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| <b>DISPATCH</b> |   | CLASSIFICATION<br><b>S E C R E T</b> | PROCESSING ACTION                       |
| TO              | Chief of Station, Mexico City                       |                                      | MARKED FOR INDEXING                     |
| INFO            | Chief of Station, Copenhagen; JHKAWE(Attn: JANIONS) |                                      | X NO INDEXING REQUIRED                  |
| FROM            | Chief, WR Division                                  |                                      | ONLY QUALIFIED DESA<br>CAN ADD INDEXING |
| SUBJECT         | PDDUMEN - Possible Operational Lead                 |                                      |   |

**ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES**

**Latent Assessment of Identity**

1. It is requested that Identity be assessed for possible recruitment as an asset against PERUMEN. MEXI 4151, 4269, and 5433 plus travel listings show that Identity traveled to PERUMEN and returned to Mexico City on 13-21 April and 23 June-2 July of this year. Headquarters traces revealed that he was in PERUMEN to negotiate regarding his country's frozen assets there, and also to negotiate for the release of one of his countrymen who had been arrested for alleged espionage activities. We assume that Identity's superior has made Identity responsible for matters pertaining to PERUMEN, and that he will be travelling to PERUMEN two or three times a year. It would be important to determine the duration of his present tour of duty; he has already served there three years. Other Headquarters traces on IDENTITY are forwarded in Enclosure, as is a biographical sketch on Identity's father. As Enclosure shows (assuming only that Identity resided with his father during his teens), Identity spent his youth (from 8 to 21 years of age) in PERIME, graduating from a PEPRIE university. Considering his and his family's long residence here, there is a reasonable likelihood that Identity is pro-PEPRIME and would be cooperative.

2. If assessment is favorable and recruitment is recommended, it is suggested that the initial proposition be coached in terms of Identity becoming a political observer for us, not an espionage agent; we prefer to solicit his "confidential cooperation", hoping to phase in covert requirements after he has cooperated for a while and has become accustomed to taking direction.

continued

**Enclosure:**  
Identity and traces, w/s/c

**Distribution:**  
2- Mexico City, w/encl. w/s/c  
1- JHKAWE, w/encl. w/s/c  
1- Copenhagen, w/encl. w/s/c

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| CROSS REFERENCE TO | DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER<br><b>HMW 12138</b> | DATE<br><b>20 November 63</b>       |
|                    | CLASSIFICATION<br><b>S E C R E T</b>           | HQS FILE NUMBER<br><b>21-120-12</b> |

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| CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH | CLASSIFICATION<br><b>S E C R E T</b> | DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER<br><b>EEHW 12138</b> |
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3. In assessing him, it is of great interest to determine his attitude regarding whether or not his government should be informed of his cooperation. We would, of course, prefer a unilateral operation if it is possible to conduct one with a reasonable certainty that Identity will not inform his government.

However, if he wishes his government to know of his activities on our behalf, we have no significant objections to so informing them; but we would prefer to present them with a fait accompli: i.e., "Identity has agreed to work for us. We are therefore informing you FYI. Have you any derogatory information or other reason why you object to our using him as a political observer?" Past experience indicates that if we can present the matter to Identity's Intelligence Service thusly, there is little likelihood that they will deny us the opportunity to use an individual unless there is derogatory information.

4. If the Station prefers not to make the recruitment, it is suggested that JENTONS could step in after the assessment has been completed.

5. Mexico and Copenhagen Station traces and comments are requested, particularly from Copenhagen if WESTEGG's decision not to recruit Identity's superior (COPE 3101 (ZF-30629) 18 July 63) has any bearing on the proposal in the dispatch.

**FRESTON T. CARBOULD**

**OLIVER G. GALBOED**