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~~STAFF REPORT ON~~

THE EVOLUTION AND

IMPLICATIONS OF THE

CIA SPONSORED

ASSASSINATION

CONSPIRACIES AGAINST

FIDEL CASTRO

STAFF REPORT

OF THE

SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

NINETY-FIFTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION



AUGUST 5, 1978

March 1979

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~~STAFF REPORT ON THE~~
EVOLUTION AND IMPLICATIONS
OF THE CIA - SPONSORED
ASSASSINATION CONSPIRACIES

~~ISSUE I - CUBAN CONSPIRACY~~
AGAINST FIDEL CASTRO

~~Introduction~~ Forward

(1) The attempt of the United States government to assassinate Cuban premier Fidel Castro ^{and} ~~as well~~ as other foreign leaders during the turbulent decade of the 1960s ^{seriously disturbed the} ~~shocked and disgusted the~~ American people citizen. When ^{it was} ~~sources~~ disclosed that the Central Intelligence Agency (~~hereinafter "CIA"~~) intentionally solicited and received the assistance of various members of organized crime (~~La Cosa Nostra~~) in the furtherance of such plots, ^{also} ~~more outrage prevailed.~~ ^{addition concern was expressed.} ~~Civilized society simply did not and does not condone such acts as a legitimate instrument of foreign policy. There is no excuse, no rationalization.~~

(2) ~~The effect and influence of these actions did not stop, however, with invoking the disdain of the American public and the~~ ^{the} world. These assassination attempts ^{thereafter} gave birth to the ~~haunting~~ theory that Fidel Castro ^{may have} orchestrated the assassination of ~~the~~ President John F. Kennedy in ~~defensive~~ retaliation for the plots on his life.

(3) In its Final Report published in April, 1976, the Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities ^{considered this} (hereinafter "SSC") ~~responded to this theory.~~

(4) In this Report, the SSC focused on two operations of the CIA ^{that} which may have provoked Castro into retaliation. First, the SSC documented the joint effort of the CIA and Organized Crime to eliminate Castro. Second, the SSC examined the nature and extent of the CIA AMLASH operation. The SSC concluded its analysis with the statement that "The Committee believes the investigation should continue in certain areas, and for that reason does not reach any final conclusions."¹

(5) This ^{staff report} analysis is an ^{affair} attempt ^{summary} to make such ^{additions} conclusions. ^{inadequacies} It is ~~not the purpose of the remainder of this material to~~ ^{not every} review ~~the~~ ^{of the plots} details of the CIA-Mafia plots or of the AMLASH operation, ^{will be reviewed.} to ^{in addition, no effort will be made to} resolve all of the conflicting viewpoints of the SSC and the CIA in regard to the importance of the various operations, ² ~~or to subject anyone to moral~~ ^{for carrying on assassination plots.} tongue-lashing. ^{report} Instead, this material first seeks ^{will}

to present a ~~summary~~ review of the CIA operation AMLASH and of the involvement or potential involvement of organized crime in the CIA operations against Castro during 1960-1963. From this review, it will ~~be possible to analyze~~ ^{inferences} ~~certain inferences and conclusions are then drawn~~ ^{it} concerning the nature, scope, and ~~ramifications~~ ^{implications} of these operations.

II. BACKGROUND MATERIAL - RELEVANT SUMMARY

A. CIA-Mafia Plots

(6) The genesis of the ^{use} utilization of the ^{nations} United States ~~criminal syndicate~~ ^{of organized crime} by the CIA to attempt to assassinate Castro is placed by the 1967 Report of the ~~(hereinafter = 6B)~~ Inspector General³ as occurring during a conversation between the Deputy Director of Plans, Richard Bissell, and the Director of Security, Colonel Sheffield Edwards. These plots extended from ^{late} 1960 until early 1963 and can be divided into two stages.⁴ The first stage occurred from August 1960 until April, 1961, and can best be termed as Phase I or the pre-Bay of Pigs period.⁵ From April, 1961 until ^{April, 1962} 1961, ~~the~~ CIA ^{records indicate that the operation was} ~~was~~ ^{inactive.} ~~inactive.~~⁶

1962

(7) In late 1961, the CIA decided to renew the CIA-Mafia plots, then creating Phase II, and kept them active until late 1962 or early 1963.⁷

(8) During the initial stages of Phase I, Edwards assigned the specific task of locating the proper persons to assassinate Castro to ~~the Chief, Office of Security Operations Support Branch~~ ^{the Chief, Office of Security Operations Support Branch} ~~(with the Support Chief)~~ ^(with the Support Chief). Both men ~~at private investigator and former FBI man~~ ^{at private investigator and former FBI man} agreed that ~~the Support Chief~~ ^{the Support Chief} should contact Robert A. Maheu,

whom the CIA had previously used in several covert operations, to recruit the necessary personnel.⁹

(9) Maheu subsequently contacted ^{John} Roselli,¹⁰ ^{an organized crime figure,} who in turn recruited two persons, initially known to the ~~Support Chief~~ ^{Support Chief} as "Sam Gold" and "Joe."¹¹ ~~The Support Chief~~ ^{The Support Chief} says he, along with Maheu, later discovered the true identities of these persons to be Sam Giancana and Santo Trafficante, respectively,¹² ^{two major figures in organized crime.}

(10) After meeting several times in Miami and deciding upon poison pills as the method of assassination, the ~~IGR~~ ^{IGR} ~~1967-10 Report~~ ^{suggests} contends that Trafficante made the arrangements for the assassination of Castro with one of his contacts inside Cuba on one of the trips

he allegedly made to Havana, Cuba.¹³ This contact was ~~_____~~, a Cuban official who held a position close to Castro.¹⁴

(11) The ~~1967 IGR Report~~ ^{IGR} then states that Roselli passed the pills to Trafficante.¹⁵ Roselli subsequently told ~~O'Connell~~ ^{the Support Chief} that the pills were delivered to ~~O'Connell~~ ^{the Cuban official} in Cuba.¹⁶ ~~O'Connell~~ ^{The Cuban official} apparently retained the pills for a few weeks and then returned them since he was unable to fulfill any plan.¹⁷ ~~O'Connell~~ ^{The Cuban official} was no longer in a position to kill Castro because he had lost his Cuban post.¹⁸

(12) With ~~O'Connell~~ ^{the Cuban official} unable to perform, the syndicate looked elsewhere. Roselli next told ~~O'Connell~~ ^{the Support Chief}, sometime during early 1961, that Trafficante knew a man prominent in the Cuban exile movement who could accomplish the job.¹⁹ ~~Dr. Manuel Antonio de~~ ^(the transfer of the Cuban exile leader)

~~Verona y Boredo~~ ¹⁹ After receiving approval, Trafficante approached ~~Verona~~ ^{this person} about assassinating Castro and he ²⁰ reported that ~~Verona~~ was receptive. ^{IGR} The ~~1967 IGR~~

~~Report~~ ^{the Support Chief} states that ~~O'Connell~~ again distributed pills ~~which~~ ²¹ which eventually reached ~~Verona~~ ^{the Cuban exile leader}.

(13) This activity concluded the pre-Bay of Pigs phase of the plots. The ~~1967 IGR~~ ^{IGR} does not document any ^{Actual} attempt to ~~administer~~ administer the pills to Castro.

employee

(14) The ~~IGR~~ ²² IGR relates that after a period of apparent dormancy, Bissell directed William Harvey, ^{a CIA agent, employee} in approximately November of 1961 to reactivate the CIA-Mafia plots. ²³ The Support Chief then ~~O'Connell~~ ^{therefore} introduced Harvey to Roselli. ²⁴ During this phase, the CIA decided against using Giancana or Trafficante; instead, a person referred to as "MACEO" entered the plot as the person who would help provide Castro ²⁵ contacts. In addition, the plots still utilized the services of ~~the Cuban person~~ ⁽²⁶⁾ ~~the Cuban person~~ ^{gentle leader.}

(15) Even though the plots no longer included Trafficante and Giancana, the CIA admitted that Roselli most likely kept them informed. The ¹⁹⁶⁷ ~~IGR~~ ^{noted} ~~that~~ that "i/t would be naive to assume that Roselli did not take the precaution of informing higher-ups in the syndicate that he was working in a territory considered to be the private

domain of someone else in the syndicate." ²⁷

*Cuban
exile
leader*

(16) In June of 1962 Roselli reported to Harvey that ~~the three-man team~~ dispatched a three-man team into Cuba with the general assignment of recruiting others to kill Castro, and, if the opportunity arose, to kill him themselves, maybe through the use of pills. ²⁸

In September of 1962 Roselli reported to Harvey in Miami that the "medicine" was reported in place, that the three-man team was safe, and that ~~the three-man team~~ *the Cuban exile leader*

was prepared to dispatch another three-man team ²⁹ to infiltrate Castro's bodyguard. In December, 1962, Roselli and Harvey agreed that not much seemed to be occurring and by February, 1963, Harvey terminated the plots. ³⁰

B. The Las Vegas Wiretap Incident

(17) The ~~(17)~~ IGR also mentioned an event that occurred during Phase I of the CIA-Mafia plots ^{that} which resulted in the first dissemination of the details of the plot to persons other than the ones involved in the operation. On October 31, 1960, Las Vegas police arrested Arthur J. Balletti, an employee of a Florida investigator named Edward DuBois, for placing

31
 an electronic bug in a hotel room in Las Vegas.
 Subsequent investigation determined that Robert A.
 Maheu ~~is the man who~~ authorized the surveillance and possibly the
 wiretap of the subject involved and that Maheu probably
 acted on behalf of Giancana and the CIA. 32

(8) The violation of the wiretap statute placed
 the case under federal jurisdiction and the FBI soon
 began an investigation. In the course of this
 investigation, Maheu informed the FBI that he
 instituted the surveillance on behalf of CIA efforts
 to obtain Cuban intelligence through the hoodlum
 element, including Giancana. 33 In its efforts to
 prevent the prosecution of Balletti, Maheu, and an
 unidentified individual known as J. W. Harrison, the
 CIA eventually told the Justice Department the details
 of Phase I of the CIA-Mafia plots to kill Castro.
 This ~~is~~ most accurately
 can best be related through the following

memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover to Attorney
General Ramsey Clark (quoted in part):³⁴

Blank letterhead memorandum 3-6-67

TO: Attorney General
FROM: Director, FBI

TOP SECRET

/Attorney General Robert Kennedy/ indicated that a few days prior to /5-9-62/ he had been advised by the CIA that Robert A. Maheu had been hired by the CIA to approach Sam Giancana with a proposition of paying \$150,000 to hire gunmen to go into Cuba and kill Castro. He further stated CIA admitted having assisted Maheu in making the "bugging" installation in Las Vegas which uncovered this clandestine operation and for this reason CIA could not afford to have any action taken against Giancana or Maheu. Mr. Kennedy stated that upon learning CIA had not cleared its action in hiring Maheu and Giancana with the Department of Justice, he issued orders that the CIA should never again take such steps without first checking with the Department of Justice.

Mr. Kennedy further advised that because of this matter it would be very difficult to initiate any prosecution against Giancana, as Giancana could immediately bring out the fact the United States Government had approached him to arrange for the assassination of Castro. He stated the same was true concerning any action we might take against Maheu for any violation in which he might become involved.

(19) In summary, the Las Vegas wiretap ^{incident} ~~is~~ forced the CIA to acknowledge the existence of the CIA-Mafia plots to non-CIA government officials

and provided the first occasion for participants to manipulate the operation to prevent prosecution.

C. Robert Maheu and the Long Committee

(20) The next major event related to the CIA-Mafia plots occurred in 1966 when Maheu used his involvement with the CIA to avoid testifying before Senator Edward Long's Committee, which was investigating invasions of privacy. ³⁵ The attorney for Maheu, *Maheu* Edward Pierpont Morgan, informed the ~~House Select Committee on Assassinations (hereinafter the "Committee")~~ that Maheu contacted him during the fall of 1966 and said he was going to be called before the Long Committee in conjunction with the Morgenthau investigation. ^{36 35a} Maheu then informed Morgan of the plots and suggested that any testimony might necessarily reveal his previous covert activities with the CIA. ^{37 95b} Morgan then contacted Senator Long and Lawrence Houston, the General Counsel to the CIA, to reiterate Maheu's concerns in an apparently successful effort to block any testimony. ^{38 35c}

John Roselli

D. Roselli Efforts to Avoid Prosecution

(21) The SSC related that in May, 1966, the FBI threatened to deport Roselli "for living in the United States under an assumed name unless he cooperated in an investigation of the Mafia." ³⁷⁻³⁹

The SSC then states that Roselli contacted Edwards who subsequently spoke to the FBI in regard to Roselli. ³⁸⁻⁴⁰

(22) The SSC reports that Roselli again contacted CIA sources in an effort to thwart prosecution when Roselli was arrested for fraudulent gambling activities at the Friars Club in Beverly Hills in 1967. ⁴¹⁻³⁹ Roselli

contacted Harvey, who was no longer a CIA employee, to represent him. ⁴²⁻⁴⁰ Harvey subsequently attempted ^{unsuccessfully} to influence the CIA into preventing the prosecution. ⁴³⁻⁴¹

The Justice Department, however, subsequently convicted Roselli for a violation of the interstate gambling laws. ⁴²⁻⁴⁴

E. Debut of the Retaliation Theory

(23) The genesis of this theory can be attributed to an interview that Premier Castro held on September 7, 1963, with Associated Press reporter Daniel Harker. In that interview, Castro warned against the United States "aiding terrorist plans to eliminate Cuban leaders." He stated, according to Harker, that United States leaders would be in danger if they promoted any attempt to eliminate the leaders of Cuba. In early January, 1967, Edward Morgan approached columnist Drew Pearson, related the background of the plots, posed the possibility that the plots could have provoked a Castro retaliation and asked Pearson to inform Chief Justice Earl Warren of the operation. Warren subsequently informed Secret Service Director James J. Rowley who in turn notified the FBI. Morgan informed the Committee that Roselli initially approached him complaining of excessive FBI surveillance ever since he had been involved in this patriotic venture. Roselli also informed Morgan that Castro had retaliated for these plots by assassinating President Kennedy.

Rowley

(25) After receiving this information the FBI decided not to further investigate the allegation. ⁴⁷
 Following the publication of the Jack Anderson and Drew Pearson articles of March 3 and 7, 1967, however, where the theory of retaliation first gained public notoriety, President Johnson ordered the FBI to investigate the matter. ⁵²⁻⁴⁸ The FBI consequently interviewed Edward Morgan on March 20, ⁵³⁻⁴⁹ 1967. Morgan informed the FBI that he represented clients that were reasonable individuals who entered into a project that they understood to have high governmental backing and ⁵⁴⁻⁵⁰ which involved the assassination of Fidel Castro. Morgan then stated that his clients had reason to suspect that Castro learned of these plots and killed President Kennedy in ⁵¹⁻⁵⁵ retaliation.

(26) The FBI investigation resulted in President Johnson acquiring a personal interest in the retaliation theory, which prompted CIA Director Richard ⁵²⁻⁵⁶ Helms to prepare a report on the assassination plots.

F. 1967 IGR



Note only

Castro assassi-
nation plots

All activity

identified against
Castro, including

that not assassi-
nation, is well
as other

(27) On March 23, 1967, Director Helms ordered the CIA Inspector General to prepare a report on the CIA assassination plots. ^{57 53} This report detailed the accounts of various CIA ^{plans and} operations against ~~Cuba~~ ^{Castro} including an analysis of the CIA-Organized Crime plots and the AMLASH operation. The IGR also examined the 1960 Las Vegas wiretap incident.

(28) In reference to the AMLASH operation, the IGR related AMLASH's activities in Madrid, Spain in late 1964 and early 1965, where AMLASH was meeting with Manuel Artime. ^{58 54} The IGR further noted that Rafael Garcia-Bongo, a former lawyer ^{in Cuba} for Santo Trafficante, was in Madrid, Spain in March, 1965. ⁵⁹ Bongo claimed to be in contact with dissident Cuban military leaders, including AMLASH. ^{56 60}

G. Anderson Articles

(29) In 1971, Anderson once again published information promoting the retaliation theory in two articles dated January 18 and 19. These articles exhibited more detail, relating that several assassins made it to a rooftop within shooting distance of Castro before being apprehended, that this event

occurred in late February or early March, 1963, that Robert Kennedy at least condoned the CIA-Mafia plots, and that Roselli delivered poison pills to be used in killing Castro to a contact at the Miami Beach Fountainbleu Hotel on March 13, 1961.

H. Roselli deportation

(30) In 1971, the same year that Anderson released additional information on the plots, the CIA contacted the Immigration and Naturalization Service, Department of Justice, in an attempt to prevent information on CIA operations from being disclosed in the event INS brought deportation proceedings against Roselli.

The CIA's concern was the protection of intelligence sources and methods.

The SSC stated in its Interim Report, released in November, 1975, that the deportation order was still in the process of being litigated. In August, 1976, authorities discovered Roselli's butchered body stuffed in an oil drum and floating in Miami's Biscayne Bay. His colleague in the plots to kill Castro, Sam Giancana had been shot to death in his home in June, 1975.

affiliated in any way with the CIA. ^{62 65}

(33) The SSC identified the AMLASH operation, however, as being "clearly different" from the under-world plots. ^{66 68} The SSC stated that AMLASH was in progress at the time of the assassination, that it could clearly be traced to the CIA, and that AMLASH's proposal for a coup had been endorsed by the CIA, ^{67 SA} the initial step being the assassination of Castro. The SSC cautioned, however, that it saw "no evidence that Fidel Castro or others in the Cuban government plotted President Kennedy's assassination in retaliation for U. S. operations against Cuba." ^{65 68}

(34) As related in the Introduction to this material, the SSC did not reach any conclusion because it believed additional investigation needed to occur. ^{69 88}

J. The CIA 1977 ^{TASK FORCE (TFR)} ~~Director General~~ Report ~~1977~~

(35) ^{Concern with} Stung by the senate criticism and the ^{effect} rippling effect that Book V caused in the media, the CIA prepared a comprehensive report in ^{1977 e} ~~1977~~ designed to ^{investigate} ~~investigate~~ at least within the CIA, the critical questions postulated in the SSC Final Report.

(36) The ~~TFR~~ ^{TFR} identifies a principal theme of Book V as the possibility that Castro retaliated against the United States for attempts on his life and that the CIA operations may have specifically caused ~~any~~ such actions by Castro. ^{10 71} In responding to this theory, the CIA decided to perform the following:

- 1) to conduct a full review of information and operations as the Cuban target to identify any activity that might relate to the assassination of President Kennedy, and
- 2) to review the possibility that CIA activities against Cuba did, by their nature, cause Castro to order the assassination of President Kennedy. ~~72~~ ⁷¹

(37) The details of the ~~TFR~~ ^{TFR} are thoroughly related in this material because no source has previously publicly released them.

1. Syndicate Operations

(38) Before analyzing the AMLASH operations, the CIA first related new considerations pertaining to the syndicate operations. The ~~TFR~~ ^{TFR} refers to a series of articles written by Paul Meskill and appearing in the New York Daily News in April, 1975.

(39) In these articles Meskill described how Frank Fiorini, ^{also} ~~was~~ known as Sturgis, allegedly

a former mistress of Castro,⁷²
 recruited Marie Lorenz⁷³ to spy on Castro and
 how Sturgis knew Juan Orta and planned to use him
 in a bombing assassination of Castro. Meskill⁷³
 asserted that Sturgis claimed he had been a hired
~~operative~~^{operative} for the CIA for at least a decade and that
 Sturgis was in touch with all the casino operators
 in Havana during the period of the Castro takeover.⁷⁴
 In another article on June 13, 1976, Meskill related
 the claim of Marie Lorenz that in the fall of 1960
 Frank Sturgis, acting for the CIA, gave her two
 capsules of poison powder which she was to sprinkle
 in some food or drink of Castro.⁷⁵

(40) The writers of the 1977 TOR^{TFR} were quite concerned
 with ~~these~~^{these} assertions because ~~Orta~~^{the name of the Cuban official involved in Phase I of} had ~~the plots~~^{the plots}
 publicly surfaced in connection with a Castro assassina-
 tion plot before the SSC ~~recognition of~~^{revelation of Orta's role in} the CIA-
 organized crime plots, and thus the assignment to
 poison ~~Castro~~^{given} gave to the "official case to Castro
 who may have receive kickbacks from the gambling
 interests." The possibility that ~~Orta~~^{this Cuban official} was involved
 in assassination plots other than the CIA operation
 also attracted the attention of the CIA.⁷⁶

(41) In reference to Sturgis' allegation that he had been a hired ~~operator~~^{operative} for the CIA for a decade the ~~1977 TFR~~^{TFR} asserted that "he was in contact with some of the CIA Cuban employees in the Miami area, ~~1977~~ but had no direct relationships with the Agency." The ~~1977~~^{TFR} recognizes that Sturgis, through his gambling activities and relationships with various casino owners, may quite possibly have known Orta, and also raises the question of whether Sturgis may have been a source of information to Castro regarding Orta's participation in any assassination plot. ~~1978~~

(42) In reference to the Lorenz-Sturgis poison pill plot, the ~~1977 TFR~~^{TFR} noted the similarity of this plot to the details in the 18 October 1960 FBI ~~memo~~^{memorandum describing a plot to kill Castro}. The CIA concluded that this October date is too early for the CIA syndicate operations and that therefore the syndicate may have been acting independently. ~~1979~~⁸⁰

(43) The CIA also concluded that ~~Antonio~~ the Cuban exile leader active in the CIA syndicate operations may have already been active in plots with the Mafia when the CIA approached him. ~~1979~~⁸¹

(44) The CIA cited two FBI memorandums as support.

First, a 21 December 1960 memorandum pertaining to underworld support for some Cubans, and second, a 18 January 1961 memorandum relating an unconfirmed report that ~~V...~~ ^{the Cuban exiles leader} was one of the Cubans receiving support. 82

(45) The CIA further acknowledged that although the operation with the Mafia was suspended after the Bay of Pigs, it appeared to still be in progress when re-activated in April, 1962. 83

(46) The ~~...~~ ^{TFR} summarized its position concerning non-CIA sponsored syndicate operations in the following passage:

It is possible that CIA simply found itself involved in providing additional resources for independent operations that the syndicate already had underway... In a sense CIA may have been piggy-backing on the syndicate and in addition to its material contribution was also supplying an aura of official sanction. 84

2. AMLASH

(47) The ~~...~~ ^{TFR} states the SSC suggests that AMLASH was possibly a Castro agent assigned a provocation

mission ^{had} which would then justify retaliation, or, in the alternative, that AMLASH was a security risk through ^{had} which details of the plotting may have surfaced to Castro thus providing the impetus for provocation. ⁸⁵ Additionally, the ^{TFR} ~~TFR~~ cites the SSC as holding that in either case, AMLASH should ^{87 36} have been reported to the Warren Commission.

(48) ^{TFR} The ~~TFR~~ contends neither theory is correct. ^{87 ea} stating that the relationship between the CIA and AMLASH before the death of President Kennedy was so "unsubstantial and inconclusive that it provided no basis for AMLASH/1 to feel that he had any tangible ⁸⁸ CIA support for plotting against Castro.

(49) In support the ^{TFR} ~~TFR~~ proceeds to narrate the Agency's understanding of the operation. On August 17, 1962, the case officer for AMLASH reported that he "[has] no intention [of giving AMLASH/1] physical elimination mission as requirement but recognize this [as] something he could or might try to carry out on his own initiation." ⁸⁹ Headquarters replied.

the next day, "Strongly concur that no physical elimination mission be given AMLASH/1." ⁹¹⁹⁰ From August 29, 1962 until September, 1963 the CIA states it did not have any contact with AMLASH. ⁹²⁹¹

(50) On September 1, 1963 the CIA received the following cable:

AMLASH still feels there only two ways accomplish change either inside job or invasion he realistic enough to realize latter out of question. According AMWHIP, AMLASH still waiting for U. S. reveal plan of action. ⁹³⁹²

The ~~TSR~~ ^{TSR} notes that the SSC interpreted "inside job" as referring to an operation against Castro; the CIA, however, says it refers to a general commitment concerning how to effect change ⁹³. The ~~TSR~~ ^{TSR} also states that at this point Book V says "characterization of this phase of the AMLASH operation is disputed." ⁹⁴ The CIA contends that any dispute only exists in the eyes of the SSC. ⁹⁵⁻⁹⁵ ND

(51) The ~~TSR~~ ^{TSR} next comments on an interview of Castro by AP reporter Daniel Harker in which Castro said that anti-Castro terrorists had the support of

U. S. leaders. ⁹⁶ The ^{TFR} TGR states that the Book V implies that AMLASH/1 may have reported to Castro ⁹⁷ what the SSC characterized as assassination plots. ⁹⁸ The CIA response is that "Castro's remarks at that time could not have stemmed from anything said to AMLASH/1 by CIA officers as they proposed nothing and undertook nothing." ⁹⁸

(52) On October 11, 1963 the case officer ^{cabled} ~~called~~ headquarters and said that AMLASH/1 claimed to have the necessary people and equipment to overthrow Castro without U. S. assistance. ¹⁰⁰ ⁹⁹ In October, ~~1963~~ 1963, Desmond Fitzgerald ^{outside the United States.} met AMLASH/1 ^{in Paris.} ~~in Paris.~~ ¹⁰⁰

At this meeting the CIA maintains that Fitzgerald rejected AMLASH's request for an assassination weapon, specifically, a high powered rifle with a telescopic lens. ¹⁰² ^{TFR} The ~~CIA~~ contends that at this point it was clear that AMLASH was informed that there would be no U. S. assistance until after the fact, which is contrary to the SSC statement in Book V to the effect that it was uncertain how AMLASH interpreted the put-off by Fitzgerald. ¹⁰³ ¹⁰²

(53) On November 19, 1963, Fitzgerald approved informing AMLASH/1 that he would be given a cache inside Cuba and that a high-powered rifle with a scope would be included upon request. ¹⁰⁴ On November 20, the case officer informed AMLASH that he would be receiving the meeting he requested. ^{104 105} This meeting occurred on November 22. ^{106 105}

(54) The ^{TFR} ~~IGR~~ summarized the significance of these contacts with AMLASH as related to the contentions in Book V in the following passage:

Whatever the relationship with AMLASH/1 following the death of President Kennedy, there is every indication that during President Kennedy's life AMLASH/1 had no basis for believing that he had CIA support for much of anything. Were he a provocateur reporting to Castro, or if he was merely careless and leaked what he knew, he had no factual basis for leaking or reporting any actual CIA plot directed against Castro. ¹⁰⁶

(55) Finally, in reply to the SSC allegation that the CIA inadequately responded to the Warren Commission's request for all possible relevant information, the ^{TFR} ~~IGR~~ observed:

reinforce

While one can understand today why the Warren Commission limited its inquiry to normal avenues of investigation, it would have served to ~~reinforce~~ the credibility of its effort had it taken a broader view of the matter. CIA, too, could have considered in specific terms what most saw in general terms - the possibility of Soviet or Cuban involvement in the assassination (JFK) because of tensions of the time...The Agency should have taken broader initiatives, then, as well."

K. Recent Anderson articles

JACK

(56) In September 1976 and October, 1978, Anderson again published articles ^{that} which propounded the retaliation theory. ¹⁰⁷~~108~~ In addition, for the first time Anderson publicly revealed that John Roselli served as his source for the retaliation theory in all of the articles published through the years.

(57) The September 7, 1976, article appearing in the Washington Post contains all components of the retaliation theory. ^{The article} ~~This~~ states:

Mafia mobster John Roselli may have taken the secret of the John F. Kennedy assassination with him to his death. He was brutally murdered a few weeks ago, his hacked up body stuffed into an oil drum and dumped into Miami's Biscayne Bay.

Before he died, Roselli hinted to associates that he knew who had arranged President Kennedy's murder. It was the same conspirators he suggested, whom he had recruited earlier to kill Cuban Premier Fidel Castro.

By Roselli's cryptic account, Castro learned the identity of the underworld.



contacts in Havana who had been trying to knock him off. He believed, not altogether without basis, that President Kennedy was behind the plot.

The Cuban leader, as the supreme irony, decided to turn the tables and use the same crowd to arrange Kennedy's assassination according to Roselli's scenario. To save their skins, the plotters lined up Lee Harvey Oswald to pull the trigger.

Roselli could never be pinned down on names or details. It was also difficult to assess whether he knew what he was talking about or whether he merely described what he thought might have happened. Certainly there is no real evidence to support Roselli's story. But there are enough curious circumstances to justify telling it. Here are the fascinating highlights.

The ruggedly handsome Roselli, a flamboyant mobster with underworld contacts in Havana, was recruited by the Central Intelligence Agency in 1960 to assassinate Castro. He had no authority, however, over the underworld elements in Havana.

They were under the loose control of Florida's Mafia chieftain, Santos Trafficante. His gambling enterprises in Havana had been closed down by Castro after the 1959 revolution. In fact, Trafficante had been lodged for a period in a Cuban jail, an indignity that didn't endear Castro to him.

After Trafficante made it back to his Florida haunts, he left part of his organization behind in Havana. Some of his henchmen even managed to develop contacts in Castro's inner circle. These were the people Roselli wanted to use to knock off Castro.

But Roselli didn't have the stature inside the Mafia to make the necessary arrangements with Trafficante. So Roselli called in his patron, the Chicago godfather Sam (Lomo) Giancana, to deal with Trafficante.

As Roselli's associates tell it, he persuaded Giancana that it would be to their advantage to win the good will of the CIA. Convinced, Giancana flew down to Florida to make the preliminary arrangements.

Once Giancana and Trafficante set it up, Roselli used the Havana underworld to plot Castro's demise. At first, they tried to plant poison pills, supplied by the CIA, in Castro's food. The pills would have made it appear that he died of natural causes. When this failed, snipers were dispatched to a Havana rooftop. They were caught.

The word reached Roselli that some of the plotters had been tortured and that Castro had learned about the whole operation.

The CIA called off the Roselli operation in March, 1963, but recruited a Castro associate, Rolando Cubela, to murder Castro.

In an impromptu, three-hour interview with Associated Press reporter Daniel Harker, Castro indicated that he knew about the attempts on his life and warned that U. S. leaders also

might not be safe. That was Sept. 7, 1963.

According to Roselli, Castro enlisted the same underworld elements whom he had caught plotting against him. They supposedly were Cubans from the old Trafficante organization. Working with Cuban intelligence, they allegedly lined up an ex-Marine sharpshooter, Lee Harvey Oswald, who had been active in the pro-Castro movement.

According to Roselli's version, Oswald may have shot Kennedy or may have acted as a decoy while others ambushed him from closer range. When Oswald was picked up, Roselli suggested, the underworld conspirators feared he would crack and disclose information that might lead to them. This almost certainly would have brought a massive U. S. crackdown on the Mafia.

So Jack Ruby was ordered to eliminate Oswald, making it appear as an act of reprisal against the President's killer. At least this is how Roselli explained the tragedy in Dallas.

Several key CIA officials believed that Castro was behind the Kennedy assassination.

It has also been established that Jack Ruby, indeed, had been in Cuba and had connections in the Havana underworld. One CIA cable, dated Nov. 28, 1963, reported that "an American gangster type named Ruby" had visited Trafficante in his Cuban prison.

III. ISSUE ANALYSIS

A. Preface

(58) ^{Committee} The ~~HSCA~~ investigated this material to determine what conclusions ^{if any, could} ~~can~~ be ascertained ^{drawn} concerning the nature, scope, and ~~implications~~ ^{implications} ramifications of these operations. In this regard, various issues are presented in the following sections, subjected to analysis, and ~~then resolved according to available evidence, probable motivations and the most logical inferences.~~

(59) ^{Committee} To fulfill this process, the ~~HSCA~~ reviewed material from numerous governmental sources that pertained to the persons and operations relevant to the investigation. These persons included:

- 1. John Roselli - principal in CIA-O.C. operation
- 2. Santo Trafficant - principal in CIA-O.C. operation
- 3. ^{Cuban exile leader} ~~Antonio de Leon~~ - principal in CIA-O.C. operation
- 4. Sam Giancana - principal in CIA-O.C. operation
- 5. Robert Maheu - principal in CIA-O.C. operation

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- 6. Michael McLaney - Involved in Havana Casino business
- 7. Samuel Benton - Involved in Havana Casino business
- 8. Norman Rothman - Havana Casino operator
- 9. John Martino - Anti-Castro Activist
- 10. Edward P. Morgan - Washington, D.C. attorney
- 11. Edward K. Moss - International Public Relations Representative
- 12. Dino Cellini - Havana Casino operator
- 13. Richard Cain - Associate of Sam Giancana
- 14. Charles Tourine - Involved in Havana Casino business
- 15. Rafael "Macho" Goner - Associate of Santo Trafficante
- 16. ~~Identity protected~~ - Anti-Castro Cuban
- 17. ~~Identity protected~~ - Anti-Castro Cuban
- 18. Joseph Shimon ← Former Inspector on the Washington D.C. Police Department
Associate of Sam Giancana
- 19. Angelo Bruno - Reputed organized crime leader of Philadelphia
- 20. Sam Mannarino - Havana Casino operator

- 21. Kelly Mannarino - Havana Casino operator
- 22. Edward Browder - pilot active in Anti-Castro Activities
- 23. Joseph Merola - pilot active in Anti-Castro activities
- 24. Arthur Balletti - former private detective for Emma O'Brien
- 25. Dominick Barton - reputed organized crime figure from Cleveland, Ohio
- 26. Richard Helms - former Director of CIA
- Chief, Office of Security Operations Support
27. ~~James O'Connell~~ Branch - former employee of CIA
- 28. Luis Balbuena Cilizadilla - Associate of Evelio Duque Miyar
- 29. AMEASH - Cuban official in the Castro government
- 30. William Alexander Morgan - figure active in Anti-Castro activities
- 31. ~~Juan Ochoa~~ - former secretary to Fidel Castro
- 32. Jack Anderson - columnist
- 33. Frank Sturgis - soldier of fortune active in Anti-Castro activities
- 34. Fidel Castro Ruz - Premier of Cuba
- 35. Victor Espinosa Fernandez - anti-Castro Cuban
- ~~George Jackson~~
- 36. Meyer Lansky - organized crime figure

(60) ^{possible} ~~9~~ Wherever applicable and desirable, the ~~HSCA~~ ^{HSCA} Committee either interviewed or deposed these persons or subpoenaed them to give testimony before Committee members.

(61) The government sources where the HSCA ^{Committee} requested and reviewed material were:

1. Central Intelligence Agency
2. Federal Bureau of Investigation
3. Drug Enforcement Agency
4. Department of Defense
5. Department of State
6. Department of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms
7. United States Customs Service
8. Immigration and Naturalization Service
9. United States Senate Committee on Intelligence
10. United States Secret Service
11. Chicago Crime Commission
12. Chicago Police Department
13. New York Police Department
14. Public Safety Department, Organized Crime Bureau, Dade County, Florida
15. Cuban Government

(62) In the majority of instances, review of ~~any~~ ^{the} material at these sources and ~~any~~ ^{the} statements from individuals were not pertinent to any assassination plots against Castro, particularly the CIA-Organized Crime ~~or~~ ^{and} the AMLASH operations. Further, ~~most~~ ~~of~~ ^{the} relevant information acquired was already known through the SSC investigation and the CIA ~~Inspects~~ ^{IGR and TFR.} ~~General Reports~~. For this reason, the following analysis represents ^{evidence} ~~conclusions~~ principally derived from information substantively the same as that which the SSC and CIA previously considered. Consequently, the ~~HSCA~~ ^{Committee} investigation resulted in additional ^{FACTUAL} corroboration of this information from a diversity of sources. ~~109~~ ¹⁰⁹ ~~What remained~~ ^{to be drawn} ~~are~~ ^{were} ~~the~~ ~~conclusions.~~

B. ~~Issues Pertaining to~~ The AMLASH Operation

1. ~~Analysis~~
 - ⓐ Characterization of the AMLASH operations

35-

~~SECRET~~

(63) Richard Helms, the former Director of the CIA, (in his testimony before this Committee) stated that the AMLASH operation was not designed to be an assassination plot. ¹¹⁰ As already indicated, the ~~1977 IGR~~ ^{TFR} concluded that AMLASH had "no factual basis for leaking or reporting any actual CIA plot directed against Castro" during President Kennedy's life. ¹¹¹

(64) Joseph Longosch, the Chief of Counterintelligence for the CIA's Special Affairs Staff in 1963, the component responsible for CIA operations directed against the Government of Cuba and the Cuban Intelligence Services, offered a contrasting view to the testimony of Mr. Helms and the assertions of the ~~1977 IGR~~ ^{TFR 112 1086}.

Desmond Fitzgerald headed the Special Affairs Staff ¹¹³ ~~1080~~ which was responsible for the AMLASH operation.

In an affidavit to the Committee, Longosch recalled:

~~SECRET~~

The AMLASH operation prior to the assassination of President Kennedy was characterized by the Special Affairs staff, Desmond Fitzgerald (sic) and other senior CIA officers as an assassination operation initiated and sponsored by the CIA-108e-
115

(b5) ¶ Langosch further recollected that as of 1962 it was highly possible that the Cuban Intelligence Services were aware of AMLASH and his association with the CIA and that the information upon which he based his conclusion that the AMLASH operation was insecure was available to senior level CIA officials, including Desmond FitzGerald. 108-116

(b6) In response to Langosch's sworn statements, this Committee received the affidavit of Kent (CIA A former CIA employee. pseudonym) L. Pollock, ~~from the CIA~~. Pollock "served as Executive Officer for Desmond FitzGerald during the entire period in which he was Chief of the Special Affairs Staff... and discussed with him the AMLASH operation as it progressed. 117 800 Pollock specifically contested the assertions of Langosch stating:

To the best of my knowledge, Mr. FitzGerald considered the AMLASH operation to be a political action

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activity with the objection of organizing a group under ~~the~~ AMLASH/1 to overthrow Castro and the Castro regime by means of a coup d'etat. I heard Mr. FitzGerald discuss the AMLASH operation frequently, and never heard him characterize it as an assassination operation. Mr. FitzGerald stated within my hearing on several occasions his awareness that coup d'etat often involves loss of life. ~~1988~~ 118

(67) & He also stated:

Desmond FitzGerald did not characterize the AMLASH operation as an 'assassination operation'; the case officer did not; I, as Executive Officer did not, never discussed any aspect of the AMLASH operation with Joseph H. Longosch; the Deputy Chief, the other branch chiefs and the special assistants could not have so characterized it since they did not know about the pen (the pen was specially filled with a hypodermic syringe in response to urgings by AMLASH for a means to start the coup by killing Castro.) The case officer offered the pen to AMLASH on the day of President Kennedy's death. AMLASH rejected the pen with disdain. ~~1988~~

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(68) The Committee also received numerous files in an effort to determine the true character of the AMLASH operation. Since the Committee received equally persuasive evidence, however, it cannot determine whether the AMLASH operation can be described as an assassination plot prior to the death of President Kennedy. Further, in the course of its investigations, the Committee found no evidence that the AMLASH operation provoked Premier Castro into assassinating President Kennedy.

cop-out

Q² The probability that Castro would
have ~~not~~ assassinated
the President of the United States

Skipped

(69) In his interview with the Committee, Premier
Castro set forth some reasons supporting ~~his~~ ~~position~~.
~~The Committee agrees with~~ the reasoning in his
is persuasive.
statements. Castro said in part:

That was insane. From the ideological
point of view it was insane. And from
the political point of view, it was a
tremendous insanity. I am going to tell
you here that nobody, nobody ever had the
idea of such things. What would it do?
We just tried to defend our folks here,
within our territory. Anyone who subscribed
to that idea would have been judged insane...
absolutely sick. Never, in twenty years of
revolution, I never heard anyone suggest nor
even speculate about a measure of that sort,
because who could think of the idea of

Why he would ~~not~~ not
have assassinated President Kennedy.

organizing the death of the President of the United States. That would have been the most perfect pretext for the United States to invade our country which is what I have tried to prevent for all these years, in every possible sense. Since the United States is much more powerful than we are, what could we gain from a war with the United States? The United States would lose nothing. The destruction would have been here. 120

(70) Castro also added:

I want to tell you that the death of the leader does not change the system. It has never done that. 121

(71) In this interview Castro also commented on the speech of September 7, 1963, ^{that} which has been cited throughout the years as an indication that Castro may have assassinated President Kennedy in retaliation.

Premier Castro asserted:

So, I said something like those plots start to set a very bad precedent. A very serious one - that that could become a boomerang against the authors of those actions...but I did not mean to threaten by that. I did not mean even that...not in the least...but rather, like a warning that we knew; that we had news about it; and that to set those precedents of plotting of other countries would be a very bad precedent...something very negative. And, if at present, the same would happen under

the ASSASSINATION of leaders

the same circumstances, I would have no doubt in saying the same as I said (then) because I didn't mean a threat by that. I didn't say it as a threat. I did not mean by that that we were going to take measures - similar measures - like a retaliation for that. We never meant that because we knew that there were plots. For three years we had known there were plots against us. So, the conversation came about very casually, you know; but I would say that all these plots or attempts were part of the everyday life. 122

(72) ^{general analysis} Some reasoning, ~~which~~ ^{is} ~~Committee cautions is~~ speculative, may be of some assistance. ~~have~~. It does not seem likely that Castro would make a veiled reference to assassinating ^{any} American leaders in retaliation for plots on his life if he was actually planning ^{or} ~~or~~ contemplating such acts. He would want to call as little attention as possible to himself. Rather, it seems Castro was attempting to display his public dismay and knowledge of such attempts in an effort to prevent their continuance. ⁽⁷³⁾ Consequently, together with an absence of any evidence implicating Castro in the assassination, ^{it seems probable} ~~the Committee believes~~

*This ~~conclusion~~ ^{argument} is not based on Castro's
A. Daniel that he made a threat;
Castro would naturally deny such a charge.*

that this incident, while displaying Castro's displeasure at American activities, does not implicate Castro in the assassination.

(74) ~~The Committee believes~~ There are additional reasons to discount any involvement of Castro in the assassination which are also compelling. ~~The~~ ~~Committee cautions that~~ These reasons, while persuasive, are ~~not~~ ^{also} necessarily ^{general in character} speculative.

(75) First, William Atwood, Special Advisor to the United States Delegation to the United Nations, was involved in diplomatic efforts to establish a framework for detente during the fall of 1963. ¹²³ Atwood told the SCC that McGeorge Berndy, an advisor to President Kennedy, told him that President Kennedy was in favor of "pushing towards an opening toward Cuba" to take Castro "out of the Soviet fold and perhaps wiping out the Bay of Pigs and maybe getting back to normal." ¹²⁴ Atwood also arranged for a French journalist, Jean Daniel to meet with Kennedy prior to a scheduled trip by Daniel to see Castro. ¹²⁵ Daniel and Kennedy

- 2 -

discussed the prospects for reestablishing United States-Cuba relations and Kennedy asked Daniel to see him after visiting Castro. ¹²⁶

(76) ^{It seems likely} ~~The Committee believes~~ that such efforts to establish a peaceful coexistence between the United States and Cuba would have hampered any desire by Castro to assassinate Kennedy.

(77) ^{in comparing the attitudes of the} ~~the Committee also believes that~~ ^{it can be argued that} ~~among the~~ leaders of the United States, President Kennedy supported a less hostile attitude and position toward Cuba. Even if Castro felt the relations between Cuba and the United States were bad under the Kennedy Presidency, there were legitimate reasons to suspect they would have been worse under any other administration.

(78) ^{Consequently,}

^{if} Assuming that AMLASH was not an assassination plot during the life of President Kennedy and that Castro uncovered its existence and scope, ~~the Committee~~ ^{it is highly unlikely} ~~believes~~ that Castro would ~~not~~ have been provoked in a manner sufficient to induce assassinating President Kennedy in retaliation.

(79) ^{Further} Assuming that AMLASH was an assassination plot during the life of President Kennedy and that Castro uncovered its existence and scope, ~~the Committee~~ ^{it is still unlikely} ~~believes~~ that Castro would ~~not~~ have resorted to assassinating the President of the United States in retaliation.

3. ^{Summary} ~~Conclusions~~ Summary

Thus, with the prospects of renewed diplomatic relations in the air and the knowledge that Kennedy possessed a more favorable attitude toward Cuba than other military or political leaders, Castro would have

had every reason to hope that Kennedy maintained the Presidency. Further, ~~the Committee does not believe that~~ eliminating Kennedy would ^{not} necessarily have favorably altered the United States' operations and ties toward Cuba. In addition, ^{it does not seem probable that} ~~the Committee does not believe~~ Castro would have assassinated President Kennedy because such an act, if discovered, would have afforded the United States the excuse to destroy Cuba. The risk would not have been worth it.

C. ~~Is Relevant to~~ The CIA-Organized Crime Plots

1. Scope and Nature of Plots ~~(The SSC)~~

a) Roselli Knowledge of CIA Sponsorship

(80) ^{The Support Chief} James O'Connell informed the Committee

that Maheu told Roselli he represented an international group of clients who had vested interest in Cuba. ¹²⁶

Roselli, however, testified to the SSC that Maheu told him from the beginning that ^{the Support Chief} ~~O'Connell~~ was with the CIA. ¹²⁷ Maheu confirmed this account to the SSC. ¹²⁸

Maheu also stated in a deposition to the Committee that Giancana knew at the time that ^{the Support Chief} ~~O'Connell~~ was with the CIA. ¹²⁹ Further, Trafficante testified to the

fn. 127
 Testimony of Robert Maheu, Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations, 7/27/75, p. 11

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Committee that Roselli informed him that he, ¹³⁰
~~133~~
Roselli, was operating as an agent of the CIA.

(81) The weight of the evidence indicates that Roselli, and thus Giancana and Trafficante, knew the CIA was behind the assassination plots at an early stage. This recognition of CIA initiation is important, ~~however~~ it shows that Giancana and Trafficante and thus organized crime knowingly became involved with the CIA.

b) Discovery of True Identities

(82) Roselli arranged for the entrance of Giancana and Trafficante into the plots and introduced them to ~~O'Connell~~ ^{the Support Chief} as "Sam Gold" and "Joe." ~~O'Connell~~ ^{The Support Chief} contends he learned the true identities of these persons a few months after the operation was in progress when he and Maheu saw an article in one of the Sunday sections of the Miami newspaper. ~~132~~ This article supposedly pertained to organized crime in the United States and contained pictures of top hoodlums, including Same Giancana and Santo Trafficante. ~~132~~ In the

^{the Support Chief}
~~134~~ IGR ~~O'Connell~~ stated that the article
 came from the Parade magazine ¹³⁴ in the Miami Times.
 Maheu also contends that he did not know the true
 identities of Sam Gold and Joe until this article
 appeared. ^{the Support Chief} ~~135~~ O'Connell also stated that this incident
 occurred after the "we were up to our ears" in the
 operations and consequently the CIA decided to
 progress forward. ~~136~~

(83) The SSC conducted a search of supplements
 to all Miami newspapers for the requisite time
 period and could not locate any such article. ¹³⁷
 The Committee consequently searched Parade magazine
 for the fall of 1960 all of 1961, and all of 1962,
 the years which spanned the entire operation. The
 Committee learned that on January 21, 1962, Parade
 published an article entitled, ^{"THE INTOLD STORY: Our} ~~Our~~ government's
 crackdown on organized crime," written by Jack
 Anderson, which contained a listing of the top ten
 hoodlums in the country as well as several photographs
 of mobsters, including Santo Trafficante. ¹³⁸ The
 article focused on the efforts of Attorney General

Robert Kennedy's campaign against organized crime and mention^{ed} both Giancana and Trafficante.

(84) Although this Parade article appears to correspond with ~~the Support Chief's~~ ^{the Support Chief's} ~~Maheu's~~ and Maheu's description, it is over one year past the beginning months of the operation. Indeed, it occurs nine months after the completion of Phase I of the plots. Additionally, neither the SSC nor the Committee has discovered any other article pertaining to organized crime in Parade magazine or the supplements of any Miami newspaper for the alleged time period.

(85) It appears ~~the Support Chief~~ ^{the Support Chief} and Maheu are ~~lying~~ ^{not telling the truth} in an attempt to look for an ex post facto reason for continuing the operation after the introduction of two of the top organized crime figures in the United States. Implicit in their contention is that while the CIA wished to solicit criminal sources to assassinate Castro, it would not knowingly have recruited any figures from the top-echelon of organized crime. ~~139~~ Additionally, ~~the Support Chief's~~ ^{the Support Chief's} ~~of Connell's~~ ^{of Connell's} *crime*

statement that "we were up to our ears in it" is even more difficult to fathom since according to the ~~1957~~ IGR the operation was in its embryonic stage in the fall of 1960 and no pills were even delivered until approximately February or March of 1961.

Without additional support, the ~~Committee~~ ~~does not believe the~~ contentions of Maheu and ~~the Support Chief~~ ~~of committee~~ are not believable.

(86) ^{Further,} ~~this~~ CIA plot to assassinate Castro was necessarily a highly volatile and secret operation.

Once Roselli introduced additional contacts into the scene it is not logical that the CIA would have neglected to verify the identities of such principals.

On the contrary, it is more believable and more probable that the CIA ascertained the true identities of "Sam Gold" and "Joe" at an early stage and consciously progressed forward in the operation, confident that these two persons, in the words attributed to Colonel Sheffield Edwards, were individuals "tough enough" to handle the job. 140

c) Roles of principals

1) Phase One

(87) Colonel Sheffield Edwards assigned the Support Chief ~~O'Connell~~ the task of finding someone to assassinate Castro. ~~141~~ ^{They} Edwards and ~~O'Connell~~ both decided to utilize Maheu as someone to recruit persons to effectuate the operation. ~~142~~ ^{The Support Chief} ~~O'Connell~~ also described his role as the liaison to the CIA and confirmed that all reports or information would proceed through him to the Agency. ~~143~~ In addition, ~~O'Connell~~ ^{the Support Chief} said he acted as a "babysitter" to Roselli ~~8~~ ^{he} ~~remained~~ ^{ed} with him to occupy his time to insure that Roselli was fulfilling his role. ~~144~~

(88) There is a discrepancy over who suggested Roselli for the operation, ~~145~~ but in any event, he was recruited because he had connections with persons who could handle the assignment. ~~146~~

(89) Conflict arises over the role of Giancana. Roselli informed the SSC that Giancana was only a "back-up" man. ~~147~~ ~~It should be noted that~~ Giancana was murdered four days before Roselli made this statement. Mahue, however, described Giancana

In 147- Testimony of John Roselli, Senate Select Committee To Study Governmental Operations, 6/24/75, p. 50.

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as having a key role and characterized his job as "to locate someone in Castro's entourage who could accomplish the assassination." ¹⁴⁸ Joseph Shimon, a close friend of Roselli who had knowledge of the plots at the time, stated that Roselli contacted Giancana to provide Cuban contacts. ¹⁴⁹ Shimon further characterized Giancana as only providing contacts, specifically Santo Trafficante, and not as an active participant. ~~150~~ 150

(90) The most sound analysis is that Giancana solely served as a person Roselli could approach who could then make the necessary contact into the Cuban domain, specifically Santo Trafficante. Roselli, who FBI files indicate represented Giancana's interest in Las Vegas and was subordinate to him, would ^{probably} not directly contact the organized crime boss of the Cuban and Southern Florida area without first contacting his superior, Giancana, who would then make any necessary arrangements. Both Giancana and Trafficante, being bosses of two organized crime domains, would have the means, power, and stature to arrange for the assassination. ⁽⁹¹⁾ After contacting Trafficante,

who ^{had} have the influence to recruit the necessary personnel to ~~assassinate~~ perform the assassination. Giancana probably was not an active participant in the process of poisoning pills or actually in the assassination. ¹⁵¹

(92) The role of Trafficante, the only living major organized crime figure involved in the case is a major source of conflict. The ~~1967~~ IGR contains several references to Trafficante which characterize his function. In discussing how poison pills were given to Castro, it states that "Trafficante (the courier) was in touch with a disaffected Cuban official with access to Castro and presumably a source of information that would enable him to surreptitiously deliver the pills to Castro." ¹⁵² Later the report states that "Roselli passed the pills to Trafficante" and that "Roselli reported to ^[the Support Chief] ~~the Support Chief~~ that the pills had been delivered to ^[the Cuban official] ~~the Cuban official~~ in Cuba." ¹⁵³ After ~~the Cuban official~~ lost his position in the Cuban government and could no longer deliver pills, the ^{I.G.R.} ~~report~~ says "Roselli told ^[the Support Chief] ~~the Support Chief~~ that Trafficante knew of a man high up in the Cuban government movement who might do the job." ¹⁵⁴ Roselli

[Handwritten notes and scribbles on the right margin]

a leading figure in the Cuban exile movement.

him as ¹⁵⁵ ~~Antonio de Verona~~ ^[this Cuban] The following passage further confirms Trafficante's role:

Trafficante approached ~~Verona~~ ^[this Cuban] and told him that he had clients who wanted to do away with Castro and that they would pay big money for the job. ~~Verona~~ ^[this Cuban] is reported to have been very receptive, since it would mean that he would be able to buy his own ships, arms and communications equipment. ¹⁵⁶

(93) Trafficante testified in public to the Committee that Roselli asked him to solely act as an interpreter ¹⁵⁷ between the American operations and the Cuban contacts.

Trafficante denied handling or carrying any poison pills used in the operation, ¹⁵⁸ ~~the Cuban exile leader~~ ¹⁵⁹ denied recruiting ~~Verona~~ ^{the Cuban official}, and denied recruiting ~~Verona~~. In his Senate testimony, Roselli confirmed Trafficante's role as that of a translator. ¹⁶¹

(94) ^{The Support Chief} ~~O'Connell~~, however, informed the Committee that Trafficante was the person in contact with Cubans in Havana. ¹⁶² Giancana partially confirmed this in the ~~1967~~ IGR by identifying Joe as a man "who would serve as a courier to Cuba and make arrangements there." ¹⁶³

^{The Support Chief} ~~O'Connell~~ also confirmed that he was the only CIA conduit and that if the ~~1967~~ IGR states Trafficante

fn. 161 - Testimony of John Roselli, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Governmental Operations, 6/24/75, p. 20

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contacted or procured the assassin then it accurately reflects the information the CIA received.

(95) It is interesting that the 1975 and 1978 Congressional testimony of Roselli and Trafficante corroborate each other, but remain contrary to how the principals reported the facts in 1967. The evidence strongly indicates that Trafficante was not merely an interpreter but an active participant in passing the poison pills and in recruiting the potential assassins. This is important in dramatizing the deep involvement of organized crime with the CIA in these plots. One can understand why Trafficante today wishes to downplay his role; the facts, however, simply do not support his assertions. The ^{evidence} ~~Committee~~ ^{supports the} ~~belief~~ ^{of the} CIA, ICR.

(96) The Committee also heard testimony from ^{the Cuban} ~~Antonio~~ ^{Verona} ~~Verona~~. ^{He} ~~Verona~~ stated that he is not aware of any CIA assassination plots to kill Castro and denied involvement in their operations. ^{165 He} ~~Verona~~ is obviously ^{not telling the truth} lying.

Further ~~The Committee does not feel, however, that a~~ ^{prosecution for perjury, if possible, would ~~not~~ probably not} ~~any~~ ^{investigation} ~~any~~ ^{ive} ~~goals.~~ ^{goals.}

2) Phase Two

Support Chief (97) In Phase Two William Harvey assumed *the* ~~the~~ ~~role~~ of ~~Connell's~~ role. ¹⁶⁶ Giancana and Trafficante were

no longer involved in the operation. ¹⁶⁷ The

IGR states that Roselli remained as a prominent

figure and worked "directly with the Cuban exile community and directly on behalf of the CIA." ¹⁶⁸

(98) Although the IGR does ^{reflect} ~~request~~ that Trafficante was not involved in Phase II, ¹⁶⁹ it contains this

caution:

Trafficante was one of the principals in Shef Edwards Phase One of the operation. He presumably was not involved in Phase Two under Harvey, but we cannot be sure of that. After all, Trafficante was the man who brought ~~Verona~~ ^{Verona} into the operation late in Phase One, and Verona was one of the main players during Phase Two. ¹⁷⁰

[the Cuban exile leader]

(99) *OK* It is reasonable to assume that Roselli at least kept both Giancana and Trafficante informed of the operation's progress.

d) Delivery of the Pills

(100) Neither the ~~IGR~~ IGR or the SSC pinpoints the date on which ^{the Support Chief} ~~Connell~~ delivered the pills to Roselli during Phase One of the plots. The chain of custody, as already mentioned, was for Roselli to deliver the pills to Trafficante. The subsequent

steps remain a mystery but Roselli reported to ~~the~~
Support Chief ~~of Connell~~ that the pills had been delivered to ¹⁷¹
the Cuban official ~~of~~ in Cuba in late February or early March, 1961.

(101) Joseph Shimon informed the Committee that he and Maheu travelled together to Miami to the Fontainbleu in March, 1961, to witness the Patterson-Johansson fight. ¹⁷² Once there Maheu informed him of the plot to assassinate Castro. ¹⁷³ Shimon also says that during this trip he attended a meeting where a poisonous liquid to be used in the assassination was passed. ^{151 174}

(102) Shimon is probably the source for Jack Anderson's column of January 19, 1971, which fixes the date of the passage of the poison at the Fontainbleu as March 13, 1961.

(103) In any event, it appears certain that the CIA did not pass any pills, poison, or assassination weapons before February of 1961. The fall segment of the plots only constituted a planning stage; no one undertook any operational activities.

underline or underline

(104) ~~It is interesting to note that~~ Richard Helms stated in his testimony to the committee that he doubted if the pills ever left the United States ~~or~~ ever if this project ~~was~~ was AN ASSASSINATION plot. He said.

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I also understand that there was a question of poison pills which were supposed to be transported to Havana. There was never any evidence they were transported there or ever left the United States. There was never any evidence that this plot ever left the Florida mainland, and if it was indeed an assassination plot, it was misadvertised to me because I had understood it was an effort to see if a connection could be made between the Mafia in Florida and the Mafia in Havana. As to the best of my knowledge, the connection ^(sic) ¹⁷⁵ never was made.

(107) If Trafficante was actually travelling between Miami and Havana, the implications are interesting. He was either willing to risk being detained again or had acquired assurances from the Cuban government regarding his safety. In any event, the presence of Trafficante during the fall of 1960 in Cuba raises the possibility of a ^{more} ~~Cooperative~~ ^{Cooperative} relationship between himself and the Cuban government than previously believed. Such a relationship during the period when Trafficante was scheming to assassinate Castro invites the theory that Trafficante was possibly informing the Cuban government of activities in the Miami area in general and of the plots in particular. In return for such information, Trafficante could have ^{been promised} ~~acquired~~ lost gambling operations as well as support and a Cuban sanctuary for the smuggling of contraband into the United States.

(108) ^{There are} ~~The Committee realizes the~~ enormous ramifications ^{to} ~~the Committee~~ such a theory and cautions that it has not received

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any information or evidence in this regard. In addition, the available evidence indicates Trafficante was not travelling between Miami and Havana although ^{it is recognized} ~~the committee recognizes~~ that Trafficante could make such trips and not disrupt his normal routine in Miami and Tampa, thus possibly undermining the effect of any surveillance.

f) Verona's Other Contacts

(109) As previously related, the FBI forwarded to the CIA a memorandum ^{dated} ~~on~~ 21 December 1960 revealing that U. S. racketeers were making efforts to finance anti-Castro activities and subsequently forwarded another memorandum ^{dated} ~~on~~ 18 January 1961 ^{that} ~~which~~ associated ^{the Cuban exile leader} ~~Verona~~ with those schemes. ~~179~~

(110) Other sources were also providing assistance to Verona to conduct anti-Castro operations. At the time of his introduction into the CIA-Organized crime plots, the ^{Cuban exile leader was active in} ~~CIA was funding Verona through the~~ Revolutionary Democratic Front and the Cuban Revolutionary Council. ⁵⁶ ~~56~~ ^{The exile leader} ~~Verona~~ informed the Committee that the purpose of the council stemmed from an agreement with

the American government to invade Cuba and ¹⁸¹~~157~~ establish democratic control of the island.

(11) Adding to the support for ~~Vasquez~~ ^{the Cuban exile leader} were the promotional efforts of Dino and Eddie Cellini who reportedly were working through a Washington, D.C. public relations firm, Edward K. Moss and Associates. Moss had previous C A associations. ^{He also} ~~and~~ was supposedly acting as a conduit for funds supplied by the Cellini brothers with the understanding that this group would receive privileged treatment in the Cuba of the future. ~~182~~

(112) In his testimony before the Committee, ^{the Cuban exile leader} ~~Vasquez~~ also described a meeting with ^{an anti-Castro Cuban} ~~George Blonco Pijet~~ and Meyer Lansky in Lansky's home in Miami in the summer of 1960. ¹⁵⁹~~163~~ Lansky said he had business interests in Cuba and wanted to help the Cubans fight Castro, destroy Castro, and try and establish a democratic government. ~~165~~ ¹⁸⁴

(113) The logical inference to be drawn from this is that the CIA, ~~organized crime~~, and other persons interested in removing the Castro regime all settled

the Cuban exile leader
 upon ~~Varela~~^{Varela}, probably independently, as a person
 who had the potential of uniting the multitude of
 exile groups to overthrow Castro. Additionally, the
 exile leader's
~~Varela~~ reported contacts with Organized crime
 raises the possibility that he was involved with
 them in a plot to kill Castro before the evolution
 of the CIA-organized crime plots. If this was the
 case, then Trafficante's recruitment of ~~Varela~~^{the exile leader} into the
 CIA operation would result in providing official U.S.
 sanction to an already existing independent operation.
 The CIA recognized this in stating, "It is possible
 that ~~Varela~~^{the exile leader} already was involved in independent
 operations with the criminal syndicate when first
 approached prior to the Bay of Pigs in March 1961
 to carry out the Castro Assassination." ¹⁸⁵ (see yellow page
 186)

g) Introduction of "Joe" and "Gold" and Related Events

(114) The timing of the introduction of Giancana ("Gold") and Trafficante ("Joe") is important to the analysis of the true role of organized crime in the Castro assassination plots. This introduction,

together with other related events, further suggests the thesis that the CIA found itself involved in providing additional resources for independent operation that the syndicate already had commenced.

(115) According to the ~~1967~~ IGR, the entrance of Giancana and Rosell occurred during the week of September 25, 1960. In contrast, the SSC did not assign a precise date for their entrance because of conflicting evidence between the ~~1967~~ IGR and Maheu's Senate testimony which set the date after November, 1960. The SSC did conclude, however, that Giancana was involved in the operation during October because of the Las Vegas wiretap incident which occurred on October 30, and because of the October 18, 1960 FBI memorandum ^{that} which revealed Giancana had told several people of his involvement in a plot to assassinate Castro. ¹⁸⁷ ¹⁸³ ¹⁸⁸

(116) Although these two events ^{that} which the SCC cites may support the involvement of Giancana during October, they also invite speculation of independent organized crime operations. The October 18, 1960, FBI memorandum is particularly applicable. This states:

During a recent conversation with several friends, Giancana stated that Fidel Castro

was to be done away with shortly, said it would occur in November. Moreover, Giancana said he had already met with the would-be assassin on three occasions, the last meeting taking place on a boat docked at the Fontainebleu Hotel, Miami Beach. Giancana stated everything had been perfected for killing Castro and that the assassin had arranged with a girl, not further described, to drop a 'pill' in some drink or food of Castro. ¹⁶⁵ 189

(117)

Since, ~~according to the 1967 FOR~~ the poison pills, which the CIA prepared at Giancana's request, were not ready for delivery until late February or early March, 1961, it is ~~seemingly~~ doubtful that Giancana's November, 1960, assassination plot was part of the CIA operation. Rather, it appears that organized crime already had its poison plan in progress, using a mistress of Castro to accomplish the deed, when the CIA fortuitously entered the scene. Organized crime then occupied a perfect position. If their private plot succeeded, they then would possess far-reaching blackmail potential against the CIA ^{that} which they could exercise at an opportune moment; If their intrigue failed, however, they could then assume the position that they were only executing the directives of the government ^{and could possibly} still use their involvement as blackmail potential.

h) ~~Government~~
Richard Cain

(118) The "~~assassination~~^{assassination attempt}" that Giancana refers to in the October 18 memo may have ~~been~~^{involved} Richard Scallzetti Cain. Cain, in connection with the top Echelon Criminal Enforcement Program, informed the FBI of his criminal activities and close association with Giancana. ¹⁶⁶ Cain admitted that he had covertly worked for Giancana and been on his payroll while he was a member of the Chicago Police Department from 1956-1960, director of a private detective agency from 1960-62, and Chief Investigator ¹⁹¹ ~~(see yellow page 102)~~ for the Cook County Sheriff's Office from 1962-1964.

(119) Several of Cain's activities during the fall of 1960, together with his past experience, support the proposition that if Giancana was involved in any Cuban affairs, specifically an assassination of Castro independent of the CIA plot, he would have recruited Cain to assist him.

(120) First, Cain maintained a record of voluntarily providing information to the CIA concerning his foreign ventures, a practice Giancana may have promoted in an effort to gain possible leverage with the CIA. In a CIA memorandum to the FBI dated 4 November 1960 Cain supplied the following information in his first contact with the CIA:

(See yellow 104)

- 1) that in 1950-52 while in Miami, Florida, he initiated several telephone taps on various Cuban revolutionary figures under the supervision of William Buenz, a private detective who had contact with the Batista government.
- 2) that on October 2, 1960, William Buenz, then operating out of New York City, met with Cain at O'Hare Airport and offered him \$25,000 to travel to Cuba at the request of former President Piro to install telephone taps on various Cubans, and
- 3) that in 1959, Constantine Kangles, a former attorney for the Cuban 26th of July movement, inquired whether Cain would instruct Castro Army officers in the use of polygraphs. ~~192~~ 192

(121) It seems more than coincidental that Cain's approach to the CIA to supply this information occurred simultaneously with Giancana's meeting with Roselli and Maheu. Cain subsequently volunteered information to the CIA during 1961-63.

64-

(122) Second, on November 2, 1960, a confidential informant told the Bureau that on October 20, 1960, Serapio Mont^eo, the former head of the July 26 Movement in Chicago, met Richard S. Cain in the office of Constantine Kangles, the former attorney in Chicago for the Cuban 26th of July Movement and former counsel in the United States ¹⁹³ ~~194~~ for the Cuban Government headed by Fidel Castro. Cain indicated to Kangles that he had clients who wished to get news stories and photographs out of ¹⁹⁴ ~~195~~ Cuba concerning rebel activity in the Cuban foothills. Cain further indicated that he wanted to cover this story and was soon going to Miami in an attempt to enter Cuba, and that Jack Mobley, a Chicago columnist, and Bob Ajamian, of Life magazine, had knowledge of this ~~195~~ ¹⁹⁵ venture. ¹⁹⁵

(123) Third, on November 2, 1960, the FBI interviewed Cain in Miami at the Sands Hotel, Miami Beach. ¹⁹⁶ ~~197~~ Cain said he was a representative of Accurate Detective Laboratories, ¹⁹⁷ ~~198~~ Life magazine, and sixty-four other newspapers. ¹⁹⁸ After providing information on the military armaments in Cuba, Cain said that the

Resistance movement had eight hundred men fighting in the Escambray Mountains and that he was awaiting the opportunity to parachute into the Escambrays to take photos for ~~life~~ ¹⁹⁹ life. Cain said that Antonio de Verona gave him ~~the~~ ¹⁹⁹ information on the Cuban armaments. ~~200~~

(124) When Cain's plans to visit Cuba, either to install wiretaps for former President Prio or to take photographs of rebel activity, or both, are considered simultaneously with Giancana's presence in Miami, ~~and~~ ^{GIANCANA'S} ~~reference~~ ^{Castro} to the assassination of ~~Castro~~ in November and ~~with~~ Cain's approach to the CIA, the true purpose and possible interrelation of these events become even more suspect. The wiretap assignment and the photographic story may have been covers. Giancana may have been attempting to send Cain to Cuba to supervise the poisoning attempt on Castro. Cain ~~belonged~~ ^{was connected} to La Cosa Nostra, spoke Spanish, had extensive contacts in Latin America, was well-versed in sabotage and investigative procedures, had been on Giancana's payroll for four years, and apparently

was attempting to arrive in Cuba by approximately November, 1960.²⁰¹ Further, Cain's reference in his FBI interview to ~~Antonio de Verona~~ ^{the Cuban exile leader}, the person that the CIA concedes may have been active in independent organized crime assassination plots against Castro prior to his recruitment by Trafficante in March, 1961, raises more suspicion.

(125) ^{It can, however, be argued that} These events ~~can be interpreted to~~ indicate that Cain may have been the "assassin-to-be" whom Giancana referred to in the 18 October 1960 FBI memorandum, ^{OR} ~~or~~ he may have been the contact man for the operation. ~~It should be noted that this~~ analysis is obviously speculative.

(126) Cain could also have provided another service to Giancana. As already indicated, a second person, called J.W. Harrison, allegedly accompanied and assisted Balletti in the wiretap. Although the Justice Department vigorously pursued this investigation and

not know the identity of Harrison or felt that their client's interests prohibited them from revealing such information. ^{9 (129)} The theory that

Maheu, however, denied ever recruiting or arranging for Harrison to participate in the operations. 205

Clearly someone arranged for Harrison's presence and knew his identity. At seems most likely that Maheu provided Harrison at the request of a source that had a direct interest in the surveillance. Seems most logical. Maheu did say, however, Maheu informed the Committee that he instituted

the surveillance to pacify Giancana's concerns ^{In a personal matter} that Phyllis McQuire was having an affair with Dan Rowan. 206 and to uncover any possible leaks regarding the operation.

See yellow p. 113

Roselli confirmed these two accounts in his Senate testimony. ~~207~~ Shimon further informed the Committee that Giancana told him he paid \$5,000 for the Las Vegas operation. 208

See yellow p. 114

(130) Assuming that Maheu did provide for Harrison, he ~~was~~ likely did so at the request of someone else. Maheu did not have any reason to independently prefer one person over another; the CIA or Giancana, however, did have such a personal interest. Giancana's interest obviously stemmed from his ^{personal matter,} (relationship with McQuire) and it is probably correct that Giancana requested

~~SECRET~~

Maheu to bug ^{the} ~~(Rowan)~~ room. This personal interest could have prompted Giancana to direct Maheu to use a person of Giancana's choice; Cain fits that role perfectly. He was a skilled electronic surveillance technician and was in Miami during late October and early November, ^{which} ~~Maheu~~ was the debarkation point for Harrison and ^{Ballatti} ~~Bartlett~~ on their trip to Las Vegas. ^{(13) as already mentioned} In his ~~deposition~~, Maheu ^{in a deposition to the Committee} ~~denied~~ denied any knowledge of Cain. ~~When~~ When shown several photographs of Cain from the late 1950's and early 1960's, Arthur Ballatti also could not identify Cain as Harrison. ²¹⁰ These denials do not detract from the theory that Cain was Harrison; if no one would identify Harrison in 1960 there is no reason to expect any change in testimony.

^{(12) In regard to the wiretap incident,}
 target A (two persons were targets, target A and target B).
~~Maheu~~ because of the 18 October 1960 memorandum where

Giancana discussed an assassination plot against Castro. The SSC concluded that this memo caused the CIA to be concerned ^{about} ~~with~~ determining if Giancana was leaking information on the CIA-organized crime plots. This may be partially correct, but as already

indicated, the FBI Memorandum depicts a plot substantially in progress and involving a girl ^{like} which ~~cannot be found in~~ does not resemble the October status of the CIA operation. The CIA could have been more concerned that Giancana was involved in a separate assassination plot and consequently could have been concerned with its nature and extent. ⁽¹³³⁾ The reasons why ~~McQuire would have been the target for~~ ^{target A} such surveillance were two-fold. First, ~~her~~ ^{the target A's} relationship with Giancana might have entailed ~~her~~ ^{the} learning of certain clandestine activities. Second, ~~she~~ ^{target A} was one of the "several friends" in the conversation related in the 18 October memo. ~~211~~

(134) The CIA interest would also explain why a wiretap was installed. Maheu informed the Committee that he only ordered physical surveillance of the target, ~~Reasons~~ and could not understand why anyone installed a wiretap since the primary intent was to check on ~~McQuire's reported affair with Bowen.~~ ^{the personal matter.} ~~212~~

See yellow p. 118

(135) Physical surveillance and a room bug would, admittedly, be more than adequate to uncover any ^{of the personal matter} ~~evidence~~. If, however, Maheu also wished to investigate

the possibility of leaks in the operation as well as the possibility of Giancana's involvement in an independent plot, then the use of a wiretap would have been logical.

Target B, investigating the

(196) Assuming that investigating ~~an affair~~ ^{the personal matter} was not the primary focus of the Las Vegas operation, it can be argued that direct surveillance of ~~McGuire~~ ^{target A in target B's own room and other habitats, as opposed to McGuire} would

have been the optimum method to investigation ~~for~~ ^{for such} leaks and information that Giancana may have ~~given her~~ ^{provided.} This, however, would have run the risk

of incurring the wrath of Giancana and his possible departure from the CIA assassination plots if ~~anyone~~ ^{he}

detected the surveillance. Through the cover of surveilling ~~McGuire~~ ^{target B} for a possible ~~association~~ ^{Association} with ~~McGuire~~ ^{target A},

however, the CIA had the opportunity to ~~indirectly~~ ^{target A} surveil ~~McGuire~~ to obtain information on the

assassination plots for a reason which met the approval of Giancana. Indeed, Giancana probably always believed

that his directive to investigate ~~a possible affair~~ ^{the personal matter} was the only issue involved in the surveillance.

(137) ⁹⁸ In any event, the objectives of both Giancana and the CIA could have been achieved whether Harrison was a Giancana choice, specifically Cain, or an Agency ~~operation~~ ^{operative}.

(138) After the Las Vegas operation backfired, the CIA obviously decided to continue the assassination plots. This indicates that ~~the Support Chief~~ ^{the Support Chief} felt the security of the CIA organized crime plot had not been seriously breached. Additionally, it possibly indicates that the CIA determined that even if Giancana was involved in an independent operation, that it would not hamper their efforts, and that all interests could be reconciled. The CIA continued on the same track: blithely going "to bed" with organized crime.

i) The "girl" in the 18 October 1960 FBI Memorandum

(139) In this memo, Giancana spoke of a girl who was going to drop a pill in some food or drink of Castro. This format is again ^{IN} contradiction to the CIA operation which initially relied on ~~the Cuban official~~ ^{the Cuban official}, a secretary in Castro's prime ministry, to administer the pills.

(140) The identity of this "girl" referred to by Giancana has not been ascertain, but it is reasonable to assume that Trafficante was in the ^a ~~same~~ position to recruit a mistress of Castro because of his numerous contacts in the Cuban gambling and prostitution circles.

~~American gamblers routinely maintained Cuban mistresses and Trafficante was a typical example. A witness also informed the Committee that Castro customarily arrived at the Nacional Hotel unescorted to visit one of his paramours. This indicates that it may have been a habit of Trafficante to have arranged for a young woman to service Castro and to attempt to poison him.~~

Consequently, the use of a girl is quite logical and further supports the involvement of organized crime in an independent plot to kill Castro.

(141) Therefore, the CIA is probably correct in asserting that

~~The Committee~~
CIA assertion that the Agency "may have been piggy-backing on the syndicate and in addition to its material contribution was also supplying an aura of official sanction." 213

~~SECRET~~
-174- j) Articles on Frank Sturgis

(142) As indicated in Section II Paul Meskill of the New York Daily News wrote several articles in 1975 and 1976 concerning activities of Frank Sturgis. These articles further reflect the theory that organized crime was involved in independent Castro assassination plots.

(143) ~~The following considerations emanate from~~ ^{points made in these articles} this theory; ^{they also} and more thoroughly respond to the allegations in the Meskill articles. (See paras. for these allegations)

(144) First, organized crime probably initiated independent assassination plots against Castro prior to any CIA involvement in late 1960. Such plots may have been in progress when the CIA reactivated its plans to kill Castro in April, 1962.

(145) Second, organized crime could quite possibly have been directing activities such as those described in the New York Daily News article.

(146) Third, Frank Sturgis most probably established contacts with organized crime through his gambling associations and probably was used by them in some capacities. This does not ~~mean~~ ^{mean} that he was ~~a member~~ ^{not connected} to organized crime.

(147) Forth, Frank Sturgis probably knew ^{the Cuban official} ~~Orta~~ and could have been involved with him in an assassination plot. Since Sturgis is not a reliable source, however, his allegations are suspect.

(148) Fifth, according to the ~~Committee's review of~~ ~~all~~ available evidence, the CIA was not involved in any operations with ~~Orta~~ ^{the Cuban official} prior to late 1960.

(149) Sixth, Sturgis was not necessarily involved with Lorenz or ~~Orta~~ ^{the Cuban official} in a plot to kill Castro. He may have learned of plots involving ~~Orta~~ ^{the Cuban official} and possibly Lorenz in Miami after ~~Orta~~ ^{the Cuban official} arrived there in 1965.

(150) Additionally, the April, 1975, Meskill articles did not ~~report~~ ^{include} the Sturgis-Lorenz plot to kill Castro with poison pills. It is only after the publication of the SSC Interim Report in November, 1975, and the Final Report in April, 1976, that Meskill describes this plot. Thus, Sturgis may have combined accurate information obtained from ~~Orta~~ ^{the Cuban official} and other Miami sources with the facts the SSC presented and then fabricated the Lorenz story, ^{which,} together with other evidence such as the 18 October memo, ~~which~~ ^{which} can succeed unfortunately in appearing both logical and believable.

k) Implications Arising From Phase Two ~~of~~
~~the Operation~~

(151) Significant differences are apparent between Phase One and Phase Two which reflect upon organized crime's motivation and seriousness in fulfilling its part of the bargain originally initiated in 1960.

(152) First, in Phase One, Roselli and his colleagues demonstrated their ability to execute the contract on Castro by naming their source who was, indeed, in a position close to Castro. In Phase Two, the modus operandi and the ability of the assassin or assassins becomes quite vague. Harvey reported that ~~Verona~~ ^{the Cuban exile leader} had an asset in Cuba who had access to someone in a restaurant which Castro frequented who could administer the poison. ²¹⁴ In June, 1962, Roselli reported to Harvey that ~~Verona~~ ^{the Cuban exile leader} had dispatched a three man team to Cuba to recruit persons to kill Castro, or to kill him themselves, maybe with poison pills, if the opportunity arose. ²¹⁵ Harvey said they had no specific plans. ²¹⁶

(153) Second, as already indicated, the cast of the organized figures involved changed. Maheu, Giancana, and Trafficante allegedly retired from the scene, with

a "Maceo" assuming the position of Trafficante.
 Roselli and ~~Verona~~ ^{The Cuban exile leader} remained. ^{The CIA is probably correct}
^{in suggesting} ~~with the idea~~ that these figures, at least Trafficante
 and Giancana, were kept informed of the progress of
 the plots.

(154) What is puzzling is the introduction of a
 person simply referred to as "Maceo" into a highly
 sensitive and covert CIA operation without any
 apparent attempt by the CIA to check his background
 or ascertain his identity. It seems extraordinary
 that the CIA would propel the plots forward without
 performing any security check. Indeed, it seems
 more logical that at least Roselli and Harvey did
 ascertain the identity of Maceo and for whatever
 reason decided to withhold this information. Further,

(155) ^Q although the
 IGR characterizes Micco as Roselli's man, it is
 more probable that Trafficante, who had recruited
 all the Cuban personnel previously used in the
 attempts and who maintained the most complete network
 of Cuban allies in Miami and Cuba, provided this
 individual. ^{argument can be so sustained} If this speculation is accurate, then it
 displays Trafficante again performing a direct role
 during Phase II, a function every source has denied.

-98-

(156) A related issue is whether "phases" actually existed or whether the operations to kill Castro encompassed a continuous time period. As previously indicated, the CIA precautions that the plot was dormant from the Bay of Pigs until Harvey assumed direction in the spring of 1962. Both Harvey and ~~the Support Chief~~ ~~of Concell~~ stated, however, that Harvey "took over a going operation." Considering that Roselli was able to immediately mobilize his forces in 1962 in response to Harvey's request, and that this ~~was~~

^{the Cuban cell}
mobilization involved Vefena, whom Trafficante recruited in Phase One, it seems reasonable to assume that some of the individuals in Phase One were actively attempting to kill Castro after the Bay of Pigs and probably until the advent of Soviet solidification. These efforts, however, may well have been conducted without CIA knowledge and ^{further} ~~as a~~ support the theory of independent organized crime plots.


(157) During late 1962 and early 1963 Phase Two undramatically and slowly terminated. In retrospect, the ambiguous modus operandi, the lack of identity of the potential assassins, the total reliance of Harvey on Roselli for any information, and the seemingly apathetic desire of the CIA to corroborate any information from Roselli, all converge to posit the theory that organized crime was not seriously attempting to assassinate Castro ~~after~~ following the solidification of Soviet influence in the Castro regime. (158) In this regard Trafficante, Lansky, and other Cuban casino owners must have realized by the mid-1962 that the "golden goose" of Havana had laid its last egg, and that fortunes were to be made elsewhere. Certainly, history shows growing Lansky influence in the Bahamas and Las Vegas, Trafficante projects in the Dominican Republic, and burgeoning bolita operations in Florida arising from the influx of Cuban exiles. Further, organized crime may have determined that the new Justice Department crackdown ~~would probably~~ ^{may} not have permitted the "wide open" Cuba of the pre-Kennedy era even if the United States had succeeded in ousting the Cuban regime. (159) Consequently, while the United States

relationship with the CIA. Indeed, the CIA prevention of prosecution in 1961 in the Las Vegas wiretap incident would have given Maheu, Roselli and Giancana confirmation of the value of such a relationship and impetus for continuing it in 1962 even though the assassination of Castro may no longer have been a viable alternative.

(162) The actions of Maheu, Giancana, and particularly Roselli in the years following these plots support this theory. As related in Section II, these individuals actually did use their CIA affiliation and knowledge of the plots in attempts to hinder law enforcement prosecutions and objectives. ²⁰⁵⁻²¹⁷

(163) The success of some of their efforts verifies the tremendous blackmail potential they possessed. As Sam Papich, the FBI liaison to the CIA, commented in May, 1967, Giancana and Roselli had the CIA "over a barrel" because of "that operation" and he doubted that the FBI would be able to do anything about either Giancana or Roselli because of "their previous activities" with the CIA. ²¹⁸

~~It is not clear from the above that Giancana and Roselli benefited from the failure of the assassination plots.~~



(164) In an interview with the Committee, former Deputy Director of the CIA Richard Bissell discussed ~~the issue of blackmail,~~ ^{the issue of blackmail,} ~~subordinates,~~ stating that he had come to feel that the threat of blackmail by the underworld figures involved had constituted the single greatest danger in the plots. 219 Bissell, as Deputy Director for Plans, had been personally involved in the planning and authorization of the CIA-Mafia plots in 1960-1961. 220 Bissell had not been interviewed by the Inspector General's Office during their 1967 investigation of the plots, and thus his recollections and views were not contained in the Inspector General's Report. 221

(165) Bissell told the Committee that he believes he and other Agency officials should have been more cognizant of the possibility of blackmail by the organized crime figures involved in the plots. 222 Bissell stated, "We didn't give it sufficient attention at that time. It was unwise. We only thought of the possibility of blackmail later." 223 The former Deputy Director recalled that the CIA's main fear at the time had been "some sort of unfavorable publicity, if by chance it leaked out," rather than the potential ramifications of entering into such a sensitive relationship with

powerful criminal figures. 224 Bissell went on to state: "I knew it was serious. I knew these were Mafia leaders. And I knew they were in a position to make very damaging revelations about the Agency. But we thought it was all under control." 225

(166) While Bissell stated that he and his colleagues had not realized the potential for blackmail when they first enlisted Mafia leaders in the assassination plots, the CIA officer who later assumed control over the continuing plots has stated he was well aware of - and fearful about - such a possibility. 226 William Harvey, the clandestine services agent who coordinated the reactivation and continuation of the plots in 1962 and 1963, testified in 1975 that he and then Deputy Director Richard Helms had concealed the existence of the assassination plots from CIA Director John McCone partly out of concern over the potential for such blackmail. In his Senate Testimony, Harvey stated that he and Richard Helms decided not to inform McCone about the plots:

. . . until we reached the point where it appeared it might come to fruition or had a chance to assess the individuals involved and determine exactly the problem we faced, including the possible problem - and it was a very, or it appeared to be and in my opinion was, at that time, a very real possibility of this government being blackmailed either by Cubans (exiles) for political purposes or by figures in organized crime for their own self-protection or aggrandizement, which, as it turned out, did not happen, but at that time was a very pregnant possibility. 227

(167) Upon learning partial details of the plots, both Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy and FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover had immediately recognized the disturbing leverage the participants in the plots had gained through their involvement with the CIA in the murder attempts. As noted earlier, Attorney General Kennedy was partially briefed about the pre-Bay of Pigs assassination attempts, authorized during the Eisenhower Administration ~~in~~ May, 1962. 228 Upon being informed of the plots, Kennedy had met with FBI Director Hoover to share the information and to voice his anger over the CIA's actions. 229 In ^{the} memorandum of their conversation prepared on May 10, 1962, Hoover stated that Kennedy had angrily noted that the CIA's use of these figures had resulted in the possibility that

"the CIA was in a position where it could not afford to have any action taken against Giancana and Maheu." 230 Hoover further noted that he had been greatly disturbed over the Agency's use of these individuals, stating, "I expressed great astonishment at this in view of the bad reputation of Maheu . . . The Attorney General shared the same views." 231

(163) In his interview with the Committee, former Deputy Director Richard Bissell stated that he had been distressed over reports that CIA Director John McCone had never been told about the Agency-Mafia assassination plots during the period in which they were occurring. 232 McCone had been appointed Director of the Agency by President Kennedy in November of 1961, thus serving as head of the CIA during the last 15 months in which the plots were continuing.

233 In his Senate testimony in 1975, Richard Helms (who served as McCone's Deputy Director during the period in which the plots were continuing) stated that he could not recall telling McCone of the existence of the plots while they were occurring. 234 Helms went on to state that he "was trying to scratch my head as to why I didn't tell him at the time and my surmises are the best I can come up with. I am really surprised I did not discuss it with him at the time." 235 McCone's former Executive Assistant, Walter Elder, told the Senate that McCone had once notified Deputy Director Helms that "assassination could not be condoned and would not be approved," and that the Agency was never to become involved in such activity. 236 In his Senate testimony, William Harvey stated that

Director McCone had once personally told him that the Agency and U.S. government must not engage in such plots against any foreign leader, and further, that "if I got myself involved in something like this, I might end up getting myself excommunicated." 237 As noted earlier, Harvey went on to testify that he and Helms had withheld their knowledge of (and personal involvement in) the murder plots from Director McCone, partly out of fear "of this government being blackmailed . . . by figures in organized crime . . ." 238

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(169) Speaking of the failure of Helms, Harvey, and other Agency personnel to inform Director McCone of the plots, former Deputy Director Bissell told the Committee, "The Director should have been informed. This was bad, and shouldn't have gone on." 239 Bissell, who left the Agency in January 1962, stated, "The Director should know if his subordinates - his top subordinates - are in a position of being subject to blackmail or are in fact being blackmailed by Mafia figures or anyone else. This is very bad." 240 Bissell commented that "in something that sensitive, involving national security, you shouldn't have that potential of blackmail going unknown to the Director." 241

(170) Bissell told the Committee that he would not have become involved in the early plots without then Director Allen Dulles' personal authorization, stating, "If Dulles told me not to become involved in such a thing, I know for sure I wouldn't. You can't disobey the Director." 242 Speaking of Director McCone's reported notification of both Richard Helms and William Harvey that the Agency must not become involved in assassination activity, Bissell stated, "I cannot say what McCone's reaction would have been if he found out about such a violation of his wishes at the time. I do know that Helms would have been in a most uncomfortable position, but I can't speculate." 243 The former Agency official stated, "It's wrong. Obviously senior officials should follow directions, especially on something like that." 244 Bissell further commented, "If McCone told Helms and Harvey not to get involved, then it raises obvious questions about their actions . . . I would rather not speculate about this. I don't know who gave what orders to whom after I left." 245

(171) Speaking of the CIA's withholding of all information pertaining to the existence of the CIA-underworld assassination plots from the Warren Commission, Bissell stated that the Agency probably "didn't think it was relevant I would guess." 246 Bissell further stated, "I can't believe the potential concern over blackmail by the Mafia people would have been allowed by the Agency to serve as a reason

for shielding the existence" of the plots from the Presidential Commission. 247 ^{Nevertheless} However, Bissell added, "I guess you couldn't absolutely rule out such a possibility." 248

(172) Asked if he believed that the Agency would have informed the Warren Commission of the CIA plots if there had been substantive news reports at the time linking Santos Trafficante, Sam Giancana, or other organized crime leaders to the assassination of President Kennedy, Bissell stated, "I can't speculate what it would have done. I would hope so." 249 Bissell went on to state that he believes that if the Agency actually suspected such Mafia involvement in the President's murder, it would probably have informed the Warren Commission of the CIA plots. Bissell stated, "They wouldn't have liked to. But I do think they would have told Earl Warren." 250 Bissell stated his belief that had the Agency found that Trafficante or Giancana had been involved in some way with President Kennedy's assassination, it would have informed the Warren Commission of the CIA plots against Castro, even though such information would have led to the disclosure of the Agency's own prior involvement with these same Mafia elements in assassination conspiracies. 251

3. Retaliation Theory

(173) ^{a) Results of the Committee's investigation} The Committee found no evidence that these operations provoked Premier Castro to assassinate President Kennedy in retaliation.

(174) The Committee also ~~has~~ found no evidence that Castro knew of CIA sponsorship of these activities or even knew of their existence prior to the death of President Kennedy. ~~Even~~ If Castro did discover their existence, however, ^{he would not} ~~he would not~~

~~As the CIA would have commented on the CIA in this regard only a few persons know of CIA sponsorship of Cuban operations and their engaged in operations by Cuban directly participating in the operations. It is reported that the United States Government organization sponsored the operations.~~

See attached insert

Proprietor of the Retaliation Theory

(176) In an article in the Washington Post on September 9, 1976, Anderson revealed that ex-CIA

agent William Harvey, attorney Edward P. Morgan, and reputed mobster John Roselli were ^{the} ~~his~~ sources ^{for his newspaper articles.} ~~It seems certain.~~ The Committee has determined that John Roselli was the person who informed Harvey and Morgan about the plots and the retaliation theory; thus, only one source,

5 King

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seems invalid 25-2-64

~~Concluded~~ the contention of ~~the~~ SSC that Castro would not have connected them with the CIA. ~~It~~ ^{IT IS} recognized that only a few persons actually knew of the CIA sponsorship and that the Cuban operatives and other engaged in penetrating Cuba or directly participating in the assassination efforts were reportedly told that the United States businessmen and organized crime sponsored the operation. ~~It still became more probable,~~ ~~It~~ ^{It still became more probable,} ~~was~~ ~~not~~, however, that while not being able to be certain, Castro would have highly suspected the CIA in any assassination plot he uncovered, at least to the degree that he would have suspected the CIA was funding the ~~one~~ person or persons plotting his murder. The reason is that Castro suspected the CIA of constantly attempting to overthrow his government ^{through every possible method including assassination}; Castro's meeting with Senator George McGovern where Castro gave McGovern a list of ^{alleged} CIA-sponsored assassination plots ^{supports this contention} ~~is~~ ⁽¹⁷⁵⁾ ~~in~~ ⁽¹⁵³⁾ Consequently, there is no reason to assume that Castro would not have attributed ^{most plots, including this} ~~the~~ ^{particular} plot to the CIA.

John Roselli, actually existed. Further, John Roselli supplied all information concerning the operation to the CIA through either ^{the Support Chief} James O'Connell (17) or William Harvey. ~~The Committee notes that~~ The public dissemination of the details of the plots corresponds remarkably to the efforts of John Roselli to prevent his deportation in 1966 and 1971, and to prevent his prosecution for illegal gambling activities in 1967. These coincidences plus other evidence ^{available} ~~have led the Committee to conclude that~~ John Roselli manipulated the facts of the plots into the retaliation theory in efforts to force the CIA to favorably intervene into his legal affairs to prevent the further disclosure of the plots in general and the retaliation theory in particular and to prevent further waves of public paranoia. ~~The Committee notes that~~ In some instances John Roselli was successful.

c) Summary

(178) Even assuming that Castro did ascertain the existence of the CIA-organized crime plots and that the CIA sponsored them and ignoring the ~~Committee's~~ belief that Roselli fabricated the retaliation theory, ^{it is still} the ~~Committee still believes it is~~ unlikely that Castro would have resorted to assassinating the President of the United States in retaliation for the reasons indicated in the AMLASH portion of the Issue Analysis section. Specifically, these reasons are:

- 1) the prospect of exposing Cuba to invasion and destruction would not have been worth the risk;
- 2) the act of changing a leader does not necessarily change the system;
- 3) Castro may have recognized that among the leaders of the United States, Kennedy may have maintained the least hostile approach towards Cuba; and
- 4) the growing prospect of detente between Cuba and the United States would have refrained Castro from assassinating an American official.

4. Related Organized Crime Activities

(179) The Committee reviewed ^{additional} evidence that ~~further~~ raises the possibility that various organized crime ^{were} figures involved in attempts to assassinate Castro ^{for} were unrelated to the ^{effects of the} CIA.

a) Norman Rothman

(180) To ascertain more information about organized crime's knowledge about Castro assassination plots, the Committee investigated Norman Rothman, who was active in operating various casinos in Cuba before the Castro takeover and who consequently maintained associations with organized crime and the Batista regime.

(181) At various times, Rothman served as manager of the Sans Souci and Copacabana Clubs in Cuba representing the interests of the Mannarino brothers of Pittsburgh ²⁵⁴

see yellow p. 149

(182) FBI files on Rothman indicate that a proposal to kill Castro was ^{allegedly} made to Rothman as a "quid pro quo" in which Rothman expected to avoid imprisonment for a 1960 gun running conviction. ²⁵⁵ During an FBI interview, Rothman stated that he had been in "personal contact with White House attorney Harry Hall Wilson, as well as Assistant Attorney General John ³¹ Regenthaler, both of Washington, D.C. and members of the Kennedy Administration. ²⁵⁶

(183) In a deposition to the Committee taken in Miami on April 16, 1978, Rothman expanded on the theme to include a series of mysterious telegrams summoning him to the White House for a series of two or three meetings ^{lat} which began in Attorney General

Kennedy's office with members of his staff and continued in a conference room where Rothman's assistance in providing contacts inside Cuba was explored. At the last meeting Rothman says that:

"one of them happened to discuss the assassination of Castro with me, but not in a technical way. You know, just in a casual way. That is about it. I cannot for the moment remember it word for word because it is too far back."

See yellow p. 151

Q. (184)

The evidence suggesting such an approach by Robert Kennedy is entirely uncorroborated and makes no sense when viewed in light of the Justice Department crack-down on organized crime. Further, it seems extremely doubtful that any meeting with Rothman on this topic would have occurred at the White House. Consequently,

the Committee believes it is highly unlikely that such an event occurred.

b) ~~Committee~~ Name links between the AMLASH operation and the CIA-Organized Crime Operations.

(185) The Committee also reviewed evidence which indicates that organized crime may have been aware of the AMLASH operation during its existence.

(186) The IGR identified three name links between the AMLASH operation and the organized crime operation. The IGR did not sufficiently analyze, however, that the common denominator in two of the links was Santo Trafficante.

1) Link One

(187) In March, 1965, the CIA received information that ^{both} a high-ranking military figure in the Castro regime and a former personal secretary of Castro ²⁵⁹ both wished to defect. The military officer was ~~Rolando Cubela Secada~~ ^{to AMLASH} and the former secretary was ~~Juanita~~ ^{the Cuban official} used in Phase I of the CIA-organized crime plots. As already indicated, the ~~IRG~~ ^{revealed} documents that Trafficante recruited ~~her~~ ^{the Cuban official}.

(188) ~~The Committee has determined that~~ Other than the coincidence of both ^{the Cuban official} and AMLASH seeking infiltration at the same time there is nothing to suggest a relationship between the two men in attempting to assassinate Castro; ~~there is no~~ ^{NO EXISTS among} common denominator ~~of the~~ Trafficante, Rosell, Giancana or any other members of the American gambling syndicate. This link is therefore insignificant.

2) Link Two

(189) In mid-March, 1965, Rafael Garcia Bongo, a ~~noted~~ Cuban lawyer whose brother occupied the prestigious position of Minister of Sports in Cuba, contacted ^{the} CIA

~~station personnel in Madrid~~ to inform the agency that "he was in contact with a group of military officers who were planning to kill Castro." ²⁶⁰ ~~(1967)~~

I.C. Report, p. ~~260~~. It quickly became clear to CIA employees that Bongo's reference was to ~~Cuba~~ and the group of military men who were allied with him in attempting to depose Castro. ²⁶¹ Although the ~~1967~~ and ~~1968~~ ^{IGR} ^{the TFR} Reports are silent ^{regarding an} ~~on~~ attitude toward Bongo's information, it must be assumed that ~~they~~ ^{the CIA} did not respond affirmatively since the AMLASH operation was in progress at the time and Arttime was in the process of delivering arms caches to ~~Cuba's~~ ^{the Cuban official's} people within Cuba.

(195) Interestingly, Bongo identified himself to Agency personnel as a lawyer ^{who represented} ~~of~~ the Capri Hotel and Casino in Havana, ^{and} who had been jailed in July, ¹⁹⁶² ~~1961~~ for a period of 75 days, allegedly as a reprisal for representing Santo Trafficante. ²⁶² Bongo's utilization of the short prisor term to establish his "bona fides" is questionable. ^{since} Trafficante was in jail during August, 1959, For the Cuban government to wait ^{three} ~~five~~ years to exact retribution for that representation ~~is~~

~~is~~ ^{seems} unlikely. Possibly, Bongo was involved in approaching

the Castro government in 1962 on Trafficante's behalf for permission to reopen the Capri casino.

~~Bongo's trip to Madrid apparently involved more than a contact with the CIA for he was arrested for counterfeiting and held until his old client, Santo Trafficante, arrived with a suitcase full of cash to obtain his release. Presumably Bongo was paroled back to Cuba at an unspecified interval where he died.~~

(191) One aspect of the Bongo-Trafficante relationship ~~in Madrid~~ deserves fuller treatment, although it is doubtful that anything more than supposition can result ~~from further exploration~~. As already indicated, it has been reported by Jack Anderson that ~~he~~ ^{the} ~~secret source~~ secret source until his death, John Roselli, had reason to speculate that Cubans originally recruited by Santo Trafficante to kill Castro were "turned around" and sent back to the United States where they were directly involved in the assassination of President Kennedy. If this line of hypothecation is adopted, then the trip ~~to Madrid~~ by Bongo could assume ~~some~~ ^{other} ~~sinister~~ implications such as the possibility that Bongo's

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CIA

real purpose in contacting the ~~Madrid Station~~ was to act as a double agent for Castro in ascertaining the nature and scope of the AMLASH operation. Castro ^{probably} ~~probably~~ became aware of the Arttime meetings with ~~Cubela~~ ^{AMLASH} ~~Cubela~~ in the fall of 1964 since the list of charges upon which ~~Cubela~~ ^{AMLASH} went to trial in 1966 began with these ~~Madrid~~ meetings. If Castro had begun his suspicions of ~~Cubela's~~ ^{AMLASH's} role with the CIA during late 1964 or early ~~1965~~ ¹⁹⁶⁵, it is likely that he would have begun counter-intelligence measures to confirm his fears which could have led to Castro sending Bongo ^{that} ~~on the trip~~ to ~~contact~~ to contact the Agency. Given ~~the~~ ^{the} Trafficante's ~~relationship~~ ^{- Bongo relationship} ~~to Bongo~~, it can be postulated that Trafficante ^{would have} ~~was~~ aware of Bongo's true mission prior ^{at least} to his departure or ^{at some later} ~~became~~ knowledgeable ~~when he~~ ~~left~~ ~~the~~ ~~country~~ ~~in~~ ~~1965~~ ~~date~~.

~~Trafficante also could have received news of Cubela's ties with the Agency through his close associate Jorge Noregas who was described by Gorge Crite in his Washington Post article (circa 8/17/76) as "having worked with the CIA, was in Cubela's student revolutionary group in Cuba, and always close to Trafficante."~~

(192) ~~It is~~ Given the extent of Trafficante's high-level contacts within the exile community and the low-level security in the CIA exile operations, it is ^{therefore} ~~extremely~~ logical that Trafficante and other members of the underworld knew, in some fashion, part or all of the AMLASH plot. The question becomes: So what? Short of being able to blackmail the government about the modus operandi of the 1960-62 events, the significance of mob knowledge of AMLASH is not readily apparent.

(193) ^{however,} If Trafficante was a double agent, working for the CIA but actually supplying information to Castro, then another scenario emerges. It is then logical to assume that Castro knew of the AMLASH and CIA-organized crime operations from their inception. As mentioned earlier in this material, Trafficante could have received a sanctuary and assistance in smuggling contraband for such information. As also discussed earlier, ^{this knowledge would not, however,} ~~however,~~ the Committee believes ^{have promoted CASTRO} that ~~even if Castro had knowledge of CIA sponsorship of [redacted] against [redacted] that [redacted] would not have~~ ^{to} ~~provided him~~ ^{Nevertheless,} ~~to~~ kill President Kennedy. ~~The benefit~~ contemporaneous knowledge of the plots would

the amorphous nature of those "name links," which included "A," ^{so that a possible causal energy} ~~into~~ theory that "A" was the conduit through which the Syndicate became knowledgeable of both the AMLASH operation and the initial CIA efforts to eliminate Castro.

(197) The only ~~solid~~ ^{such a nexus} ~~factor~~ basis for ~~Book V's~~ ~~link~~ between AMLASH and the 1960-62 CIA syndicate plots is based upon ^{"A"} ~~Vicente Espinosa's~~ ^{exile} ~~exile~~ activities in June-July 1963, ²⁶⁵ ~~which Book V examined.~~ ~~CIA files contained at least some FBI reports on "A," the Cuban exile who was involved in transporting Reports of these activities employees to New Orleans in 1963. These reports~~

detail his involvement with anti-Castro exiles and "underworld figures" who were operating the guerilla training camp in New Orleans in July 1963.

(198) The "underworld figures" reference relates to Michael and William McLaney, who have been considered organized crime affiliates by some law enforcement and media personnel. ~~As [redacted]~~ Again, however, no evidence from any source places ^{either of the brothers} McLaney into the early CIA plots to kill Castro or into the AMLASH operation. A review of the June-July 1963 activities of McLaney and ^{"A"} ~~Vicente Espinosa~~ lead only to the inference that


(200) Other evidence ~~investigated~~ pertains to ^{which}

Mike McLaney's ties to organized crime, ^{investigated} have been ~~substantiated~~ ^{found} within federal law enforcement agencies since the 1950's. ~~but~~ ^{however} No solid evidence has linked him to Trafficante, Roselli or Giancana, ^{possibly because} McLaney has been most frequently ^{mentioned with Meyer} ~~mentioned~~ ^{to establish a link between} McLaney ^{and principals in the} the 1940-62 plots, ^{that} requires a series of ~~speculative~~ ^{speculativ}-hurdles ^{which} include:

- ✓ (a) Meyer Lansky was a plotter with Trafficante,
- (b) McLaney was Lansky's "action" man; and
- ✓ (c) the various underworld figures acted in concert in promoting anti-Castro operations.

^{ing.} The ~~Committee~~ ^{finds} that ~~none of~~ ^{these} premises are ^{not} easily supportable with facts. ^{Consequently,} ~~there is no evidence to support a possible~~ ^{link} ~~between~~ ^{Victor Spinoza}

link.
5. Deaths of Roselli and Giancana.
(207) As indicated earlier, both Sam Giancana and John Roselli were murdered. Sam Giancana was shot in the basement of his home in Chicago in June, 1975, just prior to his scheduled testimony before the SSC regarding the CIA organized crime plots;



John Roselli's butchered body was found inside an oil drum which was floating in Key Biscayne Bay, Florida in August, 1976, ~~which was~~ shortly after his testimony before the SSC regarding the CIA-organized crime plots.

(203) Various theories have surfaced concerning why they were killed and who was responsible. One theory relevant to this investigation is that Giancana and Roselli were killed because of their participation in the Castro assassination plots and the SSC attempts to elicit information on the plots. In this regard, Trafficante has most often been the person assigned responsibility for the deaths. On the other hand, the Justice Department informed the Committee that it believes that organized crime performed the murders ^{for} ~~and that the~~ reasons ^{that} were unrelated to the CIA-organized crime plots. 266

(204) The Justice Department is still investigating both murders. The Committee has not uncovered evidence relevant to solving these murders. ~~The Committee~~ ^{It is likely} ~~does believe~~ however, that a variety of motivations inspired the deaths. These motivations included internal mob conflict, especially in the case of Giancana, and participation and knowledge of the CIA-

(205) 9

organized crime plots. The ~~Committee~~ ^{quite possible} considers ~~It~~ ^{is} ~~that~~ Trafficante approved of and assisted in the murder of ~~at least~~ John Roselli. Trafficante's motivation ^{could} ~~would~~ have been to maintain a low profile in connection with the CIA plots and to prevent disclosure of other unknown persons involved in the plots as well as other operations and activities which an investigation of the plots might uncover. ~~The Committee does not believe that~~ ^{This mean that} such activities were necessarily connected to the assassination of President Kennedy. ~~For instance,~~ Trafficante may have ^{wished to protect} ~~had~~ a covert relationship with Castro ^{that} ~~which~~ may have entailed his running contraband through Cuba into the United States.

(206)

~~DL~~ Consequently although the deaths of Roselli and Giancana ^{are} ~~at least~~ ~~were~~ related ~~partially~~ to the CIA-organized crime operations, ~~the committee does not believe that they are~~ ^{they are not necessarily} related to the assassination of President Kennedy.

6.

CIA
Agency Actions ⁱⁿ ~~the~~ Concealing ^{the} ~~the~~ Reactivation ^{and} ~~and~~
Continuation ^{of} ~~of~~ ~~the~~ ~~plots~~ / ~~assassination~~ Plots ^{from} ~~from~~
Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy

(207) From an

~~During the course of its~~ examination of the CIA's use of ^{organized crime}
the ~~plots~~ in assassination conspiracies against ~~Castro~~ Castro,
evidence seems to indicate that the ~~Committee has been disturbed by~~ the Agency's ^{concealed} ~~concealment~~ of
the continuation of those plots in 1962 and 1963 from Attorney
General Robert F. Kennedy.

(208) As ^{already indicated in section II, Part B,} ~~was first detailed in the~~ Senate Select Committee on
~~Intelligence Reports on the CIA underworld murder plots,~~ Attorney

General Kennedy had been told of the pre-Bay of Pigs phase of the
plots during a CIA briefing on May 7, 1962. 267 Rather than
the CIA volunteering this information about the existence of such
plots, the meeting had come about when Attorney General Kennedy had
inadvertently learned that the CIA had secretly utilized the services
of former FBI Agent Robert Maheu and Chicago Mafia leader Sam Gian-
cana a year earlier. 268 ^{This information had surfaced} ~~Kennedy had learned of the CIA's Giancana~~
~~Maheu connection~~ during the course of a wiretap prosecution against
Maheu; a prosecution the Agency had warned might "result in most
damaging embarrassment to the U. S. government." 269

(209) During the ~~resulting~~ briefing ~~of the Attorney General on May~~
~~7, 1962~~ CIA officials Sheffield Edwards and Lawrence Houston in-
formed Kennedy about the Agency's use of the underworld in a 1960-
1961 plot to assassinate Castro. 270 ~~Edwards was the CIA's officer~~
~~who had first coordinated the actual murder plot~~

As the CIA's own evidence and internal records of the plots has
shown, as well as the Senate Committee's investigation of the matter,
Edwards and Houston told Attorney General Kennedy that the assassi-
nation efforts against Castro had begun during the Eisenhower Admini-
stration, had climaxed at the time of the Bay of Pigs invasion, and
"had been terminated completely" 271

(210) Yet, as the CIA and Senate evidence makes clear, and as the Committee's investigation has confirmed, the CIA ^{Organized Crime} ~~Mafia~~ plots were actually being reactivated and intensified at the very time that Agency officials were telling Attorney General Kennedy that they had been "terminated." 273 In the ^{IGR} ~~Agency's Inspector General's~~ Report ~~prepared in early 1967~~, it was noted that

The Attorney General was not told that the gambling syndicate (assassination) operation had already been reactivated, nor, as far as we know, was he ever told that CIA had a continuing involvement with U.S. gangster elements. 274

(211) While noting the accuracy and veracity of the preceding conclusion from the ^{IGR} ~~1967 Inspector General's Report~~, ~~as the Committee has been advised by~~ other statements in the ^{IGR} ~~Agency's Report~~ that ~~seemingly~~ ^{seemingly} attempt to justify, excuse, or even deny the ^{CIA's} ~~Agency's~~ concealment of this important information about the plots from Attorney General Kennedy have been disturbing.

(212) Lawrence Houston, the CIA's former general counsel, testified in 1975 that Attorney General Kennedy had voiced strong anger over the ^{CIA} ~~Agency's~~ use of the Mafia during his briefing by Edwards and Houston on May 7, 1962. 275 Houston, who testified that while Edwards was familiar with the plots, he (Houston) was not, stated that Kennedy had specifically ordered that he be personally notified before the Agency ever considered utilizing organized crime figures again. 276 Houston testified: "If you have ever seen Mr. Kennedy's eyes get steely and his jaw set and his voice get low and precise, you get a definite feeling of unhappiness." 277 Houston testified that Kennedy had stated, "I trust that if you ever try to do business with organized crime again - with gangsters - you will let the Attorney General know." 278 Former Office of Security Director Edwards similarly testified that Kennedy had demanded, "I want you to let me know about these things." 279

(213) In the ^{(1967) IGR} ~~Inspector General's Report on the plots in 1967~~, it was noted that Attorney General Kennedy believed that as a result

of the meeting, he would be told of any such future actions contemplated by the Agency. The Inspector General concluded, "From reports of the briefing, it is reasonable to assume that Kennedy believed he had such a commitment from Agency representatives." 280

(214) Disturbingly ~~however,~~ ^{however,} The Inspector General's Report then went on to conclude that Edwards had "probably acted properly" in concealing knowledge of the reactivation and continuation of the Mafia plots from Robert F. Kennedy. The CIA Report stated:

The gambling syndicate operation had been taken from him, and, in retrospect, he probably acted properly in briefing the Attorney General on only that aspect of the operation for which he had been responsible and of which he had direct, personal knowledge. 281

(215) One page later in the Report, the Inspector General went on to state, ~~That,~~ "the Attorney General on 7 May 1962 was given a full and frank account of the Agency's relations with Maheu, Roselli, and Giancana in the Castro operation . . ." 282

~~The Committee has been misled by the contradictions and~~
~~These inconsistencies~~
~~judgments evident~~ in the Inspector General's Report, the official Agency document on the CIA-Mafia assassination conspiracies, ^{demonstrate a lack of good faith.} The

~~Committee's report on the Report's~~ statement that Edwards "probably acted properly" in concealing the continuation of the murder plots from Attorney General Kennedy ^{is misleading and inexcusable.} ~~to be clearly false, unjustified,~~ ^{I & R's}

~~and disturbing.~~ Further, the Inspector General's description of the briefing on May 7, 1962 as "full and frank" is ^{also} ~~similarly~~ untruthful, in light of the reactivation and continuation of the plots ~~under~~ under the direction of Deputy Director Richard Helms, CIA agent William Harvey, and Mafia leader John Roselli. ~~The~~

~~Inspector General's conclusion that Edwards "probably acted properly" in concealing his knowledge of the continuation of the plots from Attorney~~

~~General Robert Kennedy~~ ^{This statement} is all the more disturbing ^{when considering} ~~in light of the~~ fact that the Inspector General's Office knew that Edwards' own assistant was then still involved in the plots, with Edwards' personal knowledge. 283

~~From the~~ ^(Academy) the Inspector General also knew that Edwards had personally prepared a fraudulent internal

memorandum for the files, in which he falsely stated that the assassination plot and utilization of John Roselli was being dropped. 234

I G R

(216) The implications of the Inspector General's 1967 conclusions about the adequacy and propriety of Sheffield Edwards and Lawrence Houston's May 1962 briefing of Attorney General Kennedy are serious. The Inspector General's Office was clearly cognizant of the fact that Edwards had withheld - and thereby concealed - the continuation of the plots from Robert Kennedy, and more importantly, that this concealment of information concerning the Mafia murder plot was in direct disobedience to the Attorney General's personal direction:

The Committee views such ~~disobedience~~ ^{disobeyal} of the Attorney General's orders to be of utmost seriousness, particularly in light of the gravity and nature of the operations in question.

(217) While the concealment of the reactivation and continuation of the CIA - Mafia assassination plot from Attorney General Kennedy - and hence, in all likelihood President Kennedy - was ~~serious~~ ^{is} ~~serious enough~~, the Inspector General's apparant endorsement and justification of such concealment in the Report prepared for Director Helms in 1967 is even more ~~alarming~~ ^{also alarming} ~~troubling~~ ^{troubling}.

(218) The Agency's ~~total~~ withholding of information pertaining to the CIA-Mafia assassination attempts from the Warren Commission (which never asked about such matters in 1964) becomes all the more ~~troubling~~ ^{inevitable} ~~troubling~~ when the withholding of the same matters from the Attorney General (who did ask for such information in 1962) is ~~considered~~ ^{considered}.

That these two separate withholdings and concealments may have been directly connected is a possibility the Committee believes cannot be dismissed.

(219) While the propriety and ~~wisdom~~ ^{of} these Agency actions in 1962 and 1964 must be seriously questioned, the judgments and statements of the ~~Inspector General's Report~~ ^{I G R} must be weighed just as seriously. As the most important embodiment of internal checks and balances within the Agency, the Inspector General's Office is intended to serve the function of conducting official internal reviews and investigations of potential wrongdoing and

internal abuse. ~~with the CIA~~ The findings and judgments of the Inspector General have long been integral to the continuing integrity and well being of the Agency's operations and activities. ~~That the Committee has found particularly disturbing~~ ^{consequently} the judgments reached by the Inspector General in 1967 regarding the propriety of Sheffield Edwards' actions in the briefing of Attorney General Kennedy about the assassination plots in May of 1962 ^{and hinted the function of the} To state ^{Office of the Inspector General} in 1967 that Edwards had "probably acted properly" in withholding the important information that he did, and to characterize the May 7th briefing as "full and frank," represents a mistake in judgement, and ~~departure from truthfulness as serious as any the Committee has found in its investigation of the complex series of CIA assassination plots, operations that~~ ^{plots, AS} former Director Richard Helms ~~has~~ ^{has} described as ~~some of the~~ "not . . . very savory." ^{the plots themselves, it is}

It should be noted, however;

* ~~The Committee would note that~~ the views and conclusions reached in the 1967 Inspector General's Report do not necessarily reflect the judgment about such matters by present Agency officials. ~~How would the Committee would do at someone~~ that a principal author of the 1967 Report has served as the Agency's official liaison to the Committee during the course of its investigation, coordinating Agency activities and responses relating to the investigation of President Kennedy's death.

Balance of Evidence
IV. CONCLUSIONS

~~The committee makes the following conclusions:~~

A. AMLASH OPERATION

- (220) 1. ^{There is} ~~THE COMMITTEE FINDS~~ NO EVIDENCE THAT THE AMLASH OPERATION PROVOKED PREMIER CASTRO TO ASSASSINATE PRESIDENT KENNEDY IN RETALIATION.
- (221) 2. ^{There is insufficient evidence} ~~THE COMMITTEE HAS NOT BEEN ABLE TO ASCERTAIN~~ WHETHER THE AMLASH OPERATION PRIOR TO THE DEATH OF PRESIDENT KENNEDY CAN BE CHARACTERIZED AS AN ASSASSINATION PLOT.
- (222) 3. ASSUMING THAT AMLASH WAS NOT AN ASSASSINATION PLOT DURING THE LIFE OF PRESIDENT KENNEDY AND THAT CASTRO UNCOVERED ITS EXISTENCE AND SCOPE, ~~THE COMMITTEE BELIEVES~~ IT IS HIGHLY UNLIKELY THAT CASTRO WOULD HAVE BEEN PROVOKED IN A MANNER SUFFICIENT TO INDUCE ASSASSINATING PRESIDENT KENNEDY IN RETALIATION.
- (223) 4. ASSUMING THAT AMLASH WAS AN ASSASSINATION PLOT DURING THE LIFE OF PRESIDENT KENNEDY AND THAT CASTRO UNCOVERED ITS EXISTENCE AND SCOPE, ~~THE COMMITTEE BELIEVES~~ IT IS STILL UNLIKELY THAT CASTRO WOULD HAVE RESORTED TO ASSASSINATING THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES IN RETALIATION.
- (224) 5. ~~THE COMMITTEE HAS NO~~ ANY KNOWLEDGE ON THE PART OF ORGANIZED CRIME OF THE AMLASH OPERATION OR ANY CONNECTION BETWEEN ORGANIZED CRIME FIGURES INVOLVED IN THE CIA-ORGANIZED CRIME PLOTS AND AMLASH WOULD NOT ALTER THE CONCLUSION THAT CASTRO WAS NOT INVOLVED IN THE ASSASSINATION OF PRESIDENT KENNEDY.

B. CIA-ORGANIZED CRIME PLOTS

- (225) 1. *There is* ~~THE COMINT REFERENCE~~ NO EVIDENCE THAT THESE OPERATION; PROVOKED PREMIER CASTRO TO ASSASSINATE PRESIDENT KENNEDY IN RETALIATION.
- (226) 2. *There is* ~~THE COMINT REFERENCE~~ NO CONCLUSIVE EVIDENCE THAT CASTRO KNEW OF THE EXISTENCE OF THESE PLOTS DURING THE LIFE OF PRESIDENT KENNEDY; *however, the* ~~AND EVEN IF CASTRO DID LEARN OF THEIR EXISTENCE, THE COMINT REFERENCE BELIEVES THAT~~ CASTRO *probably* WOULD HAVE ~~RESORTED TO ASSASSINATING THEM WITH~~ THE CIA. *Attributed to*
- (227) 3. ASSUMING THAT DURING THE LIFE OF PRESIDENT KENNEDY THAT CASTRO DID LEARN OF THE EXISTENCE OF THESE PLOTS AND THAT THE CIA WAS SPONSORING THEM, ~~THE COMINT REFERENCE BELIEVES~~ IT IS UNLIKELY THAT CASTRO WOULD HAVE RESORTED TO ASSASSINATING THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES.
- (228) 4. *It is highly likely* ~~THE COMINT REFERENCE BELIEVES~~ THAT ORGANIZED CRIME WAS INVOLVED IN ATTEMPTS TO ASSASSINATE CASTRO INDEPENDENT OF ANY CIA OPERATIONS.
- (229) 5. ~~THE COMINT REFERENCE BELIEVES THAT~~ *SA* PRINCIPAL REASON WHY ORGANIZED CRIME PARTICIPATED IN THE PLOTS WAS TO STRING THE CIA ALONG AND THUS FOSTER A GROWING RELATIONSHIP WHICH COULD SUBSEQUENTLY BE EXPLOITED TO PREVENT PROSECUTIONS OF THE ORGANIZED FIGURES INVOLVED IN THE PLOTS.
- (230) 6. ~~THE COMINT REFERENCE BELIEVES THAT~~ JOHN ROSELLI USED THE FACTS OF THE CIA-ORGANIZED CRIME PLOTS TO FABRICATE THE RETALIATION THEORY IN EFFORTS TO PREVENT HIS PROSECUTION IN LEGAL MATTERS.

STAFF REPORT ON THE
EVOLUTION AND IMPLICATIONS OF THE CIA-

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(Footnotes) IS: JWG I
SPONSORED ASSASSINATION CONSPIRACIES
AGAINST FIDEL CASTRO

1. The Investigation of the Assassination of President John F. Kennedy: Performance of the Intelligence Agency, Book V, Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations, 4/23/76, p. 2. Senate No. 94-455. [Hereinafter cited as Book V.]
2. The complete details of the AMCLASH and CIA-Organized Crime plots can be reviewed in Book II and Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders, Interim Report, Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations, 11/20/75, Senate Report No. 94-465. [Hereinafter cited as Interim Report.]
3. 1967 Report of the Inspector General, Central Intelligence Agency, p. 14. [Hereinafter cited as I.G. Report]; Interim Report at p. 74.

4. See generally, III G. Report

5. Ibid. ~~at~~ p. 3, 14

6. Ibid. ~~at~~ p. 3

7. Ibid. ~~at~~ p. 15 ~~---~~

8. Ibid. ~~at~~ p.

9. Ibid. ~~at~~ edges

10. Ibid. ~~at~~ p. 16. There is some disagreement between Robert Mahew and James O'Connell over who suggested that Roselli be contacted; each believes the other did. In any event, Mahew initiated the contact with Roselli.

11. Ibid. at p. 19

12. Ibid. ~~at~~ p. 18

13. Ibid., ~~at~~ p. 20

14. Ibid., ~~at~~ p. 25

15 Ibid., p. 27

16 Ibid.

17 Ibid.

18 Ibid., p. 28

19 Ibid., p. 29

20 Ibid., p. 31

21 Ibid., p. 32

22 The CIA contends that the plots were dormant after the Bay of Pigs (see footnote 6). The possibility exists, however, that the plots were an on-going operations

23 I.G. Report, p. 31

24 Interim Report, p. 83

25 I.G. Report, p. 48

26 Ibid., p. 47, 49

see

(4)

27 Ibid., M p. 49.

28 Ibid., M p. 51.

29 Ibid.

30 Ibid., M p. 52.

31 Interim Report, M p. 77.

32 Interim Report, M p. 78-79.

33 FBI Memorandum to Sullivan from Wannall, ~~XXXXXXXXXX~~ "CIA's Intention to Send Hoodlums to Cuba To Assassinate Castro," 3/6/67.

34 FBI blank internal memorandum to the Attorney General from the Director, FBI, 3/6/67, TOP SECRET.

35 Interim Report, M p. 79.

36 ~~FOUO~~ Interview with Edward Pierpont Morgan, ^{House Select Committee on Assassinations} 6/22/78, p. 1, (JFK Document No. 009530)

37 Ibid., HV

38 Ibid., HV

39 Interim Report, footnote 4, at p. 85.

40 Ibid.

41 Ibid.

42 Ibid.

43 Ibid.

House Select Committee on Assassinations

44 Ibid. See also Deposition of Robert ^(JFK Document No. 012926), Maker, 8/8/78, p. 37, ^{to be submitted in the F.R. Mann's Club case} where Maker discusses the issue of Roselli using Agency connections as assistance in Court proceedings. Maker stated that Roselli's attorney called him to ask him to participate in a statement ^{regarding} Roselli's involvement in the CIA - Organized Crime plots.

45. Book II, p. 14

46. ~~Ibid.~~

See fn 36,

47. ~~See~~ Interview of Morgan, ~~1/2/70~~, p. 3

48. Book II, p. 80

See fn 36,

49. ~~See~~ Interview of Morgan, ~~1/2/70~~, p. 2.

50. ~~Ibid.~~, p. 3

51. Book II, p. 82

The IGR noted in reference to this release of these plots that:

52. ~~Ibid.~~ Pearson's "ultimate source, Roselli, knows more about certain details of the gambling syndicate operation than we do, and he evidently has talked." ^{FBI A1} 106, p. 126

53. ~~XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX~~ 3/21/67, FBI Document no. 62-109060-4839.

54. ~~Ibid.~~, p. 3.

55. ~~Ibid. (over)~~ Type source indicate that

56. Book II, pp. 6, 85, 86.

On March 23, 1967, Director ~~_____~~ ordered the CIA Inspector General to prepare a report of the CIA assassination plots.

It should be noted that during this time, March, 1967,
~~Roselli~~ Roselli met with Jim Garrison in Las Vegas. Garrison,
of course, was then in the midst of his highly
publicized trial into the death of President
Kennedy. The ~~CIA~~ ~~OSI~~ ~~State~~ IOR stated:

"The Roselli-Garrison contact in Las Vegas in March is
particularly disturbing." ¹⁶⁴ p 127

57 Ibid, pp. 85-86.

58 I.G. Report at pp. 101-103.

59 Ibid, at p. 103.

60 Ibid, at p. 104.

61 The Washington Post, Monday, January 18, 1971, Section B, p. 7; Tuesday, January 19, 1971, Section D, p. 15.

62 Interim Report, footnote No. 4, at p. 85.

63 Ibid.

~~64~~

64 ~~100~~ Book II, at p. 1.

65 ~~100~~ Ibid, at p. 68.

66 ~~100~~ Ibid

67 ~~71~~ Ibid, p. 5

68 ~~70~~ Ibid, p. 2.

69 ~~71~~ Ibid.

70 ~~72~~ 1977 TASK FORCE Report, Central Intelligence Agency, pp. 1, 2. [Hereafter cited as T.F. Report]

71 ~~73~~ Ibid, TABA, at p. 2.

Paul Meskill,

72 ~~74~~ New York Daily News, article by Paul Meskill, 4/20/75.

Paul Meskill,

73 ~~75~~ New York Daily News, article by Paul Meskill, 4/21/75.

Paul Meskill,

74 ~~76~~ New York Daily News, articles by Paul Meskill, 4/21/75 and 4/23/75.

Paul Meskill

75 ~~77~~ New York Daily News, article by Paul Meskill, 6/13/76.

76 ~~82~~ Book I, W p. 80.

77 ~~89~~ T. F. Report, at Tab C, p. 15.

78 ~~80~~ Ibid. at Tab C, p. 17.

~~81~~ ~~80~~ Ibid., at p. 19. ~~scribble~~

80 ~~85~~ Ibid., at p. 18. ~~scribble~~

81 ~~85~~ T. F. Report, at Tab C, p. 19.

82 ~~84~~ Ibid., at p. 20 - should encompass the intended items.

83 ~~85~~ Ibid.

84 ~~83~~ Ibid.

85 ~~87~~ T. F. Report, at Tab D, p. 1.

86 ~~87~~ Ibid.

87 ~~87~~ Ibid., at pp. 6, 2.

88 ~~88~~ Ibid.

89 ~~97~~ Ibid. UK p. 5

90 ~~98~~ Ibid.

91 ~~99~~ Ibid.

92 ~~100~~ Ibid. UK p. 8

93 ~~101~~ Ibid. UK p. 8

94 ~~102~~ Ibid.

95 ~~103~~ Ibid.

96 ~~104~~ Ibid. UK p. 9

97 ~~105~~ Ibid.

98 ~~106~~ Ibid.

99 ~~107~~ Ibid. all p. 10

100 ~~108~~ Ibid. all p. 11

101 ~~109~~ Ibid. UK p. 13

102 ~~110~~ Ibid. UK p. 14

103 ~~105~~ ibid, p. 15.

104 ~~106~~ ibid, p. 16.

105 ~~107~~ ibid.

106 ~~108~~ ibid.

107 ~~109~~ T.F. Report, p. 12.

~~108~~
~~108~~

Jack Anderson, THE WASHINGTON POST

Jack Anderson and Les Whitten, "Behind John F. Kennedy's Murder," The Washington Post, 9/7/76; "CIA Withheld Data in JFK Probe," The Washington Post, 9/9/76; "Roselli Points From His Grave," The Washington Post, 10/23/78; "The Story Behind Trafficante's Testimony on JFK Assassination," The Washington Post, 10/24/78.
For this reason information

~~109~~
109

previously footnoted in this report which is used in the following analysis may not be cited again.

~~110~~
~~110~~
~~111~~

Executive Session Testimony of Richard Helms, 8/9/78, Hearing Before the House Select Committee on Assassinations, pp. 26-27.

See footnote #108.

~~112~~
112

Affidavit of Joseph Langosch, 9/14/78, House Select Committee on Assassinations, p. 1

113
~~115~~ Book V, pp. 3, 8, 19

115
~~116~~ Affidavit of Joseph Langoach, 9/14/78, p. 4

116
~~117~~ Ibid.

117
~~118~~ Affidavit of Kent L. Pollock, 10/5/78, House Select Committee on Assassinations, p. 1

118
~~119~~ Ibid., para 3, p. 2

119 Ibid., para 4, p. 2

House Select Committee on Assassinations

✓ 120 ~~(S)~~ Interview of Fidel Castro Ruz, 4/3/78, p. 38, 39, (JFK Document No. 011776)

✓ 121 Ibid., p. 40

✓ 122 Ibid., pp. 2, 3

○ 123 ~~(S)~~ Interim Report, p. 173

○ 124 ~~(S)~~ Ibid. p. 174

○ 125 ~~(S)~~ Ibid.

126 ~~(S)~~ Ibid.

127 ~~(S)~~ Ibid. p. 76

Interim Report, p. 76; fn. 1.

~~128~~ ~~Interim Report, p. 76; fn. 1.~~

129 Deposition of Robert Mahan, House Select Committee on Assassinations, 8/8/78, p. 18, (JFK Document No. 012926)

~~129~~ ~~Interim Report, p. 76; fn. 1.~~

130 Immigrant Testimony of Santo Trafficante, 9/28/78
Hearing Before the House Select Committee on Assassinations, 95th Congress, 2nd Session, Washington D.C., U.S. Government Printing Office, 479
Affidavit of James O'Connell, 9/25/78, Volume II, p. 78, JFK Document No. 012926

132 Ibid, p. 8 Committee on Assassinations

133 Ibid.

134 I.G. Report at p. 19
Deposition of Robert Mahan, 8/8/78, House Select Committee on Assassinations,

135 ~~Interim Report, p. 76; fn. 1.~~ p. 7, (JFK Document No. 012926)

136 Interim Report, at p. 77

137 Ibid, at footnote no. one, p. 77.
Jack Anderson, "The Untold Story: Our Government's Crackdown on Organized Crime"

138 The Washington Post Parade Magazine, 11/21/62.

139 Such a distinction ~~is~~^{is} invalid:
The action of dealing with any
criminal sources in a plot
to kill is reprehensible enough.

140 Interim Report, pt. p. 74

141 ibid. pt. p. 74

142 ibid.

House Select Committee on Assassinations

→ 143 Affidavit of James O'Connell, 9/25/78,
p. 12, ~~JK~~ ~~id.~~ ~~No.~~

144 ibid.

Call
main

145 Both maben and O'Connell attribute
each other with suggesting
that John Roselli be recruited. See
Interim Report at p. 75.

146 Interim Report at p. 75.

147 ~~Testimony of John P. ... Senate Select
Committee to Study Governmental
Operations, ...~~
Interim Report, p. 77

Ibid.

148

Testimony of Philip Markou
Special Select Committee on
Governmental Operations
12/27/78

House Select Committee on
Assassinations

~~149~~

149

~~Interview of Joseph Shimon,¹
8/17/78, p. 4, (JFK Document No. 013889)
See also Interview of Joseph
Shimon, British Broadcasting Corporation,
December, 1977, p. 6.~~

See fn. 149, Joseph Shimon, HSCA,

150

~~Interview~~ Interview, p. 4; BBC
Interview, p. 2

151

The contention refers only to the
CIA-Organized crime, 704s and not
to any independent operations that
Guatemala may have been involved in

152

I. B. Report, p. 25

153

Ibid., p. 27

154

Ibid., p. 29

155

Ibid.

156 ibid, @ p. 31

See fn. 130,

check

157 Immigrant Testimony of Santos
Trafficante, ~~(circled name)~~ 128/77, ~~(circled name)~~ Volume I, p.
→ public access to that government

158 ibid, @ p. 37

159 ibid, @ p.

160 ibid, @ p.

161 Testimony of John Roselli, Senate select Committee To
Study Governmental Operations, 6/24/75, p. 20

→ 162 Affidavit of James O'Connell, 9/25/70, p 17,
~~FBI DOCUMENT FILE~~

163 I. G. Report, @ p. 19.

164 O'Connell, @ p. 17.

→ 165 Executive Session Testimony of Antonio Verona,
~~(circled name)~~ p. 58.
Hearings Before the House select Committee on Assassinations, 3/16/78,

166 I. G. Report, @ p. 43.

167 ibid, @ p. 48

168 ibid.

169 = bid.

~~essentially~~

170 ~~Ibid.~~ ~~at~~ p. 49 - ~~chase~~ -

171 ~~Ibid.~~, ~~at~~ p. 27

House Select Committee on Assassinations,

172 ~~Interview~~ Interview of Joseph Shimoni, n
p. 3, JFK Document No. 013889

173 ~~Ibid.~~

174 ~~Ibid.~~

175 See Act. 110, Testimony of Richard Helms, Volume , p. 155.

~~176~~ I. G. Report, ~~at~~ p. 19.

176 File on Santo TRAFFICANTE AT THE Department

~~177~~ See ~~TRAFFICANTE~~ of State,

in case of ~~immunity~~ ~~test~~

~~178~~ ~~See~~ ~~TRAFFICANTE~~ ~~Testimony~~

See ~~TRAFFICANTE~~ fn. 130, Immunity Testimony of Santo TRAFFICANTE, Volume 5.

179 ~~179~~ I. G. Report, ~~at~~ p. 29.

See fn.

180 ~~179~~ ~~Executive Decision~~ Testimony of ~~TRAFFICANTE~~ ~~Verona~~, ~~TRAFFICANTE~~ ~~TRAFFICANTE~~

3/16/78, ~~TRAFFICANTE~~ pp. 7-10 ~~TRAFFICANTE~~

181 ~~181~~ ~~Ibid.~~, ~~at~~ p. 10.

(18)

~~182~~
~~182~~ I. G. Report, p. 30.

Sec. ref. 179,

~~183~~
~~183~~ Executive Session Testimony of Antonio
Verona, p. 36. *Del 30*

~~184~~
~~184~~ Ibid.

~~185~~
~~185~~ T.F. Report, TAB 2, p. 19.

~~186~~
~~186~~ I. G. Report, p. 18.

~~187~~
~~187~~ Interim Report, Footnote No. Two, p. 76.

~~188~~
~~188~~ Ibid.

~~189~~
~~189~~ FBI Memorandum, 10/18/60, to the
Director of the CIA from J. E. Hoover,
Subject "Anti-Castro Activities - CUBA",
File No. 109-524-0053.

~~190~~
~~189~~ FBI Report, 3/8/73, Richard CAIN
File, 92-12846-11, JFK DOCUMENT
NO.

~~191~~
~~191~~ Ibid. CAIN's superior dismissed
him from office in 1964 when CAIN
went to trial in a drug case
investigation. After 1964 CAIN

traveled extensively with
Giamore throughout the world and
also served a three year sentence
in the Texas State Federal
Penitentiary following a 1969
conviction for embezzlement in the
1963 robbery of Franklin Park Bank,
Illinois. As a result of the
bank robbery Cain became a target
of the TOP Echelon Criminal
Enforcement Program.

Early in his career Cain
established a reputation for experience
in sabotage, polygraphs, and
electronic surveillance. Cain was
reportedly fluent in Italian and
Spanish and traveled extensively
throughout Latin America. In
1973 Cain was slain in
gangland fashion in a Chicago
restaurant. See generally FBI
file on Richard Scallozetti CAIN, File
No. 92-12846.

192

~~192~~ CIA MEMORANDUM TO FBI, 11/4/60,
TO THE DIRECTOR, FBI, FROM DEPUTY DIRECTOR
OF PLANS, CIA, FILE NO. 105-93264-2,
SUBJECT: CAIN.

193

~~192~~ FBI LETTERHEAD MEMORANDUM, 11/2/60,
OFFICE: CHICAGO, ILLINOIS; SUBJECT: ANTI-
FIDEL CASTRO ACTIVITIES - INTERNAL SECURITY - CUBA;
FILE NO. 105-93264, ALSO CONTAINED IN
RICHARD E. CAIN FILE WHICH WAS SUPPLIED TO HSCA.
SEE ALSO FBI REPORT, 12/1/60, CHICAGO, ILLINOIS,
SUBJECT: ACCURATE DETECTIVE LABORATORY, aka,
CAIN INVESTIGATION, FILE NO. 139-1403-3.

194

~~193~~ Ibid.

195

~~194~~ Ibid.

196

~~195~~ FBI BLANK LETTERHEAD AIRTEL, 11/3/60,
TO THE DIRECTOR FROM SAC, MIAMI; SUBJECT:
MILITARY AND NAVAL MATTERS - CUBA; FILE
NO. 105-93264

197

~~196~~ Ibid.

198

~~197~~ Ibid.

199

~~198~~ Ibid.

252 Book II, p. 68

253 Castro Report, Senator George McGovern
(JFK Document 000593)

254 See generally FBI Files pertaining to
Norman Rothman: File No. 87-57543,
File No. 97-4030, Volumes 3, 5, and 6.

255 ~~255~~ FBI Files on Norman Rothman, see specifically,
FBI Interview of Norman Rothman, 6/29/61,

256 SA John P. Lenchin and George E. Drann, JR.
~~256~~ Ibid.

257 ~~257~~ Deposition of Norman Rothman, 4/6/78,
p. ~~100~~⁵⁶ (JFK Document No. 007235)

Footnotes:

- 267 1. Interim Report,
~~"Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders,"~~
Report of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, 1975,
pp. 131-132. See para.
- 268 2. Ibid.
- 269 3. Ibid.
- 270 4. Ibid.
- 271 5. Ibid., at p. 74.
- 272 6. Ibid., at p. 132.
- 273 7. Ibid., at pp. 83-84, 133.
- 274 8. Ibid., at p. 133. The Inspector General sets forth Robert F. Kennedy's partial knowledge of the plots in a similar manner in another section of the 1967 Report. In an analysis of the newspaper column by Drew Pearson and Jack Anderson in 1967, in which it was stated that, "Robert Kennedy may have approved (the) plot," the Inspector General's Report disagreed with that statement. The Report stated: "Not true. He was briefed on Gambling Syndicate-Phase One after it was over. He was not briefed on Phase Two." The Report went on to state (pages 118-119) that Pearson and Anderson had "a garbled account of the role played by Robert Kennedy."
- 275 9. Interim Report,
~~"Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders,"~~ p. 133.
- 276 10. Ibid.
- 277 11. Ibid.
- 278 12. Ibid.
- 279 13. Ibid.
- 280 14. I.G.R., p. 64.
- 281 15. Ibid., at p. 64-65.
- 282 16. Ibid., at p. 66.
- 283 17. Interim Report,
~~"Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders,"~~ p. 134.
- 284 18. Ibid.
- 285 19. Ibid., p. 103.