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Hicks file

CC: N.Y. Office 10/28

CONTACT REPORT

SUBJECT: Meeting with Manuel Bay and Angel Chiloe in the latrine
specimen (J.W. Dwyer, New York City) on 22
November, 1960.

PART ONE OF THREE

1. Notes: This meeting was been called by me in order to explain
the existing situation at Headquarters concerning our future
relationship with the PNP. (See Memorandum From the Record dated 21
November 1960, TIN 12552, OUT 4580, and C/W/M/L/1774, 19 and 20 which states that
C/W/M/L, 9 November, 1960; also see TIN 1774, 19 and 20 which states that
Bunt obtained Verona's concurrence on 21 October to discuss the fact with
the PNP's controller.)

2. The meeting was started by me telling Bay that I had received a
somewhat garbled message concerning a certain incident on the date of
July 4, 1960 which an undertaking we that and who, probably, was
involved? (Unknown. The question was passed over to me by C/W/M/L and in line with C/W/M/L/M's memorandum to me.) Bay informed me
as follows:

(a) There are two garrisons stationed at the Isle of Pinas
with whom his organization has contact. One garrison is commanded
06 by a [Captain Carpio] who could count no approximately 10 men to
follow him and if [Carpio] decides to break away from Duxico.
06 [Carpio] also has approximately 50 trustworthy officials under his
command (whether these officers were military or civilian Bay did
not know) which were ready to assist in anti-dictator activities—the
second garrison was located at the Punta Del Este and was primarily
a coast artillery installation. Bay did not say what name of the
commanding officer.

06 (b) Quite separately from the above, Bay's people are in con-
tact with a (one) [Padilla] who is the commandant of the prison where
Huber Hayes is incarcerated. According to reliable information, Bay
says, [Padilla] may be of help in arranging the escape of Hayes. A
final contact was arrived in Plaza on 21 November said that Hayes
seems to trust [Padilla] and was going to visit his wife who can visit him
at the prison—the plan to utilize [Padilla] in efforts designed to
liberate Hayes from prison. 06

(c) In considering the situation outlined in (a) and (b) above,
Manuel Bay's military planners felt that one single garrison
be formed since most of the members believe that the most effective
be freed and if the two garrisons in the time being were to be split up
will defect, then other troops and a good part of the population in
the Isle of Pinas, known by the name of La Isla, is inclined to follow
Carpio. At present, the PNP has lost the Isle of Pinas—

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should be probably and be able to do so. I asked him whether certain segments of Castro's air force could be used during or during the course. He said he had thought about Castro's ground forces according to my theory there are only three roads or passes leading into the island of Puerto Rico over land. These roads, the KEPers feel, can be easily monitored by them. As far as the sun, the general object of the operation would be for [deport] to capture and destroy the plane. That [deport] could form a convoy of approximately 40 naval ships to the ports where the neutralizing would take place. He also referred to the fact a number of cities in Cuba to get supplies to [deport] surface. These would be found to be the [deport] cities and cities substantially with the [deport] cities. [deport] would have to be positioned near these and ready to [deport] and, perhaps, other strategic locations.

(d) He advised that 27 November was set as the target date but that both [facilities] and [targets] were for rotation in the very near future. Furthermore, the KEP planned that, a Sunday is the best day to [deport] when in operation.

3. After the above discussion I asked for the following information:

- (a) Our support to end/or advice on how to neutralize Castro's air force,
- (b) Intelligence concerning coastal mining and air fields,
- (c) Delivery of anti-air craft artillery and continuing resupply for mobile vehicles after the operation has begun, and
- (d) Maps prepared by the Aerial Survey Company of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. (1)

4. Without noting my comments on the above request I asked whether or not they had prior communication facilities at his disposal and whether or not his people would ever be able to receive, handle, and use any supplies which might come their way. I also asked what specific types of weapons the KEP planners were thinking of and what kind of ammunition resupply would be needed for arms not already in the hands of anti-Castro forces in the area. It became clear that the [deport] had the answers to these questions which he felt should be referred for further discussion to the "technical level," i.e., Colonel Farquhar and his batch.

5. At this point of the conversation I began with the implementation of the Headquarters decisions reached in regard to the Berlin group's support of the KEP. I said that I wanted to repeat comments I had made previously to Chirba, Betancur, Barrios, and Aguirre namely, that the Berlin group could not afford any continuation of extra空中 refueling flight or administrative and supply activities had been established for either one or two, and that this machinery, i.e., the [deport] administrative organization, would have to be utilized to the fullest in operating at this site. By

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undoubtedly know Jim Smith was also the military advisor to the FID; any migrants would undoubtedly carry the FID label and in all likelihood if required, anti-Castro literature would accompany such shipments; planes and pilots utilized in such an undertaking were FID assets and identified as such.

6. Ray's reply to this was somewhat as follows: while the FID thinks it controls these pilots I, Bender, should at least realize that the pilots who were working formerly for Cuban Air Lines really belonged to the MCP. In any case he, Ray, and the MCP would accept the proposed arrangement because it would not imply that the MCP is politically beholden to the FID; it would simply indicate to the people inside Cuba that the MCP was utilizing all resources to obtain the equipment necessary to overthrow the regime. Naturally he was not enthusiastic about this formula but he could live and cope with it.

7. I told Ray that I would have to get in touch with our military people in order to find out whether or not we now had sufficient data on hand on which to base a decision. (Comment: C/HB/4 was briefed telephonically by me on the foregoing and on additional aspects of this meeting which are reported in part two of this Contact Report. C/HB/4 and I felt that we did not have as yet sufficient data to issue any committee; C/HB/4 instructed me to advise Ray that:

(a) Either the MCP should submit a detailed plan which we would consider on the basis of which we would then decide whether to be of assistance or not or;

(b) The MCP could go it alone, and ask us for some assistance after the operation has been launched and we would make our decisions then on the basis of existing circumstances.

Above was transmitted to Ray who indicated that the MCP did not desire to go it alone and that he would instruct Bergman to immediately contact Smith in Miami to work out a coordinated operational plan.)

8. At this point in the meeting I felt too, the time was ripe to make the \$7500 proposal (by Bender check) and so advised Ray that another \$7500 would be made available to him via funds in the FBI control line. Requested what I had said previously about duplication and followed the approved lines contained in my 19 November 1960 memorandum to C/HB/4. Ray and Cubas' reactions were not unexpected; they rejected this particular funding proposal. (Comment: for additional details and other items concerning this meeting see parts two and three, "Contact Report, 2 November, Meeting with Ray and Cubas.")

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