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AMMUG/1

As cited with regard to Luisa Calderon, a defec-
tor from the Cuban Intelligence Services provided the
CIA with significant information about Lee Harvey Oswald's
contacts with the DGI in Mexico City. This defector
was assigned the CIA cryptonym AMMUG-1 (A-1 hereinafter).*

CIA files reveal that A-1 defected from the DGI
on April 21, 1964 in () When
he defected, A-1 possessed a number of DGI documents which
were subsequently turned over to the CIA. () IN 68894,
24 April 64) Following his defection, a CIA officer,
Joseph H. Langosch, went to () to meet A-1, debrief
him, and arrange for A-1's travel into the United States.
(See supra cite.) On May 1, 1964, 22 reels of Langosch's ^{OSC} ~~fresh's~~
debriefing of A-1 were forwarded to the Chief of the CIA's
Special Affairs Staff from the ()
() Effective on May 1, A-1 was under contract with
the CIA for operational purposes. (Contract Approving Of-
ficer memo, 6 May 64) By June 23, 1964, Langosch was
convinced that A-1 would be of great value to the Agency.
He stated:

There is no question in my mind that AMMUG-1

*It is now known that A-1 did provide significant leads to
the CIA regarding Luisa Calderon. It is further apparent
that little of this information was made available by the
CIA to the Warren Commission. Therefore, the possibility
exists that A-1 had provided other information to the CIA
that was relevant to the Warren Commission's work ~~but that~~ which
was not properly reported to the Commission.

is a bona fide defector or that he has furnished us with accurate and valuable information concerning Cuban intelligence operations, staffers, and agents. (Langosch memo to Director of Security, 23 June 1964)

As an officer of the DGI, A-1 from August of 1963 until his defection was assigned to the DGI's Illegal Section B () IN 68894 24 April 64). This section was responsible for training agents for assignment in Latin America. His specific responsibility pertained to handling of agent operations in El Salvador. (Personal Record Questionnaire 4 June 1964; Otta In 68894 24 April 64)

~~identified for the CIA~~
A-1 knew ~~who were~~ the Cuban Intelligence officers assigned to Mexico City. In this regard he initially identified ~~Alfredo Mirabal, Manuel Vega, and Rogelio Rodríguez~~ and the ~~Commercial attache~~ as DGI officers posted at the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City. (supra) Langosch described A-1's knowledge of DGI operations in Mexico as follows:

In Mexico City, he knows who the intelligence people are. One is the Cuban Consul Alfredo Mirabal. He is called the Chief of the Centre. That is his title but he is actually the intelligence chief, or at least he was until the 16th of April at which time a replacement was sent to Mexico to take over. This fellow's name is Manuel Vega. The source says that the Commercial attache whose name is Ricardo Tapia or Concepcion (he is not sure which is an intelligence officer) and another one is Rogelio. (I might say that some of these names are familiar to me.) (p. 5 or reel 4, 23 April 1964, debriefing of A-1, 30 April 64)

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Thus, A-1 was able to provide the CIA soon after his defection with accurate information regarding DGI operations and DGI employees in Mexico City.

The Committee has reviewed the CIA's files concerning A-1. This examination was undertaken to determine: 1) whether A-1 had provided any valuable investigative leads to the CIA pertaining to the assassination of President Kennedy; and 2) whether, if such leads were provided, these leads and/or other significant information was made available to the Warren Commission.

The Committee's initial review of the materials provided by the CIA to the Warren Commission did not disclose the existence of the AMMUG files. However, the Committee did ^{during the course of its} review ^{examine} a file containing material passed to the Rockefeller Commission. That file ^{made} ~~contained~~ ^{in this file was} reference to AMMUG-1. ~~This~~ included a memorandum of May 5, 1964 written by Joseph Langosch which concerned information A-1 provided about the Oswald case. (Cite supra FOIA 68-290) Also contained within this file were the A-1 debriefing memorandum of May 7, and May 8, 1964 previously cited with regard to Luisa Caldeon. (Cite) Following review of the memoranda, the Committee requested access to all CIA files concerning ~~or~~ referring to A-1.

From review of these materials the Committee has determined that the Warren Commission did learn during mid-May 1964 that Lee Harvey Oswald probably had come in

contact with DGI officers in Mexico City.

~~Prior to learning of Oswald's probable contact~~
with DGI officers, James Angleton, Chief of the CIA's Counter Intelligence Staff passed an internal memorandum to Raymond Rocca, also of the Counterintelligence Staff. Angleton wrote in the memorandum that he had been informed by the DDP, Richard Helms, that J. Lee Rankin had contacted John McCone to request that the Director consent to an interview ^{before} ~~by~~ the Warren Commission on May 14, 1964. (J. Edgar Hoover also appeared before the Commission on that date prior to McCone's appearance.) Angleton also wrote:

I discussed with Mr. Helms the nature of the recent information which you are processing which originated with the sensitive ~~White~~ ^{White} ~~House~~ source. I informed him that in your view this would raise a number of new factors with the Commission, that it should not go to the Commission prior to the Director's appearance unless we have first had some preliminary reaction or made sure that the Director is fully aware of the implications since it could well serve as the basis for detailed questioning. The DDP stated that he would review this carefully and made (sic) a decision as to the question of timing. (Angleton memo, 12 May 1964, FOIA 689-298)

Undoubtedly the ~~White~~ ^{White} source referred to in Angleton's memo ~~is~~ A-1. This conclusion is based in part upon the date of this memo which ~~is~~ quite close in time to A-1's defection. In addition, on May 14, 1964, Director McCone did appear before the Warren Commission. At Angleton's request, Rocca's staff prepared a Brief

for Presentation to the Warren Commission outlining various positions adopted by the CIA vis a vis its investigative efforts and assistance to the Commission. (Brief, May 14, 1964, FOIA 695-302A)

At Tab E of McCone's brief it states:

Within the past week, significant information has been developed by the CIA regarding the relationship with Oswald of certain Cuban intelligence personnel in Mexico City and the reaction in Havana within the Cuban Intelligence Service to the news of the assassination of President Kennedy. The Commission Staff is in the course of being briefed on the Cuban aspect (cite supra May 14, 1964 FOIA 695-302A).

The significant information referred to therein is the information A-1 provided.

On May 15, 1964, the day of ~~the~~ *McCone's* interview, the Warren Commission received its first formal communication regarding A-1. However, the Agency did not at that time identify A-1 by his real name or cryptonym nor did the Agency indicate that the source of this information was a defector then residing under secure conditions in the Washington, D.C. area. (See May 15 Letter from Helms to Rankin FOIA). The May 15 communication did state that the Agency had established contact

"with a well-placed individual who has been in close and prolonged contact with ranking officers of the Cuban Direccion General de Inteligencia." (Cite)

Attached to the May 15 communication was a copy of Langosch's above referenced memorandum of May 5, 1964 re-

garding A-1's knowledge of Oswald's probable contact with the DGI in Mexico City. (Cite above.) The attachment made no reference to the source's status as a defector from the DGI.

As set forth in the section of the report concerning Luisa Calderon, on June 18, 1964, Howard Willens of the Warren Commission reviewed Langosch's May 5 memo and the questions upon which the information set forth in the memo was elicited. Neither the questions or the memo shown to Willens made reference to the source's status as a defector collaborating with the CIA. (Cite Arthur Dooley memo, 19 June 1964, FOIA 739-319).

Based upon review of the Langosch memoranda, the Committee has determined that significant information regarding Luisa Calderon was withheld from the Warren Commission (Cite Calderon section). This information was derived from the debriefings of A-1. (Cite May 7 and 8 Langosch memos.) From the Committee's review of the A-1 file provided by the CIA, the Committee has not found any credible evidence indicating that other information provided by A-1 to the CIA was relevant to the work of the Warren Commission. However, in its review the Committee has determined that specific documents referenced in the A-1 file ^{are} ~~is~~ not present in that file.

^{One} ~~The~~ missing item^s of considerable concern to the Committee.

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referred This is a debriefing report of A-1 entitled "The Oswald Case."

(Dispatch () 3035, 23 March 1965) On March 23, 1965, a CIA dispatch records the transmittal of the report, along with eleven other A-1 debriefing reports. (Cite supra.)

Next to the listing of the "Oswald Case" debriefing report

is the handwritten notation "SI." A CIA employee who has

staff member that worked extensively with the Agency files system *told a Committee* believed this notation *was the symbol for* ~~to stand for~~ the CIA component *known as* Special In-

telligence. ~~Other CIA representatives believed the nota-~~

~~tion to stand for the CIA component Special Intelligence.~~

Other CIA representatives believed the notation was a re-

ference to the Counterintelligence component CI/SIG. In

a CIA memorandum dated _____, it ~~is~~ stated

Quote Barbara's memo.

The Agency has been unable to locate this document and therefore the Committee cannot pass judgement upon the substance of the missing materials.

The Committee has queried A-1's case officers regarding additional information that A-1 may have supplied *about* regarding Oswald. Joseph Lanogsch when interviewed by the Committee stated that (HSCA staff interview Joseph Langosch, August 21, 1978), he did not have contact with the Warren Commission and does not know what information derived from A-1's debriefings was supplied to the Warren Commission. (Cite also Hidalgo and Piccolo.) He also stated that he does not *interviews*

recall that ~~AMMUG~~^{A-1} provided any other information on Oswald's contact with the DGI other than the memoranda discussed herein. (Cite ~~Calderon~~^{Calderon} interview.) *set forth in the of May 5, 7, and 8.*

In a further effort to clarify the substance of information that ~~AMMUG~~^{A-1} provided to the CIA regarding Oswald, the Committee has attempted to locate ~~AMMUG~~^{A-1}. The CIA has also attempted to locate ~~AMMUG~~^{A-1} (give date of separation from CIA) but has been unable to determine his present whereabouts.

Thus, gaps do exist regarding information ~~AMMUG~~^{A-1} may have supplied the CIA about Oswald. ~~On~~^{and} the basis of the written record ~~the Agency~~^{with the CIA}, except for the Calderon episode, ~~provided~~^{of} the Warren Commission with all information of investigative significance. ~~A~~^{A-1} broader question remains however. The Agency, as noted earlier, did not reveal to the Warren Commission that A-1 was present in the Washington, D.C. area and, under controlled conditions, accessible to the Commission. ~~Even considering~~^{Giving due consideration to} the CIA's serious concern for protecting its sources, the fact that A-1's status was not disclosed foreclosed the Warren Commission from exercising a possible option, i.e. to take the sworn testimony of A-1 as it concerned Oswald and the Kennedy assassination. On this issue, as the written record tends to show, the Agency unilaterally rejected the ~~option~~^{possibility of exercising this}. ~~It should not have done so.~~^{It should not} ~~The CIA did not face, in A-1's case, the enormous problems establishing bona fide as it did with Nosenko.~~

~~Definitely~~^{In} light of the establishment of A-1's bona fides (Cite Langosch's quote supora), his proven reliability and his depth of knowledge of Cuban intelligence activities, ~~this option might well have been considered by the Warren Commission.~~^{option might well have been considered by the Warren Commission.} ~~At the very least, had the opportunity for such consideration.~~