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## SUBCOMMITTEE ON CUBAN SUBVERSION

12 March 1963

TO JOINT STAFF, SERVICE AND OSD CONTACT POINTS:

This is our next draft of the paper on Propaganda.

Please submit any views you choose to turn in by 1700 today.

V. H. KRULAK

Major General, USMC

## FIRST DRAFT

#### MOVEMENT OF PROPAGANDA MATERIALS

## I. Introduction

The actions proposed herein are designed to impede the movement of Communist propaganda materials from Cuba to and within Latin American countries. Actions contemplated to control the movement of propaganda are closely related to, and in some cases identical with, those which control the movement of persons. As in the program which addresses the problem of movement of subversive trainees to and from Cuba, the successful execution of the proposals will materially reduce the flow of propaganda, but will not eliminate it entirely.

Communist Cuba has many legitimate outlets through which propaganda materials flow. By eliminating these outlets, and by physically isolating Cuba from the remainder of Latin America, Communist propagandists and their sympathizers will be forced to rely more heavily upon production and dissemination of propaganda materials in a clandestine environment within each Latin American country, with a consequent increase in difficulty.

## II. Nature and Scope of the Problem

While the Castro image has probably diminished in Latin America, by virtue of his own imprudent actions, the

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propaganda remains high. The basic social and economic factors which have made this so in the past have not greatly changed, and the variety and quantity of propaganda materials with which the Latin Americans are beset is impressive, as examplified in the \_\_\_\_\_\_ million dollars which the communists are reported as investing in the project annually. The program presents a continuing threat to the tranquility of Latin America.

For the purpose of this paper, propaganda materials include radio program scripts, tapes and recordings, printed materials, (posters, pamphlets, magazines, leaflets, books, newspapers, news service output), motion pictures, duplicating or reproducing equipment, electronic communications equipment, spare parts and supplies therefor and printing resources, particularly paper stockpiles. To be complete. moreover. "movement of propaganda materials" must extend to small quantities, of selected publications which are hand-carried into a country by legal or illegal travellers for subsequent reproduction. It also includes materials transmitted through Cuban and Soviet Bloc diplomatic installations, shipments via postal channels, quantities introduced through smuggling operations, oral transmission of propaganda guidelines by individual travelers or by Radio Havana, and the dissemination of slanted news by Prensa Latina, the official Cuban news agency. for pick-up and reproduction by local outlets.

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Finally to be considered is thematic guidance which can be exploited locally by returning trainees, front groups and sympathetic publications; and in some countries such as Mexico, Argentina and Uruguay, the products of those commercial establishments which regularly print or broadcast pro-Castro materials as a matter of police or ideological conviction.

## Press and Publications

There are 326 Communist and pro-Communist newspapers and periodicals in Latin America. Infiltration of the democratic press and the non-critical attitudes of some newspapermen help give wider diffusion of the Cuban propaganda line. In addition, there are 228 communist oriented publishing houses and bookstores which serve as outlets for 30 different Cuban periodicals and other Communist books in all Latin American countries except Dominican Republic, Paraguay, Nicaragua, and Venezuela. Many of them offer books and publications at very low prices or give away two or three books with the purchase of one, and easy credit terms are available.

Decrees banning Communist activity and propaganda have not prevented the continued clandestine publication and distribution of a number of periodicals, books and other printed materials in come countries, notably Argentina.

Excluding TASS and New China News Agency (NCNA),

Prensa Latina is the principal Communist news agency in

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Latin America. It operates openly, but not entirely without restriction, in ten countries -- Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Costa Rica, Honduras, Mexico, Panama and Uruguay. Although its users are chiefly leftists or overt Communists, in some countries there is fairly extensive unattributed use of <u>Prensa Latina</u> releases, especially in radio.

### Radio

Shortwave radio is the principal direct mass audience medium available to Cuba to carry subversive propaganda to Latin America, and extensive use is made of it. The Castro regime has constantly increased Radio Havana's shortwave broadcasts to Latin America to a total of 115:30 hours per week. Communists have had little success in placing radio and television material on local stations in Latin America.

## Cultural Activities

Penetration under the guise of "cultural" activities is a favored Communist propaganda technique in Latin America. There are 64 binational centers and friendship societies in the area.

## F11ms

Feature films and short documentaries produced by the Cuban Institute of Motion Picture Art and Industry (ICAIC) play a direct propaganda role. Their showings have been focused on binational centers, pro-Communist labor and student groups, and on private or clandestine meetings.

It will be seen from this brief review that Latin

America is the target of a broad scale propaganda program,

comprising not only propaganda materials but including also
the ideas, the knowledge and the funds which are necessary
to make those materials effective.

# III. <u>Direct Actions to Impede Legal Movement of Propaganda</u> Materials.

Presented below is a summary of actions contemplated to impede legally executed movement of propaganda materials from Cuba to and within Latin American countries. For the purpose of this paper, legal movement is characterized as movement by recognized private and governmental carriers and communications, as well as postal systems and diplomatic pouching.

The following actions offer promise of contributing to the production of early and effective results in selected Latin American countries. It is recognized that they do not necessarily have universal application and that those which are effective in one country may not be feasible in another.

## 1. Political Actions

- a. Induce the countries in which <u>Prensa Latina</u> operates to limit or exclude its activities.
- b. Persuade those governments which receive
  Cuban and Bloc diplomatic missions to maintain close
  surveillance over the propaganda activities of the

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Communist embassies with a view toward prohibiting abuses of diplomatic privilege for subversive purposes.

- c. As applicable and feasible, induce Latin
  American countries to:
  - (1) Adopt adequate internal security legislation which would provide severe penalties for any person engaging in dissemination of Cuban Communist propaganda aimed at the overthrow of the legal governments by force and violence.
  - (2) Preclude attendance of Cuban delegates to international meetings held in Latin America. (Delegates are propaganda disseminators.)

## 2. Intelligence Actions

- a. Continue U.S. intelligence efforts in each country to identify individuals, organizations and facilities involved in propaganda importation, reproduction and/or dissemination; make available to each country selected intelligence concerning these individuals, organizations and their activities.
- b. Encourage each country not having a legal Communist Party to offer rewards for information leading to interception of Castro Communist propaganda materials considered dangerous to the country's tranquility.

- c. In separate diplomatic approaches to each country, urge full and effective cooperation with the appropriate organs of the OAS, and bilaterally among the several nations, in the interchange of information concerning movement of propaganda materials.
- d. Persuade Latin American countries to report promptly to the diplomatic mission of the country concerned, the identity of any national of that country who arrives from Cuba and who is discovered to have been carrying propaganda materials.

### 3. Covert Actions

- a. Cause disruption in the reproduction and distribution of propaganda materials, and in the procurement and delivery of related supplies and equipment.
- b. Induce Latin American printing craftsmen to deface, destroy, or misprint Castro Communist propaganda in the process of reproduction.
- c. Disrupt Castro Communist sponsored labor and youth congresses, industrial and agricultural exhibits in Latin American countries.
- d. Maintain or increase economic pressures on media owners, local advertising agencies and film producers and/or distributors who accept Communist materials.

- e. Dissuade U.S. and local businessmen and firms from advertising in Latin American media which carry pro-Communist materials; prepare and circulate to U.S. firms, for information, lists of such media in order to encourage their support of a non-Communist press.
- f. Inhibit the spread of Cuban Friendship Societies in Latin America by an active program to expose their subversive activities and objectives.
- g. Subsidize non-Communist newspapers or press services in order to make them economically competitive with papers served by <u>Prensa Latina</u> and TASS in Latin America.
- h. Organize surveillance over in-country sources of newsprint and related supplies, and deny or inhibit the use of these supplies for printing Communist materials.

## 4. Military Assistance Action

Complete and distribute, through U.S. Military Groups, printed material and film strips on the realities of Communist propaganda, for use in Latin American troop education programs.

## IV. <u>Direct Actions to Impede Illegal Movement of Propaganda</u> Material.

As the actions outlined in the preceding sections become effective, movement of propaganda materials will be forced

into clandestine channels. Although many of the actions outlined in Section III will serve to restrict illegal movement, additional measures to impede this clandestine traffic will acquire increasing importance.

## 1. Intelligence Actions

- a. Use penetration and other intelligence techniques to identify efforts to move propaganda materials from Cuba to and/or within Latin American countries; determine routes and methods employed; report selected information, consistent with requirements for protecting our own intelligence program, to governments concerned.
- b. Utilize U.S. intelligence capabilities to determine the nature and extent of clandestine air-craft and small boat traffic between Cuba and other countries in the Caribbean area, with special attention to Mexico, Honduras, Jamaica, Haiti and Dominican Republic. Use the evidence obtained to induce governments concerned to initiate surveillance and other control measures aimed at interception of propaganda materials.

## 2. Surveillance and Reporting Action

Exploit the mechanism of the Caribbean surveillance system approved in the study on movement of personnel, for discovering and impeding the movement of propaganda materials by illicit means.

## 3. Political Action

Where legally feasible to do so, induce each Latin American country to improve police measures to seek and destroy the subversive Communist propaganda apparatus in that country, and to detect and eliminate corrupt officials who permit illicit shipment of propaganda materials.

## 4. Technical Assistance Action

- a. Provide technical assistance to enable local officials to locate clandestine transmitters.
- b. Assist Latin American governments, which so desire, to develop a jamming capability against radio broadcasts.

## 5. Military Action

Assist in the accelerated improvement of Latin

American internal security forces and police forces,

especially patrol and intelligence activities aimed

at preventing clandestine propaganda activities.

Provide equipment, training and advice as required.