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LATIN AMERICA SECURITY
CUBAN SPONSORED SUBVERSION

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
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RESTRICTIONS : 4
CURRENT STATUS : Redact
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OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS : Califano Papers, Box 6, Folder 30. Assorted documents related to Cuban material support of Communist subversives in Latin America.

JFK Records Review
Department of the Army EO 13526
☒ Declassify ☐ Exclude ☐ Exempt
Authority
☐ Refer To
Review Date 3/12/2015 By

ARMS SHIPMENTS - TO
AND FROM CUBA

NW 50955 DocId:32423736 Page 2

ARMS SHIPMENT

General: Arms smuggling is one of the "facts of life" in Latin American and has been engaged in by dissident elements for many years. Reports of Castro involvement in these activities have been frequent since shortly after his seizure of power early in 1959. None of these reports has ever been proven. With the arrival of large quantities of Soviet Bloc arms in 1961, Cuba recovered all U.S. arms in the hands of the populace and made it a crime punishable by death to have possession of weapons of U.S. manufacture. The U.S. arms furnished under the MAP to former Cuban governments together with those collected by Castro provide the Castro government with large stocks which could be shipped to subversive groups in other countries. Identification of these arms with Cuba would be extremely difficult.

Tab

1 Reports of Method of Operation

This Tab contains five items: (1) Two reports alleging arms smuggling by fishermen and by means of food products shipped to Latin America; (2) A report which indicates that a Cuban arms cache discovered in Brazil is not of Cuban origin; and (3) Two reports concerning a Cuban arsenal purportedly being used to supply arms for an invasion of some Caribbean country or an invasion of South America.

2 Reports of Arms Smuggling

This Tab contains a number of items reporting arms smuggling to Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, Venezuela, British Guiana and Brazil. Note particularly the top item in which the British indicate the numerous reports on arms smuggling to British

NW 50955 DocId:32423736 Page 3

Guinea are without foundation and the second item which refutes the report contained in the Life Magazine article of 8 February.

NW 50955 DocId:32423736 Page 4



TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
CONTROLLED DISSEM

COUNTRY CUBA/LATIN AMERICA

REPORT NO. TDCS DB-3/653,152

SUBJECT POSSIBLE CONCEALMENT OF WEAPONS FOR SHIPMENT TO LATIN AMERICA

DATE DISTR. 6 FEBRUARY 1963

PRECEDENCE ROUTINE

DATE OF INFO. LATE 1962

REFERENCES IN 62553
35871

PLACE & DATE ACQ. UNITED STATES (4 FEBRUARY 1963)

APPRAISAL 6

FIELD REPORT NO.

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE U.S. OWNER (C) OF A MARINA, FROM A FORMER CUBAN AIR FORCE OFFICER, FROM THE BROTHER OF AN EMPLOYEE OF A CANNERY IN SAN CRISTOBAL.

1. IN LATE 1962 A DAY-SHIFT EMPLOYEE AT A CANNERY IN SAN CRISTOBAL, PINAR DEL RIO PROVINCE, FOUND A HAND GRENADE WRAPPED IN NYLON AND BEDDED IN SHREDDED COCONUT IN A CAN WHICH HAD FELT UNUSUALLY HEAVY. (FIELD COMMENT: IT IS NOT CLEAR WHETHER THE CAN HAD GONE THROUGH THE CANNING PROCESS AND HAD BEEN SEALED.) AS A RESULT OF HIS DISCOVERY THE WORKER WAS ALMOST FIRED. ONE OF THE MILITIA GUARDS AT THE CANNERY SAID THAT AMMUNITION AND OTHER EQUIPMENT IS REGULARLY CANNED AND SHIPPED TO LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES. A SPECIAL NIGHT SHIFT WORKS AT THE PLANT.

2. (FIELD COMMENT: AN UNTESTED SOURCE REPORTED IN EARLY OCTOBER 1962 THAT IN JULY 1962 A STORY WAS CIRCULATING IN SAN

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
CONTROLLED DISSEM

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

STATE/INR	DIA	ARMY/ACSI	NAVY	AIR	JCS	SECDEF	NSA	NIC	XXX	USIA	OCI	ONE	OCR	ORR	OBI	OO	FBI
STATE/DIR																	

REPCINCLANT INS EXO

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

ANDRES, AN ISLAND POSSESSION OF COLOMBIA, THAT A PISTOL HAD BEEN FOUND EARLIER CONCEALED INSIDE A FROZEN CHICKEN WHICH HAD BEEN PART OF A SHIPMENT RECEIVED FROM CUBA.)

3. FIELD DISSEM: CINCARIB, CINCLANT.

END OF MESSAGE

NW 50955 DocId:32423736 Page 7

An arms cache of weapons and ammunition recently discovered at the Ligas Camponesas guerrilla training center in the interior of the Brazilian state of Goias is believed by US Embassy and CAS officers to be of Brazilian rather than Cuban arms, despite a Brazilian newspaper suggestion that they were Cuban. There were also discovered about 125 copies of Communist publications including Che Guevara's well-known treatise on "Guerrilla Warfare". The training center was described as organized according to that book. A confidential report on the discoveries added that "members of the center want to be the Brazilian equivalent of those who fought in the Sierra Maestra and so bring the hard Chinese-Cuban type revolution to Brazil." Some 90 to 95 persons in the locality are reported members of or sympathetic to the Ligas Camponesas activities, but only 2 of the 24 for whom warrents were issued have yet been taken into custody. (Am Emb, Rio de Janeiro 1122, 10 December, CONFIDENTIAL, and CIA, Brasilia, IN 33026, 11 December, SECRET NOFORN)

NW 50955 DocId:32423736 Page 8

INFORMATION REPORT

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY Export 2 Rev.

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S-E-C-R-E-T
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

w/ Plw

COUNTRY	Cuba/USSR/Latin America	REPORT NO.	CS-3/530,898
SUBJECT	1. Use of Soviet Fishing Boats to Transport Arms to Latin America 2. Belgian Arms Dealer in Habana	DATE DISTR.	11 December 1962
		NO. PAGES	1
		REFERENCES	RD -W-2107 RD-ACQ-01258
DATE OF INFO.	Paras. 1 & 2: October 1962; Para. 3: August 1962		
PLACE & DATE ACQ.	Paras. 1, 2: France, Paris; Para. 3: Spain, Madrid Paras. 1, 2: 23 November 1962; Para. 3: 12 October 1962	FIELD REPORT NO.	38957

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE: Paras. 1 & 2: An official French service; Para. 3: CC-1197, Cuban refugee (F), a former employee of the Cuban diplomatic service, who visited Santiago de Cuba in August 1962.
Appraisal of Content: 3.

1. Soviet fishing boats, under cover of fishing Atlantic waters, are transporting contraband arms to Latin American countries. The boats are met outside the territorial waters of those countries, and arms are transferred in small quantities. On board the Soviet boats are only Soviets and a very few Cubans or other Latin Americans who talk with those who pick up the arms. The arms being delivered are of American manufacture, including those obtained during the Batista regime and those taken during the Playa Giron invasion. The Soviet fishing boats also carry propaganda and pamphlets containing military instructions, the same type of material being sent by diplomatic pouch from Mexico.

2. A Belgian in Habana who says he represents a Belgian firm, has offered the Cuban Government any type and nationality of arms for payment in dollars. The Belgian has made a similar offer of sale of arms to a representative of an anti-Castro group in Habana.

3. In August 1962 a fisherman in Santiago de Cuba said that on several occasions he had been forced by the Government to use his boat for transporting small groups of men, in civilian clothes, and supplies of arms. He also knew of other fishermen who had been forced to do the same. The men and arms were carried to small islands or transferred to other boats at sea. Such trips sometimes lasted as long as four or five days. The fisherman did not know the purpose or final destination of the men and arms.

S-E-C-R-E-T
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

STATE	ARMY	NAVY	AIR	NSA	OCR	DIA	FBI
X	X	X	X	X	X	X	2

REPCINCLANT CINCARIB # COAST GUARD X X NIC X

(Note: Washington distribution indicated by "X"; Field distribution by "#".)

INFORMATION REPORT

SECRET

SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM

Exploit & Rev.

CIA INFORMATION REPORT CS-3/532,138

COUNTRY: CUBA

26 December 1962

SUBJECT: IDENTIFICATION OF CUBAN VESSELS ALLEGEDLY PREPARED TO INVADE A CARIBBEAN COUNTRY

DATE OF INFO: 28 NOVEMBER 1962

SOURCE: TRAVELING SALESMAN (F)

APPRAISAL OF CONTENT: 3

HEADQUARTERS COMMENT: ACCORDING TO TDCS-3/530,589, DATED 6 DECEMBER 1962, AS OF MID-NOVEMBER TWO CUBAN SHIPS LOADED WITH PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT WERE XXXX SAID TO BE PREPARED FOR AN INVASION OF HAITI. SOURCE SAID HE WOULD PROVIDE THE NAMES OF THE SHIPS AND THEIR DEPARTURE DATE.

THE FRUCUBA AND THE FUNDADOR, CUBAN-FLAG VESSELS, WERE DOCKED AT THE ARSENAL DOCKS IN CASABLANCA (HABANA) IN LATE NOVEMBER. THESE XXXX VESSELS WERE SCHEDULED TO PARTICIPATE IN AN INVASION OF SOME CARIBBEAN COUNTRY.

SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM

SECRET

NW 50955 DocId:32423736 Page 10

ARMS SHIPMENTS

CONFIDENTIAL

Extract

CONFIDENTIAL

CUBA

Stockpile of War Material for Latin America (C)

19 January 1962

1 of 1

Early January 1962

None

Habana, c/a 7 January 62
C-6
DUJ X16/36-6-62

DUJ
DUJ
DUJ-43-62

1. Source reports an arsenal or stockpiling of war materiel at Casablanca, a Habana District, northeast shore of Habana Bay, Habana Province.

2. Source has heard this materiel is targeted for an invasion of South America.

DOWNGRADED AT 12 YEARS
INTERVALS NOT AUTO-
MATICALLY DECLASSIFIED
DOD DIR 5200.10

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

OPNS BRANCH

Venezuela Uncovers Communist Arms Cache

The Venezuelan Government -- in a raid on a small village near Caracas on 5 January -- uncovered a large cache of arms and equipment which it claims belonged to the pro-Castro Armed Forces of National Liberation, reputed to be emerging as a para-military arm of the Venezuelan Communist Party. Several tons of explosives and large quantities of hand bombs, arms, and ammunition were seized as well as a nearby clandestine Communist radio transmitter. (SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM)

SOURCE: TDCS 533,071 (S/NFD); FBIS (OUO); PRESS

(REVERSE BLANK)

SECRET—NO FOREIGN DISSEM

NW 50955 DocId:32423736 Page 12

ARMS SHIPMENTS

12 Feb 63 "All the information available to Her Majesty's Government and to the British authorities in British Guiana indicates that there is no truth whatever in the continuing reports that arms are being shipped to the colony from Cuba. Similar stories have appeared from time to time in the past, but upon examination all have been found to be without foundation."

(British Embassy in US to Reuters, AP and UPI).

SECRET

12 February 1963

SUBJECT: (U) Reported Arms Shipment from Cuba on 14 Jan 63

1. The 8 February 1963 edition of LIFE contains a story on Cuba with the following caption under the photo of a Russian freighter:

> "But refugees aboard the SHIRLEY LYKES said two ships put out from Mariel (Cuba) only last week with holds loaded with weapons sent by Castro to British Guiana."

2. A debrief report of a Cuban national who arrived at Port Everglades on 25 January 1963 contained the following statement:

> "I was told by an assistant ship inspector for the Port of Havana that on 14 January 1963 two launches captained by a man with what appeared to be an Italian accent had departed from the La Coubre wharf (Havana). Manifest on ship indicated the destination was British Guiana. However, the ship inspector had been told by the stevedores at the wharf that two launches were loaded with arms and the true destination was Venezuela."

TD/00-R-3249336 DTG 2816052

3. The following information may refer to this arms shipment. An untested CIA source, a member of the Communist Party of Colombia in Cali, has stated that during a conversation on 5 January 1963 between Amado de Jesus Zapata, member of the Department of Valle Regional Committee of the Communist Party of Colombia (PCC), and P.I. Plata, a Cuban deep-cover agent working with the Seventh of January Worker - Student - Peasant Movement (MOEC), in Colombia and Venezuela, Plata said that the MOEC is not a local movement but rather a part of a Latin American concept which is being assisted by Castro and the Cuban Government. He said he has been in Cali for one year on a special assignment from the top leaders in Cuba to see that arms, propaganda, and instructions from Venezuela, originating in Cuba, get into the hands of the MOEC groups.

4. Plata said an important shipment for MOEC is due to arrive from Venezuela via Cucuta in February 1963. (Cucuta, capital of the Department of Norte de Santander, Colombia, is on the Venezuelan border and is a traditional center of smuggling between the two countries.)

CIA Report C3-1/5[illegible], dated 10 Jan 63 Ref RD-W-2107

5. Another report may also refer to this arms shipment. According to information dated 1 February 1963 from a CIA source and appraised by the CIA preparing office as possible true, Pedro MATOS, who together with the three-member regional command committee of the Partido Comunista de Venezuela (PCV) in the state of Zulia is responsible for PCV arms matters in that state, said recently that the party is awaiting a shipment of arms from Cuba and Panama but that the exact date of arrival is still unknown.

CIA Report TDCS-3/536,942, dtd 9 Feb 63 Ref IN 44876

6. Replies to DIA SICR's on this subject from NSA and CNO do not indicate any vessels departing Havana on or after 14 January bound for British Guiana, nor do State Department queries to Georgetown, British Guiana indicate the arrival of any arms. No reports have been received from service attaches in Venezuela or from sources in Panama concerning this particular matter.

Project Officer:
CDR Barton

TELEGRAM | INFORMATION REPORT | TELEGRAM

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Cuba

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CONFIDENTIAL (When Filled In)

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

NO FOREIGN DISSEM

COUNTRY NICARAGUA / HONDURAS / COSTA RICA / CUBA

REPORT NO. TDCS-3/534,035

SUBJECT PLANS TO LAND ARMS FROM CUBA IN HONDURAS

DATE DISTR. 16 JANUARY 1963

Export Rev Draw

PRECEDENCE ROUTINE

DATE OF INFO. 9 JANUARY 1963

REFERENCES IN 50511

PLACE & DATE ACQ. NICARAGUA, MANAGUA (15 JANUARY 1963)

APPRAISAL 3

FIELD REPORT NO. NM-729

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE A NICARAGUAN JOURNALIST (C) FROM A NICARAGUAN OFFICIAL (F) IN SAN JOSE; FROM CESAR AUGOSTO VILLAREAL CABEZAS

ACTION COPY
OPERATIONS AREA

1. ON 9 JANUARY 1963 CESAR AUGUSTO VILLAREAL CABEZAS, A NICARAGUAN REVOLUTIONARY LIVING IN SAN JOSE, SAID THAT HE WAS AWAITING INSTRUCTIONS TO GO TO PUERTO CORTES, HONDURAS TO RECEIVE A SHIPMENT OF ARMS WHICH WILL COME FROM CUBA ON THE "CORK_C", A MERCHANT VESSEL OF UNKNOWN REGISTRY. HE SAID THAT THE INSTRUCTIONS TO GO TO PUERTO CORTES WILL COME FROM CUBA THROUGH DR. EMILIO ORTEGA TAPIA.

2. THE "CORK_C" WILL UNLOAD THE ARMS AT CAYO COCHINO WHERE THEY WILL BE RECEIVED BY GRIFFIN (FNU), WHO LIVES IN PUERTO CORTES. GRIFFIN WILL DELIVER THE ARMS TO VILLAREAL AT PUERTO CORTES.

3. THE ARMS WILL BE TAKEN FROM PUERTO CORTES TO PUEBLO NUEVO,

CONFIDENTIAL

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

NO FOREIGN DISSEM

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

STATE/INR	DIA	ARMY/ACSI	NAVY	AIR	JCS	SECDEF	NSA	NIC	AID	USIA	OCI	ONE	OCR	ORR	OBI	OO
STATE/DIR																

TELEGRAM | INFORMATION REPORT | TELEGRAM

DA IN 8112

FORM 1Kq OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS CONFIDENTIAL 0000

NW 50955 DocId:32423736 Page 17

NICARAGUA BY VILLAREAL, JULIO VELASQUEZ VELEZ, AND DR. HERNAN SILVA ARGUELLO WHERE, THEY WILL BE TURNED OVER TO DR. EMILIO FLORES OBREGON.

4. (SOURCE COMMENT: THE DATE OF ARRIVAL OF THE "CORK C" IS UNKNOWN. CARLOS FONSECA AMADOR, NICARAGUAN COMMUNIST GUERRILLA LEADER IN HONDURAS, HAS RECEIVED ARMS FROM CUBA BY THE SAME SYSTEM.)

FIELD DISSEM: STATE ARMY CINCARIB CINCLANT.

ACTION: ACSI, NAVY, AF, JCS, OSD
INFO : DCSOP
DA IN 8112

END OF MESSAGE

TELEGRAM | INFORMATION REPORT | TELEGRAM

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

SECRET (When Filled In) 1963 FEB 9 11 41

COUNTRY VENEZUELA

REPORT NO. TDCS-3/536,942

DIAAP-3

SUBJECT POSSIBLE SHIPMENT OF ARMS FROM CUBA AND PANAMA TO WESTERN VENEZUELA

DATE DISTR. 9 FEBRUARY 1963

PRECEDENCE ROUTINE

DATE OF INFO. 1 FEBRUARY 1963

REFERENCES IN 64876

PLACE & DATE ACQ. VENEZUELA, MARACAIBO (1 FEBRUARY 1963)

FIELD REPORT NO. HVC-2651

APPRAISAL 3

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE A MEMBER (C) OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF VENEZUELA IN MARACAIBO.

1. PEDRO MATOS, WHO TOGETHER WITH THREE MEMBER REGIONAL COMMAND COMMITTEE OF THE PARTIDO COMUNISTA DE VENEZUELA (PCV, COMMUNIST PARTY OF VENEZUELA) IN THE STATE OF ZULIA IS RESPONSIBLE FOR PCV ARMS MATTERS IN THAT STATE, SAID RECENTLY THAT THE PARTY IS AWAITING A SHIPMENT OF ARMS FROM CUBA AND PANAMA BUT THAT THE EXACT DATE OF ARRIVAL IS STILL UNKNOWN. SOURCE COMMENT: ALTHOUGH THE LOCATIONS OF ARMS ARE KNOWN ONLY TO MATOS AND THE REGIONAL COMMAND COMMITTEE, IT IS POSSIBLE THAT THE AREA AROUND LA CONCEPCION AND LA PAZ, TOWNS APPROXIMATELY SOUTHWEST AND WEST, RESPECTIVELY, OF MARACAIBO CITY IN THE DISTRICT OF MARACAIBO, ARE SITES). (FIELD COMMENT: ACCORDING TO SOURCE, THE REGIONAL

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

SECRET

GROUP Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

STATE/INR	DIA	ARMY/ACSI	NAVY	AIR	JCS	SECDEF	NSA	NIC	AID	USIA	OCI	ONE	OCR	ORR	OBI	OO	
STATE/DIR																	

TELEGRAM | INFORMATION REPORT | TELEGRAM

AAP-3

FORM 114 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. (15-20)

NW 50955 DocId:32423736 Page 19

COMMITTEE OF THE PCV IN THE STATE OF ZULIA HAD BEEN DISSOLVED AS OF EARLY FEB '63 AND A THREE MEMBER REGIONAL COMMAND COMMITTEE ESTABLISHED).

2. FIELD DISSEM:STATE ARMY NAVY AIR CINCLANT CINCARIB.

END OF MESSAGE

NW 50955 DocId:32423736 Page 20

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
STAFF MESSAGE DIVISION
INCOMING MESSAGE

RETRANSMITTED TO: SAC, TAC, CONAD, AFSC, MATS (per req Mr Kerp-CIN-25Feb62)

AF IN: 50955 (24 Feb 62) K/eld

ACTION: CIN-17 (18)

A/D: ARMY-2, NAVY-2, CMC-7, JCS-45, OSD-15 OSD/SDLU-1, STATE-15, CIA-11, NSA-7 XPD-3, ISI-2, IDS-2 (112) (Rtsd by Mr Kerp-CIN-25Feb62)

RC 41/24 FEB 62
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1127 USAF FAG FT BELVOIR VA //PROTECTED//
INFO CIARC ALBROOK AFB CZ
USAIRAS GUATEMALA BRAZIL VENEZUELA
BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L XX CITE CHARLIE DASH NINE SGD HARRIS PARA MILITARY REP OF EURHPEAN WESTERN NATION ACCREDITED MEXICO REPORTED TWO TWO FEB HAVING RECD INFO FROM TWO DIFFERENT SOURCES THAT CUBAN SHIPLOAD OF ARMS HAD DEPARTED EITHER SANTIAGO DE CUBA OR BAHIA DE NIPE TWO XERO DEGREE FOUR FIVE MINUTES NORTH SEVEN FIVE DEGREES FOUR XERO MINUTES WEST DURING WEEK OF ONE ONE TO ONE SEVEN FEB PD SHIP REPORTEDLY HEADED FOR BRITISH GUIANA OR NORTHEAST BRAZIL PD LOCAL EMB INTEL AGENCIES UNABLE CONFIRM PARA SCP DASH THREE

BT

DOWNGRADED AT 12 YEAR INTERVALS;
NOT AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED
DOD DIR. 5200.10

ACTION: AF, (ARMY ACSI)
INFO : DCSOP, ORD
DA IN 205836

CONFIDENTIAL

AFHQ AGM NOV 50 0-309a
PREVIOUS EDITIONS OF THIS FORM MAY BE USED.

The British consul in Santiago de Cuba has informed Washington and the Governor of British Guiana that two alleged US citizens, John Allram Johnson, aged 53, and his wife Margaret Frances Johnson, were leaving Cuba on 31 December on the Cuban vessel BAHIA DE TANAMA destined for Georgetown, British Guiana. On board with them were 17 cases in their name, including two large wood crates understood to be "very similar to those recently unloaded from a Soviet Union ship in Santiago de Cuba." The British consul notes the unlikelihood of US citizens' leaving Cuba in this manner, and the resulting doubt as to their real identities and intentions. (British Foreign Office to Washington, No. 9759, 31 December, 1962 (SECRET))

NW 50955 DocId:32423736 Page 22

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

COUNTRY Cuba/British Guiana

SUBJECT Shipment of Weapons to British Guiana

REPORT NO. OO- K-3,210,102

DATE DISTR. 21 Feb 62

NO. PAGES One

REFERENCES CD/OO Case 36159 H2/05676/G5
Case 35662 78/IWW/DOM-81/CX

DATE OF INFO. Dec 1962

PLACE & DATE ACQ. --; Dec 1962

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

SOURCE: Cuban national, A 12 884 576, who arrived in the US on 3 Feb 1962.

Source is an electrical engineer and advisor to undergroundgroups in Cuba.

[This report was developed by an Army representative assigned to the office of preparation.]

I was advised by a Cuban merchant marine officer that the Cuban freighter, "Bahia de Nipe" left Cuba for British Guiana on 22 Dec 1961 with a cargo shipment of weapons. The boxes containing this equipment were stored in the bottom of the ship's hold and covered with mattresses and canvas. A cargo of sugar bags was placed on top of the weapons.

-end-

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State 02147

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

FEB 6 10 16 AM '63

Origin: EUR

Info: SS G SAL ARA P USIA SCA NSC INR CIA NSA OSD ARMY NAVY AIR RMR

ACTION: Amembassy GEORGETOWN 286

UNCLASSIFIED MESSAGE REFERRING TO THIS MESSAGE BY CITE NUMBER WILL BE DESIGNATED EFTO

The Feb 8 edition of LIFE contains story on Cuba with following caption under photo of Russian freighter:

QUOTE

But refugees aboard the Shirley Lykes said two ships put out from Mariel (Cuba) only last week with holds loaded with weapons sent by Castro to British Guiana. UNQUOTE

Would appreciate any available comment.

END

RUSK

ACTION: STATE (ARMY ACSI)

INFO : DCSOP, OSA, JCS

DA IN 827722

Drafted by: EUR:RNA:RTepper:cjk 2/5/63

Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: RNA — Mr. Knox

Clearances:

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FORM S-61 DS-322

NW 50955 DocId:32423736 Page 24

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

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CONFIDENTIAL

8 1013

1963 2 13

Control: 4682
Rec'd: February 7, 1963
12:57 PM

FROM: Georgetown

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 245, February 7, NOON

Reference: Department's 286 February 6.

Neither harbor master nor shipping companies have any knowledge Cuban ships en route Georgetown. Guiana Import-Export agents for sales rice Cuba, states it is always notified as soon as rice ships leave Cuba so that necessary arrangements at RMB wharf can be made. It denies having received any notice recently. Governor also reports negative results his inquiries.

CONGEN has had numerous inquiries AP story mentioned TOUSI 18. Appreciate any clarification (not for release to press) Department can give.

MELBY

TEK/18

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FBIS 84 OFFICIAL USE ONLY

PARIS AFP IN ENGLISH TO THE FAR EAST 1905 7 FEB 63 E

(EXCERPT) GEORGETOWN--BRITISH GUIANA IN A STATE OF NEAR PANIC TODAY AFTER NEWSPAPERS AND RADIO STATIONS PUT OUT A WASHINGTON NEWSPAPER REPORT THAT CUBA WAS SENDING TWO SHIPS FULL OF SOVIET ARMS TO THIS COUNTRY. PREMIER CHEDDI JAGAN CALLED THE REPORT FROM THE WASHINGTON EVENING STAR FANTASTIC AND UNFOUNDED. A SPOKESMAN IN THE HOME AFFAIRS MINISTRY SAID THE GOVERNMENT EXPECTED NO ARMS FROM THE SOVIET UNION OR CUBA.

7 FEB 749P FG/OP

04289

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

CONFIDENTIAL

CUBA

FEB 9 11 17 AM '63

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Origin
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ACTION: AmConGen GEORGETOWN 293

Info:
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Washington ~~investigation~~ intelligence agencies have no information to confirm alleged munitions shipments from Cuba to Georgetown.

~~Sub~~

Story originated with caption current edition Life Magazine to effect two Russian ships carrying munitions from Mariel, Cuba to BG. O'Leary of Washington Evening Star apparently seized on Life story as basis Evening Star article. Unlikely any responsible US official confirm story as O'Leary alleged in article.

If repeat if Department is asked by press, we plan say we have no information but are making inquiries.

END

RUSK

Drafted by: EUR:BNA:RJTepper:ldd 2/8/63

Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: EUR/BNA - M. Gordon Knox

Clearances:
INR - Mr. Packman
EUR/P - Mr. McGowan
INR/CS - Mr. Simmons
~~ARA - Mr. Sumn~~
CCA - Mr. Follestad

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FORM 5-61 DS-322

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

COUNTRY	British Guiana/Cuba	REPORT NO.	OO-B-3,247,344
SUBJECT	Jagan's Political-Economic Viewpoints/Expropriation of Foreign Properties Linked to Foreign Aid/Futility of Jagan's 5-Year Plan/Peoples Progressive Party Infiltration of United Front/Arms Smuggling from Cuba/ Filariasis Disease Common in Guiana Back Country.	DATE DISTR.	11 Jan 63
		NO. PAGES	
		REFERENCES	
DATE OF INFO.	Thru Oct 62		
PLACE & DATE ACQ.	British Guiana/Thru Oct 62		

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

SOURCE: US national, executive in a US aluminum company.

Source has frequently traveled to and within British Guiana in connection with geological surveys for his company. He has known Jagan for about nine years, and on his latest trip had several conversations with Jagan.

1. On the basis of many conversations with Cheddi Jagan (mostly concerning possible investments by my company in British Guiana), I am convinced that he is not a Communist. In fact, Jagan does not know what he is. He is simply looking for anything new that will help to pull up his people quickly. In this context he sees Soviet and Chinese Communism as the two principal Twentieth Century economic experiments -- and as economic experiments he is willing to try them.

2. In talking with me, Jagan has made clear that he is not a "Castro Type." He wants help from anybody. The one thing that might in the future seriously hinder his getting economic aid from the USSR is that he demands that aid be without strings.

3. Both Jagan and his Trade Minister, Frank Hubbard, have told me that Jagan would hesitate to do anything (such as confiscating foreign properties in an attempt to increase revenues) which would offend the US or the UN for fear of ruining any future chances of obtaining US or UN aid. Jagan is of course quite conscious that he is still under the UK and that it is therefore unconstitutional for him to expropriate anything. After British Guiana achieves independence, I am confident Jagan would not expropriate anything if he is getting aid from the US or the UN -- that is, until the money is spent. If at any point (after independence) Jagan is receiving no such aid and has no prospects of receiving such aid, then anything could happen. I would, however, temper this somewhat depressing estimate of Jagan by commenting that in 1953 when he entered office, he was something of a wild-eyed fanatic without direction. Since then he has matured considerably.

4. The PPP capability for increasing the industrial wealth of British Guiana is hopeless. Jagan indiscriminately wants all kinds of factories. His "Five Year Plan" is no plan at all. In his eagerness to do something for British Guiana, Jagan thinks he ought to build any kind of factory that the country does not have. Whenever he thinks of something, he just tells a subordinate to add it to the Plan. But there is no one in the Jagan government who has done or can do the marketing research, etc., which is necessary for any such investment.

5 4 3 2 1

5 4 3 2 1

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

STATE	ARMY	NAVY	AIR	FBI	AEC

NW 50955 DocId:32423736 Page 28

5. In the last elections Jagan ordered some of his (Indian) Peoples Progressive Party (PPP) supporters to join the United Front Party (UFP) in order to impress the world in general and the US in particular that democracy in British Guiana was working. By virtue of the fact that the UFP membership was "growing," it was "obvious" that Jagan was not a dictator. I was told this by two Indian Guianese who were working for Jagan.

6. I was in British Guiana for about 12 months on my latest trip. Since much of this time was devoted to geological surveying in the hinterland, I was accompanied by an Indian Guianese doctor. A well-educated man of the upper-middle class, he told me that arms were being smuggled into the country from Cuba. He did not go into any detail on the subject, but he did mention that his sons, who were members of the Progressive Youth Organization (PYO) frequently brought arms into their home, kept them for a while, and then disposed of them. The doctor was so much concerned -- and pessimistic -- about the situation that he emigrated from the country shortly after I departed.

7. Malaria is not a factor now. Even well into the interior there is less than 1 percent incidence. But anywhere away from the coast filariasis presents a problem. At first I did not believe it when my Indian Guianese doctor said that mosquito bites incurred in the day-time were harmless but mosquito bites at night would infect with filariasis. After several months in the back country I believed him. The disease seems to affect women more than men, causing women's legs to swell. But the disease's affect on men's sexual organs was not exactly encouraging. I never did understand why, but my doctor said that to be effective in detecting the disease a blood test must be made at night (preferably between 11 p.m. and 1 a.m.), and analyzed quickly. If filariasis is treated promptly, a man's sexual prowess can be saved. We found that the disease is very common throughout the country.

- end -

NW 50955 DocId:32423736 Page 29

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

COUNTRY Cuba/British Guiana

SUBJECT Shipment of Weapons to British Guiana

REPORT NO. OO- K-3,210,102

DATE DISTR. 21 Feb 62

NO. PAGES One

REFERENCES CD/00 Case 36159 H2/05676/G5
Case 35662 78/IWW/DOM-81/CX

DATE OF INFO. Dec 1962

PLACE & DATE ACQ. --; Dec 1962

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

SOURCE: Cuban national, A 12 884 576, who arrived in the US on 3 Feb 1962.

Source is an electrical engineer and advisor to undergroundgroups in Cuba.

[This report was developed by an Army representative assigned to the office of preparation.]

I was advised by a Cuban merchant marine officer that the Cuban freighter, "Bahia de Nipe" left Cuba for British Guiana on 22 Dec 1961 with a cargo shipment of weapons. The boxes containing this equipment were stored in the bottom of the ship's hold and covered with mattresses and canvas. A cargo of sugar bags was placed on top of the weapons.

-end-


COMMUNICATIONS

COMMUNICATIONS

There is little information available on the Castro/Communist communication network with Latin America. Over the past years there are numerous reports indicating that communications are carried by visitors to and from Cuba, that Cuban Embassies serve as communication points for Castro/Communist subversive groups in various countries, and that directions to subversive groups are transmitted by clandestine radio transmitters in Cuba. Preceding items on radio propaganda and propaganda shipments, arms shipments, and the training of personnel in Cuba are closely related to communications. Information on Communist organizations and the Communist apparatus also are related to the question of communication.

There have been some references to instructions from Cuba; however, such evidence is not available and copies of these documents made available in the past would not withstand scrutiny.

TAB

1 Electronic Communications

This Tab contains three items: (1) A general comment on electrical communications; (2) An item indicating the use of amateur radio stations for communications; and (3) A report of a clandestine receiving station in the Dominican Republic.

2 Documents

This Tab contains an item referring to documents obtained from the plane crash in Peru. Initially, the Peruvian press and Peruvian officials indicated these documents proved Castro/Communist sponsor-

NW 50955 DocId:32423736 Page 32

ship of a revolution in Brazil; however, the Brazilian Government has not taken public note of the document.

3 Couriers

This Tab contains illustrative reports of travellers to and from Cuba who may act as couriers. This item is closely related to information on individuals and groups travelling to Cuba for training or propaganda.

NW 50955 DocId:32423736 Page 33



ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATIONS

There are numerous reports of a highly classified nature concerning electronica communications between Cuba and the Bloc, within Cuba, and between Cuba and Latin America. Some reports infer that Prensa Latina facilities may be used for other than news purposes and there are frequent reports of clandestine radio instructions to Latin American from Cuba and between clandestine stations in Latin America.

NW 50955 DocId:32423736 Page 35

ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATIONS

CONFIDENTIAL

Export

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CUBA

Central "Ham" Radio Transmitting Station, Rancho Boyeros Airport, Habana Province (C)

30 January 1962

1 of 1

19-20 January 1962

Kono

Rancho Boyeros, Jan 62
C-3
EUJ 316/37-1-62

EUJ
EUJ
EUJ-39-62

1. Sub-Source reports that the Government of Cuba had planned to inaugurate a [illegible] amateur radio transmitting station at the Rancho Boyeros Airport, south of Habana City, on the 19th or 20th of January 1962.

2. The purpose of the station was to be communication between Cuba and Tegucigalpa, Honduras, on the 9077 frequency.

DOWNGRADED AT 12 YEARS INTERVALS NOT AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED DOD DIR 5200.10

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OPNS BRANCH

NW 50955 DocId:32423736 Page 36

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S-E-C-R-E-T
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

COUNTRY	Dominican Republic/Cuba	REPORT NO.	CS-3/535,788
SUBJECT	Clandestine Radio Receiving Station in Santo Domingo	DATE DISTR.	1 February 1963
		NO. PAGES	1
		REFERENCES	RD
DATE OF INFO.	22 January 1963		
PLACE & DATE ACQ.	Dominican Republic, Santo Domingo 22 January 1963	FIELD REPORT NO.	HDC-553

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE: Foreign businessman (B) with good contacts in Dominican political circles. Appraisal of Content: 3.

One of the under-cover receiving stations for radio messages from Habana is believed to be in a house at Calle Espaillat 56. The house is occupied by Johnson (fnu), who has an electrician's repair shop there.

Headquarters Comment. Johnson (fnu) is probably identifiable with the Johnson (fnu) reported by another source as a Communist member of the Agrupacion Politica Catorce de Junio (APCJ - 14th of June Political Group). See CS-3/511,814, of 24 May 1962. Also see CS-3/528,287, of 14 November 1962, from an official British service, which reports on a clandestine group of pro-Castro Dominicans who are in radio contact with Habana from a repair shop in Santo Domingo..


2

The CIA station in Rio de Janeiro has reported that some efforts may be made to put pressure on President Goulart to publicly take some note of the Cuban intervention in Brazil's internal affairs, allegedly shown by some 16 pages of Spanish-language documents found in the Varig plane crash which carried a Cuban delegation to their deaths in November. The documents are considered by a Brazilian source who made them available to the CIA station to be "explosive, since they prove the Cubans are sponsoring revolution in Brazil." Paraphrases of these documents have appeared in the Lima press; but it is unlikely that President Goulart will give any support to publicizing them. (CIA, Rio de Janeiro, IN 43586, 2 January, SECRET NOFORN)

NW 50955 DocId:32423736 Page 39



2-7123

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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S-E-C-R-E-T
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

COUNTRY	Paraguay/Cuba	REPORT NO.	CS-3/536,454
SUBJECT	Paraguayan Travelers to and From Cuba	DATE DISTR.	7 February 1963
		NO. PAGES	2
		REFERENCES	RD
DATE OF INFO.	December 1962 - 20 January 1963		
PLACE & DATE ACQ.	Paraguay, Asuncion (24 January 1963)	FIELD REPORT NO.	HYA-833

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE: Paraguayan security officer (B) from a member of the Paraguayan Communist Party (C). Appraisal of Content: 2.

1. On about 20 January 1963 Cantero, a leader of the Partido Comunista Paraguayo (PCP - Paraguayan Communist Party) in Paraguay,[1] met with five rural leaders of the PCP from the areas of Villarrica, Concepcion, Piribebuy, Tebycuarymi, and Guarambare. These leaders received political instructions from the PCP for their trip to Cuba, where they will receive military and political training in rural organization. Lopez (fnu)[2] is the leader from Piribebuy, and Ignacio Acosta[3] is the leader from Tebycuarymi.

2. Federico Tatter, a retired ensign in the Paraguayan Navy, entered Paraguay from Cuba in the first half of December to assume military direction of the Frente Unido de Liberacion Nacional (FULNA - United Front for National Liberation).

3. Anibal Garcete[4] has returned to Paraguay from Cuba to organize the sugar-cane workers. Garcete is a PCP member masquerading as a member of the Colorado Party.

1. Field Comment. Cantero is the PCP pseudonym of a person whose true name is unknown.

Source Comments

2. Lopez was born about 1937.

3. Acosta is a cousin of Wigberto Acosta, a long-time member of the PCP.

5
4

NW 50955 DocId:32423736 Page 41

[illegible] Comment. Wigberto Acosta was reported in June 1960 [illegible] have been a PCP member active in the labor dispute in [illegible] Tebyouarymi area involving the sugar cane worker's demand for higher salaries.

4. Source Comment. [illegible] was mentioned in confidential PCP correspondence [illegible] which time he was an officer in the Federation of Sugar Cane Workers.

On 4 December Brazilian President Goulart telephoned General Alves, commander of the First Army with headquarters in Rio de Janeiro and the highest ranking extreme leftist in the Brazilian armed forces. He told Alves to choose four or five junior officers of his absolute confidence to escort certain people who were arriving from Cuba via Bolivia. Goulart said the people were coming with "much material." (CIA, Sao Paulo, IN 30353, 6 December, SECRET NOFORN)

NW 50955 DocId:32423736 Page 43

Eight Dominican pro-Castro leaders were aboard the Czech airlines flight to Cuba which transited Shannon Airport on 14 December, according to an official Irish service. The Dominicans included Maximo Lopez Molina, Tomas Parmenio Erickson, and Gustavo Ricart, leaders of the outlawed Dominican Popular Movement (MPD), one of the most active pro-Communist groups in the Dominican Republic. The eight Dominicans were among the ten who were deported from the Dominican Republic to France earlier this year. Another source reported last November that the Cuban ambassador in Paris had a meeting with the ten Dominican deportees to discuss helping them travel to Cuba without passports. (CIA Dublin, TDCS-3/531,991, 21 December, SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM)

NW 50955 DocId:32423736 Page 44

Premier Castro is to deliver the closing speech at the Congress of Women of the Americas on 15 January in Havana. Havana Radio announced that the congress, scheduled to begin 11 January, will be attended by more than 200 delegates from Latin America, the U. S., and Canada, as well as by guests from many other non-American countries. Delegations from Communist China, Albania, Czechoslovakia, North Korea, and North Vietnam arrived in Havana on 9 January. (FBIS 03 and 51, 10 January, OFFICIAL USE ONLY)

NW 50955 DocId:32423736 Page 45


SABOTAGE

SABOTAGE

A number of acts of sabotage have been committed in various Latin American states. There is no conclusive evidence available to link these acts of sabotage with the Castro/Communist apparatus.

Portions on training indicate that sabotage is being taught to trainees in Cuba.

TAB

1 Reports of Sabotage

This Tab contains four items: (1) A report that Cuba is training personnel for sabotage missions in the U.S.; (2) A report that Dominicans are leaving Cuba to sabotage cane fields in the Dominican Republic; (3) A report on the controversial sabotage of the Maracaibo oil fields in Venezuela. (Not substantiated by evidence available to the U.S.); and (4) Report of an unsuccessful attempt to sabotage a bridge in Venezuela.

2 Terrorist Activities

This Tab contains an item reporting Castro/Communist inspired terrorist activities in Venezuela linked to the Maracaibo sabotage.

NW 50955 DocId:32423736 Page 47


1

An expert Cuban electrical technician in the Borjita sugar mill has told a former close associate who is now a regular clandestine source that Cuba is training personnel in the techniques of using explosives prior to sending them to the United States on sabotage missions. It is intended that such persons will go in the guise of anti-Communist refugees, and the sabotage will be so arranged that in some cases it will be taken to be merely accidents. The electrical technician added that there is a large Communist espionage ring operating with a ring in the United States across the border, with several plans already under way. (CIA DDP IN 29517, 4 December, SECRET NOFORN)

NW 50955 DocId:32423736 Page 49

A Dominican exile in Cuba reportedly told a source who was there about mid-December that Dominican Communists are leaving Cuba for the Dominican Republic to sabotage the cane fields there. (CIA, Panama City, [redacted] 48599, 11 January, SECRET NOFORN)

NW 50955 DocId:32423736 Page 50

INCOMING TELEGRAM Department of State

42-41 1962 4 13 45 CONFIDENTIAL

Control: 1171
Rec'd: NOVEMBER 3, 1962
11:29 P.M.

Action
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FROM: CARACAS

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 548, NOVEMBER 3, 9 P.M.

NIACT

DEPARTMENT PASS CINCARIB, CINCLANT

FOREIGN MINISTER FALCON BRICENO INFORMS ME HE WILL ARRIVE WASHINGTON SUNDAY NIGHT TO MAKE SPECIAL SPEECH IN OAS/OC MONDAY RE CUBAN SITUATION UNDERSCORING CUBAN INSPIRED SUBVERSION AND SABOTAGE AGAINST VENEZUELA.

HE WILL PRESENT INTERCEPTED CABLE TO VENEZUELAN STUDENTS AND OTHER EVIDENCE WHICH HE HOPES OBTAIN FROM INTERIOR MINISTRY. HE ASKS IF DEPARTMENT CAN PROVIDE HIM SUNDAY AT VENEZUELAN EMBASSY WITH TRANSCRIPT RAUL CASTRO'S STATEMENT AFTER MARACAIBO SABOTAGE IN WHICH PRESS CLAIMS RAUL TOOK CUBAN CREDIT FOR INCIDENT.

SUGGEST DEPARTMENT MAKE THIS AND ALL OTHER USEFUL FBIS INTERCEPTS AS WELL OTHER EVIDENCE AVAILABLE TO HIM.

FALCON'S ARRIVAL NEW YORK AND WASHINGTON WILL BE AVAILABLE VENEZUELAN EMBASSY THERE. PLEASE EXTEND COURTESIES. HE PLANS STAY US ABOUT EIGHT DAYS.

STEWART

SMD

NOTE: PASSED TO CINCARIB, CINCLANT 11/4/62. MESSRS. MOSKOWITZ, BOWDLER AND ALLEN (ARA) NOTIFIED 12:10 A.M., 11/4/62 TEM.

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TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

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(When Filled In)

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

Mr. Rowen has seen

COUNTRY VENEZUELA

REPORT NO. TDCS -3/537,176

SUBJECT CONTINUATION OF COMMUNIST TERRORIST ACTIVITIES

DATE DISTR. 13 FEBRUARY 1963

PRECEDENCE PRIORITY

DATE OF INFO. 8 AND 12 FEBRUARY 1963

REFERENCES IN 67419

PLACE & DATE ACQ. VENEZUELA, CARACAS (13 FEBRUARY 1963)

APPRAISAL 2

FIELD REPORT NO. HVC 2655

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE PARA 1: FORMER POLICE OFFICIAL (C) WITH CONTACTS IN THE HEADQUARTERS OF THE NATIONAL GUARD; PARA 2: U.S. BUSINESSMAN (B) WITH EXCELLENT CONTACTS IN THE VENEZUELAN MILITARY.

1. ON THE EVENING OF 8 FEB 63 NATIONAL GUARD SOLDIERS WHO WERE PROTECTING THE CARACAS-LA GUAIRA TURNPIKE SURPRISED A GROUP OF MEN AT THE ENTRANCE TO TUNNEL NUMBER 1 WHO WERE ATTEMPTING TO DESTROY TURNPIKE BRIDGE NUMBER 1. FIRE WAS EXCHANGED FOR ABOUT THIRTY MINUTES BETWEEN THE SOLDIERS AND THE MEN IN THE TUNNEL AND LATER A BOX CONTAINING ABOUT 1ØØ POUNDS OF DYNAMITE WAS FOUND BELOW THE BRIDGE.

2. TWO CAR LOADS OF GUERILLAS ATTACKED THE NATIONAL GUARD HEADQUARTERS AT DABAJURO, A PIPE LINE OUTPOST BETWEEN AMUAY, IN THE PARAGUANA PENINSULA AND LAKE MARACAIBO, STATE OF ZULIA, IN WESTERN VENEZUELA, ON 12 FEB. ABOUT 1ØØ SHOTS WERE EXCHANGED BUT ALL THE GUERILLAS ESCAPED.

SECRET

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

DA IN 16985

STATE/INR	DIA	ARMY/ACSI	NAVY	AIR	JCS	SECDEF	NSA	NIC	AID	USIA	OCI	ONE	OCR	ORR	OBI	OD	EXO
STATE/DIR																	

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

SECRET

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FORM 5-63 1K OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. (15-20)

3. (FIELD COMMENT: TERRORIST ACTIVITIES HAVE BEEN INCREASING IN VENEZUELA. SEVERAL MEMBERS OF THE FUERZAS ARMADAS DE LIBERACION NACIONAL (FALN, ARMED FORCES OF NATIONAL LIBERATION) TOOK TEMPORARY POSSESION OF THE OFFICE OF THE PREFECT IN THE TOWN OF SAN DIEGO DE LOS ALTOS, ABOUT 20 MILES FROM CARACAS, ON 4 FEB. THEY TIED UP THE POLICEMEN ON GUARD, STOLE A FEW RIFLES, AND PAINTED THE WALLS WITH ANTI-GOVERNMENT SLOGANS. ON 5 FEB AN ATTACK WAS MADE ON THE HOME OF COLONEL JOSE ANTONIO GONZALEZ, COMMANDER OF THE MILITARY TRIBUNAL, LOCATED IN A WELL-TO-DO RESIDENTIAL AREA OF CARACAS. THIS WAS FOLLOWED BY ANOTHER ATTACK ON 12 FEB WHICH RESULTED IN THE GOVERNMENT ESTABLISHING ROAD BLOCKS AND SENDING TROOPS AND POLICE INTO THE AREA. ON THE MORNING OF 9 FEB AN ARMED ATTACK WAS MADE ON THE AMERICAN (PORTION GARBLED WILL FWD)* WHERE OFFICES WERE SET ON FIRE AND EQUIPMENT DESTROYED, AND ON THE NIGHT OF 9 FEB SEARS WAREHOUSE IN ANTIMANO WAS COMPLETELY DESTROYED BY MEMBERS OF THE FALN. THREE BRIDGES ON THE PAN AMERICAN HIGHWAY, BARQUISIMETO AREA, STATE OF LARA, WERE DAMAGED BY BOMBS ON 12 FEB AND AN ATTEMPT WAS MADE ON THAT DAY TO BLOW UP A CREOLE OIL LINE IN CATIA LA MAG, FEDERAL DISTRICT, BUT ONLY ONE SMALL BOMB EXPLODED CAUSING MINOR DAMAGES).

4. FIELD DISSEM:STATE ARMY NAVY AIR CINCLANT CINCARIB.

* 5. HEADQUARTERS COMMENT: MISSING PORTION WILL BE DISSEMINATED ONLY IF IT MATERIALLY AFFECTS THE SENSE OF THIS REPORT.

END OF MESSAGE

NW 50955 DocId:32423736 Page 53



Extremist And Police Activities In Venezuela

Venezuela has been afflicted over the past several months with a rash of Castro-Communist terrorist actions. Many incidents, involving shootings and robberies, are connected with the Movement of the Revolutionary Left, the Venezuelan Communist Party, and the Armed Forces of National Liberation -- the Castro-Communist group credited with the destruction at the Maracaibo oil fields during the Cuban crisis. These activities are probably designed to discredit and weaken the Betancourt Government.

The police have demonstrated considerable proficiency in preventing major outbreaks and in acting rapidly to arrest terrorists. They have rounded up extremists responsible for the holdup and looting of a printing supply warehouse and the burning of the Dupont paint warehouse and have captured the Communist leader of guerrilla bands operating in the Falcon area of northwestern Venezuela.
(CONFIDENTIAL)

COMMUNIST ORGANIZATION
FOR LATIN AMERICA

COMMUNIST ORGANIZATION FOR LATIN AMERICA

Information on the Communist apparatus for Latin America and its relationship with Cuba and the Sino Soviet Bloc is largely derived from highly classified intelligence which is provided separately. From the reports contained in this section, it may be concluded that the organizational links vary from country to country depending upon, among other factors, the legal status of the Communist party, whether diplomatic representation is located in a country, the relative strength of Communist alliances with other leftist or opposition parties, and the character of current government leadership in these countries. Next attached is an unclassified report prepared in October for release as a White Paper. Although this paper was not released due to the missile crisis, it represents an agreed summary (State, DOD, CIA and USIA) of the Communist apparatus in Latin America. The report contains briefs on Communist activities in each of the Latin American countries.

The reports vary with respect to the country priority for Castro/Communist action in Latin America. Brazil, Venezuela, and British Guiana are mentioned most frequently as the likely priority targets. There are also conflicting reports on the relative independence of Castro from the Soviet Union and indications that the publicized Sino Soviet disagreements are reflected in local Communist organizations throughout Latin America.

TAB 1 — Cuban Relationships and Policies Toward Latin America

This tab contains relevant excerpts from the draft NIE now under preparation. (USIB is meeting on this item and

NW 50955 DocId:32423736 Page 57

the most current agreed positions will be made available to you in the event there is any significant change.) Also included at this tab are a number of significant reports indicating the probable orientation of Castro/Communist actions directed toward Latin America. The last item at this tab summarizes the unsuccessful armed incursions of 1959 (Panama, Nicaragua, and Dominican Republic).

TAB 2 Soviet Activities and Conflicts

This tab contains a number of items indicating possible Cuban-Soviet conflicts as reflected in Latin America. The last two items reflect the concern attached to the possible establishment of a Soviet fishing port in Cuba.

TAB 3 Situation in Latin America

This tab contains a number of current situation and pertinent background reports on various Latin American countries in the following order: Central America, Panama and Mexico; Bolivia; Brazil (4); Colombia; Costa Rica; Ecuador; Haiti; Mexico; Panama; Peru (4); and Venezuela (3).

NW 50955 DocId:32423736 Page 58

4 October 1962

MEMORANDUM: Cuban Subversion in Other Latin American Countries

I. General Summary

1. The Castro regime denies that material support is being given any anti-regime group outside Cuba. Castro claims that such assistance is unnecessary since the people of these countries, thanks to Cuba's example, are becoming aware of their revolutionary potential. The publicly stated position of the Cuban leaders is that their country, "the first socialist state in America," has become the example, the "beacon". In fact, however, Cuba's moral and material support to Communist and Communist-influenced groups has been felt in varying degrees in every one of the 19 other Latin American republics. The Castro regime has become an effective instrument of the Sino-Soviet effort to weaken and eventually destroy democratic political institutions in Latin America.

2. Cuban subversion has become more subtle since 1959, when a Cuban-mounted expeditionary force was launched against the Dominican Republic and smaller "invasion forces" left Cuba for abortive attacks on the governments of Panama, Nicaragua, and Haiti. Now Cuban subversive efforts generally fall in three categories:

a. The indoctrination and training of hundreds of Latin Americans in Cuba;

b. The intensive propaganda beamed at Latin America by Cuban radio stations and circulated through printed material and the Cuban-subsidized international "news" agency, and;

c. The covert material support given subversive groups in other countries.

II. Cuban Subversive Programs

A. Training of Latin Americans in Cuba:

3. Fidel Castro announced on 9 June 1961 that his government would grant 1,000 scholarships to "poor students" from other Latin American countries for the next school term and 100 scholarships to students from other countries of the world. Hundreds of young Latin Americans have been subjected to Communist indoctrination. In addition to whatever formal training they receive in Cuba, many of them receive training in guerrilla warfare and other techniques of revolution.

4. Cuban refugees who have arrived recently in the United States have provided detailed information on the training programs offered to some of these young Latin Americans.

NW 50955 DocId:32423736 Page 59

a. One refugee, a deserter from Castro's army, reported from personal knowledge that in late 1961 there were a number of students from Chile, Ecuador, Argentina, Guatemala, and Brazil living in a Havana suburb who regularly attended classes in Marxism-Leninism, propaganda techniques, and other subjects to prepare them for active revolutionary roles in their homelands. He reported that those male students who were between 16 and 20 years of age were sent as part of their training to the Minas del Frio training center in Oriente province. During this phase of their training they received familiarization in the use of small arms and hiked to the top of Cuba's highest mountain, Pico Turquino, in the Sierra Maestra, the locale of Castro's guerrilla warfare against the Batista dictatorship.

b. Another refugee, who lived in Oriente province, learned from conversations with militia-men in the area and from Latin Americans training there that continuous training of students from other Latin American countries is going on at Las Arenas, Oriente. The trainees receive instruction in military tactics, guerrilla warfare, subversion, sabotage, propaganda, and Communist ideology. The refugee did not know how many Latin Americans were involved, but believed the duration of each course was about eight weeks, after which another group replaced the one that had been training.

5. Much of the travel of Latin American students to Cuba for training and indoctrination is handled by the Instituto Cubano de Amistad con los Pueblos (ICAP - Cuban Institute for Friendship with Peoples).

6. Cuba is also a major takeoff point for Latin Americans traveling to and from the Sino-Soviet bloc. Over 400 Latin Americans returned from last July's Communist-sponsored Youth Festival in Helsinki aboard a Soviet passenger vessel with the 400-man Cuban delegation. They disembarked in Havana and stayed in Cuba some weeks before some of them began returning to their home countries. Others may well be remaining in Cuba for some time.

B. Cuban Propaganda:

7. International broadcasts by Cuban radio stations maintain a relatively constant propaganda level at all times, with regularly scheduled and special broadcasts to specific countries as well as general transmissions to all of Latin America. The general theme of all these broadcasts is that "the Cuban example" is awakening the "people" of Latin America to the opportunity for revolutionary action against the "corrupt" regimes in power and against "Yankee imperialism" which allegedly supports them.

8. There are regular programs beamed by Havana radio to Nicaragua, the Dominican Republic, Guatemala, Peru, and Honduras. They are all subversive in content and frequently incite to rebellion. These programs to specific countries are apparently directed and produced with the guidance of exiles from the countries concerned resident in Cuba.

NW 50955 DocId:32423736 Page 60

9. The program to the Dominican Republic, for instance, is announced as the program of the Dominican Liberation Movement (MLD), and the program is entitled Patria Libre. At present, Radio Havana beams the 20 minute Patria Libre program to the Dominican Republic on Thursdays and Saturdays. Just prior to the program, the Radio Havana announcer explains that the station is making its facilities available to the MLD for its program. There are some areas in the Dominican Republic where, due to the absence of local radio stations, the Cuban broadcasts are the only ones heard. Last July, the subversive content of these broadcasts to the Dominican Republic led the Dominican government to protest to the Organization of American States.

10. The content of such broadcasts is exemplified in the stated goals of the "Voice of Revolutionary Nicaragua," the program which is regularly beamed by Radio Havana to Nicaragua. On 31 August this program celebrated its first anniversary by repeating its original statement of its purposes:

> "The Voice of Revolutionary Nicaragua has set itself the goal of contributing to pointing out the real way to Nicaragua's liberation from the dominion of Yankee imperialism and the Somoza tyranny. Elections (scheduled for next February to choose President Somoza's successor) with the Somozas in power, and under the State Department's economic and political control of Nicaragua, will be a farce. Without. . a prior revolutionary overthrow of the Somoza tyranny there can be no free elections in Nicaragua nor can a popular government be established. This program will be at the service of the revolutionaries and against the electioneers...The Voice of Revolutionary Nicaragua will defend the Cuban revolution because it is an important part of the Latin American people's liberating revolution."

11. Cuban propaganda is also disseminated through the offices of Prensa Latina, the Cuban-subsidized international "news agency" which has close working relations with TASS, the New China News Agency, and other propaganda media for the Sino-Soviet bloc.

12. Cuban printed material is circulated throughout the hemisphere; Che Guevara's book on guerrilla warfare has received wide distribution. Periodically, the Mexican government, most recently last August, has been obliged to confiscate large quantities of propaganda materials from Latin Americans passing through that country enroute from Cuba to their homelands.

C. Cuban covert support for subversive groups:

13. Cuban covert support for Communist or pro-Communist groups in other Latin American countries is provided in a number of ways. In the five Latin American countries where Cuban diplomatic missions are still resident (Mexico, Brazil, Uruguay, Chile, and Bolivia), these missions have often been the channel. The Cuban embassy in Mexico is known to have provided

NW 50955 DocId:32423736 Page 61

frequent assistance to exiles from Guatemala, Nicaragua, and other Central American countries living in Mexico. In other instances, assistance is provided through travelers coming from Cuba and through Prensa Latina representatives.

14. The assistance is usually financial. The Cubans appear to have been careful since 1959 to avoid being caught in a blatant act of subversion that could be used to justify concerted inter-American action. Financial assistance is often just as useful and much less risky than actual weapons deliveries. In a number of American countries, small arms and other weapons are available for a price. Unscrupulous or careless arms dealers in the US have also contributed to the arms traffic from which pro-Castro groups have benefitted, directly or indirectly.

15. As the following country-by-country rundown indicates, Cuban support for subversive activity has affected in varying degrees every one of the 19 other Latin American countries.

a. Argentina: Ernesto "Che" Guevara, an Argentine by birth, has retained his deep interest in Argentina's political affairs. On 25 May, the Argentine national holiday, he addressed the group of Argentine citizens resident in Cuba and told them that he hoped that next year they would be celebrating in Argentina under "the flag of socialism." At another point in this address he said: "Our revolution is one which needs to expand its ideas...and other people are helping us. Let the other peoples of the hemisphere get angry and take up arms or seize power and aid us in this task which is the task of the entire hemisphere and of humanity."

The Argentine community in Cuba last April organized the "Cuban-Argentine Friendship Institute" with headquarters in Havana. One of the leaders is John William Cooke, who was for a time chief of former Argentine dictator Peron's political machine in Argentina. Cooke continues active in that faction of the Peronista party which seeks concerted action with the Argentine Communists. Cooke maintains regular contact with sympathizers inside and outside Argentina through travelers and through his wife, Alicia Eguren de Cooke, a resident of Montevideo, Uruguay, who apparently has regular means of communication with individuals in Argentina. Argentine citizens have been recruited through this channel to go to Cuba for training. There are also strong indications that terrorist activities by Argentine Peronists and Communists have been encouraged and perhaps assisted through this channel.

Prio Prior to the diplomatic break between Argentina and Cuba last February, the Cuban embassy in Buenos Aires provided financial assistance to anti-government groups there. An Argentine journalist who has contacts in the Communist party there reported last December, for instance, that the Argentine Communist party had received the sum of 50,000 pesos from the Cuban embassy as a contribution to the railway workers who were then on strike in the province of Cordoba.

NW 50955 DocId:32423736 Page 62

Though the Cuban embassy is no longer in Buenos Aires, Cuban clandestine assistance to Argentine Peronist-Communist groups continues. On 19 July of this year the federal police in Buenos Aires reported the unearthing of a center of Communist and Peronist activities in the capital. Two Buenos Aires policemen were shot and killed at a surburban warehouse in June. Investigations revealed that a quantity of explosives and propaganda were stored in the warehouse. The trail led to the arrest of one Jose Maria Aponte, a journalist and known Peronist activist, and one Mario Massi, owner of the firm which owned the warehouse. It was revealed that Massi had been maintaining contact with Cuban Communists, with John William Cooke, and with an unidentified woman associated with the Cuban embassy in Uruguay who was probably Alicia Eguren de Cooke referred to above. According to the Argentine police investigation, some 150 Argentine citizens had been sent from Argentina to Cuba (through Uruguay and Mexico) for training in guerrilla warfare. On their return to Argentina, these men were to be used in planned activities in the provinces of Formosa, Tucuman, Salta, and the wooded areas of eastern Argentina. A number of other individuals were apprehended by the Argentine police in connection with the subversive activity revealed in these investigations.

b. Bolivia: Bolivia has been the recipient of special Cuban attentions. The number of Bolivians receiving "scholarships" in Cuba this year--between 130 and 150-- appears disproportionately high. The Bolivian government felt obliged to request the departure of Cuban Ambassador Tabares in 1960 and of Cuban Charge Garcia Trians in 1961 for blatant intervention in internal Bolivian affairs, including support for Bolivian Communists and attempts to incite extreme leftist members of the governing MNR party to leave the party. In June 1961, the Bolivian government published a series of documents linking the Cuban embassy with a Communist conspiracy to seize control of the government. One of these documents, a statement by an arrested Bolivian agitator who had been in close contact with the Cuban embassy, gave the names of a number of Bolivians who had received financial support from the Cuban embassy. This evidence was used to justify the request for the Cuban charge's recall.

The present Cuban charge in Bolivia, Ramon Aja, has also been active though perhaps a bit more discreet than his predecessors. He has been particularly energetic in cultivating relations with Bolivian campesinos. The peasant union in the Cliza Valley of Bolivia has been reported to be the recipient of Cuban financial assistance.

c. Brazil: During the pasttwo years the Castro regime has developed increasingly close ties with Francisco Juliao, self-proclaimed Marxist and leader of the Peasant Leagues in the troubled northeast region of Brazil. Juliao, whose wife and children are resident in Cuba, has traveled there on several occasions, and a number of his associates and rank-and-file members of the Leagues have gone to Cuba for agricultural training which is undoubtedly heavily larded with ideological indoctrination. Transportation direct from northeast Brazil to Cuba has been provided by Cubana airlines on at least one occasion. Circumstantial evidence strongly suggests that Juliao has received financial assistance for his movement from the Cuban government. Brazilian Communist leaders have privately stated, in

NW 50955 DocId:32423736 Page 63

fact, that Juliao's Peasant Leagues have received not only money but also shipments of small arms from Cuba. These Brazilian Communist leaders also said that the reason Juliao sent his family to Cuba was his fear that they might be endangered in the civil war he expects to erupt shortly in Brazil.

The Cuban government has also during the past year cultivated particularly close relations with leaders of the dissident Communist Party of Brazil (CPB). One of the CPB leaders who had visited Cuba last May told a friend of a long conversation he had had with Fidel Castro in late May. Castro expressed identity of feeling with the dissident Brazilian Communists and criticized the regular Communist party for its failure "to take a strong revolutionary line" in accordance with the decision of the 22nd party congress of the Communist party of the Soviet Union. Castro approved the insurrectionary policy of the CPB and urged the leaders to organize guerrilla activities and start the revolutionary movement in Brazil "as soon as possible." Castro advised them that government reprisals against revolutionary action in Brazil would serve only to increase popular discontent in Brazil and swell the ranks of the revolutionaries. He advised CPB leaders to give special emphasis to securing as wide a base as possible among agricultural workers and the inhabitants of rural areas.

The Cuban embassy in Rio de Janeiro, like Cuban embassies elsewhere in Latin America, has been a source of assistance to Communist and pro-Communist elements. Last May leaks to the Brazilian press reported discussions in the Brazilian cabinet on the subversive activities being directed by Cuban ambassador Joaquin Hernandez Armas. The Navy and Army Ministers are reported to have expressed particular concern over Hernandez' activities.

d. Chile: Senator Salvador Allende, leader of Chile's Communist-dominated popular front and a leading presidential aspirant, has made at least two trips to Cuba.

The Cuban embassy in Santiago is the source of propaganda support for pro-Communist groups, mostly those associated with Allende, who are intent on coming to power in Chile through elections or revolution. Orlando Prendes, cultural attache of the Cuban embassy, is known to be supervising the printing of Cuban propaganda on a clandestine printing press in the home of Julio Bocanegra, who also prints propaganda for the Chilean Communist party. This activity has been going on for some time. As long ago as August, 1961, Chilean officials investigating political agitation and resulting unrest in the Salamanca area learned that after a visit to the area by a Cuban diplomat the previous month, pro-Cuban propaganda was being distributed in the area, and Communists and pro-Communists there were saying "The mountains of Salamanca are going to be the Chilean Sierra Maestra."

Last March, when Cuban Minister of Education Armando Hart went to Chile for an international conference he took with him several sacks of propaganda.

e. Colombia: The United Front for Revolutionary Action (FUAR), organized early this year by Colombian extremists, is believed to have received financial assistance from Cuba to promote its objective of creating a guerrilla movement aimed at the overthrow of the government. A Colombian

NW 50955 DocId:32423736 Page 64

citizen who has contacts among FUAR members reported last June that Fidel Castro had just given the group $15,000 and promised further financial aid semi-annually. Gloria Gaitan de Valencia, the wife of a FUAR leader and the daughter of the Colombian leader Gaitan whose assassination in 1948 sparked the disastrous Bogota rioting, is a long-time personal friend of Fidel Castro. He has visited Cuba frequently and probably returns to Colombia with specific advice and assistance from the Cuban government. The FUAR has succeeded in drawing members from the extremist wing of the regular Colombian Communist party who are dissatisfied with that party's reluctance to engage in ipen revolutionary action.

f. Costa Rica: The small Costa Rican Communist party, the Popular Vanguard party (PVP), is charged by the Cuban government with the selection of young men to be trained in Cuba. Riboberto Carmona and Jose Murillo, PVP members, left Costa Rica last June for training under this program, and PVP leaders had plans for organizing guerrilla training programs in Costa Rica under the direction of the Costa Ricans who had received training in Cuba.

g. The Dominican Republic: The provisional Council of State, which is preparing the country for its first free elections this December in more than 30 years, has been a major target for Cuban subversion. A cadre of Dominican Communists is headquartered in Cuba, and clandestine contact is probably maintained with sympathizers inside the Doninican Republic. Broadcasts to the Dominican Republic from Cuba have helped incite the frequent riots in Santo Domingo. The fact that broadcasts from Cuba have on occasion referred to very recent events in the Dominican Republic strongly suggests the presence of clandestine radio contacts between the two countries.

h. Ecuador: The Communist party of Ecuador has formed the nucleus of a small guerrilla organization. This group was drawn largely from the pro-Castro Revolutionary Union of Ecuadorean Youth (URJE), which was involved in a two-day battle with government forces last April. The leader of the April affair, as well as several other Ecuadoreans involved in subversive activities, has received guerrilla training in Cuba. A URJE leader told a friend last June that this organization has so far in 1962 received $22,000 in financial aid from the Cuban government.

Manuel Araujo Hidalgo, pro-Communist former Ecuadorean Minister of Interior who has visited Cuba and who recently traveled in Communist China, appears to be working with the URJE. He is reported to have received a considerable amount of money from the Cuban government for his efforts, according to a private statement by the URJE leader.

i. El Salvador: On 1 March 1961, the Salvadoran government broke relations with the Castro regime after it had received evidence of conversation between the Cuban charge, Roberto Lassalle, and leading Salvadoran Communists in which Lassale urged increased revolutionary activity.

j. Guatemala: On 5 March 1962, a Cuban arrived in Mexico with a message for a leader then in Mexico of the Guatemalan Communist-influenced

NW 50955 DocId:32423736 Page 65

13 November group, which had recently engaged in guerrilla activity in Guatemala. The Cuban gave him $4,000 which he said was the first installment of a total of $10,000 to be used to establish a new guerrilla front in Guatemala. On 8 March, Castro's emissary gave the Guatemalans the balance of the $10,000 and told one of the 13 November leaders that the decision to provide them with the money was taken by Fidel Castro personally. Castro, he said, had sent instructions that the group did not have to account for how the money was spent, that no strings were attached, and that he hopes they are successful so he can provide them with additional assistance.. Later the Cuban emissary met with leaders in Mexico of the orthodox Guatemalan Communist party. These Guatemalan Communists had apparently complained that the Cuban money was not going to them. They were told that Castro wanted the money to go to the 13 November group because this group had demonstrated its capacity to fight the Guatemalan government, a capacity which the Guatemalan Communists had not shown. The Cuban said: "It is not a matter of standing around with Arab fatalism waiting for events to take place--- We should act efficiently so as to precipitate the death of imperialism. Because of this we are ready to help anyone who may decide to struggle against imperialism anywhere."

Cuban propaganda media have sought through publicizing the activities of the 13 November group to increase its prestige and chances for success. A Prensa Latina reporter published an alleged interview with 13 November leader Yon Sosa.

k. Haiti: A cadre of Haitian Communists led by Rene Depestre is resident in Cuba, and many thousands of Haitian citizens living in eastern Cuba are now being subjected to Communist regimentation and indoctrination.

l. Honduras: Prior to the break in Cuban-Honduran diplomatic relations in April 1961, Cuban personnel under the cover of consular and diplomatic offices engaged in proselyting in the north coast region of Honduras. Honduras now is the target of a particularly vicious regular radio program beamed especially to Honduras by Radio Havana. Many Hondurans are in Cuba under the "scholarship" program.

m. Mexico: The Cuban embassy in Mexico City, the consulate in Merida, and the "Cuban-Mexican Cultural Center" in Merida have all g engaged in propaganda activities designed to encourage the pro-communist cause in Mexico, particularly the Communist-influenced National Liberation Movement (MLN). Former Cuban ambassador in Mexico Portuondo is reported by people in close contact with MLN leaders to have concluded an agreement whereby some of the money sent by Havana to cover the expense of the embassy is earmarked as a contribution to the MLN. Mexican officials were disturbed at the participation of Cuban embassy officials in inciting the anti-US demonstrations by Mexican students in July and August 1960. Mexican authorities have periodically impounded quantities of Cuban propaganda being sent through Mexico to other Latin American countries. The most important aspect of Mexico in Cuban propaganda and subversive operations in Latin America is its use by the Cubans as a way station or jumping off place between Cuba itself and the rest of Latin America.

NW 50955 DocId:32423736 Page 66

n. Nicaragua: A cadre of Nicaraguan Communists is based in Cuba. Contact between them and pro-Castro Nicaraguans in Nicaragua and in exile in other countries of the Caribbean area is maintained at least on a sporadic basis. A number of Nicaraguans periodically have traveled to Cuba and some have received training there in guerrilla tactics. Reliable reports indicate that some of these Cuba-trained Nicaraguans have been among the small guerrilla bands that have infiltrated Nicaragua across the largely unguarded Hondruan border. The Nicaraguan government is the target of a regularly broadcast Radio Havana program to Nicaragua which is announced as the program of "free Nicaraguans."

o. Panama: Cuban financial assistance is believed to be channeled to the pro-Communist National Action Vanguard (VAN) in Panama. One of the VAN leaders, Deputy Thelma King, is a frequent traveler to Cuba and claims to be a personal friend of Fidel Castro.

p. Paraguay: Paraguayan exiles in Uruguay and Brazil have received Cuban financial assistance. Four members of the United Front for National Liberation (FULNA), a Communist Paraguayan exile group in Uruguay, receive the equivalent of $230 monthly each from the Cuban embassy in Uruguay to finance clandestine pro-Castro activities in Uruguay, according to a Paraguayan exile in Uruguay who is in close touch with FULNA.

q. Peru: At least eight Peruvians traveled to Cuba by way of Mexico last June to receive training and indoctrination in that country. Other Peruvian Communists or pro-Communists have long been in Cuba and a regularly broadcast Radio Havana program is beamed to Peru.

r. Uruguay: The Cuban embassy in Montevideo has been engaged in promoting pro-Castro propaganda. In January 1961 the Uruguayan government was obliged to declare the Cuban ambassador persona non grata for intervening in internal Uruguayan affairs.

s. Venezuela: The Castro regime has been extremely vitriolic in its propaganda blasts against the Betancourt administration in Venezuela. Cuban assistance has been channeled to members of the militant opposition Leftist Revolutionary Movement (MIR), which is attempting to develop a guerrilla movement in Venezuela with the aid of its ally, the regular Venezuelan Communist party. While there is little evidence to indicate direct Cuban involvement in this Communist effort, a significant number of the leading figures involved, including Fabricio Ojeda, are known to have traveled to Cuba, where they probably received financial and other assistance in addition to official encouragement and propaganda support for their activities.

NW 50955 DocId:32423736 Page 67



EXCERPT FROM DRAFT NIE 85-63, 4 FEBRUARY 1963

Policies Toward Latin America

42. Here Castro has more capability for independent action than in any other field except the internal politics of Cuba. Castro is deeply committed to a policy of armed insurrection throughout Latin America. Because of his own experience he has a deep-seated belief that only through insurrection can revolution be promoted in Latin America. Further, he apparently believes that a successful revolution in another Latin American country would give great impetus to the revolutionary movement and would also consolidate his own regime in Cuba. In trying to foment insurrections, he apparently does not believe it crucial that he cannot now give direct military assistance to them, nor does he seem to consider it important whether he has or has not Soviet support. For the Soviets, however, such an inflexible approach smacks of the Chinese position and causes great problems in dealing with other Latin American Communists. Most important, however, it is probable that the Soviets believe such a posture will damage Soviet prospects for penetration of Latin America and inevitably bring about a confrontation with the US.

NW 50955 DocId:32423736 Page 69

EXCERPT FROM DRAFT NIE 85-63, 4 FEBRUARY 1963

18. Cuban overseas military capabilities remain severely limited by lack of the requisite air or sea lift. The Cubans could probably not undertake an overseas operation on a ssale larger than one battalion. For political as well as military reasons, the Castro regime is most unlikely to undertake military operations of this nature. It would prefer to concentrate on rendering clandestine support to local insurgents.

NW 50955 DocId:32423736 Page 70

EXCERPT FROM DRAFT NIE 85-63, 4 FEBRUARY 1963

31. The decline of his prestige has at least for the moment reduced Castro's capability for subverting popular groups and moving them into action against their own governments and against US interests. Local fidelistas have encountered greater difficulty in mobilizing mass support for anti-government strikes and demonstrations on other than local issues.

NW 50955 DocId:32423736 Page 71

EXCERPT FROM DRAFT NIE 85-63, 4 FEBRUARY 1963

32. Nonetheless, Castro continues his appeal for revolution in Latin America on the Cuban model. Those Latin Americans who are committed to violent revolution continue to look to Castro for help, particularly from his training program in Cuba and his large-scale dissemination of printed and broadcast propaganda. Communist agitators are concentrating their efforts increasingly in rural areas, as they have done in Peru recently. In addition, there has been an increase in sabotage and other violence perpetrated by extremists, of the sort not requiring the participation of large popular groups, yet designed to provoke drastic countermeasures by governments and to increase popular anti-government sentiment. These widespread activities have demonstrated that the ability of local Communists to engage in terrorist and subversive activities and their willingness to accept Cuban and Soviet support do not dpend upon Castro-s prestige or upon their opinion of his doctrines and policies.

NW 50955 DocId:32423736 Page 72

Che Guevara's mother, who lives in Argentina, told a clandestine source in mid-December that during her recent visit to Cuba her son told her that Cuban leaders now feel they will have to rely more and more on their own efforts to promote Communist penetration in South America. Guerrillas will be used on a large scale after they have received training in Cuba, Guevara said. He explained to his mother that this is necessary since both he and Castro feel Khrushchev "let them down" and has no further interest in spreading Communism in South America. Guevara added that he and Castro believe they and the Chinese are better Communists than Khrushchev. (CIA DD/P Buenos Aires, 19 December, SECRET)

Comment: This report is consistent with recent public speeches by Guevara which have emphasized the important role of Cuba with respect to the "anti-imperialist revolution" in Latin America. (SECRET)

NW 50955 DocId:32423736 Page 73

CIA Report 21 Dec 62 Rome

Translation of report dated 6 Dec 62 from Italian Embassy Havana to Foreign Ministry in Rome. "As I noted in my 9 November report is is difficult for Castro to remain calm. Therefore the revolutionary regime will continue with all means at its disposition to disseminate subversive propaganda in the whole continent, as demonstrated by the fact that all the states of Latin America (including Mexico) are taking strong measures against the dissemination of this propaganda. But it is doubtful that today Castro can do much more and that he constitutes a real menace to the security of other countries, if only because he lacks the necessary funds. I tend to share the opinion of the Ambassador to Brazil that the Cuban leaders are trying to concentrate all their subversive efforts in one country, and that they have selected Venezuela for various reasons, including the old ill feeling between Castro and Betancourt. I note in passing that, according to what was told me by the aforementioned Ambassador, during the recent meeting of the OAS the Venezuelan representative accused the Cubans of promoting the recent attempts in his country but, when asked to furnish proof, he was unable to do so."

SECRET (NOFORN) (CONTROLLED DISSEMINATION)

NW 50955 DocId:32423736 Page 74

A relative of a leading Communist in Cuba (who has previously given reliable advance information of important developments) expressed the opinion on 30 November that there will be revolts in Caribbean countries which will masquerade as "national revolutions" so as to negate the accusation of Cuban complicity. In fact, however, these revolutions will be directed from Cuba through revolutionaries from various countries who are now being trained in Cuba. (CIA DD/P IN 48717, 12 January, SECRET)

Comment: This points up what is probably the most effective means of Cuban subversion in Latin America - the training of hundreds and perhaps thousands of Latin Americans in Cuba. (SECRET)

NW 50955 DocId:32423736 Page 75

The recent spate of public addresses by leading Cuban officials on the subject of insurrection in other Latin American countries reflects a more aggressive stance than prior to the "missile crisis" and suggests that a decision to step up Cuban support for subversive groups in other Latin American countries may be under discussion within the inner circle of Cuban leaders.

Che Guevara and Education Minister Armando Hart have been in the forefront since late November in publicly expressing the view that the only road to the "liberation" of the Latin American peoples is the road of insurrection. Fidel Castro's earlier public line had been to deny the necessity for Cuba to "export" its revolution; Cuba's "example" was sufficient. This line is given only perfunctory attention in the recent Guevara and Hart speeches. The line emerging in these speeches appears even stronger than that espoused in the "Second Declaration of Havana" promulgated last February which suggested that in certain circumstances Communist-dominated coalitions could come to power by peaceful means. The whole tenor of the recent speeches suggests that Cuba intends to provide every assistance within its means to Latin American insurgents. The attention given in the Cuban press to developments in Venezuela in recent weeks strongly suggests a more than academic interest in developments there.

Canadian Ambassador Kidd, speculating on the "Trotsky-like dedication to permanent revolution" apparent in a 21 November speech by Armando Hart, commented that Cuban leaders may be attempting to counter "the humiliation of the withdrawal of the Russian missiles" by making renewed efforts to "light revolutionary fires in neighboring countries." (Comment on: Canadian Embassy, Havana, 23 November, CONFIDENTIAL) (SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM)

NW 50955 DocId:32423736 Page 76

SUPPLEMENT

THE CASTRO THREAT TO LATIN AMERICA

Despite diminished prestige, especially among government leaders, Castro retains great influence over politically unsophisticated Latin Americans. He is also supported by Western Hemisphere Communist parties and the vast majority of extreme leftists. Castro's main appeal lies in his claim to be the leader of a successful revolution against "Yankee imperialism" and in the support he is ready to provide subversive activities throughout Latin America.

The degree to which Cuba is involved in current hemisphere unrest is not clear. Antigovernment nationals and Communists of various Latin American countries, however, have made frequent visits to Cuba to receive pro-Castro indoctrination and propaganda. During 1962, 1,000 to 1,500 are believed to have received intensive education and training in sabotage and guerrilla warfare. Significant representation has been noted from Venezuela, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, Bolivia, Paraguay, and Nicaragua. There is no definite proof that Cuba is now exporting arms to any dissident groups, but propaganda materials, explosives, and financial support are reliably reported to have been furnished.

Cuban leaders have also called with increasing frequency for open rebellion as the "only road" to liberation for the Americas; they have been especially vociferous since the first of the year. Leading officials, such as Castro, Blas Roca, Che Guevara, Carlos Rafael Rodriguez, and Juan Marinello are among those calling for revolutionary violence. The "Betancourt tyranny" in Venezuela has been designated a primary target, but Peru and Chile apparently also have high priority. The use of the Prensa Latina organization and the agent network already in existence makes it virtually sure that Havana will intensify its clandestine activities.

Latin American governments are generally now more alert to Castro's threat. Inadequate security forces and widespread poverty throughout the area, however, make it almost certain that Cuban-supported insurgency will have an effect out of proportion to the number of people involved.
(SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM)

NW 50955 DocId:32423736 Page 77

Cuban Developments

Following Fidel Castro's call for revolution in Latin America in his 2 January speech, other Cuban speakers are emphasizing the same theme. Che Guevara told a group of Central American delegates in Havana recently that they must prepare for simultaneous revolutions in all Central American countries and pointed to Venezuela and Chile as major targets for revolution. Long-time Communist leader Blas Roca, on 23 January, praised Venezuelan Communists for their recent acts of sabotage and pledged continued Cuban support for the struggle of the people against the Betancourt "tyranny." Venezuela has long been a major Castro-Communist target, and Blas Roca's remarks imply Cuban support for the present upsurge of Communist activity there.

NW 50955 DocId:32423736 Page 78

(EXCERPT FROM UNCLASSIFIED DEPARTMENT OF STATE WHITE PAPER ON CUBA ISSUED AUG 1960)

1. Armed Incursions.

No sooner had the Revolutionary Government of Cuba taken power than it launched a program for exporting its revolution to other countries in the Hemisphere, particularly in the Caribbean area. The memories of the invasions and attempted invasions of Panama, of Nicaragua, and of the Dominican Republic, following closely upon one another in the spring and summer of 1959 are still fresh. Support of Cuban officials for military expeditions against the Governments of these countries, although vehemently denied, has been established beyond reasonable doubt. With the invasion of the Dominican Republic came the realization among the American Republics that international tensions in the Caribbean area, to which Cuba had significantly contributed, had risen to the extent that a Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the American States was necessary.

The Investigating Committee appointed by the Council of the OAS, acting provisionally as Organ of Consultation under the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, in the Panama case in June, 1959 concluded "that the Republic of Panama was the victim of an invasion, organized abroad, that sailed from a Cuban port and was composed almost entirely of foreigners". The Committee report stated that the Chairman of the Committee was able to confirm that 82 of 84 imprisoned invaders

NW 50955 DocId:32423736 Page 79

were Cubans. Further, the Government of Panama, prior to the departure of the invasion group from Cuba informed the Cuban Government of reports about this impending event, invoking the 1928 Habana Convention on the Duties and Rights of States in the Event of Civil Strife. The Cuban Foreign Minister in turn assured Panama that the Cuban Government would take the necessary preventive measures.

In connection with several of the invasions or attempted invasions of Nicaragua from Costa Rica and Honduras in June, 1959, and the individuals organizing them, documentary and other types of evidence which came to light demonstrated Cuban officials support in the form of arms and financial contributions.

Official Cuban complicity in the invasion of the Dominican Republic in the same month was clear. The expedition was organized, trained, and equipped in Cuba with the undoubted assistance of Cuban officials. An officer on active duty with the Cuban Rebel Army was one of the expedition's leaders. The Cuban Navy escorted the three landing craft used by the invading force on their voyage to the Dominican Republic.

Even during the Fifth Meeting of Consultation in Santiago, Chile, a report was received of the invasion of Haiti on August 13, 1959 by a group of armed men coming from Cuba. The Haitian Government after the Santiago meeting expressed its fears of further invasion attempts. It charged that the August 13 invasion from Cuba was a violation of the 1928 Habana Convention on Duties and Rights of States in the Event of Civil Strife. The assistance of Cuban officials, including the Cuban

NW 50955 DocId:32423736 Page 80

Ambassador to Haiti and his five military attaches, in the attempt to overthrow the Haitian Government was denounced by that Government. The Cuban Government, though admitting that the invasion was launched in Cuba and all but one of the participants were Cubans, conveniently disavowed the acts of the Cuban citizens involved.

NW 50955 DocId:32423736 Page 81

EXCERPT FROM DRAFT NIE 85-63, 4 FEBRUARY 1963

33. There have been indications of disapproval of Castro-s policies on the part of those Latin American Communist parties which are committed to a more gradual and less violent approach to revolution. Castro has shown himself willing to collaborate with any group, Communist or not, willing to resort to violence and in so doing to circumvent some of the regular Communist parties. Some of the latter resent such tactics and have appealed to the Soviets against Castro. It seems likely that the question of relations with other ~~Latin American~~ Communist parties, as well as the question of tactics, is likely to hamper Communist revolutionary efforts in Latin America and cause strains in Soviet-Cuban relations.

NW 50955 DocId:32423736 Page 83

EXCERPT FROM DRAFT NIE 85-63, 4 FEBRUARY 1963

29. ... Among much of the revolutionary left, discussion has tended to shift to the need for indigenous, nationalist revolutions, and away from internationalism and alliance with Moscow-oriented Communists and fidelistas.

NW 50955 DocId:32423736 Page 84

Panamanian Communist Party (PDP) leader Ruperto Thomas' recent trip to Cuba was evidently an effort to persuade Castro to support the PDP rather than the more activist Panamanian pro-Communist VAN group. When he returned to Panama on 14 December, Thomas reportedly said that Jorge Turner, who also went to Havana in September and has not returned, and other VAN leaders are still campaigning against the PDP in Cuba. However, the Cubans claim to have told VAN leaders they must cooperate with the PDP to get Castro support.

The Castro government seems consistently to favor the VAN with funds and international trips. The Cubans may distrust the PDP's poor organization and believe VAN charges that the PDP is infiltrated. However, the VAN is a rather unstable group and the Cubans are probably trying to keep on good terms with both. Thomas said he received no military training but was taught a few things like how to dismantle a machine gun.

Thomas commented that no particular group seemed to be in command in Cuba, resulting in such disorder that it was a wonder the revolution had survived. He believes the ORI is merely a mechanism.

Mexico would not issue Thomas a visa, so he returned to Panama via Prague where he talked with Czech Communist officials and may have pleaded the PDP case against VAN with them. (CIA Panama City TDCS-3/ 531,754, 20 Dec, SECRET)

NW 50955 DocId:32423736 Page 85

TELEGRAM | INFORMATION REPORT | TELEGRAM

SECRET

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

SECRET (When Filled In)

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

NO FOREIGN DISSEM

COUNTRY VENEZUELA EAST GERMANY

REPORT NO. TDCS-3/537,107

SUBJECT VENEZUELAN ATTENDANCE AT THE EAST GERMAN COMMUNIST PARTY CONGRESS

DATE DISTR. 12 FEBRUARY 1963

PRECEDENCE ROUTINE

DATE OF INFO. JANUARY 1963

REFERENCES IN 65920

PLACE & DATE ACQ. VENEZUELA, CARACAS (1 & 7 FEBRUARY 1963)

APPRAISAL 2

FIELD REPORT NO. HVC 2652

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE PARA 1: A MEMBER (B) OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF VENEZUELA, FROM A FELLOW CELL MEMBER WHO WORKS IN THE NATIONAL PARTY OFFICES.
PARA 2: A MEMBER (B) OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF VENEZUELA, FROM POMPEYO MARQUEZ.

1. JESUS FARIA, MEMBER OF THE NATIONAL SECRETARIAT OF THE PARTIDO COMUNISTA DE VENEZUELA (PCV, COMMUNIST PARTY OF VENEZUELA), AND OLGA LUZARDO FINOL, SECRETARY OF WOMEN'S AFFAIRS OF THE PCV, WERE TWO OF THE DELEGATES OF THE PCV TO THE EAST GERMAN COMMUNIST PARTY CONGRESS HELD DURING JAN '63. THEY RETURNED TO VENEZUELA WITH A LENGTHY DOCUMENT WHICH CLEARLY DISCUSSES THE IDEOLOGICAL DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE COMMUNIST PARTIES OF CHINA AND THE USSR. THIS DOCUMENT IS BEING CIRCULATED AMONG SOME MEMBERS OF THE PCV.

2. POMPEYO MARQUEZ, MEMBER OF THE NATIONAL SECRETARIAT OF THE PCV, ON 1 FEB SAID THAT THE VENEZUELAN AND CUBAN DELEGATIONS AT THE EAST

SECRET

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

NO FOREIGN DISSEM

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

STATE/INR | DIA | ARMY/ACSI | NAVY | AIR | JCS | SECDEF | NSA | NIC | AID | USIA | OCI | ONE | OCR | ORR | OSI | OO | STATE/DIR

TELEGRAM | INFORMATION REPORT | TELEGRAM

DA IN 16376

SECRET

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FORM 5-62 1K OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS (15-20)

NW 50955 DocId:32423736 Page 86

GERMAN COMMUNIST PARTY CONGRESS TOOK A NEUTRAL POSITION REGARDING THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN CHINA AND THE USSR WHEREAS THE OTHER LATIN AMERICAN COMMUNIST PARTY REPRESENTATIVES STRONGLY SUPPORTED THE POSITION OF THE USSR. REPRESENTATIVES OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNIST PARTIES AT THE CONGRESS CAUTIONED THAT EXTREME CARE SHOULD BE TAKEN BY THE PCV IN USING GUERRILLA FORCES.

3. FIELD DISSEM: STATE ARMY NAVY AIR CINCLANT CINCARIB.

ACTION: ACSI, NAVY, AF, JCS, OSD
INFO : DCSOP, DIA
DA IN 16376

END OF MESSAGE

NW 50955 DocId:32423736 Page 87

Cuban Anniversary Celebrations (See pictures following)

The Cuban Armed Forces parade in Havana yesterday included infantry, naval, artillery, armor, and air formations. The most significant display was that of SA-2 missiles and possible cruise missiles.

Ground units included 15 companies of the 2d Western Army, units of the National Militia, and other infantry units in a "new parade step" resembling the goose step. The artillery unit had antitank guns, heavy artillery, multiple rocket launchers and AA artillery. Three battalions of medium tanks, heavy tanks and assault guns, along with the surface-to-air and possible cruise missiles made up the final unit of the parade.

The air formations included helicopters, propeller-type training planes, and MIG-15's, 19's and 21's.

Soviet participation in the parade has not been established, although Soviets and Czechs may have piloted some of the aircraft.

Premier Castro's speech following the parade brought no surprises aside from its unusual brevity. He made an effort to indicate Cuban control of the air defense system, including the SA-2's, and, in a probable reference to US reconnaissance flights, said there could be an incident "at any time".

Castro reiterated the five demands he first made after the announcement that the Soviets would withdraw offensive missiles from Cuba. He included his usual anti-US statements and slurs at President Kennedy and made a low-keyed appeal for "unity" within the Communist Bloc. He called for revolution in Latin America, with special emphasis on Venezuela, and cited Cuba's "historic task . . . of serving as an example" for that revolution.

In the USSR, Cuban and Soviet spokesmen lauded Cuban-Russian friendship and unity, and the Soviet spokesman, Suslov, pledged that his country would "never leave Revolutionary Cuba alone in distress." (CONFIDENTIAL)

SOURCE: VARIOUS

NW 50955 DocId:32423736 Page 88

reportedly continues, the threat of retaliatory action from forces rallying around deposed Air Force Chief Lemus has apparently diminished, and the majority of the armed forces still supports President Ydigoras. The President's intention with regard to leftist ex-President Arevalo, who plans to return and seek the presidency in next December's elections, is an unsettling factor. The armed forces universally oppose Arevalo. Some factions want to replace Ydigoras with a civilian-military junta and call new elections before Arevalo becomes eligible to run in March. Should Arevalo return, the military will probably move to prevent his candidacy and the coming months may be critical.

Honduran President Villeda Morales, although not a strong leader, is expected to complete his term. The ruling Liberal Party will probably retain the Presidency in the October elections, and maneuvering for the nomination has begun. Rodas Alvarado, President of the Congress and one of the three leading contenders, has used his position to build up strength, but the armed forces regard him as the least desirable and a developing anti-Rodas coalition may prevent his nomination. Either of the three leading candidates would probably follow the present government's policies, including its relatively soft Communist stand. The Communists, while not yet a direct threat, are steadily increasing their influence in the labor field and are exploiting the country's discouraging political, economic, and social conditions.

El Salvador, faced with a serious Communist threat about two years ago, continues to show political and economic progress, but there are clouds on the horizon. President Rivera, who assumed control last summer in a full return to constitutional government, still has widespread support and military backing. The government is moving ahead with its reform program, but there is some resistance to the proposed new income taxes. Communist activities have been curbed, but the Communists still retain a subversive capability particularly among labor and student groups. There is concern over the likely election of a pro-Communist as rector of the university, a center of subversion and intrigue.

Costa Rica continues to be one of the most democratic and politically stable countries in Latin America but there are reverberations of unrest stemming from the deteriorating economic situation. The ruling National Liberation Party, which was returned to power in last year's election in a bitterly contested but peaceful election, represents the liberal left, although it includes a number of moderates such as President Orlich and some members of his cabinet. The Communist Party is small and illegal but well organized and effectively led. It recently instigated disorders in the banana zone and, while not an immediate threat, has long-range potential should economic conditions worsen.

NW 50955 DocId:32423736 Page 89

Panama is relatively quiet. Although Panama has failed to receive any commitment for a long-sought renegotiation of the Canal Zone treaty, continuing talks on areas of disagreement and some concessions have eased tensions and softened violent anti-US propaganda. Public emotion may again be aroused, however, by the recent petition, filed by a Communist lawyer, requesting the Supreme Court to declare the treaty unconstitutional. President Chiari has also indicated he expects to press for increased compensation during the forthcoming talks. On the internal scene, President Chiari has failed to provide a strong administration. Corruption continues; the cabinet is divided by conflicting loyalties and ambitions; badly needed reforms have not yet been adopted; and the chronically depressed economy remains stagnant.

The stability which has marked the 30-year dominance of Mexico's Party of Revolutionary Institutions (PRI) is gradually being eroded. Extreme right and left factions of the PRI are vying for domination. In attempting to placate both, President Lopez Mateos has adopted inconsistent and vacillating policies, pleasing neither group. Forces outside the PRI also pose an increasing threat -- particularly the recently formed Independent Peasant Central (CCI) with which leftist ex-President Cardenas is associated. The CCI, organized to exploit unrest among the landless peasants, may also attempt to challenge the PRI politically. To undercut the CCI, the government plans to complete the land distribution program by the end of Lopez Mateos' term late next year. Although this may alleviate discontent in the agrarian sector, rising population and mounting unemployment will continue to be major problems.
(SECRET)

NW 50955 DocId:32423736 Page 90

Construction of the fishing port in the Bay of Havana, whose announcement as a Soviet undertaking caused so much concern last fall, will be directed by a team of Soviet technicians and Cuban engineers and will start in February - according to a Havana radio announcement. The port is to be completed by the end of 1963 and is to cost 12 million pesos, which will be met by a loan from the Soviet Union, to be amortized over 10 years. The port is expected to serve 130 vessels of the Soviet fishing fleet and from 24 to 30 of the Cuban fleet. It will have installations such as freezer plants for 10,000 tons of fish, factories for processing sea products, machinery for making no less than 80 tons of ice a day, a floating dock to repair ships of up to 2,500 tons, and well-equipped repair shops. The announcement emphasized that the port is to be operated by and will be the "absolute property of the Cuban state."

It has also been announced that Poland has now formulated plans for building the shipyard envisaged in the port of Mariel. The installation will be managed by Cuban technicians who are presently receiving training in Polish shipyards on the Baltic. Ship construction will reportedly reach a level of 70,000 tons per year. (FBIS 58, 17 January, and Daily Report, 16 January, OFFICIAL USE ONLY)

NW 50955 DocId:32423736 Page 91

INCOMING TELEGRAM Department of State

CONFIDENTIAL

48.
Action

CONFIDENTIAL

PASSED TO
GEN. CARROLL ☐
GEN. QUINN ☐
GEN. HALL ☐
COL. GILLIS ☒

Control: 7384
Rec'd: February 11, 1963
9:11 p.m.

FROM: Kingston

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 567, February 11, 6 p.m.

PARAPHRASE NOT REQUIRED
Ref by msg number in
unclassified reply prohibited.

Expediting Resolution

Permanent Secretary External Affairs Ministry told Embassy today that GOJ concerned over reports it had received that USSR furnishing Cubans not only fishing vessels, but also torpedo boats and submarine chasers. He foresaw Soviet-supplied ships as having potential adverse effect on Jamaican fishing industry as well as presenting possible security problem. He asked whether US could provide more detailed information on these ships which would operate from Soviet-built "fishing base" in Cuba.

In view of reports, he planned to urge Cabinet to take early action on deciding and publicizing limits of Jamaican territorial waters in order to avoid incidents with Soviets and Cubans. He is considering recommending to Cabinet that Jamaica claim territorial waters of six-and-six miles. Jamaica now apparently claims three-mile limit.

Although GOJ obviously counting on receipt US military equipment, seems unlikely that this expression GOJ concern motivated primarily by desire to speed up delivery. Embassy inclined to view Jamaican approach as healthsome indication GOJ at technical level beginning to appreciate ramifications of Cuban problem.

ACTION: STATE(ARMY ACSI)
INFO : DCSOP, OSA, JCS, USDEL IADB
DA IN 16465

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NW 50955 DocId:32423736 Page 92

SUPPLEMENT

THE SITUATION IN CENTRAL AMERICA, PANAMA, AND MEXICO

Central America is relatively stable. Preparations are under way for President Kennedy's scheduled meeting with the Chiefs of State of these countries at San Jose, Costa Rica, on 18 and 19 March. Tensions are rising, however, in those countries having elections scheduled this year; Mexico's political stability is threatened; and the Cuban subversive potential remains a problem throughout the area.

During the forthcoming meeting, an attempt will be made to center discussions on areas of common interest. Economic integration of the Central American region -- one of the major objectives of the Alliance for Progress Program -- will undoubtedly be emphasized. Central America, which has been moving toward greater political unity, has begun to take steps toward economic integration, and presently envisages the creation of a Common Market by 1965. The Cuban subversive threat is also likely to be given top priority. All of the Central American countries regard this as one of the major problems and are seeking ways to meet it.

On 3 February, Nicaraguans are scheduled to cast ballots for the first time in nearly 30 years for a Presidential candidate who is not a member of the Somoza family. Rene Schick -- the government's Liberal Party (PLN) candidate and hand-picked by the Somozas -- is expected to win easily, however. Effective opposition to Schick collapsed when the major opposition party -- Traditionalist Conservative (PCT)-- boycotted the elections because the government refused to permit OAS supervision. The only opponent is Diego Manuel Chamorro Bolanos, a last-minute candidate of the splinter Nicaraguan Conservative Party (PCN), whose entry into the race seems to have been engineered by the government to provide a semblance of opposition. Castro-Communist elements, militant conservatives and others may attempt to create disorders before or during the elections, but the Nicaraguan National Guard is believed capable of controlling any troubles short of a general uprising or well-coordinated rebel invasion -- neither of which seems likely.

Anti-Somoza Nicaraguans have alleged fraudulent registrations and may attempt to challenge the elections. Although Schick may not turn out to be a Somoza puppet, opposition suspicions will be reinforced with the likely retention of General Anastasio Somoza as Director of the National Guard.

Repercussions in Guatemala from the recent abortive Air Force revolt have not been too serious. Although plotting

NW 50955 DocId:32423736 Page 94

[illegible] continues, the threat of retaliation [illegible] forces rallying around deposed Air Force Chief Lemus has apparently diminished, and the majority of the armed forces still supports President Ydigoras. The President's intention with regard to leftist ex-President Arevalo, who plans to return and seek the presidency in next December's elections, is an unsettling factor. The armed forces universally oppose Arevalo. Some factions want to replace Ydigoras with a civilian-military junta and call new elections before Arevalo becomes eligible to run in March. Should Arevalo return, the military will probably move to prevent his candidacy and the coming months may be critical.

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(REVERSE BLANK)

SECRET-NO FOREIGN DISSEM

NW 50955 DocId:32423736 Page 95

Panama is relatively quiet. Although Panama has failed to receive any commitment for a long-sought renegotiation of the Canal Zone treaty, continuing talks on areas of disagreement and some concessions have eased tensions and softened violent anti-US propaganda. Public emotion may again be aroused, however, by the recent petition, filed by a Communist lawyer, requesting the Supreme Court to declare the treaty unconstitutional. President Chiari has also indicated he expects to press for increased compensation during the forthcoming talks. On the internal scene, President Chiari has failed to provide a strong administration. Corruption continues; the cabinet is divided by conflicting loyalties and ambitions; badly needed reforms have not yet been adopted; and the chronically depressed economy remains stagnant.

The stability which has marked the 30-year dominance of Mexico's Party of Revolutionary Institutions (PRI) is gradually being eroded. Extreme right and left factions of the PRI are vying for domination. In attempting to placate both, President Lopez Mateos has adopted inconsistent and vacillating policies, pleasing neither group. Forces outside the PRI also pose an increasing threat -- particularly the recently formed Independent Peasant Central (CCI) with which leftist ex-President Cardenas is associated. The CCI, organized to exploit unrest among the landless peasants, may also attempt to challenge the PRI politically. To undercut the CCI, the government plans to complete the land distribution program by the end of Lopez Mateos' term late next year. Although this may alleviate discontent in the agrarian sector, rising population and mounting unemployment will continue to be major problems.
(SECRET)

NW 50955 DocId:32423736 Page 96

Campesino Strike Scheduled in Bolivia

A planned Campesino (peasant) strike in Bolivia today could lead to violence if it occurs. The Government reportedly plans to block all entrances into La Paz, and campesinos loyal to the government are assembling and arming to counter the strikers who are led by pro-Communist Torribio Salas. A government spokesman claims that the Cuban and Czechoslovak Embassies are financing the strike and that the Cubans are training campesino militia in other areas as well.

President Paz has reportedly said he will do everything to prevent the strike but will call on loyal campesinos for aid if he fails. If armed conflict develops between the two groups of campesinos, the Armed Forces would probably be forced to step in. President Paz might also have to take action against trouble makers like Salas, something he has tried to avoid.
(CONFIDENTIAL)

SOURCE: ARMA LA PAZ CX-11 (C)

(REVERSE BLANK)
SECRET-NO FOREIGN DISSEM

NW 50955 DocId:32423736 Page 97

Three top Brazilian Communist Party officials, including Luis Carlos Prestes, are reported leaving for Cuba via Prague prior to 15 January to discuss certain political problems with the Cuban Communists responsible for pro-Cuban activities in the different Latin American countries. Before leaving they planned to be briefed by a Brazilian Communist Party member who has just returned from a visit to party leaders in Uruguay, Argentina, Chile, Peru, and Bolivia to get their opinions about holding the "Latin American Congress in Support of Cuba," now rescheduled for March, in Rio or Sao Paulo. (CIA, Rio de Janeiro, IN 42868, 31 December, SECRET NOFORN)

NW 50955 DocId:32423736 Page 98

The National Executive Commission of Brazil's orthodox Communist Party (PCB) reportedly planned to meet on 7 January to discuss the party position in relation to Francisco Juliao, Brazilian Peasant-League leader who has been closer to Brazil's dissident hard-line Communist Party than to its orthodox group (CPB). The PCB leaders planned to consider the possibility of sending a high-level party delegation to Cuba to confer with Fidel Castro, not only to improve relations but to protest a report that Castrol is supporting Juliao. (CIA Sao Paulo, TDCS-3533404, 9 January, SECRET)

Comment: Cuba has for some time had a divisive influence on Brazilian Communist affairs. The dissident Communist Party formed in late 1961 has - like Juliao - favored a more revolutionary line and has apparently received considerably more support from Cuba than has the orthodox party. Another indication of the divisive influence of Cuba is the report that Francisco Leivas Otero, PCB leader responsible for matters pertaining to Cuba, attacked party subservience to the CPSU at a national PCB conference on 29 November. Leivas maintained that the PCB should discuss the Sino-Soviet dispute with complete independence, rather than maintain silence on it as it had been doing. (SECRET)

NW 50955 DocId:32423736 Page 99

SECRET

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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SECRET (When Filled In)

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

COUNTRY MEXICO/BRAZIL

REPORT NO. TDCS-3/537,187

SUBJECT CLOSE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN VICENTE LOMBARDO TOLEDANO AND PRESIDENT MATEOS; REASONS FOR LOMBARDO'S TRIP TO BRAZIL

DATE DISTR. 14 FEBRUARY 1963

PRECEDENCE ROUTINE

DATE OF INFO. 12 FEBRUARY 1963

REFERENCES IN 67594

PLACE & DATE ACQ. MEXICO, MEXICO CITY (12 FEBRUARY 1963)

APPRAISAL 2

FIELD REPORT NO. HMM 7016

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE A PERSON (B) IN CLOSE PERSONAL CONTACT WITH LOMBARDO.

1. ON 12 FEBRUARY VICENTE LOMBARDO TOLEDANO, SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE PARTIDO POPULAR SOCIALISTA (PPS - POPULAR SOCIALIST PARTY) CONFERRED WITH HUMBERTO ROMERO PEREZ, PRIVATE SECRETARY OF ADOLFO LOPEZ MATEOS, PRESIDENT OF MEXICO. LOMBARDO TOLD ROMERO HE WANTED THE PRESIDENT TO KNOW ABOUT HIS TRIP TO BRAZIL AND WHY HE WAS GOING. HE ASKED ROMERO TO TELL LOPEZ MATEOS THAT HE WOULD LEAVE MEXICO CITY FOR RIO DE JANEIRO ON 13 FEBRUARY, AND EXPECTED TO BE BACK IN MEXICO CITY ON 23 FEBRUARY. LOMBARDO TOLD ROMERO HE WOULD CONTACT HIM ON HIS RETURN FROM BRAZIL IN ORDER TO ARRANGE A PRIVATE MEETING WITH THE PRESIDENT. LOMBARDO SAID HE HAD SEVERAL THINGS

ASD
NASD
EXEC
D/BA
EUR
NESA
WHA
FE
SOV
FMRS
FEA
D/AC
DIS
D/C
C/SY
P/FL
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V/PS
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DA IN 17084

SECRET

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

STATE/INR	DIA	ARMY/ACSI	NAVY	AIR	JCS	SECDEF	NSA	NIC	AID	USIA	OCI	ONE	OCR	ORR	OBI	OO	

STATE/DIR

TELEGRAM | INFORMATION REPORT | TELEGRAM

SECRET

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FORM C-62 1K OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. (15-20)

NW 50955 DocId:32423736 Page 100

TO DISCUSS WITH LOPEZ MATEOS.

2. LOMBARDO GAVE ROMERO THE FOLLOWING REASONS FOR HIS TRIP TO BRAZIL. HE SAID THAT A GROUP OF BRAZILIAN PERSONALITIES AND INTELLECTUALS HAD CONVOKED A CONGRESS WHICH IS SCHEDULED TO BE HELD IN RIO DE JANEIRO IN MARCH 1963. HE SAID THE TWO PRINCIPAL AIMS OF THE CONGRESS ARE:

A. TO CREATE AN ORGANIZATION IN DEFENSE OF CUBA.

B. TO EXAMINE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL CONDITIONS EXISTING IN LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES IN ORDER TO PROMOTE THE SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF LATIN AMERICA.

3. LOMBARDO SAID THAT SOMETHING WENT WRONG IN BRAZIL BECAUSE, APART FROM THE COMMITTEE WHICH CONVOKED THE CONGRESS, A SECOND SEPARATE COMMITTEE HAD SPRUNG UP WHOSE AIMS ARE THE SAME, AND THAT A SORT OF RIVALRY HAS DEVELOPED BETWEEN THE TWO GROUPS. LOMBARDO SAID THE RESULT WAS "THAT MY COMRADES IN EUROPE HAVE ASKED ME TO GO TO BRAZIL TO INTERVENE IN THE MATTER, TO TRY TO ORGANIZE A SINGLE UNITED COMMITTEE, AND MAKE DEFINITE PREPARATIONS FOR THE HOLDING OF THE CONGRESS IN ORDER TO ENSURE ITS SUCCESS." LOMBARDO SAID "THE COMRADES IN EUROPE" SHOULD HAVE SENT AN ARGENTINE, A CHILEAN, A URUGUAYAN, OR SOMEONE NEARER BRAZIL, BUT THEY INSISTED ON SENDING HIM BECAUSE HE HAS EXPERIENCE, AND THEY ARE CONVINCED THAT HE CAN STRAIGHTEN THINGS OUT SATISFACTORILY.

4. LOMBARDO TOLD ROMERO THAT IF THE CONGRESS IS HELD IN MARCH AS

NW 50955 DocId:32423736 Page 101

SCHEDULED, HE WILL NOT ATTEND IT. HE SAID "THE PRIMA DONNAS" AND ORNAMENTAL FIGURES WILL TAKE OVER THEN, AND I AM NOT ONE OF THOSE." ROMERO REMARKED THAT LOMBARDO IS A MAN OF WORK. LOMBARDO SAID, "I GO TO ORGANIZE SO THE CONGRESS WILL NOT FAIL, THAT IS MY MISSION, NOTHING MORE, AFTER THAT ANY ONE FROM MEXICO CAN ATTEND."

5. (FIELD COMMENT. LOMBARDO'S PLAN TO LEAVE MEXICO ON 13 FEBRUARY FOR PANAMA AND RIO DE JANEIRO HAS ALREADY BEEN REPORTED.)

6. FIELD DISSEM: STATE ARMY NAVY AIR FBI I&NS CINCARIB.

ACTION: ACSI, NAVY, AF, JCS, OSD

INFO : DCSOP

DA IN 17084

END OF MESSAGE

ACTION

ARA-4

(25)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AIRGRAM

CSM 9-6 BRAZ

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OSD 12	USIA 8	NSA 3

A-234

NO.

OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Mr. Rowan Hassessen

HANDLING INDICATOR

TO : DEPARTMENT OF STATE

INFO : RIO DE JANEIRO

FROM : Amcongen, SAO PAULO

DATE: February 6, 1963

SUBJECT : Sample survey of worker sentiment shows receptivity toward communism; São Paulo business leaders reported by one observer as generally unconcerned over Communist danger.

REF :

Two straws in the wind that have come recently to my attention indicate the existence of an unhealthy attitude toward communism on the part of at least some segments of São Paulo's working and managerial classes. Further indications in support of or in refutation of these signs will be submitted as they are noted.

On January 31, I was visited by the two top American executives of a Brazilian subsidiary of a large American corporation. § They said that their firm, following a practice instituted some years ago of periodically sampling worker sentiment in their plants, had just finished a small survey conducted very informally by trusted Brazilian employees among 55 or 60 of their semi-skilled workers to discover how the latter would feel about the establishment in Brazil of a communist system of government. The result of this survey was so shockingly different from that of earlier pulse-taking that these executives thought the Consulate General should know about it. Eighty percent of the workers approached had indicated that while they did not pretend to know much about communism, they thought they would be better off under a communist regime than they are at present. Among the reasons most commonly given were that things were so bad in Brazil that any change would be for the ~~best~~ better and that communism would put an end to the rascality (malandragem) which is so prevalent. The other twenty percent thought that communism would be bad for the country.

§ Names withheld at their request.

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DMBraddock:tmn 2-6-63

Contents and Classification Approved by:

Clearances:

São Paulo
A-234

The company executives attributed the pro-communist sentiment as revealed, mainly to the economic difficulties experienced by low-income families as a result of the rampant inflation. They said their labor relations were good, that while their pay scales were not as high as those in some other industries, some popular fringe benefits were provided, and that to the best of their knowledge there had been no communist agitators at work among their employees.

Not long before this visit I was lunching one day at the Jockey Club with Sr. Paulo Ayres Filho, a Brazilian banker and pharmaceutical manufacturer who is the spark-plug of IPES (Instituto de Pesquisas Economicas e Sociais), the principal democratic action group in the local business world. Looking around him at the other tables, occupied by a good many well-known figures of São Paulo's conservative upper classes, Sr. Ayres said to me, "Apart from the two of us, there isn't a man in this dining room who is seriously concerned over the communist danger in Brazil."

No conclusions, obviously, should be drawn from such slender indications. It has been my observation, however, that most Brazilians either believe that a communist take-over would be impossible in Brazil, or believe that even if it occurred, it would take a relatively mild form with which they could live. The Brazilian's boasted calm, which is genuine and in most circumstances a virtue, could in the present state of affairs be the cause of his undoing.

Daniel M. Braddock
Minister Consul General

NW 50955 DocId:32423736 Page 104

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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S-E-C-R-E-T
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

COUNTRY	Colombia/Cuba	REPORT NO.	CS-3/536,069
SUBJECT	Cuban Support of Guerrillas in Colombia	DATE DISTR.	4 February 1963
		NO. PAGES	1
		REFERENCES	RD
DATE OF INFO.	October 1962		
PLACE & DATE ACQ.	Germany, Munich (14 December 1962)	FIELD REPORT NO.	

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE: An official [redacted] service, from "a fairly reliable source with contacts in Buenos Aires." Appraisal of Content: 6.

1. Maximo Gruber, a major in the Cuban Army and one of the leaders of the G-2 section, has been appointed technical leader of the Communist guerrillas in Sumapaz, Colombia.[1] Gruber, a Polish Jew, was formerly a commissar in Spain. His wife is European. His son Maximo is a graduate of the Lenin Institute in Moscow. On his frequent trips to Bolivia, Uruguay, and Cuba he carries a Bolivian diplomatic passport identifying him as "traveling inspector of the Bolivian Foreign Ministry."

2. Gruber is being assisted in his tasks in Colombia by Jaime Guerra, also known as Captain Veneno. One of his liaison officers to the Communist Party of Colombia is Blanca Diaz y Collazo, a lawyer and former member of the Cuban Embassy in Bogota, who was trained in Prague in 1952.

1. Headquarters Comment. An official [redacted] service reported in April 1961 that Maximo Grobart, nationality unknown, was training guerrillas in the Sumapaz area; Grobart, who claimed to be of Hungarian origin, had a Cuban passport in the name of Jose Blanco and might have had other passports of different nationalities.

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INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

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S-E-C-R-E-T

COUNTRY Costa Rica/Cuba

SUBJECT Departure of Costa Rican Communist to Live in Cuba

REPORT NO. CS -3/534,724

DATE DISTR. 22 January 1963

NO. PAGES 1

REFERENCES RD

DATE OF INFO. November 1962

PLACE & DATE ACQ. Costa Rica, San José (23 November 62)

FIELD REPORT NO. HRS-3006

SOURCE EVALUATIONS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE: Costa Rican (B) with good contacts in Costa Rican Communist Party circles. Appraisal of Content: 2.

Carlos Guillen Fernandez, Costa Rican Communist who was formerly very active in the Sociedad de Amigos de la Revolucion Cubana (Society of Friends of the Cuban Revolution), left Costa Rica on 14 November, on his way to Cuba, where he planned to remain indefinitely and to work.

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

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C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

COUNTRY	Ecuador/Cuba/Latin America	REPORT NO.	CS-3/535,791
SUBJECT	Request by Cuban Diplomat in Chile to Member of the Revolutionary Union of Ecuadorean Youth for Information on Leftist Activity in Ecuador	DATE DISTR.	1 February 1963
		NO. PAGES	1
		REFERENCES	RD-W-2107
DATE OF INFO.	Mid-January 1963		
PLACE & DATE ACQ.	Ecuador, Guayaquil (22 January 1963)	FIELD REPORT NO.	HEG-2108

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE: Member (C) of the Revolutionary Union of Ecuadorean Youth. Appraisal of Content: 3.

Alfredo Vera Arrata, a member of the National Executive Council of the Revolutionary Union of Ecuadorean Youth (URJE) until his expulsion from URJE during its National Convention held in early January 1963, has received a letter from Pedro Martinez Pirez, First Secretary of the Cuban Embassy in Santiago, Chile, in which he asks Vera to send a person to Chile to inform him on current leftist activity in Ecuador. Vera plans to send Jaime Galarza Zavala, also expelled from URJE, if funds can be raised for the trip.

Field Comment. Martinez is in charge of Cuban subversive activities in Chile, Peru, and Ecuador.

SECRET

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SECRET (When Filled In)

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
CONTROLLED DISSEM

Mr. Rowen has seen

COUNTRY CUBA/HAITI

REPORT NO. TDCS DB-3/653,274

SUBJECT PLANNED MILITARY COUP TO OVERTHROW PRESIDENT DUVALIER OF HAITI

DATE DISTR. 14 FEBRUARY 1963

PRECEDENCE ROUTINE

DATE OF INFO. 8 FEBRUARY 1963

REFERENCES IN 67457

PLACE & DATE ACQ. UNITED STATES (28 JANUARY, 8 FEBRUARY 1963)

APPRAISAL 3

FIELD REPORT NO.

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE AN OFFICER (B) OF NEWS DISTRIBUTING MEDIA; FROM A COLLEAGUE OF EUSEBIO MUJAL BARNIOL.

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OCR

1. PAUL E. MAGLOIRE, FORMER HAITIAN PRESIDENT, IS PLANNING TO OVERTHROW PRESIDENT FRANCOIS DUVALIER OF HAITI IN A MILITARY COUP. MAGLOIRE CLAIMS TO HAVE THE BACKING OF THE HAITIAN ARMY. THE DATE OF THE COUP IS EXPECTED TO BE SET AT A SECRET MEETING WHICH WILL BE HELD IN NEW YORK ON 20 FEBRUARY.

2. MAGLOIRE EXPECTS TO RECEIVE FINANCIAL SUPPORT AND MANPOWER FROM CERTAIN CUBANS IN EXILE. ANTONIO RODRIGUEZ Y ECHAZABAL, FORMER CUBAN AMBASSADOR TO HAITI, IS LINING UP CUBAN EXILE SUPPORT. RODRIGUEZ HOPES THAT IF THE CUBANS PLAY A PROMINENT ROLE, THEY

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CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
CONTROLLED DISSEM

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

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FORM 5-62 1K OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. (15-20)

NW 50955 DocId:32423736 Page 108

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

SECRET (When Filled In) CONTROLLED DISSEM

TDCS DB-3/653,274

IN 67457

PAGE 2

MIGHT BE GIVEN A BASE FROM WHICH TO OPERATE ACTIVELY AGAINST CASTRO IN THE FUTURE. (SOURCE COMMENT: RODRIGUEZ HAD BEEN A DELEGATE OF THE 26 JULY MOVEMENT IN PUERTO PRINCIPE UNTIL JANUARY 1959 WHEN HE WAS NAMED AMBASSADOR TO HAITI BY FIDEL CASTRO RUZ. IN LATE 1959 RODRIGUEZ MANAGED TO ESCAPE ASSASSINATION).

3. EUSEBIO MUJAL BARNIOL OF THE CONFEDERACION DE TRABAJADORES DE CUBA EN EXILIO (CTCE-CONFEDERATION OF CUBAN WORKERS IN EXILE) IS ASSISTING RODRIGUEZ, A RELATIVE.

4. FIELD DISSEM:STATE, CINCLANT, CINCARIB.

ACTION: ACSI, NAVY, AF, JCS, OSD
INFO : DCSOP
DA IN 17056

END OF MESSAGE

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

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NW 50955 DocId:32423736 Page 109



CLASSIFICATION - DISSEMINATION CONTROL

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MEXICO TO DECLARE HIM UNWELCOME BECAUSE OF HIS OPPOSITION TO THE REGIME OF FIDEL CASTRO RUZ, COMMUNIST PRIME MINISTER OF CUBA.

2. MIGUEL PADILLA GUTIERREZ, A LEADING MEMBER OF THE JCM, IS ALSO TRYING TO ORGANIZE AND INCITE THE MEXICAN WORKERS AND FARMERS TO DEMONSTRATE AGAINST BETANCOURT'S VISIT.

3. FIELD DISSEM: STATE FBI CINCARIB.

ACTION: ACSI, NAVY, AF, JCS, OSD
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END OF MESSAGE

CLASSIFICATION - DISSEMINATION CONTROL

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INFORMATION REPORT

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CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM

COUNTRY PANAMA/CUBA A IN : 9477 (13 Feb 63) R/b

REPORT NO. TDCS 3/537,022

SUBJECT CUBAN PROPOSAL TO THE PARTIDO DEL PUEBLO TO ASSIST IN ESTABLISHMENT OF CUBAN ESPIONAGE NET IN PANAMA

DATE DISTR. 12 FEBRUARY 1963

PRECEDENCE ROUTINE

DATE OF INFO. 17 DECEMBER 1962

REFERENCES IN 38943

PLACE & DATE ACQ. PANAMA, PANAMA CITY (21 DEC 62)

APPRAISAL 2 - THAT THOMAS IS ACCURATELY QUOTED

FIELD REPORT NO.

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE REGIONAL OFFICER (B) OF THE PARTIDO DEL PUEBLO, FROM THOMAS WHO IS A PERSONAL FRIEND.

1. ON 17 DECEMBER 1962, RUPERTO LUTHER THOMAS, NATIONAL SECRETARY OF PROPAGANDA OF THE PARTIDO DEL PUEBLO (PDP - PEOPLE'S PARTY - COMMUNIST), SAID THAT WHILE HE WAS IN CUBA HE HAD COMMITTED THE PDP TO ACCEPT A PROPOSAL MADE BY THE CUBANS, WHO PROPOSE TO ESTABLISH AN ESPIONAGE NET IN PANAMA, TARGETED AGAINST UNITED STATES MILITARY INSTALLATIONS IN THE CANAL ZONE, TO BE FUNDED THROUGH THE PDP. THOMAS SAID THE CUBANS ARE EXTREMELY INTERESTED IN THE MOVEMENTS OF MILITARY SHIPS THROUGH THE PANAMA CANAL, AND THAT THEY TOLD HIM THAT THE NET WOULD REQUIRE TWO MEN, ONE A RADIO TECHNICIAN, THE OTHER A CODE EXPERT. THOMAS WISHED TO KNOW WHETHER A RADIO TRANSMITTER COULD BE BOUGHT IN PANAMA.

2. THOMAS SAID THAT HE HAD REPORTED THE CUBAN PROPOSAL TO THE NATIONAL EXECUTIVE

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM

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INFORMATION REPORT

SECRET IN 16496

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COMMITTEE (CEN) OF THE PDP ON 16 DECEMBER BUT THAT HE HAD NOT TOLD THE CEN THAT HE HAD COMMIT[illegible] THE PDP TO ACCEPT THE PROPOSAL. THOMAS WAS WORRIED ABOUT THE MATTER BECAUSE AT THE 16 DECEMBER MEETING MIGUEL PORCELL, NATIONAL SECRETARY OF ORGANIZATION OF THE PDP, HAD OPPOSED THE IDEA. HE DID NOT BELIEVE THAT THE PDP SHOULD ENGAGE IN SUCH ACTIVITY AND SAID THAT IF THE CUBANS WANTED THIS KIND OF INFORMATION THEY SHOULD GET IT THEMSELVES. RUBEN SOUZA, NATIONAL SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE PDP, DISAGREED WITH PORCELL, SAYING THAT SO LONG AS THE PDP COULD USE THE INFORMATION DEVELOPED BY SUCH AN OPERATION HE BELIEVED THE CUBAN PROPOSAL SHOULD BE ACCEPTED. THE SUBJECT WAS TO BE DISCUSSED FULLY AT THE CEN MEETING SCHEDULED TO BE HELD 18 DECEMBER 1962. (FIELD COMMENT: THOMAS WENT TO CUBA 14 SEPTEMBER AND RETURNED TO PANAMA, VIA ZURICH, 14 DECEMBER. TDCS 3/531,754 GIVES FURTHER DETAILS OF THOMAS' EUROPEAN TRAVEL.)

3. FIELD DISSEM: STATE, ARMY, NAVY, AIR, CINCLANT, CINCARIB.

END OF MESSAGE

ACTION: ACSI, NAVY, AF, JCS, OSD
INFO : DCSOP
DA IN 16496

NW 50955 DocId:32423736 Page 113

SECRET

TELEGRAM | INFORMATION REPORT | TELEGRAM

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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SECRET (When Filled In)

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

COUNTRY PERU

SUBJECT 1. DECISION OF GUARDIA CIVIL JUDGE TO RELEASE COMMUNISTS
2. COMMUNIST LEGAL ADVISER IN GUARDIA CIVIL

DATE OF INFO. 12 FEBRUARY 1963

PLACE & DATE ACQ. PERU, LIMA (12 FEBRUARY 1963)

APPRAISAL 2

REPORT NO. TDCS-3/537,185

DATE DISTR. 14 FEBRUARY 1963

PRECEDENCE ROUTINE

REFERENCES IN 67560

FIELD REPORT NO. HPL 2756

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE COMPETENT AMERICAN OBSERVER (B).

1. MAJOR GUILLERMO HINOSTROZA, WHO WAS NAMED AS THE GUARDIA CIVIL JUDGE TO TAKE THE STATEMENTS OF THE COMMUNISTS ACCUSED OF PLOTTING SUBVERSION, DECIDED ON 12 FEBRUARY 63 THAT HE COULD NOT ASSUME RESPONSIBILITY FOR BRINGING THE COMMUNISTS TO TRIAL. HE INTENDS TO RELEASE THEM ON 15 FEBRUARY IN THE ABSENCE OF A DECISION BY THE GOVERNING JUNTA (FIELD COMMENT: THE PRESS REPORTED HINOSTROZA'S APPOINTMENT AS AD HOC JUDGE OR MAGISTRATE FOR THE SECOND POLICE JUDICIAL ZONE IN THE ARRAIGNMENT PROCESS. IT ALSO REPORTED THAT COLONEL ENRIQUE DIEZ CANSECO WAS THE GUARDIA CIVIL LEGAL ADVISOR IN THE CASE. ACCORDING TO A USUALLY RELIABLE SOURCE WITH GOOD

SECRET

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

BA IN 17081

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

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NW 50955 DocId:32423736 Page 114

CONTACTS AMONG COMMUNIST PARTY LEADERS, THE PARTY IS PLEASED THAT DIEZ CANSECO IN THE CASE BECAUSE HE WAS A COMMUNIST SYMPATHIZER WHO CONTRIBUTED TO THE PARTY IN THE NINETEEN FORTIES. PARTY RECORDS FURNISHED BY THE POLICE IN 1950 SHOW ACTUALLY THAT HE WAS A PARTY MEMBER).

2. NAVY CAPTAIN ENRIQUE CARBONNEL, CHIEF OF THE SERVICIO DE INTELLIGENCIA NACIONAL, PLANNED TO DISCUSS THE SITUATION WITH THE PRESIDENT OF THE JUNTA AND URGE HIM TO PREVENT THE RELEASE OF THE COMMUNISTS. JAVIER CAMPOS MONTOYA, CHIEF OF THE STATE SECURITY DIVISION OF THE POLICIA DE INVESTIGACIONES DEL PERU, INSISTS THAT THE GOVERNMENT HAS AMPLE EVIDENCE, INCLUDING SOME CONFESSIONS, ON WHICH TO CONVICT THE COMMUNISTS. CAMPOS EXPRESSED DISAPPOINTMENT AT THE RECOMMENDATION OF THE JUDGE, WHOM HE DESCRIBES AS WEAK, BUT HE HAS SOME HOPE THAT THE JUNTA WILL OVERRIDE THE DECISION.

3. FIELD DISSEM: STATE ARMY NAVY AIR CINCARIB.

ACTION: ACSI, NAVY, AF, JCS, OSD

INFO : DCSOP

DA IN 17081

END OF MESSAGE

NW 50955 DocId:32423736 Page 115

Three Cuban nationals have been identified, according to a usually reliable and competent source, among the leaders of the 17 December strike violence at the US-owned Cerro de Pasco mine in La Oroya, Peru. One of the three Cubans has also been active in promoting the seizure of ranchland in the Peruvian highlands by Andean Indians. Communist-led Indians were said to have planned to synchronize a major new seizure campaign with the violence against Cerro de Pasco. No such incidents have been reported yet. (SECRET)

NW 50955 DocId:32423736 Page 116

Peruvian Communist Elements Coordinating Their Activities

Orthodox Communists in Peru are apparently putting aside their differences and moving toward closer co-operation with the extremist Trotskyist faction, believed to be leading the recent outbreak of disorders. The groups are reportedly co-ordinating previously random plans to carry out extensive destruction of industrial and agricultural installations and to provoke uprisings. Cubans and other Latin American nationals as well as Havana and Moscow-trained Peruvians are said to be instrumental in this latest development.

Members of the Peruvian junta have expressed serious concern over the internal situation and hinted that they favor strong action. Although constitutional guarantees have been suspended in a fourth department, and several Army units have been moved into the areas of disorders, the junta has taken no further action. It has requested riot control equipment from the US and says it is ready to embark on an anti-Communist program upon assurance that the equipment is forthcoming. (SECRET)

SOURCE: EMB LIMA 612 and 613 (S); AIRA LIMA C-1 (C)

NW 50955 DocId:32423736 Page 117

Peruvian Junta Makes Firm Anti-Communist Move

Continued Communist-incited disorders and an alleged Havana-Moscow plan to take over the government prompted the military junta to suspend constitutional guarantees in Peru and institute a nationwide state of siege early on 5 January. Military commanders assumed political control in their respective zones, and a reported 800 Communist Party leaders and pro-Communist subversives have been arrested. The Lima headquarters of several Communist and Communist-front organizations, as well as their publications, have been closed.

According to the Communist plan, subversive activity was to have been intensified between 15 and 20 January in all parts of Peru, with assaults on banking and commercial institutions, military garrisons, vital communications facilities, and universities. A clandestine radio station operating on the Bolivian border allegedly was to direct and co-ordinate this activity.

The junta has regarded members of the leftist but non-Communist American Popular Revolutionary Alliance (APRA) a greater danger than the Communists and originally tended to blame them for the disorders. There is no proof that APRA has been involved in anything but legititmate strike activity. Suspension of constitutional guarantees would enable the junta to strike at APRA to discredit and weaken it before the scheduled elections next June. (SECRET)

SOURCE: EMB LIMA 622 (S), 623 (LOU) and 624 (U)

NW 50955 DocId:32423736 Page 118

SUPPLEMENT

THE VENEZUELAN SITUATION

A number of high-ranking Cuban leaders since the first of the year have publicly called for revolution in other Latin American countries, with Venezuela singled out as a country with top priority.

Coinciding with these appeals have been reports that the Venezuelan Communist Party (PCV) planned to step up terrorist activity to discredit President Betancourt before his US visit. The recent incidence of terrorism, which has included attacks on the US Chamber of Commerce office building and the burning of Sears, Roebuck warehouses, is apparently part of this campaign.

Involved in the current terrorism is the Armed Forces of National Liberation (FALN). The FALN, although purporting to represent all of the opposition, includes some prominent Communists and is emerging as a paramilitary force of the PCV with its main strength in the Caracas area.

Guerrilla bands also operate in western Venezuela, but there is no firm evidence that their activity is coordinated with that in the Caracas area. Venezuelan army units, with air support, have been used in a recent campaign against these guerrillas.

The armed forces are generally capable of maintaining internal security and of defending the nation's borders against neighboring countries. The vast majority supports constitutionality and is loyal to the Betancourt government. The armed forces would not hesitate, however, to take over the government in order to maintain order or to forestall a Communist uprising. The armed forces were earlier greatly frustrated over the government's inaction against Communist-instigated disorders. Betancourt's recent willingness to take more vigorous action, however, coupled with the strong support given the US during the Cuban crisis, has overcome much of this dissatisfaction, and armed forces' support of the government is greater now than it was six months ago.

The officer corps is generally free of Communist penetration, although there has been some infiltration in the Marine corps, two or three battalions having been involved in leftist-led revolts during the spring of 1962.
(SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM

NW 50955 DocId:32423736 Page 119

Extremist And Police Activities In Venezuela

Venezuela has been afflicted over the past several months with a rash of Castro-Communist terrorist actions. Many incidents, involving shootings and robberies, are connected with the Movement of the Revolutionary Left, the Venezuelan Communist Party, and the Armed Forces of National Liberation -- the Castro-Communist group credited with the destruction at the Maracaibo oil fields during the Cuban crisis. These activities are probably designed to discredit and weaken the Betancourt Government.

The police have demonstrated considerable proficiency in preventing major outbreaks and in acting rapidly to arrest terrorists. They have rounded up extremists responsible for the holdup and looting of a printing supply warehouse and the burning of the Dupont paint warehouse and have captured the Communist leader of guerrilla bands operating in the Falcón area of northwestern Venezuela. (CONFIDENTIAL)
SOURCE: VARIOUS

NW 50955 DocId:32423736 Page 120

SECRET—NO FOREIGN DISSEM

Venezuelan Communists Plan to Increase Violence

As part of its terrorist campaign, the Venezuelan Communist Party reportedly plans to mark the fourth anniversary of Betancourt's presidency on 13 February by guerrilla bombings in the Caracas area. Other Communists are to see to it that the capital is flooded with propaganda that day. According to unconfirmed reports, Venezuelan authorities have charged the Castro government with ordering the recent terrorism in both Venezuela and Colombia under an extensive plan to create collective panic and insecurity in both countries. Colombian military authorities have reportedly drawn up a plan to prevent terrorism in Colombia's cities.
(SECRET)

SOURCE: TDCS 3/537,117 (S); FBIS (U)

14 Pages

IX.B.2

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SUBJECT: Alternative US Public Posture on Subversion in Latin America

1. Although our public posture on subversion in Latin America may be too firmly established for instant and radical revision, the following analysis is offered on the assumption that some change in emphasis is both possible and desirable, now or at some time in the future.

2. Given the existence of a Communist state, of either major persuasion, what is the likelihood that it will engage in subversion toward neighboring states?

a. Total. All experience of the past forty years demonstrates that a Communist state emanates subversion as the sun emanates heat.

b. But let us be clear that two kinds of subversion are involved:

(1) Hardware-centered - that is, funds, guns, tools of sabotage.

(2) Egalitarian and libertarian ideals.

3. How much does this fact of inevitable subversion raise the probability of Communism spreading to target countries?

a. Subversion is never a sufficient condition - and frequently not a necessary one.

b. If subversion is really dangerous to a target state, there is per se something seriously wrong in that state. (France's "Nasser Fallacy" of 1956: France embarked on the Suez adventure on the assumption that if Nasser were disposed of, the trouble in Algeria would magically disappear. Although the game was not played out, few would dispute the conclusion that France's assumption was wrong; or, for that matter,

~~TOP~~ SECRET - SENSITIVE

NW 50955 DocId:32423736 Page 122

that France would have been in an even deeper morass if her military forces had managed with the British to occupy Cairo.)

4. How feasible is it to control subversion at the source without destroying the Communist State?

Usually it is infeasible to do so or the costs are prohibitive. For instance, the costs of a protracted tight quarantine which could prevent the export both of hardware-oriented and idea subversion, would be very high, even if the activity were accepted by Cuba and the Soviet Union. This would mean inspecting every vessel, searching every traveler, forcing planes down for inspection, etc. We submit (a) that ideas would still be exported and (b) that by so doing we would magnify the importance of Cuba beyond imagination. It would become a kind of forbidden fruit. The analogy with prohibition in this country comes to mind. This course involves an increment of prestige and lure to Cuba which would be likely to outweigh the doubtless desirable diminution in the export of trained subversives and associated hardware. Furthermore, given the success of such an effort, the obvious Soviet counter would be to use other channels which we could not surveil without major East-West confrontation. The Cuban subversion export organization might well move to Moscow, Prague and/or even Peiping. Therefore, to take a public stance opposed to Cuban subversion without having resolved on invasion is to be committed to a policy bound to demonstrate US impotence.

5. If we want to control subversion at the source by destroying the Communist State, Cuba, how useful is it for us publicly to emphasize hardware-centered subversion as the reason?

NW 50955 DocId:32423736 Page 123

a. For many people outside of the US, even the export of subversion by force and sabotage also involves ideas and dedication, as well as funds, arms, and other equipment. (We, for example, are not ashamed of the Bay of Pigs expedition except that it failed.)

b. Usually attitudes toward violent subversion depend on attitudes toward the target. (Example: acts against Jiminez, Trujillo did not offend US/ most of Latin America/ most of the world; the parallel today: Somoza, Ydigoras, Stroesser). We run the danger of falling into the USSR projection of the US as the "world gendarme." Subversion directed against the Dutch government would outrage not only all Americans, but also all non-Communist Europeans; its legitimacy is total. But the same can not be said for most LA governments. The difference is decisive and perhaps sometimes neglected.

c. Most people generally recognize that when violent subversion is powerful, it is because it taps fundamental sources of discontent.

d. We in the US tend to look at subversion in Latin America from the point-of-view of hardware. But a great deal of the subversion in Latin America is or at least appears as idea-centered, not hardware-centered. The export of "armed aggression" by dedicated revolutionaries is only a part of the process. Another part, which is at least as important, and probably more so, is the export of propaganda. This, however, to much of the world, including Latin America outside of the oligarchies, will appear as an export of ideas and ideals (perhaps wrong, but nevertheless ideas). Our approach, then, tends to pass rather than meet the

NW 50955 DocId:32423736 Page 124

Latino viewpoints. We are very close to putting ourselves into the position of the Tsarist gendarmes who tried to use brute force against the power of ideas. The trap is that we may seem thereby to be acknowledging the decline and imminent fall of our own ideas.

e. One consequence of this line of reasoning would be that, if we ever find it necessary to invade Cuba, we should do so "to stop the firing squads," "to guarantee free elections," -- but not to save Somoza.

6. How feasible is it for us to control both kinds of subversion at the target rather than at the source?

a. It is often feasible. This is how we have in fact successfully controlled subversion except in the dubious case of S. Vietnam. Even in the difficult case of Greece, we succeeded by a combination of military and economic measures.

b. The point is not that this is always a feasible way of handling the problem; rather it is often practicable and also often the most desirable way.

7. Suppose that we decided to invade Cuba to control subversion with the result (three cases):

a. That we restored the status quo ante Castro.

b. That for reasons of expediency we try to maintain Castro's "reforms" -- i.e., what many Latinoes would regard as "socialism."

c. That we gave the Cuban people an obvious free choice, no matter what ensued.

How would the prospects for Communism in the Western Hemisphere be affected?

NW 50955 DocId:32423736 Page 125

Case A: Boomerang - we would almost certainly enhance the prospects for Communism.

Case B: There would be strong popular Latin American support, some governmental outrage, but the prospects for Communism would be diminished.

Case C: Paradoxically, the result would depend on what ensued, because most Latin Americans do not trust the US (and particularly would be skeptical of "free elections" if US soldiers were present).

CONCLUSIONS

1. Conditions in most parts of Latin America are such that subversion (Cuban or Bloc or both) is really dangerous.

2. Since this is so, the US public posture should not recognize this; and we should abstain from public pronouncements that subversion is conceivably a casus belli.

3. The point-of-view set forth in this paper, insofar as it can be made operative, may tend to bring a fundamental alignment between the US public posture and LA opinion.

4. The US course of action towards any LA country has to weigh the advantages and disadvantages, in any given case at any given time, of subversion control (a) at source or (b) at point of impact.

5. The same principles would apply if another Communist-oriented government were to come to power in any part of Latin America.

NW 50955 DocId:32423736 Page 126