use of Article 23 as the vehicle of unification and the need to avoid drafting a new constitution. As a result, we expect unification to be complete within a year, perhaps much sooner. (See Annex) Although the East German Christian Democrats are less adamant than Kohl about keeping a united Germany in NATO, they will be unlikely to challenge him on the issue given Bonn's overwhelming political and economic leverage. CIA Statute

Intra-German accord on Article 23 and on NATO membership will strengthen Kohl's position in the Two-plus-Four talks. He can argue that the Germans have agreed among themselves on the path to unity and NATO membership for a united Germany. The Soviets will find it much harder to exploit intra-German differences on timing, NATO, and other issues than if the Social Democrats had won in East Germany.\* French and British pleas to slow the pace of unity now would more clearly contradict the preference of East and West German voters. CIA Statute

At the same time, Bonn will continue efforts to placate West European concerns through conciliatory stands on EC and border issues. Kohl will call for speedy passage of the joint Bundestag-Volkskammer declaration abjuring territorial claims on Poland. His recent suggestion of a December conference on EC political union probably portends efforts to strengthen policy coordination with Paris on European issues, thereby underlining Bonn's EC credentials and assuaging French concerns about German obsession with unification. CIA Statute

## British and French Perspectives

Paris and London probably hoped for a less clear-cut election result in East Germany that would have slowed unification. They must now come to terms with the East German voters' clear support for the Christian Democratic policy of relatively quick unification as well as with a strengthened Kohl. The French, in particular, are already softening the tone of their German policy and appear to be mending fences with Kohl. Paris and London may even find some benefits in accession through Article 23; hoping the process would take at least a year, they probably believe it would:

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\*The East German Social Democrats may demand the Foreign Ministry should they enter a grand coalition with the Christian Democrats--an office that might allow them to complicate intra-German talks on NATO. But the Christian Democrats will be in a strong bargaining position because--with their liberal allies--they will have an absolute majority in parliament even without the SPD. And while Social Democratic statements on NATO are vague, they seem to suggest acceptance of the Genscher Plan as long as eastern Germany's non-integration into NATO is firmly guaranteed. CIA Statute

- Provide an orderly process for unification.
- Compel Moscow to come to terms with the likelihood of German membership in NATO and help minimize potential damage to East-West relations.
- Preserve the Allied voice in Two-plus-Four negotiations on the future of Allied rights and on the external aspects of unity.
- Allow Kohl to be more explicit in guaranteeing the Oder-Neisse line as Germany's eastern border.
- Provide more time to determine East German participation in the EC and to cushion the impact of this enlargement on EC integration and monetary union.
- Eventually increase French and British exports into East German markets. CIA Statute

Nevertheless, Paris and London worry that a rush to accomplish de facto unity over a period of weeks or a few months could create new problems or exacerbate existing ones. They seem to fear that rapid accession could:

- Undermine Gorbachev by strengthening his domestic critics, who might vilify him for handing Germany to the West.
- Destabilize East Germany's fragile economy, fostering greater emigration to West Germany or even violence in the GDR.
- Force a currency realignment or higher interest rates on other EMS members and possibly raise inflationary pressures.
- Commit the EC to funding too large a share of East German adjustment, diverting regional aid from other EC countries and seriously straining the EC budget. CIA Statute

Even if unification under Article 23 appeared to be moving too quickly for comfort, the UK and France probably would not try to stop it. They might, however, try to delay the process by acting together or in conjunction with Moscow on certain issues--but only if they became convinced that German leaders had become insensitive to European concerns about the form and pace of unification. They could:

- Harden their stand on issues where Four-Power rights are most explicit, such as intra-German aviation, the status of Berlin, or the withdrawal of Allied troops.
- Seek to revive public concerns about German commitment to EC integration and feed already widespread concerns about

the potential negative impact of East German participation on Germany's EC partners.

- Pose obstacles to German interests in the EC and the G-7.
- Insist that no Two-plus-Four decisions be considered final without review by the 35-member Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. CIA Statute

#### Other West European Views

Other West Europeans generally share British and French worries that speeded-up unification will outpace the ability of West Germany's allies and EC partners to adjust to the accompanying security and economic complications. Public support for Germany's right to self-determination masks, in some cases, strong skepticism about Germany's willingness to look beyond its own inner-German interests; these doubts surface occasionally in statements reminding Bonn that unification moves must be acceptable to the EC, NATO and CSCE.

- Rome will probably use its impending presidency of the EC as a lever to gain greater access to the unification debate currently taking place in the Two-plus-Four forum. Italy probably believes that the clear-cut East German election results will help clarify the pace of unification and free Kohl to focus more on the European implications of his policies.
- The Benelux countries continue to fear that rapid unification will threaten EC integration. Belgian Prime Minister Martens recently urged accelerating integration, particularly on economic and monetary issues, to ensure Germany's commitment to the EC. CIA Statute

#### East European Responses

The GDR election convinced any remaining doubters in Eastern Europe that German unification is inevitable. The East Europeans hope that unification will be a managed process--the Czechoslovaks, for example, continue to believe that the process can be harnessed on behalf of European integration. CIA Statute

It is primarily the Poles whose level of concern has risen as a result of the East German election. Some two-thirds of Poles in a recent survey felt that unification will be disadvantageous to Poland. Warsaw would prefer a drawn-out process that would maximize the chances of satisfactory guarantees for Poland's security interests. Instead, the Poles now face the prospect of an accelerated unification in which their equities may get short shrift.

- Although Mazowiecki did gain Two-plus-Four agreement to Polish participation in talks bearing on the Oder-Neisse Line, he will continue to press for access to other discussions that he believes affect Poland's security.

-- It is also unlikely that the Poles will get FRG and GDR initials on a treaty guaranteeing Poland's borders prior to unification. In an effort to put more pressure on Kohl, Mazowiecki is now upping the ante by calling for language in the revised Federal German constitution explicitly renouncing any territorial claims against Poland. CIA Statute

Poland will maintain pressure on the Allies to protect Polish interests, especially if political paralysis or economic collapse in the GDR accelerates the unification timetable even more. The remaining loose ends regarding territorial and security issues will strengthen Mazowiecki's resolve to tie complete Soviet troop withdrawal from Poland to resolution of the border question and a CFE accord, despite continuing anti-Soviet sentiment in the populace. CIA  
CIA Statute

#### Implications for the United States

Britain and France suspect that the United States is still too interested in placating West German concerns and are likely to hold Washington accountable for any "concessions" that Bonn tries to give the Soviets over continued NATO membership. Both France and Britain, for example, will expect the United States to support their efforts to win a commitment from Kohl to maintain at least some nuclear weapons on German soil. Moreover, Paris and London will hope for US backing when they press Germany for some sort of formal peace settlement that would help meet Soviet concerns and reassure the Poles about German willingness to sign a treaty recognizing the Oder-Neisse line. If the French and British are driven to try to delay unity on their own or with the Soviets, they could attempt to portray the United States as standing alone with Germany in seeking quick unification at the expense of European stability. CIA Statute

Annex A

The Unification Timetable

We expect unification to be complete within a year, and perhaps much sooner. East Germany as a whole, or reconstituted East German states, will accede to the Federal Republic under Article 23 of its Basic Law--a simpler and speedier procedure than drafting a new all-German constitution.

- The East German parliament is likely by this summer to declare its support for unification via Article 23.
- During a transition period of up to a year, the two German governments will work out key political, legal, and economic procedures for unification.
- An all-German parliament and government probably will be in place by mid-1991. CIA Statute

Bonn hopes to have Four-Power agreement on the external aspects of unification by the CSCE summit this fall. The West Germans probably will use their leverage with East Berlin to keep up the pace of unification and put the Four Powers under pressure to meet this target. CIA Statute

The unification timetable could change markedly in response to unforeseen developments. Economic collapse in the GDR, for example, would increase the odds of hasty accession to West Germany. Alternatively, new East-West tensions on issues like Lithuania conceivably could either torpedo the Two-plus-Four talks or prolong them beyond this fall. This would increase the risk of unification through a German fait accompli, perhaps in the form of an uncoordinated rush by individual East German states to accede to the FRG. CIA Statute