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Vol II

Rogelio Rodriguez Lopez 261-332665
Memo for Record

From: Lawrence F. Barker

Subj: Meeting w/ LITAMIL -9, 27 Dec 63

"Litamil -9 reported on the recent firing of Teresa Proenza Proenza and this was made the subject of 2 cables to HQ's in view of the importance in the AMROD operation (see MEXI 7613 and MEXI 7625)

MEXI 8982 IN 59445 11 April 64

To: DIR

- 1. Subj ref, Rogelio Rodriguez Lopez, is one of two top priority Mexi targets for recruitment (other is Code Clerk) Station planning pitch soon.

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Memo for: C/wt/3 Mex

Subj - Rogelio R. Lopez / Deluge report # 59 of Army - 1

Ref: [] 1611 26 April 64

- 1. Rogelio Rodriguez Lopez to CIA office stationed in Mex City. He used the pseudonyms "Edwards", "Cabrera", + "Jose Antonio".

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2 Rodriguez has the following description: age approximately 24 years old, 5'8" tall, husky build, blond hair & a reddish complexion.

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Target Personality Data Form
opened on Rogelio Rodriguez Lopez

Loose Docs / RRL

HMMA-18861, Dispatch 17 Apr. 1962

To: C/WHD

From: COS/MWly

Subj: Operational / Link's relation-
ship w/ Osmin Fernandez Concepcion
aka "Oswaldo", concerning
Guatemalan guerrilla activities.

at P6 under COMMENTS

2. "Link has been cautioned to be extremely careful in his approach to and departure from the safehouse & to double check himself carefully en-route. He is well aware of the need for such precautions and has assured his Case Officer that he is observing all precautions possible. (A new safehouse has just been obtained for the phase of the operation). Link also has been instructed again to stop seeing June Cobb

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since she has proved a definite
danger to the operation especially
since Gutierrez, according to
Sinluck's version has dodged
responsibility for failing to
properly support the Moore
13 November group by implying
that "infeltration" of the Party
was responsible for the capture
of that group and that June
Cobb knows too many Party
secrets through her association
w/ Sinluck. Sinluck once again
has promised to stop seeing
her and has admitted the
validity of our past attempts
to get him to stop his affair
w/ her. He also has been cautioned
against letting this relationship
- w/ Cobb alienate Gutierrez.

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AMOOHIP/201 - 267956

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Memo for: C/WHP for Cuba

Subject: Espionage Allegations

1. Sensitivity: Regardless of accuracy, they
 - A. present a problem because of their having been presented to other govt agencies;
 - B. in view of matters touching on U.S. security, are delicate and could have unfavorable repercussions if repeated to newsmen by the complainant or his associate (whose independent, previous threats were of greater potential embarrassment);
 - C. affect the reputations and the security of our personnel at Madrid and Paris

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2.

Action: In view of the foregoing, the allegation

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A. should be put in proper perspective i.e. not ignored because of the potential embarrassment but considered in the light of what we already knew (Almost all of this is repetition of previous charges and reports, known well to both the Madrid + Paris stations & to Hqs office)

Concerned w/ the AMHASH group, whose members' reliability, reputation and good faith are questionable. Two of the things - about Carle and "Tota" and about AMW HIP-1 and Carrillo - are new.]

B. should be treated so as to protect us against any charge of laxity and so as to establish the facts but, at the same time, treated so as to avoid attributing to them more importance than they deserve.

C. should be kept in mind as example of other charges which may be bandied about and reported by the AMHASH group to other governmental agencies or to other governments or to news media (In the last connection recall the implied threat of publishing ODYORF responsibility as reported previously by IN);

D. should be examined together with all the other available reports so that we may

(1) clarify our own position and work w/ respect to all the AMHASH group (and this includes

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AMWITIP).

- 2) sort out which people, if any, are worth our time in the future;
- 3) take appropriate measures, including interrogation and polygraphing, to clarify doubts and then, when necessary, terminate those who are working ~~with~~ for us but are not worthwhile;
- 4) tighten up our own operational and security procedure in connection w/ the AMWITIP group

3. Preliminary Analysis: As pointed out in a preliminary analysis of the AMWITIP complex, made in March 1965 when I was preparing for travel to Madrid in connection w/ the ~~AMWITIP~~ HOPS-1 case: "... There is no convincing evidence that the group is working either for or against the regime of Fidel Castro. Reports on their contacts w/ us and their discussions among themselves are at variance. In 1962 Fidel Castro, reportedly knowing that the Cubans were plotting against him, talked to AMWITIP and seven members of the group

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To enlist their support against Anibal Escalante Dellunde and the communists in Cuba. Possibly they are playing both ends against the middle. They certainly have been and are in contact with the two ends." The following comments are keys to the matter raised by Espinosa:

A. The AMHAST conspiracy - As detailed by -3716 (IN 28634) on 6 April 65, QUSPORT-1 reporting on a meeting of the AMHAST group, including AMWHIP-1 mentioned the following significant points:

- 1) Mulvan was criticized for "fooling around for years" w/out helping and for jeopardizing the operation.
- 2) The group was to be prepared to denounce ODYORF as responsible if the operation fails and believed that the resulting scandal would make the Bay of Pigs seem insignificant, and
- 3) AMHAST-3 was in touch w/ Cuban intelligence as established by code message which he exhibited.

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As reported by [redacted]-1532 (IN
8 2939) on 4 June 65, based on
meetings w/ Espinoza. The
problem seen by [redacted] is that
"The AMRASH circle is wide and
each of our friends of whom we
learn seems to have knowledge
of the plan." I believe that
the problem is a more serious
and basic one. As indicated
in paragraph 3 of the present
memorandum Fidel Castro
himself reportedly knew as
far back as 1962 that the
group was plotting against
him and knewing it, enlisted
its support. Hence we cannot rule
out the possibility of provocation.
Assassination, obviously, is a
dangerous game, not merely to
the plotters in a physical
sense, but to a sponsoring
government which may
suffer severe political re-
percussions at home and abroad
if its involvement is made
known. In the instant case,
the risks of opposing the
ODYSSY bank would appear high
whether the issue is a provocation or

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not. Considering the individuals who are involved directly, their contacts w/ KOBARK officer, and their reported plan to expose ODYORF, persisting in the plan could be highly embarrassing to KOBARK. (This is even more the case now that Espinosa has talked to ODENVY and ODURSE, although fortunately the tenor of his complaint was that KOBARK had not given adequate support to the plan.

B. The contacts at [redacted] and the matters affecting the [redacted] The "recruitment" of Maureen had been the subject of an exchange of cable between [redacted] and HAS and of discussions at HQS between WH/C and WF (See [redacted] - 1071 (IN 60557) and DIR-16955). The annoying thing in this connection now is that Espinosa has talked about it to ODENVY & ODURSE and the danger that, if he is indiscreet, his story about this (and the other matters) could reach some curious newspapers. (In this connection, it appears

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That the questionable decision to put Maurice in touch w/ the AMKASH group was made w/out the knowledge of STOCKWOOD. Espinosa did not report any criticism of the KOBARKERS at Paris but it is evident that the AMKASH group knows more about them than we might wish. What is new and of

concern from Espinosa about matters in Paris is his story of AMWHIP-1 and UNSNAFO-19 dealings. The questions raised about AMWHIP-1 are of mutual concern also to HQ's which have been running him and MADRID which he has visited often. (On the occasion of my previous trip to Madrid on the QUHOPS-1 case, Rowley had voiced his doubts about the whole group and specifically about AMWHIP-1 and his connection w/ UNSNAFO-19.)

At issue are two basic points: (the knowledge on the part of UNSNAFO-19 about KOBARK'S connection w/ AMWHIP-1 and the charge that AMWHIP-1 has been

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defrauding KUBARK in the jewelry transaction. Also to be kept in mind is the fact that ODENVY has an office in Paris which well might have been informed of the allegations and which might have been asked for comments - although ODENVY policy always has been to stay away from any investigation of other government agencies unless specifically directed by the Attorney General to investigate.

C. Criticism of the [redacted] Criticism of the [redacted] by the AMKASH group is not new. Amlesh 2 and 3 were [redacted] and wanted direct contact, but the [redacted] has had reservation about seeing them. The Station has been involved indirectly because of reporting by its sources about and involvement of Station targets w/ both the AMKASH and [redacted] operations (both hatched from Has) (See [redacted]-2932 (EW 7206) and [redacted]-2998 (FN 73094) (code RYBAT).) Meeting among QUSWIT, QUSWIT, AMKASH-1 and AMKASH

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figures produced conflicting reports which previously were discussed at Madrid and at H.A.S. Insofar as GROVERY himself is concerned, it must be kept in mind that he is a natural target in whom the AMWASH group would be inclined to focus its complaints. With regard to the specific complaint about "Tota", Grovery has identified her as QOSWIFT-7 and has reported that no staffer from the Station ever had contact w/ her.

4. Further involvement of ESPINOSA

On 10 June ODENVY notified KOBARK at New York that AMWASH-2 had telephoned ESPINOSA to ask whether he had succeeded in contacting "the proper people" i.e., responsible KOBARK representatives and to request notice of the resulting arrangements.

5. AMWHIP-1: Our plan calls for making him report to obtain PR information and to obtain clarification of the roles played by those involved w/

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him in the AMBLASH operation.
His dealings w/ UNSWAFD-19
also will be covered. Following
this, and LCFUTTER examina-
tion is planned. This may help
to determine whether he has
been truthful in his reporting.

Harold F. Swanson
WH/c/SP

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