

Box 55
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Background

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(SSC)

In April 1935, the Senate Select Committee to Study Government Operations with respect to Intelligence Activities published their Final Report (Part II) which in essence faulted the CPT and to some extent for its error of omission in not informing the Warren Commission of the Agency's ongoing plots against the revolutionary government in Cuba and ~~its~~ ^{its} ~~personal~~ attempts on the life of ~~the~~ ^{the} premier, Fidel Castro. The Committee's ~~report~~ ^{report} is ~~discussed~~ ^{discussed} on pages 6-7 of its ~~Final Report~~ ^{Final Report} but one paragraph succinctly sums up their position.

P 7
Part II
have

"Senior CPT officials also should have realized that their agency was not utilizing its full capability to investigate Oswald's pro-Castro and anti-Castro connections. They should have realized that CPT operations against Cuba, particularly operations involving the assassination of Castro, needed to be considered in the investigation. Yet, they duped their subordinates to conduct an investigation without telling them of these vital facts. These officials, whom the Warren Commission relied upon for expertise, advised the Warren Commission that the CPT had no

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P 10
1977 ~~Final~~
Report

taken broader in its terms, than,
as well."

Conflicting

to the work of
the ~~United~~
Committee

It is not the purpose of
this analysis to detail ~~and~~ the
viewpoints of the SSC and CPTA
with regard to the significance
of the CIA's Castro ~~unsuccessful~~
attempts and to resolve ~~the~~ ^{the parties}
controversy as to ~~the~~ ^{the operations} importance.

~~Rather~~ Instead this paper seeks
to present a comprehensive
review of all the facts, drawn from
a variety of sources, of organized
Cubans' involvement or potential
involvement in CPTA operations
against Cuba during 1960-63.

Certain influences and conclusions
~~to~~ will then be drawn upon
the nature, scope, and motivation
~~of the operations~~ of the syndicate
participants in the operations.

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Envolvement of Raymond Payne in
CIA Plots to Assassinate Fidel Castro

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The genesis of the ^{utilization} ~~use~~ of the United States ~~ground~~ syndicate of the CIA ~~to~~ attempt to assassinate Castro is of the 1967 Inspectors General's Report as occurring during a conversation between the Deputy Director of Plans, ~~was~~ Richard Bissell, and the Director of the Office of Security, Colonel Sheffell Edwards.⁺

[1967 IG Rpt. p. 74; Intern Rpt p. 74; Sec. 1.1]

Edwards assigned the specific task of locating the right party to "eliminate or assassinate" Castro, to James "Big Jim" O'Connell, who was the Chief of the Special Support Division of the Office of Security. Both men agreed that Robert A. Mahon ⁺ who ~~has~~ had been previously utilized by the Agency in several sensitive cover operations, would be contacted to recruit the necessary personnel.

⁺ [Mahon's CIA history and relationship to O'Connell are detailed on pp 74-75, Intern Rpt.]

0002181 Although Mahon and O'Connell differ as to who initially brought up John Rosselli's name for consideration there was a meeting between Mahon and Rosselli at the Brown Duty Restaurant in Los Angeles in early September 1968 [Intern Rpt. p. 75]

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[Comment: Mahon seems the

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logical person to have thought of and contacted Roselli for several reasons. In an office of security file on SA Morgan, Mahan's attorney, there is a memo to the DCP dated 19 November 1970 which reviews the mafia operation. Paragraph 5 states that "Mr. Mahan advised that he had met one John Roselli on several occasions while visiting Las Vegas. He only knew him casually through other clients, but was given to understand that he was a high ranking member of the syndicate and controlled all the ice-making machines on the Strip! Mahan advised that, if Roselli was in fact a member of the Club, he undoubtedly had connections leading into the Cuban gambling industry."

quotes?

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Comment

Confirmation of ^{the} Mahan-Roselli contact is found in Roselli's FBI file and consists of an alleged telephone call in 1959. [See Roselli write-up] from Mahan to Roselli

Comment

date

Mahan and Roselli had mutual contacts in Las Vegas prior to 1950. Mahan's contact was Sam, editor of the Las Vegas Sun.

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Rosselli, although apparently skeptical at first, agreed to a meeting in New York City with Mahan and Council to discuss further details.

[Fitzsim Report p 76; Office of Security memo from Morgan file, dated 19 Nov. 1970]

Although the Dujeanowski Report places the meeting at the Playa Station on 14 September 1960, Rosselli recalled that the ~~event~~ discussion took place during Castro's visit to the United Nations which began on September 18, 1960.

Comment

Tony de Valma admits going to NY at the time of Castro's visit, but it is unlikely that he was in contact with Rosselli at this time or [Fitzsim] of de Valma, that his visit had an assassination motivation.

According to a 19 Nov. 1970 memo to the D.C.I., it was at this September meeting in New York City, that Rosselli "agreed to introduce him (Mahan) to a friend, 'Sam Ford', who knew the Cuban crowd."

Comment:

The timing of the introduction of both ~~Frank~~ (Ford) and Traffim (Joe) is ~~an~~ important to the analysis of the "true" role of the mob in the Castro assassination plots. Kennedy

to the 1967 I. G. Report, the ~~entry~~ ^{entry} of biancana took place ^(a) during the week of 25 September 1960:.....
[1967 I. G. Report, p 18]

date certain
is although

In contrast, the SSC Interm Report at p. 76, does not ~~state~~ ^{state} for biancana's initial appearance ^{was} ~~it was~~ "certainly prior to October 18." (p 76) because of conflicting ~~testimony~~ evidence between the 1967 I. G. September date and Mahon's Senate testimony which set the interde in ~~at~~ November 1960. As a compromise, the Interm Report reasoned that biancana had been introduced to the Mahon "prior to October 18" because the Las Vegas wiretap occurred on October 30, 1960, and ~~the~~ DDP Bissell had received an FBI memo dated 15 October 1960 which revealed an FBI FLSAR quoting biancana as discussing his involvement in an assassination plot against Castro. (FBI memo, dated 15 Oct 1960 from Horro to Bissell, Interm Report, p 79)

is
is

[Comment: 0002184
Each ~~of~~ dual reasons listed on the Interm Report on p 77 are subject to critical analysis which will be dealt with separately ~~in the below.~~]

[Comment: ~~SECRET~~
Although the 1967 I. G. Report ~~stated~~

That "Mahon pointed out "bold" to O'Connell from a distance but O'Connell never met either "bold" or Joe", the Intern Report disputes this observation by apparently quoting from O'Connell's Senate testimony and stating that "The Support Chief, who was using the name 'Tom J. Hs.', said he had met 'Sam' and Joe, once, and then very briefly S.O.C. 5/30/75, pp 26-29; Intern Report 70

COF-

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Comment
~~Comment~~

Conflicts appear also on ~~a number of~~ several island minor points surrounding the September 1965 meeting in N.Y. and Miami. For instance:

1) Did Rosselli learn from the report that ~~Mahon~~ the operation was CIA?

a) O'Connell stated that Mahon told Rosselli that they were representing international business interests whereas Rosselli testified that Mahon told him that O'Connell was CIA (Intern Report 70

Also, footnote 1 on p. 26 indicates that Rosselli told O'Connell "about 3 weeks after the New York meeting", which is during the Miami involvement of Horvath, that "I am not kidding, I mean what you work for".

The importance of Rosselli's recognition of CIA ~~is~~ ^{is} ~~in~~ ^{is} that it is doubtful if ~~anyone~~ ^{anyone} and ~~anyone~~ ^{anyone}

could have been enlisted unless they could be sure of government protection. This theme will be developed more fully below.

2) Roselli told his Cuban contacts that he was an "agent of some summer interests of Wall Street that had... nicht interests and properties around Cuba..." (Roselli, 6/24/75 pp 9, 17)

CF. Jack Anderson column of Jan. 19, 1971, which stated that ⁽⁴⁾ "Could the plot against Castro have backfired against Richard Kennedy? ... None of the assassination teams, however, had direct knowledge of the CIA involvement. The CIA instigators had represented themselves as oilmen seeking revenge against Castro for his seizure of oil holdings."

If Anderson's source for this article were Roselli and ~~William~~ William Henry, who was not privy to the details of Phase F, it is another ~~example~~ ^{instance} of serious discrepancies between the CIA, Senate, and Anderson versions which all purport to depend, in varying degrees, upon Roselli.

3) The alleged ~~discovery~~ "surprise discovery" by Mahon and O'Connell as to the ~~possible~~ identification of "Sambo" and "Joe" is really suspect. First, ~~all~~ although it is

possible that the Senate Committee staff ^{reviewed} the Miami newspaper

Sunday supplement (Pamphlet) which purportedly included pictures of persons and ^{gradually} ^{showing} ~~and~~ ^{and} ~~Trappan~~ ^{Thur} ~~the~~ ^{the} ~~nature~~ ^{the} of the people with whom they were dealing, it is a relatively easy matter to research Pamphlet magazine for the months of October and November. It would appear that ~~that~~ O'Connell and Mahan were looking for an ~~easy~~ ^{easy} ~~just~~ ^{just} facts reason for continuing the operation after the introduction of two of the top Mafia in the United States. O'Connell testified that his discovery was after "we were up to our ears in it" which is difficult to fathom since the operation was in the embryonic stage and not quite well defined at Pamphlet until approximately March 1961, ^{wherein} ^{the} ^{reason} the Senate staff insists it could not find the Pamphlet.

In June Report
RTT.F.I

The principals in Phase 1 of the operation ~~was~~ ^{also} ~~disagree~~ ^{disagree} as to the roles which were to be played by both "Gold" and "Joe" in ~~Phase~~ ^{the} ~~pre~~ ^{pre} - ~~Play~~ ^{Play} of ~~Phase~~ ^{Phase} 1 of the operation.

"Although Mahan described Pamphlet as playing a "key" role.

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Quoted
p. 15

(Makou, 7/29/75, p. 34) and discussed his job as "to locate someone in Castro's entourage who could accomplish the mission"; Roselli downplayed Brancosi's part to that of a "back-up" man. (Roselli 6/24/75, p. 15)

~~All of the information also~~
Whether Roselli received a message from Brancosi's murder four days before Roselli's Senate appearance is open for question. J. Roselli's characterization of Brancosi's role as minor is in contrast to his alleged ^{recruitment of} ~~description of~~ Brancosi's "knowledge of the Cuban word" used in the 19 Nov. 1970 memo recorded.

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due to his

Trafficante's involvement in Phase I is even more justified by the available evidence. The 1967 Feb. Report and Senate Interim Report ~~also~~ state that "Goel" identified "Joe" to Makou as a man who would serve as a courier to Cuba and make arrangements there. (Feb. Report p. 19; Interim Report, p. 775. To support the description of Trafficante as a courier, the ~~1967 Feb. Report~~ Interim Report quotes p. 19 of the 1967 Feb. Report in stating that, "At that time, the gambling casinos were still operating in Cuba and Trafficante was making regular trips between Miami and Havana in syndicate business."

0062190 Comment ^{factually}

This unsupported assertion runs contrary to the evidence available through official government records ^{of other agencies}. As an example, State Department files reflect that Traffante applied for a passport ^{in Havana} on October 4, 1959 and received that document in Havana on February 2, 1960.

(See Traffante file, State Dept). ~~None~~ ~~is~~ ~~record~~. No records available to the Committee from DNS, State Department or FBI record any later 1960 travels even though the Bureau ~~and~~ maintained decent surveillance on Traffante during the period. In

his Committee testimony, Traffante recalled ~~maintained~~ that he made two trips to Cuba after his release from prison in August 1959 and placed these sojourns within two or three months after his release. ^{from prison} Testimony, pp 4-53, Oct 2, 1978

His testimony has some logical credibility in that all of the casinos ^{in Havana} were either closed or operating in the mid-1960s, and law enforcement reports placed him in the Tampa-Miami area consistently ~~in~~ during the pre-Bay of Pigs period.

By the time of the Senate testimony of Roselli, however, Traffante's role had diminished to a joint

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even below Biancanis. He had been reduced ^{from "courier"} to a mere "translator" and was needed only to facilitate ~~communication~~ ^{been} Roselli and the Cubans who had been recruited for the actual assassination. Intently, Trafficante and Roselli 1975 and 1977 Congressional appearances dove tail well but remain in contradiction to the ~~my~~ facts as reported in 1973 of the journals.

they were being

Comment?

The Senate testimony of Roselli and Trafficante needs to be outlined ~~separately~~ with a view to contrasting the "courier vs interpreter" role. My memory is that the Senate did not vigorously cross examine either man on this discrepancy nor did ~~they~~ the Defense Report "hint" at the problem.]

Once the actors had been assembled for the launching of the enterprise, a discussion began as to the method ~~of~~ to be employed to accomplish the goal. The Agency took the simpler, straight forward approach of shooting Castro but this ~~plan~~ ^{SECRET} was rejected

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 by Bincaera. In a Comment
 to its 1967 Report, the Inspector
 General noted that Bincaera
 was flatly opposed to the use
 of firearms. He said that no one
 could be recruited to do the job
 because the chance of survival
 and escape would be negligible.
 Bincaera stated a preference for
 lethal pill that could be put
 into Castro's food and drink.
 Trappaneto (Joe; the courier) was
~~in touch~~ in touch with a ~~high level~~
 Cuban official with access to
 Castro and presumably of a sort
 that would enable him to
 surreptitiously poison Castro. The
 gangster named their man
 inside as Juan Ota, who was
 then office chief and Director General
 of the Office of the Prime Minister
 Castro. The gangster said that
 Ota had once been in a position
 to receive feedback from the
 gangster's contacts but had since
 lost that source of information and
 needed the army's. [F.B. Report, p 25]

Comment

The observations of the 1967 F.B.
 Report ~~are~~ are ~~of~~ extremely significant
 in several respects. First, the poison
 pill ~~is~~ ~~not~~ ~~of~~ ~~any~~ ~~kind~~ ~~and~~ ~~originally~~
 with Bincaera, not the Report; a point

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which is crucial to the final
conclusion presented below.

Secondly, Trappanese is identified
as ~~providing~~ having access to, and
providing the ^{mutual} assassin in Cuba
which is in consistent with
his "self-saving" role depicted
of "in the paper". His ability to
recruit Cuba apparently ~~is~~ was
directly tied to his former
gambling empire associations
which formed a constant gathering
for all his ~~illegal~~ ^{conduct} for Trappanese both
during and after his Cuban days.
[see Trappanese profile]

Comment

note

Speculation concerning Oates
arose during the Agency's 1977
Report when it was faced to
address a problem raised by
an April 23, 1975 article, concerning
Frank Stupis, written by Paul
Merkell of the New York Daily News.
Stupis was quoted as saying,
"The third (assassination) scheme
involved planting a bomb in Castro's
office. I had access to the Prime
Minister's office," Stupis said. "I knew
Fidel's private secretary, Juan Ota.
I recruited him to work with the
Embassy. I ~~recruited~~ ^{recruited} Embassy in Havana.
What was his ^{purpose} to the

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writes of the 1977 Report was the fact that Ota's name had surfaced in connection with a Castro assassination plot, before revelation of the CIA-Mafia connection by the Senate Intelligence Committee. The Report references news stories linking Stuyvesant with Treppe and with a "gamby partner" of Treppe, Norman Rothman. (See Rothman's profile). Coupled with Stuyvesant's ~~past~~ relationships, is the allegation that Stuyvesant had a role in ~~an~~ inspecting the gamby casinos in Cuba on behalf of the Castro government and could have developed an contact with Ota in seeing gamby "high roller".

A second aspect of Maschke's ~~the~~ news series concerned a claim by Maitha Jorony that she had acted on behalf of Stuyvesant in 1960 in attempt to poison Castro when derailed with the 18 October 1960 FBI memorandum on Penoncel's electronically surveilled conversation in which he stated that "the assassin had arranged with a girl, not further described, to drop a 'pill' ^{SECRET} some drink or food of Castro" (Memo, Havana to DCI, SA, D.D. 10/19/60).

The tentative conclusions advanced in the 1977 Report are as follows:

It is obvious that many lines of speculation can be developed, not the least of which is that the Agency did not know the full extent of syndicate activities...

Additional considerations:

1. Current syndicate may well have had some independent activities of its own anyway prior to CPTA involvement in late 1960. Also, could have been Agency run CPTA activity prior in 1962 April
2. Syndicate operators could have had contacts such as those in New York Daily News story in 1975 and 1976.
3. Frank Stupin seems to have had contacts with, but not a member of syndicate. Could well have been used by the syndicate.
4. Stupin has not been a reliable source. He professed to know Osta in Cuba but he was outside Cuba when Osta arranged roll of masses.

If there was an earlier operator in Osta, it was not CPTA; it could have been earlier operation of syndicate.

Stupin could have been or been involved in syndicate operation, or picked up gossip from him in 1965 after his with him

Neither the 1967 I-C Report
 or the SSC Interim Report can
 pinpoint the precise date on which
 the Agency processed the poison pills
 which Dr. Connell delivered to Rosselli
 { Interim Report, p 83. The chain of
 custody, according to the 1967 I-C
 Report ~~was~~ was for the lethal
 pills to be delivered from Rosselli
 to Truffante. Although the next
 intervening steps remain a
 mystery, Rosselli reports to Connell
 that the pills had been delivered to
 Sata in Cuba in late February - early
 March 1961 { Interim Rpt, p 27; Interim Rpt p 8

Comment:

The Senate Interim Report reported
 the version of Joe Shimon ~~whose~~
~~story~~ whose memory was that the
 money and pills for the operation were
 delivered at a meeting at the Fontainebleau
 Hotel on March 12, 1961 attended by
 "Mahan, Rosselli, Truffante, and the
 Cubans" { Interim Rpt p 15. Shimon's
~~memory~~ story is filled with
~~quite~~ details which are documented
 on p 2 of the report, but his credibility
 is subject to serious question as
 his account is not shared by
 anyone else connected with the plan
 and nor is his relationship with

verid

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0002198 Roselli, Brancana, or Trafficante appear as "copy" as he would lead me to believe.

It is also apparent that Shimon was a source for Fred Belmont's column of January 9, 1961, which fixed the date of the passage of the person at the Fourtanblet ^{by Roselli} as March 13, 1961, and contained the report that Castro became ill a few ~~days~~ weeks later.

The real problem with Shimon's story is that the pills were returned to the CIA for a few weeks because Ota could or would not attempt the poisoning, a fact apparently unknown to Shimon before his "leak" to Belmont and his Senate testimony.]

Comment

One additional fact concerning Ota's inability to carry out the mission ties in with the final thesis of this report. Ota lost his position in Castro's office on 26 January 1961, while the planning for the operation was still going on in Miami and Washington.

It would seem though, that the generals did know that Ota had already lost his access to Castro [The 1967 ~~to~~ Report p. 27.]

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With the failure of Onto
to produce the desired results,
the project was at a standstill
until, once again, Santos Trujillo
assumed command. Roselli has
indicated that "Trujillo believed
a certain leading figure in
the Cuban exile movement ~~etc~~ might
be able to accomplish the mission."
Σ File 1967 DC Lpt. 8 29; Parker Rpt p. 8.

Comment:

The well known leader was, of course
Tony de Varona, ~~the~~
who was the subject of speculation
in an FBI memorandum of 18 June 1961
connecting him with receiving financial
aid from American gangsters for
anti-Castro activities which were
the CIA operation.

At the time of his introduction
into the CIA mob jobs, de Varona was already
being funded by the Agency through
the Revolutionary Front and was heavily
involved in CIA planning for the
Bay of Pigs invasion which was
imminent.

De Varona was also ^{being} funded
by Mike McRaney whose ~~agency~~
agency was ~~engaged~~ engaged in
promoting Varona's image in
collaboration with McRaney from

in 1960-61

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"Chirri" or "Chillo" Mendez Mendez
is described in Tupper's FBI files
as a close Cuban associate.

Completing the picture of
support for Varona is the promotion
efforts of the Dins and Eddie
Cullini, McHenry and Ramsey Brusnic
associates, who were reportedly
working through a Washington DC,
public relations firm, Edward
K Moss and Associates. Moss had
previous CPA associations and
was supposed acting as a conduit
for funds supplied by the Cullini
benefactors with the understanding
that their group would have
"privileged treatment" in the
Cuba of the future. Attempts
to refute these reports were
unsuccessful. [1967 FBI Report
p. 30]

The Danish influence
using the Cullini brothers as a
"front" is particularly interesting
in light of Varona's admission
that Jorge Pujol arranged a
meeting in Miami in ~~the summer~~
1960 wherein ^{my} Danish offered to
financially "back" Varona's
efforts to ~~assist~~ "educate"
the American people about Castro,
which may be a euphemism for
anti-Castro plots. [See Varona transcript

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The logical inference to be drawn is that both the Agency ~~and~~ ^{and} other persons interested in removing the Castro regime, had settled upon de Varna, ^{proving independent} as an individual who had the potential of uniting the ~~various~~ ^{various} multitudes of exile groups who were in a continual internecine feud. de Varna was understandably pleased to permit both the U.S. government and criminal syndicate

to offer him support and asked no questions as to the source of the funds or the motives of his benefactors. [See Varna testimony -]

Although de Varna has no ^{specific} memory of meeting Truffante, the Tampa court has admitted that he acted as an "interceptor" in several meetings attended by de Varna, Roselli, Bernieria, and other exiles. These meetings were arranged by Rafael, "Macho" Jener, a Truffante family partner from Havana who continued to serve Truffante in Miami during the 1960s. Truffante claimed that Roselli had primary contact with Jener but this appears unlikely in view of Truffante's long-standing ^{relationship} with Jener on Cuba. And Roselli's admission to

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O'Connell that ~~the~~ Traffante would provide the replacement for the ill-fated, Juan Orta who had escaped to the Venezuelan Embassy in April 1961.

Comment: Paralleling ~~the~~ the situation at the Senate hearings July 1975 when Rosselli's description of Traffante's role ~~changed~~ changed from ~~his~~ his "counsel" ~~character~~ character in 1960 as reported by the Agency to conform to Traffante's "interpreter" state ment, in the recent interview with Cener who agrees with Traffante's ~~Committee testimony~~ testimony that he was an ~~interpreter~~ ^{with de Vanna} interpreter for Rosselli. ~~and~~ the net result in both instances is to minimize Traffante's exposure (See C.F. Fonzi interview with Cener, May? 1978 and Traffante testimony, Oct 7, 1977)

~~Haggren, who met with de Vanna came to the~~

Jeopardies of the ~~ambiguity~~ ambiguity exists as to the introduction of de Vanna into phase one of the Castro assassination plots, more ~~clear~~ ~~ambiguity~~ confusion surrounds de Vanna's ~~as~~ actual participation prior to the Bay of Pigs invasion. The I & Report indicates that de Vanna attempted a second run before the ~~Castro~~ invasion that Rosselli was positive that only one

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attempt, (Orta) was made. He was also positive that he delivered both pills, money and supplies to de Vanna which is corroborated by O'Connell ~~reports~~ during 1961. The conflict is resolved by the Senate in speculation that only one pre-Pray of Pigs attempt was made, and that de Vanna was the contact in the United States who arranged for [Orta] to administer the poison.

Comment

There appears to be no factual way to resolve de Vanna's initial contribution to the poison attempts especially since Vanna denies ever having received poison pills from Roselli or being involved in any attempt on Castro's life at any time [See Vanna transcript]

Comment

The Agency was aware of the possible dangers inherent in having de Vanna participate in the mob's plot while ~~in~~ employing his part on the Peruvian Canal. However, "Steps ^{were} taken to end his participation in the syndicate plan but [they] were apparently ineffective" [C.I.C. Report, p 325]

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Phase II

The debacle which marked the mid-April 1961 Bay of Pigs effort, curtailed CIA efforts with the mob to assassinate Castro, but it was not until April 1962, when Bill Harvey assumed Agency responsibility for the task, were efforts made to re-establish contact with Roselli.

However, the fact that the Agency was squeamish during the Bay of Pigs aftermath to condemn to pay to kill Castro, does not mean that the mob shared their shyness. Indeed, both Harvey and Roselli swore that Harvey "took over a going operation". I.E.O. Rept p 33. The exact details of what that operation might have been ~~cannot be determined~~ has not been uncovered, but Roselli's ability to regenerate his forces ~~was~~ in response to Harvey's contact in April 1962 was immediate. Once again the ubiquitous *de l'homme* was to provide the ~~individuals~~ who would carry the lethal poison into Cuba.

However, there were some significant ~~important~~ differences between Phase One and Phase Two of the operation which bear upon the ultimate question of the mob's motivation and

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success in carrying out their part of the bargain struck in 1960 with the Agency.

Fact. In Phase One, Roselli et al had demonstrated their ability to execute the contract on Castro by naming their source who was, in fact, in a position close to Castro to succeed. In contrast, the details of the matter operated and the ability of the ~~source~~ ^{operator} was deliberately vague. After ~~Harry~~ Harry contacted Roselli in Miami in April 1962, Harry reported that "the plan in which the material was to be introduced into Castro's Ford (which involved) an asset of someone who had access to someone in a ^{restaurant} frequented by Castro." By June 1962 after the ~~Vanna~~ Vanna had received money and instructions from the JMWAVE station and had personally sent the gold into Cuba, ~~the~~ "Roselli" reported to Harry on 21 June that Vanna had dispatched a team of three men to Cuba. Just what they were supposed to do is pretty vague. Harry said that they appeared to have no specific plan for helping Castro. They were to recruit others who might be used in such a scheme. If an opportunity to help Castro presented itself, they or the persons they recruited will to make the attempt -- perhaps using the pills. Harry never heard

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work for Pearson and did know
that Anderson had more than a
passing acquaintance with Morgan.
- Morgan also fought with
Pat Coyne of N 82

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their names or anything about them"
 [1967 DO Report p57]

Comment

As the 1967 DO author correctly observed, Harvey's tale of the "favorite restaurant" personifying opportunity ~~was the same plan that Edwards~~ was familiar in that Edwards had decided previously the same plan. The fact that Vauma related the exact modes operandi to Harvey as he had discussed with Edwards in Phase One (circa 1960-mid 1961) leads to the possibilities that:

- (1) Harvey was correct in assuming that he was taking over an ongoing operation in April 1962 or
- (2) he had not had been working w/ Vauma before, during, and after the Bayou Pige and permitted the CDA to provide logistical support and future protection against the Justice Department; or
- (3) de Vauma was simply making up a story for the Agency to gain their financial backing or in response to directives from organized crime.

Second

The cast of underworld

character changed. Agency had insisted that Mahue and someone be dropped from the operation which "Rosselli" readily acceded to. Traffante's "in person" role was assumed by "Marco", a mysterious "Cuban who spoke Italian" and who sometimes used the name *Barra-bony* and today.

Comment

"Marco" introduction into one of the most sensitive CIA covert actions in history without any attempt ^{to check his background} or to ascertain his identity is extraordinary. Yet, the Agency apparently blithely "fed" ~~to~~ ^{with} ~~the~~ ^{information} of the top leadership in the United States without doing any basic background security investigation.

Although the 1975 Report characterizes Marco as "Rosselli's man", it is probable that this individual was ~~never~~ drafted by Traffante who had provided all the Cuban personnel previously used in the attempts and who still possessed, in 1962, the most complete network of Cuban allies in Miami and Cuba.

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termination of the CPTA -
mafia ^{was} plots slow and un-dramatic
Rorselli, in May 1962, reported to
Hany that the plots and games which
had been allowed to Varma in Miami
in April had moved on Cuba, and as
unidentified three-man team had been reported
in June to execute the plan [Interim Report
p845]

?

During September 1962, ~~and~~ Rorselli
related to Hany that de Varma crossed
making a second three-man team
who were "supposedly military men
whose assignment was to penetrate
Castro's body guard. During this period
the 'medicene' was reported as still in
place and the three men of the first
team safe [1967 Int. Report, p57]
However, the second team never
made Cuba and a series of clinics
were constructed during December and
January 1963. Nevertheless, de Varma
supposedly collected \$200 for the maintenance
of these individuals from Rorselli
who had received the payment from
Hany. [1967 Int. Report p52]

In mid-July 1963 both
Hany and Rorselli agreed that "nothing
was happening and that there was
not much chance that anything would
happen in the future" [1967 Int. Report p52]
Rorselli was intended to ease
his way out of funds with
Varma which ~~he~~ ^{he} promised did.
The last meeting between Hany

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and Rosselli occurred in Washington
D.C. in June 1963. When he was
Harvey's ~~host~~ overnight guest. Hence
their meeting ostensibly was not directly
related to any assassination plots.

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CONCLUSION

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in part,

The available evidence suggests that ~~the~~ the thesis which is tacitly assumed by the Agency in its 1977 internal Directorate General Report wherein it states that, "It is possible that CFA singly found itself involved in providing additional resources for independent operations that the syndicate already had under way. ... In a ~~some~~ ^{sense}, CFA may have been piggy-backing on the syndicate, and, in addition to its material contributions, was also supplying an aura of official sanction." [1977 FB Rpt p 100]

7.

The relevant evidence is as follows

1. FBI memo 18 Oct 1960 re Biarcana ET SUR:

Biarcana reportedly assured those present that Castro's announcement would occur in November. Moreover, he allegedly indicated that he had already met with the woman to be on three occasions. ... Biarcana claimed that everything has been perfected for the benefit of Castro, and that the woman had arranged with a girl, not further named, to drop a 'girl' in some hut or food of Castro. [1977 FB Rpt p 197]

Comment

SECRET

Although the reported meetings between Mahon, Donald, and Panama

SECRET

are subject to different interpretations,
it is clear that no plans were
developed between the parties ~~by~~
until sometime after October 5, 1961
the date of the ^{FATS} intercepted conversation of
Biancana.

The grim pills prepared by the
CPTA at Biancana's request were
not ready for delivery until late
February - early March 1961, so that it
is difficult to see how Biancana's
November 1960 assassination plot
could be a part of the CPTA operation.
Rather, it appears that the mob had
its own plan in progress, using
a mixture of Castro's ~~and~~ ^{and} ~~the~~
aid, when the CPTA fortuitously
happened along to offer its support.

The mob was then in a perfect
position. If their ~~private~~ ^{private}
plot actually worked and Castro died,
then the Syndicate had enormous
Machiavelli potential against the CPTA
which it could exercise at the
opportune moment. However, if their
~~plot~~ back-fired, then their position
would be that they were
only attempting to execute the
wishes of their Government.

intrigue

Additional Comment

The notion of Biancana's
"hired hand" Richard Cain ~~was~~
~~not to~~ raise some interesting
possibilities. Brian Cain's admission

SECRET

0002212

to the FBI that he had ~~been~~ joined the Chicago Police Department and Sheriff's office while on ~~prisoner~~ payroll. Cain's approach to ~~the~~ the OIA Chicago office in the fall of 1960 to volunteer ~~his services~~ information on the Cuban community appears ~~as a little more than~~ coincidental, then when FBI files disclose that he is planning to go to Cuba for Life magazine (and me stay), and to "buy" influential Cubans in Havana ostensibly for ~~us~~ ~~product~~ Prio (second stay) the coincidence becomes more suspect. The suspicion is that Cain was being sent by someone to supervise the ~~prisoning~~ attempt on Fidel Castro. Cain called me the "arranger to be" when someone referred to in the ~~report~~ OIA, 1960 or he could be the contact man for the operation.

[Tie in memo on Cain with Salomon's view which strongly supports the inference, that Cain was the "missing second man" in the ~~for~~ ~~the~~ writing of Oct 30, 1960. Make note to be quoted on this point]

Cain continued to "volunteer" information and assistance to the CIA during 1961-1963. In August 1963, he offered information on the DPT Student Directory in Chicago to that office of the Agency. In ~~Chicago~~ Cuba

SECRET

0002213

was the former head of the Directorate
in Cuba when he was a major
power in deposing Batista.

In September 1963, Cain reported
to the Chicago office of the CIA that
DRB was in a deal to purchase
a large arms shipment. He was
told by the Agency to "get out
of the picture" with a disclosure
which is subject to several interpretations
including the fact that the CIA
was a willing participant in the deal.

Again, on November 27, 1963, Cain
now the chief investigator for Cook
County Sheriff's office, gave the Agency
some information that Oswald was
in ~~Cuba~~ Chicago in April 1963 with
the Fair Play for Cuba Committee and
had purchased the ~~massacre~~
rifle in March 1963.

2. Recruitment of ~~potential~~ ^{the potential} Assassins

In ~~recruiting~~ ^{identifying} the potential poisoner,

Brancana spoke of a "guy" who
was close to Castro while the
individual recruited for the CIA pills
was Juan Dorta, a secretary in
Castro's Prime Ministry.

The identity of the "guy" referred
to by Brancana can never be ascertained
but Trafficante was clearly in the
best position to recruit ~~at least one~~
one of Castro's Cuban ministers due to
his multitudinous contacts in the
Cuban government and pentagon circles

000221A

It was common for American gangsters to have Cuban mistresses and Traffucante, Rottoman, and Tourine were typical examples. Also, one witness told the Committee that Castro was accustomed to coming at the Macina Hotel (owned by Mike McKay) every week on a regular basis to visit one of his paramours. Thus, it would have been relatively easy for Traffucante to have arranged for a young woman to service Castro and to attempt to poison him.

L. Maria Torony is a unassuming woman, to say the least, and her potential as an assassin recruited by Frank Stupis has been grossly discounted. However, one extremely good point is that she was also Vladimir Tourine's mistress and, thus, could have been solicited to activate the poison plot. Unfortunately, Tourine is totally uncooperative but Torony was not asked about her relationship with Tourine in Cuba so that we do not know the dated match.

Comment

— Juan Orta, the man identified to the Agency as the gangster's contact in Castro's inner circle, was presumably enlisted by Traffucante, but to date former receipt of grand "hook-ups". One fact is extremely bothersome however, in attempting to gauge the depth of the mob's sincerity in using Orta to execute the mass murder plan. According to the ~~SECRET~~ FBI Report L-1022

Ota "lost his position in the Puerto Rican Office in July 1961, which planning for the operation was still going on in Miami and in Wash DC." According to the official version Ota accepted the pills in late February-early March 1961 and kept the pills for a couple of weeks before returning them" [1967 FBI Rpt p 275]

7.7. If the mob was close enough to Ota to have pills smuggled in and out of Cuba, then they had to know that Ota had lost his position of necessity. The other possibility is that the pills were left in the US and then were available to him at Havana when he was brought into the plot.

The question arises then, as to whether the mob was pursuing their own assassination plot and the CIA operation or, what appears more likely, simply using the Bay for its ulterior motives previously outlined.

Turning to Phase II of the operation which began in April 1962, ~~there is~~ the same possibilities exist. If Hany and O'Connell are correct in assuming that Hany had walked into an "ongoing operation, then ~~it~~ ~~can~~ be assumed that the mob's relationship with de Verna, which predated the CIA participation according to the FBI summary of 21 Dec 1960, and 18 Jan 1961 had continued uninterrupted after the Bay of Pigs ~~with~~ the receipt.

it can

0002216

of the CIA's participation, funding and material support could, once again, be returned to the Agency although de Vanna would continue to deal through his not contacts, Russell and "Mac".

True to the loose structure of Phase II in terms of the ambiguous nature of the operational means of attack, the lack of identity of the potential assassins, the complete reliance of Harry upon Russell and not that whether was actually being used not, the Agency's inability to corroborate Russell's information, the speculation arises that the syndicate was not serious trying to assassinate Castro after the Bay of Pigs fiasco and the solidification of Soviet influence on Castro's Cuba. Being settled rumor, Trappanthe, banker and other must have advised that the "golden game" of Barrow had laid its last egg, and that fortune was to be made elsewhere. Clearly, the evidence showed hardly influence in the Bahamas, Las Vegas, and Trappanthe projects in the Panama Republic and a new opportunity for Robert speculation in Florida with the influence of Cuban whites. It was also abundantly clear that the new Justice Department program on regard crime would never permit the "wide-open" Cuba of the pre-tenure era if even if Castro and all his Communist associates could be eliminated. SECRET

lack of intent or

??

Despite the uncertainty

0092217 business sense in
 continuing the prosecution attempts
 against Castro in a substantive way.
 There still was a percentage in
 "stringing the Agency along." First, there
 was no upside to the syndicate
 because the Agency was providing full
 logistical support for Urova. Second,
 there was the mounting pressure
 from the ~~State~~ FBI and Justice Department
 which had to be blunted, if possible.
 No better weapon to accomplish this
 goal could be found than to use
 one agency (CIA) against another (FBI).

A brief look at the record shows the
 employment of ~~the~~ strategy ~~at~~ at moments
 of crisis for those who perpetrated the
 plots.

1. Robert Mahon

- Quarterly Long Committee subpoena
 in 1966 [Intern Report, p 79, note 3; Intern ^{Edward} _{P Morgan}
- solidification of position with
 CIA and with Hughes Department
 [Hughes was definitely told of the project of Mahon
 in Nov. 1960, and was himself involved in an
 alliance with the CIA which in fact, occurred
 later when Mahon was Hughes' principal agent]
 [Intern Report, p 75, note 2; Mahon Suite, Turkey ?]
 - Dispute with Hughes; See memo 20 May 1971
 on office of Sec'y file on Edward P Morgan

2. John Rosselli

- evading criminal prosecution [Intern
 Report, p 55, note 4]
- use in ~~legal~~ moves in March 1971 to
 attempt to reduce sentence
- ~~was~~ attempts to delay deportation
 through work with JNS which included

0002218

Jack Anderson's personal intervention
with PRS (See Anderson interview, and
CFA Roselli file; ~~re~~ CFA office
of Security file re Edward P. Morgan)

3. Sam Giancana

- October 1960 wiretap in Las Vegas
where Giancana got Malin to take the heat
for him by blaming the tap was a
result of the CFA plots.

- Early 1962, intervention with FIVE
Farrell of DNS re possible deportation
[See Tab C, Roselli CFA file,
stating that inf. [Swab, Osborn, Stephen
Rocca, & Houston know]

- attempts to ward off FBI surveillance
in 1963 & 1967 [D.C. Report p 129]

- Conversation with Sam Pupich
on 3 May 1967. Sam comments that
Roselli and Giancana have CFA
'over a barrel' because of "that operation".
He said that he doubted that the FBI
would be able to do anything about either
Roselli or Giancana because of their
previous activities with your people. 11
(1967 F.B. Rpt p 137)

SECRET

SECRET

Notes re Jack Anderson
"Castro Retaliation" theory

0002219

March 3, 1967 }
March 7, 1967 } Drew Pearson Office

Source:

1967 I.B. Report:

1) It is quite likely that Rosselli is the source, Morgan the channel, and Anderson and Pearson the recipients

(P 120)

- We may now assume that Pearson's story is not patched together from bits and pieces picked up here and there. His ultimate source Rosselli, knows more about certain details than we do, and he evidently has talked

(P 120)

- Impact

The Rosselli boom contact in Las Vegas in March is particularly disturbing. It lends substance to reports that Castro had something to do with the Kennedy assassination in retaliation for US attempts on Castro's life. We do not know that Castro actually tried to retaliate, but we do (CIA emphasis) know that there were such plots against Castro. Unhappily, it now appears that boom may also have been this (P 122)

- Mahan

SECRET

does have good reasons not wanting the story aired further. Unfortunate publicity might cause him to lose his microphone

002221

Client, Hughes. There might be some value to be gained from endorsing his suggestion that he approach Morgan and perhaps Roselli and vice versa.

- The Pearson story, which is now causing so much distress, includes one detail that is not found in Phase Two: the three-man team
Comment

Not necessary since Pearson was involved in Phase One also, he may have begun the 3-man team initially and may have used Roselli on the concept in Phase Two or Roselli just didn't mention the 3-man team to Mahan or O'Connell during Phase I
Comment

- In figuring out "ulterior motives" for a leak to Pearson, Agency makes the following point:

If protection was what the source was seeking, he could be better assured of getting it by a direct approach to CIA for help. Eq 123

Since Agency can figure an ulterior motive, they decide that Roselli is doubly too much and ~~too~~ ^{too} ~~close~~ ^{close} to Morgan who is also doubly as likely to be inquired of Pearson.

Comment

Even Pearson has not yet, as far as we know, used two of his best gordies in the story of the pills

and the fact of the State Dept. meeting.
GOC22222 (p 1275) SECRET

Comment

See p 112 wherein "Drew Pearson claims to have a report that there was a high-level meeting at the Dept of State at which plans for the assassination were discussed."

I-6 speculates that Pearson is falling about the 10 August meeting of the Special Group (Signal) which was attended by Harvey. (p 112)
E R F K was not present

2. Other Sources

a) Memo re 15 Feb 1972

DCD aware that Russell's were going to expose plots. He "decided to ignore his threats and take a calculated risk as to the consequences that may occur with the disclosure of his story. This was subsequently done by Russell or someone in his office furnishing Jack Braden details of the incident."

(Memo in office of security file re Morgan)

3. Memo: 20 May 1971

Subject: Exposed

Mr. ^{Ho} Pease (former CIA & now with Exposed) said Mahon & Braden together on some oil mix deal. ... Recent exposure of Braden re Mahon's role in the Carter Revolution was a deliberate exposure instigated by Robert Mahon using his son Peter, as an intermediary.

Believe' theory is that Mahan probably thought that such publicity would "scare them off" (re. Fintel in re new CIA stuff to influence Hughes)

-Magan makes noises to certain Hughes officials that they had better take it easy on Mahan because of his past involvement with CIA
 [Σ Memo in Security File re Magan]

4. Memo 19 Nov 1970

-Hagy had contacts with Roselli in November - December 1967 and January 1968 following Roselli conviction.
 - 17 Nov 1970

Magan had received a call from Tom Wadden who requested Roselli that Roselli faced deportation and would blow story. DCF decided to ignore threat and Mahan agreed.

"Mahan further advised that he was not concerned about any publicity as it reflected him generally.

5. 19 Dec. 1967

-Summary conversation instigated by Hagy on Roselli's behalf to get CIA interested. directly or at least ensure how good court case against Roselli was.

- Calls from Roselli began on October 6 Hagy. Roselli knew what Agency had done for Mahan with Sen. Long because SA Magan told

Roselli:

- Also, the Director Belmont had sent Harry a news clipping re Agency use of Binmore (primarily the August 1963 Chicago story of Sandy Smith)

Roselli said the leak came from Senator Kennedy's office when Kennedy was still Attorney General.

6. Memo 28 April 1967

- J. Connell sent to Las Vegas to find out source of Binmore story

- Mahan admitted telling Morgan some of the Phase 7 operation but to Agency delaying on long committed subpoenas

- Mahan visibly upset over Morgan going to Pearson and asked if he (Mahan) had been identified as the "client" by Morgan because he was afraid of the publicity of his relationship with Hughes, with Roselli:

- Mahan denied all except latter phase of operation & said he had no knowledge of operation after April 1962

- Roselli met Morgan through Hunt newspaper in the 1950s

- Mahan recalled that Morgan and Roselli met with Binmore in Las Vegas during March 1967. Under the ~~impression~~ impression that Roselli sought legal advice from Morgan but did not know the circumstances

- Roselli under pressure from FBI during hearings had a 99 yr old gov.

- Belvid Morgan had done some

Jan 6th

15 Jan 1977

0002225

Memo re request of Dade City
investigator for information on
B Sabani:

1. a. Ramon Don Estevan
b. Rolando Masferrer Rojas
c. Luciano Nunez
d. Jose de la Torre
e. Jose Quintana
f. Joaquin Herminio Cortez
g. Manolo Artime
h. M.L.H.

2. Two of the 3 Cubans mentioned in
Roselli (SSCP) testimony.

Two names mentioned in a Dec
1970 office of Security memo

v. No background investigation done on
Roselli or Brancura

vi. Sporadic contacts, direct and indirect
between Roselli's Agency opponents reported
approx. 1971.

vii. O'Connell has already been interviewed
by Dade City.

viii. Office of Security has no such
evidence that Cuban Fulbrighter Serna may have
been involved or Cuban agents in Miami area
during time of his death.

0002225

Nieves

- c. Released in March 1965 after serving approx 16 months of a 20 yr sentence for anti-Castro job; went to Spain briefly where he was of interest to Madrid Station
- August 1965 entered US
 - Nov 1965 to Jan 1966 of operational interest to DDO

Shirwin

He is mentioned in the John Roselli file as a personal friend of Roselli. It is further noted that Shirwin knew Roselli but nature & extent of their official/social relationship is unknown

30 August 1976 report by S/A Edward C. Rudiger, Alexandria FPD office.

- Cuban contacts of Roselli

1. Juan Ota

was an official of the Castro Govt circa 1960-61 and was a contact of Santos Trafficante. Ota was reportedly selected by Trafficante to make the assassination attempt against Castro.

2. Tony Vanna

When Juan Ota was not successful in carrying out the mission against Castro, Trafficante suggested Vanna be used. Roselli contacted Vanna. Vanna was to use

assets of his son to carry out the mission. Varona also reportedly used his son's initials to assist him in this effort but there is no identifying info in regard to the mission.

3. Roselli had a man, also presumably in Miami, known to Harvey as "Macco", who also used the names Garcia Gomez and Godoy. Harvey was unable to identify Macco, who was described as Cuban who spoke Italian.

517-339-3523
 F. No info in regard to death or welfare threats against Roselli or Cuban in G1 or Mexico, Venezuela, Togo, Sudan, or Myanmar in C1

3. Memo 15 Feb 1972

4. This Agency was aware that Roselli intended to expose his participation in the plot should we not intervene on his behalf. The DCP decided to ignore his threats and take a calculated risk as to the consequences that may occur w/ the disclosure of his story. It was subsequently done by Radd or someone on his behalf furnishing Jack & William details of the incident.

0002229

Memo 20 May 1971

Subject: Futer Tel

005 - Magan had been engaged by Hughes
Tore getting thru Makin's efforts. (H. Pearce
from Army and Interfel now, said Magan
may advise to certain Hughes officials, that
they had better take it easy on Makin because
of his past involvement w/ LIT.

2 [redacted] - in 1942-44 was in touch
w/ Makin & simultaneously wrote out details
of a [redacted]

[redacted]

For past several days had been quite busy.

In May 10, 1971 Mr. Pearce said Makin
& Androm are involved together in some oil
deal. Futer Tel took into this and other
such similar matters to trace the source & disburse
of funds. Recent exposure by Pearce
Makin's role in the Cuban Revolution was a
deliberate exposure instigated by Col. Makin
using his son Peter as an intermediary.
Pearce's theory is that Makin prob. that
such publicity would 'scare them off'.
The Futer Tel staff is aware of a number
contacts & meetings between Peter Makin
and Jack Anderson or a number of his staff.

19 Nov 1970

For: D C I
 Subj: Roselli, Johnny

2. In August 1960, Mr. Richard M. Bissell advised Col. Sheppard Edwards to inform of the office of Security had assets that may assist in a sensitive mission requiring geographic-type action. The mission target was Fidel Castro.

5. Mr. Mahan advised that he had met one J R on several occasions within the past year. He did not know him casually prior to that, but was given to understand that he was a high ranking member of the 'squad' and controlled all of the oil making matters in the group.

Mahan would have, if R was in fact a member of the Club, he undoubtedly had connections leading into the Cuban family interests.

6. Mahan to approach R who knew M as a per-
 mitted handler for the group's foreign assets.

7. Pitch made on 14 Sept 1960 at Hahn Plaza. His initial reaction was to avoid getting involved but, thru M's persuasion, he agreed to introduce him to a friend Sam Gold who knew the Cuban crowd. "No money required or paid."

8. During the week of 25 Sept, Mahan introduced to Sam Stagg at the Fort Belvoir. It was several weeks after his meeting with Sam and Joe, who was identified

SECRET

0002232

- to him as a courier operating between Havana & Miami that he saw photos in Sunday "Supplement" of Parade
9. In discussing the possible methods of accomplishing this mission Sam suggested that they not resort to ferreting but if he could be furnished some type of potent pill that could be placed in Castro's food or drink, it would be a much more effective operation. Sam indicated that he had a prospective nominee in the person of Juan Orta, a Cuban official who had been receiving back-bait payments from the guerrilla units, who still had access to Castro and was in a financial bind.
 11. Joe delivered the pills to Orta. After several weeks of repeated attempts, Orta apparently got cold feet & was kicked out of the assignment. He suggested another candidate who made several attempts w/out success.
 12. Joe then indicated that Dr. Gregory Shuman ... had become disinterested w/ the apparent ineffectual progress of the Orta and was willing to handle the mission thru his own resources.
 13. He asked, as a prerequisite to the deal, that he may be given \$10,000 for organizational expenses & \$100 per commission

SECRET

74000
secret says RPK on memorandum saying up
to make it in court in writing. At our report possibly
17. May 1962 Harry told me as Case
officer & it is not known by this office
whether R was used equitably from
that point on

0002233

17. Illegal entry Nov. 1967
18.2 Dec 1968 R arrested by FIA on
19. Harry reported to office of some of his
contacts w/ R in Nov - Dec 1967 & Jan 1968.
It was his belief that Johnny was in contact
the Agency for assistance in deportation
unless he actually faced deportation.
R expressed confidence that he would win
an appeal.

20. 17 Nov 1970.
Mahn called O'Connell to advise
that Mahan's attorney, Ed Morgan, had
received a call from Tom Wadden who stated
appeal exhausted & R faced deportation.
If someone did interfere on R's
behalf, he would make a complete
expose of his activities in Agency

21. 18 Nov 1970. DCF lawyer's direct
not to arrest R. Mahan was so
pleased w/ Agency's position & he was in
complete agreement w/ our stand. He further
advised that he was not concerned about
any publicity as it appeared quickly.

Anders McCall June 18, 1971
by attorney's initial letter; fast turn on a

SECRET

stop; last of Feb or first of March 1963
March 13, 1961 R delivered expects to his
contact at Fontainebleau

0102255

- a few weeks later contact ill

Feb 23, 1971

Once he called on the racket boss
Sam Giancana to line up a contact.
The confidential files report that he had
"gambly interest and an interest in the
Shump Brennan in Cuba". However, the
Chi gangster took no direct part in the
massive plot.

19 Dec 1967

Memo For Record

Telephone conversation Harry & Howard Osborn

2. The suit involved Dir of Security
the subject of our last Sweden memo
re J.R. the validity of the Justice Dept case
against him; & whether or not the Agency plans
to consider any possible intervention on
his behalf

3. Harry indicated that he thought the
policy of "sitting tight" might be alright,
but that he felt it would be a simple
matter for the Dir to see Howard personally
& determine on an individual case by case basis
what actual case the Justice Dept had.

Osborn - speculates Harry might
find out validity of case for purpose of
Harry to work for. Memo

11 Dec 1947

1. Harry reported luncheon meetings w/ Pajich on 8th Dec. & Osborn on Dec 9th
2. 26 Nov. 1947. R calls Harry. who met him at Madison Hotel for 3 hrs.

27 Nov, they "bumped" into Tom Taylor & Harry called R as "Mr. Ralston."

28 Nov spent 11 hours at Pittsburg

4. Harry to Harry, County Club.

R in town to see Morgan re a radio station in San Jose. Not worked re until when he brought.

- R said he had not seen someone since 1965 (Papich checking & may respond to Harry)

- R & H state or imply that he wanted help from Agency.

6. Jolly told Harry re luncheon meeting w/ Col. Edwards in 1944 & long meeting of 'Council' had w/ Miller & R in Cal when he returned from duty in Far East.

7. Harry insists that he must know status of case. If it is a good case, Harry feels the Agency must exert influence to have the matter "handled". If it is not a good case, Carl Harry will tell Jolly & he will walk it out.

10. Harry independent as reputation his contact was more than to protect Agency.

SECRET

0002237

He had my the highest regard for ~~Harry~~
and the way we had handled his problem.

8 Nov 1967

R. Harry is source

R called on Oct 22nd & 27th. but
Harry refused to serve as R's attorney

- R wondered why ~~Harry~~ would not
do as much for him as it did for ~~Mahon~~.
Ed Morgan knew what ~~Harry~~ did for ~~Mahon~~
w/ Sen. Long & had told ~~Harry~~ about this.

4 Oct 67

Osborn & Harry at lunch.

- R quote vehemently better re
Mahon indirectly Mahon would "sell anyone
down the river to protect his interest."

- Dor had sent Harry news clipping
re use of banana. R said leak came
from Sen. Kennedy's office when he was still ~~to~~

Eye on Mahon

28 April 67

O'Connell - Morgan allegedly contacted some high level
officials in Oct indirectly he had a client
who had been involved in an operation against ~~the~~
~~Mahon~~ records & said he had told Morgan
when ~~Harry~~ delays on Long subpoena.

2. Mahon surely upset to find if he
had been identified as client source

SECRET

publicity on his relationship w/ Hayes.

5. No knowledge of mission after April 1946
 & never discussed latter phases w/ R
 C. Mahon - R met Magon thru Pearson
 in 1950's when Magon was legal work
 for Lai Vang Sun.

R & Magon in Vegas sometime in
 March. Jim Cannon in town "it was Mahon's
 recollection that these individuals spent
 some time together. He was under the
 impression that they sought legal advice
 from Magon but did not know nature of their
 conversation.

7. Claimed R had detour w/ rapidly
 developing 11 yr old girl & account of ^{Shirley} ~~James~~
 for father to report. R pretty positive
 for Mahon to hire his friends.

8. Believed Magon had done some
 work for Pearson & did know that Friedman
 had more than a passing acquaintance w/
 Magon.

Magon fight w/ Pat Coyne for
NSA.

9. Knows only heavy portions of the
 FBI but don't know details.

10. It is evident that Mahon is deeply
 concerned about possibility of being identified
 w/ Castro project. but placed cooperation some
 to heavy involvement

SECRET

1002239

Sen Long Mahu

S. Shonker, Long's personal atty, told me
that Mahu would be away.

7 June 66

Mahu reported by Morgan is dead
w/ St Louis atty, a personal friend of Long,
re Mahu's appearance -

3. Fensterwald. had identified some
names, etc by name to O Connell &
Col. Edwards.

In the case of Sam, Ed Dubois
& a couple of his technicians now aware
of Mahu's tie-in w/ Hancock.

31 May 1966

Mahu asked if "Sam grant" was in
the mind

12. Morgan had advised Mahu that he
knew Long's personal atty who exerts great
influence on Long. They flew to St Louis
& then the 3 men flew to D.C. & met
w/ Long & Fensterwald. Fensterwald
wanted Mahu as his "ace in the hole"
so that Mahu's credits were good enough
for T.V. Also that Mahu was not just
enough to hold behind. When Long saw
M, Fensterwald would proceed

13. Mahu claims name of [unclear]

SECRET

Sam thru a series of circumstances
that were planned at our request.
The Hon. R.D. RFX was orally
briefed on the background that led up
to Mikoy's involvement & a Top Secret
document furnished to Justice Dept
which served as a backup of the
briefing

000000

000000

SECRET

p3

Each phase is a reflection of the then prevailing Govt attitude toward the Cuban regime

a. Prior to August 1960

All of the identifiable schemes prior to Aug. 1960, w/ one possible exception, were aimed only at directly Castro personally. by influencing his behavior or by altering his appearance

b. August 1960 to April 1961

Plots aggressively pursued; views of at least some of participants as one aspect of effort to overthrow regime ultimately in BOB

c. April 1961 to late 1961

Major scheme begun Aug 60 was called off after BOB & removed dormant for several months

d. Late 1961 to late 1962

Particular scheme reactivated in early 1962 & pushed vigorously in era of Monrovia

e. Late 1962 until well into 1963

After monrovia & collapse of Project MONROVIA, aggressive scheme begun Aug. 60; revived in April 1962; were finally terminated in early 1963

p6 Drew Pearson column of 2 March 1967 refers to a reported CIA plan in 1963 to assassinate Castro.

He also has info:

- a) State Dept meeting at which assassination discussed
- b) team actually landed in Cuba w/ pills

SECRET

5. If ~~syndicate~~^{SECRET} ~~activity~~ is an
operation, tends to reinforce thought
that details named have been
characterized by direction or security despite
that Oct 1942 report.

pas Ford Report requires that prob
plots have no relation in a practical
thing

Ruby - Traffante

Other Reported Assassination Proposals

5 agent messages were identified that
made reference to plans to kill Castro or
proposing such action. Three of the
messages related to the same operator
the other two relating to separate
proposals; there is no indication
that any of these proposals was the
result of CPTA initiative.

WARRONC 15. Identified 29 May 1942
and was identified 30 August 42. He has
been reported as never admitting that
he was a CPTA agent. His name not
given to me. Three other were

0002243

SECRET

AMKASH

0002244

SECRET

SSC

1) inferre that AMKASH a custo agent
with the mission of providing a plot agent Castro
so that Castro had justification for retaliation;

or

2) AMKASH so in detail the details would have
been known thru providing Castro

what he should have been reported to us

Agony - The character of the relationship
between CIA and AMKASH (I), prior to Oswald
murder of President Kennedy, was so insubstantial
and inconclusive that it provided no base for
AMKASH (I) to feel that he had any tangible
CIA support for plotting against Castro.

..... there was little for him to
report or leak!

Comment p 5

Over a year passed between August
1962 and Sept 1963 when he was next
contacted by CIA. In terms of the
relationship that he had with CIA the
critical period, since is therefore between
5 Sept and 22 Nov 1963

Reason for hiatus is clear.
CF 13
Solid report AMKASH In Havana Cuba; he was
recontacted due to his potential.

SECRET

0002245

Cable on Sept 7th says "HMLASH ~~could~~ ^{is} ~~totally~~ spoiled but who will always be a control problem.

... is best approached as a chief conspirator allowed to recruit his own cohorts among whom we may then find persons susceptible to long distance and covert inquiries.

Clearly, at that point, while HMLASH was viewed as potentially important, he was also viewed as a person of uncertain loyalty, requiring careful but long range development for whatever course of action that might later ensue.

93-4 of SSC Summary and Findings, presents HMLASH as an accommodator plot & infers that Carter Sept 7th speech might have been a result of leak by HMLASH.

910 "The fact remains that whatever views HMLASH may have expressed, he had no response from his CIA contacts of any support for his proposals at that time.

Fitzgerald meeting should be reported high-power eye w/ selective rights

14 Nov from WHIP reported that [redacted] satisfied w/ policy considerations but unhappy over fact he had not been given technical assistance. He can understand why he had not been given "Cuban small piece" of equipment which presented a "small solution" to the problem.

Comment

In essence he [redacted] was told there would be no U.S. support until after the fact, and then only if he was successful. While that may not seem a very realistic way in which to bring about the overthrow of a govt, it is directly relevant to the question of what [redacted] was told and what he understood. It is contrary to the statement in the SSC Final Report (p. 18) to the effect that it was not clear how [redacted] interpreted the part of a [redacted] case.

Case: July 1964 FBI Report states that [redacted] unhappy with CIA program and [redacted] had refused to support [redacted]

19 Nov 63 Fitzgerald "approved" telling [redacted] he would be given a cache inside Cuba. The cache

could, if he requested it, include...
high power refer w/ sec... ..

19 Nov. Mark ASH tells CIA he is
returning to Cuba.

Request by headquarters to ask him
to delay for 1 more meeting.

Mark ASH agrees "if it is smug
intensity"

As a SSC speculator that this is fact
indecipherable might receive specific support
Agency - at best a piece of highly
speculative analysis, not supported by
the evidence.

[Fails to mention per w/ collecting
Opinion

M HU [redacted]

p 26

"A"

"unaware of MARK ASH 1963 association
with CIA"

No info at least 1 1/2 years
after death of JFK; no idea of 1963
CIA ties w/ Mark ASH what was
my intention

c. CIA trace (sent in early 1961 & again in early 1962) supplied list of pills to US gambling syndicate members. . . . The 1961 plot aborted & pills were recovered.

These furnished in April 1962 passed by gambling rep. to a Cuban wife leader in Fla who in turn, had them sent to Cuba about May 1962. In June 1962, the wife leader reported that a team of 3 men had been dispatched to Cuba to recruit for the operation.

18. . . . While the events described by Drew Pearson did occur & are subject to being patched together as the one complete story, the implication of a direct, causative relationship among them is unproven.

Q 18: During the week of 25 Sept 1960, O'Connell's Mahan went to Miami where Roselli introduced my Mahan to "Sam Gold" at a meeting in the Fontainebleau Hotel. "Gold" said he had a man whom he identified only as "Joe", who would serve as a courier to Cuba & make arrangements there. Mahan provided a "lead" to O'Connell from address but O'Connell never met either "Gold" or "Joe".

Q 19: At that time the gambling casinos were still operating in Cuba. Trafficking was making regular trips between Miami & Havana as syndicate business.

SECRET

p. 24 Despite the document that a poison in liquid form would be most desirable, what was actually prepared and delivered was a solid in the form of small pills about the size of saccharine tablets.

0002252

Comment - Binamon was fully opposed to the use of firearms. He said that no one could be recruited to do the job because the chance of survival's escape would be negligible. Binamon stated a preference for a lethal pill that could be put into Castro's food and drink. Truj. (love; the courier was on track with a disguised Cuban official with access to Castro and personally of a sort that would enable him to smuggle any poison Castro. The gangster named them was inside as Juan Ocho who was then Office Chief and Director General of the office of the Puma Mountain. The gangster said that Ocho had once been in a position to receive mail parcels from the gangster contacts, had some lost that source of income and needed the money.

p. 27. Late Feb - March 1961

As passed the pills to Truj. Roselli reported to O'Connell that the pills had been delivered to Ocho in Cuba. Ocho is understood to have kept the pills for a couple of weeks before returning them. According to the gangster, Ocho got cold feet.

Comment Ocho lost his position in B.M.I

SECRET

SECRET

officer on 26 Jan. 1961, while getting for the
operation was still going on in Miami & Wash DC.
He took refuge in the Singapore Embassy
April, 1961...

0002254

... It would seem that, that the
gangster did know that Vita had already
set his name to Castro.

p 30. The Cuban brothers were believed to be
in touch with Vanna. Some men were
reported to have offered Vanna large sums
of money for his operations against Castro with
the understanding that they would receive
privileged treatment "in the Cuba of the future".
Attempts to verify these reports were unsuccessful.

p 31. Traff appeared Vanna and told her
that he had clients who wanted to do work with
Castro & that they would pay big money for the
commit.

Russell said as a loyal person he would
interview he could & would never divulge
the operation.]

p 31. R wrote deliver money to Vanna for expenses.
- O'Connell recalls 50,000; Edwards recalls
25,000; Pennington recalls 25,000

p 32 Russell gave the jills and money to Vanna. Also
Russell dealt with ~~under~~ a pseudonym. Little
is known of the delivery channels beyond Vanna

SECRET

p. 32 ²² Edwards recalls something about a contact who worked in a restaurant frequented by Castro.

0002255

p. 33 (O'Connell) believes that there was something going on between April 1961 and April 1962 but he cannot now recall what. He agrees with Bill Harry that when the operation was underway April 1962, Harry took over a "going operation".

p. 34. O'Connell believes he must have passed the pills, but he has no specific recollection of doing so.

p. 49. Roselle needed Brian & Troff in the first phase as a means of establishing contacts inside Cuba. He did not need them in the second phase because he had Vernon. However, it would be naive to assume that Roselle did not take the precaution of informing higher ups in the syndicate that he was working in a territory considered to be the private domain of someone else in the syndicate.

p. ~~47~~⁵¹ June 1962 Harry said they appeared to have no specific plan for killing Castro. They were to recruit others who might be used in such a scheme. If an opportunity to kill Castro presented itself, they or the persons they recruited were to make the attempt. ^{perhaps using the pills.}

Harry never learned their names or anything about them.

p. 52 Harry says Roselli wasn't kidding him. He agreed with Harry that nothing was happening and that there was not much chance that anything would happen in the future.

p. 201 RFK - I trust that if you ever ~~try~~^{try} to do business with regard to ~~some~~ - with ~~you~~ ^{you} ~~you~~ ^{you} you will let the Attorney General know before you do it. Houston quotes Edwards as replying that this was a reasonable request.

p. 64. The Attorney General's copy of the memo for the record of that meeting (May 62 by Edwards & Houston) is in possession of the AG's office.

p. 67. Major Sam-Toner's article of 16 August 1963 cites Justice Dept belief that Oswald never did any spying - merely pretended to go along "in the hope that the Justice Dept done to put him behind bars might be slowed or at least affected - by his use of co-operation w/ ~~unsub~~ ^{unsub} ~~get~~ ^{get} ~~apprec~~ ^{apprec}."

Trull puts his cooperation from 1959 to some time in 1960 - long before the above rebel invasion at the Bay of Pigs in April 1961. Reports McBain's bugging incident.

p69 20 August 1963 Chicago Daily News

FBI agent factory beam video allegedly says:

Why don't you fellows leave me alone?
I'm one of you.

Person pictured as being approached by CIA but denying

0002258

AMLABSH

- 079 - DR took Presidential Oath which they refused to surrender to Che; later did to Fidel
- Cuba believed to be one participant in assassination of Gen Antonio Blanco Rico, head of Batista's military in Havana
- DR quite apart from 20th of July but signed a unity pact

⇒ ... Agency was primarily oriented in helping Cuba's actions in ~~Latin~~ PRON program directed against Cuban military leaders, with receiving his plan for technical assistance in an assassination attempt. The voluminous project files and info furnished us by Nestor Sanchez, Cuban case officer, do not wholly support these recollections. The Agency offered both direct and indirect support for Cuba's operations.

087 10 Sept 1963

Cuba wrote Tuzedno - "I don't intend to see (be interrogated by) your friend again!" whom you should tell them, "so they don't

make the top: I want to get away from politics completely?

1992 Sancy says that, while Cuba was anxious to do away with Castro, Cuba was not willing to sacrifice his own life in exchange for Castro. What Cuba really wanted was high-powered, silenced rifle w/ an effective range of hundreds or thousands of yards. Cuba finally said that, as a doctor of medicine (which he was) he was quite sure that we could devise some technical means of doing the job that would not automatically cause him to lose his own life in the try.

The Drew Pearson Story

a) <u>Published Details</u> Robert Kennedy may have is not true. He was briefed on Phase 1 and an execution plot	<u>The Facts as we know them</u> He was briefed on Phase 2 after it was over - He was not briefed on Phase 1
--	---

b) Three (3) men arrested were caught in Havana; one still in prison	E-tells Hany on 21 June 7, that Mann says 3 men involved. We do not know their identities or what may have happened to them. We have no proof that they were actually disabled. Most of the unnamed captives are mentioned during this period of this year
--	--

could have enough at ~~that~~ this report has come out
to believe that ~~it~~ was seen by ~~him~~ in the ~~document~~ ~~investigation~~. It
was also stated by Castello in
the Philippines under ~~secret~~
investigation. We have no
independent corroboration of any sort. (No
that ~~was~~ ~~not~~ ~~in~~ ~~Result~~
in Las Vegas March 1965)

0002260

SECRET

1977

SECRET

9 May 1967

Beamborough apparently to be used as a person
by Garrison to show Oswald a CIA agent
& was to be used to associate Castro. Garrison
alleges he has letters signed by CIA reps
or by Sen. RFK authorizing certain persons
to work with Cubans for name of Castro.
This memo is intended to record that
such letters were used & therefore could
not be in Garrison's possession.

0002261

SECRET

Request

SECRET

0002265

- Richard Cain aka Robert Scully Cain
Richard Scalpette
DOB OCT 1931 Chicago

FBI memo

- 21 Dec 1960 not finally set

- 18 Jan 1961
identified individuals

- Identity of W1 ROCAF

- April 61 to April 62 ^{000 100} matters
- ~~some~~ "something going on"
independent of Agency

- RFT security called on 4 March 67
to obtain memo; already saw article
of 7 March 67

- 15 March 65

Bango in Madrid & claims group
in Cuba naty.

Jailed in July 62

1 March 66 arrests in Cuba

Trial refused up to late fall 64 & early 65
w/ Airline meetings

SECRET

10 Jan 64 "Paper" Brubaker memo approach The White

SECRET

0002266

O'Connell's interview of Malcom in May 1960

- Additional info on S.T. GR & SB contained in material previously shared for review on Sturgis

- Chicago Trib

Dec 28, 31, 1973

- Cain

- Fall 1960, contact in Chicago

- Summer 1961 Mexico City

- April 1962 Mexico City

- 4 June 62 departed

- 19 Aug 63 Chicago

- 26-30 Aug 63 Infr - re Student Directory, Miami

- 12 Sept 63 DRF arms purchase

- toll to get out of picture

- 1 May 1972 disappear.

27 NW 63

- Fair Play met in Feb 63 at 907

~~S. S.~~ S. Spaulding under direction Melvin Criley

- LHO purchased rifle March 63

- Sturgis suspect LHO in Chicago 1963 April

SECRET

SECRET

6002267

1. Ramon Don Pestevy Dominguez
DOB 2 May or 5 Feb 1934
 2. Rolando Masferrer Rojas
DOB 12 Jan 1918
 3. Lucio Nevés
 4. Jose de la Tormenta
 5. Jose Quintana
DOB 3 Oct 45 *replu G. mungo*
 6. Joaquin Antonio Cortez DOB 10 Jan 45
- Edward Percipit Morgan DOB 28 May 1913 St Louis

SECRET

SECRET

0002268

Morgan

Covert Security Clearance on 2 Feb 1951 for use as "cut out" re negotiations for school of Howard Ditt Studios & John Hopton Lines.

Amended & Approved March 1951 to include Morgan's use in providing covert legal support for operations in the form of a "cut out"; legal advice transmission of funds in connection with DDO projects.
 ∴ DDO should make decision whether to release info.

Resort

Resorts Int. #591 727

Walker Bros OS file # 473 865

- assoc w/ Meyer Lansky

- Corp. Grand Bahama Development Corp
 w/ Robert Whisart (#633 974) and
 John P. Roulett (#639 997)

Cain

According to DeMar, Cain in
 Mexico 1961 into 1962

-1964-65

SECRET

SECRET

0002269


7-Mar-35
St Paul, Minn
36 yr

Bradley Earl Ayers
Eglin AF Base Fla.

April 12, 1971 Post

April 27, 1971 Post

Friday April 18 1971



campus of Mum U.

Room; Harry, Robinson (Wp) Big Paper

Tracing sites

Orlando Hts. Key

Upper Key Camp

Card found in edge of P. P. P.

Security Approval

Date 10 Aug 1964

Refined 23826 (DDP / WTT / SH)

Case No. 366085

Request For Recusal Notice

Serial No
366085

Nature
Separation Return to Parent SUC 12-15-64

Organizational Designations:
DDP / SRS
US Field Office
Forward of copies to: JMWAVE
Paramilitary Branch Section 117
Reinstated C.R.C. Indiv. Pol. Groups

SECRET

2R/RIFLE

All (cable) traffic bearing 2R/RIFLE to be delivered in sealed envelope to Chief FI/Div. D, 15024 Bldg only

- Personally approved of DD Plans

Harry
Chief FI/Div. D

19 Feb 1962

To Harry re authorization of ATW for 2R RIFLE activities thru Dec 1962.

Because of sensitive nature of this activity, accounts for funds will be of general category & by your certificate

2. Salary \$500 per yr; \$750 in addition to salary
3. Money to be considered in lieu of project & constitute authorization for all travel per diem; operational & other expenses
4. Eyes only

Rich. D Helms.

Hand written notes

Morgan - Roselli - Mahan - Gannon
- Mackin - LaVigne

Morgan & Jack Hudson

- 1) Prior to Aug 60
- 2) Aug 60 to April 61 (BOS)
- 3) April 61 to Sept 61
- 4) Sept 61 to Sept 62 (Customs & Finance Unit)
- 5) Sept 62 to March 63

Roselli of started in Sept 66
 (Mahn to Roselli to Oranena)

to brief 7 May 67

Taylor became chairman of FCS
 on 9 Aug 67

Push, McNamee, Taylor, Bundy,
 Ottowen, Gilpatrick, Lambell,
 Murren, McClure

Memorandum For Record

Rept at request of DCF; conveyed
 to FO on 23 March 67

The one stayback been copy (FO)
 all notes, & other derived source material
 destroyed 23 May 67.

Memorandum: Chief WTT (Dareen)

From: Dir of Security

Subject: WTT (Security Object)

Final account of names reported on
 a sensitive paper of interest of DDIP; Chief WTT
 & Dir of Security

Dissemination:

25 Sept 1960 thru
 6 Feb 1961

SECRET

TO Contact

0900.

11 Feb 1961 To General Agent 1020
 31 Jan 1961
 14 Feb 61 Criminal Program 1,043
 26 Sept 1961
 12 Feb 1961 993

Page 3
IO Rpt

e. Late 1962 until well into 1963

After several crises Oct 62 & collapse of MINWOODS, aggressive scheme that was begun in Aug 1960; covered in April 1962, was finally smashed in 1963
 Two other plots were organized in 1963 but were impracticable & nothing came of them

P 9

b. 10 August 1962

Meeting of Special Group (Krymchuk) wherein McNamara brooded subject of liquidation of Cuban leaders.

Result - Project MINWOODS memo by Lansdale

31 Jul 64

Discussion at Special Group of a clandestine Service memo of exile plot to kill Castro. CIA had refused to fund. Mike had no work.

and Decker

P 2 Gonzalez Callanetta

Press Release
7 March 1966

Missing page

- program of contact for intelligence; not
 fourth to form program
 - Jose ROBERTO, Alberto Blanco Ramon; Cuba Top Secret

Late Sept 1960

Edwards, O'Connell, Bessell of James
Brewer; 15 Swords then brief
Allen Dulles & General Cabell.

Mahon called O'Connell & pointed out
Paradise room saying Gold & Joe
(Presumably in time, Mahon & O'Connell
know names)

Joe a courier to Castro make
arrangements there re entry to Gold

- Traff making regular trips to Havana
- 7 Jan 59 - casino closed
- 13 Jan 59 - Castro announced re opening
- 17 Feb 59 - Casino announced opening
- 30 Sept 61 - last casino closed

P 23

Technical Chief TSD

4 approaches: (1) highly toxic like shellfish
poison to be admitted via pin (Wheeler's Committee
Roosevelt's suit was supplied to Gary Powers
(2) bacterial material in liquid or (3) cigar
or 1) handwriting

P 29. March April 1961

Roselli told O'Connell that Tracy saw a
man high up in evil movement. (Vanna
Rpt from ~~SECRET~~ suggest him Tracy

known values:

- a) 21 Dec 1960 FBI memo re gangster financing Cuban activities to overthrow Castro.
- b) 18 Jan 1961 memo to [redacted] with case summary. Had hired Moss as a front man

CIA had contact in Miami but no indication of any involvement in Cuba.

March (1959) memo in [redacted] Division on

[redacted]

- Nov 62 by CIA Staff under [redacted]

[redacted]

Roselli to deliver \$400k. Estimate vary but Eskerline says 10,000 + 100k of commutation as per secret memo.

Comment - V one of 5 key figures in [redacted] from a heavy involvement in [redacted] Steps taken to end his participation in [redacted] plan but apparently ineffective.

People who knew:

1. J. J. - original man to go in
2. A. V.
3. son-in-law of H.V.

Phase 2

SECRET

6002275

Harry briefed by authority of Bissell
in Feb 1961 in connection with a general
stand-by capability for Executive action

Harry had already discussed problem
w/ ⁰⁵Arnold Silver & Sidney both who
both parties probably cut in to Cuba
project.

Helms briefed on general concept but
not on ongoing Cuba plot.

AS W/N account of ^(murd 05) Silver use
in Congo; Justin O'Donnell summit with
ZR RIFLE covered as a FID operation
(ostensibly to develop a capability to enter safer
& kidnap carriers)

15 Nov 61 - Harry discusses application of
ZR RIFLE to Cuba; instructed by Bissell
to run syndicate operation

Unrelated - Helms puts Harry in
charge of Agency's Cuba task force

Late 1961 - Early 1962 Harry busy

Early March 62

- Much later Harry takes over Castro
- Harry view

came to threat of Castro operations &
ZR RIFLE so being symmetrical.

- Exec Action is symmetrical w/ AS W/N
- ZR RIFLE ~~SECRET~~ used to Exec Action
ZR RIFLE alone meant Castro

Advised
in operation

A review of his correspondence was unrevealing

(Permitt handled Castro operation & L/n use any of assets being developed in ZR RIFLE)

- Memo of Harry after he left Task Force W & going to Rome on 22 June 1963 to Chief FI / Staff that ~~the~~ ^{the} case to keep AT was no longer worth & support ~~through~~.

- Records (OLLA-1974, 24 April 64) show termination of status on 21 April 64.

^{There is no indication in the file that the Exec Adm}
 Copy of ZR/RIFLE / ATWIN ~~was ever used~~
 Edwards -

- No activity after B of P until Harry met Rosell & recontacted April 62.

- Edwards inf contact w/ RFK over McBuire wiretap

- 14 May 62 - Harry called Edwards & indicated he was bringing Rosell from further west

743
 Harry - took out a "gring" operation since he described plan for getting possession to a favorite Castro restaurant. The mechanics were identical to those described by Edwards and as reported in Phase one's

- O'Connell thinks "something going on" before April 61 & April 62 but can't remember

0002277

April 8th approx

- Harry met w/ Russell & O'Connell
- O'Connell pointed Mahan there
| Harry says he would have recognized Mahan; saw him socially once or twice after 1947 when Harry came to Agency; not since '52 when Harry sent to Berlin.

- Edwards, ^{deliberately} ^{by} ^{Harry} did not mention Mahan when he first

p45

O'Connell out of June 62 when he was assigned PCS to

p47

18 April 62
O'Connell gets calls for Russell weekly w/ Harry in Miami

O'Connell says operation going on when Harry took it over altho he could remember when it was started.

Harry specified that bean not to be brought in for 2nd phase & further Roubli bound upon.

Roubli right that bean asked him what was going on; R replied "nothing" bean - "too bad"

p48

Macco - whether a Venocato named Antonio MACEO Mackle who Harry probably would have known. Also, 15th clear Macco was "Roubli man".

Roubli essential to 2nd phase as a contact to Venocato.

p 49. When the jobs were given to ...
Vanna reported arms and equipment needed for
his end of the operation.

0002278

SECRET

April 1962

- a) explosives
- b) detonators
- c) 20.30 caliber rifles
- d) 20.45 cal. handguns
- e) 2 radios
- f) 1 boat radio

V requested names & support of Roubil
joined next to Harry. With help
of Shaddy, chief of TMDAHS,
about 5M of weapon & equipment.

Harry & Shaddy went U-Haul
& put facts in pickup for
delivery to Miami, V, or via son in Cal.
Harry & Shaddy set up watch on
do Roubil & Connell.

p 50

May 62 - Roubil reported that the job was in Cuba at the
restaurant reported used regularly by Castro.

V had ~~sent~~ ^{dispatched} 3 men team to Cuba
Sept 1962

Harry saw Roubil in Miami on
7-11 Sept. Another 3 man team
of military men assigned to penetrate
Castro's body guard but never happened.
"Medicine" reported safe still in place and first team safe

Sept 62 - Jan 63

Harry in Miami. 22 Dec - a team
saw Roubil & Macco several times. Gave
Roubil 2700 to V for return of 3 military
men who never left (in Fla keys)

Feb 63

Harry left word for Macco in
Miami 11-14 Feb that nothing new & looked
as if dead off. (Just how Harry left this
word for Macco is not clear)

p 51
Military men
needed to
take off

Delay due to
condition in
Miami

SECRET

April May 67

Helms approved a last meeting
w/ Harry Roselli before Harry left
for Rome.

People who knew
Q 55 Bruce Cheever (Harry defmt 1962)
knew Harry meeting w/ gangster in
Reno in winter of '62

May 62

Shuf Edwards & Lawrence Houston brief
RFK "all the way". RFK agreed not to
prosecute writing case but wanted to be
informed of Agency work dealt w/ "gangster" again.

RFK asked for a memo of
the meeting via a phone call; memo
prepared on 14 May 1962 by Edwards & Houston.
NO briefing of McLean, ^{General} Carter, or Helms.

RFK not told that Phase II had
begun; that V had little or no info into back.

On 14 May 62 Harry briefs Helms;
advises against briefing McLean & General
Carter. Writes Edwards that Roselli
is not going to be used.

Comment

RFK's secretary called on 4 March 67
to obtain Edwards memo. He knew

of Pearson article of 7 March 62 & apparently wanted to check his recollection of what he had been briefed upon.

Helms had talked w/ RFK & allowed him to read memo. He did not have a copy.

1954-55 Mahon served by Neardness to offset Onassis control of Saudi oil shipments. Worked at top levels of U.S. & British govt & met at least once w/ Neeson.

O'Connell rept'd that during negotiations w/ Long Committee, Mahon stated he might buy his attorney to represent in past activities.

10-11 Sept 42 ⁰³ SECRET

(Wainwright) Tegeduro & Cubela in
Copenhagen & (Wainwright) used "massacre"
& Cubela insisted "element"

14-23 Sept 42

⁰³ Cubela, Tegeduro, (Wainwright) &
(Earle Williams) from Madrid; met in Paris.
Cubela given S/W training &
supplies; shown a handwritten document.
Refused to be photographed.

(Williams)⁰³ cubela that no physical
elementary missions be given as a
requirement but he might do it on his
own initiative. Headquarters strongly comm. that
no physical elementary missions be given Cubela.

5-8 Sept 43

Brayel - met by (Wainwright)
Tegeduro & Nestor Sanchez who became
case officer.

Cubela showed 2 S/W manuals but
only 1 record. Official of postal censorship.

Phot. report of Ramon Guin Diego
AMTRUNK-10 who was being moved
DIAZ Isalguera (MICE-14) who had
been sent to recruit BRAYEL

14 Sept 43

SECRET

From Brayel Cubela flew to Paris
& was going to tell Castro after the fact

9 March 61 03 - Mexico City station

P28

(Jack Stewart) met w/ Cubela in Mexico City, arranged by Carlos Tepedeno Hernandez, a long-time friend. Cubela was (Stewart) from Havana where he was once assigned.

Cubela and leader of DR are like group of leftist students signed in 1956 to fight Batista; Nestor Sanchez - case officer.

28 March 61

Both Cubela & Cole wanted to defect; according to asset of Miami Station.

Ex-filtration called off a report that Cuban police aware of Cubela's desire to defect & his departure plans.

Comment:
First of 3 rumormongers within DR; but unknown if Cubela consented of meet in Cuba! Other two links are even more nebulous

~~15 Jan 61~~ 14 August 61

Message from aviation station (god friend) Tepedeno that Cubela going to Paris & wanted to talk ^{under a friend of Stewart's} No indication of any money.

15 Jan 62

Lucia Echevarria Bianchi told an asset (HM contact-1) that Cubela going to Helsinki & wanted to defect.

SECRET

Would stop in Paris to see Tepedino

0002283

27 June 1962

Tepedino approached FBI in Miami on 11 June with idea that Cabelo wanted to defect. FBI sent a detailed memo to CIA since they knew Tepedino to be a CIA asset.

8 July 62

Tepedino dissatisfied w/ CIA handling of Cabelo's "defection" in Paris in 61 so he contacted FBI. Stated his source of info on memo for defection were w/ Chivarrias.

30 July - a August 62 '63

Wm Wainwright met w/ Tepedino a jeweler in NYC & both went to Helsinki: Cuba. Talked into being recruited in place of not defecting.

Cupela wanted to blow up oil refineries; kill Castro, Carlos Rodriguez, & Soviet presence.

7-a August 62

Meeting in Stockholm because Helsinki too risky. Cupela stated that he told 4 of his Cuban associates that he met Tepedino in Helsinki.

SECRET

SECRET

that he was taking a vacation.

0002286

3 Oct 63

Sandy arrives in Paris to meet w/ Cuba who had written Tejada on NY that he didn't want to continue.

CIA had to tell [redacted] 24
[redacted] that contacts were for purposes of deflection.
[redacted] Cuba under surveillance.

11 Oct 63 Sandy calls that Cuba insist on meeting w/ RFK; convinced Cuba going to try an attempt on Castro even w/out US support.

29 Oct 63

Fitzguald, Deputy SAs, go to Paris & got approval from Helms.

Fitz states he told Cuba that US would have no part in attempt on Castro's life.

Winton went from Sandy in company

14 Nov 63

19 Nov 63

Sandy memo states Fitz assumes that Cuba would get cache of rifles w/ scopes inside Cuba, on request

22 Nov 63

SECRET

Sandy arrives in Paris on Nov 22 after getting run w/ ~~Robert Kennedy~~

Sandy says Cuba accepted plan but stated he would not submit it to

Cuba with him. SECRET

0002287

Cubela asked for a cache of arms to be placed at AMTRUNK is L2 high-power rifle w/ telescopic sights; 20 grenades; 2000 C-4 sticks
fam. As they left meeting, heard JFK shot.

Sandy stated he rec'd an OP in cable from Fitzgerald that Sneydy is "off" but nothing in AMTRUNK file.

Cubela w/ a take 5/10 with him to Prague
1 Dec 63

Cubela returns from Prague to Cuba
19 Feb 1964

JMWAVE to have 2 caches in place in March.

Done on 17-21 March 64 on AMTRUNK VIII

24 April 1964

Tegedino had been brief to meet Carlos Jorge ROBERTO mungy who has message from Cubela.

3 May 64 - Roberto says Cubela wanted a silencer
30 August 64

Artime record info thru Madrid that a group of doubtful members of Castro regime would to ~~the~~ establish direct contact. 7 Oct 64, Artime sees

Alberto BLANCO Romariz.

13 Nov. 64. SECRET

Artime agrees to talk to AMTRUNK-1 if it turns out he is contact man for internal dissent group. Artime

Think if ~~ARMAS#1~~ is chief of ~~insider~~
group we can forget about operation
4 Dec 64

Sanchez prepares a memo for 6570 for
Arteme to maintain contacts w/ ~~insider~~
group's reps in Bay. Arteme does
6-5 Dec 64

Sanchez meets Cubela in Paris & was
~~not~~ going to continue his plans
Told US. could not be involved.
10 Dec 64.

Arteme did know not Cubela
that CIA in direct contact with ~~him~~.
Rather STS continued to put both
men together.

CIA did want to put select
weapons on ~~the~~ Cubela's hands directly
but could do it. Thus Arteme
27 Dec; 30 Dec (initial)

Cubela & Arteme meet in ^{Madrid} Madrid.
Arteme reports to Sanchez that Cubela
had requested a select for FAT rifle
but Americans w/n give him one.

Arteme to come up w/ select or
different rifle in Cuba.

11 Feb 65

Cubela to receive pistol w/ select
& Belgian FAT rifle w/ select from
Arteme's secy ~~SECRET~~ ^{both} weapons come
from ~~the~~ US. & are now in Madrid.

Congress

12 Feb 65

SECRET

0002289

Artemio has never talked to Cubela
in Madrid.

4 March 65 - Cubela in Havana; source
is friend of Tepedino's who telephoned him

15 March 65

Rafael Garcia-Bango Director
arrives in Madrid from Cuba & introduced
to a state officer.

Publicly close friends of Cubela; & claims
to be in touch w/ group of wealthy leaders
planning to overthrow Castro.

Dad in July 62 for exp. Traff
as lawyer for Cypri Kell. Traff - ex manager
| Another name - link

June 1965

Victor ESPINOSA Hernandez, a former
PM turned now was arrested as a militant
on 20 March 1961, contacted FIA's new lawyer
FBT on 3 June 65.

Espinosa stated he had received letter
from a friend in Paris urging him
to meet w/ Albert Polanco who had a
message from Cubela who wanted it delivered
to CIA

Monge - Cubela in a position to help Castro
& would CIA & US Gov be willing to support them
If "yes", then details on what he needed.

SECRET

Cubela had wanted money in Paris
on 1 Feb 65. Travel down & report -

16 Feb 65 Sandy gave hint to.

0002290 Tepehu 7,00 in NY C.

SECRET

23 June 1965 Headquarters sent cable Kennedy contact. 'convincing proof that evidence from [redacted] group measure', Fernando A&A?

1 March 66 - Cabelo & basin arrested for activities w CIA

Jose Luis Gonzalez Ballarreta, Alberto Blanco Romany, Juan Alena Navarro. Confirmed

Also appearing - Guillermo Cuenca Alvarez, Royal Herminio Udey

Gonzalez Ballarreta⁰³ - attests in Spanish contact of [redacted] at US Embassy in Madrid. 32

Cubela met w/ Arteme in Spain in Feb. 1965.

Arteme sent Ballego to US to get Helicopis signt & silencer. Delivered to Blanco Romany who delivered it to Gonzalez Ballarreta then to Cubela the day before he left Madrid.

Signt in Cubela's residence were Helicopis signt, F&H rifle +
9 March 66

Tasco

Castro sent personal letter that death sentence not be asked.
10 March 66

Cubela testimony:

Silencer did not break; I threw it away because it was burning my hands

SECRET

0002291 I spoke to Fidel in January. He opened the door to me ^{SECRET} but I did not have

the courage to tell him
(Comment)

Trial evidence confined to trip to Europe in mid 64 & early 65 to meet w/ Botkin. No mention of Madri at the Nov 65 contact w/ Agony.

No hint of poison pen Nov 63.

Speculate

If full details would have come out, Castro would have little to complain about & probably impudently expected someone in our line.

2 high-level meetings where Castro was usually discussed

Special Group (August 18 August 62 (probably one described by Pearson) State: Dean Rusk, Alexei Johnson, Edwin Martin, Richard Goodwin, Robt Hurwath what have

Maxwell Taylor, McGeorge Bundy (RFT absent) DeFunis;

McNanna, Belmont, Kennedys, Kennell CIA - McCone Harry

USIA - Edward Murrow, Donald Wilson

Secy - Thomas Parrott

Parrott's notes & a number of others but Madri & King would be mentioned ~~perhaps~~ raising it & Munson's comment.

No one raised Madri & McNanna 'highly agree' ^{SECRET}

Lansdale wrote memo on 13 August to Harry, Hurwath, Harris, & Wilson which

Probable Pearson's info re a high-level meeting was 10 Sept 62

O'Connell interviewed Mahan in May 67 & wrote a report:

- 1 - Mahan taught Morgan in Phoenix
- 2 - Never heard of Phase II from Roselli or anyone

G002293

- 3. Roselli started to Morgan by Greenspan
- 4 - Mahan suspects Roselli in chain of Morgan
- 5 - Roselli definitely heard; Morgan in Vegas recently "in secret"

6 - Garrison, Morgan, Roselli in Vegas in March. ^{been with} In truck w/ Roselli; so was Morgan

It is our impression that Greenspan also involved in the conversation.

Point finger to Roselli as source of info and to confirm Morgan as Pearson's source.

Summer of 62 - Edwards, Mahan, & Roselli had lunch & Edwards said he told Roselli he in front RFK of Roselli's contribution.

Pearson's story seems to rely on ref. phere. Could be Harry if ref. source.

Probably from 2 sources:

State Dept meeting + met. organizer so Roselli chief suspect.

Inference: Roselli definitely had lunch & Morgan definitely talking to a newspaperman friend (Morgan)

As Robert Mahan's relations with DA intelligence with knowledge of the subject Kennedy's

SECRET

Lindsay memo among drafting papers
for various subjects related to Cuban
operation. A portion of used form CIA
copy of memo was "encl. summary statement
of matter". Lindsay repeated tried to
raise assumption of Castro w/ Hany over
next several weeks but Hany did not.

000292

H. Hunt 5 people in Lindsay's office
sum. MIA took to Lindsay out of
investigation as part of it.

30 July 1964

303 Committee met in Situation Room
of White House.

McBryde Bundy, Vance, Malone, Thomas
Hughes & Des. Fitzgerald for a discussion
of Cuba

~~Thomas~~ Peter Jensen as secy.

10 June 64 memo from DD/P to Don
re Mafia plot to assassinate Castro.

Price was 150,000 w/ 10,000 copies.
Cuban exile: Jose Mario "Pepin" Bosch,
Bacardi Rum, to contribute 50,000. He opposed
JMWAVE for US participation. Refused outright

19 August 64

DCI (McCrall) to Bundy - re
FBI interest w/ all participants

SECRET

SECRET

0002294

Publicity has not run its course:

- a) Pearson has not yet used the pills & fact of State Dept meeting
- b) Baum has not revealed full case; CIA should be promptly displayed when he does
- c) P wants Pearson in custody & will be deported

Pearson stay in detail & detail found only in O here the 3 man team.

p 126. Put in it but slight - that there is no other motive in Speedy's stay.

p 127. We do not know that Carter actually tried to retaliate, but we do know that there were such plots against Carter. Unhappily, it now appears that Baum may also know this.

p 129. Wilson reports that Taylor is in jail in Tampa. Powell is a former CIA agent in San Diego, very useful & register ^{with police} some he is in form. None of them would have connections about disapp in his CIA connections when he was pulled by law enforcement author. Evidence has already shown it when the FBI was ready in 1963, Powell appears to deny it in his conversation with Meyer's Baum.

P. 131. Search - 3 May 1967

Comment: Red base CIA over a barrel

Tab A

SECRET

0002295

241 July 75 memo

Santino Tropp

4. ST desired person full to agent who had access to Castro

When this attempt failed, T supported another candidate (cancelled re BGP)

- Mahan former contact subject w/ Office of Security
- Roselli conviction

Nov 1967 - illegal entry

Dec 68 - Fugitive

Senate Staff 7-8-June 1975

Ad Hoc Staff

No 838-75

9 June 75

4. Report to Maxwell Taylor made by Dick Bissell on 8-Dec 1971 DDO

(maybe on continuing the active capability)

5. Who is Torrella (yet another alleged Castro assassin) DDO

6. - WIRROU's operational aliases?

- who was (WIZARD 14) John Stein's memo

- 2 young officers who contacted WIRROU DDO

- want to know John Stein's all WIRROU file by Walt P. Lee

SECRET

1/1

Memorandum

SECRET

5 May 1967

Subj: Wm K. Harvey

0002296

Missing

1. ~~Harvey~~ ^{Bill} Harvey contacted Papich to report to Papich some contact he had w/ "gangster" and offer his copy to FBI. He expressed to Papich ---

16 May 67

Tab B Attention Edward Cohen
Finn Bamburo 7 April 77
cc Duke City

Morgan associated w/ Papich circa 1951 as a lawyer "cut out" in matters of contact to DDO.

Edward Pierpont Morgan

DOB 28 May 1913 St Louis

Richard Scully Cain

MKA - Richard Scalpette SS 357-22-333

1969 Texarkana Tex (Reg No. 17169-TT)

In May 1964 Bolden refused to testify before Warren Com. in absence of counsel George Howard.

SECRET

Chicago American for 26 Nov. 1963 in column Daily Day & Maggie Daily - rumor that assassination planned w/ FBI of Chicago 9/7/63

SECRET

1 Sept 27 name of wife

Garrison a guest of Mario Marini,
a henchman of Marcella, at her 1944
banquet denied knowledge of Marini's contact
to Marcella.

TO Chief SRS
Sulge. Carr

9 Oct 1947

TAD
R

Info re meeting of Fair Play
under Richard Criley (# 346 116)

Source of info on Guillermo WSCOBAR
who was 'int' of Horace Speeds (SAS)
leads obtained from Ralph PEREZ (44426
Speed # (199499))

WSCOBAR recruiting Cubans for Communist
Party in Chicago.

0002297

SECRET

File

7 Dec 1978 VCT for Doc of Scout

Ruselli, Jolung

9 August 1976

SECRET

Brief memo "Sally" Jolung Ruselli

0002298

Tab B o c

Additional info re Troff, Ruselli, & Brewer contained in material previously released for review re Sturgis.

21 May 1975 Memo by Balchowski re Arthur Ballitto & Fred Hume

1. 12 Jan 1961 memo told FBI he recommended DuBois for an A atty whom he w/n disclose

2. A Hays is James Confield per a 13 March 1961 report.

3. 22 May 61 FBI memo re interview w/ Col. F Swain who said he contacted Mahan in fall of 1960 for use as a "cut-out" for Havana. Swain gave any indication to Mahan he would attempt to accomplish some clandestine efforts in Cuba.

10 Jan 1974

Memo: Chief Warden Hampton Downer

Subj: Salvatore Bramanna & Richard Cain

Re Chicago Tribune Articles of 28 and 31

Dec. 1973

Richard S. Cain # 272141

DOB Oct 1931 in Chicago.

Left Vice Squad in 1960; Acquired
Lohman.
a F.I. from

CIA contacts

SECRET

0002299

A. Fall 1960

Cain initiated contact w/ Chicago office
& volunteered info on Cuban cell groups in
Chicago area.

B. June 61

Contacted Lohman of Chicago Field office
re a Mr. Krougansky who was met w/
President of Panama's Investigative Commission.

C. Summer 61

Cain met in Mexico City by CIA staff
identity & purpose unknown.

D. Oct 1961

Cain wrote to Lohman from Panama
offering his services

E. April 1962

Cain makes unannounced visit to Hong
Kong. Warden Scott & Warden Dean in Mexico City
says he had an investigative agency w/
branches in Chicago & LA which he used to
provide training to Mexican Coast Agents

F. 4 June 62

Reported from Mexico for small number
has books & information on Mexican officials
& writing

G. 19 August 63

met in Chicago at Lake Shore Drive Athletic
Club & Dolphin Club by Grace Speed w/ a
Dev. Staff officer & Chief of Chicago DCD office.

He would like to work overseas
for CIA

Cain worked for Croft of Shuff
& ~~was~~ in contact with Cubans in Chicago
area & would provide info on unknown
activities of Cubans particularly Paulino Sierra
H. 26-38 Aug 1963

Cain informed the Student Directory,
a Cuban exile group in Miami

- Miro Cordoy's interest in
purchasing arms

2 Sept 63 J. DRE people who had purchased
arms. (Goran Speed) via Washington Chicago
told Cain to get out of the picture
H. 1967.

FBI investigating Cain's arms work
& recommended CIA sever contact

L. 15 April 1972

Cain returned to Chicago from Mexico
City; then disappeared. May 1972 says he
was going to Latin America. Involved
in illegal arms deals (international) &
on various occasions stated he was CIA

M. 16 May 1972

FBI agent in Mexico City asked
Mexico City Station for traces on Cain

Eastern Airlines got ed. Cain at
Smythair old field near Hammond. 5 May 72

27 Nov 63

By ROBT B. P. Lohman

1. Fair Play for Cuba Committee in Feb 63 met at 987 S. Spaulding Chicago under direction of Michael Bailey, Secy of Chicago Chapter. Assassination of Rev. Dr. King
3. LHO provided info in March 1963 Shuff's office had not established LHO at Feb meeting but strong suspicion he was in Chicago in April 1963 & responsible for firing the officer of UPT
4. Shuff advised in like FBI so had "officially" asked FBI for info on Fair Play for Cuba. If they developed anything definite they would notify inform FBI

~~Could not read!~~ "that emp in 1963 the Chicago info over again in US for Fair Play"

15 August 63

Sandy Smith Chicago Sun Times following up a lead that he call CIA re report Bureau would get info from Cuba but no info of value.

Said he did not show info to Ed Butman but to someone in Butman's office (justified)

Breckenridge memo to Dept of requests

1. Persons in Sec H of paragraph 3 is contained in one 50 volume of material
2. Section B lists 3 American citizens. Contact is minimal
3. Quarter in Section C B 1 is Arteme; Also used by Mafia in custo operation

Detectives have already interviewed several who is retired.

TAD C

1. Ramon Don Estevan Dominguez (shortly) DOB 2 May or 5 Feb 1936
2. Rolando Masferrer Rojas family DOB 12 Jun 1948
3. Luciana Nieves (shortly)
4. Jose de la Tormenta (shortly)
5. Jose Quintana DOB 3 Oct 48
reported by name to Roubin
6. Joaquin Antonio Cortijo DOB 10 Jan 48
7. Manuel Arteme

TABC

SECRET

0002303

14 March 1974

Mulroy vs Terry Sawyer

Frank O'Malley referred Hunt to Bob Mullen of the Mullen Corp.

- O'Malley knew Hughes a client of Mullen's; this information picked up in course of a casual relationship between O'Malley & Mullen in early 60's in connection with Full Cuba Committee.

Hunt & Mullen met in Paris during Marshall Plan

- when Mullen doubted if Hunt possible insight on some placements and employment.

- Hunt approached O'Malley for an individual having access & information only details.

- Thomas C. Amato apparently refused job.

- Houston

- Paul or intervention w/ Farrell of ISNS re possible departure of Brennan.

- only people who knew were E. Swales, Osborn, Angleton, Rocca, & Houston

SECRET

1977 Report

SECRET

0002304

AmTRUNK

Designed to identify & later use disrupted
personnel in current forces in Cuba.

Bay 63, Nestor Antonio Moreno Lopez
& Enrique Cayardo Robera developed Fernando
Plan to overthrow Castro.

Moreno defects in April 1961 & assoc. w/
George Volsky; Cuban citizen of Polish origin.
Presumably USSR ^{1940s} & then in Polish Ar Force under
British Command. Married Cuban & arrived in
Miami May 61.

Bay 63

Volsky contacts Ted Szyde & met w/ w/ w/
Gardner & Herwicz (State). CIA assigns plan
to Miami Station out is known as AmTRUNK

Nerve program run for & by Sgt 63
had 3 sources including Guin

Moreno in Oct 63 was removed from
AmTRUNK due to indiscretion. He was judge
appeal to JFK thru Volsky & Szyde.

Had some contacts but no real action
capability; In '65 Guin & Piny arrested.

Szyde & Volsky both Polish & met in Cuba
in 195-60

SECRET

Joe Ricardo RABEL Nurey
suspected agent who defected Dec 62
joined AmTRUNK; returned to Cuba on her own

X in 65 to infiltrate his family. Arrested & given 30 yrs. but freed in 67.

Accusation RHPZ a Cuban agent as early as July 1963.

Possibility -

WTRUNK might have been an important Cuban plan from the beginning. Inf action was buying cables & some info's & infiltration.

M.D.

NY Daily News 20-25 April 1975 by Paul Mackell, - quotes Sturgis on assassination attempts including using Juan data to bomb Castro. I recruited him to work w/ the embassy (US).

Sturgis' id of RHPZ, prior to its disclosure by external investigators, raises question as to what he knew.

Office of Security memo 1975 noting connection between Sturgis & Rotherman in 1960 citing FBI reports.

(made in conjunction w/ Daily News story)

Giancana in FBI memo 18 Oct 1960 indicated he had met w/ assassin-to-be. & pills in Castro's food or drink.

Since CIA pills not until Feb 1961, seems that not had their own plan.

SECRET

- Lorenzo claims Sturgis recruited her in 1960

Verna

0002307

FBI 21 Dec 1960

- MRO support for Mike

FBI 18 Jan 1961

V receiving some of that support

Stungis could have learned of Mike's
role after Mike settled in Miami in 1965

FBI report

14 August 1964 would a statement by a
person jailed in Cuba by Troff.

Other Proposals

1. May 1975

Cuban exile who came to be a
contract employee stated that in Feb 1961 he
was given a rifle & a memo to kill Castro.

Tried to enter Cuba 3 times & failed

2. May 1977 Anderson column re
Antonio Veciana

On 3 occasions (Dec 1960, July 62, Havana)
he proposed to CIA. He was assisting Castro

In 1970 report he made a proposal to
an AID employee at an overseas post.

5 Agent Messages in 1961

SECRET

1. 3 of messages involved some group of agents

so probably same plan

1. 27 March 1961 AMBROSE 15

Plan to sabotage electric company in Havana & hit Castro at Sports Palace

2. 29 March 1961

same idea with effort to arrive on 30 March but no commitment as assassin

3. 5 April 61

only room for 50 men; would try 9 April but need military aid.

a) AMBROSE infiltrated several times & finally executed 30 August 62 after May 62 arrest. Reported as some identity he was CIA; & not mentioned in McBrown Book

b) AMCOAX 11 ^{the} ~~two~~ persons in

c) AMPUB 11 touch w/ AMBROSE

d) AM PANIC 17 & mentioned in McBrown book, Drey 30 yr sentence

All 3 people sentenced prior to Bay P-8 none had assassination mission. Only AMBROSE mentioned that!

06, 24

4. 4 June 61 [Moratori of Italian Embassy]

claimed he had plans for program within 30 days after killing Fiedl.

Reply was that info was untrue & (Moratori) confession

SECRET

5. 3 May 61

0002309

- from a member of Revolutionary
Recovery Movement saying they would try to
kill Fidel today"

- Reply was "Lay low"
- Maybe HRM Pub 1

Tab D

AMLASH

- Rejects notion that AMLASH a Cuban agent.
- No contact between August 1962 and Sept 1963
- 7 Sept & 9 Sept cables indicate that AMLASH is a "spoiled brat"; hopeless as an intelligence performer; but approach in chief com speaker allowed to recruit his own cohorts."

p 3-4
Summary of Findings

Book V leaves inference that Castro's
speech to Dan Horner after AMLASH leak
lit CIA had not probed anything at that
time. & CIA met until 3 Oct 63

Nov 19, 63 AMLASH told CIA officer
he was returning to Cuba. On 20 Nov
he was reported as delay until February
"of something important" AMLASH

p 26 SSC Final Rpt.

SECRET

On 24 Nov Mexico Station responded to a
Headquarters request for names of known
contacts of certain Soviet personnel in Mexico,

Purpose was to determine significance
LHO's contact w/ Soviets

But AMTASH / 1 name was included
in reference to contact between a member
of the Soviet embassy & a Cuban cultural
attache. NOT a report of a contact between
AMTASH / 1 and the Soviet

"H" role - Chief did not know of
AMTASH 1963 association w/ CIA

Table E

- 24 Nov 63 Subj: Cuban Recenter following
Assassination of Pen Kennedy
- 28 Nov 1963 DIR 85657 (C/WH/3)
John Wilson - Hudson
- 29 Nov 63
Action on FTP report, Agency reports Almeida
be turned over to Mexican authorities.
- 12 Dec 1963 CSCT-3/779,048 (C/WH/3)
Subj - Wilson, Carlos Golen
- 30 Jan 1964 CSCT-3/779,814 (CI/Sec,
Subj: Jack Ruby - LHO
- 20 March 1964 CSCT-3/780/612 (SR/CF/R)
Photos of individual Chief resending LHO

SECRET

10 June 1964 CSCI - 31781,841 (CJ/R&A)
Info re Ruly

6 Oct 64 CSCI - 316101446-64
VIA DUCT interview on 9 Sept 1964
His comments on 7 Photos Forwarded ~~to~~

W C Doc. 1054 Ruly & Associates -

0002311

SECRET

June 21/1977

1977 D.C. Report

SECRET

0002312

1. Comments on Final

The contents of the CFT are more a series of questions of how various intelligence should be handled, and on the non-acceptance of various Agency operational activities that the SSC Final Report judges to have been allowed to the Warren Commission inquiry.

2. A stated thesis of the SSC Final Report is that the creators of the intelligence system against Cuba should have a negative influence on the quality of their support for the U.S. coverage.

"If your personnel ... investigated p 2 they should have ... facts ... p 7 Certainly ... information, p 7

A central feature of the rationale in the concept that of Castro had allowed by these activities it would have provided some information against Cuba. Surely, the SSC Final Report makes it clear that if these facts they should have been pursued and accepted at the time of the intelligence system (not to mention the U.S. subject a review of the government's Cuba program to see what it might reveal.

Agency views the program they in the Final Report a part form of "the

result of an evolution in perception.
 i.e. Provocative report in 63 from
 both Cuba & USSR from Bay of Pigs.
 Minkovits; 'story with the army of US
 Cuban program.

"The SSC Find Report has shifted to
 emphasis instead CIA operational activities
 against Cuba as requiring specific attention.

Review of Agency -

Persons ~~in charge~~^{was} know details of 1963
 & 1964 operations for the most part are no
 longer available. Primary reliance on records.

CIA has now conducted such a
 review - looking at "the other end"
 of a possible chain of evidence, where they
 theoretically could have started. This has
 produced no new evidence bearing on the
 assassination, altho' it has produced the basis
 for new lines of speculation. In fact, the
 review sometimes seemed to become
 a subtle exercise in trying to put
 fault to the provocation being
 rather than being not to completely
 evidence actually being on the
 assassination of Pres. Kennedy. To explain
 sometimes became out of a story if this
 Agency (which our own would review)
 could have provided info to order
 the assassination ~~SECRET~~ Kennedy had

Had Castro learned of it. The SSC, in its Final Report, fell into this very trap, trying to make the AMLABH operation actually fit the theory for which the SSC's penetration seemed to be tailored!

Two C

AMLABH

The Agency had not a tentative relationship with this man during Puro Kennedy's life, altho the SSC Final Report - in trying to prove its thesis -- has attempted to present it differently. Because the case is discussed so extensively in the SSC Final Report, it is treated in a separate column in the paper at Tab D. The key point is that prior to Puro Kennedy's death the relationship ~~to~~ with AMLABH was ambiguous and without substance. Had Castro heard of it he could ~~not~~ have any idea there was a contact that had not developed to the point of an understanding.

p 14 New Consideration on the Supplanted Operation

In a column of stories by Paul Mitchell in the New York Daily News, of April 20-25, 1975 it quoted Sturges as follows:

"I had heard Comintern was involved in planting a bomb in Castro's office. I had

across to the Prime Minister's office, Stueger said. F. Bruno Felli's parents security guard Orta. F recruited him to work with the Embassy (Russian Embassy in Havana).

"He (Stueger) has claimed on a number of occasions to have been an employee of CIA, although there is no record of any such relationship. He was in contact with some of the CIA Cuban employees in the Miami area, but had no direct relationships with the Agency.

Orta was the director of the office of the Prime Minister, which gave him ^{access} ~~access~~ that would make it possible for him to pass customs. The plan failed because Orta lost his position, and with it his access, in late June 1961. This was prior to delivery of the poison pills to him in late Feb or early March 1961. Orta's escape in this manner was over when he took refuge in the Venezuelan Embassy in Havana in April 1961. He was allowed to leave Cuba in October 1964 and settled in Miami in Feb. 1965.

Some news stories discuss a possible relationship between Stueger and Trappanese, also mentioning a former Robinson as a former partner of Trappanese. Office of Security wrote a memorandum in 1975; noting
and on 13 June 1974

a connection between Sturgis and Portman in 1960, citing FBI reports.

Reference that Sturgis reported to have had a role in gambling and in this availability due to his "lost profits." One could deduce that Sturgis and Carter could have known one another because of their connection with the gambling activities as well as having contacts with the men heading the gambling operations.

From 1976 Sturgis also reports claim by Maria (Mamie) ^{CFA} Lorenz that she acted on behalf of Sturgis in 1960 re pain pills in jar of face cream.

Quotes - FBI memo on "Vermana":
"This seems to confirm some part involving a woman to kill Carter with poison known, the timing of events does not fit the time frame known to CFA. While consolidation had been given to various schemes, there were no CFA pills for delivery until February 1961. It suggests that the syndicate may have been running ahead of its man!"

In fact, it is possible that Vermana already was involved in independent

agitation with the Communist revolution
 when first appeared prior to 1947
 in Mexico to carry out the United
 States. The 1947 TO Report refers
 to two FBI reports that bear on this.
 One of them, on 21 Dec. 1940, indicates
 support by the Communist world
 for some of the Cuban exiles. The
 other report, on 18 Jan. 1941,
 suggests that Varna was one of these
 giving that support, altho' this was
 not confirmed.

... Late in June 64 another group
 plot in Miami area for 150,000.

Speculation that when undertaken
 in April 1962 can appear just "blue
 over & smelly" already "ongoing".

It is possible that CIA simply
 found itself involved in providing
 additional resources for independent
 operations that the syndicate study
 had under way.

In a sense CIA may have been
 jockeying backing in the syndicate
 or in addition to its material contribution
 was also supplying an aura of official
 sanction.