
Agency Information

AGENCY : HSCA
RECORD NUMBER : 180-10089-10407

RECORD SERIES : NUMBERED FILES

AGENCY FILE NUMBER : 006446

Document Information

ORIGINATOR : HSCA
FROM : WILCOTT, JAMES
TO :

TITLE :

DATE : 01/28/1978
PAGES : 56

SUBJECTS :
ACTIVITIES
OSWALD, LEE, POST-RUSSIAN PERIOD, POLITICAL AND
SUBVERSIVE..
LEADS AND INFORMATION
CIA

DOCUMENT TYPE : SUMMARY
CLASSIFICATION : Unclassified
RESTRICTIONS : 1A
CURRENT STATUS : Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 01/01/2003

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS : Interview. Box 125.

NO. _____

DATE 3/21/75

Document I.D. INVESTIGATIVE INTERVIEW SCHEDULE

INDEX

Wilcott, James
Donald Lee -
CPA
Dennis Reid

Lead Wolf
COPY TO
Robert Blakey
Gary Cornwell
Kenneth Klein
Charlie Mathews
Jim Wolf
Tiny Hutton
Jackie Hess
Cliff Fenton

Team #1

Team #2

Team #3

Team #4

Team #5

Special Instructions:

Form #2

3

SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS

006446

Name James Wilcott Date 1/28/78 Time _____
 Address 2761 Atlantic St. Place Residence
Concord, Calif.

Interview:

On 1/28/78 staff investigator Harold D. Leap and staff researcher Betsy Wolf interviewed subject at his home in Concord, California relative to the assassination of John F. Kennedy. Subject's wife, Elsie, also a former CIA employee, was interviewed concerning her knowledge on certain issues discussed during the interview.

The interview lasted about four hours. All but a small portion of the interview was taped. Notes were taken by Miss Wolf concerning the portion of the interview which was not recorded.

The main purpose of the interview was to determine if Wilcott had first-hand knowledge that Oswald was a CIA agent.

Subjects covered during the interview are as follows: Wilcott's personal history, employment, association and position with the CIA, harassment by CIA and FBI after Wilcott resigned, Wilcott's belief that LHO was a CIA agent, identity of individual CIA employees who discussed the Oswald-agent issue with Wilcott. For details, please refer to tape recording identified "James Wilcott, 28 Jan. '78, HL BW" and a written paper prepared by Interviewer Signature Harold D. Leap

Typed Signature H. Leap/B. Wolf

Date transcribed 2/21/78

By: am Form #4-A

James Wilcott interview...page 2

Wilcott which is an attachment to this memo.

For the convenience of researchers, the list of CIA employees that Wilcott listed as having conversation with him concerning the Oswald-agent issue is as follows:

1. George Breen - Registry (Wife Eleanor)
2. Frederick Randall - Dep. COS
3. Jim Delaney - CO in China Branch
4. Jerry Fox - S.R.
5. Robert S. Hashima - Fuji Shoji Co. Ltd.
6. Chester Ito - writer for Japan Times
7. Elwood D. Martin
8. Bob Ojiri - C.O. Logistics
9. Jack Randall - C.O. Finance
10. Kan Takai - Japan Branch
11. Larry Watanabe - finance (wife Doris)
12. Jim Woods - Registry (wife Louise)
13. Shizuo Yamada - Logistics

Wilcott maintains that one of the above individuals specifically told him that Oswald was a CIA agent and gave Oswald's cryptonym. This individual also advised Wilcott that he (Wilcott) had issued payment for the project that included Oswald. Wilcott does not remember the cryptonym nor the identity of the person at this time.

Present: Staff Investigator Harold Leap
Staff Researcher Betsy Wolf
Mr. James Wilcott

Leap: Jim, will you give us your personal history record, starting with your date of birth.

Wilcott: Okay. I was born September 27, 1931 in Cleveland, Ohio. I went soon after I was born to Utica, New York; spent most of my life in Utica. I spent three years in the Army, three years and eight months, from 1947 to 1951. From there I went to college for two years and then to business school in Syracuse, New York, where I was recruited by the CIA. I spent three years at headquarters in Washington with the CIA, four years in Tokyo, another year at headquarters in CIA, and another year in Miami, where I resigned from CIA.

Leap: What were your positions within CIA?

Wilcott: My positions were, for the whole nine years in CIA, in Finance. I worked in payroll, headquarters payroll; I worked as a cash disbursing person for Tokyo Station; and then I worked again in payroll at Miami.

Leap: What were your duties as cash disbursing agent?

Wilcott: I have a full list of -- you want to hold on just a minute and I'll get it for you.

Leap: Alright

Wilcott: Okay. My duties at Tokyo Station were daily cash disbursements; the cash count, daily cash count at the station, recording on the cash -- it's the cash that was disbursed for various projects, etc.; the posting of vouchers --

it's the -- giving the leave balances, maintaining leave balances, etc. That was daily. On a weekly basis, I prepared housing and vehicle records, posting vouchers, housing cash count, auditing of housing, vehicle records, posting of advances and posting of statistical material, then recording in housing and vehicle books the expenses for housing and vehicle basis. On a monthly basis, auditing from TA's, posting to leave cards, computation of payroll, preparation in payment of payrolls, making of posting vouchers, and let's see, scheduling of expenses, preparation of accounting for funds, and leasing of funds-- that's State Department funds. Annually, reports to headquarters of , leave cards, new payroll sheets, etc. And then we did quarterly also, did a quarterly report.

Leap: In the course of your duties in disbursing this money, did you become acquainted with the case officers and the projects they were working on?

Wilcott: Yes, I did. And also I became acquainted with them through night duty -- we called it night duty -- that's security duty at the station in Tokyo where I pulled a lot of security duty. Everybody in support at the station was required to pull security duty unless they could find somebody to pull it in their place. Well, I was interested in making some money, so we were paid time and a half for five hours, from 5:00 to 10:00, and then after 10 o'clock I'd go to sleep in a little room right by the door that's

Leap: Yes

Wilcott: And then on Saturdays and Sundays...

Leap: Bringing your attention to your tour of duty in Japan, what was the date, sir?

Wilcott: It was, let's see now, June of 1960 to May, I believe -- wasn't it May, Elsie that we left? -- May of '64 that we left.

Leap: Who was chief of Station at that time?

Wilcott: When I first -- when -- for the first two years -- about the first two years, Pete Wheeler was chief of Station, and then after about a year and a half or two years, Bill Brough took over as chief of Station.

Leap: Who were the case officers assigned to the Soviet branch of the Tokyo Station?

Wilcott: I can't remember all of the people -- I've forgotten a lot of the people, a lot of the names -- of the stations. I know S.R. Satellite was Reid Dennis, who I worked with on an operational thing 'till we proved that Yugoslav to spy on me and on the Russians. And Elsie also was secretary for Reid Dennis and chief of S.R. Satellite. So I remember Reid better. As far as the other people I've sort of -- with a list -- for instance, with a list of the Station people, I could...

Leap: Now, Elsie is your wife?

Wilcott: Yes

Leap: Yes, when were you married?

Wilcott: We were married in -- what was it, '54, Elsie?

Elsie: 1954

Leap: I see. And she went abroad with you?

Wilcott: Yes.

Leap: And also worked for the agency?

Wilcott: Yes.

Leap: And she also had security clearance?

Wilcott: Yes.

Leap: If I would show you a roster of the Tokyo embassy in 1963, would you point out to me the individuals that you were acquainted with and knew and whether or not they were working for CIA?

Wilcott: Certainly.

Leap: This list not only covers the embassy employees at the time but also covers military personnel.

Wilcott: Mm-hmm. Well, here's William D. Brohn. Elsie, you probably would know more. Do you want to identify Elsie on the tape?

Leap: Yes, we have,

Wilcott: Pete Wheeler

Elsie: Mm-hmm, Bob

Wilcott: Bob -- yeah

Leap: Now, all of these people you're naming...

Wilcott: Ralph Morgan

Leap: ...worked for the CIA.

Wilcott: That's right. They were regular intelligence officers. John P. Horrigan, I remember him.

Elsie: Bill Dougherty.

Wilcott: Yeah

Elsie: Bill Brayton

Wilcott: You're thinking of Bramer -- George Bramer.

This was '63, huh?

Leap: Yes. 1963.

Wilcott: Funny Randall wasn't on here. I don't see Randall on here. When did he come? He may have come...maybe after...This is -- let's see now, it goes down to where the end of Japan Station? This is all Japan Station here? All of this is Japan Station too, huh?

Leap: yes

Wilcott: I see.

Leap: They are the people that was working for AID at the time. This would be the U.S. Army.

Wilcott:

U.S. Army

Elsie: Are all the names

Wilcott: I'm trying to see if there were some first names I could recognize.

Leap: Jim, in our previous conversation you told me that you overheard conversations that indicated that Oswald was a CIA agent.

Wilcott: That's right.

Leap: Do you recall who these individuals were -- where the conversations took place that you referred to?

Wilcott: The conversations all took place in Tokyo. The circumstances of these conversations were, a lot of times, while I was on security duty. The case officers would be coming back from various operations that they were carrying on in Tokyo. They would come back to the Station, either waiting for their wives to pick them up or waiting for a call from an agent that was operating somewhere in Tokyo, or something like that, and we'd pass the time. Usually I had a pot of coffee going for them and most of the time these guys'd come in after drinking and so a lot of times we got into conversations about politics and things and about various operations that were going on. And that's how most of these conversations came up. And it was usually just between me and one person. And I think that's why, perhaps, I, you know, got maybe a lot more information than I normally would have. And I think more on security duty than anyplace else. Well, then that usually gave me some basis on which to ask questions when we were, you know, out drinking in or someplace like that.

Leap: If possible, we would like to identify these people.

Wilcott: With a list of Tokyo Station personnel I think I could identify them. I know Jerry Fox, who worked in SR and was a good friend of Pete Martin, who was deputy chief of finance. And that's really how I came to know Jerry Fox pretty well. Jerry was involved in buying information from the Soviets, and that's how -- you know, would you like me to go into that other?

Leap: Yes.

Wilcott: Well, the story that Jerry gave me was that the Soviets were selling information to the CIA. And what they would do is they would have -- they were ripping off the CIA for millions of dollars. And this is what he claimed. He says that the -- when they decided that a certain information was no longer necessary through their various cutouts -- you know, they have all these agents that operate for either side that will buy and sell information for anybody who has the money. Well, according to what Jerry told me that these -- the Soviets would sell information to the CIA through these various cutouts when it was no longer considered classified. And he says: "Well, I could care less." He says: "I get - I get my accolades for - for selling and buying the information. If it's, you know, phony information, I could care less."

Leap: Was Jerry one of the individuals that discussed the Oswald project?

Wilcott: Yes, I'm quite sure. Now, it's been -- what is it, it's been -- fifteen years, and a lot of this has, you know, faded in my memory. That's why I'm kinda reluctant to say this person said that or this person said that because we were all just, you know, talking and these were, you know, usually casual conversations. I wasn't really interested in it all that much. When I first heard about Oswald being involved I thought:

"These people are crazy; the CIA would never kill the President. What is this nonsense?? And it was, you know, it was a -- it was a shock for me even to hear somebody saying such -- such things as that. So...

Leap: Did you know any CIA officer in Tokyo that may have served in Moscow?

Wilcott: In moscow. There were -- I know there were that served with the -- I forget what they call it now -- was it the Moscow Station they called it? Or anyways, whatever they called their station with the embassy in Moscow. I'm sure there were because I remember people talking about it, but I can't remember who it was.

Leap: See what I'm trying to do -- I'm trying to identify the individual or individuals who might have first-hand information that he was an agent or he was not. And, assuming that he was, he would have a case officer in Moscow -- right?

Wilcott: Yes

Leap: And what I'm trying to determine is whether or not any of those individuals would be serving in Japan in 1963 that would have first-hand information.

Wilcott: Well, I think certainly the chief of SR and -- his name is right on the tip of my tongue and I can't - can't recall offhand -- I'm sure the chief of SR would have, would have known for sure.

Elsie:

Probably would have been a police officer in the Tokyo Station.

Wilcott: I'm sure it would have. In fact, that was the impression that I got was that, that it was not a regular project of the Tokyo Station at Building 724, Washington Heights, but that it was a special project that was based at -

Wilcott: It was a special project, but that there was a lot of, of support kind of things from the Tokyo Station people, but that the people that were actually running Oswald were running him out of the Yukoska Station. It was...

Leap: Were many of the CIA personnel assigned to the military? Would the military be involved in this type of project?

Wilcott: Yes, they were. This was where the U-2 planes took off from. And it was the super-secret luxury base of Tokyo where the U-2 planes were supposedly have taken off with Gary Powers was supposedly took off from, from there.

Leap: So it's be your opinion then he was recruited, recruited in Japan rather than in Russia after he defected?

Wilcott: No. See, as far as my opinion, I mean, I can't really say. The only thing I can say is what I heard.

Leap: Right

Wilcott: I would like to also add that I was very reluctant -- this, for instance, this Kennedy assassination article was not meant for publication. This was meant to serve as a background for people like yourselves doing investigation. I don't think it serves any purpose at all to just cloud the issue by saying things that, or publishing things. This was not meant for publication. It was meant to serve as a basis for investigators. This is all heresay. And I was very reluctant to even write this up. And the major reason that I wrote it up was that I wanted to make a clear distinction as to what I heard at Tokyo Station and what I'd read from other sources.

James Wilcott interview...page 12

Wilcott: So before I started, you know, a more or less thorough study of the Kennedy assassination and so on, I wanted to get this all down on paper. And that's, that's was, you know, the purpose, in addition to Dean Kalbraith, who was working on the Daily Kalb in California, in UC-Berkeley, who wanted to do an article on the Kennedy assassination, and they were interested in what I had to say about it. And so I said: "Fine. Well, I'll put it all down on paper and then you can take it from there." And, so, that's how this came to be written. Also, Counterspy wanted to hear what I had to say about the Kennedy assassination.

Leap: Did they make any attempt to follow up on the information given -- or do you know?

Wilcott: Yes, they did. They did. They talked to George Breen. Now, some very strange things happened in my association with the Daily Cap.

Wolf: Can I ask when you wrote this article?

Wilcott: This was January of -- let's see, just about a year ago -- '77. And there were some very strange things that happened. They -- what they wanted me to do -- they said: "Well, we want confirmation of this story." I said: "Well, what kind of confirmation do you want?" They said: "Well, we want to contact the people -- like George Breen that was mentioned in here." I says: "Okay, go ahead and contact him; I don't care. You know, it's if you want to contact him, contact him." What they wanted me to do

was to talk to George Breen and while they were talking to him they were going to clandestinely record it on a tape recorder. Now, George Breen -- from the story that they told me, they'd called him up and talked to him -- he was obviously working for the agency; obviously was not sympathetic to what I was trying to do -- talk about CIA -- and it was a very strange situation. I said: "Look, I'm not about to try to beat them at their own game." That's what I told Jim Killidy, the editor at Daily Cap. I said: "I'm not about to try to beat 'em at their own game, first of all; and second of all," I said, "do you have a lawyer? Do you know that this is legal to do this? We could very easily be caught in some kind of trap -- some kind of legal thing where we were violating the law." "No," they said, well they didn't have a lawyer. I said: "Well, look, I'm not gonna do this." I said: "You know, these people are dangerous people, and they're trying," I says, "Dean, don't be too naive about - about these people because these are very possibly dangerous people that could very much prove some kind of danger to you. So you'd better be careful about what you're doing. As far as me talking to anybody from the CIA - no, I won't talk to them. First of all, I don't believe in talking to criminals. And you don't talk to criminals, you put 'em in jail. Simple as that as far as I'm concerned." Anyways, that's how the article came to be written. They were going to write a story; and I assume what they were gonna do was quote certain things from the material that I've written or say: "Well, you know, this collaborates this part of our story." So in - well, since 1968 when I broke my

secrecy agreement with the CIA -- and I've been talking about this -- you know, I've been talking about it on the basis that I believe this is true, and that, even though it's heresay evidence, I believe it is true.

Leap: Has there been any legal action because you broke the secrecy oath?

Wilcott: No, I've never been contacted directly by the CIA. Since I left CIA I've been subjected to constant harassment, intimidation, interference at my jobs, and all kinds of weird things.

Leap: In what form?

Wilcott: Well, for instance, the FBI Agent, Gordon Finch, in Utica, New York -- and this has been confirmed, absolutely confirmed -- that Gordon Finch was an FBI agent. He worked with our group. I lived with him in a commune that we had -- two communes, in fact, one of which he broke up; actually, both of which he broke up.

Leap: Where was this?

Wilcott: This was in Utica, New York in 19 -- starting late '67 -- all through '68 and '69 until May of '70 when I left -- when I left Utica because I was working for the Community Renewal Program. I was the Finance Analyst for the Community Renewal Program. I believe that this was a job that was, let's say, secured for me and I was channeled into this job.

Leap: How was it secured for you?

Wilcott: Well...

Leap: And who secured it?

Wilcott: The circumstances -- I'm not even sure exactly how I heard about the job -- but the circumstances were that this -- I heard somewhere about this job. I went in there and talked to Frank O'Connor, the director of the program. And we had a long conversation and we were -- he hired me. Now this was after I left Blue Cross, as a auditor for Blue Cross in Utica, under very strange circumstances also. Anyways, to make a long story short, finally, in May or April-- April of '70 -- Frank brought in a paper from the mayor. The paper was a resignation form. He says: "Your phone is tapped; your apartment is under surveillance; we expect a federal indictment to come down on you at any time." He says: "The mayor is not gonna fire you. What he wants you to do is sign this resignation form and when the indictment comes out, that we will predate it a day ahead." So I signed the form.

Leap: Did he say how he had this information? How he came about...

Wilcott: He told me that it was through the Public Safety Commissioner -- that this Public Safety Commissioner had had conversations with the FBI and that the FBI had told the Public Safety Commissioner about my phone being bugged, about my apartment being under surveillance, and that -- and about the federal indictment. I never received any kind of federal indictment. I was never in any way contacted by the FBI or the CIA or by any government officials as to anything that I was doing wrong. The Vietnam Council was no kind of revolutionary kind of thing whatsoever; it was a straight reform thing to inform people about the Vietnam war. And I was on the

satotaged. I know this for a fact. That it was...

Leap: What happened to your car?

Wilcott: Sugar or something was poured in the gas tank. The garage person that fixed it said they never saw anything like it -- that there was just cakes of black stuff all around the valves and so on in the car. My tires were slashed -- that's on the police records in Utica. I used to receive threatening phone calls -- people would call up and they would say: "We know all about you" -- and shoot a toy machine gun into the phone and hang up. Well this could be anybody. But I don't really think so. I think that this was part of a systematic program of intimidation and harassment. I was -- we had an encounter with a person who had been in the Marine Corps that had been sent back to Utica. He wanted to get out of the Marine Corps. He had been sent back to Utica with a .45 -- that the .45 was supposed to have been stolen from a Marine base. He contacted a person that I was working with in an anti-war movement with--the Vietnam Education Council had set up a Peace Center. And the Peace Center was the office that we maintained in Utica. It - it - this person was Pete -- his name was Pete -- was told to come and contact Dale and to tell him to sell the .45 to me. This is what the Marine Corps had told him and that if he would do that little chore, they would get him out of the Marine Corps. Elsie was there. She sat right there when he told us the whole story.

Leap: You remember what his name was, Elsie?

Elsie: No, I don't.

Wilcott: We have his full name, I think.

Elsie: There was also another incident where someone gave some phony story about trying to escape from the Army and he wanted Jim to drive him to the Canadian border. This was during the Vietnam war.

Wilcott: But that was Pete, Elsie.

Elsie: That was Pete.

Wilcott: That was Pete, yeah.

Elsie: He had some phony story about he had relatives back in East Germany and he had to get out of the Army services and he wanted Jim to drive him. They had some kind of a network, you know, to get people to the Canadian border who were trying to get out of the Army...

Wilcott: See, we were really....

Elsie: ...and tried to incriminate him in this way -- incriminate Jim.

Wilcott: Well, we were running an underground railroad to the Canadian border. And what we would do is take people who wanted to avoid the draft up to the border and there there were people that would take them across the border into Canada -- either to avoid the draft or who were AWOL as -- and so we take them across the border into Canada. And that's what we were doing. I only did it a couple of times. There were a whole bunch of people that were involved in transporting people to the Canadian border. So...

Leap: Elsie, to get back to the 1963 incident -- who was your boss at that time?

Elsie: Reid Dennis. He was SR satellite -- and that was keeping track of the satellite embassy personnel in Poland and Czechoslovakia, Albania and Bulgaria. They try to, you know, identify as many of them as they could and what their activities were.

Leap: Can you identify any of the CIA people within the Tokyo Station -- other than what your husband has already identified?

Elsie: Well, there's a Pete Redmond, who was the Personnel Chief,
Larry

Chester Etow.

Wilcott: Well, I have a list of the people that we can recall.

Elsie: Yeah, we made a list of all the people we could remember.

Leap: See, it's very important that we identify these people in our efforts to determine whether or not, in fact, Oswald was an agent; and we're attempting to locate someone that has firsthand information, and my guess is right now it's gonna have to be someone that served in Japan and also served in Moscow before this can be proved.

Elsie: And also is willing to tell them.

Leap: That's right.

Elsie: I don't know of anybody that is.

Leap: What position will it put you in if we go to the CIA and ask for a roster of all the personnel there? Do you think there'll be any repercussions directed towards you and your wife?

Elsie: I don't know.

Leap: I'm quite sure that they're aware of your statements and what you heard and so this would not be a surprise to them, I'm sure.

Wilcott: Well, if it's for myself, I'm certainly not worried now. I think there have been some progressive changes in CIA and I think Carter's on the right track. They haven't gone as far as we would like to see them go, but at least they're moving in the direction of curbing a lot of this illegal, outright illegal, stuff that's been going on for the past couple of decades. And I think that if they were going to do anything, they would have done it now if they

could do it -- so I'm not really worried myself about repercussions. I think the important thing is that this information get out about what it was that -- you know, if Oswald was an outright agent -- which I really believe he was. And I believe that investigation will prove that he was.

Leap: You're familiar with the way CIA maintains their files, their cryptonym -- whether or not the cryptonym given carried a Japan designation or a Moscow designation? What do you remember about the cryptonym that was given?

Wilcott: Well, actually I dealt with every cryptonym that came through this station -- practically. There might have been a couple that were, you know, were -- I dealt with every one. And I'm sure I could probably recall -- I've forgotten an awful lot of the cryptonyms. The most common ones that I remember were things like L.C. Flutter and things like that. It's -- I'd have to sit down and think about 'em and I could probably come up with them. At one time, after - after I was told this about Oswald, I wrote the cryptonym that they claimed was monies that were either paid to Oswald or paid for the Oswald project. And I wrote that down. I may have even hid that when the FBI agent, Gordon Finch, destroyed all my writings. And -- now this is a fact that can be substantiated.

Leap: What is the prefix for the cryptonyms out of Japan?

Wilcott: Let's see now, it's --

Elsie: Yeah, J.M. Wade? No, that was Miami, this J.M.

Wilcott: Yeah, I'd have to sit down and think about it.

Leap: Offhand, do you know the prefix for the cryptonyms coming out of Moscow?

Wilcott: I can't recall. I can't remember. I've never really even thought about them..

Leap: Well, when you heard this story, Jim, wouldn't it be a normal reaction for you to look at the records and review the project?

Wilcott: The only thing that we got in the way of projects were project -- were the sections of projects outlined -- project outlines -- that contained the fining section. You know, all the CIA operated on the basis of compartmentation and need to know, see, so we never generally saw anything. I mean there a lot of times where they didn't really sterilize them that much, but we never saw anything as far as the operation of parts of the projects that were concerned. When they brought..

Leap: I see. In your position -- you wouldn't have access to the operational section of the project file?

Wilcott: That's right. Oh, no, they were very, very much -- that's top secret, you know, and that was very much. It would be...

Leap: Did you have a top secret clearance?

Wilcott: Yes - top secret - yes

Leap: I see. But you still didn't have access to the complete project file?

Wilcott: Oh, no, that was all on a need-to-know basis -- every project. every project was a need to know.

Leap: Well, Elsie, let me ask you a question. Alright, you have a project file. Alright, now there's a number of parts to a project file. They're not kept in all one big file, or they're separated in different locations -- the various parts of a project file?

Elsie: Uh, well, basically, there would be -- the main thing was to keep separate the cryptonyms from the real names. They would definitely be kept separate.

Leap: I'm directing my question specifically toward your project file. Now, as a secretary were you involved in filing?

Elsie: Mm-hmm

Leap: Did you type case officer reports?

Elsie: Mm-hmm

Leap: And what would you do with this report -- say it was an operational report, a report from an agent coming in?

Elsie: Well, they would be sent back to Washington. They would be typed up, using cryptonyms, and they would be transmitted by cable to Washington and you can just keep copies in the file, but it would be like whoever the agent was -- I mean whoever the project officer was, he would keep his own files.

Leap: But he'd do his own filing?

Elsie: Well, a secretary might.

Leap: Yes, but not you specifically? Like if you type an operational report you would give it to the case officer?

Elsie: No, the case officers -- no the manager -- so I say in my case Mr. Dennis. We would just have it in our own files. And we'd send it back to Washington by cable and keep it in the files in the office there.

Wolf: Well, how were your files maintained in your office in the station?

Elsie: Like any office.

Wolf: Well, in what -- I mean were they maintained by project, chronologically, or in what manner?

Elsie: Well, in my case it was like reports on the -- see we'd have one probably Albania, and we'd have various personnel in there. We'd have area and whatever we knew about the personnel there and information that would come down about them. So basically it was just simply an alphabetical filing system like in any office. Of course, it was all -- I mean they were all locked up in the safe.

Leap: Do you have any questions, Betsie?

Wolf: You mentioned that after the time you were stationed in Tokyo you spent another year in headquarters and a year following that in Miami. Did you hear any additional information then either

Wilcott: Not specifically -- no. It was general things. I talked to some people at my own station who were, you know, in some kind of official capacity, about what I'd heard and they freaked out. They said: "What! What are you talking about that kind of stuff for? Are you crazy? You don't wanta talk about that kind of stuff." That's the kind of things they would tell me, for instance, at Miami Station. Now, in fact, some -- I tried to put in this committee assassination article only that information from when I left Tokyo -- what I heard at Tokyo Station. Now, it might have been some contamination from what I'd also heard, but everything that I'd heard at Tokyo was confirmed by what I'd heard at Miami Station about the Bay of Pigs; about the training of the people; about the two factions, the Batista faction and the anti-Batista faction; etc., etc. That was all confirmed.

In fact, there might -- maybe I didn't hear all as much as I put in here. I think it came from Tokyo Station, but it might have -- some of that might have come from Miami Station because the people at Miami Station were very much involved in the whole Bay of Pigs thing. So -- but I tried to separate out that which came from Miami Station and that which came from Tokyo Station. All this was written before there was any kind of reading. I think before this was written I'd read part of Mark Lane's book and part of Garrison's book. I'd read all of Garrison's book, "Heritage of Stone," and that's the only thing I'd read; and that's why I wanted to get this written up. Because when I decided to do a more thorough study of the Kennedy assassination, I wanted to make sure that I - I didn't, you know, bring into things - bring into this things that were, you know, not from other sources.

Leap: I see. Do you remember the case officers' names and identity that were working the anti-Castro programs and projects at that time?

Wilcott: Well, Grayson Lynch was the person that I knew who gave me a polygraph -- I believe it was Grayson Lynch.

Wolf: This was in Miami?

Wilcott: Yes. The polygraph came about in a little strange way. When I came back from Miami Station we were -- when I came back from Tokyo Station we were convinced that, you know, we had to get out of CIA; that what CIA was doing could not be reconciled the basic principles of democracy, or basic principles of humanism. And it, you know, we had to get out. And we were considering on how to - how to time that, I would say. Anyways, I got involved in the civil rights movement with SNCC, Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee,

in Washington. This was from September of '64 to '65. We worked with SNCC and I was at the SNCC office. Of course, CIA didn't know anything about this; and I knew they would be furious if they did find out. So eventually I ran into a guy -- his name was something like Alex Petrokoff -- who was telling about how he knew the people that blew up the statue that were -- set the dynamite at the Statue of Liberty and all kinds of weird things. Would I like to take a course in communism, and so on. Well, to me this could be nothing but a counter-intelligence project by the CIA and it -- they somehow found out that I was working with SNCC and they were trying to set me up to see where things were. Anyways, I finally -- well, I went to New York City with a bunch of SNCC people. And I was offered to a visit to Jesse Gray and -- who was the other one? -- Jesse Gray and Henry Winston, and they -- I was actually taken around. I said: "Sure, I'll go and talk to 'em." So I was taken around in a car in Harlem with the SNCC people; but neither of them were in the offices and they were not able to get ahold of them. However, I figure -- well, then I got thrown in jail one night with a SNCC worker. So, well, I hadn't told the CIA about it; and of course, anytime you get thrown in jail, you're supposed to tell the CIA about it -- but I hadn't told them about it. But all the -- it was a termination of these three things -- Alex Petrokoff, the trip to New York with the SNCC people to see how they, you know, where we went around to see Henry Winston, and also visited the Boys' Club, and so on. So, I finally went in to Security and told them that I'd been working with SNCC, and they set up -- they went crazy -- they set up an appointment with Chief of Security, CIA Chief of Security, and he took a report -- I gave him a report on what I'd been doing. And as it turned out, what they wanted to do was get me away from Washington.

He says: "Oh, you could have been killed." You know, well, this was ridiculous to me because people were not some kind of weirdo subversive communists, or anything like that; they were civil rights people seriously interested in civil rights. Now, anyways, they said: "Okay, look, we'd like to - we'd like to get you out of here." We had planned to go to Mississippi with SNCC; quit CIA, go to Mississippi with the voter registration job. We dropped those plans after I talked with several people; for instance, my supervisor, Joe Hudson, at headquarters who had worked in the FBI -- had been several years in the FBI -- and he told me about, a lot about the links between CIA and the FBI. We came to the conclusion that it would be a bad thing for SNCC -- for us to go with SNCC -- because they would have agents following us around and would just contaminate SNCC. So we have up our plans to go with the voter registration drive in Mississippi and we broke off our contacts with the people, especially after the security freaked out so bad about my associations with them.

Elsie: Well, anyhow, they sent us to Miami.

Wilcott: They sent us to Miami. When I got down to Miami, then I was there a couple of months -- all of a sudden, well, I was supposed to have had a polygraph. I didn't have any polygraph. It was a big blunder. I never should have left headquarters without having a polygraph. So I was given a preliminary polygraph, and I believe it was Grayson Lynch who gave me the preliminary polygraph in a motel room in one of the safehouses. (It's a small hotel that was a safehouse.) And they, you know, asked me all kinds of questions -- am I trying to hide anything; did I have contacts with communists, and so on; had I broken off all my contacts with the people there? Well then they sent me back to headquarters where I

had another polygraph at CIA security -- a more extensive polygraph -- and I was up there for three days from Miami Station. And then I went back to Miami Station after, after the three days at headquarters.

Leap: Did they question you relative to your tour of duty in Japan?

Wilcott: No.

Leap: Did they get on the subject of the assassination?

Wilcott: Oh, no, no, I wouldn't have -- you know, I was very reluctant to talk about it and, really, at that time I was not all that interested in, you know, for shop talk. It was shop talk, you know, and well, I figured it was just a matter of time before all this stuff would come out that Oswald was an agent of the CIA. We accepted that as, you know, and the people that I knew who also believed that accepted that as just, you know, just a matter of time that we would find -- it was never, I was never able to determine in my mind whether this was an outright project of CIA with McCone's approval, or whatever. I would tend to think that it may have been a project concocted by some of these ultra-conservative crazies that were in the CIA.

Leap: If that was the case, how would they report? What files would it go into?

Wilcott: Well, actually, as far as files go, there was nothing in the way of any black operations, or even gray operations that went into files. You know, that's, that's...

Leap: Where would it go?

Wilcott: It wouldn't go anywhere. They would have, maybe, a notation that, let's say there's a certain project where a certain person is, say, a known communist and is working on the Japan Times.

CIA tries a bunch of tricks to get rid of him; they try to blackmail him; and in some way all that fails. Let's say push comes to shove and they say: "Okay, we're gonna him. Nobody is given any kind of authorizations to him. There is a very complicated and sophisticated way of tacit approval being given by the signs of things. For instance, in the operation of support classes that I took, we were told -- do you want me to go into this? It's...

Leap: Go ahead.

Wilcott: Alright. We were told about a case of an agent that was in Europe. That this agent, through no fault of his own or in no way totally unwittingly, had stumbled across an intelligence net that the CIA was running. This was a hypothetical case, but I was told later it was really not all that hypothetical, but it really happened; that the agent's a greenhorn agent -- he writes back to headquarters asking for permission to push a guy out of a plane at 10,000 feet without a parachute. This is what we were told, verbatim: "You don't write back to headquarters asking for permission to push somebody out of a plane at 10,000 feet without a parachute. You do it and you make damn sure that you have good reason to do it and CIA will back you up." That's what we were told -- outright. Now, they said: "Well, you know, there's a lot of objections." In fact, I remember one of the women that were taking a course with us. They said -- she said: "What about the infinite value of human life?" Well, this was a -- this kind of blew me away, 'cause I think it's a pretty concept and, you see, she says: "Well, what about it?" You know, that this, the hypothetical case that they gave us was -- well, this would mean certainly the death of 10 or 15 agents maybe doing very valuable work not to do this. How could we justify not, not killing that person?

And that was the way the instructors argued. And it did sound as though there was a certain rationality to it. But the point was clearly stressed that this person had committed no crimes against the United States, no crimes against his country, and it, you know, it was that's, you know, that's but that they were justified in doing that.

Leap: I see. Getting back to Oswald. Say he was recruited with the knowledge of the military while he was in Japan. Now, how would they record if they didn't utilize their standard reporting procedure such as your standard 201? How would they record that and document it and keep up-to-date on it? How would the supervisors be able to stay on top of the projects? Where would we find the records?

Wilcott: Actually, I doubt if there are any records anywhere for any kind of real black thing except maybe phony records. In other words, they might have phony records to try to convince people that everything was in the record. And they might have totally phony black operation records to try to convince people like you that everything was recorded. They got, they've got a thousand tricks.

Leap: Well, how would they manage a project like that without records?

Wilcott: This is what I think happened. That, for some reason, they were looking for people in the military for various projects. And Oswald -- they may not have even conceived this project of the -- Oswald going to the Soviet Union until after he was recruited. For instance, there might have been -- let's say, somebody stole something

from a BX and they gave a bunch of people polygraphs. They came across Oswald -- maybe purely by accident. They found that maybe he'd done -- committed--some kind of horrible crime -- killed somebody or something like that. They think: "Ah, great, we've got a handle; here we've got a handle on somebody." So, it goes through the channels -- let's say military intelligence informs CIA, or maybe even just in casual conversation with a CIA person that somebody in military intelligence knows, they say: "Hey, you know, we ran across this guy that killed somebody. The military's thinking about prosecuting, you know, sending it to, you know, for prosecution." So CIA says: "Oh, great, let's -- this -- here's the perfect person we need," you know, "because we've got a handle on him." And that was the expression that they used. I think this may very well be how Oswald got recruited by CIA. It may be that they just needed somebody and this was the opinion of the people at Tokyo Station -- that they had some kind of handle on him; that they wouldn't have tried to get Oswald to go to the Soviet Union under that kind of a project unless they had a real firm handle on him.

Leap: Alright. Say this is the way it happened. Say they had him jammed up; they were going to use him. Now who would do the reporting and how would that reporting be done?

Elsie: They are working through the military, probably. I think he had military cover in Japan.

Leap: Yes, he was in the Marines -- assigned to Japan.
Alright?

Elsie: Yeah, so they would be working through the

Leap: They would have to be reporting on that particular project -- what they planned to do, how they planned to utilize him. And what we're trying to find out, if that is what happened, how they did it.

Elsie: It'd all be in code. I mean...

Wilcott: Yeah, I mean there's...

Elsie: It would give their phony name and phony project and -- but you couldn't get access to the real Somewheres there might be a record of somebody's phony name and all that, but you couldn't tie it to Oswald.

Wilcott: That was the way with every black project. There was nothing, absolutely nothing, on paper on any kind of the heavy black projects that CIA was engaged in that anybody could pin down anything unless they just goofed. If they, you know, and this is, you know, I think the blunders that CIA made, especially during, well during the period that we were there, and when I talk about it, that's all I know. I haven't even kept up that much with CIA since I left. I should have, but it's -- but anyways, the blunders and the inefficiency is, I think, is more remarkable than what all of these real weirdo kinds of things you hear about James Bond kinds of things you hear about. It just wasn't that way at all. It was just every project that -- of any importance -- that I ever heard about eventually had some kind of major flack. Now...

Leap: Jim, in your course of duties in Miami, I'd like to ask you if you know certain individuals.

Wilcott: Sure

Leap: Did you ever meet E. Howard Hunt?

Wilcott: Not that -- I believe so, but I can't be sure.

I can't be sure.

Leap: Do you know anything about him?

Wilcott: No, I don't.

Leap: How about Frank Sturgis?

Wilcott: No, I don't -- don't know anything about him. These -- actually, when those names first came out they really rang a bell, both Sturgis (tape interruption -- end Side 1)

Leap: (The second side of the continuation tape)

Next name -- Q.I. Wynn

Wolf: Q.J. Wynn

Leap: Q.J. Wynn -- sounds like a cryptonym.

Wilcott: I don't remember -- don't recall it.

Wolf: How about W.I. Rogue?

Wilcott: That I do recall from Miami Station. Do you remember that?

Elsie:

Wilcott: Rogue -- from Miami. Yeah, I remember him; they used to joke about Rogue's gallery -- something about that -- from the Rogue's gallery, or something.

Leap: Offhand, do you remember what kind of a project he was involved in?

Wilcott: No, I don't. At Miami Station I didn't have anywhere near the kind of contact that I'd had with operational people at Tokyo Station. I pulled security duty several times at Miami Station, but I didn't have the kind of contact there. The main reason that I had the contact with operational people at Tokyo Station was the development project for the recruiting of Peter Danger by CIA, who was working for the Yugoslav embassy -- and I go into that -- but anyways, he was -- I met him in language school and I had talked about him to some people that had met when he was in Yugoslavia. So they said: "Oh, you'll have to report that to security" --

that any contact of people from a so-called hostile country you have to report to security. So I went in and reported to security how I'd met this Peter Danger and we'd had conversation, etc., and had gone out for coffee. So they turned me over to Reid Dennis, and Reid developed the development project.

Leap: Then it did lead to the man's recruitment? Your acquaintance?

Wilcott: I don't know. The way it worked out I maintained contact with him over a nine-month period and I used to meet him after class; we'd go out bumming around Tokyo, drinking, going to nightclubs and things. CIA supplied me with unlimited funds. In fact, Reid used to tell me: "Get him to spend more money; get him to spend more money. Take him to the better places." They always give me just unlimited funds to spend when we were out together. And then...

Leap: What type of information were you trying to solicit?

Wilcott: Oh, I wasn't trying to solicit any information. I wrote down everything that was discussed, particularly about the embassy or about Yugoslavia. They were particularly interested in sentiments towards the Yugoslav government and towards the Russians. And so for every meeting I had with him I wrote a contact report. In other words, we just, you know, a narration of what happened and what was discussed, etc., etc. They tried a bunch of tricks that they had. They didn't know whether he was trying to recruit me or whether, you know, it was purely an innocent friendship.

Leap: What was the final decision on that issue? Was he trying to recruit you?

Wilcott: Well, he informed me -- well, they never told me, and, but what I gathered was they said that they didn't think that he

was trying to recruit me. They finally brought in an agent and he was a specialist in recruitment. And the only name that I knew him by was Henry. And Henry -- well they set up this phony meeting. We used to go to this restaurant in Tokyo called Shanzigusa and they had this phony thing set up where Peter and I were to go to Shanzigusa. Henry was to come bouncing in. And here I was supposed to have met Henry in New York and had worked for him a while. They set up this phony story. And it -- the idea was that we were gonna introduce Henry into our relationship. Well, we worked with Henry for two or three months -- two months, I guess. And finally I was told by Reid, Chief of SR Satellite, to break off the contact. And what happened after that I don't know. The presumption is that Henry started going to school with us and studying Japanese too and the object was that Henry was gonna take over; that I was gonna drop out of the picture; and then, of course, it would be on a need-to-know basis.

Leap: I understand.

Wilcott: The whole idea...

Leap: Digressing a little bit -- what was the results of your polygraph after you went to Miami?

Wilcott: Well, this...

Leap: What was the position the agency took? Did you pass the polygraph?

Wilcott: Oh, yeah, I had no problem with either of the polygraphs -- either the one at Miami or the one when they sent me back to headquarters. There's no, you know, reactions to any of the questions, you know. "Do you know any communists? Are you keeping --

do you have any correspondence with any of the people that you knew at SNCC? Do you..." You know, those kind of questions they asked.

Leap: I see.

Wolf: Well, did you have anything else to say about W.I. Rogue? Did you...

Wilcott: I can't remember -- maybe -- except that the name is familiar because they used to joke about the Rogue's gallery. And I think that's where, you know, that's where the name came from. Elsie was in -- where were you, Elsie--in Logistics, right? Who was the Chief of Logistics there?

Elsie: Delmonti

Wilcott: Yeah, Delmonti. My boss was Chief of Finance. It was H. Robert Braham -- or Robert H. Braham -- who went on Miami Station and denied that -- well, at Zenith Technical Enterprises; that was the cover name for Miami Station -- and he denied that, on public television in Miami that Zenith Technical Enterprises was a CIA front. After that they changed the name to Melmar Corporation -- m-e-l-m-a-r -- which stood for, let's see, Marine Electronic -- it was supposed to be a special firm making government contracts.

Leap: What was the purpose of the organization? As far as CIA was concerned, what was the purpose of utilizing this front?

Wilcott: Well, the main thing that they were doing about that I knew about operationally was burning the cane fields in Cuba. They -- I had several friends in Maritime Division that was operating the the PM, Paramilitary, Maritime Paramilitary group. They had an office

with a great big huge plan board -- like one of these war plan boards that you see in old war films. And they had every boat that covered Miami and the area all the way out to Cuba -- had all these boats and little, you know, little magnetic boats that latched on to this board. Well, I was never supposed to have been in there, of course, and the -- seen the board, but I had some friends there and they went to a trip out to Cuba, stayed with these people that I knew in Maritime. And what they were doing at that time was burning the cane field. They had a frogman project that they said was that they would have these boats go out to just off the coast of Cuba. And that these frogmen would jump off the boats, swim to the shore and burn the cane fields, and then they'd come and pick 'em back up. I mean they were doing a lot of other things too, but that's what...

Leap: Who was head of that project?

Wilcott: I can't remember. With a list of the people at Tokyo Station I could probably recall a lot more. In fact, I have some pictures of the guy that told me all about this. That we went -- when we went on a trip we took some pictures.

Elsie: (unintelligible)

Wilcott: Yeah, Riley. He was an old-time PM Maritime man that had been working in the agency for years and years. And, there's Riley -- and then there was a younger guy who, when we all went out on a weekend once and we went to Key Biscayne, and that's how I got to know him. I also was involved in a photo intelligence operation. It was quite by accident. You know, I'm a private pilot and I wanted to do some flying around Miami. So what -- I'd run into somebody from TSD,

Technical Services Division, and they said, and he told me about these various flights that they made from time to time. I said: "Well, I'd like to go along on one of these flights because the ADIZ zones, the identification, military identifications, zones around Miami is very complicated. And, you know, you have to know where you're going or they'll shoot you down. So, I wanted to ride along on one of those flights, to stay with the copilot and the navigator, and, you know, learn the flight patterns and so on. So, one time this friend of mine, when I was working in TSD, said: "Well, look, we've got a flight pulling out; would you like to go on it?" I said: "Sure, I'd like to go." So we went out; got up 4 o'clock in the morning; and went out to this airfield right nearby -- Miami -- and took off on this flight. Well, as it turned out, one of the operational people who were on this federal intelligence project didn't show up

And they said:

"Well, would you take his place?" I said: " Well, I don't know anything about photography." "Well," he said, "we'll show you how to do it." So we had one of these PBY's, you know, with the big bubbles on the side -- and there was two of us on, you know, one on either side, with the photo project director. And what we would do is fly over something he wanted photographed and he would point. And everytime he'd point, we'd click a button of the camera and take pictures. And I took over 35 rolls of film in that one day with these automatic cameras. And you just know that the camera's

So we took pictures of a maritime craft; mostly it was private craft that were used from time by CIA for projects that they would, you know, use 'em from time to

time in addition to all their craft that they owned. Plus, we flew -- we flew over Swan Island, for instance. That was the, you know, the main propaganda radio station from CIA. And we also flew over all these, this whole chain of islands -- these little islands, you know, some of them not more than a quarter of a mile, you know, in area with the length, where they had stashes of arms, munitions, food. Now what they said was that they buried boats; they buried life rafts; they buried arms and munitions, food on these islands. And the idea of the photographic mission was to take pictures of these islands where this stuff had been buried; and then they would be turned over to photo interpreters, and they would look for disruptions in the terrain, because presumably this is what Castro would be doing with these, you know, with all these islands. And so they were supposed to be able to -- the photo interpreters were supposed to be able to spot where these stashes were put on these islands.

Leap: In the course of your duties, do you have any knowledge of CIA operations in New Orleans?

Wilcott: No, I don't.

Leap: How about Mexico City?

Wilcott: No, I don't.

Leap: Do you have any questions you'd like to ask, Betsie?

Wolf: Well, I have a few more names that might ring a bell. Are you familiar with the name William Harvey?

Wilcott: Harvey -- yes. I believe that was Harvey. I'm not sure whether that was from Tokyo or Miami. That name definitely rings a bell.

Wolf: How about Daniel Carsley?

Wilcott: Doesn't ring a bell.

Wolf: Mitchell Robell?

Wilcott: Robell?

Wolf: Warbell

Wilcott: Warbell?

Wolf: It's spelled w-e-r-b-e-l-l.

Wilcott: Not offhand.

Wolf: Bernardo Detores?

Wolf: Louis Posato?

Wilcott: That sounds familiar, but I can't -- you know, it just sounds like a familiar name.

Leap: You wouldn't by chance happen to know Priscilla Johnson McMillen?

Wilcott: Not that -- no, no, that's

Leap: This will be the termination of the interview. This is a continuation of the interview with Mr. James Wilcott.

Wilcott: You would like to ask a question?

Wolf: Okay, I was wondering why -- if you contacted any formal investigative body, such as the Warren Commission, Rockefeller Commission, Church Committee; or, if you didn't, did you have any thoughts about contacting any of these people at the time you were first doing allegations as to Oswald's involvement with the CIA; and if you didn't, why not?

Wilcott: Well, first of all, I -- the information that I had, which was from heresay -- I didn't think was any kind of information that would, you know, serve any purpose. I -- I was

reluctant to even repeat some of these conversations because I was afraid I might, you know, just - just cloud the issue more than help it. And so I didn't think there was anything even that I had to say about CIA that was all that interesting. And it wasn't until two years later...

Wolf: Being when?

Wilcott: That was when we came out here. But I was also very, very reluctant, particularly under the Johnson administration and particularly under the Nixon administration, to talk about it. Now, all these various harassment and intimidation incidents had occurred and now I thought it was -- would be -- the next thing to suicide to talk to people because I felt that people were incredibly naive about what was going on in this country -- what the CIA was all about; what they were involved in -- and I was not all that anxious to talk to the -- well, Warren Commission was, you know, to my mind, a whitewash of the first order. I didn't believe a thing they said and I really felt that -- not that these people were gonna do anything -- but their, their lack of security, the lack of security in the government for somebody who was gonna talk about these kinds of things would really put me in jeopardy. And I was not willing to do that without a lawyer and without a public support group. And, for instance, just recently I talked to a lawyer, Eric Winesider, right here in San Francisco, about some things that I wanted to undertake concerning CIA. He said: "Well, to tell you the truth

Jim, I'm scared for my own safety." Well, my God, what am I to do? I said: "My civil rights are being violated and you're afraid to defend me?" "Well," he says, "I'll do it, but I'd just as soon not because I'm afraid for my career and I'm afraid for my safety." Well, I freaked out. What! A lawyer! How am I gonna protect myself? And this is the -- well, this is more or less of an extreme case that happened within the past eight years. The same thing was prevalent on my -- I was not willing to go to the government, government people and talk about it because you never knew who was in the government. From what I knew of CIA, with agents all over in the government, it would be an unwise thing to do. So there is the instant -- now I tried to contact -- when I came out here -- in fact, after my boss in community renewal program, Frank O'Connor had brought me the resignation form from the mayor and all of the people that I had been associated with were leaving Utica -- things were getting too hot there. I decided well, I've gotta get the hell out of there or, you know, things just, just ain't too healthy. So, as it turned out, my mother lives in Fremont. She had a lobotomy and is on ATD; and my aunt had been living with her, but my aunt was going to Turkey. So in order to keep my mother in her own place, there had to be somebody nearby or they'd put her in an institution. Well, I was the only one available, so that's how I came to come out to the area. But I went -- one of the first things I did when I got out here is to go to Ranparts; and I went to Ranparts to tell them, you know, that I would like to talk about CIA and so on.

Well, the way they said: "Well, write it all up; write it all up and then we'll talk to you." I said: "Well, you know, nine years is a long time, you know. Is there any particular aspect that you're interested in. I don't know whether I have anything that's worthwhile to talk about or not." Well, they didn't want to talk to me, so I said: "Okay, well, we'll forget it then." And the way I'd been talking since '68, mostly to small groups of people in their home -- and that's the way I like to talk about CIA, impromptu kind of meetings. Now the pressure has eased off a lot, but the pressure was absolutely fantastic during that time when I had great doubts as to whether I would survive to see this day. I believe that these interests killed Kennedy; I believe they killed Bobbie Kennedy, Martin Luther King, all that; you know, who the hell am I? They'd snuff me without, without giving a second thought about it. So while I considered it a social duty to talk about the kinds of things. I wasn't all that anxious to talk about it unless it was under conditions that I had some kind of control over. So what I'd like to, what I would tell anybody: "Look, anytime you want to know about the CIA, I'll be glad to talk to you."

Leap: Let me ask you, Jim, did any of the individuals you talked to at the Tokyo Station say anything that you construed to be firsthand information?

Wilcott: Oh, yes; oh, yes. Much of the information, especially, the most important thing is this. When this person came right there and I was standing right at my window -- I had a little cashier's cage where I disbursed money -- said that was --

that was a project that CIA -- it mentioned the crypto; it mentioned the crypto that was the Oswald project.

Leap: And you say that conversations of this nature, relative to this subject, would be limited to possibly four or five agents within that station?

Wilcott: Yeah, see everybody was talking about it -- speculating -- I mean, you know, just the same way that people were speculating on the street as to, you know, various things. But as far as the kind of information that's in here, I believe -- and I didn't talk about all that in this article here -- but the -- it's the kind of information that I think people had; in other words, some expertise either with direct acquaintance or could infer from previous experience that there was some real substance to what they were saying. Now, in this article I tried to include everything possible that would have any kind of weight one way or another, either for or against, you know, the things, because it seemed to me that the important thing was the motivation -- what was the motivation to killing Kennedy. That's what seems to hold together in the story that I heard out there in Tokyo.

Leap: I see. Now, if, by chance--and I'm not sure that I can do this -- if I'm able to get a list of the CIA personnel in Japan and their photographs, could you identify the individuals who made such remarks that he was a CIA agent?

Wilcott: I think so.

Leap: You could do that?

Wilcott: I think I could identify them -- some of them, certainly. I remember there was a guy in China branch, who I knew quite well, who used to meet the Polish ships. In fact, he told a story about this pill that CIA developed for him where he could take this pill and drink enormous quantities of booze and never get drunk; and that the Poles were very impressed. The Polish sailors on the ships that he met, the Polish ships, were real impressed with the amount of booze that he could drink. Well, anyways, he was one, I'm sure, that I talked to. Fred Randall had said some things, maybe not direct, but that indicated that, that, you know, that Kennedy was killed by -- he was my instructor in this course that I took, I believe I mentioned in here, in international relations. And we talked, you know, a few words, not much, not much, but I remember -- I can't remember exactly what it was, but something in connection with the Kennedy assassination--it was after I had talked to Fred Randall that I really began to believe well, you know, maybe these people aren't just crazies off their rocker, that there was really something involved with CIA killing Kennedy.

Leap: Let me ask you a question. From these conversations, did you assume or get the impression that the project was run in Japan?

Wilcott: Yes, I did.

Wolf: Well, along that line, you knew, heard these allegations and you heard Oswald's cryptonym, did you recognize the cryptony or...

Wilcott: Yes

Wolf: ...or did you happen to go back at that time and check any of your previous records to see if you had made payments to that person?

Wilcott: Not really. I wasn't all that interested. That was shop talk, more or less.

Leap: You would have noticed if it was not a Japanese cryptonym?

Wilcott: Yes.

Leap: Right. So...

Wilcott: I've forgotten a lot now about 'em -- there were so many that came across. Every, every person in the station who was working on a project came and drew funds from me under that project name. They'd fill out a request for advance, citing the project. They'd take the request for advance to Chief of Finance or the Deputy Chief, who would sign off, and then -- well, first they would take it to Will Dunham. He was the auditor, what we call the auditor, and he would check in the project book to see how much funds were available. Each project was funded quarterly. Like if they had a million dollars for a project that was to last a year, then every quarter they'd get \$250,000 for that project.

Leap: Well, let me ask you this.

Wilcott: So, every...

Leap: You say Oswald was a project.

Wilcott: Mm-hmm

Leap: Would Will Donovan know that?

Wilcott: No, no. That's all he had was the finance, the sterilized copy of the project outline that he originally set these books up for.

Leap: I see. So, he wouldn't necessarily know who the individual was?

Wilcott: No. In fact, they made the...

Wolf: By true name, by cryptonym, or anything?

Wilcott: No, unless he heard about, you know, from conversation or, you know, the need-to-know principle was not observed in all cases and things slipped out from time to time, you know, and people got familiar with projects from time to time.

Leap: I see. You have any other questions?

Wolf: Could we take a break?

Leap: Yes. We'll have a break at this time.

* * * * *

Leap: Continuation of interview -- time 12:40 p.m.

Wolf: Perhaps you could tell us a little about your knowledge as to how the files were set up -- either 201 files -- well, I can do that to begin with.

Wilcott: Okay. As I remember, the 201 files were headquarters personnel files that they, they had to be hand-carried; they had to be signed in and signed out. We never had access to those files.

Wolf: When you say you, you mean in the Finance Office?

Wilcott: Yes, in Finance -- any of the Finance offices that I worked in the field or at Tokyo Station disbursing funds, or at Miami Station on payroll -- we never had access to those files. They had to be signed in and signed out; that only Personnel -- I believe it was only Personnel people -- could draw those files out and so on. But we had division files. Now, as I understand it, the 201 files that they, I believe I remember being told at one time that the reason that they used the 201 was to smokescreen, since the military also used 201 for their files. Then it would smokescreen CIA 201 files. But CIA 201 files were entirely different from military 201 files. You know, they were entirely -- and as far as I remember, that 201 files were only employee files. For instance, if Oswald had a CIA 201 file, he must have been a regular agent of the agency. He must have been; I mean an agent of the agency -- because they were just, you know, agent files and employee files. Now, one time I did an audit, an exhaustive audit, on a guy who had been in the Soviet Union -- had been in jail in the Soviet Union. CIA was paying him a regular salary and keeping it in escrow. That was the only time I ever saw a 201 file, you know, up close -- or looked through it or anything. Joe Hudson had it and they were real, real -- they were real uptight about the 201 files. Now, there was...

Leap: What was the individual's name, do you remember?

James Wilcott interview...page 47

Wilcott: I don't remember; I don't recall. It was -- I did an audit over the three years. There had been mistakes and there had been pay raises and so on that he should have got but he was in jail and, as I recall, he had three or four more years to go on his sentence.

Leap: What year was it that you did this audit?

Wilcott: This was '64 -- late '64, early '65 -- between the time that I went from, when I went back to headquarters from Tokyo Station after my _____ and we went to Miami. And the -- now there were a lot of division files. There were personnel files that each division had its own personnel. And there were division files. And that's what was used, for instance, when I had my performance reviews and so on. When I had the polygraph at headquarters, after working with SNCC, they had my, the Chief, Chief of Security who gave me the interview -- not the polygraph interview but the first interview I had in my 201 file -- but they were, as I remember, very uptight. But this is all kind of hazy. I'm not, you know, exactly sure, but that's the best I can remember.

Wolf: In your recollection of either your 201 file or of this other person's file, do you happen to know if they had photographs of the personnel in the 201's?

Wilcott: Well, I remember in the case of the agent that was in the Soviet prison they had photographs -- they had a lot of photographs. It was a big file; it was a great big file. My file was not that big. I saw it on his desk and my kid remembers.

His name is Robert something. He's Chief of Security. But I saw it on his desk; and it wasn't that big. It was a thin file. But the Russian agent in the Soviet prison was a great big fat fellow.

Leap: Do you remember whereabouts in Russia he was incarcerated?

Wilcott: No, I don't. I don't remember anything about him. In fact, I wasn't even supposed to see the file. That's all I was supposed to do was do the audit.

Leap: Correct his pay?

Wilcott: Yeah

Leap: Pay records?

Wilcott: Yeah. I'd go all the way back from the time, you know, he was first went off CIA payroll and it went into escrow payroll, I recall it, escrow payroll. And then I had to go back and recompute it and look up all these changes -- stacks and stacks of changes in the three years, you know, that have come about

Wolf: What about in your jobs with the CIA? Did you have occasion to see 201 files?

Elsie: Nn-Nnn

Wolf: So they did it in the offices that you worked upstairs with. In the Tokyo Station there there were no copies of 201 files as such?

Wolf: Did -- you said that you were employed by the agency when you were overseas. Did you have any employment with the agencies when you were

Elsie: Yes, I was a regular employee in Washington and I had the whole security clearance and everything. But I terminated in Washington so in Tokyo I was like a contract employee, which is a wife of a CIA agent. And in Miami I worked also as a contract employee.

Wolf: And you didn't work in headquarters when you came back that year between Tokyo and Miami?

Elsie: No

Wolf: Okay. Are either of you familiar with the term "Greenlist check?"

Wilcott: The what?

Wolf: Greenlist check?

Wilcott: Greenlist check? There were so many list checks. It sounds familiar, but I can't, can't, they had so many of 'em going around and, you know, I wasn't really all that interested. It was all shop talk, you know, try to get away from it; try to get...

Wolf: Could you explain anything as to how the finance office was and was set up?

Wilcott: Oh, yes. What -- the major files that we had in the Finance office were the project funding files. In other words, there was a ledger kept that each project -- this is now we're talking about operational funds, strictly operational funds. There -- a large book was kept by Will Dunham and Pete Martin, who was also, was Deputy Chief of Tokyo Station, and Will Dunham, who was the auditor at Tokyo Station, were, maintained the operational files. Each branch had a book, and every project was listed. We'd get a copy of the project outline, and the project outline -- now, let's

see, maybe I ought to go back as to how projects were, were first set up. As I understand it, the, an agent, well, say the New York, the Japan Times instance. They'd say: "Well, we wanta place an agent on the Japan Times." Alright. They-- an agent would draw up a project as to how it would be done -- the intelligence officer, or something -- and he would submit it to his supervisor and his supervisor would usually work with him on it and draw up the project. They they would submit it to the chief -- chief of the branch. The chief of the branch would either approve it or disapprove it. If he approved it, then it would be sent to headquarters for approval at the desk, at the headquarters desk. If the headquarters desk approved it, then they would send back a project outline, and it was divided into several sections. There would be the operational section; there would be the TSD section, the Technical Services Section; there'd be the finance section. What we got are the project outlines which were our basis for setting up the account and allocating the funds. Too, it was the sterilized copy of the project outline. Everything would be cut out except the finance section of the project outline. There was also -- I can't quite remember exactly how the numbering, but there was a complicated system of numbering, numbers and everything. And then we would set that up in the book, and as soon as the funds came from headquarters, we'd get lists of funds for allocations by numbers. And then we would set up -- once it was approved by headquarters and the allocation of funds were made in our Tokyo Station budget --

then we would set up the total amount for the branch. And now we're just talking about operational funds. And then we would have to go through and allocate to each project how much of that project--how much money went to each of the projects under the total for each budget. Like China branch would have, you know, a whole bunch of projects. We'd go through and allocate that. I used to help them with that from time to time. Then, it was done in quarterly allotments. That the -- I kept the allotment ledgers for each of the operational funds for a while, and it would be allocated on a quarterly basis that if a fund had \$1,250,000 it would be set up for the first three months. And then people would draw -- if they, they -- when they wanted money for that project, they would draw money, and then that was controlled by the crypto. And each project had a crypto in addition to the numbers that they had. We mostly dealt with numbers, while operation stuff mostly was cryptos. And so then they would bring the request for advance -- they fill out the request for advance. It would be signed by...

Leap: By the case officer?

Wilcott: Well, yes, but it also would be signed by the branch chief. And then there was a place for the case officer who was making the -- withdrawing the money. And then there's a -- somebody, chief of finance -- and they'd come in, bring it to Will Dunham, he would look up the account in the ledger book by project and say he would usually initial off. And then when he brought it to Clay, Clay Norman, who was the -- Clay Norman III was the first

chief of finance at Tokyo Station. And Jack Randall was the second one -- Clay was back after about two years. So they would sign off; Will Dunham would initial it; Clay would know if there was enough money in the project to cover it; he would sign off; and then they'd bring it to me and I'd look for Clay's signature and disburse the money and set it up on my daily cash record.

Wolf: So in the case of a black operation such as we discussed before, how were the funds for that

Wilcott: Well, in the same way. There'd be nothing whatsoever in the project outline -- anything else to indicate that it was any kind of black operation. Never did I see -- even though there were black operations that I knew were going on and that people have told me about -- it was never... For instance the Zangokowans was one of the -- it's one of the original projects of CIA. It goes way back many years till late '50's. And the Zangokowans were what CIA called a quasi-political religious organization that they had members in the diet and everything. This was one of the channels that they used to route agents into the Communist party through the Zangokowans. And that was one of their big projects in Tokyo once -- Zangokowans -- and they infiltrated people into labor unions, into all kinds of political, you know, every kind of group you could imagine. For instance, moral, moral rearmament was a project of CIA. It was conceived by CIA. CIA went and approached all of these religious people for the -- for moral rearmament. And that was -- that was their project. I don't know,

maybe I'm getting off the beaten path here kind of comments.

Leap: Do you have any other questions?

Wolf: You mentioned an article that after the Bay of Pigs that there had -- there was a change in administration as far as procedures for operations, assigning cryptonyms, and that type of thing. Could you elaborate?

Wilcott: Well now, the way it hit us was that we had, you know, all these complicated numbers that -- all the projects were by this complicated numbering system. And even though we had in our ledgers the crypto, we were not so concerned with the crypto as with the numbering. All that changed. The cryptos were all changed. There are a lot of other things that I was not directly concerned with I'd heard about. For instance, that where there was a lot more work gonna be done outside the station -- this was especially after the flare-up; they had building 724 in Washington Heights -- where they came out in one of the papers that building 724 was CIA headquarters in Tokyo. So, they -- there were all kinds of changes that were made as to way -- to the way I think about it is that these were the changes that they talked about where Dulles and Bissel had promised Kennedy that these changes would be made, and that's where the changes that were made, which was really shuffling. You know, it was more efficient in a way. The -- things tightened up -- housing allowances, vehicle allowances that we were directly associated with were tightened up. As far as the operations people, they were really miffed off about a lot of things that were

coming down at that time because they were gonna rely a lot more on outside deep cover agents. So that meant that the agent, the intelligence officer, the case officer, and so on would be cut out of those projects, you know, the real heavy stuff, and the deep cover agents were gonna take over a lot more of that stuff -- something like that. Incidentally, at that time enormous amounts of material were destroyed--shredded. In fact, I worked on -- a couple of times for overtime for, I think it was Logistics -- and helping 'em shred stuff. And huge volumes of material were shredded.

Leap: Project files?

Wilcott: Project files, operational stuff. They'd really tightened up on what they put. Logistics, for instance, if they wanted, let's say, a camera. They'd go to Logistics; TSD would give them, you know, an outline as to what kind of camera they thought would be the best camera for this kind of thing. So they'd take it to Logistics. Logistics -- Bob Ulgeri was chief of Logistics -- then he would go out on a local market and try to pick the camera up or they'd, he would contact one of the other stations somewhere else, maybe if it was something real special, to get the camera and have it shipped to Tokyo Station for that particular project.

Leap: Do you have any guidelines relative to destruction of files determined to be of no further value to the agency. Are there any existing guidelines relative to that subject?

Wilcott: Well, there is an awful lot that was -- after the shakeup -- that was -- they told me that they were really, really going uptight. That's what -- things were really getting uptight. And that huge volumes of files were being destroyed and that there was gonna be a lot more reliance on, you know, reliable people, reliable people. You know, how, how whether people would go along with this higher duty theory -- the kind of higher duty theory -- and that -- so, this was one of the, you know, as I remember, the things that -- they were doing away with a lot of the people where -- that they previously had, and relying more on people that were gonna, you know, that were gonna follow directives, etc.

Leap: Jim, I have a question, a standard question I have to ask you. Is there anything in your background that would discredit you if you were called as a witness before the Committee?

Wilcott: Well, that all -- that all depends on who's -- who's saying what is discrediting.

Leap: Well, for instance, do you have any history of emotional or medical problems?

Wilcott: No, I don't.

Leap: I see. You ever been arrested?

Wilcott: No, not for -- I was arrested once in -- with SNCC, but it was overnight.

Leap: Do you remember right now what the charge was?

Wilcott: Public intoxication is what the charge was, but

I was...

Leap: Disposition?

Wilcott: Pardon?

Leap: What was the disposition of the charge?

Wilcott: Well, Elsie came down and bailed me out.

Elsie: I just paid \$20. Well, the thing is in Washington at that time, you know, there was a lot of racial tension -- I guess the idea of a white person being out with a black person late at night. So, they more or less said they were arresting Jim for his own good because he wasn't safe being out with a black person, you know, about one o'clock in the morning.

Leap: I see.

Elsie: So, I don't remember. I just paid \$20

Leap: Well, I do thank you very much for your time, your efforts.

Wilcott: Well, if there's anything more we can -- we can help with something, we'll be glad to help.

Elsie: I know it's very frustrating not to have anything tangible.

Leap: Well, thank you very much. This will terminate the interview on this date, January 28th. The time is 1:00 p.m.

#