

Declassified Under Authority of the  
Interagency Security Classification  
Appeals Panel,  
E.O. 13526, sec. 5.3(b)  
ISCAP Appeal No. 2016-182,  
document 1  
Declassification Date: Nov. 6, 2023

PRINCIPALS CHANNEL  
9560503

DIST:  
7/12

NONILON  
D  
P  
S/S

United States Department of State


*The Deputy Secretary of State*

*Washington, D.C. 20520*

*1/12/95*  
January 12, 1995

~~SECRET/NODIS~~  
DECL: OADR

MEMORANDUM TO THE SECRETARY

FROM: Strobe Talbott 

SUBJECT: Preparing for Geneva

Jim Collins and I spent approximately five hours with Deputy Foreign Minister Mamedov in Brussels Tuesday. Three hours were two-on-one, the other two were in an expanded session with Ambassadors Hunter and Churkin, General Kharchenko (MOD) and Admiral Center (JCS). Much of the discussion centered around European Security, NATO-Russia relations and the process of NATO enlargement. Because this element of our talks will be central to your meetings with Foreign Minister Kozyrev next week, I am concentrating in this memo on that subject. Other elements of the discussion will be reported separately.

The most germane part of the discussion was in the small group. I stressed importance of next week's Geneva meeting going well. We still had to overcome the effects of Kozyrev's performance in Brussels and Yeltsin's in Budapest; also, the meeting would be taking place under the cloud of Chechnya. I underscored that President Clinton, who is following Chechnya closely and with deep concern, had decided that we would proceed on a steady course in our Russia policy, including on the vital question of defining Russia's relationship to an expanded NATO.

I laid out our approach to the NATO-Russia relationship. I told Mamedov you would come prepared to range broadly and deeply in hopes of breaking new ground. Effectively no questions are out of bounds for

~~SECRET/NODIS~~

discussion. I also stressed we must have confidentiality to have productive exchange. Nonetheless, we also have Allies who will need to be informed. If the U.S. and Russia seem to be moving toward common understandings bilaterally on any issues that relate to the basic nature and equities of the Alliance, we will have to consult closely with the other Members. Mamedov said he understood this.

I then went through certain key premises that will underly your approach to the Geneva meeting (these had been discussed and approved by the Deputies Committee Monday just before my departure):

- o Our goal is an integrated and inclusive security system for Europe, including -- but broader than -- NATO expansion.
- o We want to see a robust Partnership for Peace as a permanent mechanism for NATO cooperation with all interested CEE and NIS countries.
- o We are prepared to explore an institutionalized relationship between NATO and Russia, and that exploration should proceed in parallel with NATO's deliberation on expansion. The concept of parallelism had been agreed between the Vice President and President Yeltsin last month.
- o A formalized security arrangement between Russia and NATO would serve, among other things, to assure Moscow that NATO expansion to some CEE states, when it occurs, is not directed against Russia nor aimed at marginalizing Russia.
- o The content of such an arrangement might include negative security assurances, a code of conduct for European security, commitment to consult on political and military issues of mutual concern, establishment of consultative mechanism.
- o In that regard, we are prepared to consider ways of strengthening NATO-Russia consultative mechanisms with respect to NATO operational decisions when they affect Russian interests. (I mentioned that the Contact Group on Bosnia established the precedent of our ability to establish links between NATO members and Russia when we had interests and tasks in common, although the Contact Group was probably not exactly the right model for a more general NATO-Russia link-up.)

- o Just as we hope to have agreed within the Alliance and briefed all interested PFP member on the "how" and "why" of NATO expansion by the end of this year, we would also hope -- in the spirit of parallelism -- to have worked out with Russia, both bilaterally and with our Allies, a clear understanding on the "how" and "why" -- and the "what" -- of NATO-Russia relationship.

We had no set view of the form that a NATO-Russian relationship might take. Possibilities included a NATO-Russia Treaty, a NATO-Russia Charter, something like a standing commission (comparable to the SCC created under SALT/START), and a wider security treaty within an OSCE framework. We could see advantages and disadvantages with each and would be interested in Russian views.

In response, Mamedov made the following initial comments:

- o The most recent letter from President Clinton to President Yeltsin had been a constructive reply. He, in that regard, affirmed that there is no misunderstanding now in Moscow about the NAC Communiqué or what NATO plans in 1995 with regard to the expansion process.
- o We must be careful not to let your meeting with Kozyrev be dominated by Chechnya. We need to deal with the issue carefully. This is especially true because Kozyrev is alone among the Democrats in supporting Yeltsin. If drawn out on Chechnya either behind closed doors with delegations present or in public, Kozyrev may be forced to take a fairly hard-line position, rejecting attempts at "internationalizing" the crisis. Mamedov said that Kozyrev will want to meet with you one-on-one at the beginning of your session in Geneva so that he can discuss Chechnya very privately.
- o Mamedov fully agrees with, and applauds, the American decision to proceed with the meeting, saying that decision by the U.S. is appreciated in Moscow as further evidence of the Administration's steadfastness.

On the NATO-Russia relationship, what we have heard from Mamedov and from others on the Russian side in recent days makes clear you will need to be prepared for virtually anything, including some proposals that would clearly be unacceptable to us and our Allies.

Russian thinking clearly envisions a formal arrangement. But beyond an agreement between their country and NATO, the Russians will very likely seek inclusion within NATO's own decision-making process. (In this connection, you could well hear echoes of Kozyrev's complaints in the past about how Russia has been excluded from the counsels of NATO on Bosnia issues.) Kozyrev has spoken before about bringing Russia into the "political" (as opposed to military) side of NATO; he sees a possible analogue in the French position.

Kozyrev may also raise the idea of formally amending NATO's core mission and identity as a collective defense treaty. Their motive for this would be transparent and understandable: insofar as NATO's purpose is to defend its members against an external enemy, there's little doubt who that enemy, at least potentially, is. Certainly there's no doubt in the minds of the Central Europeans whom they want to be protected against. Yet we keep saying that Russia is no longer a threat to the West. Therefore there's a degree of logic in the Russians trying to get us formally to repudiate containment/deterrence and to alter the charter of NATO. But there's also a significant degree of mischief, or at least unrealism, in what they're up to here. In any event, it's not on. This proposal if it comes, like one for the inclusion of Russia in NATO decision-making bodies, would be the compensation Russia might seek for the addition of new members of the Alliance.

But we're not in the business of having to "compensate" Russia or buy it off. Russia is not doing us a favor by allowing NATO to expand. Rather, we're trying to ensure an undivided Europe and to support Russian reform (in which we have a powerful interest) by making sure that NATO expansion is part of a larger process that is truly integrative and that takes full account of Russia's legitimate security interests.

In any event, Jim Collins and I made clear to Mamedov that, even as NATO evolves, there is no prospect for any alteration in its core mission or modus operandi. The goal of your meeting with Kozyrev and subsequent deliberations should be, as the VP and Yeltsin agreed, parallel arrangements, understandings and structures -- not substitute ones. We are prepared, during the period that the Alliance begins to expand, for Russia to proceed with NATO, but not in NATO. Tom Pickering will be reiterating this point in the days ahead.

Mamedov telephoned me from Moscow this morning to indicate that he had used Jim's and my strong cautionary reactions to good effect with Kozyrev. That said, it's still quite likely that Kozyrev will max out in his opening position. That, in itself, is manageable.

There's a time-honored tradition of ambitiously unrealistic opening gambits in negotiations. The question is whether he will move into a genuine give-and-take. If he does, there could be elements even in his coming-in position that we can turn to the purpose at hand.

For example, everything we're hearing affirms that the Russians are proceeding from the assumption that NATO will indeed expand. They seem to expect that the actual beginning of NATO expansion will take place in the next three to five years. Having accepted that, they're looking for a definition of parallelism that gives them maximum control over the process and inclusion in the outcome. Ideally, they'd like to be in the front seat of this vehicle as it moves forward, with access to the brakes.

In response, we need to convince them that what really matters -- to them and their security interests -- is the road down which we're moving together, and the destination, which is an integrated, undivided, secure, democratic Europe and Transatlantic Community.

As for the mission of NATO, there, too, we can pick up on certain elements of their thinking. For example, they want to see NATO adopt a "more universal" definition of its purpose; were NATO to include them in its political decision-making they'd support it performing the role of the peace-keeping arm of a new all-European security structure, and taking on such problems as terrorism.

We have an interest in NATO expanding its mission, as long as it preserves its core, and we can advance that through PFP as well as through what we do with NATO itself.

The Russians are very conscious of the upcoming meeting between President Clinton and President Yeltsin. They see that as a signal event, which will establish the tone, for better or worse, of how the NATO/European security issue plays in Russian domestic politics through the parliamentary elections at the end of the year and the presidential elections next year. Therefore Kozyrev may raise with you the idea of some sort of Clinton-Yeltsin agreement that will prove Russia is not being isolated or left behind, and that NATO expansion is not moving ahead in defiance of Russian objections.

On the IPP and the NATO-Russia agreement, Mamedov indicated it could be a matter of months, not weeks, before Moscow feels secure enough to bring them into force. This is purely a matter of the domestic mood, and Chechnya makes a bad backdrop for action at this time. But they are clearly looking for a face-saving way to sign, perhaps linking it to a March visit to Moscow by Claes or the May Summit. You'll need to draw Kozyrev out on the best way to overcome this hurdle.

~~SECRET/NO DIS~~

- 6 -

One procedural point: Mamedov recommends, as do I, that you and Kozyrev agree to follow up on your meeting through "a sub-ministerial forum," using the Strategic Stability Group, reinforced by European security experts.

~~SECRET/NO DIS~~