

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 2/8/2016

Agency Information

AGENCY : HSCA
RECORD NUMBER : 180-10142-10063
RECORD SERIES : CIA SEGREGATED COLLECTION
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : 22-24-02

Document Information

ORIGINATOR : HSCA
FROM : CIA
TO :
TITLE :
DATE : 00/00/0000
PAGES : 10
SUBJECTS :
CALDERON, LUISA
WC
CIA, FILES
DOCUMENT TYPE : NOTES
CLASSIFICATION : Unclassified
RESTRICTIONS : 1A; 1B
CURRENT STATUS : Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 08/07/1995
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS : Box 11

Luisa Calderon

Approximately five hours after President Kennedy's assassination, a Cuban ~~employee~~^{govt} employee in Mexico City named "Luisa" received a telephone call from an unidentified man speaking Spanish. [MEXI 7105, 27 Nov 63, attachment 3. This call had been intercepted and recorded by the CIA's Mexico City Station as the result of its LIENVOY ^(CIT Top) operation. [op cit]. The Mexico City Station identified the Luisa of the conversation as Luisa Calderon, who was then employed in the Commercial attache office at the Cuban Consulate.

During the course of the conversation, the unidentified caller asked Luisa if she had heard the latest news. Luisa replied in a joking tone
 Yes, of course, I knew almost before Kennedy.

The caller went on to tell Luisa that the person apprehended for Kennedy's slaying was the "President of one of the Committees of the Fair Play for Cuba." Luisa replied that she knew this also. Luisa inquired whether the person

being held for its killing was a gringo.
The unidentified caller replied yes.
Lucia told the caller that she had
learned nothing else about the
assassination: that she had learned
about the assassination only a little
while ago.

The unidentified caller ~~commented~~
commented:

We think that if it had
been or had seemed ... public
or had been one of the segregation-
tionists or against integration
who had killed Kennedy, then
there was let's say, the
possibility that a sort of civil
war would arise in the United
States; that ~~the~~ contradictions
would be changed ... who
knows

Lucia responded: Imagine, me,
two, three, and now, that
makes three (she laughs)

¹⁹⁷⁵ Raymond Roica, ^{former chief of research and analyst for the Kennedy staff} in response to
a Rockefeller Commission request
for information on possible Cuban
connections to a ~~senator~~ President
Kennedy wrote regarding Calderin
comment:

Latin hyperbole? Boastful



ex post facto suggestion
 of foreknowledge. This is the
 only item in the intercept
 coverage of the Cuban and
 Soviet after the assassination
 that contains the suggestion
 of foreknowledge or expectation
 [Rocca memo for DC/OPS, 23 May 1975]
 P15]

Standing by itself, Susa Calderon's
 cryptic comment does not merit
~~and~~ serious attention. Her words
 may indeed indicate foreknowledge
 of the assassination but may
 also ^{equally} ~~equally~~ be interpreted
 without such a sinister
 implication. Nevertheless, as
 will be discussed ^{below}
 The Committee has ^{determined} ~~found~~ that
 Susa Calderon's case ~~des~~ ^{des} merit
 serious attention. ^{the months following the assassination}

However,
 Calderon
 comments
 were not
 the result

~~It~~ reported to the Warren
 Commission, ~~to~~ ~~the~~
~~fact~~, apparently an ^{agency} ~~unfounded~~ ~~investigation~~

The Committee has reviewed
 Susa Calderon's CIA 201 file.
 It is the CIA's position that the 201
 file comprises all substantive documenta-
 tion in the agency's possession
 referring to or concerning Calderon.

Comm

See Calderon name first surface
November 27, 1964 in a cable
sent by then Ambassador Mann to
the State Dept. # DIR 85573
WH, FBI + CIA

CI HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT

Wanted to supply the cable to Warren
Comm. in
Mann's name
File

start

Informant was reported
to the CIA during May 1964,
from a Cuban defector, Felix
Yusua Calderon, the Cuban
intelligence operative. The
defector, AMMUG-1, was himself
a Cuban Intelligence officer
who supplied valuable and
highly reliable information
to the CIA regarding Cuban
intelligence operations. Calderon's
ties to Cuban intelligence
were reported to the Warren
Commission. However, the
Committee has determined
that the CIA did not provide
Calderon's connection to the
Warren Commission. ~~It is~~
the Warren Commission ~~was~~
aware that Calderon ~~had~~
connections intelligence work, and
~~was~~ the Cuban Embassy affairs,
the vital link between his
background and his ^(3 hrs) comments
was ~~not~~ ~~made~~ ~~to~~ ~~the~~ ~~Warren~~
~~Commission~~ ~~by~~ ~~the~~ ~~CIA~~ ~~for~~ ~~the~~ ~~Warren~~
Commission in the CIA. The
Agency's oversight in the regard,
may have precluded the Commission
from actively pursuing a ~~sub~~
lead of great significance.

In that cable Mann stated:
 ... Washington should urgently
 consider feasibility of requesting
 Mexican authorities to arrest for
 interrogation: Eusebio Azcuer,
 Lucia Calderon and Alfredo
 Meradal. The two men are
 Cuban nationals and Cuban consulate
 officers. Lucia Calderon is a
 secretary in Cuban consulate
 here." (1) (2)

in urgent terms:

(4) They may all quickly be returned
 to Havana in order to eliminate
 any possibility that Mexican
 government could use them
 as witnesses."

According to C119 file
 Calderon returned to Havana
 on Dec 16, 1963, less than four
 weeks after the assassination

(8) The cable does not state the ~~reason~~ basis
 for arresting Calderon. However,
 the CIA's copy of the cable bears
 a handwritten notation on
 its routing page. That notation
 states: "Info from Amb Mann
 on Sec Rush re: ... persons
 involved with Oswald in Cuban
 Embassy

6

~~Calderon~~ Calderon, Aguirre
Munoz were arrested
and detained, by questioning
by the Mexican ^{Police} police. However,
Sibira Duen, a friend and
associate of Calderon and
the one person believed to have
had ^{contact} contact with Oswald while
he was in Mexico City, was arrested
and questioned by the Mexican police
on two separate occasions
[inter]. During her reinterrogation
Duen was questioned regarding
her association with Calderon.
No explanation is given in the
report for the question concerning
Calderon [inter]. The information
regarding Duen's interrogation
was passed to the Warren
Commission on February 21,
1964, [DDP4-0940], more
than two months after Calderon
had returned to ~~the~~ Cuba.

Go back to 3.

Calderin's 201 file reveals that she arrived in Mexico City from Havana on January 14, 1964, carrying Cuban Passport E/63/7. Her date of birth was believed to be 1940 [Dispatch, HMMA 21612]. Calderin's presence in Mexico City was first reported by the CIA on July 15, 1963 in a dispatch from the CIA's Miami field office to the CIA's Mexico City Station and to the Chief of the CIA's Special Affairs Staff (for Cuban operations). That dispatch had attached to it a report containing biographic data on personnel then assigned to the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City. At page three of the attached report source Calderin was listed as Secretary of the Cuban Embassy's Commercial Office. The notation indicated that a report was pending on Calderin. The Agency ~~has~~ attempted without success to locate the report. On Sept 1, 1963, a dispatch was sent from the Chief of the Special Affairs Staff to the Chief of Station in Mexico City. (Dispatch HMMA 11935)

Luis Calderon's associations
 with the Cuban DSI was
 first reported ⁱⁿ May 5, 1964,
~~was~~ at that time,
 Harold Swanson, Chief of Counter-
 Intelligence for the Special
 Affairs Staff, recorded the
 results of his debriefing of the
 Cuban defector, AMMUS-1.
 The memorandum states that
 AMMUS had no direct knowledge
 of Lee Harvey Oswald or his
 activities but was able to pro-
 vide items of interest based upon
 the comments of certain Cuban
 Intelligence Service officers.
 Specifically, AMMUS-1 had been
 asked if Oswald was known to
 the Cuban intelligence service
 before November 23, 1963. Ammug-1
 then Swanson, as recorded in the
 May 5 memorandum that
 " Prior to October 1963, Oswald
 visited the Cuban Embassy in
 Mexico City on two or three oc-
 casion. Before, during and after
 these visits, Oswald was in
 contact with the Director General
 De Inteligencia (DSI), specifi-
 cally with Luis Calderon, Manuel
 Vega Perez and Rogelio Rodriguez
 Lopez

Swenson thereafter wrote that Calderon's precise relationship to the DGI was not clear. As a comment to the statement he set forth the CIA Cable and dispatch traffic which recorded the arrival ^{in Mexico} and departure for Cuba.

On May 7, 1964, Swenson recorded additional information he had elicited from AMMUG-1 regarding Oswald's possible contact with the DGI.

Paragraph 3 of this memorandum stated: "a. Lucia Calderon, since

she returned to Cuba, has been paid a regular salary by the DGI even though she has not performed any services. Her home is in the Vedado section where the rents are high.

b. Source (AMMUG) has known Calderon for several years. Before going to Mexico, she worked in the Ministry of External Commerce in the department which was known as the "Empresa Transport". Her title was Secretary General of the Communist Youth in the department named in the previous sentence.

On May 8, Swenson further disclosed Ammon's knowledge of the Oswald case. ~~Swenson~~ Swenson paraphrased Ammon's knowledge of Calderon as follows:

I thought that Luisa Calderon might have had contact with Oswald because I learned about 17 March 1964, shortly before I made a trip to Mexico, that she had been involved with an American in Mexico. The information to which I refer was told to me by a DGI case officer. I had commented to [them] that it seemed strange that Luisa Calderon was ~~apparently~~ receiving a salary from the DGI although she apparently did not do any work for the Service. [The case officer] told me that it was a peculiar case and that he himself believed that she had been recruited in Mexico by the Central Intelligence Agency, although Manuel Quintana, the Head of the DGI, did not agree. As I recall, [the case officer] had investigated Luisa Calderon. This was because,

during the time she was in Mexico, the OSI had intercepted a letter to be by an American who signed his name OLIVER (phonetic) or something similar. As you know the pronunciation of Anglo-Saxon names is difficult in Spanish so I am not sure of how the name mentioned by Hernandez should be spelled. It could have been "Howard" or something different. As I understand the matter, the letter from the American was a love letter but indicated that there was a clandestine - professional relationship between the writer and Susan Calhoun. I also understand from (the Case Office) that after the interception of the letter she had been followed and seen in the company of an American. I do not know if this could have been Oswald...

On May 11, Raymond Rocco wrote a memorandum directed to Richard Helms regarding the information Swenson had elicited from AMMUS. Rocco proposed that "the DDP in person or a designee, preferably the former, discuss the AMMUS/1

situation on a very restricted
basis with Mr. Rankin at his
earliest convenience either at the
Agency or at the Commission
Headquarters. Until this takes
place, it is not desirable
to put anything in writing.

(11 May 64, Rocca memo, FOIA 687-295
w/4 attachment)

On May 15, 1964, Helms wrote Rankin
regarding AMMUG's information ^{about the FBI} ~~MEMO~~
indicating ~~the~~ ^{its} ~~importance~~ ^{significance} & operational
significance. Attached to Helms
communication was a paraphrased
accounting of Swenson May 5
memorandum. Σ Helms memo, May 15,
1964,

FOIA 697-294]

In that attachment the intelligence
associations of Manuel Vela Perez,
& Rogelio Rodriguez Lopez are set
forth. However that attachment
makes no reference whatsoever to
Lucia Calderin.

Howard Willens of the Warren
Commission, requested as a follow-
up to the May 15 memorandum,
to look at the questions used
in Swenson interrogation of
AMMUG. (Dooley memo to Rocca, 19 June
FOIA 739-319) 1964

On June 18, 1964 Arthur Dooley
 of ^{Central Intelligence} ~~Research~~ and analysis
 group took the question and
 Ammug's response to the Warren
 Commission's office ~~at~~ for
 Willens review. Willens saw
~~Seneca's~~ ^{Seneca's} May - memoranda
 except for ~~the~~ ^{the} ~~most~~ ^{most} important
 regarding Calderon's arrival at
 the airport and departure for Havana.
 However, Willens was not shown
 the ~~the~~ ^{the} memoranda of May 7 &
 May 8 1964 which contained
 much more detailed information
 on Luisa Calderon including
 her possible association with
 Lee Harvey Oswald and/or
 American intelligence.

The only
 mention
 of Calderon
 was as follows
 "The precise
 relationship
 of Luisa
 Calderon to the
 OSI is not
 clear. She
 spent about
 six months
 in Mexico
 from which she
 returned to
 Cuba early in
 1964

It should be noted that these
 memoranda of May 5, 7, 8, 11, and
 June 19 with attachments, are
 not referred to in the Calderon
 201 file. Their existence was
 determined by ^{de la mitter} independent records
 of other agency files.

Thus, the Warren Commission
 had ~~the~~ ^{the} ~~information~~ ^{information} 19 June
 64, little if no reason to pursue
 the Luisa Calderon lead. It had

effectively been denied significant
background information which
may have ~~impeded~~ impeded or prevented
the pursuit of ~~the~~ ~~main~~
Caldron's potential relationship to
Oswald and the assassination
of President Kennedy.

One must keep in mind that
even ~~though~~ the Warren Commission
had been apprised of Caldron's background
& possible contact with Oswald
it still ~~did not~~ ~~deny~~ ~~the~~ ^{did not} deny the
one significant piece of information
that might have aroused its
investigative ^{effort} ~~to~~ ~~investigate~~ ~~at~~ ~~a~~ ~~more~~
serious level. The Warren Commis-
sion never was told about Caldron's
conversations of November 22, 1964

(give details
of how
we know
not reported
cite testimony
of Rankin, Stawson,
give section - in possible
not tell of
+ assoc. details
into on heli-
(assoc. with
the dispute)
close contact with Rankin
quotes

~~TOP SECRET~~

①

THE AMLASH OPERATION

During 1967, The CIA's Inspector General issued a report which examined CIA supported assassination plot. Included in this report was discussion of the CIA-Mafia plots and an Agency project referred to as the AMLASH operation [67 IGR pp ~~71-74~~ 78-112]. The AMLASH operation involved a high level Cuban official [assigned the CIA cryptonym AMLASH/1] who during 1962 while meeting with a CIA representative expressed the desire to assassinate Fidel Castro (1967 IGR p 84). As a result of AMLASH's expressed ~~desire~~ ^{objective} and the CIA's desire to find a viable political alternative to the Castro regime, the Agency subsequently provided AMLASH with both moral and ~~material~~ ^{material} support designed to eliminate Fidel Castro. [1967 IGR pp 80-94]. The AMLASH operation was terminated by the CIA in 1965 as the result of security leaks [1967 IGR pp 104-106].

During 1965, ~~[redacted]~~ of AMLASH and his conspirators ~~[redacted]~~ were ~~[redacted]~~ ~~[redacted]~~ ~~[redacted]~~ were brought to trial in Cuba for plotting.

against Castro. AMLAH was sentenced to death but at Castro's request the sentence was reduced to twenty-five years imprisonment. (1967 IGR PP 107-110)

In its examination of the AMLAH operation the 1967 IGR concluded that the CIA had

~~_____~~ offered both direct and indirect support for

AMLAH's plotting [1967 IGR p 80] The most striking example of the CIA's direct offer of support to AMLAH reported by the 1967 IGR states:

it is likely that at the very moment President Kennedy was shot a CIA officer was meeting with a Cuban agent in Paris and giving him an assassination device for use against CASTRO. [1967 IGR p 94]

The 1967 IGR offered no firm evidence confirming or refuting ~~_____~~ Castro's knowledge of the AMLAH operation prior to the assassination of President Kennedy. The Report does note that in 1965 when AMLAH was ~~_____~~ tried in an American Court, November 1964 was given as the ~~_____~~ initial point in time at which AMLAH's actions were tied to CIA support. [1967 IGR p 111]

The Church Committee in Book I
 of its Final Report examined the
 AMKASH operation in great detail.
 [SSC, Book I, pp 2-7, 67-69]. The
 Church Committee concluded:

The AMKASH plot was more relevant
 to the Warren Commission work
 than the long CIA assassination
 plots with the world.
 Unlike these earlier plots,
 the AMKASH operation was in
 progress at the time of the
 assassination, unlike the
 earlier plots, the AMKASH operation
 could clearly be traced to the
 CIA, and unlike the earlier
 plots, the CIA had endorsed
 AMKASH's proposal for
 a coup, the first steps
 being Castro's assassi-
 nation, despite Castro's threat
 to retaliate for such plotting.
 No one directly involved in
 either investigation (i.e. the CIA and
 FBI) was told of the AMKASH
 operation. No one investigated
 a connection between the
 AMKASH operation and President
 Kennedy's assassination. Al-
 though Oswald had been in con-
 tact with pro-Castro and
 anti-Castro groups for many
 months before the assass-

would. Unlike the earlier concepts,
the AMKASH operation was in
progress at the time of the
assassination; unlike the
earlier plots, the AMKASH operation
could clearly be traced to the
CIA; and unlike the earlier
plots, the CIA had endorsed
AMKASH's proposal for
a coup, the first step to
him being Castro's assassi-
nation, despite Castro's threat
to retaliate for such plotting.
No one directly involved in
either investigation (i.e. the CIA and
FBI) was told of the AMKASH
operation. No one investigated
a connection between the
AMKASH operation and President
Kennedy's assassination. Al-
though Overall had been in con-
tact with pro-Castro and
anti-Castro groups for many
months before the assas-
sination, the CIA did not
conduct a thorough investiga-
tion of questions, Cuban
government or Cuban exile
involvement in the assassination.
[Church Committee, Book VI,
Final Report p5]

In 1977, The CIA issued a second Inspector General's Report concerning the subject of CIA sponsored assassination plots. This Report in large part was intended as a rebuttal of the Church Committee's findings. The 1977 IGR states

The Report (~~the Church Committee~~^{The Church Committee}) assigns it (the AMLAH operation) characteristics that it did not have during the period preceding the assassination of JFK in order to support the SSC view that it should have been reported to the Warren Commission. [1977 IGR p2]

The 1977 IGR...
part to the assassination of President Kennedy, the AMLAH operation was not an assassination plot [1977 IGR Tab D, p28] and that the treatment of this issue by the Church Committee was both imprecise and misleading. Nevertheless, the 1977 IGR did state:

it would have been to reinforce the credibility of (the Warren Commission) its effort had it taken a broader view of the matter (of normal avenues of investigation). CIA, too, could have addressed in specific terms what more than does in general terms - the possibility of Soviet or

The ...
prior to the assassination of President
Kennedy, the AM:ASH operation ^{was}
not an assassination plot [Tab D, p28] ^{1977 FCR}
and that the treatment of this issue
by the Church Committee was both imprecise
and misleading. [←]
Nevertheless the 1977 FCR did
state:

it would have seemed to
reinforce the credibility of
(the Warren Commission) its
efforts had it taken a broader
view of the matter (of normal avenues
of investigation). CIA, too, could con-
sidered in specific terms what
most then saw in general terms -
the possibility of Soviet or
Cuban involvement in the
assassination because of the
tenors of the time. It is
not enough to be able to point
to erroneous criticism's
made today. The Agency
should have taken broader
indications then as well.
That CIA employees at the
time felt - as they obviously
did - that the activities
about which they knew had
no relevance to the Warren
Commission inquiry does not <sup>(FCR
p11)</sup>
wholly play a part of conscious review

It should be noted that Richard Helms, as the highest level CIA employee in contact with the Warren Commission on a regular basis, testified to the Rockefeller Commission that he did not believe the AMKASH operation ^{was} to have been relevant to the investigation of President Kennedy's death. [Rockefeller Commission, Testimony of Richard Helms, 4/24/75 pp 389-391, 2] ^{See also} Mr. Helms testified before the Committee that the AMKASH operation was not designed to be an assassination plot. [Richard Helms, Exec Session Testimony, 8/9/78 pp 26-27] ^{concerning} ^{the testimony of} ~~Richard Helms~~

Mr. Helms was ^{supervised} by Joseph Longach who in 1963 was the Chief of Counter-intelligence for the CIA's Special Affairs Staff. ^{See memo SAS} During 1963, the Special Affairs Staff was the CIA component responsible for CIA operations directed against the Government of Cuba and the Cuban Intelligence Service. [HSCA Affidavit of Longach, Sept 14, 1978, p. 1]. The Special Affairs Staff was headed by Desmond Fitzgerald and was responsible for the AMKASH operation. [Church Report Book #1, pp 1, 6 & 8] ^{as the Chief of Counterintelligence for} ~~the Special Affairs Staff~~, the Special Affairs Staff was responsible for safeguarding SAS against penetration by foreign

intelligence services, particularly the Cuban Intelligence Services. [HSCA Att. has it, supra] It was Langrock's recollection

That the AMLAASH operation prior to the assassination of President Kennedy was characterized by the Special Affairs Staff, Desmond Fitzgerald and other senior CIA officials as an assassination operation initiated and sponsored by the CIA.

Langrock further recollected that

^{it was highly possible that}
as of 1963 the Cuban Intelligence Services were aware of AMLAASH and its association with the CIA and that the information upon which Langrock based his conclusion that the AMLAASH operation was insecure was available to senior level CIA officials including Desmond Fitzgerald. ~~Fitzgerald was the Chief of the Special Affairs Staff, [HSCA Att. has it, supra]~~

However, the issue before the Committee is not simply whether the AMLAASH operation was an assassination plot prior to President Kennedy's death. The broader and more significant issue, as the 1977 LSC has identified it, is whether the AMLAASH operation was of sufficient relevancy to have been reported to the Warren Commission.

In the case of the AMLAASH operation the determination is a most difficult matter to resolve. Reasonable men may differ in their characterization of the Agency's operational objectives. Based upon the presently available evidence it is the Committee's position that such information, if made available to the Warren Commission, ~~it may~~ ^{it may} have added to the Commission's investigative ~~concern~~ ^{concern} for possible Cuban involvement ~~concerning~~ ^{concerning} the assassination. As J. Lee Rankin commented before the Committee:
... ~~investigation could not~~
~~investigate the things that~~
~~were well known~~
~~without just happen~~
~~without it happening~~

when I read ... the
Church Committee's report —
it was an ideal situation for them
to just pick out any way
they wanted to tell the story
and fit it in with the facts that
had to be met and then
put the blame the rest of it on
somebody else or not tell
any more or polish it off.
I don't think that could have
happened back in 1964. I think
there would have been a much
better chance of getting to the
heart of it. I might have
only revealed that we are involved
in all the things and who is
involved in it and who ap-
proved it and all that. But
I think that it would have at
least come out. (Rankin p 91)

new York

it might have been able to free the
speculation and conjecture that for
decades has been ~~the~~ the ~~source~~ source
of the ~~information~~ information
to the ~~public~~ public
embalmer's relation ~~to~~ to
Cuba's Cuba.
and the United States

The Committee is in agreement
with Mr Rankin that had the
ARMASH operation been disclosed to
the Warren Commission, ~~it would~~
it might have been able to free the
speculation and conjecture that for
decades has been ~~the~~ the ~~source~~ source
of the ~~information~~ information
to the ~~public~~ public
embalmer's relation ~~to~~ to
Cuba's Cuba.
and the United States