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1977 IER

6 AMTRUNK operation starting in 1963 sought to develop a capability to join dissident elements among the Cuban leadership into a group that could not take the Castro regime. It was conceived by Cuban exiles and sold to the Kennedy Administration, which assigned it to the CIA.

little concrete progress during JFK's life in 1965 CIA withdrew from its assoc. because believed to be compromised

basic ?! about security some corruption due to involvement of personalities who are suspected of having pro-Cuban sympathies, including possibly having been foreign agents

IER speculates that it is unlikely (AMTRUNK) to develop any outline till long after JFK's death suggests that it is unlikely to have provoked Castro at that time to use assass in retaliation

7 a full review of the operation shows that prior to the President's assassination not only had the CIA not agreed to give any support to AMTRUNK / 1, but had rejected his proposal to assassinate "Castro"

"The CIA's Bureau of Operations... AMTRUNK / 1 and 2 / 10 for would have

7

known only that there was an inconclusive association that clearly had not progressed to the point that it constituted the base for the postulated provocation"

IOB down + denies possibility that actual CIA plottings w/ numerous signicants which may have provided CASTRO w/ postulated provocation for the JFK assas

Items Selected by the SSC for Critical Comment

8

reference to reported 5-hour delay of a Cuban airline flight from Mexico City, awmeters arrival of mysterious passenger

\* see file on Hilberto Polcarpo LOPEZ

IOB says flight on ground for only 4-hrs + it departed 1 hr before alleged arrival of the private aircraft

FBI investigated another man who departed on another Cuban flight - info was added for use in SSC report (somewhat), "a single report that caused him to be dramatized as a fall of errors as to be highly suspect"

also SSC emphasis in cable from Mex City station replying to 11/23/63 inquiry from CIA HQ asking for info on collection of information

cable DIR 84885, 28-11-63 1111135  
MEXI 7045 (IN 62281)

24 November 1963

It is by report that the meeting was held with CIA met

8 as having contact w/ the Soviets but  
9 as the subject of a December 1960 meeting  
between funding of Cuban Embassy w/ a  
Soviet, concerning press conference to be held  
by AMKASH/1 in ~~Feb~~ Feb + March 1961

\* "On any event, the meeting in December  
1960 was prior to President Kennedy's  
inauguration, which removes it yet  
further from any possible relevance to the  
subject matter. It really is not difficult  
to understand why ~~the~~ the reference to  
AMKASH/1's name did not lead to detailed  
research about him."

I gen'l conclusions

① "The SSC Final Report contains  
numerous factual errors, both  
in the extensive treatment of a  
selected operation (AMKASH) and in  
a number of separate incidents that  
it presents."

② "while one ~~can~~ <sup>can</sup> make the point  
in principle that the Warren  
Commission could have well  
broadened its review to include  
the anti-Cuban programs  
of the U.S. Government, in trying to  
make the case for that concept  
Book 10 of the SSC Final Report  
does not do so, though it  
attempts to do so in its detail from the  
point of view. It is difficult to  
characterize it as generally

11

" it would have served to reinforce the credibility of (the Warren Commission's) efforts had it taken a broader view of the matter (or normal avenues of investigation). CIA, too, could have considered in specific terms what most saw then in general terms - the possibility of Soviet or Cuban involvement in the assassination because of tensions of the time. It is not enough to be able to point out erroneous criticisms made today. The Agency should have taken broader initiatives then, as well. That CIA employees at the time felt - as they obviously did - that the activities about which they knew had no relevance to the Warren Commission inquiry does not take the place of a record of conscious review.

11111937

" it must be recognized that CIA cannot be as confident of a cold trail in 1977 as it could have been in 1964

TAB B: CIA Pay on the Inquiry

2. b. SSC report, to considerable extent describes AM-Ash operation inaccurately. The Report assigns it characteristics that it did not have during the period preceding the assassination of JFK, in order to support the SSC view <sup>was let</sup> should have been reported to the WC

c. question of aircraft flights on 11/22 & 11/24/62 to Hawaii  
see "Unidentified Air Passengers" ~~file~~ folder

Travel to & fr USSR 1959-1962

11/26/63 Cable DIR 85133, 26.11.63

sent to [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

- requesting

any scrap info which bears on JFK's assassination

replies on 11/27/63:

[redacted]

(EN 68739), 11/27/63

(EN 68802) "

(EN 69005) "

(IN 69011) "

(EN 69100) "

(EN 69233) 11/11/63

(EN 69290) "

(IN 69328) 11/28/63

(EN 69352) 11/29/63

(IN 69371) "

(IN 694234) 12/15/63

(IN 694987) 12/16/63

(IN 69517) "

[redacted] (IN 69100) 11/27/63  
4 [redacted] reported that British journalist  
claimed that when imprisoned in Cuba in  
1959 - Santos happened; lives in luxury  
in jail, Santos visited frequently by other  
American gangster lady

[redacted] (IN 69233) 11/27/63  
[redacted] reported delight of Cuban embassy  
staff over JFK death & instructions from  
gov to cease looking happy in public

[redacted] (IN 69290) 11/27/63  
[redacted] reported Soviets shocked - blame across  
on extreme right wing

Other than above, initial reports produced  
no other info

11/29/63 DIR 85973 query to [redacted] +  
Frankfurt on Oswald's travel back to USSR  
12/2/63 DIR 86077, query to Berlin,  
Frankfurt, Bonn & [redacted]  
BONN 5579 (FN 73338) 12/4/63  
[redacted] 5116 (FN 73378) "  
MUN 8316 (FN 75065) 12/6/63  
[redacted] 5545 (FN 76758) 12/9/63  
[redacted] 1400 12/9/63  
1111939

above reports produced details about Oswald's  
travel from USSR thru Germany & Netherlands  
to US in 1962

5 No evidence found through these queries  
& related queries tying the S.O. to Oswald's  
assass. of JFK

## II Oswald Mexico Visit Sept Oct 1963

Oswald to Mex by on 11/28/63 DIR 85655

"We have by no means excluded the  
possibility that other as yet unknown  
persons may have been involved or  
even that other powers may have  
played a role. Please continue all your  
coverage of Soviet and Cuban infiltrators  
and your liaison w/ Mexicans

6 DIR 86064 30.11.63 11/30/63

Please follow all leads & tips - Question  
of Oswald acted alone not fully resolved

DIR 88680 12/12/63

Continue watch of Soviets & Cubans for complaints,  
propagandizing about the case. "FYI only,  
Soviet Intel in India had letter sent  
to (U.S. Government) leaders demanding  
full investigation of case."

41111940

HMMW - 12/93, 17.12.16 17/17/63

7 HQ forwarded dispatch to Mex by section  
commending them on job well done

"Your LFKVOY data, the statements of  
Sivora Dkhkh, and your analyses were  
very important in the quick clarification  
of the case, blurring out the really  
minor aspects of 'foreign backing'"

III Gen'l Collection Requirements

7 DIR 84603, 22, 11, 63

all CIA stations abroad get cable from HQ saying look sharp for any unusual intelligence developments. - "Be on guard alert while new Pres. Take over the reins"

8 "Were there relevant or significant information on the subject of JFK assass + Oswald, it would have been reported ~~at~~ either in response to the expression of general interest, or spontaneously, if such information was known to Agency sources"

If one believes that there was a conspiracy, w/ Oswald involved, one must accept the likelihood that his fellow conspirators would not have shared their knowledge beyond the narrow circle of those directly involved. Conversely, if there were no conspiracy, there obviously

9 ~~it~~ would be nothing to report in the first place. The absence of concrete reporting seems to prove, regardless of which is the case, as the basis for the apparent SSC view that no collection effort was undertaken."

comment in HQ dispatch to Mex City Sta on 12/17/63 - 744 MW-12193, 17.12.63 re limited reporting from other stations "... this partly dictated by the facts of the assassination."

in combined with report, citing Oswald's intel degree, which in Cuba, JFK says that



9. There were no penetrations of CASTRO'S inner circle when any info on subject (JFK assassination) would exist.

10. However, assets in Cuba did have reporting requirements

### III. Unpursued Leads

re Cuban airline flights + mysterious passenger see file on Gilberto Policarpo LOPEZ

11. Flight of 11/22 + 11/25 to Cuba from Mex City were passenger flights -  
Flight of 11/27 appears to have been a cargo flight w/ 1 passenger - the man referred to in Book II SSC.

CIA conducted regular surveillance of Cuban flights, filing cable reports to HQ.  
CIA had surveillance team, so did the Mexicans who provided photos of passports, + <sup>copies</sup> passenger list.

+ Also have LIEN VOY telephone tap against Cuban Embassy, transcripts of conversations w/ Cuban office + Mexican Airport Control Office.

11-111942

11/22 / 1963 Flight

Book I of SSC report + later CIA could not explain, at times SSC would be informed of follow-up on 11/22/63 flight. In fact, the SSC was advised

12. that the Mexican authorities were asked about the reported flight delay, although there was no recorded response. The current review revealed additional information from the surveillance noted above, which bears directly on the subject.

13. "The report (of 5 hour delay of Cubana flight from Mex City to Havana on 11/22/63) in question was in error, and misled the SSC in its summary of the matter."

The Passenger on the 27 November 1963 Flight  
in CIA passing report to FBI + FBI not

doing followup investg. for WC

15. ISR's list of inaccuracies in SSC report -  
other position

1) Mex City Sta did not able HQ that man looked suspicious. There was a 12/5/63 cable MEXI-7253 (IN 74227) which reported the man had crossed at Laredo, Texas on 11/23/63, that registered at hotel in Mex City on 11/25, checked out of hotel on 11/27/63 & was only passenger on Cubana flight that night - good photo of him taken at airport

11111913

2) dispatch followed HONIA-22571, 12/4/63 reporting info & comments for brief of continuing following:

"Source states that timing and circum-  
stances are concerning. Subject, Travel  
through Mexico and activities for 1963 are

15 also internal memo in <sup>Mex City</sup> Station -  
see Memorandum for the Record, 12/3/63  
which stated that the man was  
reported to have "looked suspicious"

16 [redacted] Cable 3/19/64  
[redacted] -0829 (TN 43193) - info  
was Cuban American on 11/27/63 flight  
had by agent of Mexican federales

" The following should be noted about  
the report: it misspelled the  
man's name; it offered a bare state-  
ment that he "was involved in the  
Kennedy assassination"; it states  
that he entered Mexico "on foot"  
from Laredo, Texas (according to the  
SSC Final Report, the FBI concluded  
that he entered by automobile); it  
asserts that he stayed at the Cuban  
Embassy in Mexico City (while the date  
and times of his registration and check-  
out at a specific hotel in Mexico  
City, where he stayed, were known); it  
gave an incorrect number for his passport;  
and, it stated that his Mexican tourist  
card was issued in Nuevo Laredo, (when  
it was known to have been issued in  
Tampa, Florida). "

11111944

Mex City response to Washington  
Station cable regarding to copy on the  
opposed. When Mex City received  
cable, its Deputy Chief of Station advised

SECRET

17 CR MEXI - 8740 (IN 43940) 3/20/64  
that the information in [redacted]  
report "jibes fully w/ that provided  
stated by Mex cy source 4 December  
63"

"The mistake of that cable cannot  
be explained today, but wrong  
it obviously was."

"Implicit criticism of CIA's not  
collecting more info. on the man is  
not well founded. It had no  
real sources w/ access to info  
concerning him; when a defector from  
Cuba became available I suspect  
information he was queried and the  
results were provided the authorities."

### TAB C CIA operations against CUBA

4 "While CIA produced considerable  
material for the investigation (see Tab E)  
that more was not reported is a measur-  
ful indication what was known (then  
by those actually involved (in Cuban  
operations (supply of info to W.C.), as  
distinguished from what might be hypo-  
thesized at a later date. To contend  
to the contrary - which has been  
suggested by some - would require a  
wholesale and sweeping generalization  
concerning employees of CIA, many of  
whom know aspects of both the most  
sensitive and the most  
1111945

7 Operation AMTRUNK see Folder No. 7 -  
Operations to Splet  
CASTRO regime; (AMTRUNK  
operation)

(Nestor Antonio Moreno Lopez  
(Enrique Cayardo Robles

Cuban spies - developed operational  
concept to overthrow  
the CASTRO govt - known  
as the Leonardo Plan

8 Moreno assoc's in Miami

Jorge Agbunzyc Volsky  
Cuban citizen of polish origin

married Cuban national after WWII  
reportedly imprisoned following Bo. P. govt  
reportedly work Castroite

Leonardo Plan was discussed w/ Pad Szule  
Szule claimed to govt contacts - it was  
through his intercession that Leonardo  
Plan gained govt-level support & approval

↓ Richard Goodwin was Szule contact at W. Ho  
Volsky & Szule met Robert Harwitch

1. State Dept official to discuss the  
plan - he presented the idea to CIA  
CIA assigned it to Miami Station &  
became known as AMTRUNK

→ 4/17/63 - Szule tells Harwitch that Miami Station gave  
Volsky copy to be used if operation to proceed not  
considered official work

9 Early Sept 1963 - AMTRUNK had 3 intelligence  
sources in CUBA

41111946

1) Manuel...  
2) ...  
3) ...  
Harwich reportedly died to CIA 1/25/64

10 Oct '63 - decision made to separate Moreno from operational details of AMTRUNK because of indiscretion + poor security practice

By Nov 1963 - some persons successfully recruited in Cuba but no progress in setting up a any capabilities fraction

11 Szulc + Volsky considered to be highly suspect - re security considerations

12 also Jose Ricardo RABEL Perez Castro had Rabel set up Cuban

13 Maurice Lage - held job until 1960 when apptd Chief of Rural Housing defected to US in 1962 - recruited by JMWAVE Sta + used in AMTRUNK activities - returned to Cuba on his own in 1965. Was arrested and sentenced to 30 years in prison but set free in July or August of 1967.

"There were accusations that RABEL was a Cuban agent as early as July 1963. The accusations were never proven."

14 FGR Days - very little planning + overall progress in AMTRUNK during FFK's life

New Considerations on the Syndicate Operation

14

15 "While Onta (Juan) was reported in early 1961 as being used in CIA syndicate attempt against Castro, CIA had no direct relationship w/ him until he left Cuba, at which time he was used as a source of info on the Cuban leadership."

16

17 It is pertinent to note that in addition to Sturgis's reported role in Castro got re gamblers, Onta's availability for assassin attempt was understood to be due his last payoff to he had received from gamblers which "One can deduce that Sturgis and Onta could have known one another because of their connections with the gambling activities as well as having contacts w/ the men heading the gambling orgs."

18

see vol 19 CIA report

"It is possible that Varona already was involved in independent operations w/ the criminal syndicate when first approached prior to the Bay of Pigs in March 1961 to carry out the Castro assassination. <sup>7 per. Rev. Juan Frank Varona</sup>

4111948

As late as 6/10/64 - it was reported that these gamblers did not want to be involved in the crime of Bay of Pigs as was indicated when approached by Roselli.

SECRET

20 In 67 FBR, notes that case officer ~~XXXXXX~~  
~~XXXXXX~~ said that the program reactivated  
 in 4/62 & had been shut down following B.P.  
 in 4/61 - he felt that something was ongoing  
 in interim. "It is possible that CIA  
 simply found they involved in providing  
 additional resources for independent opera-  
 tions that the syndicate already had  
 under way" ... "In a sense ~~the~~ CIA may  
 have been peppy-backing on the syndicate  
 and in addition to its material contribution,  
 was also supplying an aura of official  
 sanction."

21 Considerations:

- 1/ <sup>Possible</sup> Indep crim syndicate operation  
 Costa prior to CIA involvement in  
 late 1960. ~~to~~ May have continued  
 after B.P 4/61 shutdown & be ongoing  
 in some form when reactivated by CIA  
 in 4/62
- 2/ Frank Sturges may have had  
 contact w/ crim syndicate. Cards  
 have been used by syndicate in its  
 activities

22

3/ Sturges probably knew Onto.  
 However, Sturges not in Cuba when Onto  
 given assassin role. But  
 Sturges may have fabricated his  
 story for Miami gossip

23 Arthur Vinson ~~was~~ CIA Manager  
 was connected w/ ~~the~~ ~~the~~ Cuban  
 exile incident. He proposed Castro arms  
 in 3 occasions <sup>to CIA</sup> in 1/60, 7/62, 4/66





The 4 agents named in plan

28

① AMBROW/5 - a) 201 file opened on 5/15/60  
 POA issued 12/18/61  
 OA issued 1/31/62  
 debriefing on Nov 1960 -  
 indicates that he had contact  
 w/ plotters against CASTRO &  
 claimed to have attempted to  
 make ~~some~~ <sup>similar</sup> plans. Infiltrated  
 on 12/9/60 - exfiltrated  
 on 2/15/61

(b) infiltrated  
 3/3/61  
 exfiltrated  
 6/19/61

Sold mission to org. resistance  
 groups

(c) infiltrated  
 12/17/61  
 exfiltrated  
 3/29/62

still same mission

(d) infiltrated  
 5/2/62

arrested 5/29/62 & executed 8/30/62

reported to never admit was CIA agent

name not in McGovern's book given by Castro

11111951

② AMCOAX/1 - AMBROW/5 asked to contact  
 him re gen'l plan for 4/61

a) POA - 1/7/61

mission to org. participating in  
 plot in Cuba

infiltrated  
 5/61

exfiltrated  
 6/17/61 following D.P.

29

SECRET

29

(6) reinfilitrated

7/29/61 same mission  
arrested

8/17/61 - serving 30 year term  
in Mc Given's book

(3) AMRUG/1 - another AMBRONC contact  
for 4/61 plan

a) recruited in 9/60 & infiltrated then  
received androps in 12/60  
returned to U.S. 5/15/61 following B.P.

b) infiltrated

6/29/61 - mission to org. resistance  
groups  
& conduct sabotage

arrested 7/61 & 30 year term  
name in Mc Given's book

30 (DAMPANIL/7 - another AMBRONC 4/61 contact

a) was a "walk-in" on 4/15/60

POA - 1/30/61

MOC name 8/12/60

mission to org. resistance in  
Havana + Pinar del Rio

b) infiltrated 3/3/61

arrested 4/23/61 - 30 year term

in Mc Given's book

c) was infiltrated on 8/60

infiltrated 11/60

(prior to POA) - 11111952

Mission was sabotage & assass.  
of prominent Cuban Communist  
members in Havana

records destroyed by FBI  
in Cuba at that time

highly confidential source with not authorized  
to discuss information on AMBRONC mission

## TAB D AMLASH OPERATION

1 1977 ER says actual nature & sign. of AMLASH  
is much diff. than Book II

Book II suggests that Amlash may have  
been Castro agent w/ provocation mission  
that would justify his retaliation &  
in alternative Amlash was a security risk  
by which details of plotting could have become  
known to Castro, providing some provocation  
& whatever the reasoning Amlash should  
have been reported to W.C.

"We believe that neither of these applies.  
The character of the relationship between  
CIA and Amlash/1, prior to Oswald's  
assassination of President Kennedy,  
was so insubstantial and inconclusive  
that it provided no basis for Amlash/1  
to feel that he had any tangible  
CIA support for plotting against CASTRO.  
Whether one is inclined to see Amlash/1  
as either a double agent or provocateur,  
or simply as a man who carelessly  
revealed what he was doing, there  
was little for him to report or to leak."

As of Sept '63

5 Comment

11111953

"It is noted at this point that AMLASH/1  
was not a recruited agent at that time -  
he would be so for that matter, but  
Operational Approval was never granted  
for this purpose. By the end of August  
1962 the CIA attempted to recruit AMLASH/1

5 had made no real progress, although  
he was viewed as an operational con-  
tact w/ potential. On a year passed  
between August 1962 and September 1963  
when he was next contacted by CIA.  
On terms of the relationship that he had  
w/ the CIA the critical period, for  
purpose of the paper, is therefore between  
5 September and 22 November 1963.

7 9/9/62 HQ cable to AMLAST case officer  
~~report~~ <sup>apparently</sup> AMLAST as chief conspir-  
ator allowed to recruit his own  
cohorts among whom he may find  
persons susceptible to long  
distance + covert disciplines -  
Cable also spell out long range  
requirements prior to action based  
on Amblast possible internal organiza-  
tion

8 9/7/63 cable reporting first 63 meetings w/ Amblast  
"Amblast still feels there only two way  
accomplish change either inside  
job or invasion he real state  
concerns realign late out of question,  
According AMWHP, Amblast still  
awaiting for US reveal plan of action

1. At conference - <sup>13-14-63</sup> ~~initial~~ reference to "inside  
job" did not specify Amblast as necessary  
for Boker's group, ~~but~~ <sup>but</sup> ~~initially~~ <sup>initially</sup>  
since you'll ? of how to bring about change  
and cooperation with Boker

10

"The fact remains that whatever views Amblask/1 may have expressed, he had no response from his CIA contacts of any support for his proposals at that time. Whatever may have been the cause for Castro's remarks at that time they could not have stemmed from anything said to Amblask/1 by CIA officers as they proposed nothing and undertook nothing"

10/3/63 - Amblask case officer arrives in Paris to meet w/ Amblask even tho Amblask told Amblask he does not "intend to see your friend again"

Station officer in Paris had been in contact w/ him, 2 of whom participated in meetings that followed

10/11/63 - case officer cable HQ that Amblask claimed to have "necessary people and equipment inside Cuba) to accomplish overthrow w/out (U.S.) assistance"

Amblask wanted meeting w/ RFK for moral support assurance. Cable indicates that Amblask determined to attempt operation against Castro w/ or w/out (U.S.) support

11/11/63  
RFK's typical "jumped" meeting - RFK to help self as personal rep of RFK & assurance of full US support if there is a change of the political situation in Cuba

11 10/29/63 - Ambush meets w/ Fitzgerald  
in Paris. Case officer also at  
meeting

12 11/13/63 - Case officer memo summarizes  
meeting of D.F. w/ Ambush  
US support only after real coup  
effected + group involved in position  
to request U.S. support.  
U.S. won't commit to isolated uprising

B D.F. in 1967 IFR recalled that Ambush  
repeatedly requested high powered rifle  
w/ telescopic sights + other weapons to  
kill Castro from a distance. D.F. stated  
he rejected the request.  
Case officer memo said nothing of operational  
nature discussed at Fitzg. meeting

11/14/63 - Contact report of another meeting  
in New York re Ambush reaction  
to 10/29 Fitzgerald meeting -  
Ambush happy about policy but  
not fact that wasn't given  
technical assistance for  
operational plan.

14 1  
If Ambush doesn't get advice  
and materials from U.S. got  
technician he will become  
fed up + we'll lose progress  
made

Comment Book II at p 18 <sup>11/11/66</sup> Chapter 2  
Ambush findings in Fitzg. meeting  
as unclear. IFR says the matter  
is corroborated by deventer report

11/19/63 - Fitzg. approves telling Amalash  
what he would be given a cache  
inside Cuba, to include high  
power rifle w/ scope

11/19/63 - Amalash tells CIA officer he plans  
return to Cuba

11/20/63 - HQ cables Paris to delay  
Amalash departure to permit  
one more meeting which Amalash  
requested

On same day, Amalash agrees  
to delay <sup>departure</sup> of its something inter-  
esting. Case officer said couldn't  
assure it but it was a meeting  
Amalash requested.

16

FBI <sup>sup</sup> notes is highly speculative  
evidence of indication that Amalash  
might receive specific support  
be requested

11/22/63 - Case officer in Paris meets  
w/ Amalash in afternoon

Conclusion

11. ... there is every indication <sup>11/19/57</sup> that  
during President Kennedy's life  
Amalash/1 had no basis for believing  
that he had CIA support for  
much of anything. Were he a  
prosecution reporter to Castro,  
or if he was merely careless and  
leaked what he knew, he had no  
factual basis for making a report, or  
any amount of plot directed against  
the state.



Specific Sections of Book II

17 View of SSC as to why AMHATH should have been examined by WC is stated at p 5 of the Report

ESR disagrees saying Amblak w/out substance prior to JFK's death

18 Incorrect to say CIA endorsed Amblak's proposal. No agreement w/ Amblak & a commitment to him and even if Castro learned of contacts w/ him there was nothing to learn beyond fact of contact relationship was tenuous w/ no support promised to him for whatever he planned.

at p 68 SSC outlines position on significant plots

19 "we are inclined to acknowledge in principle the possibility - not seriously considered as a likelihood during the Warren Commission inquiry - that other operations could have suffered the defects attributed to the Amblak operation by the SSC Report."

41111959  
"we tend to not expect a general attention could have been given by the Warren Commission to the Castro program of the U.S. Government, including CIA activities."

19

p 4 + P 19  
SSC Final Report - attribute  
Fitzgerald saying that  
U.S. would support a coup &

gave gen' assurance that  
U.S. would help in organizing  
about the coup  
attributed to case officer testimony  
which doesn't give us/ 1963 volume  
in subject

20

ISK says Fitzgerald <sup>assurance of</sup> support  
contingent on if there is a  
change in gov't in Cuba

- 21

re to CIA case officers who were  
responsible for investigation  
at time of WC - saying knowing  
of Amblak operation would have  
affected investigation - ISK says  
" it is likely the views elicited  
from CIA employees in 1975  
probably were response to  
representations by SSC staff  
members as to what the operation  
involved, as distinguished from  
what it actually was "

21

Interview CIA office re investigation  
read Fitzgerald testimony, interview  
memoranda

The AMTAS # case office

same w/ synchmate stuff

Interview 67 FBR staff & internal  
docs  
also

21 p 249 Book II - reference to 67 FBR  
wherein case officer Amlesh  
ordered to break contact w/  
Amlesh due to assassination of JFK  
77 FBR says 67 FBR states that  
case officer got cable from City saying  
'everything was off' - but case  
officer didn't testify that reason  
for everything being off was JFK's  
assassination.

22 OPM cable never found - it may never  
have been sent being case officer  
misrecollection. FBR says 2  
sources in Book II don't support its  
version

11111960

p. n 30, p 17 Book II - ? of Amlesh of security  
not until after JFK assassination was ? of  
security of sufficient concern for CIA  
to break relation w/ him

23 Amlesh as protection - recruited  
strangely - served 10 years of 3 years  
prison - The book which listed Amlesh  
was not first published until 3/61 - 11/67

p 26 of Book II - re Amalash name as  
 known contact of Soviets  
 in Mex Cy - Amalash  
 real name in list of  
 names on the Mex Cy cable  
 above used as basis for Book II  
 discussion of why Amalash name  
 in list did not lead to identification  
 of Amalash operation

- 21 Amalash name brought up by Soviet  
 embassy official and Cuban cultural  
 attache in 12/60 re Amalash planned  
 press conference in Mex Cy 2/61-3/61  
 and a report of contact between Amalash  
 and the Soviet which was subject of  
 inquiry -  
 the 12/60 removes the question from  
 relevance to subject because of the  
 Kennedy crisis.

p 72 of Book II re 7/64 FBI report  
 concerning CIA meetings w/ Amalash  
 FBI report sup meeting was to plan  
 Castro assas. - badly misrep  
 time & events - substantially post  
 date JFK death + not relevant to  
 WC inquiry

- 25 p 75 Book II re testimony of Chief SA [unclear] / CE  
 re selection uncertain. Book II  
 gives the opinion re Castro assas by  
 Amalash full play despite [unclear]  
 question as to the reliability

25

P 68-75 Book I re what CIA people knew about Amtrak, what was understood and conclusion that should have been drawn  
TGR says Book I overlooks intricate quality of Amtrak relationship during the period in question

26

P 78, 79, 105 Book I re Cuban exile designated A who informed FBI + CIA in mid-65 of Amtrak activities + A relationship w/ CIA. TGR says if read Book I carefully it is clear that 'A' was unaware of Amtrak's assoc. w/ CIA

- 1) info was 1 1/2 yrs after JFK assn
- 2) informant had no knowledge of earlier CIA / Amtrak relationship

27

28

" At the time of the 1967 FS report there was no issue of how to characterize the operation at different times, and the question was not addressed. Facing that question now, it is clear that toward the operational relationship developed after the death of President Kennedy, it was unformed and without substance during his life. During that time it was not an assassination plot. The treatment of the question in the SSC Report is both impressive and misleading. "

11/11/67

TAB F

Material Forwarded TO WARREN  
COMMISSION AND FBI

Listed here are reports and other papers  
submitted to the FBI (which had primary  
responsibility for the investigation) and the  
the Warren Commission.  
4 sections to the list

F.1 Dissen to Onnell. Comments  
F.2 Dissen to W.C. SECRET

E3 Dissem to FBI on Persons & Allegations  
 E4 Memoranda to W.C.

F 2

18

Dissemination of Reports to CIA Staff  
 " Since CI Staff held the Agency's official file on OSWALD, all cable traffic (inter-ally) including dissemination by cable was sent to the Staff for filing in the official file. Additionally, cable dissemination was released by CI/LIA's. Copies were, therefore, available to the Staff.

Since CI Staff released all log-  
 form CSCI's, coordination  
 sheet from CSCI's, and maintains  
 the CSCI log, the CI Staff received  
 copies of all CSCI's.

18

Dissem. of Material to W.C.

19	Co D.	Date	NOT C.D.'S		
			Date	Subj	D/P
	100	12/13/63	1/21/64	memo from Helms	
	300	1/21/64		to J. L. Rankin	
	691	1/22/64		re. Draft 2's	
	321	1/25/64	2/5/64	for submission	
	347	1/31/64		to Soviet Govt	
	361	2/5/64		memo from Kara	
				messages to Rankin	
				14 attachs	
				including report	
				Soviet States, on	
				L-110	
20	1182	2/8/64	2/18/64	memo for FBI	
				dissem.	
				Adm. Sec. Report	
				2/18/64	

28 22 July 1964 DDP 4-3712 C.D. 1273  
Memo from Helms, DDP to Rankin  
Subject: Apparent inconsistencies in  
Material furnished the Commis-  
sion by CIA and the Department  
of State

29 11 September 1964 DDP 4-4793  
Memo from DDP Helms to Rankin  
Subject: Publication of Documents furnished  
to the Commission by the CIA

32 13 Oct. 1964 DDP 4-5275  
memo from DDP Helms to Rankin  
Subject: Public. of Docs furnished  
to Commission by CIA

DOC. DATE DOC. NO. ORIGINATING OFFICE

1 11/23/63 DIR 84915 (WH/3)

Info related to telephone call on 9/28/63  
to Soviet Embassy in Mex Cy. Request  
FBI

2

41111064



Tab E - Materials Forwarded to W.C

Tab F - Media Coverage of Oswald's Visit

Intel. Sources on Oswald's Visit to Mexico in '63

umbrella type project

1. Unilateral Coverage

LIPSTICK - multi-line phone taps  
3 photo sites, mobile surveillance team + mail intercept operation

LIFEAT - telephone taps -

- handled by case officer & recruited agents

3 photographic sites subscribed under LIPSTICK:

managed by a CIA agent

LIMITED - fixed to directly of post office Soviet Embassy  
LILYRIC - alternate photo base main street on limited front gate  
LICALLA - Southwest side of Soviet Compound  
bradston - get good TD photos of Soviet personnel

2

closed down when Station received word that photo of the "unidentified man" was being released by W.C

Film collected 3 times/week from limited and Lilyric sites  
Sovola film processed on outside by the agent like the above

3 mobile surveillance done by <sup>1965</sup> American staff officers - had team of 10 recruited agents stationed to intercept by radio from limited site whenever someone of interest left the ~~embassy~~ Soviet Embassy

3 unilateral mail intercept; Libright -  
handled by American case officer

### Guam Coverage

unreliable because as was the nature  
of Mexican Service at the time

4 Telephone tap w/ Mexican, called Lienvoy  
<sup>at one time</sup> run by Mex office - 30 lines on the  
listening post, In 61 Station chief  
became project case officer on LIENVOY

### Oswald Coverage

Mexicans asked for telephone numbers of  
Soviet, Cuban & Satellite Embassies  
to do Lienvoy tap - we disconnected  
our unilateral lines toward discovery,  
Mex connected 5 Cuban lines, 5 Soviet  
lines, 3 Czech lines, 2 Polish lines,  
and 1 Yugoslav line - recorded,  
transcribed

plus monthly modest summaries for  
Station chief of interesting conversations  
& time lag of a day or two

5. Boris Yarosoff and Russian translation  
translations ran about a week behind  
date of conversation. All transcripts  
made in Spanish or English since this  
is all Stalkief could read & because  
he ordered these transcripts for operations  
alone.

6 Ann Coogan's sister screened all photographs  
as soon as station learned that  
Lee Oswald had joined Soviet Embassy  
0 Oswald came to alerting listening  
post operators from top of Soviet line.  
It was picked up & taken to B. Tarasoff  
for translation because the caller  
was trying to speak in Russian.  
There was some delay because Station  
personnel wanted to review the  
photograph, coincidentally w/ the  
typed transcript.

Tab G

Selected Newspaper Story w/ Comment  
(45) - Comments on Ronald Neasler's  
Washington Post article of 11/26/76  
re CIA w/ held details of Oswald's call

2 memo - J. Lee Rankin 3/24/64 for PPP Helms  
Subject: CIA Dissem of Info on LHO  
date 10/10/63

2) Memo for Rankin from Helms 1/31/64  
re Info developed by CIA on  
LHO activities in Mex 9/28-10/3/63

3) Letter to Helms 2/10/64 from Rankin

4) memo for Rankin 2/19/64 from  
Helms - re Info on LHO Mex, Helms  
9/28 - 10/3/63

Tab # 4 w/ CIA comments

1. Jack Anderson column 5/6/77 alleges CIA activity in Dallas in 1963
2. " " " " 1/20/77 alleging CIA told to false Oswald story
3. Norman Kempster story 1/1/77 alleging CIA w/ held date on Oswald
4. Clark Booth since involvement w/ Cuban exile
5. Ronald Kessler story 11/26/76 alleging CIA w/ held details of Oswald telephone calls, w/ report on handling of documents
6. John Gaskko story 11/13/76 alleges Oswald told Cubans of plans to kill Kennedy
7. Tabloid Midnight story 8/2/76 regarding CIA & Castro
8. Wash Post story 10/1/76 re CIA consideration of possibly interviewing LITTO in 1960