

**File #:**

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1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW  
65994 Date: 11-01-2021

62-116395

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**Serial Scope:**

386 ONLY

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62-116395

*# 10216*  
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 1-3-01 BY SP-2 AUN/SLC

- 2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz (Enc. 76)  
(J. B. Hotis)
- 1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall  
July 10, 1975
- 1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
- 1 - Mr. R. L. Moore

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE (SSC)  
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS  
WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

RE: DOCUMENTS PERTAINING TO THE "HUSTON  
PLAN," COINTELPRO, AND OTHER PRACTICES  
AND PROGRAMS

HUSTON PLAN AND RELATED DEVELOPMENTS

Reference is made to SSC letter dated May 14, 1975,  
with attached appendices, requesting certain documents and  
other information from the FBI.

Appendix C, Part I, Item number 6, requested all  
memoranda and other materials pertaining to FBI policies,  
practices, and procedures for liaison with the CIA from 1960  
to May, 1970. General instructions concerning liaison with  
other agencies, including CIA, are set forth in Section 102  
of the Manual of Instructions, a copy of which has been  
furnished to the SSC.

Item number 9 requested all memoranda and other  
materials reflecting conversations or communications, during  
1970, between Agents of the FBI and the FBI Director on the  
subject of liaison or contact between personnel of the FBI  
and personnel of the CIA, including, but not limited to, all  
memoranda and other materials written by former Special Agent  
Sam Papich. Pursuant to these requests there are enclosed  
copies of 19 FBI communications.

In addition to the documents being furnished, there  
are a number of internal memoranda, dated March 6-9, 1970,  
prepared by the Intelligence Division in response to the Sam J.  
Papich memorandum to the Director, March 5, 1970, which because  
of their sensitive nature are being made available for review  
by SSC staff personnel at FBI Headquarters. These memoranda  
are amplifications of the possible CIA grievances listed by  
Mr. Papich.

- Assoc. Dir. \_\_\_\_\_
- Dep. AD Adm. \_\_\_\_\_
- Dep. AD Inv. \_\_\_\_\_
- Asst. Dir.:
- Admin. \_\_\_\_\_
- Comp. Syst. \_\_\_\_\_
- Ext. Affairs \_\_\_\_\_
- Files & Com. \_\_\_\_\_
- Gen. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_
- Ident. \_\_\_\_\_
- Inspection \_\_\_\_\_
- Intell. \_\_\_\_\_
- Laboratory \_\_\_\_\_
- Plan. & Eval. \_\_\_\_\_
- Spec. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_
- Training \_\_\_\_\_
- Legal Coun. \_\_\_\_\_
- Telephone Rm. \_\_\_\_\_
- Director Sec'y \_\_\_\_\_

RLM:mam  
(8) mam

*YBR*  
*PLM*

ORIGINAL AND COPY TO ATTORNEY GEN'L  
SEE NOTE PAGES TWO AND THREE

SECRET MATERIAL ATTACHED

62-116395-  
CLOSURE

*386*  
*wrb*  
*LFS*  
*TJM*

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE (SSC)  
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH  
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

RE: DOCUMENTS PERTAINING TO THE "HUSTON  
PLAN," COINTELPRO, AND OTHER PRACTICES  
AND PROGRAMS

HUSTON PLAN AND RELATED DEVELOPMENTS

In response to Item number 9, it has been necessary to excise numerous names, dates, places, and other material in order to protect sensitive operations, sources, and methods and to protect the privacy of individuals. In some instances, to protect privacy, it was also necessary to remove information which could lead to an individual's identity. At the end of numerous paragraphs administrative details, such as file numbers, were deleted.

Enclosures (19)

1 - The Attorney General

NOTE:

All documents responsive to Item number 9 being furnished to SSC were previously furnished to the Rockefeller Commission (see W. R. Wannall memorandum to Mr. J. B. Adams, 4/16/75). Originally the Rockefeller Commission was to review the material in FBI space but the Commission obtained possession of the documents.

The documents being made available for review by SSC staff personnel are the cover memorandum W. C. Sullivan to Mr. DeLoach, 3/9/70, and enclosed 37 memoranda. These memoranda have been classified Secret and have been appropriately excised.

Enclosed for the Office of the Legal Counsel are one unexcised and one excised copy of the memoranda being made available for review.

NOTE CONTINUED PAGE THREE

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE (SSC)  
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH  
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

RE: DOCUMENTS PERTAINING TO THE "HUSTON  
PLAN," COINTELPRO, AND OTHER PRACTICES  
AND PROGRAMS

HUSTON PLAN AND RELATED DEVELOPMENTS

NOTE CONTINUED:

The Papich letter and memoranda, and the review of the 38 possible grievances, contain comments and other information which could have an adverse effect on our current relationship with CIA.

While numerous dates have been excised to protect the identity of individuals, any reader can extrapolate the approximate time of an event since Papich wrote his 3/13/70 letter following a chronological scheme from 1951 to 1970. There is some chronological variance in the 3/5/70 letter.



5-140 (Rev. 1-21-74) FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20535

Addressee: Senate Select Committee

LTR  LHM  Memo  Report dated 7/10/75

U.S. Senate Select Committee Re: Huston  
Caption of Document: Plan and Related Developments  
Appendix C, Part I, Items 6 and 9.

Originating Office: FBI

Delivered by: Paul Valby Date: 7/15/75

Received by: Robert E. Duff

Title: Jack Jones Reader

Return this receipt to the Intelligence Division, FBI

#mde16  
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 1-3-01 BY SP2 AM/116

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- Tab A - Response to SSC request, Appendix C, Part I, Item number 6.
- Tab B - Response to SSC request, Appendix C, Part I, Item number 9.
- Tab C - Unexcised version of documents furnished to SSC in response to request in Appendix C, Part I, Item number 6.
- Tab D - Unexcised version of documents furnished to SSC in response to request in Appendix C, Part I, Item number 9.
- Tab E - Excised version of 38 memoranda being held at FBIHQ for review by SSC.
- Tab F - Unexcised version of 38 memoranda being held at FBIHQ for review by SSC.

#MOR 16  
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 1-3-01 BY SP-2 AZM/176

62-116393-386

ENCLOSURE

Response to SSC request, Appendix C, Part I,  
Item number 6

#MDR/6  
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 1-3-01 BY SP2 AEM/16

## Memorandum

TO : Mr. Sullivan

DATE: June 22, 1961

#mDR16

FROM : R. O. L'Allier

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 1-3-01 BY SP-2 ALM/HS

SUBJECT: LIAISON WITH IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE (INS)

Liaison with INS has been handled for the past several years by SA Sam Papich, who also handles liaison with the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). The purpose of this memorandum is to recommend that SA Papich be relieved of his assignment with INS in order to devote full time to CIA.

## INFORMATION RELATING TO INS

CIA continues to be one of the most important liaison assignments as well as one of the most time consuming. Proper handling of this assignment now requires the full time and attention of a Liaison Supervisor and it is believed that SA Papich should be relieved of his INS assignment in order to devote his entire attention to CIA.

INFORMATION RELATING TO AGENT TO BE  
ASSIGNED TO HANDLE LIAISON WITH INS.ACTION:

If you approve, liaison responsibility for INS will be transferred from SA Papich to NAME

~~This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings of your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized persons without the express approval of the FBI.~~

OK but please  
load NAME  
w/pt  
K10

(E) CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA) - DOMESTIC CONTACT SERVICE -- You previously have been informed regarding CIA's Contact Division which has had offices in various U. S. cities and which is openly identified as being connected with CIA. This division has been responsible for the overt collection of positive intelligence gained through interviews of aliens, travelers, businessmen, etc. The division has not been engaged in any operational activity such as the development of double agents. For your information, CIA has reorganized this division and it is now called the Domestic Contact Service.

An examination of CIA's activities in the area of overt collection of positive intelligence has indicated that the Bureau can strengthen its position by having our field offices establish direct contact with the local offices of the Domestic Contact Service. [This particularly applies to those situations where the Bureau and CIA both have an interest in Soviet-bloc and Yugoslav nationals, excluding those who are connected with embassies or the United Nations.] We recognize that CIA has a responsibility for collection of positive intelligence (i. e. information regarding Soviet-bloc capability in a particular research field) which might be acquired from such visitors but we cannot condone any CIA activity which might interfere with Bureau operations. You therefore are authorized to establish liaison with local offices of the Domestic Contact Service. (S)

9-28-65

SAC LETTER NO. 65-54

- 5 -

*This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings of your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.*

(5) In each case when you initiate any inquiry or investigation of a [visiting Soviet-bloc national] you should obtain from the local Domestic Contact Service the nature and extent of CIA interest and all pertinent information which CIA has gained or may acquire in the future relating to our internal security responsibilities. If you feel that CIA activity conflicts with Bureau objectives, you should so advise the Seat of Government, clearly setting forth your reasons. In this connection; there may be instances where continuing CIA pursuit of positive intelligence would conflict with the Bureau's discharge of its internal security functions.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director

9-28-65

SAC LETTER NO. 65-54

- 6 -

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT  
MEMORANDUM

TO : Director, FBI

DATE: 10/25/65

FROM : SAC, Philadelphia

SUBJECT: CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY -  
DOMESTIC CONTACT SERVICE  
INFORMATION CONCERNING

# 10016  
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 1/17/01 BY SP-7 ALM/STC

Re Section (E), SAC Letter 65-54, 9/28/65.

NAME, Philadelphia Office, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Domestic Contact Service, was contacted on 10/14/65 as directed in referenced SAC Letter.

NAME advised he had just returned from conferences at his Agency Headquarters in Washington, where he had been advised the Bureau was directing its field offices to establish liaison with the local offices of the Domestic Contact Service.

NAME offered his complete cooperation with this office in matters of mutual interest.

Arrangements were perfected wherein Agents of this office making inquiries or investigations of a Soviet-Bloc National can contact NAME and he will place them in contact with the Domestic Contact Service representative handling the case, so that information of interest to us can be secured. Any information coming to the attention of the Domestic Contact Service relating to our internal security responsibilities will be immediately reported to this office.

NAME requested, in view of his Agency's regulations, that CIA not be identified as the source in the event

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information received from his office should be included in a communication going to anyone outside the Bureau. NAME was assured that CIA's identity in this regard would be fully protected.

INFORMATION RELATING TO THE  
TERRITORY COVERED BY THE PHILADELPHIA  
OFFICE CIA DOMESTIC CONTACT SERVICE  
INCLUDING NAMES OF CIA PERSONNEL.

REQUEST OF THE BUREAU:

In the course of future contacts with CIA in these cases, it is anticipated that CIA representatives may at times request information relating to Subjects' background, habits, and characteristics, as well as any available photographs.

The Bureau is requested to advise if it will be permissible to orally furnish such background information to the CIA representative and to furnish copies of photographs, if they are available.

The Bureau is also requested to advise if the establishment of liaison on the field office level with CIA's Domestic Contact Service envisages the furnishing of reports and letterhead memos to this Service at the field office level where they have a legitimate interest in the Subject.



SAC, Philadelphia

10/29/65

Director, FBI

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA)  
DOMESTIC CONTACT SERVICE  
INFORMATION CONCERNING

#MDR16  
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 1/17/01 BY SP7 ALM/AB

Reference is made to your letter dated 10/25/65.

The Bureau has been following a policy of not disseminating Bureau information to the Domestic Contact Service at a local level. This policy will continue unless you are advised to the contrary.

In the event that the local CIA office desires information concerning any subject, such requests should be directed by CIA to Bureau Headquarters.

*This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.*

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

TO : Mr. C. D. DeLoach

DATE: 6/25/70

FROM : W. C. Sullivan

#mDR16  
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 1-12-01 BY SP-2ALM/STG

SUBJECT: LIAISON WITH CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA)  
WASHINGTON FIELD OFFICE

The Director has inquired regarding the nature of any liaison existing between the Washington Field Office (WFO) and CIA. Limited liaison does exist, being addressed to specific operational cases and name checks.

WFO, of necessity, is in contact with CIA concerning specific cases in the espionage field. For example, \_\_\_\_\_

SPECIFIC EXAMPLE GIVEN:

In addition, CIA has a domestic operations office in the District which makes name checks with WFO and secures background information concerning foreign diplomatic personnel. No liaison is conducted with respect to policy matters and the objective of all contacts is the handling of immediate operational matters.

ACTION:

For the Director's information.

*This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.*

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

TO : Mr. C. D. DeLoach

DATE: 6/26/70

FROM : W. C. Sullivan

#MDR16  
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 1-3-01 BY SP-2 AM/FR

SUBJECT: LIAISON WITH CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA)  
WASHINGTON FIELD OFFICE

My attached memorandum, 6/25/70, discussed the operational contacts between the Washington Field Office (WFO) and CIA's local domestic operations office. Mr. Tolson noted "I thought all such contacts were to be handled by letter" and the Director said "I most certainly intended the same." We are instructing WFO accordingly.

It is possible that other field offices have working-level contact with the CIA offices in their territories. If the Director desires, similar instructions will be issued to them.

## ACTION:

(1) Attached for approval is a letter to WFO instructing that all future contacts with CIA are to be handled by letter.

no.  
js

(2) If the Director desires, an SAC Letter will be prepared containing similar instructions, applicable to all offices.

no  
js

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

Response to SSC request, Appendix C, Part I  
Item number 9

#MDR16  
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 1-8-01 BY SP2-HEM/116

March 2, 1970

Mr. J. Edgar Hoover  
Director  
Federal Bureau of Investigation  
Washington, D. C.

~~SECRET~~

#MDR16  
DECLASSIFIED BY SP2Aml/HG  
ON 1-2-01

Dear Mr. Hoover:

I ask that you approve my request to retire from Bureau service and, if it is convenient, to have this retirement become effective April 1, 1970.

For several weeks I have been giving this matter serious thought since I began questioning my capability to bring about a better coordinated effort directed against foreign intelligence targets, particularly those of the Communist-Bloc. I have always aimed for perfection, but I do not find that the desired results are being achieved. For almost 18 years I have handled an assignment during a period of turbulent, hectic, and controversial developments in the area of Internal Security - U. S. Intelligence. It was most challenging, very rewarding, but also punishing. Because of this deep involvement I now realize that I have badly neglected my responsibilities as a father and husband. With the time I may have left I would like to give my family the attention it rightfully deserves.

It would be most dishonest of me if I didn't comment on the recent events which have led to the severance of direct liaison with the Central Intelligence Agency. Since I have been the principal Bureau element in the day to day relations between the organizations, it has been my responsibility to anticipate problems, move in on the situation, and protect Bureau interests in an efficient and effective manner. I have reviewed my position in this latest development, and I certainly must share responsibility for the tragic turn of events. I believe that I might have employed better perception by following developments in Denver more closely. I deeply regret this. I do not like to fail. I do not like to lose.

I have been involved in intelligence operations dating back to our S.I.S. history, and I think I can speak with some authority in stating that never in our history has this nation been faced with greater security threats from communist intelligence services who, through police state organizations, have developed unusually sophisticated capabilities to strike at our vulnerabilities of a democratic and free society. A continuing and priority target of the Bloc is to penetrate and split or disrupt our internal security and intelligence organizations. Contrary to the tempo of the times many years ago, there is hardly an intelligence operation or an internal security case which does not have direct or indirect international ramifications. The course of events and the highly capable effectiveness of Communist-Bloc intelligence services have placed increasing burdens on us and have necessitated close working relations with CIA, military intelligence services and other agencies. The complex nature of many cases, the rapid means of travel and communication, the daily occurrence of emergency type political developments in various parts of the world have warranted direct liaison with approximately twenty CIA officials on a daily basis. In addition, there are about thirty officials contacted with lesser frequency. The Bureau is a member of the U. S.

Classified by 19-  
Exempt from GDS, Category 2  
Date of Declassification Indefinite

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION

Unauthorized Disclosure  
Subject to Criminal Sanctions

~~SECRET~~

Intelligence Board and its sub-committees which cover matters such as handling of defectors, development of computer programs, leaks of classified information and production of intelligence studies. Our Legal Attaches have reason to contact CIA on a regular basis, and although it has been a small volume of business, the line of communication between our domestic offices and local CIA representatives has been definitely useful. The daily business with CIA relates to hundreds of cases pertaining to activities of all Communist-Bloc services, the New Left, Black Nationalists, the Communist Party and related organizations, and political crises in areas such as Vietnam, the Middle East, and Latin America. Theoretically, all business could be handled by mail, but from a practical standpoint such a procedure will lead to unbelievable chaos. There will be almost insurmountable obstacles if we are to discharge our duties in a responsible manner and if we are to counter a relentless enemy in the interest of national security. Because interests of other agencies are frequently intertwined with cases involving the Bureau and CIA, the break in FBI-CIA liaison will adversely affect our liaison with such agencies.

I think you will share my alarm over the consequences once the word is received by the "troops" in all U.S. agencies that FBI and CIA no longer have any liaison. Unfortunately, there will be individuals who will maliciously distort and misinterpret the true facts. Within a short period, there will be stories in the press, and worst of all the Communist-Bloc services will pick up a choice entree for the promotion of subtle, skillful and extremely harmful disruption. I am absolutely convinced that the intelligence services of Great Britain, France, West Germany and others are well penetrated by the Soviets. I can't believe that the Philbys, the Blakes, the Alger Hisses were the last of the penetrations. I mention this because if such penetrations exist, the break in relations between the FBI and CIA will provide a basis for promoting further rifts. This is the first time in our history that such an event has occurred, and it is difficult to believe that the enemy will not make every effort to reap the greatest profit possible. Briefly, Mr. Hoover, I have too much respect for you and our FBI to expose us to a potentially disastrous situation.

Although the Denver incident is a blight on the relations between the FBI and CIA, it would be most unfair of me not to comment on the dedicated and selfless efforts of numerous individuals in CIA who strived for honest and harmonious relations. As a result of their endeavors there have been many services performed in behalf of the Bureau including notable and outstanding accomplishments. We have been furnished sources, informants, solid productive cases, technical advice and equipment, and there have been instances of cooperation which led to substantial saving of Bureau funds. There also have been examples of alertness on the part of CIA employes which prevented Bureau commission of errors and averted embarrassment. Among some of the more significant examples of cooperation I cite the excellent and badly needed assistance of CIA in the Rudolph Abel case. I also refer to the Agency's providing us with one of the better criminal informants we have had in recent years in the person of **NAME**. I only refer to the foregoing to emphasize that, if at all possible, we should preserve the good friends and the supporters of the Bureau.

~~SECRET~~

It is recognized that one can also present a bill of particulars relating to examples of poor cooperation and deliberate skulduggery. I hold no brief for those in CIA who disrupted relations between


the two agencies been... of unneeded-for actions. Some of these were the parasites who converted their bureaucratic empires, never used a creative idea, and lived off the errors of the dedicated people. I believe that an honest and thorough examination will reveal that the presence of such types at the present time is negligible or their influence is almost completely neutralized. Unfortunately, CIA also believes that in the past we did not always act in a forthright manner, and the Agency undoubtedly could present a list of grievances. You may not realize that a few years ago we enjoyed a poor reputation among CIA employees. We were characterized as being devious and there was a decided atmosphere of mistrust. Happily, that is not the situation today. I am confident that you can go into any segment of CIA, here and abroad, and you will find that Fidelity, Bravery, and Integrity are sincerely related to the FBI. The problems in past years primarily arose from unbelievably poor communication among interested parties. This communication has been greatly improved because of the efforts of many dedicated people. Nevertheless, there is room for improvement. In our own Bureau there are numerous officials and employees who have little or no knowledge of the background and the principles of the National Security Act of 1947 and of the National Security Council Directives. In addition, these same people have a vague conception of the objectives and functions of an intelligence organization. Similarly, within CIA there are very many whose conception of the FBI, its jurisdiction, its objectives, its law enforcement character, is shocking at times. Tremendous progress has been made, but it is not easy to harmoniously coordinate the operations of an organization designed to operate in a clandestine manner with an agency which is basically a law enforcement body. This difficulty is further aggravated because our relationship is still composed of a fragile fabric. One incident potentially can destroy years of constructive effort.

Mr. Hoover, I respectfully request that you reconsider the decision to sever liaison with the Central Intelligence Agency. I appeal to you to leave the door open for further deliberation because I am confident this conflict can be satisfactorily resolved. I believe that my removal from the scene provides the opportunity to appoint another agent who will measure up to your desired capabilities and who will be able to rapidly resolve the problem with a new and fresh approach. It is a good time to reexamine our relations with CIA and to make adjustments satisfactory to you.

I sincerely regret that this situation arose, since I readily appreciate you are burdened with so many heavy responsibilities. Yet I feel that I had a firm obligation and duty to communicate with you because of the very nature of my assignment these many years and because of my involvement in this controversial case.

My years with the Bureau gave me more satisfaction than anyone can imagine. You would have to know me better to appreciate this. I want to assure you that wherever I go or whatever I do I will be prepared to be of service in any cause which involves the preservation of a strong and respected FBI.

Sincerely yours,

  
Sam Papich

~~SECRET~~

## Memorandum

TO : Mr. C. D. DeLoach

DATE: March 5, 1970

FROM : W. C. Sullivan

SUBJECT: RELATIONSHIPS WITH CIA

#MDR16  
 ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
 HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
 DATE 1-2-01 BY SP-2ALM/ZTG

DECLASSIFIED BY  
 ON

Attached is a memorandum dictated by Special Agent Sam J. Papich in response to the Director's request for the identification of the instances Papich had in mind when in his retirement request he indicated that CIA "believes that in the past we (FBI) did not always act in a forthright manner, and the agency undoubtedly could present a list of grievances."

A list identifying the cases and outlining the problems involved has been prepared by Papich and is attached to the memorandum. A review of the 25-page document reveals that it contains several instances in which CIA has registered its dissatisfaction and could conceivably renew its complaints, and others in which presumably CIA had no knowledge of Bureau action and has made no complaint.

For the Director's further information, I have instituted in this Division an analysis of each situation cited and a memorandum will be prepared as to each, containing my views and recommendations as a result of that analysis. This is being handled on an expedite basis and the memoranda will be sent through as soon as possible.

*This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.*



UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

~~SECRET~~

# Memorandum

TO : The Director

DATE: March 5, 1970

FROM : Sam J. Papich

(5668SLD/KCL-JFK 2/9/98)

SUBJECT: RELATIONS WITH CIA

DECLASSIFIED BY SP7CLC/ALM  
ON 12-7-94  
CIA # 88-1826  
PER CFA REVIEW OF 6/2/94

Reference is made to my letter of 3/2/70. I made the statement, "Unfortunately, CIA also believes that in the past we did not always act in a forthright manner, and the Agency undoubtedly could present a list of grievances." It is my understanding that you want such grievances identified. There is enclosed herewith a list of cases or situations which arose over the years.

Based upon a review of files and my personal recollection this list would be representative of matters which CIA could use for making charges such as: not being forthright, not playing fairly and squarely, not cooperating, not being of assistance, not recognizing the need for concrete FBI contributions to the foreign intelligence effort. What CIA may have compiled over the years is unknown. What situations are known to CIA and have not come to our attention cannot be answered at this time. I am thinking of leaks including distorted information which may have been passed to CIA from ex-Bureau employees and CIA informants and sources;

It should be clearly emphasized that there is no indication whatsoever within CIA that the Agency has been seeking any kind of a showdown or confrontation with the FBI. Contrary to what some people may believe, the relationship between the two agencies up to the recent crisis was never better despite the problems which have arisen from time to time. I am confident that a thorough and impartial examination will conclusively support the foregoing.

In order that there may not be any misunderstanding, it is important to emphasize that the Bureau can also produce an extensive list of justified grievances. We can also produce an excellent record of support which we have given CIA; presumably CIA could do the same. There are ingredients for continuing conflict and there is also adequate machinery for maintaining sound working relations and producing badly needed intelligence information.

Classified by ~~XXXX~~  
Exempt from GDS, Category 263  
Date of Declassification Indefinite

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION  
Unauthorized Disclosure  
Subject to Criminal Sanctions

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO  
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR  
RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION  
IN THIS DOCUMENT. KPM/1/98

~~SECRET~~

I believe that it would be most helpful to you and interested Bureau officials when evaluating and passing judgment on the attached material if we analyzed very briefly the role of the Bureau liaison Agent. A liaison Agent can be a simple mail courier or he can be the true Bureau Agent ready to confront any problem or issue with another agency, very often working with very limited information. It is expected that the Bureau Agent carry out his instructions forcefully and efficiently. He must be prepared to handle all types of personalities under various conditions. He must be alert for pitfalls and express himself in a most judicious and prudent manner but always making certain that the Bureau position is well fortified.

In evaluating the attached and my encounters with CIA, it should be noted that protests from the Bureau always were easy to handle because the Agent had J. Edgar Hoover behind him. However, when an Agent struck at an official on one day and solicited his cooperation the next day, it did require some resourceful action. It is believed that other liaison Agents regularly encounter similar situations. On numerous occasions I have bitterly feuded with CIA officials and this has included rough language. I have walked out on CIA officials when I felt they were unreasonable. They took the initiative by asking the Agent to return. I did try to play fairly and squarely with all of them and never hesitated to accept a confrontation; this included the Director of the Agency. When I lectured to CIA personnel over the years I always made a point to challenge them to present any grievances or raise any subject matter relating to the Bureau. I never left a discussion with any CIA official without being positive that our position was absolutely understood. The approaches utilized by me might be open to criticism. I can only refer to the records of the Bureau and CIA and I believe the Bureau's position is most favorable. I don't think CIA has ever transmitted a letter of protest to the Bureau during the eighteen years during which the Agent handled the assignment.

ACTION:

For information.

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

CASES AND/OR SITUATIONS  
INVOLVING CONFLICTS WITH THE  
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA)

(1) MOCASE (THE BORIS MORROS CASE)

This was a sensitive Soviet-espionage case which originated in 1943 and terminated for the most part in 1957. The case had many wide foreign ramifications and historically has been, and undoubtedly will be, one of the most important and involved cases of Soviet operations in this country and abroad. We did not disseminate any information of significance in this case until 1954. On various occasions when the Liaison Agent has become involved in heated arguments with CIA officials, they have seen fit to raise this case as an outstanding example of FBI failure to cooperate with the Agency. The position taken by CIA was that it should have been advised regarding the Soviet operational activity in foreign countries, claiming that the Agency would have had the opportunity to develop more information of significance, identify Soviet agents, and possibly prepare conditions for recruitment or doubling of Soviet operatives. We did not disseminate our reports to CIA because of the extreme sensitivity of the case. We actually did not permit CIA to handle any investigations relating to the MOCASE until 1957.

In 1957, CIA complained that it certainly had every right to have received the information earlier because many aspects of the MOCASE pertained to CIA employees and operations. CIA further argued that it had been greatly handicapped in effectively carrying out the leads in 1957 because the leads were given to the Agency at the same time that the case was publicized. The Agency argued that the failure of the Bureau to coordinate with CIA those French aspects of the case permitted the French, rather than the U. S., to play a dominating role in Europe.

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO  
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR  
RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION  
IN THIS DOCUMENT. KP 1/8/98

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(JFK) 2/9/98 4/21/98

Per CEA AND (MANGOLD) RELEASE  
CA# 88-1226

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION

Unauthorized Disclosure  
Subject to Criminal Sanctions

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ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

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With regard to dealing with the French, we took the position that we would cover the leads through our Legal Attaches wherever possible and to furnish leads to CIA in those countries where we did not have Legal Attaches. CIA maintained that since we were on record that our Legal Attaches do not handle operations abroad, the Bureau had an obligation to levy those French leads on CIA or at least coordinate with the Agency before going to the French.

It is to be noted that in any argument relating to jurisdiction in this matter, CIA will fall back on the responsibilities placed on the Agency under the provisions of the National Security Act of 1947 and the implementation of the foregoing through National Security Council Directives. CIA will maintain that it is incumbent upon the Bureau to recognize the provisions of the National Security Act of 1947 and the Directives. The Agency would argue that in the MOCASE, these were ignored by the Bureau.

(2) SENSITIVE ONGOING OPERATION

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SENSITIVE ONGOING OPERATION (continued from page 2)

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SENSITIVE ONGOING OPERATION (continued from page 2 and 3)

(3) THE ABEL CASE

Although CIA has not raised the point for several years, the prevailing attitude was, and probably still exists, that the FBI did not play it square with CIA in the Abel case by not making certain that the Agency was given the proper recognition for its contributions. CIA feels that in the first place, there would not have been any U. S. access or availability to the source in this case, *NAME* because CIA took the full responsibility for moving *NAME* from *PLACE* to the U. S. in 1957. CIA claims it took the risk and responsibility of doing this after the Bureau declined to become involved in any operation designed to transport *NAME* to the U. S. It should be noted that *NAME* was an alcoholic and that his first contacts with CIA in *PLACE* raised questions concerning *NAME* mental stability.

After *NAME* arrived in the U. S., we arranged access to him for a period, the purpose of which was to obtain a complete story of his intelligence activities in the U. S. and we were particularly interested in identifying all of his associates, especially the man who later was identified as Rudolph Abel. After a short handling period in the U. S., we dropped *NAME* because he became a problem. It was an extremely critical situation because we had not yet identified Abel. CIA agreed to take the responsibility for the carrying and safeguarding of *NAME* but we

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were given free access to this difficult source. This was a most fortunate arrangement as far as CIA was concerned, because this adjustment gave us the time to work with *NAME* and subsequently develop the leads which led to the apprehension of Abel. The Agency has maintained that it was largely responsible for making absolutely certain that *NAME* was mentally and physically prepared for testimony at the Abel trial. *NAME* was a key witness. CIA has also referred to the heavy expenses incurred by the Agency, all for the benefit of the Bureau. CIA has complained that the Bureau never really thanked the Agency for its cooperation and CIA has been particularly irked because the Bureau did not see fit to inform the Attorney General or the White House of the role played by CIA.

(4) *NAME OF SUBJECT*

In July, 1953, Senator *NAME* sought to subpoena *NAME AND OCCUPATION* to testify before the Senator's Committee. *NAME* claimed that *NAME* alleged communist activities were clearly documented. The most serious allegation was that *NAME* had *IDENTIFYING DATA*. All of this was publicized. The information set forth in the newspapers emanated from a Bureau report. CIA planned to charge the Bureau with leaking the information to Senator *NAME*. CIA officials held numerous conferences concerning the matter but charges were never made against the Bureau. What information CIA has on this particular item is not known but the Agency did know that we maintained liaison with *NAME* Committee.

(5) BUREAU DISSEMINATION OF INFORMATION CONCERNING

In May, 1954, Allen Dulles raised the question concerning the propriety of FBI dissemination of information concerning *NAME*. This information had been furnished to us by *NAME* a former official of the

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Department of Labor. When interviewed by us, NAME made several accusations against CIA. We disseminated the information to the White House, the Attorney General, and some data also went to the State Department. Dulles took the position that by disseminating derogatory information concerning his Agency, he had been placed on the spot because the NAME data was not the complete story. In the past, CIA informally referred to this as an instance of very unfair conduct on the part of the Bureau.

(6) BUREAU HANDLING OF CIA REQUESTS FOR TOURS FOR FOREIGN OFFICIALS

On occasions in the 1950's, CIA complained that officials visiting the U. S. under CIA sponsorship were given excellent treatment on the tour but, nevertheless, many of the visitors left most disappointed because they had not had any contact with any Bureau officials. CIA felt that contact with Bureau officials had very significant benefits and left lasting favorable impressions because of the FBI's world-wide reputation. CIA also pointed out that when foreign visitors had no contact with Bureau officials, they were left with the suspicion that there was some kind of friction between the FBI and CIA. In 1956, we had a clear-cut policy to the effect that tours for such visitors would be of a restrictive nature in that such visitors would view our facilities normally seen by the public and nothing more. CIA was so informed but periodically indicated that our policy prevented the Agency from truly enhancing U. S. interests abroad. CIA never lodged an official complaint.

It should be emphasized that for the past several years there would not be any basis for any form of complaint with regard to Bureau treatment of foreign officials coming to the U. S. under CIA sponsorship. The personal attention given to such officials by NAME and other officials and Supervisors in the Domestic Intelligence Division has been outstanding and benefits have accrued to the Bureau. These visitors have gone back to their native

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countries with far better impressions than in the past. In addition, we have learned more about these countries, their services, and their security chiefs by spending a few minutes with them. Needless to say, this kind of treatment has also immeasurably helped our Legal Attaches.

(7) [CIA] - [DUTCH] INTEREST IN SOVIET ESPIONAGE ACTIVITY

(s) In 1965, the [Dutch Internal Security Service] (s) was in the process of investigating individuals in [Holland] who allegedly had been engaged in Soviet-espionage activity. The [Dutch] wanted to have certain individuals in the U. S. interviewed and approached [CIA] to make inquiry at the Bureau. At that time, our relations with the [Dutch] had been practically nonexistent because the [Dutch] had failed to honestly deal with us in the case of NAME AND IDENTIFYING DATA who had been clandestinely collecting intelligence at the National Security Agency. When [CIA] approached us, we told the Agency that the Dutch could submit their request through diplomatic channels. We subsequently told [CIA] (s) we would not handle the interviews for the [Dutch]. (s) We stuck to our position. (s) [CIA] surrendered but felt that we were impairing their efforts to gather information concerning Soviet-espionage activities in Europe.

(8) TWO NAMES

NAME	IDENTIFYING
<u>DATA</u>	<u>DATA</u>
, during World War II, established a private intelligence network, operating throughout the world but primarily in Europe. His sources included any number of European exiles who came to the U. S. While he was in business, he was financed by the State Department, then the Department of the Army, and in the later 1940's and into the 1950's by CIA. <u>NAME</u> established contact with the Bureau through one of his subordinates, <u>NAME</u> who periodically called	

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on us and furnished information which NAME felt was of interest to us. This dissemination through NAME continued during the period of relationship with CIA. We never informed CIA that we were receiving such information which also was of interest to the Agency. It is possible that had given the same data to CIA but we do not know. CIA and NAME clashed and the relationship was severed in an atmosphere of severe bitterness. In the last years of its dealings with NAME [the Agency] had (s) successfully penetrated the latter's organization and allegedly had identified many of the sources. CIA hinted to the Liaison Agent that it had become aware of the relationship between NAME organization and the Bureau. How much CIA really learned about this relationship is not known but if its penetrations were significant, the Agency may have developed evidence to justify a charge that the Bureau had withheld information from CIA, particularly when we were receiving the data from an organization which was [financed by the Agency.] (s)

(9) COMMISSION ON THE ORGANIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH OF THE GOVERNMENT

(Herbert Hoover Commission. - 1954)

In October, 1954, a task force of the captioned Commission initiated a survey of CIA's operations under the leadership of NAME. In MONTH, 1955, we were advised by a representative of the task force that Senator NAME had furnished the group a list of CIA employees who were considered subversive. CIA became cognizant of this development and there was talk within the Agency that the Bureau had furnished the names to the Senator. When the Liaison Agent was informally approached on this, he flatly told the Agency to officially submit its charges. The Agency never did. What information CIA may have had on this matter as it pertained to the Bureau is not known. It is possible that the Agency's attitude was strictly predicated on a knowledge that we maintained liaison with the Senator's Committee.

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(10) INTERNAL SECURITY LEADS IN FOREIGN COUNTRIES

During the 1950's, we gave our Legal Attaches numerous leads stemming from internal security cases in the U. S. In many instances we did not see fit to notify CIA although the Agency always maintained that you could not separate "internal Security" from "counter-intelligence," namely a lead in France pertaining to a communist in the U. S. warranted advising CIA, if not, at least asking the Agency to handle the lead. In the last several years, it is not believed that there is any basis for complaint since we have regularly been notifying CIA concerning subjects of cases who travel abroad. If the Legal Attache is investigating, CIA is notified in order to avoid duplicate efforts. There have been exceptions where we have taken the position that CIA should not be notified because of the sensitivity of the matter. How many such exceptions are known to CIA cannot be established from our files; however, we should bear in mind that when our Legal Attaches investigate, they contact many of the same foreign officials normally contacted by CIA. How many of these foreign officials are CIA informants, or on the Agency payroll, is unknown.

(11) BUREAU OPERATIONS IN CUBA

We operated informants in Cuba when we had a Legal Attache's Office in Havana. Informants reported on activities of communists and other subversives in that country. During the period we operated these informants, we did not coordinate our operations with CIA. We did not advise the Agency that we had such sources. However, in 1960, after Castro came on the scene, it became infeasible to handle certain informants in a secure manner. Approval was granted to turn certain informants over to CIA. What these informants may have subsequently told CIA about past Bureau operations is unknown. This item is being cited in the event CIA had evidence to establish that we had been operational in Cuba and had not coordinated with the Agency pursuant to Directives.

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(12) BUREAU OPERATIONS IN BRAZIL -

In YEAR the U. S. Ambassador in Brazil accused our Legal Attache of engaging in uncoordinated covert intelligence activity "of a nature which I believe exceeds his terms of reference." The Ambassador further indicated that CIA was unhappy over the Legal Attache's activities and the Agency allegedly had told the Ambassador that the Legal Attache had disseminated information from a source who was a fabricator or a provocator. This situation arose as a result of the Legal Attache's operation of an informant in [Brazil].<sup>(S)</sup> Some of the information that he received from the informant was of a derogatory nature and related to a [Brazilian] who was being touted as a Presidential candidate. CIA asked for the identity of the informant and we told the Agency that the person could not be identified because he did not wish that his identity be disclosed. This case is being cited because CIA may have evidence that we had been operational in [Brazil] had not coordinated pursuant to Directives, and that the matter was further aggravated because of the alleged unreliability of the information. <sup>(S)</sup>

(13) BORDER COVERAGE

INVOLVES SENSITIVE METHODS AND TECHNIQUES

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SENSITIVE METHODS AND TECHNIQUES

(Continued from page 10)

(14) CODE NAME

In May, YEAR the Bureau's double Agent in the captioned case was advised by [his Soviet contact] that he was to have a meeting in PLACE during the period DATE. A question arose as to whether CIA should be informed concerning the double Agent's travel to PLACE. It was recommended and approved that we not advise CIA. (s)

What is important here is that CIA established contact with our double agent at one point. The Agency may have had further contact without our knowledge. The Agency may have also picked up the contact with the [Soviet] in PLACE. The case is being highlighted since we cannot exclude the possibility that the Agency has evidence to demonstrate that we were operational in PLACE and we did not coordinate with the Agency. (s)

(15) CIA REQUESTS FOR BUREAU LECTURE ON COMMUNISM IN THE U. S.

On September 25, 1958, CIA inquired if NAME could give a lecture on the communist movement in the U. S. It was recommended that NAME give the lecture. Such lectures were being afforded in other parts of the Government. The Director made the notation "We cannot make NAME available to this outfit." The Agency accepted this as an affront and a blatant refusal.

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to cooperate on a most important subject of interest to both agencies.

(16) CASE OF NAME

On July 9, YEAR, an official of the State Department confidentially advised the Bureau that NAME a CIA employee in PLACE, had been involved in an affair with a FOREIGN girl. According to NAME allegedly had furnished information to the FOREIGN girl. We checked with the State Department and CIA and we confirmed NAME involved in an affair and that he had been recalled. According to CIA and State Department, there was no indication that NAME involved in any espionage against the U. S. CIA gave consideration to requesting the Bureau to identify its source and then changed its mind. Whether CIA has documented this as an instance where the Bureau failed to cooperate by not volunteering the source is a matter of conjecture but, it is a case that should be kept in mind.

(17) NAME OF CASE

In April, 1963, we became involved with CIA in that Agency's efforts to collect sensitive information relating to FOREIGN Government intentions to conduct espionage against the U. S. CIA had access to a sensitive source, NAME who was in a position to make available highly important FOREIGN documents. On April 11, 1963, CIA informed us that our Legal Attache in PLACE had locally contacted CIA concerning this matter. CIA Headquarters was highly disturbed because its office in PLACE had not been cut in on this operation and the Agency wanted to be informed regarding the nature and the extent of our dissemination of CIA information to our Legal Attache. We

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determined that the Legal Attache had made inquiries in PLACE in response to leads which had been sent from Bureau Headquarters. This matter is being highlighted because it was a vitally important operation to CIA and the Agency had received indications that information had been leaked to FOREIGN authorities. We have no evidence or reason to believe that the Legal Attache Office ever involved itself in any such leak. However, we should not, under any circumstances, discount the fact that CIA has penetrated FOREIGN services and has had access to sensitive information in PLACE. The FOREIGN have always had an outstanding capability of tapping phones and installing microphones in PLACE. Such coverage on U. S. officials, including their residences, should never be excluded. The information we had conveyed to our Legal Attache possibly may have been acquired by the FOREIGN through clandestine coverage. CIA possibly could charge us with handling their sensitive information in an insecure manner by transmitting it to PLACE without conferring with the Agency.

In connection with alleged FOREIGN espionage activity in the U. S., CIA has never been satisfied with the efforts made by the Bureau. The Agency possibly could take the position that we looked lightly at the allegations and did not pursue a matter which, in their eyes, merited a more aggressive approach.

For some time, CIA has held to a position that the FOREIGN Intelligence Service, NAME is penetrated by the Soviets. The Agency has pointed out that if the FOREIGN are collecting sensitive information in the U. S., the product is ending up in Moscow. In January, 1964, we reviewed the status of our investigation of FOREIGN intelligence activities in the U. S. The Director commented "I think this whole thing has been imaginary on the part of CIA which has been played as a sucker by NAME. I would waste no more time on it at least until all CIA restrictions are removed." CIA did impose restrictions by not permitting us to pursue certain leads because it feared that its sensitive source would be jeopardized.

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(18) LEAKS TO THE "NATIONAL REVIEW" - 1959

In April, 1959, CIA became concerned over the appearance of certain items in issues of the "National Review." The publication carried a column authored by an unidentified individual who was making derogatory references to CIA. CIA subsequently identified the author as *NAME* a former CIA employee. CIA investigation indicated that *NAME* was obtaining his information from former CIA Agents. In checking on *NAME*, CIA identified some of his friends who were listed as *NAME* former member of the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee; and *NAME* former Assistant to the Director. The Liaison Agent was unable to develop any additional information as it might have pertained to *NAME* in this particular matter. CIA may have additional data not revealed.

(19) TRAVEL OF BUREAU INFORMANTS TO CUBA

In September, 1965, we received information indicating that one of our informants on the Mexican border was in a position to travel to Cuba. A question was raised concerning CIA interest in this matter, if the informant made the trip. It was recommended and approved that we not advise CIA concerning the identity of the informant or his trip to Cuba.

It is not known if CIA acquired any knowledge but, if the Agency did, we potentially are vulnerable. The Agency could charge that we were operating outside of the U. S. and we failed to coordinate with the Agency.

(20) DISSEMINATION OF CIA INFORMATION IN A BUREAU MONOGRAPH

By letter dated May 5, 1965, we disseminated to interested agencies, including CIA, a copy of a monograph entitled "Communism in the Dominican Republic." The monograph contained considerable information which had emanated

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from CIA. We did not obtain clearance from CIA for the inclusion of this information in our monograph. Clearance approval was not obtained because of the urgency of the document. CIA was irritated because it considered our action a distinct violation of the third agency rule. The Agency never made any protest.

(21) BUREAU INFORMANTS IN PLACE

In 1966, and 1967, we were operating informants in PLACE. At the inception of our operational activity, CIA was not informed. In one case, we finally were able to effect the necessary arrangements with CIA whereby the Bureau would be permitted to run the informant in PLACE. In the second instance, we established an agreement with CIA in October, 1967, that we could continue handling an informant in PLACE with the understanding that the Bureau Agent, on the occasion of each visit, would confer with the local CIA office on political information collected from the informant. These two cases had all the makings of a conflict. CIA was under the definite impression that we had been running these informants before we had finally coordinated with them. (S) It is true that the CIA Chief in PLACE was much incensed but no issue was made at CIA Headquarters and the matter was put to rest. (S)

CIA may have developed concrete evidence that we were operating in PLACE bearing in mind that in a place such as PLACE, it would not be difficult for a CIA intelligence officer to spot an FBI Agent in contact with FOREIGNERS. Our potential vulnerability is that we were operating in PLACE without coordinating with CIA.

(22) CODE NAME

CURRENT SENSITIVE  
OPERATION

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CURRENT SENSITIVE OPERATION -

Continued from page 15

**(23) HARRASSMENT OF CIA**

By letter dated November 15, 1967, CIA inquired if the Bureau would check the toll calls on the home telephone of one *NAME* who was harrassing CIA in the Miami area. *NAME* allegedly was seeking information concerning the Agency's covert operations. We told CIA that we would not check the toll-calls. We explained that on the basis of the information received, there was not sufficient information to justify investigation falling within the Bureau's jurisdiction. CIA accepted our response but there is no doubt that the Agency characterized our position as a concrete example of refusal to help a sister agency with a problem relating to the security of U. S. intelligence operations.

**(24) SENSITIVE DOCUMENT**

CIA became very irked when we restricted dissemination of our *SENSITIVE DOCUMENT* to two copies for the Agency. CIA took the position with the Liaison Agent that CIA always has been most liberal in providing the Bureau with as many copies as we needed when it involved various types of CIA material. The Agency never made an official issue of this matter. The Liaison Agent is confident that CIA always considered this an uncooperative gesture on our part.

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(25) ESTABLISHMENT OF BUREAU LIAISON WITH  
DUTCH INTERNAL SECURITY SERVICE - 1960

In January, 1960, our Legal Attache, traveled to Holland for the purpose of exploring arrangements for liaison with appropriate Dutch authorities.

NAME raised questions, pointing out that over the years, all relations with the Dutch authorities had been handled through CIA. He indicated that before there was any change in procedure, it would be necessary for CIA and FBI to come to some form of an agreement. Allen Dulles subsequently expressed disappointment in that his Agency had not been contacted by the Bureau prior to exploring the liaison arrangement. We eventually conferred with CIA and came to an agreement satisfactory to all parties concerned.

Again, CIA could cite this as an instance where we failed to coordinate with the Agency in line with National Security Council Directives.

In the latter part of 1959 we gave consideration to establishing a Legal Attache in Copenhagen, Denmark. The purpose of the assignment was to follow Bureau leads in Denmark, Norway, Sweden, and Holland. We did not inform CIA of our intentions.

(26) BUREAU DISSEMINATION OF COUNTERINTELLIGENCE  
INFORMATION TO FOREIGN SERVICES - DATE

By letter dated DATE, CIA raised questions concerning the propriety of Bureau dissemination of counterintelligence information to foreign intelligence services. CIA, at that time, had particular reference to information which our Legal Attache had transmitted to the Foreign Intelligence Service concerning KGB operations. CIA took the position that pursuant to the coordinating

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Directive, the Bureau was obligated to coordinate with CIA prior to such dissemination. The particular data had emanated from one of our sensitive FOREIGN sources CODENAME. We responded to CIA by stating that the information was the product of an internal security operation and did not relate to any operational activity abroad, CIA again surrendered. The Agency could argue that it was responsible for following Soviet matters with the FOREIGN Intelligence Service and that we had an obligation of coordinating with the Agency.

(27) TITLE OF BOOK  
AUTHOR

BOOK AUTHORED BY

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In August, 1963, we received information indicating that AUTHOR in the process of gathering material for a book pertaining to activities of U. S. intelligence activities. AUTHOR contacted the Bureau. It was recommended that liaison orally advise CIA that AUTHOR preparing a book concerning U. S. intelligence agencies. The Director noted "I see no reason doing so."

It is not known if CIA was aware of the contact with the Bureau. AUTHOR subsequently published the book which contained extremely derogatory information concerning CIA.

(28) COMMUNIST ACTIVITIES - AFRICA

In April, 1960, CIA inquired if the Bureau would give any consideration to assisting the Agency toward developing coverage in Africa. CIA was looking for the services of any Negro informant who might be available. The Agency also inquired about placing a Negro in the Communist Party, USA, under a plan which would have as an eventual objective, the sending of the informant to

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Africa under an appropriate cover and for an extended period. We told CIA we had no informants available because they were necessary for our own operations. We took the position that we saw no benefit to be gained by loaning an informant on a short or long term basis.

This item is being mentioned because Africa has become vitally important to U. S. interest, bearing in mind that both the Soviets and Chinese Communists have made significant inroads into the area. CIA could argue that as early as 1960, it had the foresight to recognize the need for additional coverage, that it appealed to the Bureau for assistance, and that we did not cooperate.

(29) ADVISING THE WHITE HOUSE REGARDING CRITICISM  
OF INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS - EUROPE

By letter dated October 23, 1964, we furnished the White House information received by our Legal Attache from the SOURCE He was critical of intelligence operations in Europe and made particular reference to the overstaffing of personnel.

We do not know if CIA became cognizant of the existence of the Bureau letter bearing in mind that the Agency undoubtedly would have considered the document as relating to its operations. We do know that for several years, CIA personnel have been assigned to the White House and had access to considerable information.

(30) THE PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY  
BOARD AND JOHN MC CONE

In May, 1963, we became embroiled with CIA in a rather critical conflict as a result of communication the Bureau sent to the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board. The matter dealt with consideration that might be given to increasing wire taps on diplomatic establishments.

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In a portion of our communication, we attributed certain information to McCone, then Director of CIA. He charged that the information attributed to him was not so because he had never made any such statement and he could prove it. The actual fact was that the information relating to McCone had been given to us by one of his subordinates who had indicated that the information originated with McCone. McCone maintained that we should have checked with him before we went on record that any information had originated with him. The record at the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board was subsequently corrected.

(31) ALLEGED PENETRATIONS OF CIA

In February, 1965, Bureau representatives met with CIA officials and with *NAME* to discuss allegations made by *NAME* a Soviet defector, relative to alleged Soviet penetrations of CIA. *NAME* was interviewed in detail concerning these allegations. By letter dated February 26, 1965, we officially advised CIA that there appeared to be no basis at this time for a full investigation of the individuals involved.

There are officials in CIA who continue to be seriously concerned about possible penetrations of the Agency and have not discarded *NAME'S* allegations.

We do not have any reason to believe that CIA has developed any substantive evidence to support *NAME'S* allegations. If it does, we could be vulnerable and could be charged that we did not cooperate and conduct the necessary investigation in 1965.

(32) VICE PRESIDENT NIXON'S TRIP TO SOUTH AMERICA - 1958

In 1958, Vice President Richard M. Nixon traveled to Latin America during which time there were numerous riots and attacks which were directed against the Vice President and his party. By letter dated May 16, 1958, we provided the Vice President with a summary of information which we had received concerning the events in Latin America relating

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to the trip. Most of this information came from CIA. Our letter could be interpreted as raising the question concerning the quality of CIA's coverage in Latin America.

It is not known if CIA ever became knowledgeable of the referenced communication. As already indicated, we do know that CIA personnel have been assigned to the White House. We also know that *NAME AND TITLE* CIA, was attached to Vice President Nixon's staff.

If CIA is cognizant of the communication, the Agency technically could raise a question concerning a violation of the third agency rule and, furthermore, could question the Bureau's propriety of making reference to CIA's coverage in Latin America.

(33) *NAME OF SUBJECT*

The captioned individual is a criminal informant whom we have been utilizing to very significant advantage in New York City. He has been the source of valuable criminal intelligence and has been a key witness in prosecutions of cases being handled by the Bureau. We acquired access to *NAME* through CIA. A covert CIA operator in New York City had become acquainted with *NAME* saw his potential as a source of criminal intelligence, and then conferred with *NAME* CIA. *NAME* contacted the Bureau Liaison Agent and asked if the Bureau was interested. Negotiations were initiated and we subsequently acquired the services of *NAME*. Although the Agency has never officially made any statement to us, it has been bitterly disappointed that the Bureau never acknowledged CIA's assistance which the Agency considered extremely valuable.

(34) EXCHANGE OF TECHNICAL INFORMATION

For many years, we maintained tight restrictions with regard to the exchange of technical information with CIA, particularly as it related to the technical surveillance field. CIA exhibited its equipment to us but, for many years, we declined to show any of our devices, with some exceptions.

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CIA never made any official protest but informally indicated from time to time that the lack of exchange in this highly important field was prejudicial to over-all intelligence and internal security interests. The Agency implied that we actually were more open with the British in this general area than we were with CIA.

It should be noted that the foregoing situation does not exist today. There is good exchange between the Bureau and CIA.

(35) CIA LECTURERS AT BUREAU TRAINING SCHOOLS

CIA has never been able to understand why the Bureau will not permit CIA personnel to lecture at Bureau schools or training courses. CIA has felt that through a careful selection of lecturers, the Agency could make a very valuable contribution both to the Bureau and to CIA. The Agency has indicated that its participation in some of our courses would give the Agency the opportunity to describe CIA's organization, objectives, and operational problems. Furthermore, it has been expressed that Bureau personnel could be given the opportunity to pose questions and there would be a far better over-all orientation on the part of our people.

The Liaison Agent has always resisted CIA's request. It has been a delicate matter to handle because Bureau personnel have lectured to hundreds of CIA employees.

(36) EXCHANGE IN THE TRAINING FIELD

Although CIA has never officially made an issue of the matter, the Agency has not been happy about our attitude concerning exchange of information in the training field. When the matter has been brought up for any discussion by CIA, the Agency has been discouraged. CIA informally has expressed the feeling that an exchange along certain guidelines could be most useful to the U. S. intelligence and internal security effort.

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(37) POSITIVE INTELLIGENCE

This is an area where discussion with CIA officials can rapidly generate criticism of the Bureau for failure to cooperate and offer the necessary assistance. Positive intelligence, briefly, is that information which might assist the U. S. Government in formulating foreign policy. Much of it is of a political nature and a vital portion pertains to scientific developments, military capabilities of foreign countries, and intentions of foreign countries. Positive intelligence is not only important as it concerns the communist-bloc countries but also the non-bloc nations.

There never has been any law, Directive, or Executive Order which has fixed the responsibilities for the clandestine collection of positive intelligence in the U. S. The Bureau does have a responsibility which we refer to as internal security and which falls into the accepted area of counterintelligence. We do investigate subversives, spys, and we develop penetrations of foreign intelligence services. Our work in the positive intelligence field, for the most part, has been restricted to the compliance of requests imposed upon us by the State Department, usually when a political crisis occurs in some country.

CIA has maintained that there is a tremendous unexplored field for expanded acquirement of positive intelligence in the U. S. This would mean vastly increased technical surveillance coverage, development of informants, and collection of cryptographic material. CIA does not feel that we have aggressively moved on this particular subject and that over the years, the Agency has been thwarted in its attempts to do much about the problem.

(S) In DATE , CIA requested the Bureau to install technical surveillances at the offices and temporary residences of two FOREIGN Government officials visiting the U. S. Pursuant to instructions, CIA was told to seek the authority of the Attorney General. The Director stated that he did not want CIA utilizing FBI as a channel.

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In the same month, CIA inquired if the Bureau would reestablish technical surveillance coverage on NAME who CIA felt was a key figure in the transmittal of scientific intelligence data to the FOREIGN Intelligence Service. We declined to reinstitute the coverage. CIA considered the matter important because of its relationship to the PLACE

On October 21, 1969, we told CIA that future requests from CIA for technical surveillance coverage should be transmitted by the Agency directly to the Attorney General.

CIA has never made any official comment or protest but it has considered the afore-mentioned action by the Bureau as unfriendly and uncooperative. The Agency has looked to the Bureau as the logical point of contact and as the only organization having the resources and capabilities of adequately determining if such coverage is even feasible.

(38) MISCELLANEOUS ITEMS

The Liaison Agent recalls fragments of other situations or conflicts which occurred over the years and which resulted in the voicing of CIA displeasure or criticism. The Agent cannot recall the names of the cases which is necessary to acquire the required data. There was one instance early in the 1950's which involved information received from a source of unknown reliability charging Allen Dulles with having been a communist and a spy while in Europe. We disseminated the information to several agencies. Dulles exploded but never lodged a protest.

The Agent also has recollection of instances when CIA alleged that its source or informant was compromised by Bureau revelation of CIA information during the course of interviews conducted by us. Technically, this would be a violation of the third agency rule and, if CIA had hard core facts, we would be vulnerable, particularly if an important informant was lost. CIA never made any official issue or protest.

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**SECRET**

There also have been instances, but cases cannot be recalled, where we included CIA information in Bureau reports but CIA had requested that the information not be passed outside of the Bureau. CIA never protested.

**SECRET**

- 25 -

Memorandum

TO : Mr. C. D. DeLoach

DATE: March 11, 1970

FROM : W. C. Sullivan

*This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.*

SUBJECT: RELATIONSHIPS WITH CIA

Reference my memorandum 3/9/70 recommending that a letter be directed to CIA outlining the elements of intelligence and counterintelligence work affecting the United States. Purpose of this letter is to protect Bureau by giving CIA a chance to make any comments it may have concerning current use of sources and facilities affecting both Bureau and CIA. Director instructed "Prepare same and let me see it."

We have prepared letter to CIA Director Helms in line with the foregoing. Letter cites agreement or so-called "ground rules" drawn up between Bureau and CIA in January, 1966, with regard to coordination of FBI-CIA efforts in collection of positive intelligence in the United States. At that time Vice Admiral Raborn was head of CIA and we are enclosing a copy of the 1966 agreement for Mr. Helms' attention.

In letter we have also pointed out the Bureau's primary responsibility concerning internal security of the United States and for conducting counterintelligence operations here. We have noted that while the Bureau has no statutory responsibilities concerning collection of foreign intelligence, we have made a concerted effort to obtain positive intelligence of value to other U.S. agencies and policy-making officials and have regularly furnished the product to CIA and other interested agencies. Letter invites any observations Mr. Helms may desire to make after reviewing this matter, including the 1966 agreement.

A copy of the 1966 "ground rules" between CIA and the Bureau is attached to this memorandum for the Director's information.

ACTION: If the Director approves, the attached letter to Helms should go forward.

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DATE 1/4/09 BY SP2 AML/STG

OK

SECRET MATERIAL ATTACHED

January 19, 1966

**SECRET**

**CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
OPERATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES**

(1) CIA will not initiate an investigation of any foreign official in the United States without the concurrence and coordination of the FBI. In this context, the term "investigation" means systematic and direct inquiries or procedures (such as physical or technical surveillances or neighborhood inquiries) aiming at developing information concerning an individual's activities or background; "investigation" does not include the acceptance or the development of information through social contacts or contacts normally made by CIA agents in discharging their cover functions. (S)

(2) CIA will seek concurrence and coordination of the FBI before approaching for recruitment any foreign official or communist-bloc visitor in the United States. The FBI will concur and coordinate if the proposed action does not conflict with any operation, current or planned, including active investigation of the FBI. (S)

(3) CIA will advise the FBI prior to any planned meeting between a CIA asset and a foreign official or communist-bloc visitor of known or presumed interest to the FBI (this would include all communist-bloc officials and visitors) for purposes of assessment and social development. (S)

(4) Clandestine CIA staff operatives, domestic American agents of CIA, and foreign agents of CIA recruited abroad who come to the United States will be identified to the FBI by name or appropriate description depending on the national security interest involved. (S)

(5) Pursuant to paragraph 4 above, when a CIA agent arrives in the United States for a visit or for an assignment, the Bureau will be advised and the two agencies will confer regarding the handling of the agent in the United States. It is recognized that each case will have its individual peculiarities. The governing principle will be positive intelligence interest as weighed against internal (S)

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
OPERATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES

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security factors. CIA will continue its contractual relationship for the purpose of handling the training, the procurement of positive foreign intelligence, the fulfillment of CIA commitments to the agent, and the preparation of the agent for his next assignment abroad. (S)

(6) In those cases where CIA will be handling its agent in the United States, CIA will service FBI security or counterintelligence requirements and will provide the FBI all agent information bearing on counterintelligence or internal security matters, including the scope and nature of the agent's access to information and the identities of the agent's significant contacts, particularly in the communist-bloc field. In such cases where CIA servicing has been inadequate to FBI internal security interests, the FBI will have direct access to the agent. (S)

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March 11, 1970

DECLASSIFIED BY 5668 SLD/GCL  
ON 4/2/98 (JFK)

Honorable Richard Helms  
Director  
Central Intelligence Agency  
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Helms:

As I am sure you will agree, the need for close coordination of the intelligence-gathering and counter-intelligence efforts of the FBI and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) is self-evident. This matter is one which requires a continuing analysis to assure that both agencies have established working agreements whereby we can most effectively realize positive results with a minimum of duplication, misplaced effort, and jurisdictional problems.

During January, 1966, representatives of this Bureau met with officials of the CIA to consider coordination of our mutual efforts in the collection of positive intelligence in the United States. As a result of these conferences, a set of ground rules was drawn up and agreed to by both agencies. A copy of this agreement was transmitted in my letter of February 7, 1966, to then CIA Director Vice Admiral William F. Raborn, Jr. A copy of the agreement is enclosed for your information. This agreement has proven generally effective and no major problems have been encountered since its adoption in the areas it covers.

The FBI has primary responsibility with regard to matters involving the internal security of the United States as well as for conducting counterintelligence operations in

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this country. While this Bureau does not have any statutory responsibilities with regard to the collection of foreign intelligence, I have always recognized that the potential for the development of such intelligence in this country is considerable. The FBI has, in fact, made a concerted effort to obtain positive intelligence of value to other U. S. intelligence agencies, including the CIA, and policy-making officials of the Government. While these efforts have, of course, been incidental to our main internal security and counterintelligence responsibilities, we have on a selective basis developed sources, both live and technical, providing coverage at key foreign establishments in the United States. The product of this coverage has been furnished on a regular basis to the CIA and other interested agencies and officials of the Government.

I know that you will share my belief that this matter requires a periodic reexamination to assure that the national security interests continue to be served in the most effective and complete manner possible. After reviewing this matter, including the attached 1966 agreement, I would welcome any observations you may desire to make.

Sincerely yours,

J. Edgar Hoover

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Memorandum

~~SECRET~~

TO : The Director

DATE: 3/13/70

FROM : SA Sam Papich

DECLASSIFIED BY ~~5658 SLD/CLL~~  
ON ~~2/6/98 (JFK)~~

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO  
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR  
RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION  
IN THIS DOCUMENT AS SWITZED  
10/11/93 JBH (10300) GAT  
GMB 6-22-94 (103 JF)

SUBJECT: RELATIONS WITH CIA

Reference is made to my letters dated March 2 and March 5, 1970. In my letter of March 5, 1970, I stated "it is important to emphasize that the Bureau can also produce an extensive list of justified grievances." It is my understanding that the Director desired that this list be identified. Enclosed herewith is a list of approximately 75 items.

This list should not be considered absolutely complete. Preparation was predicated on my personal recollection and a review of Bureau records. To make this list more complete and specifically accurate would necessitate the review of thousands of files. The enclosed list can be supported by Bureau records. What CIA records reflect on the same items is unknown. This also must be kept in mind in connection with our evaluation of the alleged CIA grievances which I previously listed.

I realize that it is presumptuous on my part, but if the Director feels that our Bureau work can benefit by a personal discussion between the Director and myself, I am available until April 3, 1970. I plan to leave the area immediately thereafter for an extended period.

ACTION:

For information.

Enclosure

~~SP8 MAC/MSR  
6-24-94  
Classified by 90310A/GAT (JFK)  
Declassify on: OADR (JFK)~~

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RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION  
IN THIS DOCUMENT. KP 1/8/98

There is no  
need for a  
personal discussion.  
H

~~Classified by 12  
Exempt from GDS Category 263  
Date of Declassification Indefinite~~

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OTHERWISE

LIST OF BUREAU GRIEVANCES

CLASSIFIED BY 5668 SLD/GCL  
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 1,6  
(JFK) 4/2/98

1. ATTACKS AGAINST BUREAU PLACE 1951)

Although Agent Papich did not begin handling Liaison with CIA until 1952, it is important to refer to highly significant differences with CIA which culminated in a serious conflict in the Fall of 1951. Our Legal Attaches in PLACE and PLACE reported that CIA representatives were attacking the Bureau, were endeavoring to place us in an unfavorable light, were questioning our jurisdiction, and were making disparaging remarks concerning the Bureau. Some of this was summed up by characterizing it as covert hostility within CIA, stemming largely from disgruntled former employees of the FBI.

In October, 1951, General Walter Beddell Smith, then Director of CIA, asked to meet with the Director and other Bureau representatives for the purpose of discussing the existing differences. General Smith denied that there was any covert hostility against the Bureau and maintained that there was a general feeling of respect for us. He admitted that there had been isolated instances of friction for which CIA must accept its share of responsibility.

It is my recollection that the Director and other Bureau officials did meet with General Smith, at which time guidelines were set forth for maintaining future relations between the two agencies. I was not able to find a memorandum of record covering this meeting.

2. PROSELYTING OF BUREAU PERSONNEL BY CIA

The Agent clearly recalls that early in the 1950's we encountered difficulties with CIA because the Agency allegedly was recruiting Bureau-employed personnel. We vigorously protested, and subsequently the Agency advised that it would follow a policy of not having any contact with a Bureau employee until the individual had been separated from the Bureau for a period of at least thirty days. The Agent could not locate the background of this matter in the files reviewed by him. It is possible that the pertinent information lies in the personnel file of some former Bureau Agent.

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IN THIS DOCUMENT AS SANITIZED

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3. NAME

By letter dated May 19, 1954, we protested to CIA for the manner in which the Agency handled the case of the captioned individual, a FOREIGN defector who had been placed under CIA control in PLACE. The Bureau had been interested in interviewing NAME as soon as he came to the United States, and this had been agreed to by CIA. Without notifying or consulting with us, CIA permitted NAME to arrive in the United States and be placed in the hands of a Congressional committee. We were, therefore, unable to interview the subject in any detail.

4. CIA EVALUATION OF MOCASE

In February, 1954, we complained to CIA because the Agency had evaluated information coming from the key source in the captioned case as emanating from a fabricator. We had disseminated certain foreign intelligence information originating in this case to CIA. The source was a key double agent in one of the most important cases handled by the Bureau, and the CIA evaluation was not proper or correct as far as we were concerned.

5. CASE OF NAME

NAME a CIA employee whom that Agency considered to be a communist penetration. The Agency requested an investigation which was then initiated by us. We subsequently learned that CIA had been conducting its own investigation which even included technical surveillance coverage on the subject. We considered this most uncooperative and we protested.

6. NAMENAME AND OCCUPATION

defected to the communists PLACE AND DATE .A few weeks before his defection, he came to the United States under CIA sponsorship. He was afforded a tour of the Bureau and he briefly met the Director.

It is believed that if all available facts were collected, the evidence would strongly indicate that CIA did a very ineffective job of assessing NAME permitting the United States Government to be embarrassed by even promoting a visit for him to this country. We could consider this instance an affront to the Director and the Bureau.

7. CASE OF POLISH SEAMEN - DEFECTORS - 1954

By letter dated October 13, 1954, a very strong letter of protest was sent to NAME, Interagency Defector Committee at CIA. This letter made reference to political asylum which was being considered for certain Polish sailors who had been seized by the Chinese Nationalist Government.

NAME disseminated a memorandum indicating that members of the Committee had agreed that in view of commitments made by the United States and Chinese officials, that failure to arrange re-entry for the Polish seamen would have an adverse effect on the over-all United States Defector Program. We emphasized to NAME that this matter had never been officially presented before the Defector Committee. He was informed that his action was not conducive to mutual cooperation.

8. CIA INTERVIEW OF ALIENS IN THE UNITED STATES - DISCUSSION WITH ALLEN DULLES SEPTEMBER 27, 1955

On September 27, 1955, the Liaison Agent met with Allen Dulles, at which time the CIA Director's attention was referred to a matter which had not yet developed into a serious situation but if not properly followed could lead to conflicts between the two agencies. Dulles was referred to the contacts of aliens in the United States made by CIA personnel without first obtaining the necessary clearance from the Bureau. The requirement for such clearance was clear-cut and pursuant to an established agreement.

9. CIA APPROACH OF A NATIONAL ACADEMY GRADUATE (1955)

In November, 1955, an incident arose when CIA approached a National Academy graduate to utilize his services [in Guatemala. This approach was made while the graduate was attending National Academy classes. A protest was made to key CIA officials for not having advised us prior to establishing contact with the Academy graduate.

10. NAME

In December, 1955, we received information indicating that CIA was in contact with an individual whom the Bureau was developing for utilization in a double agent operation. We learned that CIA representatives had established contact with NAME and had given him some advice and guidance without first checking with the Bureau. We protested to CIA.

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11. ALLEGED FABIAN SOCIALISTS IN CIA

In 1956 *NAME AND POSITION* made available to the Bureau on a strictly confidential basis detailed information concerning alleged infiltration of the United States Government by "Fabian Socialists." *NAME* furnished the names of many individuals whom he considered to fall into this category. Many of those listed were CIA executives.

This item is being listed in the event we felt that it could be used to justify that as of that period there was reason to deal with CIA in a very circumspect manner.

12. DELAYS IN HANDLING NAME CHECK REQUESTS

By letter dated January 11, 1956, our Washington Field Office called attention to extreme delays encountered in obtaining results of name check requests submitted to CIA. These delays particularly related to investigations of applicant matters being handled by the Bureau.

13. NAME

In March, 1956, Allen Dulles announced that *NAME AND POSITION* Intelligence Advisory Committee (IAC), of which the Bureau was a member. *NAME AND DESCRIPTIVE DATA* admitted contributing to the Alger Hiss Defense Fund. *ADDITIONAL DESCRIPTIVE DATA.*

Although we did not object to the appointment of *NAME* this is another item to be kept in mind in the event we desired to uphold an argument that there was reason to be circumspect in dealings with CIA.

14. NAME

*NAME* was a leading scientist assigned to the *LOCATION*. He had been used as a consultant by such agencies as the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) and CIA. In October, 1955, he met a Soviet scientist and, with the knowledge of AEC and CIA, began cultivating him. *NAME* informed

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us that he had been advised by a CIA official that the FBI would be furnishing operational guidance to him. We had never become involved in any such arrangement, and we later determined that a CIA official had been in error in making the above-described misrepresentation. We protested the CIA official's handling of this matter.

15. NAME

On July 20, 1956, we determined that one NAME had been in contact with [FOREIGN DIPLOMAT] (S) Washington, D. C. We further ascertained NAME was a CIA employee. We were informed by CIA on July 21, 1956, that the Agency had no information concerning NAME contacts with FOREIGNER. We later interviewed NAME it was indicated NAME in fact, had been in contact with a CIA official concerning his meetings with the [DIPLOMAT] (S). We protested and CIA submitted a letter of apology.

16. NAME

In July, 1956, a statement was made by a State Department official to the effect that a CIA employee allegedly had advised that the subject, a Soviet agent, was being permitted to enter the United States so that his activities could be covered and so that the Bureau would be in a position to promote a defection. The Bureau was not in possession of any information indicating that we had sanctioned the entry of the subject for the purpose described above. The State Department official was unable to recall the name of the CIA employee involved; inquiry at CIA was negative. We were not in a position to identify the CIA employee without conducting investigation within the Agency or without the Agency coming up with the identity.

17. NAME

By letter dated November 8, 1956, we strongly protested to CIA because representatives of that Agency had interviewed an alien in the United States without first obtaining clearance from the Bureau. It should be noted that there was a well-established agreement whereby it was incumbent upon CIA to first check with the Bureau before interviewing any alien in the United States.

18. NAME

was a former student at Columbia University with whom we had been in contact because of his association with a [Soviet assigned to the United Nations.] In December, 1956, NAME made a trip to [Russia] where he was contacted by an unidentified individual and was given a letter indicating that the writer was a [Colonel in the KGB] and that he was interested in cooperating with the United States. When NAME returned to the United States, we permitted CIA to interview the subject because of the Agency's foreign intelligence interests. We subsequently interviewed NAME at which time he informed us that he had been cautioned by CIA not to furnish pertinent information to the Bureau. CIA denied that any such statement was made.

19. CIA REQUEST FOR INFORMATION CONCERNING A HIGH-SPEED CAMERA-1957

The San Francisco Office furnished information indicating that CIA had requested a firm in California to furnish that Agency information regarding all foreign inquiries pertaining to a high-speed camera manufactured by the company. The matter was reviewed because we wanted to be certain that CIA was not invading our jurisdiction. We did not develop evidence that CIA had overstepped its jurisdiction. The Director did make a notation, "O.K., but it does seem to me we give CIA a pretty wide authority to explore such a field. H"

20. NAME

On May 28, 1957, CIA advised that one of its representatives in the field had interviewed the captioned (FOREIGN) alien who had agreed to cooperate with the Agency after he returned to PLACE ... CIA conducted this interview without first obtaining clearance from the Bureau. Such clearance was necessary pursuant to an established agreement. A vigorous protest was made to the Agency.

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21. <sup>(S)</sup> CIA REQUEST FOR TOUR FOR <sup>(S)</sup> COLOMBIAN INTELLIGENCE SERVICE REPRESENTATIVES - 1957

<sup>(S)</sup> In July, 1957, CIA requested a tour for several <sup>(S)</sup> Colombian officials who were coming to this country under CIA invitation. CIA was told that no tours would be given to the Colombians, because in the past a Colombian ambassador had grossly insulted the Bureau after we had arrested the ambassador's chauffeur on White Slave Traffic Act charge. ~~(S)~~(U)

If we so desired, we could give consideration to accusing CIA of trying to impose upon us individuals whom we considered undesirable in light of the foregoing. ~~(S)~~(U)

22. [REQUEST FOR SECURITY SURVEY OF COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS - NEW YORK CITY - 1957] ~~(S)~~(U)

On November 15, 1957, our New York Office was contacted by the local CIA representative who desired to be informed if the Bureau could conduct a security survey of the premises of the Council on Foreign Relations which were located across the street from a building occupied by the Soviet - United Nations Delegation. The CIA representative indicated that his visit to our office was pursuant to instructions received from Allen Dulles who allegedly was concerned about the possibility of the Soviets establishing coverage of conversations and discussions which might be held at the Council. It should be noted that the Council included as members many well-known personalities, including officials of the United States Government. ~~(S)~~(U)

Pursuant to instructions, Allen Dulles was informed on November 18, 1957, that we did not like the approach used by CIA in that such a sensitive matter had been taken up at the field level rather than through Bureau Headquarters. ~~(S)~~(U)

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23. NAME

In October, 1957, we received information from NAME indicating that a Polish scientist then visiting in the United States might defect. We followed developments through NAME and we kept CIA advised. The Agency was fully aware of the situation and particularly knew that we were in contact with NAME. We subsequently received information indicating that NAME, a CIA employee, established contact with NAME for the purpose of developing information concerning the work of Polish scientists. A protest was made to CIA for not properly coordinating their interests with us, bearing in mind that the action taken by NAME possibly could have jeopardized a Bureau operation.

24. NAME

By letter dated February 10, 1958, we directed a protest to CIA charging that Agency with interviewing the subject, FOREIGN alien, without first obtaining the necessary clearance from the Bureau.

25. ALLEGED IMPERSONATION OF FBI EMPLOYEE

On April 23, 1958, we received information indicating that a CIA employee allegedly had represented herself as being with the FBI when she tried to arrange an interview with NAME, an official of the International Association of Machinists in Washington, D. C. NAME gave a signed statement in which he claimed that he had received a phone call from NAME who said she was with the FBI. Upon checking with CIA, we were informed that NAME denied that she had made such representation.

26. NAME

By letter dated May 12, 1958, the Bureau protested to CIA for interviewing an alien in the Detroit area without first obtaining the necessary clearance from the Bureau. Such clearance was necessary pursuant to established agreement.

27. NAME

We received information in May, 1958, that a CIA employee, was listed as being employed with the Bureau in the records of the District of Columbia National Guard. The information was developed as the result of an investigation being conducted by the Bureau for the White House.

NAME furnished a signed statement indicating that he personally had no knowledge of the existence of the above information in the National Guard records.

28. NAME

By letter dated June 10, 1958, we protested to CIA for not advising us concerning that Agency's interview of an individual who was the subject of a Bureau investigation. We had been corresponding with CIA concerning the subject, and the Agency should have been aware of our interests.

29. ALLEGED CIA INCOMPETENCE AND ALLEGED PENETRATION OF UNITED STATES AGENCIES

By letter dated June 3, 1958, Legat, PLACE furnished information volunteered to him by NAME of G-2. NAME was very strong in his denunciation of CIA. He indicated that the Agency was incompetent and that it was penetrating other United States agencies. He also mentioned that when Allen Dulles was in Switzerland, Dulles was intimate with a woman, not identified.

The above is being cited in the event we desire to use this information as evidence for supporting a position of being circumspect in dealings with the CIA.

30. NAME

The Legal Attache, PLACE advised by letter dated June 10, 1958, that he had been invited to visit NAME the head of the FOREIGN Intelligence Services. CIA became aware of this invitation, and an Agency representative informed our Legal Attache that it was not desired that the Legat visit with NAME. Our Legat was instructed by the Bureau to accept the invitation regardless of the CIA position.

We could evaluate the CIA position in this matter as being uncooperative.

31. CIA INTEREST IN [CHINESE] ALIENS (S)

In June, 1958, we raised the question concerning CIA's failure to adhere to an agreement relating to CIA's recruitment of [Chinese] aliens in the United States for overseas intelligence operations. Under the agreement, CIA was not to approach any [Chinese] alien without first checking with us. A situation developed in Illinois indicating that CIA allegedly had become interested in recruiting an alien and even took some action without first checking with us. We expressed our disapproval in a letter to CIA June 12, 1958.

32. CIA OFFICIAL'S CRITICISM OF "MASTERS OF DECEIT"

Our Legal Attache, PLACE, obtained a copy of a memorandum sent to an official in our Embassy in PLACE by NAME Chief of the CIA Office PLACE. In his communication NAME belittled the value of "Masters of Deceit" as an anticommunist weapon in foreign countries. He claimed that the book pertained only to the Communist Party, USA, which he characterized as a small, ineffective, fraction-ridden organization. He stated that the author of the book was not an intellectual but rather a policeman.

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33. CIA DEVELOPMENT OF [INDONESIAN] GOVERNMENT SOURCES IN THE UNITED STATES

(S)

(S)(U)

In May, 1958, CIA furnished identifying and background data concerning three individuals - NAME all employees of the NAME Government and assigned to the United States. NAME had been developed as a source of information by CIA in PLACE. NAME came to CIA in Washington, D. C. and volunteered his services. NAME had been developed as a source by CIA and had been furnishing some information to the Agency. In a letter dated June 24, 1958, we told CIA that in the case of NAME, we felt that the Agency should have notified us at an earlier date in order that we could have considered exploitation for internal security purposes at the outset. (S)(U)

34. NAME

The subject, a former member of FOREIGN intelligence Service, defected to the United States and furnished extremely valuable information. The beginnings of this case include information raising questions concerning CIA cooperation.

In June, 1958, we developed information indicating that CIA may have opened a letter in PLACE which had been addressed to the Director by an individual who had identified himself as NAME. The writer further indicated that he might be connected with FOREIGN intelligence Service. The letter addressed to the Director had been placed in an envelope which, in turn, had ended up in the office of the [United States Ambassador] PLACE. We subsequently received a copy of the particular communication from CIA, and the contents were such at that time that no action was required by the Bureau. We asked CIA for particulars leading to the alleged opening of the letter which had been addressed to the Director. CIA claimed that it had not opened the letter. We were confidentially informed by an Agency representative that the [Ambassador] had opened the letter and then referred the matter to CIA. The contents were such that investigative action of an extensive nature was required by CIA in PLACE. What actually happened at the United States Embassy is something we may never know. (S)(U)

SECRET

35. NAME

By letter dated June 26, 1958, we voiced our concern regarding CIA's alleged interview of a FOREIGN alien whom CIA was considering for overseas recruitment. CIA denied that an approach of the alien had been made. Our investigation contradicted the statements emanating from CIA.

36. COMPROMISE OF FBI SENSITIVE SOURCE

DETAILS CONCERNING  
SENSITIVE SOURCE  
[OPERATED AGAINST A  
FOREIGN DIPLOMATIC  
ESTABLISHMENT] (S)

SENSITIVE SOURCE  
(continued from page 12)

37. CIA ALLEGED PARTICIPATION IN FOREIGN GOVERNMENT  
DEPORTATION OF AMERICAN COMMUNISTS (S)(U)

In DATE, CIA officially informed us that it was engaged in a program designed to disrupt overall communist activity in PLACE. We became concerned because this program was to involve deportation of undesirables, including American communists residing in PLACE. The implementation of such a program would have resulted in the return of American communists to the United States. CIA denied that it was engaged in any operation specifically designed to oust American communists. In September, 1958, we were informed that the FOREIGN Government had embarked on a strong anticommunist program and certain Americans were ordered deported. We checked with CIA and the Agency's chief in PLACE claimed that his Agency was not involved. (S)(U)

The Liaison Agent subsequently was informed on a strictly confidential basis that the American Ambassador had been in contact with certain FOREIGN officials concerning possible anticommunist activities. The Ambassador had consulted with the local CIA chief and had asked for a list of Americans who could be considered as being deportable. The CIA officer reportedly furnished a list of approximately 40 names. (S)

38. NAME

(S)(U) We expressed our displeasure to CIA in September, 1958, because of that Agency's unauthorized investigation in the United States of a FOREIGN citizen who was here in connection with an exchange program. The FOREIGNER indicated to an American friend that he was interested in staying in the United States, but was not ready for actual defection because of a

possible hostage situation in his native country. The Bureau was following this potential defection and pursuant to established procedures was keeping interested agencies apprised of developments. On September 15, 1958, we received information indicating that another Government agency was conducting an investigation of the subject. It was later established that CIA was the other agency.

39. CIA ACTIVITIES IN PLACE

The Legal Attache, PLACE reported by letter dated September 22, 1958, that NAME AND POSITION

(u) [was a paid, highly regarded, and very sensitive source of CIA] This information was given to the Legal Attache by NAME AND POSITION

According to NAME CIA did not want this information to be known to other agencies, particularly the FBI. The Director's notation was, "Some more of CIA double dealing. H."

40. ALLEGED CIA INCOMPETENCE

During the period October DATE, Bureau representatives attended a seminar at Orlando, Florida, which was given by the U.S. Air Force. Among the activities was a lecture given by NAME of CIA. Subsequent to the briefing, General NAME of the Air Force confided to Bureau representatives and expressed his displeasure with the briefing given by NAME. He was particularly critical of NAME reluctance to furnish certain information, using the excuse that the matter was of a "Top Secret" nature. General NAME stated that the position taken by NAME was only an excuse for incompetence on the part of CIA.

This item is being cited in the event we desire to use the foregoing as evidence to support a position that we were obliged to be circumspect in dealing with CIA.

41. CIA COVERAGE IN CUBA PRIOR TO OVERTHROW OF BATISTA GOVERNMENT

The overthrow of the Batista Government on January 1, 1959, and the subsequent assumption of power by Castro raised questions concerning the efficiency and competence of U.S. intelligence. Allen Dulles indicated that future developments would

show that many more people were involved in the Castro organization than the U.S. Government had realized. Information coming to our attention suggested the possibility that both State and CIA had failed to assess developments in Cuba properly.

The foregoing is cited in the event that we found reason to question the competency of (CIA in Cuba.) This could be useful if we wanted to justify the existence of a Legal Attache office in Havana. One could also comment that poor coverage in Cuba had an indirect and adverse effect on our operations in the United States.

#### 42. NAME

By letter dated April 25, 1959, we voiced our objections to CIA for giving guidance to an individual with whom we had been maintaining contact for the purpose of developing him as a double agent. The individual involved was NAME

, a well-known expert in the field of TYPE OF research as it applied to SPECIFIC SUBJECT MATTER was also a contract agent of CIA and had occasion to handle sensitive matters for that Agency. In [April,] DATE. NAME was preparing to make a trip to Moscow. CIA briefed him on matters as they applied to his trip. The Agency also interviewed him concerning his relationship with the subject in Washington, D. C., and, furthermore, gave him guidance concerning the relationship. We objected to CIA giving any guidance to NAME concerning his contacts with the subject without first consulting with us.

#### 43. ALLEGED BELITTLING OF COMMUNISM BY ALLEN DULLES

In July, 1959, Allen Dulles of CIA spoke at the National Strategy Seminar of the National War College. One of the professors handling the Seminar was critical of Dulles. He claimed that Dulles had belittled the importance of the communist problem.

The above is being cited in the event we desire to utilize the information in justifying a position that it was necessary to be circumspect with CIA.

#### 44. NAME MAGAZINE ARTICLE - SEPTEMBER, DATE,

In September, DATE: NAME magazine carried an article captioned TITLE OF ARTICLE which included information of a derogatory nature concerning the Director and the Bureau. The article precipitated a crisis



which led to an almost open break between the Bureau and CIA. The article was written by *NAME* who was connected with the *NAME AND LOCATION OF ORGANIZATION AND NAME'S CONNECTION WITH CIA*. The article was very complimentary toward CIA. The author made reference to relations between the Bureau and CIA and quite clearly indicated that they were strained. He claimed that the CIA took Agents from FBI; that Agents did not remain in the Bureau for an extended period; and he related a story very critical of the Director.

We learned that the author had been in contact with CIA when he was preparing the article. We were told that *NAME* a CIA official, had read and approved the article prior to its publication. As a result of this information, *NAME* became persona non grata with the Bureau.

The Liaison Agent had conferred with both Dulles and *NAME* concerning the matter. We took the position that based upon the information made available CIA had promoted, condoned, or possibly even authored the article. Dulles denied that this was so and then *NAME* produced information indicating that he had been knowledgeable of the author's article before it was published. The author had contacted *NAME* one of *NAME* subordinates, and had discussed the matter with him. The author allegedly had raised the question of strained relations between the two agencies and at that time *NAME* reportedly told the author that relations were not strained, but were satisfactory. Nevertheless, the final draft of the article included the derogatory information and the facts available to us indicate that *NAME* had the opportunity to alert the Bureau to the existence of the article before it was published. He did not do so. He told us that this was an oversight.

Consideration was given to severance of liaison relations. It was recommended and approved that liaison continue and that we keep Dulles and CIA on the string as to what course of action we were going to take. It was suggested that we not immediately answer letters which had been sent to the Bureau by Dulles and *NAME* in connection with this particular matter. It was also recommended and approved that we cut off all contact with *NAME*.

By letter dated September *DATE* to Dulles, the Director expressed his keen disappointment because officials of CIA, when they had the opportunity, had failed to voice any concern or objection to *NAME OF MAGAZINE* and furthermore, had failed

to notify the Bureau. A letter dated September DATE was also sent to NAME and he was told that the Bureau was disappointed in him because he had failed to make any objection to the article and had not alerted us concerning the impending attack against the Bureau.

45. ACTIVITIES OF CONTACTS DIVISION OF CIA - 1959 (S)(U)

We received information in September, 1959, that the Contacts Division of CIA had held interviews with American businessmen in the Boston area; which dealt with meetings between the businessmen and visiting Soviets. (S) CIA reportedly was interested in developing positive intelligence information, but it so happened that one of the Soviets was involved in a double agent operation being handled by the Bureau. The Bureau already had notified CIA of our interest in the Soviet. (S) By letter (S) dated September 29, 1959, we voiced our objection to the manner in which CIA had handled this. (S)(U)

DEFECTUALS

46. APPEARANCE OF NAME BEFORE THE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON UNAMERICAN ACTIVITIES (HCUA) - 1959

On DATE, 1959, information was received indicating that HCUA was interested in obtaining NAME AND CHARACTERIZATION to testify before the Committee. HCUA advised us that it had contacted the State Department who, in turn, had conferred with CIA. Allen Dulles allegedly informed HCUA that NAME was agreeable to appearing before the Committee and that he would be made available pursuant to certain security instructions.

The Director asked whether or not CIA had authority to make a defector available to a congressional committee without first checking with other interested agencies. The Director was informed that CIA did not have such authority because a National Security Council directive made it very clear that this could not be done without processing the matter through the Inter-Agency Defector Committee. In this particular case the aforementioned Committee had not called a meeting, but the chairman, a CIA official, had made certain phone calls. A Bureau representative was contacted by phone on DATE 1959, but at that time we had not formulated a position. Allen Dulles allegedly contacted the chairman of the Committee and was told that the Committee had no objection to making NAME available.

On DATE 1959, CIA representatives were informed that we were opposed to making the defector available to HCUA. On that same date we were told that CIA was informing HCUA it was reversing its position and that upon reconsideration, it did not feel that NAME could be made available.

By memorandum dated DATE 1959, the developments in this matter were reviewed and it was recommended that at the next Inter-Agency Defector Committee meeting we strongly protest CIA's dereliction in the handling of the HCUA request.

47. CRITICISM OF DIRECTOR

On April 11, 1960, NAME of NAME OF COMPANY, Caracas, Venezuela, informed the Bureau that he recently held a conversation with NAME an official of the U.S. Embassy in PLACE. NAME was a CIA employee. NAME took exception to complimentary statements made by SOURCE concerning the Director and the FBI. SIA stated that the Director should have retired five years ago for the good of all concerned. A protest was made to Allen Dulles on April 20, 1960.

48. NAME, CIA OFFICIAL ALLEGEDLY ADVOCATING RECOGNITION OF RED CHINA - 1960

In February, 1960, NAME AND POSITION for the NAME Foundation, volunteered information concerning statements allegedly made by NAME a top CIA official. NAME allegedly advocated recognition of Red China.

This matter was called to the attention of Allen Dulles and on April 20, 1960, Dulles informed the Liaison Agent that he had conducted an inquiry, had reviewed a tape recording of NAME talk, and was satisfied that NAME had not made the statement attributed to him.

The above is being cited in the event we desire to dispute the position taken by Dulles. If the evidence clearly established that NAME had made such a statement, we could use the information to support a position that we would have been warranted in being most circumspect with CIA.

49. ALLEGED INSTALLATION OF MICROPHONES ON U.S. PREMISES ABROAD BY CIA

A State Department representative informed the Bureau that a microphone had been found in the U.S. Embassy, Mexico City; that it had been planted by CIA; and that Allen Dulles allegedly,

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had maintained that if CIA was to operate effectively, it had to know what was going on in U.S. establishments. The implication was left that CIA was covering activities of other U.S. agencies through technical installations. Inquiries developed information indicating that CIA had installed a microphone in the Embassy in 1952 at the request of a State Department official. The Office of Security in State Department was contacted in an effort to pin this down in a more specific manner. We were told by State that their records did not contain any information concerning the microphone.

Subsequently, a letter was transmitted to all Legal Attaches instructing them to be on the alert for technical installations which may affect Bureau operations.

50. NAME

(u) We received information indicating that the subject, a [former Cuban] intelligence agent and the subject of a Bureau investigation, had planned to defect [in New York City] (S) We permitted a CIA representative to contact the subject in order to orient him so that maximum propaganda effect would be derived through newspaper publicity. We were told that the CIA representative [in New York City] (S) had been instructed by his headquarters to tell the subject that he would not be prosecuted by the U.S. Government. We complained to CIA stressing that the Agency had no power or authority to promise the subject immunity. (u)

51. NAME

Miss NAME a CIA employee, obtained a position as a secretary in the Office of [the NAME Delegation to the United Nations] (S) Prior to receiving this job, CIA checked with the Bureau. The Liaison Agent subsequently learned that NAME had informed [the DELEGATION] (S) that she was leaving her job. The DELEGATION inquired if she could recommend somebody else. She gave them the name of another CIA employee, Miss NAME.

The Liaison Agent informed CIA that the Agency was out of line by not first checking with the Bureau before recommending NAME to [the DELEGATION] (S) that the Bureau was interested in developing intelligence information which might be useful to the U.S. Government; and that, in this instance, CIA was obstructing operations by not appropriately coordinating with the Bureau.

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52. CIA USE OF BUREAU INFORMATION IN  
A U.S. INTELLIGENCE BOARD DOCUMENT

On March 30, 1961, the Liaison Agent contacted Allen Dulles concerning CIA's failure to obtain Bureau clearance for use of our information in a U.S. Intelligence Board document. No known damage had been done, but the Agent stressed the sensitivity of the Bureau information. Dulles requested one of his subordinates to establish a procedure to prevent a recurrence of such errors.

53. TITLE AND AUTHOR OF BOOK

In July, 1961, our PLACE Office received galley proofs of the book TITLE written by AUTHOR. A review of these proofs disclosed several references which portrayed our counterespionage capabilities in an unfavorable light. Since CIA was responsible for NAME and for any writing which he might perform, the matter was discussed with CIA. It turned out that CIA had not been following the preparation of the book. We were told that steps would be taken to protect Bureau interest. The publishers had indicated to CIA that they would cooperate on changes. Although some changes were made, the book still came out with some information which was not entirely favorable to the Bureau.

54. CONFLICT WITH LEGAL ATTACHE, PLACE 1961

On October 6, 1961, our Legal Attache, PLACE received information indicating that FOREIGN Embassy in that city was planning to protest harassment of its personnel by U.S. Intelligence. The Legal Attache was told by the [local CIA office] that the Agency was not involved. On October 12, 1961, the same CIA officer changed his position and admitted that CIA had been involved to a certain extent. The Liaison Agent objected to these tactics. It was important to him to know the facts so he could be guided accordingly. (S) (u)

55. CIA TECHNICAL SURVEILLANCE ACTIVITY IN THE UNITED STATES - 1961

When he defected in DATE 1961, NAME furnished information concerning alleged penetration of American intelligence. Inquiries and review conducted by CIA within the Agency suggested that a CIA intelligence officer, NAME was a logical suspect. We conferred with CIA and on DATE 9, 1962, we advised the Agency that we would take over the investigation.

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On DATE - 1962, NAME AND POSITION

CIA, informed the Liaison Agent that CIA was preparing a report containing extremely sensitive information. He stated that this information came from a sensitive source and he was not certain as to how it should be handled. As a result of a discussion with NAME on DATE, 1962, it was ascertained that CIA had maintained a technical surveillance on NAME over an extended period. NAME explained that he had been reluctant to identify this source at an earlier date because he feared that prosecution could have been jeopardized and, furthermore, he did not want his Agency embarrassed in the event the Bureau objected to CIA maintaining a capability such as technical surveillances. It was made emphatically clear to NAME that it was absolutely necessary that we be provided with all the details and, furthermore, that CIA, at the outset, should have apprised us of the existence of the coverage. The Director made the notation, "I only wish we would eventually realize CIA can never be depended upon to deal forthrightly with us. Certainly my skepticism isn't based on prejudice nor suspicion, but on specific instances of all too many in number. Yet, there exists wistful belief that the 'leopard has changed his spots.' H."

56. NAME

In February, 1962, the Liaison Agent was requested to discuss with CIA a case which, in our opinion, clearly indicated CIA had failed to keep us appropriately informed of developments. The Bureau's original interest was initiated in Miami as a result of a discussion with CIA personnel in that city. Attempts to get CIA replies via correspondence were negative. On February 13, 1962, the Liaison Agent discussed the matter with CIA and received a reply which did not adequately satisfy the Bureau's request.

57. CIA WIRE TAPPING IN THE UNITED STATES

Sometime prior to the Bay of Pigs fiasco, CIA had become involved in a weird plan designed to bring about the assassination of Fidel Castro. One of the principal ingredients of this plan was to be the utilization of U.S. hoodlums. CIA established contact with NAME AND CHARACTERIZATION who served as the intermediary in dealings with the notorious hoodlum, NAME

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The entire operation fell apart when we developed information indicating that NAME was behind a wire tapping operation in Nevada. Potentially, there were elements for possible violation of unauthorized publication or use of communications. However, prosecution was out of the question because of the tainted involvement of CIA.

58. NAME

In October, 1962, we lodged a protest with CIA because the Agency initiated operation of Cuban agents in the Miami area and in so doing violated Bureau jurisdiction. Arrangements were subsequently effected where the source in the matter was turned over to the Bureau for handling.

59. NAME

On DATE 1963, CIA requested that the Bureau establish coverage on a visiting FOREIGN national. We immediately instituted investigation and then determined that CIA actually had been instrumental in supporting the subject's trip to the United States. CIA had been endeavoring to recruit the subject. On DATE 1963, a strong protest was lodged with NAME AND POSITION CIA.

60. ALLEGED ATTACK ON BUREAU BY JOHN McCONE

We received information in December, 1963, indicating that John McCone, Director of CIA, allegedly was attacking the Bureau in what would appear to be a vicious and underhanded manner. McCone allegedly informed NAME and NAME that CIA had uncovered a plot in Mexico City indicating that Lee Harvey Oswald had received \$6,500 to assassinate President Kennedy. The story attributed to McCone appeared to be related to information which had come from one NAME a FOREIGN national. Interrogation of NAME including a polygraph, disclosed that he had fabricated his story. This had been made known to CIA and to McCone. Therefore, if McCone had made the above statements to NAME it would appear that it would have been an obvious attempt to ridicule the Bureau. The Liaison Agent contacted McCone on December 23, 1963. McCone vehemently denied the allegations.

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61. NAME

The subject is a FOREIGN national who first made contact with CIA in DATE expressing a desire to cooperate. He openly defected in DATE and he is currently in the United States. He has been the source of considerable controversy because of questions raised pertaining to his bona fides. Early in CIA took a very strong position indicating that NAME was a plant. The Bureau did not make a commitment on bona fides. In the meantime, NAME although controversial, continues to furnish voluminous information.

It is possible that at some future date the issue of bona fides will be conclusively resolved and the action taken by the Bureau so far will have been justified. This is important to be kept in mind as far as the future is concerned.

If it is finally concluded that NAME is a bona fide defector, CIA could be charged with gross mishandling of the subject over a period of years.

62. NAME

On April 13, 1964, the Liaison Agent protested to CIA because the Agency had failed to notify the Bureau concerning the past utilization of an individual as a double agent in an operation directed against the WHOM [in] WHERE [in Texas] in 1964 and because CIA did not notify us concerning the past, our interests could have been jeopardized, bearing in mind that the FOREIGNER could have been in contact with WHOM without our knowledge. CIA had severed its relationship with the FOREIGNER prior to his POSITION assignment in the United States, but CIA, nevertheless, had an obligation to give us proper notification. (S)(U)

63. CIA COVERT ACTIVITY [IN MIAMI] 1965 (S)(U)

We received information in June, 1965, that certain Cuban exiles in the Miami area were representing themselves as being with the "Department of National Security." These exiles had been interviewing Cuban refugees concerning political conditions in Cuba. We ascertained that this activity was being performed in behalf of CIA, who had issued credentials to the exiles under the cover of "Department of National Security." We protested, bearing in mind that the cover being used could cause embarrassment to the United States and could impose a problem for the Bureau because we would become the recipients (S)(U)

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of impersonation complaints. CIA was requested to take immediate steps to correct the undesirable situation. We were subsequently informed by CIA that the credentials had been withdrawn and that the cover would no longer be used.

#### 64. NAME

In August, 1965, both the Bureau and CIA had an interest in assessing the potential utilization of the services of NAME a FOREIGN exile residing in the United States. We were interested in NAME because he potentially could furnish information concerning FOREIGN exiles in this country and the Agency wanted to utilize him in overseas intelligence operations. We informed CIA that NAME would not be made available to the Agency. CIA appealed and asked that we reconsider our position because of the potentially high value of NAME in the proposed CIA operation. While we were negotiating with CIA, we determined that the Agency was already in contact with the subject and was conferring with him. We subsequently protested to the Agency who claimed that it had not been out of line in contacting because the Agency had maintained a relationship with him in the past. We did not accept this explanation.

#### 65. INSECURE HANDLING OF CODENAME INFORMATION

DETAILS CONCERNING CIA'S  
INSECURE HANDLING OF  
INFORMATION RELATING TO  
SENSITIVE FBI OPERATION

#### 66. NAME

In [March, 1966,] CIA requested coverage on a visiting official of the FOREIGN Government because of information developed by the Agency indicating that FOREIGNER was working for the KGB. (u)

Instructions were sent to the field and we then learned in New York City that CIA allegedly planned to make a recruitment approach. The matter was taken up with CIA headquarters and a protest was made because of the wide discrepancy in the reports we received on CIA intentions. (U)

67. PASSING OF BUREAU DOCUMENTS TO SENATOR NAME BY CIA EMPLOYEE - 1966

In September, 1966, we developed information indicating that copies of FBI documents had been passed to Senator NAME by CIA. The matter was discussed with the Director of CIA and the Agency subsequently conducted an investigation and established that one of its employees, NAME, had submitted a name check request to the Bureau concerning one NAME who was the subject of the material in question. At that time NAME had a responsibility of handling name check requests for CIA and, in this connection, was in contact with our Name Check Section. He admitted that he instituted a name check on an "off the cuff basis" for another CIA employee named NAME.

It is my recollection that one or both CIA employees were subsequently fired or asked to resign.

68. ALLEGED COMPROMISE OF BUREAU DOUBLE AGENT (S)(U)

In March, 1967, we protested to CIA in connection with a matter relating to our mutual interest in a Chemist (S) connected with COMPANY (S) in PLACE [New Jersey] (S)(U). We were utilizing the Chemist (S) as a double agent in an operation directed against the Soviets. (S) CIA had established a relationship with the same person for the purpose of acquiring positive intelligence relating to the field of SCIENCE. Our Newark (S)(U) Office received information indicating that a CIA officer, without authorization, compromised our relationship with the Chemist (S) by discussing the matter with the president of the firm. (S)

69. NAME

In July, 1967, we protested to CIA in a case where the Agency allegedly had failed to report to us concerning a communication which a FOREIGN exile, residing in the United States, had received from the FOREIGN Intelligence Service. The particular communication had instructed the exile to initiate preparations

for the handling of an intelligence assignment in the United States. CIA claimed that the exile had been reluctant to operate in this country and CIA then instructed him not to respond to the communication received PLACE. We took the position that despite this reluctance on the part of the exile, the Bureau had been entitled to have had the opportunity to make its own assessment.

70. CIA AND ITS INVOLVEMENT IN LEGISLATION DEALING WITH THE NAME OF LEGISLATION

On June 5, DATE information was received indicating that Richard Helms had sent Senator NAME three proposed amendments to the legislation being proposed by the Senator, all dealing with the protection of the constitutional rights of Government employees. We had been following developments relating to this proposed legislation because the provisions had a very definite bearing on Bureau operations. The proposed amendments made by Helms included exemptions from certain provisions of the Bill for FBI, CIA, and the National Security Agency. These amendments were suggested by CIA without prior consultation with the Bureau. The Director made the notation, "This presumptuous action of Helms' is astounding."

71. CIA COVERAGE OF BUREAU LEADS

Historically, CIA's coverage of Bureau leads had been decidedly spotty from the standpoint of delivering satisfactory content and servicing the leads within a reasonable period of time. It would be necessary to review hundreds, if not thousands, of files to document what we consider delays in following our leads. It should be noted that CIA, organizationally, has never maintained an atmosphere of discipline in any way comparable to that of the Bureau. Matters are not followed as promptly and responsibility is not firmly fixed. This evaluation is made in light of standards followed by the Bureau. We continually prod and push CIA for responses. To develop all of the evidence to explain these delays would require an inspection of CIA operations. CIA has given the following types of responses: hazards of adverse operating conditions in backward countries; limited personnel; undue exposure to hostile intelligence, police, and security services; pressures placed on the Agency on priority

targets quite often dealing with political crises in foreign countries. Although CIA has not ventured to emphasize the point, it is believed that in many instances it has not produced satisfactorily and efficiently because of the absence of reliable sources.

72. LACK OF PROPER ORIENTATION OF BUREAU RESPONSIBILITIES AND JURISDICTION

Although there has been decided improvement in recent years, the Liaison Agent continues to note a definite lack of knowledge of FBI responsibilities and jurisdiction on the part of CIA employees. They do receive some training in this regard, but the impression is left that such training could be much more extensive. The Bureau's Liaison Agent has lectured to hundreds of CIA employees in the last few years and this has produced significant signs of concrete benefits. CIA employees encountered the Liaison Agent on a very regular basis and asked questions pertaining to our responsibilities. Nevertheless, there is room for much improvement.

73. CIA POLICY REGARDING DISSEMINATION TO OUR LEGAL ATTACHES

(u) There has been a sore spot in connection with CIA policy relating to its dissemination of information [at a local level in our embassies] (S) This policy allegedly has applied to all other agencies and includes our Legal Attaches. CIA has maintained that unless the information it develops or receives is in the immediate jurisdiction of a particular agency, it will only disseminate at the Seat of Government. As an example, if CIA received information concerning the existence of a U.S. criminal fugitive in a foreign country, it would disseminate to the Legal Attache. However, if the information falls within the area of intelligence, which includes subversive activities, the Agency has stated that under its system the information is considered to be "raw material" and that it must be evaluated at headquarters and reviewed in the context of what has been received from other countries, and then disseminated to interested customers. We have not raised an issue, but dissemination regarding political conditions in a country where the Legal Attache is assigned could be useful because it would further orient him in his dealings with foreign officials. There have been exceptions where the CIA [chief in an area, on his own initiative] (S) has given such information to our Legal Attache. After CIA disseminates at headquarters, we are in a position to communicate the information to our Legal Attaches. This helps, but it would be much more convenient for the Legal Attache to receive it [at the local level.] (S) (u)

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There are situations where CIA offices abroad receive information regarding a subject, such as an alleged spy traveling to the United States, or the case abroad simply has ramifications in this country. In these instances, CIA has followed a definite pattern over the years of not furnishing such information to the Legal Attache, but disseminating to us at Seat of Government. Here again, CIA has maintained that its headquarters must review the data and make the decision regarding dissemination. We have not raised an issue. We could be claiming that the Legal Attache could be useful in evaluating the case and being in a position to follow Bureau interests as soon as possible. However, if we pushed for a change in current conditions, we should consider that the Legal Attaches possibly could inherit responsibilities abroad which might present risks or operational headaches.

[For several years there existed a coordinating mechanism in Germany headed by CIA. This was a committee headed by the Agency and composed of representatives of other U.S. agencies. The committee reviewed espionage and counter-espionage developments in Germany which had a bearing on U.S. interests. If a problem of operational jurisdiction arose among the U.S. agencies, the committee mechanism was used to establish an agreed-to operating agreement. Quite often various responsibilities were divided among the different agencies. It is my recollection that the Bureau has not been interested in becoming a part of such a committee. If we did, we could end up with responsibilities not entirely agreeable to us.]

74. SOME PAST HISTORY WHICH IS VERY RELEVANT

When evaluating our relationship with CIA, including our grievances, it is believed that we cannot overlook the relevancy of the serious differences we experienced with the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) during World War II. The seeds leading to the establishment of CIA came from OSS.

NAME AND CHARACTERIZATION has been referred to as the "CHARACTERIZATION"

There were instances when OSS blatantly ignored FBI jurisdiction and failed to coordinate on numerous matters. There was a number of CIA officials who obviously had a definite dislike for the Bureau. The loose administration of OSS, its employment of known subversives, its alleged penetration by the Soviets, and its attitude toward the Russian Government at the time posed serious problems to the Bureau. At one point OSS was actually giving serious consideration to establishing liaison with the

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NKVD. Because a substantial number of OSS officials subsequently became important figures within CIA, it would be logical to assume that the FBI was justified in being most prudent, if not circumspect, in dealings with the Agency.

When evaluating its position in 1970, the Bureau rightfully cannot forget the troubles with OSS. At the same time, it would be most unwise if we neglected to examine the role played by the Bureau when we disbanded our SIS operations in 1947. In a matter of hours, we destroyed hundreds of files in our SIS offices abroad, and we did not turn over to CIA a large number of sources and informants. There have been many ex-Agents who had been connected with SIS, who were familiar with the file destruction operation, and who later became connected with CIA. It is possible that the Agency could argue that the actions by the Bureau were detrimental to U.S. interests and impaired CIA's early efforts to establish desired coverage in Latin America.

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UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 2/9/98 BY 5668 SLD/GCL  
(JFK)

TO : Mr. DeLoach

DATE: March 23, 1970

FROM : Mr. W. C. Sullivan

CIA HAS NO COLLECTION PI TO  
DENY DISSEMINATION OF WORK  
RELEASED BY CIA INFORMATION  
ENTERED DOCUMENT: KP 1/8/98

SUBJECT: RELATIONSHIPS WITH CIA

By letter dated 3/11/70, the Director communicated with CIA Director Richard Helms referring to the existing agreement entered into between the Bureau and CIA in 1966 with regard to mutual efforts in the collection of positive intelligence in the United States. The Director noted that he would welcome any observations that CIA might desire to make to assure that national security interests continue to be served in the most effective and complete manner possible. By letter dated 3/20/70, Mr. Helms replied stating that he valued highly the Director's personal judgment in affairs bearing on the national security and suggested certain areas which warrant periodic reexamination since they have a direct bearing on domestic clandestine collection of positive intelligence.

In view of the fact this is being held very tightly and it will take several days for me to review necessary files and make proper analysis of Mr. Helms' letter, it is believed desirable to advise Mr. Helms that this matter is under study at the Bureau and that the Director will communicate with him further upon completion of our analysis. In the meantime, I am going over this matter very thoroughly and will submit the results of my analysis to the Director for his consideration and will attach a suggested additional communication to Mr. Helms.

RECOMMENDATION:

That the attached letter go forward to Mr. Helms advising him of the receipt of his letter and that this matter is receiving analysis by the Bureau.

*This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.*

*Set a deadline.*

*WCS*

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

TO : Mr. C. D. DeLoach

DATE: March 24, 1970

FROM : W. C. Sullivan

SUBJECT: RELATIONS WITH CIA

The attached memorandum dated 3-23-70 reported the receipt of a letter dated 3-11-70 from Richard Helms, Director of CIA referring to agreements between the Bureau and the CIA concerning our mutual efforts in the collection of positive intelligence in the United States. This memorandum recommended that the letter which was attached go to Mr. Helms acknowledging the receipt of his letter and advising that the matter was under consideration at the Bureau. The Director asked that a deadline be set.

A preliminary evaluation of the nine matters which have been presented by CIA indicate that they will require extensive file review and study in order that the pertinent aspects of each matter as it affects FBI interests and responsibility may be properly considered. It is my judgment that these matters lend themselves to the preparation of a series of about six memoranda with accompanying letters to CIA. To attempt to handle them in an all-inclusive memoranda might result in a lengthy and unwieldy document. Therefore, if approved, the matters raised by CIA will be handled in a series of six memoranda, the first of which is now being completed and will be sent through for approval not later than tomorrow. The remainder will be submitted in three-day intervals thereafter.

ACTION:

For information

*No demand to all in  
one letter.*  
*— H*

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 11/2/01 BY SP-2ALM/STG

*This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.*



UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

TO : Mr. C. D. DeLoach

DATE: 3/25/70

FROM : W. C. Sullivan

SUBJECT: RELATIONS WITH CIA

Reference is made to my attached memoranda of 3/23 and 3/24/70 with reference to our response to CIA's letter to us of 3/11/70.

In accordance with the Director's instructions, the matter is being given attention and the various subject matters raised by CIA are being studied. It is contemplated that our memorandum and letter for the Director's approval will be ready by Monday, 3/30/70.

ACTION:

For information.

OK

*[Handwritten signature]*

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO  
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR  
RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION  
IN THIS DOCUMENT. KP 1/8/98

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 2/9/98 BY 5668 SLD/BCL  
(JFK)

*This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings of your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.*

# Memorandum

TO : Mr. C. D. DeLoach

DATE: March 30, 1970

FROM : W. C. Sullivan

~~SECRET~~

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO  
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR  
RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION  
IN THIS DOCUMENT. KP 1/8/98

SUBJECT: RELATIONS WITH CENTRAL  
INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA)

Reference my memorandum 3/25/70 concerning letter 3/20/70 from CIA Director Helms. In letter, Helms expresses full agreement with Director's view that intelligence collection efforts of FBI and CIA must be closely coordinated and that periodic reappraisal of such efforts is required. He has invited Director's desires as to how such reassessments can be best conducted. He refers to 1966 conference between Bureau and CIA representatives, which resulted in agreement covering certain phases of intelligence collection, and suggests additional discussions at this time.

Helms has listed nine specific areas for possible discussion at conference between Bureau and CIA. He states he would sincerely welcome Director's observations on his proposed agenda. Specific items listed by Helms are set forth hereinafter together with my observations.

1. Electronic Surveillance Coverage (Elsurs)

Helms notes Bureau has been receptive in past to requests for this type coverage and has capability and experience in this field which cannot be duplicated by any other U.S. agency. Helms refers to October, 1969, CIA request for elsur coverage of two FOREIGNERS visiting U.S., one of whom had KGB connections. Bureau advised CIA at that time that it should refer such requests directly to Attorney General (AG) for approval. Helms suggests question of such coverage be reopened between FBI and CIA representatives, adding that this coverage should be rigidly controlled.

Comment: We have always been highly selective in our use of elsur, particularly during recent years in view of sensitive nature of this type coverage, legal considerations, and manpower commitments. CIA, which has no prosecutive responsibilities, may not understand the Bureau's position in this matter or need for great selectivity but I do not feel Director should modify stand taken in October, 1969, that CIA should seek approval directly from AG. Helms' point that no other U.S. agency has capability of FBI in this field may have merit and when CIA can first clearly justify requests

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ON 4/2/98 (GFK)

Classified by 72  
Exempt from GDS, Category 263  
Date of Declassification Indefinite

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NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION  
Unauthorized Disclosure  
Subject to Criminal Sanctions

Memorandum for Mr. DeLoach  
RE: RELATIONS WITH CIA

~~SECRET~~

No.  
It is  
up to  
CIA  
↑

for this type coverage to the AG, if the Director wishes we could consider handling actual installations on a highly selective basis as we currently do with respect to meritorious requests by State Department. Each one, of course, would be judged on its own merits. But, there should be no change in our October, 1969, position that CIA must first get approval for such coverage from AG.

*Share Tolson's view. H*  
2. Mail Coverage

Helms cites importance of this as intelligence tool, which has been proven in past. He has impression it has been discontinued and suggests FBI-CIA representatives confer to determine whether such coverage could be used with regard to investigations of Soviet bloc, New Left, and foreign agents.

Comment: In line with Director's instructions, we have discontinued this coverage in recent years. We know that other Federal agencies, including Army and CIA, utilize this type coverage frequently and often with success such as we experienced ourselves in the past. Both Army and CIA regularly make available to us results of their coverage abroad concerning individuals of interest to Bureau. This type coverage is sensitive and Helms has not spelled out specifically what CIA may have in mind here. This type coverage is too sensitive to be discussed in written correspondence. I recommend that we seek further information in direct discussions with CIA before deciding on our course of action. Of course no commitments of any kind will be made and all issues raised will be referred to the Director for a decision.

No.  
we will  
not do  
it  
↑

*Share Tolson's view. H*  
3. CIA Technical Services

Helms calls attention to recent technical and scientific equipment recently developed by CIA in the counterintelligence field ( SENSITIVE METHODS ). He indicates willingness to share such equipment and developments with Bureau and indicates he would welcome suggestions as to how such equipment can be better employed.

Comment: While it is not likely CIA has developed equipment of this type which is not already known to FBI Laboratory and while some of equipment to which Helms alludes may have no applicability to our needs, I do not believe we have anything to lose by exploring this on a selective basis. Qualified personnel from FBI Laboratory could confer with appropriate CIA representatives to insure we have benefit of any recent scientific advances realized by CIA.

*O.H.*

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#### 4. Courses in Positive Intelligence Requirements and Reporting

Helms offers to make available to us training courses in positive intelligence for purpose of discussing in depth the needs of the intelligence community, including CIA.

Comment: I see no need for this at this time. We have a highly effective and comprehensive training program for our Agents in security work and I see no necessity for training lectures by CIA personnel. We regularly receive from CIA copies of the Current Intelligence Reporting List which outlines priorities and requirements of other U.S. intelligence agencies in particular areas of positive intelligence. These Lists are reviewed by appropriate supervisors at SOG and are then furnished on regular basis to interested field offices. If any new developments occur in this field, we can always reconsider if we wish. But as stated there is no need at this time. C.K. H

#### 5. Seminars on Opposition Services

Helms suggests that FBI and CIA specialists concerning hostile intelligence services meet as needed to keep abreast of new developments and patterns on part of hostile intelligence agencies. He feels such discussions should provide an opportunity to possibly devise new means to penetrate or neutralize enemy forces.

Comment: I do not believe there is any need for conferences of type referred to by Helms except on an infrequent basis. Of course, where special circumstances warrant and provided such conferences are tightly controlled by Bureau and specifically approved by Director there would be no reason to object to them per se. C.K. H

#### 6. Live Bloc Sources

Helms refers to prior cooperation between FBI and CIA in handling of communist bloc defectors and penetration agents but expresses belief there is room for improvement in establishing more uniform exploitation of these sources. He invites Director's suggestions for better coordination and evaluation of live source information.

Comment: Our 1966 conferences and agreement with CIA were largely concerned with coordination and handling of live sources. This agreement has proven effective as Helms agrees. I am not aware of any need for modifying the 1966 understanding but this is an area which is quite sensitive and Helms has not spelled out what he may have in mind. I feel we should listen to any proposals CIA may have to offer on this point in direct discussions with their representatives. Again, no commitments would be made and any proposals would be referred to the Director for a decision.

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- 3 - C.K. H

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7. Live Sources in Non-Bloc Area

Helms points out diplomatic sources in this area, especially critical Middle East and Latin-American fields, could provide much needed intelligence. He urges the full potential of this area be explored by representatives of both agencies.

Comment: This is very similar to previous point (6) and again involves 1966 agreement. I think our approach should be the same; namely, while we are not aware of any problems in this area we could listen to any proposals CIA has to make and, of course, we would refer them to the Director prior to taking any action.

OK-M

8. New Left and Racial Matters

Helms notes that there is already a substantial exchange of information in this area and cites close connections between subversive elements in U.S. and abroad. He suggests we consider how we can best employ our respective manpower to meet this threat which is international in scope.

Comment: We have carefully reviewed this situation and feel CIA could definitely provide more information concerning activities of New Left and black extremists while traveling abroad and additional data concerning foreign funding or support of subversive activities in U.S. We furnish a great deal of information to CIA regarding foreign aspects of the extremist movement developed through our investigations. As to manpower commitments, our own use of manpower is, of course, under constant review. There are heavy manpower demands on FBI in a host of areas (organized crime, civil rights, applicant investigations, etc.) outside the security field. I would be definitely opposed to any discussions with CIA involving the allocation of manpower by either agency. This is a matter for each agency to decide in its own best interests and judgment.

OK-M

9. Relations With Domestic Field Offices and Legal Attaches

Helms expresses belief there are no serious conflicts in this area but there may be room to improve quality of liaison so as to expand intelligence collection efforts, particularly in view of changing conditions both here and abroad.

Comment: As indicated, Helms does not perceive any serious problems in this area either in U.S. or abroad. Our policy has always been that any matters of substance involving liaison with CIA or other agencies must be

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CONTINUED - OVER

Memorandum for Mr. DeLoach  
RE: RELATIONS WITH CIA

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handled at headquarters level. To do otherwise could result in loose administrative control. I feel that we should adhere strictly to our long-standing policy in this connection and I see no need for discussions with CIA on this issue.

RECOMMENDED REPLY TO HELMS:

OK-N

I do not believe the Director should seek to furnish detailed observations regarding the Bureau's position on the various matters suggested by Helms. Many of them are quite sensitive and complex and there is nothing to be gained by spelling out the Director's views in writing on such matters. Accordingly, I recommend that a general reply be sent to Helms indicating our willingness to meet with CIA representatives for direct discussions on those points which merit further elaboration or where we might at least be willing to listen to any CIA proposals.

OK-H

Bearing in mind specific observations set forth above, I think our reply to Helms should show we are amenable to direct conferences with CIA on certain of these issues but we should indicate we see nothing to be gained by discussions at this time with regard to the following:

- (4) Courses in Positive Intelligence Requirements and Reporting;
- (5) Seminars on Opposition Services; (8) New Left and Racial Matters; and (9) Relations With Domestic Field Offices and Legal Attaches. With regard to the other points, any discussions with CIA would be strictly within current policies laid down by the Director and no commitments would be made by Bureau representatives. All matters requiring a decision which might arise would be referred to the Director for a decision.

If the Director desires, NAME and myself would represent the Bureau in such meetings with CIA representatives. On a selective basis, other officials of Domestic Intelligence Division could be asked to join me as required.

OK-H

ACTION:

Attached for the Director's approval is a letter to Helms in line with the foregoing observations.

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~~SECRET~~

March 31, 1970

Honorable Richard Helms  
Director  
Central Intelligence Agency  
Washington, D. C.

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO  
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR  
RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION  
IN THIS DOCUMENT. KP/8/98

DECLASSIFIED BY 5668 SLD/KCL  
ON 2-9-98 (JFK)

Dear Mr. Helms:

I have carefully reviewed your letter of March 20 setting out your observations with respect to various matters of mutual interest. I certainly appreciate your kind comments concerning me and I share your convictions as to the need for close coordination of our intelligence collection activities in behalf of the national security.

Your letter suggested nine particular areas which might be the subject of further discussions aimed at improving the coordination of our operations. A number of these topics are highly sensitive and complex and I will therefore make no effort here to set forth my views in detail. However, in response to your letter and as a prelude to any direct discussions on these matters, certain observations on my part may be appropriate.

With regard to electronic surveillance and mail coverage, there is no question as to the frequent value of such operations in developing needed intelligence. On the other hand, the use of these measures in domestic investigations poses a number of problems which may not be encountered in similar operations abroad. There is widespread concern by the American public regarding the possible misuse of this type coverage. Moreover, various legal considerations must be borne in mind, including the impact such coverage may have on our numerous prosecutive responsibilities. The FBI's effectiveness has always depended in large measure on our capacity to retain the full confidence of the American people. The use of any investigative measures which infringe on traditional rights of privacy must therefore be scrutinized most carefully. Within this framework, however, I would be willing to consider any proposals your Agency may make.

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Your offer to make available certain technical equipment developed by the Agency is most welcome and I fully reciprocate your willingness to cooperate in the exchange of relevant scientific data. I am prepared to designate appropriate representatives of the FBI Laboratory to meet with CIA technical personnel at any mutually convenient time.

With respect to the inclusion of positive intelligence courses in our training curricula, I am sure you will recognize that our training programs must be designed primarily to fulfill our own widespread and demanding responsibilities. While I appreciate your offer, I do not feel it would be feasible at this time to include the proposed courses in our training schedules. I would certainly have no objection to the holding of seminars between specialists of our two agencies in selective areas of interest when justified by specific circumstances.

Concerning the coordination of FBI-CIA activities in the exploitation of live sources, both in the communist bloc field and with regard to key nonbloc establishments, I am not aware of any significant problems. The 1966 agreement between our agencies was concerned directly with this question and I have no changes to suggest in the ground rules at this time. However, in the event your Agency has some specific proposals to make, I would welcome hearing further from you in this connection.

There is already a considerable exchange of information between our agencies concerning New Left and racial extremist matters. Frequently, as you have pointed out, there have been substantial connections between subversive and extremist elements in the United States and their counterparts abroad. We will continue to furnish your Agency information being developed by the Bureau which might have a bearing on your intelligence requirements. At the same time, we are definitely in need of additional information from your Agency as to the foreign aspects of the extremist movement in the United States, including foreign funding and support of local extremist organizations. While I do not believe there is any need for detailed discussions on this point, if you have any specific suggestions to make we would be pleased to consider them.

- 2 -

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Similarly, I am not aware of any major problems which exist at this time in connection with the coordination of our field liaison operations. It has been my long-standing policy that serious questions affecting the coordination of our activities with other Government agencies should be handled and controlled at a headquarters level in order to avoid administrative confusion and misunderstanding.

In line with my letter of March 11 and the observations contained in your letter of March 20, I will in the immediate future designate appropriate officials of the Bureau to meet with your representatives for detailed discussions of these matters. It is my earnest hope that such conferences will lead to a sharpened understanding of the responsibilities and objectives of our respective agencies and will serve to promote more effective cooperation in our joint commitment to the national intelligence needs.

Sincerely yours,

J. Edgar Hoover

~~SECRET~~

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

~~SECRET~~

TO : Mr. C. D. DeLoach

DATE: April 14, 1970

FROM : W. C. Sullivan

DECLASSIFIED BY 5668 SED/KCL  
ON 4/2/98

NO OBJECTION TO  
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR  
RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION  
IN THIS DOCUMENT. KP 1-8-98

SUBJECT: RELATIONS WITH CENTRAL  
INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA)

Reference my memorandum 3/30/70 summarizing proposals of CIA Director Helms regarding FBI-CIA coordination in intelligence collection activities. Director approved meetings between CIA and Bureau representatives to further explore these matters.

On afternoon of 4/13/70, NAME and MYSELF met briefly with NAME AND POSITION CIA, and NAME of his staff. This session was strictly exploratory in nature and was aimed at defining the scope and limitations of our discussions with CIA on the points in question. NAME noted that CIA Director Helms will be closely following the outcome of these discussions and is personally interested in resolving any current problems in this area.

NAME indicated that CIA would like to direct initial attention to two of the items cited by Helms, namely, the question of audio (electronic surveillance) coverage and the suggestion that FBI and CIA specialists in the communist bloc field hold periodic seminars to coordinate our information. The Bureau's position regarding electronic surveillance coverage, as outlined in the Director's letter to Helms of 3/31/70, was reiterated with emphasis upon the problems such coverage often pose with regard to prosecution as well as adverse public reaction to this type coverage.

I made the point that the Bureau has not received the necessary support in this area from responsible quarters; that in the past the Bureau had a substantial amount of coverage of this type in the interest of both our own counterintelligence responsibilities as well as the national security interest but that we have had to retrench in recent years largely as a result of the lack of support for such operations.

NAME noted that in response to CIA's request for electronic coverage of two FOREIGNERS who were suspected KGB agents in the Fall of 1969, the Bureau had requested that they take this matter up with the

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Date of Declassification Indefinite

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION  
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Subject to Criminal Sanctions

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Memorandum for Mr. DeLoach  
RE: RELATIONS WITH CIA

Attorney General. He said that CIA has been giving the question of approaching the Attorney General considerable thought but this would involve a whole new set of procedures and policy considerations which would have to be carefully considered. *NAME* said that his staff was in the process of drawing up a proposal on this point for Mr. Helms to consider and that they would probably have something specific for the Bureau to consider at a subsequent meeting.

Concerning the proposed seminar, in line with the Director's letter to Helms 3/31/70, I pointed out that we would certainly have no objection to such conferences where the occasion justified them. From *NAME* remarks, it appears that CIA is primarily interested here in the Soviet field and would like to furnish the Bureau with details of an extensive research project CIA has undertaken in recent years to correlate all available source information regarding known Soviet intelligence agents. This apparently would not involve any commitment by the Bureau and would represent essentially an opportunity for us to see what CIA has done in this field and how it might tie in with any current Bureau interest. When CIA submits any firm proposals in this regard, we will submit specific recommendations.

*NAME* said that CIA would be in touch with us when they have firmed up various proposals and at that time *NAME* and *MYSELF* will meet with them again as required. The Director, of course, will be kept fully informed and no commitments will be made without his prior approval.

**ACTION:**

For information.

~~SECRET~~

UNEXCISED VERSIONS OF DOCUMENTS  
FURNISHED TO SSC IN RESPONSE TO  
REQUEST IN APPENDIX C, PART I,  
ITEM NUMBER 6.

#m0216  
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 1/4/01 BY SP-2 AEM/ATG

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

- Tolson
- Belmont
- Mohr
- Callahan
- Conrad
- DeLoach
- Evans
- Malone
- Rosen
- Sullivan
- Tavel
- Trotter
- Tele. Room
- Ingram
- Gandy

TO : Mr. Sullivan

DATE: June 22, 1961

FROM : R. O. L'Allier

*Jim Siggo*

SUBJECT: LIAISON WITH IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE (INS)

Liaison with INS has been handled for the past several years by SA Sam Papich, who also handles liaison with the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). The purpose of this memorandum is to recommend that SA Papich be relieved of his assignment with INS in order to devote full time to CIA.

During the early years of General Swing's tenure in the Liaison with that agency was a particularly delicate assignment and on several occasions it was necessary for SA Papich to stand up to General Swing and straighten him out insofar as that individual was straightened. The situation now appears to be changed. General Swing may not be at INS much longer and, in any event, he has not created any special problems for us during the current year.

On the other hand, CIA continues to be one of the most important liaison assignments as well as one of the most time consuming. Proper handling of this assignment now requires the full time and attention of a Liaison Supervisor and it is believed that SA Papich should be relieved of his INS assignment in order to devote his entire attention to CIA.

SA Robert H. Haynes has demonstrated that he is an able, energetic, and productive Supervisor in his liaison handling of such agencies as the Department of Commerce, the Federal Communications Commission, the Civil Aeronautics Board, the Department of Health, Education and Welfare and approximately 30 other miscellaneous agencies. We believe he can handle INS in addition to these other assignments.

If you approve, liaison responsibility for INS will be transferred from SA Papich to SA Haynes.

Mr. Sullivan  
 Mr. Papich  
 Mr. Haynes  
 Liaison Section

EX-113

REC-54

JUL 5 1961

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 YPO

*I think OK, particularly with CIA under fire*

*He had a...  
 ...  
 ...*

PERS. FILES

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT  
MEMORANDUM

TO : Director, FBI  
FROM : SAC, Philadelphia  
SUBJECT: CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY -  
DOMESTIC CONTACT SERVICE  
INFORMATION CONCERNING

DATE: 10/25/65

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 1/17/01 BY SP2 ALW/JFG

Re Section (E), SAC Letter 65-54, 9/28/65.

CARL N. MARTIN, JR., Chief, Philadelphia Office, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Domestic Contact Service, was contacted on 10/14/65 as directed in referenced SAC Letter. Mr. MARTIN advised he had just returned from conferences at his Agency Headquarters in Washington, where he had been advised the Bureau was directing its field offices to establish liaison with the local offices of the Domestic Contact Service. Mr. MARTIN offered his complete cooperation with this office in matters of mutual interest.

Arrangements were perfected wherein Agents of this office making inquiries or investigations of a Soviet-Bloc National can contact Mr. MARTIN and he will place them in contact with the Domestic Contact Service representative handling the case, so that information of interest to us can be secured. Any information coming to the attention of the Domestic Contact Service relating to our internal security responsibilities will be immediately reported to this office.

Mr. MARTIN requested, in view of his Agency's regulations, that CIA not be identified as the source in the event

information received from his office should be included in a communication going to anyone outside the Bureau. Mr. MARTIN was assured that CIA's identity in this regard would be fully protected.

Mr. MARTIN pointed out that the territory covered by his office included the State of Delaware and the southern half of New Jersey, running from and including Princeton, N.J., and Atlantic City, N.J. He also pointed out that his office did not cover State College, Pa., as this is covered by the Domestic Contact Service Office at Pittsburgh, Pa. He suggested the same procedure be followed for cases in Delaware and Southern New Jersey, as is contemplated for the Philadelphia Office territory. That is, that this office contact him, furnishing the identity of the Subject and the name and location of the Special Agent handling the case. He then will have his representative covering the area contact the FBI Agent and they then can discuss information of mutual interest on the case. He advised that SAMUEL C. REED, JR., covers the Princeton area, where the bulk of these cases are located in Southern New Jersey and BARBARA COOKE covers the State of Delaware.

REQUEST OF THE BUREAU:

In the course of future contacts with CIA in these cases, it is anticipated that CIA representatives may at times request information relating to Subjects' background, habits, and characteristics, as well as any available photographs.

The Bureau is requested to advise if it will be permissible to orally furnish such background information to the CIA representative and to furnish copies of photographs, if they are available.

The Bureau is also requested to advise if the establishment of liaison on the field office level with CIA's Domestic Contact Service envisages the furnishing of reports and letter-head memos to this Service at the field office level where they have a legitimate interest in the Subject.

Leads

**BALTIMORE AND NEWARK:**

Baltimore and Newark are requested to advise Philadelphia whether or not the above arrangements are satisfactory for cases in their territory.

**PITTSBURGH:**

Pittsburgh is requested to advise Philadelphia of liaison arrangements made with the Pittsburgh Office of the Domestic Contact Service of CIA, so this office will be able to properly handle cases within this category which may be located in the State College, Pa., area.



UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

- Tolson
- DeLoach
- Walters
- Mohr
- Bishop
- Casper
- Callahan
- Conrad
- Felt
- Gale
- Rosen
- Sullivan
- Tavel
- Soyars
- Tele. Room
- Holmes
- Gandy

TO : Mr. C. D. DeLoach

DATE: 6/25/70

FROM : W. C. Sullivan

SUBJECT: LIAISON WITH CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA)  
WASHINGTON FIELD OFFICE

*John Buchanan*

The Director has inquired regarding the nature of any liaison existing between the Washington Field Office (WFO) and CIA. Limited liaison does exist, being addressed to specific operational cases and name checks.

WFO, of necessity, is in contact with CIA concerning specific cases in the espionage field. For example, WFO handles leads to interview the Soviet defector, Yuri Nosenko, who is under CIA control and support. At the present time, there is considerable liaison with respect to the Czechoslovakian informant, "Gimme," who will defect 6/26/70. CIA is providing a "safehouse" and support for him. (S)

In addition, CIA has a domestic operations office in the District which makes name checks with WFO and secures background information concerning foreign diplomatic personnel. No liaison is conducted with respect to policy matters and the objective of all contacts is the handling of immediate operational matters.

**ACTION:**

For the Director's information.

- 1 - Mr. DeLoach
- 1 - Mr. Sullivan
- 1 - Mr. Branigan
- 1 - Mr. Gray
- 1 - Liaison
- 1 - Mr. Cassidy

GAD:mlm  
(7)

6/25/70 ADDENDUM BY MR. TOLSON.

I thought all such contacts were to be handled by letter.

CT:DSS ENCLOSURE

62-80750

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CLASSIFIED BY SP-2 ALM/STG  
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 46

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WBS

15 JUL 16 1970

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*S/K*

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

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DeLoach	_____
Walters	_____
Mohr	_____
Bishop	_____
Casper	_____
Callahan	_____
Conrad	_____
Felt	_____
Gale	_____
Rosen	_____
Sullivan	_____
Tavel	_____
Soyars	_____
Tele. Room	_____
Holmes	_____
Gandy	_____

TO : Mr. C. D. DeLoach *7/20/70*

DATE: 6/26/70

FROM : W. C. Sullivan

*#m0216*  
 ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
 HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
 DATE 1-3-01 BY SP2 HLM/STB

*wcs*

SUBJECT: LIAISON WITH CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA)  
WASHINGTON FIELD OFFICE

*og [signature]*

My attached memorandum, 6/25/70, discussed the operational contacts between the Washington Field Office (WFO) and CIA's local domestic operations office. Mr. Tolson noted "I thought all such contacts were to be handled by letter" and the Director said "I most certainly intended the same." We are instructing WFO accordingly.

It is possible that other field offices have working-level contact with the CIA offices in their territories. If the Director desires, similar instructions will be issued to them.

ACTION:

(1) Attached for approval is a letter to WFO instructing that all future contacts with CIA are to be handled by letter.

*no.*  
*10*

*[Signature]*

*yes* (2) If the Director desires, an SAC Letter will be prepared containing similar instructions, applicable to all offices.

Enclosures

- 1 - Mr. DeLoach
- 1 - Mr. Sullivan
- 1 - Mr. Branigan
- 1 - Mr. Gray
- 1 - Mr. Wannall
- 1 - Liaison
- 1 - Mr. Cassidy

*no.*  
*WCS*  
*REC-20 62-8070-4801*

15 JUL 10 1970

GAD:mlm  
(8) *[initials]*

*62-80750*

*[Signature]*

SAC, Washington Field

6/26/70

Director, FBI

REC-20 - 80750 - 4801

- 1 - Mr. DeLoach
- 1 - Mr. Sullivan
- 1 - Mr. Branigan
- 1 - Mr. Gray
- 1 - Mr. Wannall
- 1 - Liaison
- 1 - Mr. Cassidy

LIAISON WITH CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
WASHINGTON FIELD OFFICE

Henceforth, all contacts with the Central Intelligence Agency are to be handled by letter.

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DATE 1-12-01 BY SP-2 ALM/HAC

EX-114

GAD:mlm  
(10)

*mlm*

NOTE:

See memo W. C. Sullivan to C. D. DeLoach, 6/26/70, captioned as above, GAD:mlm.

40

*not sent*

*P*

*W.C. Sullivan*

*W.C. Sullivan*

*WBS*

- Tolson \_\_\_\_\_
- DeLoach \_\_\_\_\_
- Walters \_\_\_\_\_
- Mohr \_\_\_\_\_
- Bishop \_\_\_\_\_
- Casper \_\_\_\_\_
- Callahan \_\_\_\_\_
- Conrad \_\_\_\_\_
- Felt \_\_\_\_\_
- Gale \_\_\_\_\_
- Rosen \_\_\_\_\_
- Sullivan \_\_\_\_\_
- Tavel \_\_\_\_\_
- Soyars \_\_\_\_\_
- Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_
- Holmes \_\_\_\_\_
- Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

58 JUL 17 1970

MAIL ROOM  TELETYPE UNIT

UNEXCISED VERSIONS OF DOCUMENTS  
FURNISHED TO SSC IN RESPONSE TO  
REQUEST IN APPENDIX C, PART I,  
ITEM NUMBER 9.

*#models*  
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 1-5-01 BY SP-2 ACM/276

~~SECRET~~

March 2, 1970

Mr. J. Edgar Hoover  
Director  
Federal Bureau of Investigation  
Washington, D. C.

#moe/s  
DECLASSIFIED BY SP2ALM/ITG  
ON 1-2-01

Dear Mr. Hoover:

I ask that you approve my request to retire from Bureau service and, if it is convenient, to have this retirement become effective April 3

For several weeks I have been giving this matter serious thought since I began questioning my capability to bring about a better coordinated effort directed against foreign intelligence targets, particularly those of the Communist-Bloc. I have always aimed for perfection, but I do not find that the desired results are being achieved. For almost 18 years I have handled an assignment during a period of turbulent, hectic, and controversial developments in the area of Internal Security - U. S. Intelligence. It was most challenging, very rewarding, but also punishing. Because of this deep involvement I now realize that I have badly neglected my responsibilities as a father and husband. With the time I may have left I would like to give my family the attention it rightfully deserves.

It would be most dishonest of me if I didn't comment on the recent events which have led to the severance of direct liaison with the Central Intelligence Agency. Since I have been the principal Bureau element in the day to day relations between the organizations, it has been my responsibility to anticipate problems, move in on the situation, and protect Bureau interests in an efficient and effective manner. I have reviewed my position in this latest development, and I certainly must share responsibility for the tragic turn of events. I believe that I might have employed better perception by following developments in Denver more closely. I deeply regret this. I do not like to fail. I do not like to lose.

I have been involved in intelligence operations dating back to our S.I.S. history, and I think I can speak with some authority in stating that never in our history has this nation been faced with greater security threats from communist intelligence services who, through police state organizations, have developed unusually sophisticated capabilities to strike at our vulnerabilities of a democratic and free society. A continuing and priority target of the Bloc is to penetrate and split or disrupt our internal security and intelligence organizations. Contrary to the tempo of the times many years ago, there is hardly an intelligence operation or an internal security case which does not have direct or indirect international ramifications. The course of events and the highly capable effectiveness of Communist-Bloc intelligence services have placed increasing burdens on us and have necessitated close working relations with CIA, military intelligence services and other agencies. The complex nature of many cases, the rapid means of travel and communication, the daily occurrence of emergency type political developments in various parts of the world have warranted direct liaison with approximately twenty CIA officials on a daily basis. In addition, there are about thirty officials contacted with lesser frequency. The Bureau is a member of the U. S.

Classified by 12-  
Exempt from GDS Category 2  
Date of Declassification Indefinite

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Intelligence Board and its sub-committees which cover matters such as handling of defectors, development of computer programs, leaks of classified information and production of intelligence studies. Our Legal Attaches have reason to contact CIA on a regular basis, and although it has been a small volume of business, the line of communication between our domestic offices and local CIA representatives has been definitely useful. The daily business with CIA relates to hundreds of cases pertaining to activities of all Communist-Bloc services, the New Left, Black Nationalists, the Communist Party and related organizations, and political crises in areas such as Vietnam, the Middle East, and Latin America. Theoretically, all business could be handled by mail, but from a practical standpoint such a procedure will lead to unbelievable chaos. There will be almost insurmountable obstacles if we are to discharge our duties in a responsible manner and if we are to counter a relentless enemy in the interest of national security. Because interests of other agencies are frequently intertwined with cases involving the Bureau and CIA, the break in FBI-CIA liaison will adversely affect our liaison with such agencies.

I think you will share my alarm over the consequences once the word is received by the "troops" in all U. S. agencies that FBI and CIA no longer have any liaison. Unfortunately, there will be individuals who will maliciously distort and misinterpret the true facts. Within a short period, there will be stories in the press, and worst of all the Communist-Bloc services will pick up a choice entree for the promotion of subtle, skillful and extremely harmful disruption. I am absolutely convinced that the intelligence services of Great Britain, France, West Germany and others are well penetrated by the Soviets. I can't believe that the Philbys, the Blakes, the Alger Hisses were the last of the penetrations. I mention this because if such penetrations exist, the break in relations between the FBI and CIA will provide a basis for promoting further rifts. This is the first time in our history that such an event has occurred, and it is difficult to believe that the enemy will not make every effort to reap the greatest profit possible. Briefly, Mr. Hoover, I have too much respect for you and our FBI to expose us to a potentially disastrous situation.

Although the Denver incident is a blight on the relations between the FBI and CIA, it would be most unfair of me not to comment on the dedicated and selfless efforts of numerous individuals in CIA who strived for honest and harmonious relations. As a result of their endeavors there have been many services performed in behalf of the Bureau including notable and outstanding accomplishments. We have been furnished sources, informants, solid productive cases, technical advice and equipment, and there have been instances of cooperation which led to substantial saving of Bureau funds. There also have been examples of alertness on the part of CIA employes which prevented Bureau commission of errors and averted embarrassment. Among some of the more significant examples of cooperation I cite the excellent and badly needed assistance of CIA in the Rudolph Abel case. I also refer to the Agency's providing us with one of the better criminal informants we have had in recent years in the person of Herbert Itkin. I only refer to the foregoing to emphasize that, if at all possible, we should preserve the good friends and the supporters of the Bureau.

It is recognized that one can also present a bill of particulars relating to examples of poor cooperation and deliberate skulduggery. I hold no brief for those in CIA who disrupted relations between

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the two agencies because of uncalculated-for actions. Some of these were the parasites who commanded their bureaucratic empires, never produced a creative idea, and lived off the errors of the dedicated people. I believe that an honest and thorough examination will reveal that the presence of such types at the present time is negligible or their influence is almost completely neutralized. Unfortunately, CIA also believes that in the past we did not always act in a forthright manner, and the Agency undoubtedly could present a list of grievances. You may not realize that a few years ago we enjoyed a poor reputation among CIA employees. We were characterized as being devious and there was a decided atmosphere of mistrust. Happily, that is not the situation today. I am confident that you can go into any segment of CIA, here and abroad, and you will find that Fidelity, Bravery, and Integrity are sincerely related to the FBI. The problems in past years primarily arose from unbelievably poor communication among interested parties. This communication has been greatly improved because of the efforts of many dedicated people. Nevertheless, there is room for improvement. In our own Bureau there are numerous officials and employees who have little or no knowledge of the background and the principles of the National Security Act of 1947 and of the National Security Council Directives. In addition, these same people have a vague conception of the objectives and functions of an intelligence organization. Similarly, within CIA there are very many whose conception of the FBI, its jurisdiction, its objectives, its law enforcement character, is shocking at times. Tremendous progress has been made, but it is not easy to harmoniously coordinate the operations of an organization designed to operate in a clandestine manner with an agency which is basically a law enforcement body. This difficulty is further aggravated because our relationship is still composed of a fragile fabric. One incident potentially can destroy years of constructive effort.

Mr. Hoover, I respectfully request that you reconsider the decision to sever liaison with the Central Intelligence Agency. I appeal to you to leave the door open for further deliberation because I am confident this conflict can be satisfactorily resolved. I believe that my removal from the scene provides the opportunity to appoint another agent who will measure up to your desired capabilities and who will be able to rapidly resolve the problem with a new and fresh approach. It is a good time to reexamine our relations with CIA and to make adjustments satisfactory to you.

I sincerely regret that this situation arose, since I readily appreciate you are burdened with so many heavy responsibilities. Yet I feel that I had a firm obligation and duty to communicate with you because of the very nature of my assignment these many years and because of my involvement in this controversial case.

My years with the Bureau gave me more satisfaction than anyone can imagine. You would have to know me better to appreciate this. I want to assure you that wherever I go or whatever I do I will be prepared to be of service in any cause which involves the preservation of a strong and respected FBI.

Sincerely yours,

*Sam Papich*  
Sam Papich

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UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

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DATE: March 5, 1970

TO : Mr. C. D. DeLoach

FROM : W. C. Sullivan

#m DR16  
DECLASSIFIED BY SP-2 ALM/jk  
ON 1-4-01

SUBJECT: RELATIONSHIPS WITH CIA

Attached is a memorandum dictated by Special Agent Sam J. Papich in response to the Director's request for the identification of the instances Papich had in mind when in his retirement request he indicated that CIA "believes that in the past we (FBI) did not always act in a forthright manner, and the agency undoubtedly could present a list of grievances."

A list identifying the cases and outlining the problems involved has been prepared by Papich and is attached to the memorandum. A review of the 25-page document reveals that it contains several instances in which CIA has registered its dissatisfaction and could conceivably renew its complaints, and others in which presumably CIA had no knowledge of Bureau action and has made no complaint.

For the Director's further information, I have instituted in this Division an analysis of each situation cited and a memorandum will be prepared as to each, containing my views and recommendations as a result of that analysis. This is being handled on an expedite basis and the memoranda will be sent through as soon as possible.

Classified by 12  
Exempt from GDS, Category 2 & 3  
Date of Declassification Indefinite

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UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

TO : The Director

DATE: March 5, 1970

FROM : Sam J. Papich

SUBJECT: RELATIONS WITH CIA

(5468 SLD/GCL-JFK 2/19/98)  
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 12/7/94 BY SP7 CLC/PLA  
CAF # 88-1826  
Rm CFA REVIEW 6/2/94

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO  
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR  
RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION  
IN THIS DOCUMENT. KP, 1/8/98

Reference is made to my letter of 3/2/70. I made the statement, "Unfortunately, CIA also believes that in the past we did not always act in a forthright manner, and the Agency undoubtedly could present a list of grievances." It is my understanding that you want such grievances identified. There is enclosed herewith a list of cases or situations which arose over the years.

Based upon a review of files and my personal recollection, this list would be representative of matters which CIA could use for making charges such as: not being forthright, not playing fairly and squarely, not cooperating, not being of assistance, not recognizing the need for concrete FBI contributions to the foreign intelligence effort. What CIA may have compiled over the years is unknown. What situations are known to CIA and have not come to our attention cannot be answered at this time. I am thinking of leaks including distorted information which may have been passed to CIA from ex-Bureau employees and CIA informants and sources.

It should be clearly emphasized that there is no indication whatsoever within CIA that the Agency has been seeking any kind of a showdown or confrontation with the FBI. Contrary to what some people may believe, the relationship between the two agencies up to the recent crisis was never better despite the problems which have arisen from time to time. I am confident that a thorough and impartial examination will conclusively support the foregoing.

In order that there may not be any misunderstanding, it is important to emphasize that the Bureau can also produce an extensive list of justified grievances. We can also produce an excellent record of support which we have given CIA; presumably CIA could do the same. There are ingredients for continuing conflict and there is also adequate machinery for maintaining sound working relations and producing badly needed intelligence information.

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Memorandum to the Director  
RE: RELATIONS WITH CIA

I believe that it would be most helpful to you and interested Bureau officials when evaluating and passing judgment on the attached material if we analyzed very briefly the role of the Bureau liaison Agent. A liaison Agent can be a simple mail courier or he can be the true Bureau Agent ready to confront any problem or issue with another agency, very often working with very limited information. It is expected that the Bureau Agent carry out his instructions forcefully and efficiently. He must be prepared to handle all types of personalities under various conditions. He must be alert for pitfalls and express himself in a most judicious and prudent manner but always making certain that the Bureau position is well fortified.

In evaluating the attached and my encounters with CIA, it should be noted that protests from the Bureau always were easy to handle because the Agent had J. Edgar Hoover behind him. However, when an Agent struck at an official on one day and solicited his cooperation the next day, it did require some resourceful action. It is believed that other liaison Agents regularly encounter similar situations. On numerous occasions I have bitterly feuded with CIA-officials and this has included rough language. I have walked out on CIA officials when I felt they were unreasonable. They took the initiative by asking the Agent to return. I did try to play fairly and squarely with all of them and never hesitated to accept a confrontation; this included the Director of the Agency. When I lectured to CIA personnel over the years I always made a point to challenge them to present any grievances or raise any subject matter relating to the Bureau. I never left a discussion with any CIA official without being positive that our position was absolutely understood. The approaches utilized by me might be open to criticism. I can only refer to the records of the Bureau and CIA and I believe the Bureau's position is most favorable. I don't think CIA has ever transmitted a letter of protest to the Bureau during the eighteen years during which the Agent handled the assignment.

ACTION:

For information.

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CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO  
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR,  
RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION  
IN THIS DOCUMENT. KP1/898

CASES AND/OR SITUATIONS  
INVOLVING CONFLICTS WITH THE  
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA)

(1) MOCASE (THE BORIS MORROS CASE)

This was a sensitive Soviet-espionage case which originated in 1943 and terminated for the most part in 1957. The case had many wide foreign ramifications and historically has been, and undoubtedly will be, one of the most important and involved cases of Soviet operations in this country and abroad. We did not disseminate any information of significance in this case until 1954. On various occasions when the Liaison Agent has become involved in heated arguments with CIA officials, they have seen fit to raise this case as an outstanding example of FBI failure to cooperate with the Agency. The position taken by CIA was that it should have been advised regarding the Soviet operational activity in foreign countries, claiming that the Agency would have had the opportunity to develop more information of significance, identify Soviet agents, and possibly prepare conditions for recruitment or doubling of Soviet operatives. We did not disseminate our reports to CIA because of the extreme sensitivity of the case. We actually did not permit CIA to handle any investigations relating to the MOCASE until 1957.

In 1957, CIA complained that it certainly had every right to have received the information earlier because many aspects of the MOCASE pertained to CIA employees and operations. CIA further argued that it had been greatly handicapped in effectively carrying out the leads in 1957 because the leads were given to the Agency at the same time that the case was publicized. The Agency argued that the failure of the Bureau to coordinate with CIA those French aspects of the case permitted the French, rather than the U. S., to play a dominating role in Europe.

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Per CIA (MANGOLD RELEASE)  
CIA # 88-1826

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With regard to dealing with the French, we took the position that we would cover the leads through our Legal Attaches wherever possible and to furnish leads to CIA in those countries where we did not have Legal Attaches. CIA maintained that since we were on record that our Legal Attaches do not handle operations abroad, the Bureau had an obligation to levy those French leads on CIA or at least coordinate with the Agency before going to the French.

It is to be noted that in any argument relating to jurisdiction in this matter, CIA will fall back on the responsibilities placed on the Agency under the provisions of the National Security Act of 1947 and the implementation of the foregoing through National Security Council Directives. CIA will maintain that it is incumbent upon the Bureau to recognize the provisions of the National Security Act of 1947 and the Directives. The Agency would argue that in the MOCASE, these were ignored by the Bureau. (Bufile - 100-352385)

**(2) BUREAU OPERATIONS IN MEXICO**

During the 1950's, CIA periodically raised questions concerning the functions of our Legal Attache Office in Mexico City. As early as 1951, CIA claimed that the Legal Attache was acting outside of the scope of the Bureau's jurisdiction since we were on record that our Legal Attaches were acting strictly in a liaison capacity, yet we allegedly were conducting operations such as developing penetrations of the Communist Party of Mexico. A heated discussion took place in 1951 between the two Agencies but we did not change or modify the operations of our office in Mexico. CIA, from time to time, has informally raised questions on our running informants in Mexico and still being able to comply with Directives. The interpretation given by CIA is that overseas counterintelligence operations, including the operation of informants by the Bureau, must be coordinated with CIA. Further interpretation by the Agency has been that "coordination" means a discussion of the operation, including the identity of the informant, if the Agency

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feels such information is necessary. CIA officials have casually and informally referred to the situation in Mexico as a potential issue and conflict but, for several years, nobody in CIA has seen fit to create any kind of a problem. We, of course, might be vulnerable since we have been operating informants in Mexico for many years. The problem undoubtedly was greatly mitigated because of the outstanding work of former Legal Attache John Speakes and the current Legal Attache Nathan L. Ferris.

As an example of a situation encountered throughout the years, in 1957 our Legal Attache, Mexico City, asked the local CIA office for an up-to-date list of Soviet Embassy personnel in order to keep apprised of the identity of the Soviets officially assigned in Mexico City. The CIA office responded but included the following statement "It is understood that your office has no operations aimed at or involving the Soviet Embassy or any of the persons on the attached list. If I am wrong, I should appreciate being advised." The Legal Attache advised that in his opinion, the wording of the CIA communication did not warrant a reply. He, however, reported to the Seat of Government, that at that particular time, we did have three cases which might be considered as operations directed against the Soviet Embassy. (Memorandum Belmont to Boardman, March 22, 1957, re: "Relations with CIA," 62-80750)

In 1963, Legal Attache, Mexico City, received information indicating that CIA intended to penetrate the Communist Party of Mexico at the top leadership levels. The Legal Attache pointed out that this proposed action might affect top-level informants of the Legal Attache since CIA would undoubtedly be making requests of the Bureau concerning certain individuals, including those who were our informants. The Legal Attache proposed that if CIA levied any request on him, he would furnish ample information on each Party leader, but only information which was well balanced in quality and quantity, so that no one individual would stand out at the risk of being pinpointed. (Memorandum Brennan to Sullivan, August 5, 1963, re: "Legal Attache Office, Mexico City," 62-80750-4132)

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How much information CIA has developed over the years concerning our operational activity in Mexico City is unknown. However, we should bear in mind that former Special Agent George Munro handled many of our operations in Mexico, including key informants, and subsequently began performing services for CIA after he left the Bureau. We also should not forget that Americans operating in Latin American countries for one agency are heavily exposed to the resources of another U. S. intelligence or investigative agency. This Agent knows from personal experience that operating in these areas constitutes a "very small world" and the exposure to leaks and errors is considerable.

(3) THE ABEL CASE

Although CIA has not raised the point for several years, the prevailing attitude was, and probably still exists, that the FBI did not play it square with CIA in the Abel case by not making certain that the Agency was given the proper recognition for its contributions. CIA feels that in the first place, there would not have been any U. S. access or availability to the source in this case, Reino Hayhanen, because CIA took the full responsibility for moving Hayhanen from France to the U. S. in 1957. CIA claims it took the risk and responsibility of doing this after the Bureau declined to become involved in any operation designed to transport Hayhanen to the U. S. It should be noted that Hayhanen was an alcoholic and that his first contacts with CIA in Paris raised questions concerning Hayhanen's mental stability.

After Hayhanen arrived in the U. S., we arranged access to him for a period, the purpose of which was to obtain a complete story of his intelligence activities in the U. S. and we were particularly interested in identifying all of his associates, especially the man who later was identified as Rudolph Abel. After a short handling period in the U. S., we dropped Hayhanen because he became a problem. It was an extremely critical situation because we had not yet identified Abel. CIA agreed to take the responsibility for the carrying and safeguarding of Hayhanen but we

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were given free access to this difficult source. This was a most fortunate arrangement as far as CIA was concerned, because this adjustment gave us the time to work with Hayhanen and subsequently develop the leads which led to the apprehension of Abel. The Agency has maintained that it was largely responsible for making absolutely certain that Hayhanen was mentally and physically prepared for testimony at the Abel trial. Hayhanen was a key witness. CIA has also referred to the heavy expenses incurred by the Agency, all for the benefit of the Bureau. CIA has complained that the Bureau never really thanked the Agency for its cooperation and CIA has been particularly irked because the Bureau did not see fit to inform the Attorney General or the White House of the role played by CIA.  
(Bufile - 65-64538)

(4) WILLIAM P. BUNDY CASE

In July, 1953, Senator Joseph McCarthy sought to subpoena William P. Bundy, then a CIA official, to testify before the Senator's Committee. McCarthy claimed that Bundy's alleged communist activities were clearly documented. The most serious allegation was that Bundy had contributed \$400 to the defense fund of Alger Hiss. All of this was publicized. The information set forth in the newspapers emanated from a Bureau report. CIA planned to charge the Bureau with leaking the information to Senator McCarthy. CIA officials held numerous conferences concerning the matter but charges were never made against the Bureau. What information CIA has on this particular item is not known but the Agency did know that we maintained liaison with McCarthy's Committee.  
(Bufiles - 62-80750 and 140-1477)

(5) BUREAU DISSEMINATION OF INFORMATION CONCERNING JAY LOVESTONE

In May, 1954, Allen Dulles raised the question concerning the propriety of FBI dissemination of information concerning Jay Lovestone. This information had been furnished to us by Spencer Miller, a former official of the

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Department of Labor. When interviewed by us, Miller made several accusations against CIA. We disseminated the information to the White House, the Attorney General, and some data also went to the State Department. Dulles took the position that by disseminating derogatory information concerning his Agency, he had been placed on the spot because the Spencer Miller data was not the complete story. In the past, CIA informally referred to this as an instance of very unfair conduct on the part of the Bureau. (Memorandum Keay to Belmont, May 24, 1954, re: "Relations with CIA," 62-80750)

(6) BUREAU HANDLING OF CIA REQUESTS FOR TOURS  
FOR FOREIGN OFFICIALS

On occasions in the 1950's, CIA complained that officials visiting the U. S. under CIA sponsorship were given excellent treatment on the tour but, nevertheless, many of the visitors left most disappointed because they had not had any contact with any Bureau officials. CIA felt that contact with Bureau officials had very significant benefits and left lasting favorable impressions because of the FBI's world-wide reputation. CIA also pointed out that when foreign visitors had no contact with Bureau officials, they were left with the suspicion that there was some kind of friction between the FBI and CIA. In 1956, we had a clear-cut policy to the effect that tours for such visitors would be of a restrictive nature in that such visitors would view our facilities normally seen by the public and nothing more. CIA was so informed but periodically indicated that our policy prevented the Agency from truly enhancing U. S. interests abroad. CIA never lodged an official complaint. (Memorandum Roach to Belmont, May 31, 1956, re: "Visit at Bureau by Foreign Police and Intelligence Officials," 62-80750)

It should be emphasized that for the past several years there would not be any basis for any form of complaint with regard to Bureau treatment of foreign officials coming to the U. S. under CIA sponsorship. The personal attention given to such officials by Assistant Director Sullivan and other officials and Supervisors in the Domestic Intelligence Division has been outstanding and benefits have accrued to the Bureau. These visitors have gone back to their native

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countries with far better impressions than in the past. In addition, we have learned more about these countries, their services, and their security chiefs by spending a few minutes with them. Needless to say, this kind of treatment has also immeasurably helped our Legal Attaches.

(7) [CIA] - [DUTCH] INTEREST IN SOVIET ESPIONAGE ACTIVITY

(S) In 1965, the [Dutch Internal Security Service] (S) was in the process of investigating individuals in (S) [Holland] who allegedly had been engaged in Soviet-espionage activity. The [Dutch] (S) wanted to have certain individuals in the U. S. interviewed and approached [CIA] (S) to make inquiry at the Bureau. At that time, our relations with the [Dutch] (S) had been practically nonexistent because (S) the [Dutch] had failed to honestly deal with us in the case of [Joseph Petersen], a [Dutch] (S) official who had been clandestinely collecting intelligence at the National Security Agency. When [CIA] (S) approached us, we told (S) the Agency that the [Dutch] (S) could submit their request through diplomatic channels. We subsequently told [CIA] (S) we would not handle the interviews for the Dutch. We stuck to our position. (S) [CIA] surrendered but felt that we were impairing their efforts to gather information concerning Soviet-espionage activities in Europe. (Walter G. Krivitsky, Bufile - 100-11146)

(8) COLONEL JOHN GROMBACH (PAT O'BRIEN)

Colonel John Grombach was a retired U. S. Army officer who, during World War II, established a private intelligence network, operating throughout the world but primarily in Europe. His sources included any number of European exiles who came to the U. S. While he was in business, he was financed by the State Department, then the Department of the Army, and in the later 1940's and into the 1950's by CIA. Grombach established contact with the Bureau through one of his subordinates, Pat O'Brien, who periodically called

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on us and furnished information which Grombach felt was of interest to us. This dissemination through Pat O'Brien continued during the period of Grombach's relationship with CIA. We never informed CIA that we were receiving such information which also was of interest to the Agency. It is possible that Grombach had given the same data to CIA but we do not know. CIA and Grombach clashed and the relationship was severed in an atmosphere of severe bitterness. In the last years of its dealings with Grombach, the Agency had successfully penetrated the latter's organization and allegedly had identified many of the sources. CIA hinted to the Liaison Agent that it had become aware of the relationship between Grombach's organization and the Bureau. How much CIA really learned about this relationship is not known but if its penetrations were significant, the Agency may have developed evidence to justify a charge that the Bureau had withheld information from CIA, particularly when we were receiving the data from an organization which was financed by the Agency. (S) (Bufile - 62-77306)

(9) COMMISSION ON THE ORGANIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH OF THE GOVERNMENT

(Herbert Hoover Commission - 1954)

In October, 1954, a task force of the captioned Commission initiated a survey of CIA's operations under the leadership of General Mark W. Clark. In January, 1955, we were advised by a representative of the task force that Senator Joseph McCarthy had furnished the group a list of CIA employees who were considered subversive. CIA became cognizant of this development and there was talk within the Agency that the Bureau had furnished the names to the Senator. When the Liaison Agent was informally approached on this, he flatly told the Agency to officially submit its charges. The Agency never did. What information CIA may have had on this matter as it pertained to the Bureau is not known. It is possible that the Agency's attitude was strictly predicated on a knowledge that we maintained liaison with the Senator's Committee. (Relations with CIA, Bufile - 62-80750)

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(10) INTERNAL SECURITY LEADS IN FOREIGN COUNTRIES

During the 1950's, we gave our Legal Attaches numerous leads stemming from internal security cases in the U. S. In many instances we did not see fit to notify CIA although the Agency always maintained that you could not separate "internal Security" from "counter-intelligence," namely a lead in France pertaining to a communist in the U. S. warranted advising CIA, if not, at least asking the Agency to handle the lead. In the last several years, it is not believed that there is any basis for complaint since we have regularly been notifying CIA concerning subjects of cases who travel abroad. If the Legal Attache is investigating, CIA is notified in order to avoid duplicate efforts. There have been exceptions where we have taken the position that CIA should not be notified because of the sensitivity of the matter. How many such exceptions are known to CIA cannot be established from our files; however, we should bear in mind that when our Legal Attaches investigate, they contact many of the same foreign officials normally contacted by CIA. How many of these foreign officials are CIA informants, or on the Agency payroll, is unknown.

(11) BUREAU OPERATIONS IN CUBA

We operated informants in Cuba when we had a Legal Attache's Office in Havana. Informants reported on activities of communists and other subversives in that country. During the period we operated these informants, we did not coordinate our operations with CIA. We did not advise the Agency that we had such sources. However, in 1960, after Castro came on the scene, it became infeasible to handle certain informants in a secure manner. Approval was granted to turn certain informants over to CIA. What these informants may have subsequently told CIA about past Bureau operations is unknown. This item is being cited in the event CIA had evidence to establish that we had been operational in Cuba and had not coordinated with the Agency pursuant to Directives. (Memorandum Donahoe to Belmont, February 5, 1960, re: "Partido Socialista Popular," 64-200-210, 2377 and Memorandum Frohbose to Belmont, February 3, 1960, re: "Narcisco Tauler Beneficto," 134-8539-4)

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(12) BUREAU OPERATIONS IN BRAZIL <sup>(S)</sup> - 1959

In 1959 the U. S. Ambassador in Brazil accused our Legal Attache of engaging in uncoordinated covert intelligence activity "of a nature which I believe exceeds his terms of reference." The Ambassador further indicated that CIA was unhappy over the Legal Attache's activities and the Agency allegedly had told the Ambassador that the Legal Attache had disseminated information from a source who was a fabricator or a provocator. This situation arose as a result of the Legal Attache's operation of an informant in Brazil <sup>(S)</sup> Some of the information that he received from the informant was of a derogatory nature and related to a Brazilian <sup>(S)</sup> who was being touted as a Presidential candidate. CIA asked for the identity of the informant and we told the Agency that the person could not be identified because he did not wish that his identity be disclosed. This case is being cited because CIA may have evidence that we had been operational in Brazil <sup>(S)</sup> had not coordinated pursuant to Directives, and that the matter was further aggravated because of the alleged unreliability of the information. (Memorandum Roach to Belmont, May 1, 1959, re: "William I. Friedman, Legal Attache, Rio de Janeiro," 67-429840) and (Memorandum Roach to Belmont, May 25, 1959, re: "Soviet-Satellite Activities - Brazil," 134-7667-48) <sup>(S)</sup>

(13) BORDER COVERAGE

In June, 1957, our Phoenix Office presented a problem concerning the Bureau's handling of informants on the Mexican border. These informants were operating inside Mexico. The problem was predicated on situations which might arise as the result of CIA's endeavors to develop informants who already were being handled by the Bureau. It was pointed out that CIA logically could come in contact with such sources and could make approaches for recruitment. It was recommended and approved that in order to protect our coverage in the border area, a valuable, trusted, and reliable confidential source would continue to be utilized even if he were contacted by CIA. Our policy was that we would not identify our sources to the Agency.

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(6) How much CIA learned about our border coverage is not known. Again, it is pointed out that former Bureau Agent George Munro may have been knowledgeable. As indicated, he later began performing services for CIA. If CIA learned that we were operating informants in Mexico, it could use such information as additional evidence of Bureau failure to cooperate and coordinate with the Agency pursuant to Directives. (Memorandum Roach to Belmont, June 14, 1957, re "Communist Coverage Along the Mexican Border, Relations with CIA," 100-356015-1238)

(14) CARPORT CASE (S)

In May, 1957, the Bureau's double Agent in the captioned case was advised by his Soviet contact that he was to have a meeting in Switzerland during the period (S) June 16-19, 1957. A question arose as to whether CIA (S) should be informed concerning the double Agent's travel to Switzerland. (S) It was recommended and approved that we not advise CIA.

What is important here is that CIA established contact with our double agent at one point. The Agency may have had further contact without our knowledge. The Agency may have also picked up the contact with the Soviet (S) in Switzerland. (S) The case is being highlighted since we cannot exclude the possibility that the Agency has evidence to demonstrate that we were operational In Europe and we (S) did not coordinate with the Agency. (Memorandum Branigan to Belmont, June 10, 1957, re; "CARPORT," 105-25453-1825) (S)

(15) CIA REQUESTS FOR BUREAU LECTURE ON COMMUNISM IN THE U. S.

On September 25, 1958, CIA inquired if W. C. Sullivan could give a lecture on the communist movement in the U. S. It was recommended that Sullivan give the lecture. Such lectures were being afforded in other parts of the Government. The Director made the notation "We cannot make Sullivan available to this outfit." The Agency accepted this as an affront and a blatant refusal

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to cooperate on a most important subject of interest to both agencies. (Memorandum Sullivan to Belmont, October 1, 1958, re: "Request for Lecture on Communism by CIA,")

(16) CASE OF EDWARD ELLIS SMITH

On July 9, 1956, an official of the State Department confidentially advised the Bureau that Edward Ellis Smith, a CIA employee in Moscow, had been involved in an affair with a Soviet girl. According to our source, Smith allegedly had furnished information to the Soviet girl. We checked with the State Department and CIA and we confirmed that Smith had been involved in an affair and that he had been recalled. According to CIA and State Department, there was no indication that Smith had been involved in any espionage against the U. S. CIA gave consideration to requesting the Bureau to identify its source and then changed its mind. Whether CIA has documented this as an instance where the Bureau failed to cooperate by not volunteering the source is a matter of conjecture but, it is a case that should be kept in mind. (Bufile - 65-64084)

(17) THE [SLIVA]<sup>(S)</sup> OPERATION

(S) In April, 1963, we became involved with CIA in that Agency's efforts to collect sensitive information relating to [French Government] intentions to conduct espionage against the U. S. CIA had access to a sensitive source, [Phillippe DeVosjoli], who was in a position to make available highly important [French] documents. On April 11, 1963, CIA informed us that our Legal Attache in [Paris] had locally contacted CIA concerning this matter. CIA Headquarters was highly disturbed because its office in [Paris] had not been cut in on this operation and the Agency wanted to be informed regarding the nature and the extent of our dissemination of CIA information to our Legal Attache. We (S) (S) (S)

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determined that the Legal Attache had made inquiries in Paris in response to leads which had been sent from Bureau Headquarters. This matter is being highlighted because it was a vitally important operation to CIA and the Agency had received indications that information had been leaked to French authorities. We have no evidence or reason to believe that the Legal Attache Office ever involved itself in any such leak. However, we should not, under any circumstances, discount the fact that CIA has penetrated French services and has had access to sensitive information in Paris. The French have always had an outstanding capability of tapping phones and installing microphones in Paris. Such coverage on U. S. officials, including their residences, should never be excluded. The information we had conveyed to our Legal Attache possibly may have been acquired by the French through clandestine coverage. CIA possibly could charge us with handling their sensitive information in an insecure manner by transmitting it to Paris without conferring with the Agency.

In connection with alleged French espionage activity in the U. S., CIA has never been satisfied with the efforts made by the Bureau. The Agency possibly could take the position that we looked lightly at the allegations and did not pursue a matter which, in their eyes, merited a more aggressive approach. (Bufile - 105-109053)

For some time, CIA has held to a position that the French Intelligence Service (SDECE) is penetrated by the Soviets. The Agency has pointed out that if the French are collecting sensitive information in the U. S., the product is ending up in Moscow. In January, 1964, we reviewed the status of our investigation of French intelligence activities in the U. S. The Director commented "I think this whole thing has been imaginary on the part of CIA which has been played as a sucker by DeVosjoli. I would waste no more time on it at least until all CIA restrictions are removed." CIA did impose restrictions by not permitting us to pursue certain leads because it feared that its sensitive source would be jeopardized. (Bufile - 105-109053)

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(18) LEAKS TO THE "NATIONAL REVIEW" - 1959

In April, 1959, CIA became concerned over the appearance of certain items in issues of the "National Review." The publication carried a column authored by an unidentified individual who was making derogatory references to CIA. CIA subsequently identified the author as Lyle Hugh Munson, a former CIA employee. CIA investigation indicated that Munson was obtaining his information from former CIA Agents. In checking on Munson, CIA identified some of his friends who were listed as Robert Morris, former member of the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee; and Lou Nichols, former Assistant to the Director. The Liaison Agent was unable to develop any additional information as it might have pertained to Nichols in this particular matter. CIA may have additional data not revealed. (Memorandum Roach to Belmont, April 21, 1959, re: "Central Intelligence Agency," 62-80750-3341)

(19) TRAVEL OF BUREAU INFORMANTS TO CUBA

In September, 1965, we received information indicating that one of our informants on the Mexican border was in a position to travel to Cuba. A question was raised concerning CIA interest in this matter, if the informant made the trip. It was recommended and approved that we not advise CIA concerning the identity of the informant or his trip to Cuba.

It is not known if CIA acquired any knowledge but, if the Agency did, we potentially are vulnerable. The Agency could charge that we were operating outside of the U. S. and we failed to coordinate with the Agency. (Memorandum Wannall to Sullivan, October 4, 1965, re: "EP 572-S," 134-11461-39)

(20) DISSEMINATION OF CIA INFORMATION IN A BUREAU MONOGRAPH

By letter dated May 5, 1965, we disseminated to interested agencies, including CIA, a copy of a monograph entitled "Communism in the Dominican Republic." The monograph contained considerable information which had emanated

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from CIA. We did not obtain clearance from CIA for the inclusion of this information in our monograph. Clearance approval was not obtained because of the urgency of the document. CIA was irritated because it considered our action a distinct violation of the third agency rule. The Agency never made any protest.

(21) BUREAU INFORMANTS IN [GUATEMALA] (S)

In 1966, and 1967, we were operating informants in [Guatemala] (S) At the inception of our operational activity, CIA was not informed. In one case, we finally were able to effect the necessary arrangements with CIA whereby the Bureau would be permitted to run the informant in [Guatemala] (S) In the second instance, we established an agreement with CIA in October, 1967, that we could continue handling an informant in [Guatemala] with the understanding that the Bureau Agent, on the occasion of each visit, would confer with [the local CIA office] on political information collected from the informant. These two cases had all the makings of a conflict. CIA was under the definite impression that we had been running these informants before we had finally coordinated with them. It is true that [the CIA Chief] in [Guatemala] was much incensed but no issue was made at CIA Headquarters and the matter was put to rest. (S) (S)

(S) CIA may have developed concrete evidence that we were operating in [Guatemala] bearing in mind that in a place such as [Guatemala City], it would not be difficult for a CIA intelligence officer to spot an FBI Agent in contact with [Guatemalans] (S) Our potential vulnerability is that we were operating in [Guatemala] without coordinating with CIA. (Roberto Francisco Castanedo Felice, MEX-65, 134-3176) (S)

(22) SOLO

The information emanating from the captioned sensitive Bureau operation has been disseminated to CIA and other agencies for several years. The sensitive source has traveled abroad numerous times and his trips

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have included Russia. We have never identified the source to CIA and we have never coordinated with the Agency regarding any trips made by the source. Up to date, no issue has been raised.

We are potentially vulnerable in that former Bureau Agents now with CIA may have been familiar with aspects of the SOLO operation. We have no evidence that such ex-Agents passed any of their knowledge to CIA officials. If they have or, if CIA has become cognizant of the existence of the operation, we could be charged with failure to coordinate. The Agency could place special emphasis in this case because it has so many high-level foreign ramifications.

(23) HARRASSMENT OF CIA

By letter dated November 15, 1967, CIA inquired if the Bureau would check the toll calls on the home telephone of one Robert Kenneth Brown who was harrassing CIA in the Miami area. Brown allegedly was seeking information concerning the Agency's covert operations. We told CIA that we would not check the toll calls. We explained that on the basis of the information received, there was not sufficient information to justify investigation falling within the Bureau's jurisdiction. CIA accepted our response but there is no doubt that the Agency characterized our position as a concrete example of refusal to help a sister agency with a problem relating to the security of U. S. intelligence operations. (Memorandum Brennan to Sullivan, November 16, 1967, re: "Robert Kenneth Brown, Panther Publications - Harrassment of CIA," 105-94508-12)

(24) CURRENT INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS

CIA became very irked when we restricted dissemination of our Current Intelligence Analysis to two copies for the Agency. CIA took the position with the Liaison Agent that CIA always has been most liberal in providing the Bureau with as many copies as we needed when it involved various types of CIA material. The Agency never made an official issue of this matter. The Liaison Agent is confident that CIA always considered this an uncooperative gesture on our part.

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(25) ESTABLISHMENT OF BUREAU LIAISON WITH <sup>(S)</sup>  
DUTCH INTERNAL SECURITY SERVICE - 1960

(S) In January, 1960, our Legal Attache, Bonn, traveled to Holland for the purpose of exploring arrangements for liaison with appropriate Dutch authorities. The U. S. Ambassador raised questions, pointing out that over the years, all relations with the Dutch authorities had been handled through CIA. <sup>(S)</sup> He indicated that before there was any change in procedure, it would be necessary for CIA and FBI to come to some form of an agreement. Allen Dulles subsequently expressed disappointment in that his Agency had not been contacted by the Bureau prior to exploring the liaison arrangement. We eventually conferred with CIA and came to an agreement satisfactory to all parties concerned. (S)

Again, CIA could cite this as an instance where we failed to coordinate with the Agency in line with National Security Council Directives. (Memorandum Frohbose to Belmont, March 3, 1960, re: "Legal Attache Operations - Norway, Denmark, Sweden, and the Netherlands," 66-18973-123)

In the latter part of 1959 we gave consideration to establishing a Legal Attache in Copenhagen, Denmark. The purpose of the assignment was to follow Bureau leads in Denmark, Norway, Sweden, and Holland. We did not inform CIA of our intentions. (Memorandum Frohbose to Belmont, January 14, 1960, re: "Legal Attache Operations, The Netherlands," 66-18973-113)

(25) BUREAU DISSEMINATION OF COUNTERINTELLIGENCE  
INFORMATION TO FOREIGN SERVICES - 1962

By letter dated November 7, 1962, CIA raised questions concerning the propriety of Bureau dissemination of counterintelligence information to foreign intelligence services. CIA, at that time, had particular reference to information which our Legal Attache had transmitted to the (S) Greek Intelligence Service concerning KGB operations. CIA took the position that pursuant to the coordinating

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Directive, the Bureau was obligated to coordinate with CIA prior to such dissemination. The particular data had emanated from one of our sensitive Soviet sources (FEDORA). We responded to CIA by stating that the information was the product of an internal security operation and did not relate to any operational activity abroad. CIA again surrendered. The Agency could argue that it was responsible for following Soviet matters with the [Greek] Intelligence Service and that we had an obligation of coordinating with the Agency. (Memorandum Branigan to Sullivan, November 9, 1962, re: "FEDORA," 105-104811-344)

(5) (27) "THE INVISIBLE GOVERNMENT," A BOOK AUTHORED BY DAVID WISE AND THOMAS ROSS

In August, 1963, we received information indicating that Wise and Ross were in the process of gathering material for a book pertaining to activities of U. S. intelligence activities. Both Ross and Wise contacted the Bureau. It was recommended that Liaison orally advise CIA that these two individuals were preparing a book concerning U. S. intelligence agencies. The Director noted "I see no reason doing so."

It is not known if CIA was aware of the contact with the Bureau. Wise and Ross subsequently published the book which contained extremely derogatory information concerning CIA. (Memorandum Jones to DeLoach, re: "David Wise of the "New York Herald Tribune" and Thomas Ross of the "Chicago Sun Times")

(28) COMMUNIST ACTIVITIES - AFRICA

In April, 1960, CIA inquired if the Bureau would give any consideration to assisting the Agency toward developing coverage in Africa. CIA was looking for the services of any Negro informant who might be available. The Agency also inquired about placing a Negro in the Communist Party, USA, under a plan which would have as an eventual objective, the sending of the informant to

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Africa under an appropriate cover and for an extended period. We told CIA we had no informants available because they were necessary for our own operations. We took the position that we saw no benefit to be gained by loaning an informant on a short or long term basis.

This item is being mentioned because Africa has become vitally important to U. S. interest, bearing in mind that both the Soviets and Chinese Communists have made significant inroads into the area. CIA could argue that as early as 1960, it had the foresight to recognize the need for additional coverage, that it appealed to the Bureau for assistance, and that we did not cooperate. (Memorandum Papich to Frohbose, April 7, 1960, re: "Communist Activities in Africa," 64-200-302-110)

**(29) ADVISING THE WHITE HOUSE REGARDING CRITICISM  
OF INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS - EUROPE**

By letter dated October 23, 1964, we furnished the White House information received by our Legal Attache from the U. S. Ambassador to Luxembourg. He was critical of intelligence operations in Europe and made particular reference to the overstaffing of personnel.

We do not know if CIA became cognizant of the existence of the Bureau letter bearing in mind that the Agency undoubtedly would have considered the document as relating to its operations. We do know that for several years, CIA personnel have been assigned to the White House and had access to considerable information. (Memorandum Brennan to Sullivan, October 22, 1964, re "U. S. Intelligence Operations in Europe")

**(30) THE PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY  
BOARD AND JOHN MC CONE**

In May, 1963, we became embroiled with CIA in a rather critical conflict as a result of communication the Bureau sent to the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board. The matter dealt with consideration that might be given to increasing wire taps on diplomatic establishments.

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In a portion of our communication, we attributed certain information to McCone, then Director of CIA. He charged that the information attributed to him was not so because he had never made any such statement and he could prove it. The actual fact was that the information relating to McCone had been given to us by one of his subordinates who had indicated that the information originated with McCone. McCone maintained that we should have checked with him before we went on record that any information had originated with him. The record at the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board was subsequently corrected. (Memorandum Belmont to Tolson, May 16, 1963, re: "Central Intelligence Agency," 62-80750-4099)

**(31) ALLEGED PENETRATIONS OF CIA**

In February, 1965, Bureau representatives met with CIA officials and with Anatoli Golitzyn to discuss allegations made by Golitzyn, a Soviet defector, relative to alleged Soviet penetrations of CIA. Golitzyn was interviewed in detail concerning these allegations. By letter dated February 26, 1965, we officially advised CIA that there appeared to be no basis at this time for a full investigation of the individuals involved.

There are officials in CIA who continue to be seriously concerned about possible penetrations of the Agency and have not discarded Golitzyn allegations.

We do not have any reason to believe that CIA has developed any substantive evidence to support Golitzyn's allegations. If it does, we could be vulnerable and could be charged that we did not cooperate and conduct the necessary investigation in 1965.

**(32) VICE PRESIDENT NIXON'S TRIP TO SOUTH AMERICA - 1958**

In 1958, Vice President Richard M. Nixon traveled to Latin America during which time there were numerous riots and attacks which were directed against the Vice President and his party. By letter dated May 16, 1958, we provided the Vice President with a summary of information which we had received concerning the events in Latin America relating

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to the trip. Most of this information came from CIA. Our letter could be interpreted as raising the question concerning the quality of CIA's coverage in Latin America.

It is not known if CIA ever became knowledgeable of the referenced communication. As already indicated, we do know that CIA personnel have been assigned to the White House. We also know that General Robert Cushman, currently Deputy Director of CIA, was attached to Vice President Nixon's staff.

If CIA is cognizant of the communication, the Agency technically could raise a question concerning a violation of the third agency rule and, furthermore, could question the Bureau's propriety of making reference to CIA's coverage in Latin America. (Bufile - 62-88461-117)

(33) HERBERT ITKIN (S)

(S) The captioned individual is a criminal informant whom we have been utilizing to very significant advantage in New York City. He has been the source of valuable criminal intelligence and has been a key witness in prosecutions of cases being handled by the Bureau. We acquired access to Itkin through CIA. A covert CIA operator in New York City had become acquainted with Itkin, saw his potential as a source of criminal intelligence, and then conferred with James Angleton, CIA. Angleton contacted the Bureau Liaison Agent and asked if the Bureau was interested. Negotiations were initiated and we subsequently acquired the services of Itkin. (S) Although the Agency has never officially made any statement to us, it has been bitterly disappointed that the Bureau never acknowledged CIA's assistance which the Agency considered extremely valuable.

(34) EXCHANGE OF TECHNICAL INFORMATION

For many years, we maintained tight restrictions with regard to the exchange of technical information with CIA, particularly as it related to the technical surveillance field. CIA exhibited its equipment to us but, for many years, we declined to show any of our devices, with some exceptions.

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CIA never made any official protest but informally indicated from time to time that the lack of exchange in this highly important field was prejudicial to over-all intelligence and internal security interests. The Agency implied that we actually were more open with the British in this general area than we were with CIA.

It should be noted that the foregoing situation does not exist today. There is good exchange between the Bureau and CIA.

(35) CIA LECTURERS AT BUREAU TRAINING SCHOOLS

CIA has never been able to understand why the Bureau will not permit CIA personnel to lecture at Bureau schools or training courses. CIA has felt that through a careful selection of lecturers, the Agency could make a very valuable contribution both to the Bureau and to CIA. The Agency has indicated that its participation in some of our courses would give the Agency the opportunity to describe CIA's organization, objectives, and operational problems. Furthermore, it has been expressed that Bureau personnel could be given the opportunity to pose questions and there would be a far better over-all orientation on the part of our people.

The Liaison Agent has always resisted CIA's request. It has been a delicate matter to handle because Bureau personnel have lectured to hundreds of CIA employees.

(36) EXCHANGE IN THE TRAINING FIELD

Although CIA has never officially made an issue of the matter, the Agency has not been happy about our attitude concerning exchange of information in the training field. When the matter has been brought up for any discussion by CIA, the Agency has been discouraged. CIA informally has expressed the feeling that an exchange along certain guidelines could be most useful to the U. S. intelligence and internal security effort.

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(37) POSITIVE INTELLIGENCE

This is an area where discussion with CIA officials can rapidly generate criticism of the Bureau for failure to cooperate and offer the necessary assistance. Positive intelligence, briefly, is that information which might assist the U. S. Government in formulating foreign policy. Much of it is of a political nature and a vital portion pertains to scientific developments, military capabilities of foreign countries, and intentions of foreign countries. Positive intelligence is not only important as it concerns the communist-bloc countries but also the non-bloc nations.

There never has been any law, Directive, or Executive Order which has fixed the responsibilities for the clandestine collection of positive intelligence in the U. S. The Bureau does have a responsibility which we refer to as internal security and which falls into the accepted area of counterintelligence. We do investigate subversives, spys, and we develop penetrations of foreign intelligence services. Our work in the positive intelligence field, for the most part, has been restricted to the compliance of requests imposed upon us by the State Department, usually when a political crisis occurs in some country.

CIA has maintained that there is a tremendous unexplored field for expanded acquirement of positive intelligence in the U. S. This would mean vastly increased technical surveillance coverage, development of informants, and collection of cryptographic material. CIA does not feel that we have aggressively moved on this particular subject and that over the years, the Agency has been thwarted in its attempts to do much about the problem.

(S) In October, 1969, CIA requested the Bureau to install technical surveillances at the offices and temporary residences of two [Indian] Government officials visiting the U. S. Pursuant to instructions, CIA was told to seek the authority of the Attorney General. The Director stated that he did not want CIA utilizing FBI as a channel.

[Alfred S. Gonsalves, Bufile - [105-165950]] (S)  
(S)

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In the same month, CIA inquired if the Bureau would reestablish technical surveillance coverage on Zalman Shapiro who CIA felt was a key figure in the transmittal of scientific intelligence data to the (S) [Israeli Intelligence Service]. We declined to reinstitute the coverage. CIA considered the matter important because of its relationship to the Mideast Crisis.

On October 21, 1969, we told CIA that future requests from CIA for technical surveillance coverage should be transmitted by the Agency directly to the Attorney General.

CIA has never made any official comment or protest but it has considered the afore-mentioned action by the Bureau as unfriendly and uncooperative. The Agency has looked to the Bureau as the logical point of contact and as the only organization having the resources and capabilities of adequately determining if such coverage is even feasible.

(38) MISCELLANEOUS ITEMS

The Liaison Agent recalls fragments of other situations or conflicts which occurred over the years and which resulted in the voicing of CIA displeasure or criticism. The Agent cannot recall the names of the cases which is necessary to acquire the required data. There was one instance early in the 1950's which involved information received from a source of unknown reliability charging Allen Dulles with having been a communist and a spy while in Europe. We disseminated the information to several agencies. Dulles exploded but never lodged a protest.

The Agent also has recollection of instances when CIA alleged that its source or informant was compromised by Bureau revelation of CIA information during the course of interviews conducted by us. Technically, this would be a violation of the third agency rule and, if CIA had hard core facts, we would be vulnerable, particularly if an important informant was lost. CIA never made any official issue or protest.

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There also have been instances, but cases cannot be recalled, where we included CIA information in Bureau reports but CIA had requested that the information not be passed outside of the Bureau. CIA never protested.

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UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

~~SECRET~~

TO : The Director

DECLASSIFIED BY 5668 SLN/BOL  
ON 2/6/98 (JFK)

DATE: 3/13/70

FROM : SA Sam Papich

**SECRET**

~~CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO  
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR  
RELEASE OF THIS INFORMATION  
IN THIS DOCUMENT.  
AS SANITIZED  
GMB 6-22-94~~

SUBJECT: RELATIONS WITH CIA

Reference is made to my letters dated March 2 and March 5, 1970. In my letter of March 5, 1970, I stated "it is important to emphasize that the Bureau can also produce an extensive list of justified grievances." It is my understanding that the Director desired that this list be identified. Enclosed herewith is a list of approximately 75 items.

This list should not be considered absolutely complete. Preparation was predicated on my personal recollection and a review of Bureau records. To make this list more complete and specifically accurate would necessitate the review of thousands of files. The enclosed list can be supported by Bureau records. What CIA records reflect on the same items is unknown. This also must be kept in mind in connection with our evaluation of the alleged CIA grievances which I previously listed.

I realize that it is presumptuous on my part, but if the Director feels that our Bureau work can benefit by a personal discussion between the Director and myself, I am available until April 3, 1970. I plan to leave the area immediately thereafter for an extended period.

ACTION:

For information.

~~6-24-94  
Classified by SP8MAC/KSR  
Declassify on: OADR (JFK)~~

Enclosure

~~ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN  
OTHERWISE~~

*There is no  
need for a  
personal discussion.*

~~Classified by 113  
Exempt from GDS, Category 2 & 3  
Date of Declassification Indefinite~~

~~CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO  
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR  
RELEASE OF THIS INFORMATION  
IN THIS DOCUMENT. KP1-8-98~~

SECRET

4/2/98  
CLASSIFIED BY 5668 SLD/GCL  
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X1,6  
(JFK)

LIST OF BUREAU GRIEVANCES

1. ATTACKS AGAINST BUREAU (MEXICO CITY AND FRANCE - 1951)

Although Agent Papich did not begin handling Liaison with CIA until 1952, it is important to refer to highly significant differences with CIA which culminated in a serious conflict in the Fall of 1951. Our Legal Attaches in Mexico City and Paris reported that CIA representatives were attacking the Bureau, were endeavoring to place us in an unfavorable light, were questioning our jurisdiction, and were making disparaging remarks concerning the Bureau. Some of this was summed up by characterizing it as covert hostility within CIA, stemming largely from disgruntled former employees of the FBI.

In October, 1951, General Walter Beddell Smith, then Director of CIA, asked to meet with the Director and other Bureau representatives for the purpose of discussing the existing differences. General Smith denied that there was any covert hostility against the Bureau and maintained that there was a general feeling of respect for us. He admitted that there had been isolated instances of friction for which CIA must accept its share of responsibility.

It is my recollection that the Director and other Bureau officials did meet with General Smith, at which time guidelines were set forth for maintaining future relations between the two agencies. I was not able to find a memorandum of record covering this meeting. (62-80750-1712, 1715, 1716, 1726, 1728, 1748, 1750)

2. PROSELYTING OF BUREAU PERSONNEL BY CIA

The Agent clearly recalls that early in the 1950's we encountered difficulties with CIA because the Agency allegedly was recruiting Bureau-employed personnel. We vigorously protested, and subsequently the Agency advised that it would follow a policy of not having any contact with a Bureau employee until the individual had been separated from the Bureau for a period of at least thirty days. The Agent could not locate the background of this matter in the files reviewed by him. It is possible that the pertinent information lies in the personnel file of some former Bureau Agent.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO  
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR  
RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION  
IN THIS DOCUMENT AS SANITIZED  
KPI-8-98

(SECRET)

3. [NIKOLAI KHOKHLOV] (S)

By letter dated May 19, 1954, we protested to CIA for the manner in which the Agency handled the case of the captioned individual, a Soviet defector who had been placed under CIA control in Europe. The Bureau had been interested in interviewing [Khokhlov] as soon as he came to the United States, and this had been agreed to by CIA. Without notifying or consulting with us, CIA permitted [Khokhlov] to arrive in the United States and be placed in the hands of a Congressional committee. We were, therefore, unable to interview the subject in any detail. (Re: [Nikolai Khokhlov]) (S)

4. CIA EVALUATION OF MOCASE

In February, 1954, we complained to CIA because the Agency had evaluated information coming from the key source in the captioned case as emanating from a fabricator. We had disseminated certain foreign intelligence information originating in this case to CIA. The source was a key double agent in one of the most important cases handled by the Bureau, and the CIA evaluation was not proper or correct as far as we were concerned. (Re: MOCASE)

5. CASE OF [SYLVIA PRESS] (S)

(S) [Sylvia Press] was a CIA employee whom that Agency considered to be a communist penetration. The Agency requested an investigation which was then initiated by us. We subsequently learned that CIA had been conducting its own investigation which even included technical surveillance coverage on the subject. We considered this most uncooperative and we protested. (Re: [Sylvia Press]) (S)

6. DR. OTTO JOHN, VISIT TO BUREAU - 1954

Dr. Otto John, a West German security official, defected to the communists in East Germany in July, 1954. A few weeks before his defection, he came to the United States under CIA sponsorship. He was afforded a tour of the Bureau and he briefly met the Director.

It is believed that if all available facts were collected, the evidence would strongly indicate that CIA did a very ineffective job of assessing Dr. Otto John and permitting the United States Government to be embarrassed by even promoting a visit for him to this country. We could consider this instance an affront to the Director and the Bureau. (Memorandum Roach to Belmont October 13, 1954, "CIA Tours Afforded by Bureau")

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7. CASE OF POLISH SEAMEN - DEFECTORS - 1954

By letter dated October 13, 1954, a very strong letter of protest was sent to General T. J. Betts of the Interagency Defector Committee at CIA. This letter made reference to political asylum which was being considered for certain Polish sailors who had been seized by the Chinese Nationalist Government. General Betts disseminated a memorandum indicating that members of the Committee had agreed that in view of commitments made by the United States and Chinese officials, that failure to arrange re-entry for the Polish seamen would have an adverse effect on the over-all United States Defector Program. We emphasized to General Betts that this matter had never been officially presented before the Defector Committee. He was informed that his action was not conducive to mutual cooperation.

8. CIA INTERVIEW OF ALIENS IN THE UNITED STATES - DISCUSSION WITH ALLEN DULLES SEPTEMBER 27, 1955

On September 27, 1955, the Liaison Agent met with Allen Dulles, at which time the CIA Director's attention was referred to a matter which had not yet developed into a serious situation but if not properly followed could lead to conflicts between the two agencies. Dulles was referred to the contacts of aliens in the United States made by CIA personnel without first obtaining the necessary clearance from the Bureau. The requirement for such clearance was clear-cut and pursuant to an established agreement. (62-80750; memorandum Roach to Belmont September 28, 1955, "Relations with CIA")

9. CIA APPROACH OF A NATIONAL ACADEMY GRADUATE (1955)

In November, 1955, an incident arose when CIA approached a National Academy graduate to utilize his services [in Guatemala.] (S) (u) This approach was made while the graduate was attending National Academy classes. A protest was made to key CIA officials for not having advised us prior to establishing contact with the Academy graduate. [Re: Fred Fimbres] (S)

10. [DR. GEORGE ANASTOS] (S)

In December, 1955, we received information indicating that CIA was in contact with an individual whom the Bureau was developing for utilization in a double agent operation. We learned that CIA representatives had established contact with (S) [Anastos] and had given him some advice and guidance without (S) (u) first checking with the Bureau. We protested to CIA. [(105-19001)] (S)

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11. ALLEGED FABIAN SOCIALISTS IN CIA

In 1956 [General Trudeau]<sup>(S)</sup> former head of G-2, made available to the Bureau on a strictly confidential basis detailed information concerning alleged infiltration of the United States Government by "Fabian Socialists." [Trudeau]<sup>(S)</sup> furnished the names of many individuals whom he considered to fall into this category. Many of those listed were CIA executives.

This item is being listed in the event we felt that it could be used to justify that as of that period there was reason to deal with CIA in a very circumspect manner. (Memorandum Roach to Belmont January 11, 1956, "Infiltration of Fabian Socialists into the High Policy Areas of the United States Government")

12. DELAYS IN HANDLING NAME CHECK REQUESTS

By letter dated January 11, 1956, our Washington Field Office called attention to extreme delays encountered in obtaining results of name check requests submitted to CIA. These delays particularly related to investigations of applicant matters being handled by the Bureau. (Memorandum Roach to Belmont January 19, 1956 "Applicant Matters - Record Checks at CIA")

13. WILLIAM P. BUNDY

In March, 1956, Allen Dulles announced that William P. Bundy would serve as a secretary for the Intelligence Advisory Committee (IAC), of which the Bureau was a member. Bundy, son-in-law of Dean Acheson, admitted contributing to the Alger Hiss Defense Fund. At the time of this contribution, Bundy was in the same law firm with Donald Hiss, brother of Alger Hiss.

Although we did not object to the appointment of Bundy, this is another item to be kept in mind in the event we desired to uphold an argument that there was reason to be circumspect in dealings with CIA.

14. [DR.] SAMUEL ABRAHAM GOUDSMIT <sup>(S)</sup>

[Dr. Goudsmit]<sup>(S)</sup> was a leading scientist assigned to the [Brookhaven National Laboratory]. He had been used as a consultant by such agencies as the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) and CIA. [In October, 1955] he met a Soviet scientist and, with the knowledge of AEC and CIA, began cultivating him. [Goudsmit] informed <sup>(S)</sup>



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us that he had been advised by a CIA official that the FBI would be furnishing operational guidance to him. We had never become involved in any such arrangement, and we later determined that a CIA official had been in error in making the above-described misrepresentation. We protested the CIA official's handling of this matter. (Re: ~~Dr. Samuel Abraham Goudsmit~~) (S)

15. ROBERT D. WIECHA (S)

(S) On July 20, 1956, we determined that one Robert D. Wiecha had been in contact with the Czech Military Attache, Washington, D. C. We further ascertained that Wiecha was a CIA employee. We were informed by CIA on July 21, 1956, that the Agency had no information concerning Wiecha's reported contacts with the Czechs. We later interviewed Wiecha, and it was indicated that Wiecha, in fact, had been in contact with a CIA official concerning his meetings with the Czech Military Attache. We protested and CIA submitted a letter of apology. (Memorandum Belmont to Boardman July 21, 1956 "Colonel Frantisek Tisler") (S)

16. MARK GOLANSKY (S)

In July, 1956, a statement was made by a State Department official to the effect that a CIA employee allegedly had advised that the subject, a Soviet agent, was being permitted to enter the United States so that his activities could be covered and so that the Bureau would be in a position to promote a defection. The Bureau was not in possession of any information indicating that we had sanctioned the entry of the subject for the purpose described above. The State Department official was unable to recall the name of the CIA employee involved; inquiry at CIA was negative. We were not in a position to identify the CIA employee without conducting investigation within the Agency or without the Agency coming up with the identity. (Re: MARK GOLANSKY) (S)

17. MARIA KRIL (S)

By letter dated November 8, 1956, we strongly protested to CIA because representatives of that Agency had interviewed an alien in the United States without first obtaining clearance from the Bureau. It should be noted that there was a well-established agreement whereby it was incumbent upon CIA to first check with the Bureau before interviewing any alien in the United States. (Letter to CIA November 8, 1956, "Maria Kril") (S)

18. DARRELL PATRICK HAMMER (S)

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(S) Hammer was a former student at Columbia University with whom we had been in contact because of his association with a Soviet assigned to the United Nations. (S) In December, 1956, Hammer made a trip to Russia where he was contacted by an unidentified individual and was given a letter indicating that the writer was a Colonel in the KGB and that he was interested in cooperating with the United States. When Hammer (S) returned to the United States, we permitted CIA to interview the subject because of the Agency's foreign intelligence interests. We subsequently interviewed Hammer (S) at which time he informed us that he had been cautioned by CIA not to furnish pertinent information to the Bureau. CIA denied that any such statement was made. (Re: Darrell Patrick Hammer) (S)

19. CIA REQUEST FOR INFORMATION CONCERNING A HIGH-SPEED CAMERA-1957

The San Francisco Office furnished information indicating that CIA had requested a firm in California to furnish that Agency information regarding all foreign inquiries pertaining to a high-speed camera manufactured by the company. The matter was reviewed because we wanted to be certain that CIA was not invading our jurisdiction. We did not develop evidence that CIA had overstepped its jurisdiction. The Director did make a notation, "O.K., but it does seem to me we give CIA a pretty wide authority to explore such a field. H" (Memorandum Belmont to Boardman April 10, 1957, ["Flow of Intelligence Information to Soviets and Satellites through So-Called Channels"])

20. BOSEN SUN (S)

On May 28, 1957, CIA advised that one of its representatives in the field had interviewed the captioned Chinese (S) alien who had agreed to cooperate with the Agency after he returned to Red China. (S) CIA conducted this interview without first obtaining clearance from the Bureau. Such clearance was necessary pursuant to an established agreement. A vigorous protest was made to the Agency. (Re: Bosen Sun - 100-385852) (S)

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21. CIA REQUEST FOR TOUR FOR COLOMBIAN INTELLIGENCE SERVICE REPRESENTATIVES - 1957 (S)

(S) In July, 1957, CIA requested a tour for several Colombian officials who were coming to this country under CIA invitation. CIA was told that no tours would be given to the Colombians, because in the past a Colombian ambassador had grossly insulted the Bureau after we had arrested the ambassador's chauffeur on White Slave Traffic Act charge. (S) (U)

If we so desired, we could give consideration to accusing CIA of trying to impose upon us individuals whom we considered undesirable in light of the foregoing.

(Memorandum July 15, 1957, Roach to Belmont "Representatives of Colombian Intelligence Service" - Request for Bureau Tour by CIA") (S) (U)

22. REQUEST FOR SECURITY SURVEY OF COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS - NEW YORK CITY - 1957 (S) (U)

On November 15, 1957, our New York Office was contacted by the local CIA representative who desired to be informed if the Bureau could conduct a security survey of the premises of the Council on Foreign Relations which were located across the street from a building occupied by the Soviet - United Nations Delegation. The CIA representative indicated that his visit to our office was pursuant to instructions received from Allen Dulles who allegedly was concerned about the possibility of the Soviets establishing coverage of conversations and discussions which might be held at the Council. It should be noted that the Council included as members many well-known personalities, including officials of the United States Government. (S) (U)

Pursuant to instructions, Allen Dulles was informed on November 18, 1957, that we did not like the approach used by CIA in that such a sensitive matter had been taken up at the field level rather than through Bureau Headquarters. (Memorandum Roach to Belmont November 19, 1957, re "Council on Foreign Relations") (S) (U)

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23. [TADEUSZ LESER] (S)

In October, 1957, we received information from [Leser] (S) indicating that [a Polish] (S) scientist then visiting in the United States might defect. We followed developments through [Leser] (S) and we kept CIA advised. The Agency was fully aware of the (S) situation and particularly knew that we were in contact with (S) [Leser.] We subsequently received information indicating that (S) [Frederick McCann,] a CIA employee, established contact with (S) (S) [Leser] for the purpose of developing information concerning the (S) work of [Polish] (S) scientists. A protest was made to CIA for not properly coordinating their interests with us, bearing in mind that the action taken by [McCann] (S) possibly could have jeopardized (S) a Bureau operation. (Re: [Jerzy Leon Nowinski - 105-63094]) (S)

24. [IOAN FLOREA] (S)

By letter dated February 10, 1958, we directed a protest to CIA charging that Agency with interviewing the subject, (S) [a Romanian] (S) alien, without first obtaining the necessary clearance from the Bureau. (Re: [Ioan Florea - 105-62486]) (S)

25. ALLEGED IMPERSONATION OF FBI EMPLOYEE

On April 23, 1958, we received information indicating that a CIA employee allegedly had represented herself as being with the FBI when she tried to arrange an interview with (S) [Rudoph Faupl,] an official of the International Association of Machinists in Washington, D. C. (S) [Faupl] gave a signed statement in which he claimed that he had received a phone call from a Miss [Davis] (S) who said she was with the FBI. Upon checking with (S) CIA, we were informed that Miss [Davis] (S) denied that she had made (S) such representation. (Memorandum Roach to Belmont April 25, 1958, "Unknown Subject; [Rudoph Faupl]") (S)

26. [ANDREW TOGAN] (S)

By letter dated May 12, 1958, the Bureau protested to CIA for interviewing an alien in the Detroit area without first obtaining the necessary clearance from the Bureau. Such clearance was necessary pursuant to established agreement. (Re: [Andrew Togan - 105-68013]) (S)

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27. STEWART WALLACE BUCHANAN (S)

We received information in May, 1958, that Buchanan, (S) a CIA employee, was listed as being employed with the Bureau in the records of the District of Columbia National Guard. The information was developed as the result of an investigation being conducted by the Bureau for the White House.

(S) Buchanan furnished a signed statement indicating that he personally had no knowledge of the existence of the above information in the National Guard records. (S)

(Memorandum Roach to Belmont May 17, 1958, "Alleged Representation by CIA Employee of Employment with FBI")

28. CORNEL MUNTIU

By letter dated June 10, 1958, we protested to CIA for not advising us concerning that Agency's interview of an individual who was the subject of a Bureau investigation. We had been corresponding with CIA concerning the subject, and the Agency should have been aware of our interests.  
(Re: Cornel Muntiu - 105-58749)

29. ALLEGED CIA INCOMPETENCE AND ALLEGED PENETRATION OF UNITED STATES AGENCIES

By letter dated June 3, 1958, Legat, Tokyo, (S) furnished information volunteered to him by Colonel James Riley (S) of G-2. (S) Riley was very strong in his denunciation of CIA. He indicated that the Agency was incompetent and that it was penetrating other United States agencies. He also mentioned that when Allen Dulles was in Switzerland, Dulles was intimate with a woman, not identified. (S)

The above is being cited in the event we desire to use this information as evidence for supporting a position of being circumspect in dealings with the CIA.

(Letter dated June 3, 1958, from Legat, Tokyo, (S) "Relations with CIA") (S)

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30. GENERAL REINHARD GEHLEN (S)

The Legal Attache, Bonn, advised by letter dated June 10, 1958, that he had been invited to visit General Reinhard Gehlen, the head of the West German Intelligence Service. CIA became aware of this invitation, and an Agency representative informed our Legal Attache that it was not desired that the Legat visit with Gehlen. Our Legat was instructed by the Bureau to accept the invitation regardless of the CIA position.

We could evaluate the CIA position in this matter as being uncooperative. (Memorandum Roach to Belmont June 17, 1958, "Relations with CIA")

31. CIA INTEREST IN CHINESE ALIENS (S)

In June, 1958, we raised the question concerning CIA's failure to adhere to an agreement relating to CIA's recruitment of Chinese aliens in the United States for overseas intelligence operations. Under the agreement, CIA was not to approach any Chinese alien without first checking with us. A situation developed in Illinois indicating that CIA allegedly had become interested in recruiting an alien and even took some action without first checking with us. We expressed our disapproval in a letter to CIA June 12, 1958. (Memorandum Belmont to Boardman June 9, 1958, "Recruitment of Chinese Aliens in the United States for Overseas Intelligence Operations")

32. CIA OFFICIAL'S CRITICISM OF "MASTERS OF DECEIT"

Our Legal Attache, Tokyo, obtained a copy of a memorandum sent to an official in our Embassy in Tokyo by John Baker, Chief of the CIA Office in Japan. In his communication Baker belittled the value of "Masters of Deceit" as an anticommunist weapon in foreign countries. He claimed that the book pertained only to the Communist Party, USA, which he characterized as a small, ineffective, fraction-ridden organization. He stated that the author of the book was not an intellectual but rather a policeman. (Memorandum Roach to Belmont June 12 and 24, 1958, "Masters of Deceit.")

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33. CIA DEVELOPMENT OF (S) [INDONESIAN] GOVERNMENT SOURCES IN (S) THE UNITED STATES (S)

In May, 1958, CIA furnished identifying and background data concerning three individuals - [Paul Pesik, Yassy Derachman] and [Patricia O'Hara] all employees of the (S) [Indonesian] Government and assigned to the United States.

(S) [Pesik] had been developed as a source of information by CIA in [Mexico City]. (S) [Derachman] came to CIA in Washington, D. C. and volunteered his services. (S) [O'Hara] had been developed as a source by CIA and had been furnishing some information to the Agency. In a letter dated June 24, 1958, we told CIA that in the case of [O'Hara] we felt that the Agency should have notified us at an earlier date in order that we could have considered exploitation for internal security purposes at the outset. (Re: [Indonesian] Activities - [100-254749]) (S)

34. [MICHAL GOLENIEWSKI, AKA DR. HEINRICH SCHUTZE] (S)

The subject, a former member of the Polish intelligence Service, defected to the United States and furnished extremely valuable information. The beginnings of this case include information raising questions concerning CIA cooperation.

In June, 1958, we developed information indicating that CIA May have opened a letter in [Switzerland] which had been addressed to the Director by an individual who had identified himself as [Dr. Heinrich Schutze]. (S) The writer further indicated that he might be connected with the [Polish] Intelligence Service. The letter addressed to the Director had been placed in an envelope which, in turn, had ended up in the office of the [United States Ambassador in Switzerland]. (S) We subsequently received a copy of the particular communication from CIA, and the contents were such at that time that no action was required by the Bureau. We asked CIA for particulars leading to the alleged opening of the letter which had been addressed to the Director. CIA claimed that it had not opened the letter. We were confidentially informed by an Agency representative that the [Ambassador] had opened the letter and then referred the matter to CIA. The contents were such that investigative action of an extensive nature was required by CIA in Europe. What actually happened at the United States Embassy is something we may never know. [Michal Goleniewski - 65-65192] (S)

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35. CHEN Tseng-tao (S)

By letter dated June 26, 1958, we voiced our concern regarding CIA's alleged interview of a Chinese alien whom CIA (S) was considering for overseas recruitment. CIA denied that an approach of the alien had been made. Our investigation contradicted the statements emanating from CIA. (Re CHEN Tseng-tao) (S)  
(~~S~~) Bureau file 134-5243) (S)

36. COMPROMISE OF FBI TECHNICAL SURVEILLANCE COVERAGE (S)

On July 18, 1958, CIA requested the Bureau for permission to play a recording of a telephone conversation (S) obtained by the Bureau to King Hussein of Jordan. (S) The (~~S~~) recording had been developed through our sensitive coverage of the Egyptian Embassy in Washington, D. C. On June 5, 1958, we had obtained the contents of a conversation between Mahmoud Rousan of the Jordanian Embassy and the Egyptian Air Attache. (S) The conversation strongly indicated that Rousan was working closely with the Egyptians. (S) Subsequently, CIA developed information indicating that Rousan was a key figure in a revolutionary plot, the objective of which was to overthrow King Hussein. (S) (U)

(S) Rousan returned to Jordan (S) and was imprisoned by (S) King Hussein based upon information made available through CIA. (S) Rousan denied any implication in any revolutionary activity and he was strongly supported by certain top officials in the (S) Jordanian Government. (S) The King told CIA that he was on the spot and that he needed proof of Rousan's conspiratorial activity. CIA asked if we would permit the recording to be played to the King, stressing that this was the only way King Hussien could be convinced. (S) (U)

On July 18, 1958, a CIA official was advised that the Bureau positively would not grant permission to playing of the recording. (S) We maintained that if we granted such permission, our other coverage of a sensitive nature could be seriously imperiled. (S) (U)

On July 21, 1958, Allen Dulles asked if the Bureau would reconsider its position in view of the critical situation in the Middle East. (S) Pursuant to instructions, CIA was then told that in view of the position in which the Bureau had been placed, we acceded to Dulles' request. CIA was further told that we were seriously considering the termination of all of our technical surveillances because we did not intend to be placed in such a position in the future. (S) (U)

On July 22, 1958, Dulles told the Liaison Agent that he was very much disturbed over the Director's reaction. He stated that he was not interested in holding a pistol to (S) (U)



anybody's head and he further indicated that he was deliberating whether or not the [recording] should be used. It was recommended that the Liaison Agent follow the matter for the purpose of determining if the [recording] was to be used by CIA. The Director's notation was, "No. The fat is in the fire now and it is useless to waste any more time on it. We will probably hear of any details in Pearson's column. H." (S)(U)

The strong position we took in resisting the dissemination of such sensitive information to a foreign government was fully justified. (Memorandum Roach to Belmont, dated July 22, 1958, re "CIA Request for Permission to Play Technical Surveillance Recording to King Hussien, Jordan") (S)(U)

37. CIA ALLEGED PARTICIPATION IN MEXICAN GOVERNMENT DEPORTATION OF AMERICAN COMMUNISTS (S)(U)

In 1958, CIA officially informed us that it was engaged in a program designed to disrupt overall communist activity in Mexico. We became concerned because this program was to involve deportation of undesirables, including American communists residing in Mexico. The implementation of such a program would have resulted in the return of American communists to the United States. CIA denied that it was engaged in any operation specifically designed to oust American communists. In September, 1958, we were informed that the Mexican Government had embarked on a strong anticommunist program and certain Americans were ordered deported. We checked with CIA and the Agency's chief in Mexico City claimed that his Agency was not involved. (S)(U)

The Liaison Agent subsequently was informed on a strictly confidential basis that the American Ambassador had been in contact with certain Mexican officials concerning possible anticommunist activities. The Ambassador had consulted with the local CIA chief and had asked for a list of Americans who could be considered as being deportable. The CIA officer reportedly furnished a list of approximately 40 names. (memorandum Roach to Belmont, September 17, 1958, "Legal Attache's Office, Mexico City, Relationship with Embassy and CIA") (S)

38. CASSIUS TULCEA (S)

We expressed our displeasure to CIA in [September, 1958] because of that Agency's unauthorized investigation in the United States of a [Romanian] citizen who was here in connection with an exchange program. The [Romanian] indicated to an American friend that he was interested in staying in the United States, but was not ready for actual defection because of a (S)(U)

possible hostage situation in his native country. The Bureau was following this potential defection and pursuant to established procedures was keeping interested agencies apprised of developments. On September 15, 1958, we received information indicating that another Government agency was conducting an investigation of the subject. It was later established that CIA was the other agency. (Re [Cassius Tulcea,] Bureau file ~~(S)~~ [105-64024] (S) (S))

### 39. CIA ACTIVITIES IN THE PHILIPPINES (S) (U)

The Legal Attache, Tokyo, reported by letter dated September 22, 1958, that [Colonel Tenorio, Chief of Police,] (S) Manila, was a paid, highly regarded, and very sensitive source of CIA. This information was given to the Legal Attache by (S) Colonel John B. Stanley, G2 Head in Japan. According to [Stanley,] (S) CIA did not want this information to be known to other agencies, particularly the FBI. The Director's notation was, "Some more of CIA double dealing. H." (Letter from Legat, Tokyo, dated September 22, 1958, "Investigations in Hong Kong and Manila, Philippines")

### 40. ALLEGED CIA INCOMPETENCE (S)

During the period October [20-25,] 1958, Bureau representatives attended a seminar at Orlando, Florida, which was given by the U.S. Air Force. (S) Among the activities was a lecture given by [John B. Corbett,] (S) of CIA. Subsequent to the (S) briefing, General [Millard Young,] (S) of the Air Force confided to Bureau representatives and expressed his displeasure with the briefing given by [Corbett,] (S) He was particularly critical of (S) (S) [Corbett's] reluctance to furnish certain information, using the (S) excuse that the matter was of a "Top Secret" nature. General (S) [Young] stated that the position taken by [Corbett] was only an (S) excuse for incompetence on the part of CIA. (S)

This item is being cited in the event we desire to use the foregoing as evidence to support a position that we were obliged to be circumspect in dealing with CIA. (Memorandum October 28, 1958, Roach to Belmont, [Joint Strategic Planning] (S) Seminar, Orlando Air Force Base, Orlando, Florida, October [20-25,] (S) 1958")

### 41. CIA COVERAGE IN CUBA PRIOR TO OVERTHROW OF BATISTA GOVERNMENT

The overthrow of the Batista Government on January 1, 1959, and the subsequent assumption of power by Castro raised questions concerning the efficiency and competence of U.S. intelligence. Allen Dulles indicated that future developments would

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show that many more people were involved in the Castro organization than the U.S. Government had realized. Information coming to our attention suggested the possibility that both State and CIA had failed to assess developments in Cuba properly.

The foregoing is cited in the event that we found reason to question the competency of [CIA in Cuba.] This could be useful if we wanted to justify the existence of a Legal Attache office in Havana. One could also comment that poor coverage in Cuba had an indirect and adverse effect on our operations in the United States. (S) (U)

42. [MIKHAIL N. KOSTYUK] (S)

By letter dated April 25, 1959, we voiced our objections to CIA for giving guidance to an individual with whom we had been maintaining contact for the purpose of developing him as a double agent. (S) The individual involved was [Dr. William Randolph Lovelace II,] a well-known expert in the field of (S) (S) (S) [medical] research as it applied to space flying. [Lovelace] was also a contract agent of CIA and had occasion to handle sensitive matters for that Agency. (S) In April, [1959, Lovelace] was preparing to make a trip to Moscow. CIA briefed him on matters as they applied to his trip. The Agency also interviewed him concerning his relationship with the subject in Washington, D. C., and, furthermore, gave him guidance concerning the relationship. We objected to CIA giving any guidance to [Lovelace] concerning (S) his contacts with the subject without first consulting with us. (S) (S) [Mikhail N. Kostyuk,] Bureau file [105-69694] (S)

43. ALLEGED BELITTLING OF COMMUNISM BY ALLEN DULLES

In July, 1959, Allen Dulles of CIA spoke at the National Strategy Seminar of the National War College. One of the professors handling the Seminar was critical of Dulles. He claimed that Dulles had belittled the importance of the communist problem.

The above is being cited in the event we desire to utilize the information in justifying a position that it was necessary to be circumspect with CIA. (Memorandum W. C. Sullivan to Belmont, August 14, 1969, "National Strategy Seminar, National War College, July, 1959")

44. "TRUE" MAGAZINE ARTICLE - SEPTEMBER, 1959

In September, 1959, "True" magazine carried an article captioned "Allen Dulles: America's Global Sherlock," which included information of a derogatory nature concerning the Director and the Bureau. The article precipitated a crisis

which led to an almost open break between the Bureau and CIA. The article was written by Arthur Paul McCarry who was connected with the International Labor Organization in Geneva, Switzerland, and who had been utilized as an informant by CIA.] The article was very complimentary toward CIA. The author made reference to relations between the Bureau and CIA and quite clearly indicated that they were strained. He claimed that the CIA took Agents from FBI; that Agents did not remain in the Bureau for an extended period; and he related a story very critical of the Director.

We learned that the author had been in contact with CIA when he was preparing the article. We were told that (S) Lyman Kirkpatrick, a CIA official, had read and approved the article prior to its publication. As a result of this information, (S) Kirkpatrick became persona non grata with the Bureau.

The Liaison Agent had conferred with both Dulles and (S) Kirkpatrick concerning the matter. We took the position that based upon the information made available CIA had promoted, condoned, or possibly even authored the article. Dulles denied that this was so and then (S) Kirkpatrick produced information indicating that he had been knowledgeable of the author's article before it was published. The author had contacted (S) Stanley Grogan, one of (S) Kirkpatrick's subordinates, and had discussed the matter with him. The author allegedly had raised the question of strained relations between the two agencies and at that time (S) Grogan reportedly told the author that relations were not strained, but were satisfactory. Nevertheless, the final draft of the article included the derogatory information and the facts available to us indicate that (S) Kirkpatrick had the opportunity to alert the Bureau to the existence of the article before it was published. He did not do so. He told us that this was an oversight.

Consideration was given to severance of liaison relations. It was recommended and approved that liaison continue and that we keep Dulles and CIA on the string as to what course of action we were going to take. It was suggested that we not immediately answer letters which had been sent to the Bureau by Dulles and (S) Kirkpatrick in connection with this particular matter. It was also recommended and approved that we cut off all contact with (S) Kirkpatrick.

By letter dated September 11, 1959, to Dulles, the Director expressed his keen disappointment because officials of CIA, when they had the opportunity, had failed to voice any concern or objection to "True" magazine, and furthermore, had failed

to notify the Bureau. A letter dated September 16, 1959, was also sent to Kirkpatrick and he was told that the Bureau was disappointed in him because he had failed to make any objection to the article and had not alerted us concerning the impending attack against the Bureau. (Memorandum Frohbose to Belmont, August 27, 1959, "Allen Dulles: America's Global Sherlock, 'True' Magazine, September, 1959"; and Memorandum Frohbose to Belmont, September 4, 1959, "Allen Dulles")

#### 45. ACTIVITIES OF CONTACTS DIVISION OF CIA - 1959

We received information in September, 1959, that the Contacts Division of CIA had held interviews with American businessmen in the Boston area, which dealt with meetings between the businessmen and visiting Soviets. CIA reportedly was interested in developing positive intelligence information, but it so happened that one of the Soviets was involved in a double agent operation being handled by the Bureau. The Bureau already had notified CIA of our interest in the Soviet. By letter dated September 29, 1959, we voiced our objection to the manner in which CIA had handled this. (Re Bernard M. Gordon, Bureau file [134-8493])

#### 46. APPEARANCE OF COLONEL FRANTISEK TISLER BEFORE THE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON UNAMERICAN ACTIVITIES (HCUA) - 1959

On November 6, 1959, information was received indicating that HCUA was interested in obtaining Colonel Frantisek Tisler, a Czech defector, to testify before the Committee. HCUA advised us that it had contacted the State Department who, in turn, had conferred with CIA. Allen Dulles allegedly informed HCUA that Tisler was agreeable to appearing before the Committee and that he would be made available pursuant to certain security instructions.

The Director asked whether or not CIA had authority to make a defector available to a congressional committee without first checking with other interested agencies. The Director was informed that CIA did not have such authority because a National Security Council directive made it very clear that this could not be done without processing the matter through the Inter-Agency Defector Committee. In this particular case the aforementioned Committee had not called a meeting, but the chairman, a CIA official, had made certain phone calls. A Bureau representative was contacted by phone on November 6, 1959, but at that time we had not formulated a position. Allen Dulles allegedly contacted the chairman of the Committee and was told that the Committee had no objection to making Tisler available.

On November 13, 1959, CIA representatives were informed that we were opposed to making the defector available to HCUA. On that same date we were told that CIA was informing HCUA it was reversing its position and that upon reconsideration, it did not feel that Tisler could be made available.

By memorandum dated November 14, 1959, the developments in this matter were reviewed and it was recommended that at the next Inter-Agency Defector Committee meeting we strongly protest CIA's dereliction in the handling of the HCUA request. (Bureau file 105-38958)

#### 47. CRITICISM OF DIRECTOR

On April 11, 1960, [Ray Tanner, President] of Reicco Company, Caracas, Venezuela, informed the Bureau that he recently held a conversation with [Herschel Peak], an official of the U.S. Embassy in Caracas. [Peak] was a CIA employee. [Peak] took exception to complimentary statements made by [Tanner] concerning the Director and the FBI. [Peak] stated that the Director should have retired five years ago for the good of all concerned. A protest was made to Allen Dulles on April 20, 1960. (Memorandum Frohbose to Belmont, April 21, 1960, ["Herschel F. Peak, Jr."])

#### 48. ROBERT AMORY, CIA OFFICIAL ALLEGEDLY ADVOCATING RECOGNITION OF RED CHINA - 1960

In February, 1960, [Dr. Frank Barnett, Director of Research] for the Richardson Foundation, volunteered information concerning statements allegedly made by Robert Amory, a top CIA official. [Amory] allegedly advocated recognition of Red China.

This matter was called to the attention of Allen Dulles and on April 20, 1960, Dulles informed the Liaison Agent that he had conducted an inquiry, had reviewed a tape recording of [Amory's] talk, and was satisfied that [Amory] had not made the statement attributed to him.

The above is being cited in the event we desire to dispute the position taken by Dulles. If the evidence clearly established that [Amory] had made such a statement, we could use the information to support a position that we would have been warranted in being most circumspect with CIA. (Memorandum Frohbose to Belmont, April 21, 1960, ["Robert Amory"])

#### 49. ALLEGED INSTALLATION OF MICROPHONES ON U.S. PREMISES ABROAD BY CIA

A State Department representative informed the Bureau that a microphone had been found in the U.S. Embassy, Mexico City; that it had been planted by CIA; and that Allen Dulles allegedly

had maintained that if CIA was to operate effectively, it had to know what was going on in U.S. establishments. The implication was left that CIA was covering activities of other U.S. agencies through technical installations. Inquiries developed information indicating that CIA had installed a microphone in the Embassy in 1952 at the request of a State Department official. The Office of Security in State Department was contacted in an effort to pin this down in a more specific manner. We were told by State that their records did not contain any information concerning the microphone.

Subsequently, a letter was transmitted to all Legal Attaches instructing them to be on the alert for technical installations which may affect Bureau operations. (Memorandum L'Allier to Belmont, May 2, 1960, "Installation of Microphones on U.S. Premises Abroad by CIA")

50. [JOSE PAZ NOVAS] (S)

We received information indicating that the subject, a [former Cuban] intelligence agent and the subject of a Bureau investigation, had planned to defect [in New York City.] We permitted a CIA representative to contact the subject in order to orient him so that maximum propaganda effect would be derived through newspaper publicity. We were told that the CIA representative [in New York City] had been instructed by his headquarters to tell the subject that he would not be prosecuted by the U.S. Government. We complained to CIA stressing that the Agency had no power or authority to promise the subject immunity. (Memorandum L'Allier to Belmont, September 30, 1960, ["Jose Paz Novas"]) (S)

51. [CECILIE CHABOT] (S)

Miss [Barbara Bullard], a CIA employee, obtained a position as a secretary in the Office of [the Tunisian Delegation] to the United Nations. Prior to receiving this job, CIA checked with the Bureau. The Liaison Agent subsequently learned that [Bullard] had informed [the Tunisians] that she was leaving her job. The [Tunisians] inquired if she could recommend somebody else. She gave them the name of another CIA employee, Miss [Cecilie Chabot]. (S)

The Liaison Agent informed CIA that the Agency was out of line by not first checking with the Bureau before recommending [Chabot] to [the Tunisians]; that the Bureau was interested in developing intelligence information which might be useful to the U.S. Government; and that, in this instance, CIA was obstructing operations by not appropriately coordinating with the Bureau. (Memorandum L'Allier to Belmont, October 31, 1960, ["Cecilie Chabot"]) (S)

52. CIA USE OF BUREAU INFORMATION IN  
A U.S. INTELLIGENCE BOARD DOCUMENT

On March 30, 1961, the Liaison Agent contacted Allen Dulles concerning CIA's failure to obtain Bureau clearance for use of our information in a U.S. Intelligence Board document. No known damage had been done, but the Agent stressed the sensitivity of the Bureau information. Dulles requested one of his subordinates to establish a procedure to prevent a recurrence of such errors. (Memorandum L'Allier to Belmont, March 30, 1961,

["SOLO"] ~~(S)~~ (U)

53. "SPY IN THE U.S." BOOK AUTHORED BY PAWEL MONAT

In July, 1961, our Chicago Office received galley proofs of the book "Spy in the U.S.," written by Pawel Monat. A review of these proofs disclosed several references which portrayed our counterespionage capabilities in an unfavorable light. Since CIA was responsible for Monat and for any writing which he might perform, the matter was discussed with CIA. It turned out that CIA had not been following the preparation of the book. We were told that steps would be taken to protect Bureau interest. The publishers had indicated to CIA that they would cooperate on changes. Although some changes were made, the book still came out with some information which was not entirely favorable to the Bureau. (Pawel Monat, Bureau file 105-40510)

54. CONFLICT WITH LEGAL ATTACHE, [MEXICO CITY] - 1961 ~~(S)~~ (U)

On October 6, 1961, our Legal Attache, [Mexico City,] ~~(S)~~ (U) received information indicating that the [Czech Embassy] in that ~~(S)~~ (U) city was planning to protest harassment of its personnel by U.S. Intelligence. The Legal Attache was told by the [local CIA office] ~~(S)~~ (U) that the Agency was not involved. On October 12, 1961, the same CIA officer changed his position and admitted that CIA had been involved to a certain extent. The Liaison Agent objected to these tactics. It was important to him to know the facts so he could be guided accordingly. (Memorandum L'Allier to Sullivan, October 18, 1961, ["Czechoslovakian Diplomatic Activities"] - Mexico") ~~(S)~~ (U)

55. CIA TECHNICAL SURVEILLANCE ACTIVITY IN THE UNITED STATES - 1961

When he defected in December, 1961, [Anatoliy Golitzyn] ~~(S)~~ (U) furnished information concerning alleged penetration of American intelligence. Inquiries and review conducted by CIA within the Agency suggested that a CIA intelligence officer, [Serge Karlow] ~~(S)~~ (U) was a logical suspect. We conferred with CIA and on February 9, 1962, we advised the Agency that we would take over the investigation.



**SECRET**

On February 7, 1962, Colonel Sheffield Edwards, Director of Security, CIA, informed the Liaison Agent that CIA was preparing a report containing extremely sensitive information. He stated that this information came from a sensitive source and he was not certain as to how it should be handled. As a result of a discussion with Edwards on February 26, 1962, it was ascertained that CIA had maintained a technical surveillance on [Karlow] over an extended period. (S) Edwards explained that he had been reluctant to identify this source at an earlier date because he feared that prosecution could have been jeopardized and, furthermore, he did not want his Agency embarrassed in the event the Bureau objected to CIA maintaining a capability such as technical surveillances. It was made emphatically clear to Edwards that it was absolutely necessary that we be provided with all the details and, furthermore, that CIA, at the outset, should have apprised us of the existence of the coverage. The Director made the notation, "I only wish we would eventually realize CIA can never be depended upon to deal forthrightly with us. Certainly my skepticism isn't based on prejudice nor suspicion, but on specific instances of all too many in number. Yet, there exists wistful belief that the 'leopard has changed his spots.' H." (Memorandum Branigan to Sullivan February 27, 1962, ["Unknown Subject; KGB Agent Known as 'Sasha'"]) (S)

56. ISAAC MONCARZ (S)

In February, 1962, the Liaison Agent was requested to discuss with CIA a case which, in our opinion, clearly indicated CIA had failed to keep us appropriately informed of developments. The Bureau's original interest was initiated in Miami as a result of a discussion with CIA personnel in that city. Attempts to get CIA replies via correspondence were negative. On February 13, 1962, the Liaison Agent discussed the matter with CIA and received a reply which did not adequately satisfy the Bureau's request. (Memorandum Donahoe to Sullivan, February 27, 1962, and Brennan to Sullivan, March 2, 1962; Bureau file [105-99947]) (S)

57. CIA WIRE TAPPING IN THE UNITED STATES

Sometime prior to the Bay of Pigs fiasco, CIA had become involved in a weird plan designed to bring about the assassination of Fidel Castro. One of the principal ingredients of this plan was to be the utilization of U.S. hoodlums: CIA established contact with Robert Maheu, former Bureau Agent, who served as the intermediary in dealings with the notorious hoodlum, Sam Giancana.

**SECRET**

The entire operation fell apart when we developed information indicating that Maheu was behind a wire tapping operation in Nevada. Potentially, there were elements for possible violation of unauthorized publication or use of communications. However, prosecution was out of the question because of the tainted involvement of CIA. (Arthur James Balletti, "Unauthorized Publication or Use of Communications" and memorandum from the Director to Mr. Tolson, dated May 10, 1962)

58. ALWIN ODIO TAMAYO (S)

In October, 1962, we lodged a protest with CIA because the Agency initiated operation of Cuban agents in the Miami area and in so doing violated Bureau jurisdiction. Arrangements were subsequently effected where the source in the matter was turned over to the Bureau for handling. (Memorandum Brennan to Sullivan, October 29, 1962, ["Alwin Odio Tamayo"]) (S)

59. THELMA KING (S)

On April 23, 1963, CIA requested that the Bureau establish coverage on a visiting Panamanian national. We ~~(S)~~ (U) immediately instituted investigation and then determined that CIA actually had been instrumental in supporting the subject's trip to the United States. CIA had been endeavoring to recruit the subject. On April 29, 1963, a strong protest was lodged with General Carter, Deputy Director of CIA. (Memorandum Brennan to Sullivan, April 26, 1963, ["Thelma King"]) (S)

60. ALLEGED ATTACK ON BUREAU BY JOHN McCONE

We received information in December, 1963, indicating that John McCone, Director of CIA, allegedly was attacking the Bureau in what would appear to be a vicious and underhanded manner. McCone allegedly informed Congressman Jerry Ford and Drew Pearson that CIA had uncovered a plot in Mexico City indicating that Lee Harvey Oswald had received \$6,500 to assassinate President Kennedy. The story attributed to McCone appeared to be related to information which had come from one Gilberto Alvarado, a Nicaraguan national. Interrogation of Alvarado, including a polygraph, disclosed that he had fabricated his story. This had been made known to CIA and to McCone. Therefore, if McCone had made the above statements to Ford and Pearson, it would appear that it would have been an obvious attempt to ridicule the Bureau. The Liaison Agent contacted McCone on December 23, 1963. McCone vehemently denied the allegations. (Memorandum Brennan to Sullivan, December 23, 1963, "Relations With CIA")

61. [YURI NOSENKO] (S)

The subject is a Soviet national who first made contact with CIA in [1962] expressing a desire to cooperate. He openly defected in [1964] and he is currently in the United States. He has been the source of considerable controversy because of questions raised pertaining to his bona fides. Early in [1964] CIA took a very strong position indicating that [Nosenko] was a plant. The Bureau did not make a commitment on bona fides. In the meantime, [Nosenko] although controversial, continues to furnish voluminous information.

It is possible that at some future date the issue of bona fides will be conclusively resolved and the action taken by the Bureau so far will have been justified. This is important to be kept in mind as far as the future is concerned.

If it is finally concluded that [Nosenko] is a bona fide defector, CIA could be charged with gross mishandling of the subject over a period of years. [Yuri Nosenko] Bureau file [65-68530]

62. [JOSE RAFAEL SUAREZ-ARCOS] (S)

On April 13, 1964, the Liaison Agent protested to CIA because the Agency had failed to notify the Bureau concerning the past utilization of an individual as a double agent in an operation directed against the Soviets [in Mexico]. The individual in this case was serving as an [Ecuadorian Consul] in Texas in 1964 and because CIA did not notify us concerning the past, our interests could have been jeopardized, bearing in mind that the [Ecuadorian] could have been in contact with the Soviets without our knowledge. CIA had severed its relationship with the [Ecuadorian] prior to his [consular] assignment in the United States, but CIA, nevertheless had an obligation to give us proper notification. (Memorandum Brennan to Sullivan, April 7, 1964, [Jose Rafael Suarez-Arcos])

63. CIA COVERT ACTIVITY [IN MIAMI] - 1965 (S)(U)

We received information in June, 1965, that certain [Cuban exiles in the Miami area] were representing themselves as [being with the "Department of National Security." These exiles had been interviewing Cuban refugees concerning political conditions in Cuba.] We ascertained that this activity was being performed in behalf of CIA, who had issued credentials to the [exiles under the cover of "Department of National Security."] We protested, bearing in mind that the cover being used could cause embarrassment to the United States and could impose a problem for the Bureau because we would become the recipients

of impersonation complaints. CIA was requested to take immediate steps to correct the undesirable situation. We were subsequently informed by CIA that the credentials had been withdrawn and that the cover would no longer be used. (Memorandum Brennan to Sullivan, June 21, 1965, "Central Intelligence Agency - Operations [in Miami]")

64. JEAN HENRY ELIE (S)

(S) In August, 1965, both the Bureau and CIA had an interest in assessing the potential utilization of the services of [Jean Henry Elie], a Haitian [exile] residing in the United States. We were interested in [Elie] because he potentially could furnish information concerning [Haitian] [exiles] in this country and the Agency wanted to utilize him in overseas intelligence operations. We informed CIA that [Elie] would not be made available to the Agency. CIA appealed and asked that we reconsider our position because of the potentially high value of [Elie] in the proposed CIA operation. While we were negotiating with CIA, we determined that the Agency was already in contact with the subject and was conferring with him. We subsequently protested to the Agency who claimed that it had not been out of line in contacting [Elie] because the Agency had maintained a relationship with him in the past. We did not accept this explanation. (Memorandum Brennan to Sullivan, September 2, 1965, "[Jean Henry Elie]")

65. INSECURE HANDLING OF TOPHAT INFORMATION (S) (U)

(S) By letter dated [December 2, 1965], CIA informed us that one of its representatives had notified the U.S. Ambassador in [Burma] that the newly designated [Soviet] Military Attache in [Rangoon] had cooperated with the FBI prior to leaving the United States in 1962 and that he had remained in contact following his return to [Moscow]. This all pertained to a sensitive Bureau source who had been transferred by the [Soviet] Government from [Moscow] to [the Soviet] Embassy in [Burma]. By letter dated December 3, 1965, we made a strong protest to CIA charging that Agency with violating an understanding relative to [the Tophat operation]. Admiral Raborn, then Director of CIA, telephonically contacted the Director, made reference to our communication, acknowledged that his man had been out of line, but did express concern that the Bureau's displeasure had been placed in writing. The Director made it crystal clear that he was not happy with the unauthorized action taken by CIA and instructed that no further operational activity be taken with regard to [Tophat] until we determined what CIA planned to do concerning the matter. (Memorandum Brennan to Sullivan, [December 2, 1965, "Tophat"])

66. K. KRISHNA RAO (S)

(S) In [March, 1966], CIA requested coverage on a visiting official of the [Indian] Government because of information developed by the Agency indicating that the [Indian] was working for the KGB.

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Instructions were sent to the field and we then learned in New York City that CIA allegedly planned to make a recruitment approach. The matter was taken up with CIA headquarters and a protest was made because of the wide discrepancy in the reports we received on CIA intentions. (Memorandum Brennan to Sullivan, April 18, 1966, ["K. Krishna Rao"]) (S)

67. PASSING OF BUREAU DOCUMENTS TO  
SENATOR ROBERT C. BYRD BY CIA EMPLOYEE - 1966

In September, 1966, we developed information indicating that copies of FBI documents had been passed to Senator Byrd by CIA. The matter was discussed with the Director of CIA and the Agency subsequently conducted an investigation and established that one of its employees, [Stephen M. Quinn, Jr.] had submitted (S) a name check request to the Bureau concerning one [Ralph D. Fertig] (S) who was the subject of the material in question. At that time (S) [Quinn] had a responsibility of handling name check requests for CIA and, in this connection, was in contact with our Name Check Section. He admitted that he instituted a name check on an "off the cuff basis" for another CIA employee named [John Snoddy.] (S)

It is my recollection that one or both CIA employees were subsequently fired or asked to resign. (Memorandum Brennan to Sullivan, September 21, 1966, "Leak of FBI Documents Concerning [Ralph D. Fertig] to Senator Robert C. Byrd") (S) (U)

68. ALLEGED COMPROMISE OF BUREAU DOUBLE AGENT (S) (U)

[In March, 1967, we protested to CIA in connection with a matter relating to our mutual interest in a [chemist] (S) connected with [Schering] Corporation in Newark, New Jersey (S) (U). We were utilizing [the chemist] as a double agent in an operation directed against the Soviets. (S) CIA had established a relationship with the same person for the purpose of acquiring positive intelligence relating to the field of [antibiotics.] (S) Our [Newark] (S) (U) Office received information indicating that a CIA officer, without authorization, compromised our relationship with (S) (U) (S) [the chemist] by discussing the matter with the president of the (S) (U) firm. (Memorandum Sullivan to DeLoach, March 15, 1967, ["NK 2264-S, IS - R"]) (S)

69. JUSTINA MIREYA MORENO GONZALEZ (S)

In July, 1967, we protested to CIA in a case where the Agency allegedly had failed to report to us concerning a communication which a Cuban exile, residing in the United States, had received from the Cuban Intelligence Service. The particular communication had instructed the exile to initiate preparations

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for the handling of an intelligence assignment in the United States. CIA claimed that the exile had been reluctant to operate in this country and CIA then instructed him not to respond to the communication received from Cuba. We took the position that despite this reluctance on the part of the exile, the Bureau had been entitled to have had the opportunity to make its own assessment. (Memorandum Brennan to Sullivan, July 20, 1967, [Justina Mireya Moreno Gonzalez, ] IS - Cuba" ) (S) (S)

70. CIA AND ITS INVOLVEMENT IN LEGISLATION DEALING WITH THE "ERVIN BILL"

On June 5, 1969, information was received indicating that Richard Helms had sent Senator Sam Ervin three proposed amendments to the legislation being proposed by the Senator, all dealing with the protection of the constitutional rights of Government employees. We had been following developments relating to this proposed legislation because the provisions had a very definite bearing on Bureau operations. The proposed amendments made by Helms included exemptions from certain provisions of the Bill for FBI, CIA, and the National Security Agency. These amendments were suggested by CIA without prior consultation with the Bureau. The Director made the notation, "This presumptuous action of Helms' is astounding." (M. A. Jones to Bishop memorandum, June 6, 1969, "S. 782; Protection of Constitutional Rights of Government Employees to Prevent Unwarranted Invasion of Their Privacy")

71. CIA COVERAGE OF BUREAU LEADS

Historically, CIA's coverage of Bureau leads had been decidedly spotty from the standpoint of delivering satisfactory content and servicing the leads within a reasonable period of time. It would be necessary to review hundreds, if not thousands, of files to document what we consider delays in following our leads. It should be noted that CIA, organizationally, has never maintained an atmosphere of discipline in any way comparable to that of the Bureau. Matters are not followed as promptly and responsibility is not firmly fixed. This evaluation is made in light of standards followed by the Bureau. We continually prod and push CIA for responses. To develop all of the evidence to explain these delays would require an inspection of CIA operations. CIA has given the following types of responses: hazards of adverse operating conditions in backward countries; limited personnel; undue exposure to hostile intelligence, police, and security services; pressures placed on the Agency on priority

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targets quite often dealing with political crises in foreign countries. Although CIA has not ventured to emphasize the point, it is believed that in many instances it has not produced satisfactorily and efficiently because of the absence of reliable sources.

72. LACK OF PROPER ORIENTATION OF BUREAU RESPONSIBILITIES AND JURISDICTION

Although there has been decided improvement in recent years, the Liaison Agent continues to note a definite lack of knowledge of FBI responsibilities and jurisdiction on the part of CIA employees. They do receive some training in this regard, but the impression is left that such training could be much more extensive. The Bureau's Liaison Agent has lectured to hundreds of CIA employees in the last few years and this has produced significant signs of concrete benefits. CIA employees encountered the Liaison Agent on a very regular basis and asked questions pertaining to our responsibilities. Nevertheless, there is room for much improvement.

73. CIA POLICY REGARDING DISSEMINATION TO OUR LEGAL ATTACHES

There has been a sore spot in connection with CIA policy relating to its dissemination of information [at a local level in our embassies.] This policy allegedly has applied to all other agencies and includes our Legal Attaches. CIA has maintained that unless the information it develops or receives is in the immediate jurisdiction of a particular agency, it will only disseminate at the Seat of Government. As an example, if CIA received information concerning the existence of a U.S. criminal fugitive in a foreign country, it would disseminate to the Legal Attache. However, if the information falls within the area of intelligence, which includes subversive activities, the Agency has stated that under its system the information is considered to be "raw material" and that it must be evaluated at headquarters and reviewed in the context of what has been received from other countries, and then disseminated to interested customers. We have not raised an issue, but dissemination regarding political conditions in a country where the Legal Attache is assigned could be useful because it would further orient him in his dealings with foreign officials. There have been exceptions where the CIA [chief in an area, on his own initiative,] has given such information to our Legal Attache. After CIA disseminates at headquarters, we are in a position to communicate the information to our Legal Attaches. This helps, but it would be much more convenient for the Legal Attache to receive it [at the local level.]

(S)(U)

(S)(U)

(S)(U)

**SECRET**

There are situations where CIA offices abroad receive information regarding a subject, such as an alleged spy traveling to the United States, or the case abroad simply has ramifications in this country. In these instances, CIA has followed a definite pattern over the years of not furnishing such information to the Legal Attache, but disseminating to us at Seat of Government. Here again, CIA has maintained that its headquarters must review the data and make the decision regarding dissemination. We have not raised an issue. We could be claiming that the Legal Attache could be useful in evaluating the case and being in a position to follow Bureau interests as soon as possible. However, if we pushed for a change in current conditions, we should consider that the Legal Attaches possibly could inherit responsibilities abroad which might present risks or operational headaches.

[For several years there existed a coordinating mechanism in Germany headed by CIA. This was a committee headed by the Agency and composed of representatives of other U.S. agencies. The committee reviewed espionage and counter-espionage developments in Germany which had a bearing on U.S. interests. If a problem of operational jurisdiction arose among the U.S. agencies, the committee mechanism was used to establish an agreed-to operating agreement. Quite often various responsibilities were divided among the different agencies. It is my recollection that the Bureau has not been interested in becoming a part of such a committee. If we did, we could end up with responsibilities not entirely agreeable to us.] (S)(u)

#### 74. SOME PAST HISTORY WHICH IS VERY RELEVANT

When evaluating our relationship with CIA, including our grievances, it is believed that we cannot overlook the relevancy of the serious differences we experienced with the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) during World War II. The seeds leading to the establishment of CIA came from OSS. William Donovan, who was the head of OSS, has been referred to as the "Father of CIA."

There were instances when OSS blatantly ignored FBI jurisdiction and failed to coordinate on numerous matters. There was a number of CIA officials who obviously had a definite dislike for the Bureau. The loose administration of OSS, its employment of known subversives, its alleged penetration by the Soviets, and its attitude toward the Russian Government at the time posed serious problems to the Bureau. At one point OSS was actually giving serious consideration to establishing liaison with the

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**SECRET**



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NKVD. Because a substantial number of OSS officials subsequently became important figures within CIA, it would be logical to assume that the FBI was justified in being most prudent, if not circumspect, in dealings with the Agency.

When evaluating its position in 1970, the Bureau rightfully cannot forget the troubles with OSS. At the same time, it would be most unwise if we neglected to examine the role played by the Bureau when we disbanded our SIS operations in 1947. In a matter of hours, we destroyed hundreds of files in our SIS offices abroad, and we did not turn over to CIA a large number of sources and informants. There have been many ex-Agents who had been connected with SIS, who were familiar with the file destruction operation, and who later became connected with CIA. It is possible that the Agency could argue that the actions by the Bureau were detrimental to U.S. interests and impaired CIA's early efforts to establish desired coverage in Latin America.

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ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10  
MAY 1962 EDITION  
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

~~SECRET~~

Memorandum

TO : Mr. C. D. DeLoach

DATE: March 30, 1970

FROM : W. C. Sullivan

SUBJECT: RELATIONS WITH CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA)

DECLASSIFIED BY 5668 SLD/GCL  
ON 4/2/98 (JFK)

Reference my memorandum 3/25/70 concerning letter 3/20/70 from CIA Director Helms. In letter, Helms expresses full agreement with Director's view that intelligence collection efforts of FBI and CIA must be closely coordinated and that periodic reappraisal of such efforts is required. He has invited Director's desires as to how such reassessments can be best conducted. He refers to 1966 conference between Bureau and CIA representatives, which resulted in agreement covering certain phases of intelligence collection, and suggests additional discussions at this time.

Helms has listed nine specific areas for possible discussion at conference between Bureau and CIA. He states he would sincerely welcome Director's observations on his proposed agenda. Specific items listed by Helms are set forth hereinafter together with my observations.

1. Electronic Surveillance Coverage (Elsurs)

Helms notes Bureau has been receptive in past to requests for this type coverage and has capability and experience in this field which cannot be duplicated by any other U.S. agency. Helms refers to October, 1969, CIA request for elsur coverage of two Indian nationals visiting U.S., one of whom had KGB connections. Bureau advised CIA at that time that it should refer such requests directly to Attorney General (AG) for approval. Helms suggests question of such coverage be reopened between FBI and CIA representatives, adding that this coverage should be rigidly controlled.

Comment: We have always been highly selective in our use of elsur, particularly during recent years in view of sensitive nature of this type coverage, legal considerations, and manpower commitments. CIA, which has no prosecutive responsibilities, may not understand the Bureau's position in this matter or need for great selectivity but I do not feel Director should modify stand taken in October, 1969, that CIA should seek approval directly from AG. Helms' point that no other U.S. agency has capability of FBI in this field may have merit and when CIA can first clearly justify requests

Enclosure

- 1 - Mr. DeLoach
- 1 - Mr. Sullivan

~~SECRET~~

MAY 6 1970

CONTINUED - OVER

Classified by 12  
Exempt from GDS, Category 2 & 3  
Date of Declassification Indefinite  
4-26-75

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Memorandum for Mr. DeLoach  
RE: RELATIONS WITH CIA

for this type coverage to the AG, if the Director wishes we could consider handling actual installations on a highly selective basis as we currently do with respect to meritorious requests by State Department. Each one, of course, would be judged on its own merits. But, there should be no change in our October, 1969, position that CIA must first get approval for such coverage from AG.

*No. it is up to CIA*  
*John Helms' view. H*  
2. Mail Coverage

Helms cites importance of this as intelligence tool, which has been proven in past. He has impression it has been discontinued and suggests FBI-CIA representatives confer to determine whether such coverage could be used with regard to investigations of Soviet bloc, New Left, and foreign agents.

*No. we will not do it*  
Comment: In line with Director's instructions, we have discontinued this coverage in recent years. We know that other Federal agencies, including Army and CIA, utilize this type coverage frequently and often with success such as we experienced ourselves in the past. Both Army and CIA regularly make available to us results of their coverage abroad concerning individuals of interest to Bureau. This type coverage is sensitive and Helms has not spelled out specifically what CIA may have in mind here. This type coverage is too sensitive to be discussed in written correspondence. I recommend that we seek further information in direct discussions with CIA before deciding on our course of action. Of course no commitments of any kind will be made and all issues raised will be referred to the Director for a decision.

*John Helms' view. H*  
3. CIA Technical Services

Helms calls attention to recent technical and scientific equipment recently developed by CIA in the counterintelligence field (specialized TV equipment, laser beam devices, etc.). He indicates willingness to share such equipment and developments with Bureau and indicates he would welcome suggestions as to how such equipment can be better employed.

Comment: While it is not likely CIA has developed equipment of this type which is not already known to FBI Laboratory and while some of equipment to which Helms alludes may have no applicability to our needs, I do not believe we have anything to lose by exploring this on a selective basis. Qualified personnel from FBI Laboratory could confer with appropriate CIA representatives to insure we have benefit of any recent scientific advances realized by CIA.

*O.K.*  
~~SECRET~~

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Memorandum for Mr. DeLoach

RE: RELATIONS WITH CIA

4. Courses in Positive Intelligence Requirements and Reporting

Helms offers to make available to us training courses in positive intelligence for purpose of discussing in depth the needs of the intelligence community, including CIA.

Comment: I see no need for this at this time. We have a highly effective and comprehensive training program for our Agents in security work, and I see no necessity for training lectures by CIA personnel. We regularly receive from CIA copies of the Current Intelligence Reporting List which outlines priorities and requirements of other U.S. intelligence agencies in particular areas of positive intelligence. These Lists are reviewed by appropriate supervisors at SOG and are then furnished on regular basis to interested field offices. If any new developments occur in this field, we can always reconsider if we wish. But as stated there is no need at this time. C.K. H

5. Seminars on Opposition Services

Helms suggests that FBI and CIA specialists concerning hostile intelligence services meet as needed to keep abreast of new developments and patterns on part of hostile intelligence agencies. He feels such discussions should provide an opportunity to possibly devise new means to penetrate or neutralize enemy forces.

Comment: I do not believe there is any need for conferences of type referred to by Helms except on an infrequent basis. Of course, where special circumstances warrant and provided such conferences are tightly controlled by Bureau and specifically approved by Director there would be no reason to object to them per se. C.K. H

6. Live Bloc Sources

Helms refers to prior cooperation between FBI and CIA in handling of communist bloc defectors and penetration agents but expresses belief there is room for improvement in establishing more uniform exploitation of these sources. He invites Director's suggestions for better coordination and evaluation of live source information.

Comment: Our 1966 conferences and agreement with CIA were largely concerned with coordination and handling of live sources. This agreement has proven effective as Helms agrees. I am not aware of any need for modifying the 1966 understanding but this is an area which is quite sensitive and Helms has not spelled out what he may have in mind. I feel we should listen to any proposals CIA may have to offer on this point in direct discussions with their representatives. Again, no commitments would be made and any proposals would be referred to the Director for a decision.

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Memorandum for Mr. DeLoach  
RE: RELATIONS WITH CIA

7. Live Sources in Non-Bloc Area

Helms points out diplomatic sources in this area, especially critical Middle East and Latin-American fields, could provide much needed intelligence. He urges the full potential of this area be explored by representatives of both agencies.

Comment: This is very similar to previous point (6) and again involves 1966 agreement. I think our approach should be the same; namely, while we are not aware of any problems in this area we could listen to any proposals CIA has to make and, of course, we would refer them to the Director prior to taking any action.

*OK-M*

8. New Left and Racial Matters

Helms notes that there is already a substantial exchange of information in this area and cites close connections between subversive elements in U.S. and abroad. He suggests we consider how we can best employ our respective manpower to meet this threat which is international in scope.

Comment: We have carefully reviewed this situation and feel CIA could definitely provide more information concerning activities of New Left and black extremists while traveling abroad and additional data concerning foreign funding or support of subversive activities in U.S. We furnish a great deal of information to CIA regarding foreign aspects of the extremist movement developed through our investigations. As to manpower commitments, our own use of manpower is, of course, under constant review. There are heavy manpower demands on FBI in a host of areas (organized crime, civil rights, applicant investigations, etc.) outside the security field. I would be definitely opposed to any discussions with CIA involving the allocation of manpower by either agency. This is a matter for each agency to decide in its own best interests and judgment.

*OK-M*

9. Relations With Domestic Field Offices and Legal Attaches

Helms expresses belief there are no serious conflicts in this area but there may be room to improve quality of liaison so as to expand intelligence collection efforts, particularly in view of changing conditions both here and abroad.

Comment: As indicated, Helms does not perceive any serious problems in this area either in U.S. or abroad. Our policy has always been that any matters of substance involving liaison with CIA or other agencies must be

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Memorandum for Mr. DeLoach  
RE: RELATIONS WITH CIA

handled at headquarters level. To do otherwise could result in loose administrative control. I feel that we should adhere strictly to our long-standing policy in this connection and I see no need for discussions with CIA on this issue.

RECOMMENDED REPLY TO HELMS: *OK. H*

I do not believe the Director should seek to furnish detailed observations regarding the Bureau's position on the various matters suggested by Helms. Many of them are quite sensitive and complex and there is nothing to be gained by spelling out the Director's views in writing on such matters. Accordingly, I recommend that a general reply be sent to Helms indicating our willingness to meet with CIA representatives for direct discussions on those points which merit further elaboration or where we might at least be willing to listen to any CIA proposals. *OK. H*

Bearing in mind specific observations set forth above, I think our reply to Helms should show we are amenable to direct conferences with CIA on certain of these issues but we should indicate we see nothing to be gained by discussions at this time with regard to the following:

(4) Courses in Positive Intelligence Requirements and Reporting;  
(5) Seminars on Opposition Services; (8) New Left and Racial Matters;  
and (9) Relations With Domestic Field Offices and Legal Attaches. With regard to the other points, any discussions with CIA would be strictly within current policies laid down by the Director and no commitments would be made by Bureau representatives. All matters requiring a decision which might arise would be referred to the Director for a decision.

If the Director desires, Inspector D. E. Moore and myself would represent the Bureau in such meetings with CIA representatives. On a selective basis, other officials of Domestic Intelligence Division could be asked to join me as required. *OK. H*

ACTION:

Attached for the Director's approval is a letter to Helms in line with the foregoing observations.

*JAN Wel Jus WBS*  
~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

- 1 - Mr. DeLoach
- 1 - Mr. Sullivan
- 1 - Mr. Conrad

# ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

March 31, 1970

BY COURIER SERVICE

REC 8-2-80750-4794

Honorable Richard Helms  
 Director  
 Central Intelligence Agency  
 Washington, D. C.

DECLASSIFIED BY 5662 SLD/KCL  
 ON 2/9/98 (JFK)

*Confidential*  
*J. Edgar Hoover*

Dear Mr. Helms:

I have carefully reviewed your letter of March 20 setting out your observations with respect to various matters of mutual interest. I certainly appreciate your kind comments concerning me and I share your convictions as to the need for close coordination of our intelligence collection activities in behalf of the national security.

Your letter suggested nine particular areas which might be the subject of further discussions aimed at improving the coordination of our operations. A number of these topics are highly sensitive and complex and I will therefore make no effort here to set forth my views in detail. However, in response to your letter and as a prelude to any direct discussions on these matters, certain observations on my part may be appropriate.

With regard to electronic surveillance and mail coverage, there is no question as to the frequent value of such operations in developing needed intelligence. On the other hand, the use of these measures in domestic investigations poses a number of problems which may not be encountered in similar operations abroad. There is widespread concern by the American public regarding the possible misuse of this type coverage. Moreover, various legal considerations must be borne in mind, including the impact such coverage may have on our numerous prosecutive responsibilities. The FBI's effectiveness has always depended in large measure on our capacity to retain the full confidence of the American people. The use of any investigative measures which infringe on traditional rights of privacy must therefore be scrutinized most carefully. Within this framework, however, I would be willing to consider any proposals your Agency may make.

WCS:mea (5)

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Group 1

62-80750, MAY 6 1970  
 see note, page 3

Excluded from automatic  
 downgrading and  
 declassification

- Tolson \_\_\_\_\_
- DeLoach \_\_\_\_\_
- Walters \_\_\_\_\_
- Mohr \_\_\_\_\_
- Bishop \_\_\_\_\_
- Casper \_\_\_\_\_
- Callahan \_\_\_\_\_
- Conrad \_\_\_\_\_
- Felt \_\_\_\_\_
- Gale \_\_\_\_\_
- Rosen \_\_\_\_\_
- Sullivan \_\_\_\_\_
- Tavel \_\_\_\_\_
- Soyars \_\_\_\_\_
- Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_
- Holmes \_\_\_\_\_
- Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

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 COMM-FBI  
 MAR 31 1970

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*WCS*

~~SECRET~~

Honorable Richard Helms

Your offer to make available certain technical equipment developed by the Agency is most welcome and I fully reciprocate your willingness to cooperate in the exchange of relevant scientific data. I am prepared to designate appropriate representatives of the FBI Laboratory to meet with CIA technical personnel at any mutually convenient time.

With respect to the inclusion of positive intelligence courses in our training curricula, I am sure you will recognize that our training programs must be designed primarily to fulfill our own widespread and demanding responsibilities. While I appreciate your offer, I do not feel it would be feasible at this time to include the proposed courses in our training schedules. I would certainly have no objection to the holding of seminars between specialists of our two agencies in selective areas of interest when justified by specific circumstances.

Concerning the coordination of FBI-CIA activities in the exploitation of live sources, both in the communist bloc field and with regard to key nonbloc establishments, I am not aware of any significant problems. The 1966 agreement between our agencies was concerned directly with this question and I have no changes to suggest in the ground rules at this time. However, in the event your Agency has some specific proposals to make, I would welcome hearing further from you in this connection.

There is already a considerable exchange of information between our agencies concerning New Left and racial extremist matters. Frequently, as you have pointed out, there have been substantial connections between subversive and extremist elements in the United States and their counterparts abroad. We will continue to furnish your Agency information being developed by the Bureau which might have a bearing on your intelligence requirements. At the same time, we are definitely in need of additional information from your Agency as to the foreign aspects of the extremist movement in the United States, including foreign funding and support of local extremist organizations. While I do not believe there is any need for detailed discussions on this point, if you have any specific suggestions to make we would be pleased to consider them.

- 2 -

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Honorable Richard Helms

Similarly, I am not aware of any major problems which exist at this time in connection with the coordination of our field liaison operations. It has been my long-standing policy that serious questions affecting the coordination of our activities with other Government agencies should be handled and controlled at a headquarters level in order to avoid administrative confusion and misunderstanding.

In line with my letter of March 11 and the observations contained in your letter of March 20, I will in the immediate future designate appropriate officials of the Bureau to meet with your representatives for detailed discussions of these matters. It is my earnest hope that such conferences will lead to a sharpened understanding of the responsibilities and objectives of our respective agencies and will serve to promote more effective cooperation in our joint commitment to the national intelligence needs.

Sincerely yours,  
J. Edgar Hoover

NOTE:

See memo Sullivan to DeLoach 3/30/70 captioned "Relations With CIA" prepared by WCS:mea.

- 9 -

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UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

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# Memorandum

- 1 - Mr. DeLoach
- 1 - Mr. Sullivan
- 1 - Mr. Conrad

TO : Mr. C. D. DeLoach *PD*

DATE: April 14, 1970

FROM : W. C. Sullivan

DECLASSIFIED BY 5668 SLD/KCL  
ON 4-2-98 (JFK)

SUBJECT: RELATIONS WITH CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA)

Reference my memorandum 3/30/70 summarizing proposals of CIA Director Helms regarding FBI-CIA coordination in intelligence collection activities. Director approved meetings between CIA and Bureau representatives to further explore these matters.

On afternoon of 4/13/70, Inspector D. E. Moore and myself met briefly with Mr. James Angleton, Chief, Counterintelligence Staff, CIA, and Mr. W. Scott Miler of his staff. This session was strictly exploratory in nature and was aimed at defining the scope and limitations of our discussions with CIA on the points in question. Angleton noted that CIA Director Helms will be closely following the outcome of these discussions and is personally interested in resolving any current problems in this area.

Mr. Angleton indicated that CIA would like to direct initial attention to two of the items cited by Helms, namely, the question of audio (electronic surveillance) coverage and the suggestion that FBI and CIA specialists in the communist bloc field hold periodic seminars to coordinate our information. The Bureau's position regarding electronic surveillance coverage, as outlined in the Director's letter to Helms of 3/31/70, was reiterated with emphasis upon the problems such coverage often pose with regard to prosecution as well as adverse public reaction to this type coverage.

I made the point that the Bureau has not received the necessary support in this area from responsible quarters; that in the past the Bureau had a substantial amount of coverage of this type in the interest of both our own counterintelligence responsibilities as well as the national security interest but that we have had to retrench in recent years largely as a result of the lack of support for such operations.

Angleton noted that in response to CIA's request for electronic coverage of two Indian nationals who were suspected KGB agents in the Fall of 1969, the Bureau had requested that they take this matter up with the

WCS:mea  
(4)

Classified by 12  
Exempt from GDS, Category 243 CONTINUED - OVER  
Date of Declassification Indefinite  
4-11-75

57 APR 24 1970

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Memorandum for Mr. DeLoach  
RE: RELATIONS WITH CIA

Attorney General. He said that CIA has been giving the question of approaching the Attorney General considerable thought but this would involve a whole new set of procedures and policy considerations which would have to be carefully considered. Angleton said that his staff was in the process of drawing up a proposal on this point for Mr. Helms to consider and that they would probably have something specific for the Bureau to consider at a subsequent meeting.

Concerning the proposed seminar, in line with the Director's letter to Helms 3/31/70, I pointed out that we would certainly have no objection to such conferences where the occasion justified them. From Angleton's remarks, it appears that CIA is primarily interested here in the Soviet field and would like to furnish the Bureau with details of an extensive research project CIA has undertaken in recent years to correlate all available source information regarding known Soviet intelligence agents. This apparently would not involve any commitment by the Bureau and would represent essentially an opportunity for us to see what CIA has done in this field and how it might tie in with any current Bureau interest. When CIA submits any firm proposals in this regard, we will submit specific recommendations.

Angleton said that CIA would be in touch with us when they have firmed up various proposals and at that time Inspector Moore and myself will meet with them again as required. The Director, of course, will be kept fully informed and no commitments will be made without his prior approval.

ACTION:

For information.

*[Handwritten signatures and initials: "WBS" with a checkmark, "J", and "WBS" with a checkmark]*

~~SECRET~~

EXCISED VERSION OF 38 MEMORANDA BEING  
HELD AT FBIHQ FOR REVIEW BY SSC.

*#mde16*  
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 1-4-01 BY SP-2 ALM/876

# Memorandum

TO : Mr. DeLoach

DATE: March 9, 1970

FROM : W. C. Sullivan

~~SECRET~~

SUBJECT: RELATIONSHIPS WITH CIA

DECLASSIFIED BY 5668 SLD/CCL  
ON 2/6/98 (JFK)

Reference is made to the memorandum W. C. Sullivan to C. D. DeLoach dated 3/5/70, captioned as above. At that time the Director was advised this Division would make an analysis of each situation cited in the memorandum of Special Agent Sam J. Papich relative to grievances which CIA might hold in connection with relations with the FBI.

Enclosed will be found an analysis of 38 items (2 are contained in one memorandum, making a total of 37 memoranda). In substance our analysis does not show any real reason why CIA would raise any issue in connection with 37 out of the 38 items. The recommended action in each of these cases would logically close the matter. In one memorandum, the 37th item, ~~is~~, it is recommended that a carefully worded letter to CIA outlining policy and the basic elements of intelligence and counterintelligence work affecting the United States be sent to that Agency. The purpose of this is to protect the Bureau by giving CIA a chance to make any comments, if it has any, in regard to the current utilization of sources and facilities affecting both CIA and the Bureau. If CIA replies that it is satisfied with the current intelligence conditions in this area, we will put this particular matter to rest and we will have their letter in the file.

This Division will take any and all steps to comply with the Director's wishes in this matter and in any other concerning which this Division is involved.

RECOMMENDATION:

For the information of the Director.

Classified by 6283  
Exempt from GDS, Category 263  
Date of Declassification Indefinite

*Prepared by  
L. J. ...  
A*

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NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION  
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UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

~~SECRET~~

TO : Mr. C. D. DeLoach

DATE: March 6, 1970

FROM : Mr. W. C. Sullivan

~~SECRET~~

#MDR/6  
DECLASSIFIED BY SP-2 AEM/HTG  
ON 12-01

SUBJECT: RELATIONSHIPS WITH CIA  
MOCASE (THE BORIS MORROS CASE)

Item number one in the material submitted to the Director by Special Agent (SA) Sam Papich in his memorandum 3/5/70 discusses the case of Boris Morros. (Mocase).

### BACKGROUND OF CASE

Boris Morros, a Hollywood motion picture producer, was recruited by Soviet intelligence in 1935. From 1947 to 1957 he was operated as a double agent by the FBI. This was an extremely sensitive counterintelligence operation involving Soviet intelligence activities in the United States in which Morros traveled behind the Iron Curtain for meetings with his Soviet principals.

Information obtained by Morros from his Soviet contacts was disseminated to interested agencies, including the Central Intelligence Agency. On January 25, 1957, Jack Soble, Myra Soble, and Jacob Albam were arrested in New York on charges of conspiracy to commit espionage against the United States.

### PROBLEM WITH CIA

On March 16, 1954, the Bureau disseminated information received from Boris Morros to heads of the various intelligence agencies, including CIA. By letter of March 27, 1954, Lieutenant General C. P. Cabell, Acting Director of CIA, criticized the information and, in effect, characterized it as "fabrication or the product of a paper mill," which conclusion Cabell stated had been applied to many similar disseminations in the past from apparently the same source. By letter of April 5, 1954, the Bureau informed CIA that it was believed that no useful purpose would be served in making any future dissemination to CIA of information received from this source.

On April 9, 1954, Mr. Allen Dulles, then Director of CIA, advised Liaison Agent Papich that he had been looking into the matter and there was no question in his mind but that his agency had acted stupidly in transmitting such a letter to the Bureau.

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WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

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Memorandum to Mr. C. D. DeLoach  
RE: RELATIONSHIPS WITH CIA

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By letter of April 21, 1954, Mr. Dulles stated that CIA would appreciate it if the Bureau would kindly continue to send reports from the source (Morros) which relate to matters of foreign intelligence. By letter of April 29, 1954, the Director expressed the opinion that no useful purpose would be served by disseminating to CIA information received from the source in the future.

Nevertheless, memorandum *NAME* to *NAME* dated April 28, 1954, pointed out that when and if the Bureau receives information in the Mocase in the future of a type required by National Security Council Directive to be furnished to CIA, it should be carefully evaluated and a decision made at that time as to the officials and agencies of the Government to whom it should be disseminated. The Director noted "OK but before anything goes to CIA from this source I want to pass on it. This restriction does not apply to dissemination to other agencies. H"

Subsequent to the foregoing three disseminations were made to interested agencies, including CIA, based on information from Morros during October and December, 1954, and appropriate dissemination was made thereafter with the Director's approval.

As the time grew near for prosecutive action, the Department requested the Bureau to check with CIA to see if Department attorneys could interview a Soviet intelligence defector then in custody of CIA named *NAME*. Accordingly, the Director authorized an oral briefing of Mr. Dulles and on 1/8/57 he and *NAME* of his staff were generally briefed on the Mocase and the contemplated prosecution. They were furnished with background data concerning subjects residing in *PLACE, NAMES*. CIA was requested to search the names of individuals involved in the case and was asked regarding identities of CIA employees who might have information of pertinence concerning the *NAME*.

On March 4, 1957, *NAME* informed the liaison agent of resentment on the part of CIA employees and officials based upon the following:

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Memorandum to Mr. C. D. DeLoach  
RE: RELATIONSHIPS WITH CIA

(1) CIA feels it should have been advised much earlier concerning those aspects of the case relating to CIA employees.

(2) Leads were given to CIA at the same time the case was publicized and, therefore, CIA was handicapped.

(3) The failure to coordinate the French aspects of the case with CIA permitted the French intelligence agencies to play a dominant role in the European investigation.

(4) CIA fears the Bureau had not told it all there was to know about the case that CIA should have known.

DISPOSAL OF PROBLEM WITH CIA      The Bureau took the position that any necessary investigation looking toward prosecution in countries where Bureau had a Legal Attache would be referred by the Legal Attache to the appropriate investigative agency of that country. In those countries where the Bureau did not have a Legal Attache, request for investigation would be channelled through CIA. Because the *NAME* were in France, the interrogation of the *NAME* was handled by request from the Legal Attache to the French.

*NAME* during World War II had been with the Office of Strategic Services and had contacts later with CIA personnel. Prior to decision on prosecution we did not disseminate information regarding the *NAME* because we feared the effects of compromise from possible leaks would endanger the life of our source. This was particularly true in view of CIA's expressed attitude in 1954. Some leads had been given to CIA over two weeks before the arrests of the subjects in the United States. Leads were not given earlier because of the fear of possible compromise. As far as coordinating the French aspects of the case were concerned, it is doubted that CIA could have exerted any control over the French investigation after the French had the information. There was a distinct difference in this case between intelligence information and evidence in support of prosecutive action.

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Memorandum to Mr. C. D. DeLoach  
RE: RELATIONSHIPS WITH CIA

Recently the FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SERVICE has made some inquiries relating to Boris Morros indicating the FOREIGN may now believe Morros was either known to the Soviets as our agent or was under their control. It is not known if the FOREIGN have discussed this matter with CIA.

RECOMMENDED ACTION:

None. We do not believe, in light of the facts set forth, that CIA will make an issue of this matter.

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UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

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TO : Mr. C. D. DeLoach

DATE: 3/9/70

FROM : W. C. Sullivan

SUBJECT: RELATIONSHIPS WITH CIA

#mde/6  
DECLASSIFIED BY SP2A-m/316  
ON 1-10-01

Item number two in the material submitted to the Director by SA Sam Papich in his memorandum dated 3/5/70

SENSITIVE ONGOING OPERATION

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Memorandum to Mr. C. D. DeLoach  
RE: RELATIONSHIPS WITH CIA

RECOMMENDED ACTION:

None. We do not believe, in light of the facts set forth, that CIA will make an issue of this matter.

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UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

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# Memorandum

TO : Mr. C. D. DeLoach

DATE: March 6, 1970

FROM : Mr. W. C. Sullivan

#MDR/6  
DECLASSIFIED BY SP-2ALM/3TG  
ON 1/20/01

SUBJECT: RELATIONSHIPS WITH CIA  
THE ABEL CASE

Item #3 in the material submitted to the Director by SA Sam Papich in his memorandum of March 5, 1970, discusses the Abel case.

According to Papich, CIA felt it was not given proper recognition for its contribution in the case, in that it took the risk and responsibility of transporting *NAME* from *PLACE* to the U. S. in 1957 after the Bureau declined to become involved in this transportation; that after a short handling period in the U. S. the Bureau dropped *NAME*, an alcoholic, because he became a problem and CIA took the responsibility of safeguarding him, giving the Bureau free access to him and time to develop leads leading to the apprehension of Abel; that CIA was responsible for making *NAME* mentally and physically capable to testify at the Abel trial; also, CIA incurred heavy expenses, all for the benefit of the Bureau; further, the Bureau never thanked CIA for its cooperation nor did it see fit to inform the Attorney General or the White House of the role played by CIA.

### BACKGROUND OF THE SITUATION:

Abel is the Soviet intelligence officer who was uncovered in the U. S. in 1957 through the defection of *NAME*  
*IDENTIFYING DATA*

On the night of May 7, 1957, *NAME* of CIA advised *NAME* that *NAME* had walked into the American Embassy in *PLACE* about three days ago and was referred to CIA. He claimed he was a Soviet agent in New York since 1952 and gave certain details to back up his story. He claimed he was ordered back to Moscow and got "cold feet" in *PLACE* and wanted to cooperate with American officials. He was in a highly emotional state which led CIA to question his mental stability. It was the opinion of *NAME* that no steps should be taken to return *NAME* to the U. S. until the story was substantiated or demolished to reflect his actual status. Our New York Office immediately instituted investigation,

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Memorandum Mr. W. C. Sullivan to Mr. C. D. DeLoach  
RE: RELATIONSHIPS WITH CIA

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based on *NAME* disclosures and was not able to prove or disprove his story. On May 3, 1957, CIA was informed of the facts developed by our investigation and asked what action it intended to take regarding *NAME* return to the U.S. On May 9, 1957, CIA advised of a report received from CIA, *PLACE* revealing that *NAME* had suffered almost a complete mental breakdown and that in view of his condition, arrangements were made by CIA for him to be returned to the U.S. by plane. On May 10, 1957, *NAME* was returned to the U.S. in the company of a CIA agent. On arrival our New York Agents were at the airport to take him over, but because of his emotional state, he was confined at the U.S. Marine Hospital in Staten Island until May 15, 1957, when he was released to the custody of our Agents. Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) authorities arranged for his confinement in the U.S. Marine Hospital, Staten Island, for psychiatric examination through the U.S. Public Health Service. (Liaison Agent Papich had previously conferred with an INS official who had stated that if *NAME* condition warranted confinement upon his arrival in the U.S., an order would have to be issued by the U.S. Public Health Service).

*NAME* and his wife were placed in a midtown hotel by New York Agents and were under Bureau control from May 15, 1957, until June 20, 1957, when they were taken to their residence in *PLACE* at their request. All expenses for their maintenance were paid by the Bureau. During this period *NAME* and his wife were becoming a problem because of heavy drinking and irrational behavior.

On June 13, 1957, Abel was located by Bureau Agents when visiting his studio in Brooklyn, New York. Efforts by Bureau Agents and the Department to have *NAME* testify against Abel in a criminal prosecution were unavailing. With the Department's concurrence, we arranged for INS authorities to arrest Abel on June 21, 1957, on an alien warrant. After Abel's arrest, the Department continued to raise questions concerning *NAME* willingness to testify in an espionage prosecution against Abel and requested the Bureau to press *NAME* in that regard. We took the position that any efforts to induce *NAME* to testify should be made by the Department, as we realized that *NAME* would undoubtedly want assurances, such as remaining in this country and financial assistance, and the Department was so advised. The Department was also advised that the Bureau would no longer pay *NAME* subsistence and that other arrangements would have to be made. In an effort to solicit *NAME* cooperation, the Department conferred with Allen Dulles of CIA to determine if CIA would be willing to sponsor the entry of *NAME* into the U.S. under the authority granted the Director of CIA by law. Dulles indicated a willingness not only to sponsor *NAME* but also to assist in his rehabilitation

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Memorandum Mr. W. C. Sullivan to Mr. C. D. DeLoach  
RE: RELATIONSHIPS WITH CIA

in the U.S., such as assisting him in obtaining a job and furnishing financial assistance for an extended period of time. On July 21, 1957 a CIA representative was placed in touch with *NAME* by New York Agents for this purpose. Our Agents also arranged for FBI's access to *NAME* whenever necessary. Subsequently, *NAME* agreed to testify and appeared before a Federal grand jury on *DATE* and *DATE* 1957.

As indicated above, we located Apei on June 13 and he was taken into custody by INS on June 21, 1957. On July 21, 1957, over a month later, CIA instituted arrangements for *NAME* rehabilitation.

While CIA undoubtedly incurred heavy expenses on behalf of *NAME*, it was not at the request of the Bureau but at the request of the Department.

Regarding CIA's complaint that the Bureau never thanked it for its cooperation, it is pointed out that a letter from the Director was sent to Mr. Dulles on November 19, 1957, shortly after Abel's conviction. It pointed out the excellent cooperation of *NAME* and his staff with the Bureau since the inception of this case and that the Director wished to express his personal appreciation to *NAME* and his staff for their valuable assistance.

RECOMMENDED ACTION:

None, we do not believe, in light of the facts set forth, that CIA will make an issue of this matter.

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UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

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TO : Mr. C. D. DeLoach

DATE: 3/6/70

FROM : W. C. Sullivan

SUBJECT: RELATIONSHIP WITH THE  
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA)  
*NAME*

#MDR16  
DECLASSIFIED BY SP-2 RLM/JTG  
ON 1-10-01

Item No. 4 in the material submitted to the Director by SA Sam Papich in his memorandum dated 3/5/70 discusses belief by CIA officials that damaging publicity regarding *NAME* emanated from a Bureau report. *NAME* was a CIA official at the time and the publicity was felt to be damaging to CIA. CIA apparently was of the belief that the Bureau leaked the information to Senator *NAME* who then released the information to the press.

Bureau files reveal that in a discussion between SA Papich and Allen W. Dulles, then head of CIA, on 7/10/53 Dulles inquired of Papich as to where *NAME* could get information such as that released concerning *NAME*. Papich immediately informed Dulles that if Dulles was under any suspicion that the Bureau might be disseminating such information to Senator *NAME* he was definitely wrong and off base. Papich also told Dulles that the results of the Bureau investigation concerning *NAME* had also been made available to the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) as well as other interested agencies. Dulles told Papich that he definitely did not feel that the Bureau was involved in the *NAME* releases to the press and that he was sorry if there had been an impression he suspected the Bureau.

There is nothing in Bureau files concerning *NAME* which would indicate that the Bureau did, in fact, supply any information concerning *NAME* to Senator *NAME* or the news media. There was considerable publicity concerning *NAME* at the time and it is noted that due to the fact that *NAME*,  
*IDENTIFYING DATA*

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Memorandum for Mr. DeLoach  
RE: RELATIONSHIP WITH THE  
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

there was possibly an element of potential embarrassment to the Democratic Party attendant to publicity afforded the matter by *NAME AND POSITION*. It is also noted that copies of reports of Bureau investigation concerning *NAME* had been disseminated, in addition to CIA, to Civil Service Commission, National Security Agency, Atomic Energy Commission, Army and the Attorney General. A conflict broke out between CIA and Senator *NAME* after *NAME* publicly quoted from a document, not identified, which spelled out *NAME AND IDENTIFYING DATA*. The files indicate that CIA alleged that the AEC had leaked the information in question to Senator McCarthy.

RECOMMENDED ACTION:

None. We do not believe, in light of the facts set forth, that CIA will make an issue of this matter.

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UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

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TO : Mr. DeLoach

DATE: March 6, 1970

FROM : W. C. Sullivan

SUBJECT: RELATIONSHIPS WITH CIA  
BUREAU DISSEMINATION OF INFORMATION  
CONCERNING *NAME*

*#moris*  
DECLASSIFIED BY *SP-2 ALM / JTG*  
ON *1-10-07*

Item number five in the material submitted to the Director by SA Sam Papich with his memorandum 3/5/70 discusses a question raised by former CIA Director Allen Dulles concerning the propriety of FBI dissemination of information concerning *NAME* who

*IDENTIFYING DATA*

The particular information referred to by Mr. Dulles had been furnished FBI by *NAME IN DEPARTMENT OF LABOR* made several accusations against CIA. Mr. Dulles took the position that dissemination of the allegations to the White House, Attorney General and Department of State had placed Dulles on the spot because the *NAME* data was not a complete story.

### BACKGROUND:

CIA advised that on *DATE/53* *NAME* had informed CIA representatives abroad that he had evidence pointing toward *NAME* being a communist and active agent, and that *NAME* might shortly be exposed by the McCarthy Subcommittee of the Senate as the chief of the third great Soviet ring after *NAME* and *NAME*. When interviewed by Bureau 1/7/54 he furnished no information indicating that *NAME* was engaged in espionage activity and appeared to have an axe to grind insofar as *NAME* was concerned. He acknowledged everything he had come to him secondhand. Results of interview were furnished CIA by letter.

On 1/22/54 Attorney General advised the Director that *NAME* had told him of a conversation he had with *NAME*. The Attorney General said he told *NAME* he would have *NAME* interviewed to get the whole story and asked that we conduct the interview.

On 1/25/54 we wrote the Attorney General about the previous interview with *NAME* and advised we would have him interviewed again to

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Memorandum for Mr. DeLoach  
RE: RELATIONSHIPS WITH CIA

secure any additional data he might have. NAME was reinterviewed the same day and results were sent to Attorney General 1/27/54.

Subsequently, on 2/ /54, NAME called the Director from White House about the NAME situation. The Director advised NAME that he had personally talked to NAME for two hours the previous day and had concluded that NAME was obsessed with the charges he was making and while he appeared to be a brilliant and well educated man he did not appear to have specific details.

On the day the Director spoke with NAME, 2/ /54, he referred NAME to Domestic Intelligence Division where a detailed interview was conducted and results incorporated in a 4-page memorandum, copies of which were furnished Attorney General, Governor Adams, CIA and State Department.

We interviewed NAME at the specific instructions of the Attorney General based upon a White House request and dissemination of interview results to Attorney General and White House was not only proper but required under the circumstances. CIA and State Department received results since allegations concerned officials and operations of those agencies. NAME furnished names of persons who he said could support his allegations and we interviewed them and disseminated results. NAME of CIA commented on 3/13/54 that when the NAME information was first received at that Agency some officials gained the impression FBI was deliberately collecting and disseminating data solely for the purpose of "hurting" CIA. NAME said results of interviews and investigation conducted by Bureau had clearly demonstrated to CIA officials that FBI was living by its well-known tradition and reputation of developing facts and reporting information in an impartial manner. He said on the previous day all officials, including Dulles, commented the Bureau was following the NAME case in conformity with its well established reputation of getting all the facts. In view of this, there is no basis for believing that at this time CIA would raise any charges of unfair conduct on the part of Bureau in its handling of the NAME matter.

RECOMMENDED ACTION:

None. We do not believe, in light of the facts set forth, that CIA will make an issue of this matter.

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UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

TO : Mr. C. D. DeLoach

DATE: 3/6/70

FROM : Mr. W. C. Sullivan

~~SECRET~~

SUBJECT: RELATIONSHIP WITH CENTRAL  
INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA).  
BUREAU HANDLING OF CIA REQUESTS  
FOR TOURS FOR FOREIGN OFFICIALS

#MDR/6  
DECLASSIFIED BY SP2 ALN/206  
ON 1-12-01

Item six in material submitted to the Director by Sam Papich in his memorandum 3/5/70 mentions occasions in the 1950's when CIA complained that officials visiting the United States under CIA sponsorship were disappointed because they had no contact with Bureau officials. CIA felt contact with Bureau officials had significant benefits, left lasting favorable impressions because of the FBI's world-wide reputation, and when foreign visitors had no contact with Bureau officials they were left with suspicions there was friction between the FBI and CIA. In 1956, we had a clear-cut policy to the effect that tours for such visitors would be of a restrictive nature and they would be afforded the same treatment as the public and nothing more.

Memorandum 5/31/56 from *NAME* to *NAME*, captioned "Visit at Bureau by Foreign Police and Intelligence Officials," *FILE NUMBER* recommended for Director's approval that Liaison would (1) inform CIA tours afforded to foreign police officials and security officials would continue to be of a restricted nature and the visitors will only view facilities normally seen by the public, and (2) that such foreign officials would not be interviewed unless it appeared to the Bureau's advantage. In regard to 1, the Director noted, "I thoroughly agree. I am not too keen anyway about such tours. We were 'burned' in the *NAME* matter." The Director noted in regard to 2, "I see no need of interviews."

*NAME* was an official of *FOREIGN* security service who was closely associated with CIA and who was alleged to have defected to the *FOREIGNERS*.

In his memorandum, Papich emphasized that for the past several years there was no basis for complaints with regard to Bureau treatment of foreign officials coming to U.S. under CIA sponsorship.

### NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION

Unauthorized Disclosure  
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#### RECOMMENDED ACTION:

None. We do not believe, in light of the facts set forth, that CIA will make an issue of this matter.

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SECRET

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

TO : Mr. C. D. DeLoach

DATE: March 6, 1970

FROM : Mr. W. C. Sullivan

SECRET

SUBJECT: RELATIONSHIPS WITH CIA  
(S) CIA - (S) DUTCH INTERESTS IN SOVIET ESPIONAGE ACTIVITY

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

Item #7 in the material submitted to the Director by SA Sam Papich in his memorandum of March 5, 1970, discusses (S) CIA - (S) Dutch interests in Soviet Espionage Activity. SA Papich (S) notes that in 1956 the Dutch Internal Security Service (BVD) wanted to have certain individuals in the U. S. interviewed and approached (S) CIA to make inquiry at the Bureau. When (S) CIA (S) approached us, we told (S) them (S) to have the (S) Dutch (S) submit the request through diplomatic channels and we subsequently told (S) CIA (S) we would not handle the interviews for the (S) Dutch. (S) Although (S) CIA (S) accepted this, they felt it hurt efforts to gather Soviet espionage information in Europe. Our position was based on failure of the (S) Dutch (S) to deal honestly with us in the case of NAME who was involved in collecting intelligence information at the National Security Agency for a (S) Dutch (S) official.

## BACKGROUND OF THE SITUATION:

This question first arose when a (S) Dutch (S) official approached our representatives at the NATO Special Committee conference in Paris in May, 1956, and requested Bureau assistance in interviewing NAME in the U. S. and to have a (S) Dutch (S) representative present during the interview. NAME is the widow of NAME NAME, who operated an espionage network in Europe prior to his defection in YEAR The Dutch representative said CIA had interviewed her, but the results were unsatisfactory. (S) He was told to submit his request through diplomatic channels. In June, a (S) CIA (S) representative (S) advised SA Papich (S) they were receiving pressure from the Dutch to have a Dutch (S) representative bring all the material on the case to the U. S. for the Bureau's use in interviewing NAME and two others in the U. S., but not to participate in the interview. (S) In accordance with instructions, SA Papich told (S) CIA (S) to have the (S) Dutch (S) submit their request through diplomatic channels and to include all information in writing, and that the Bureau would not deal personally with a (S) Dutch (S) representative. By memorandum of June 15, 1956, it was reported that NAME (S) of CIA (S) told SA Papich he was of the very strong opinion that the Bureau's position made good sense, but other (S) CIA (S) officials (S) felt the (S) Dutch (S) should be helped in every possible way. (S)

APR 16 1-10-61  
CLASSIFIED BY SP-2AM/1816  
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X15

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION  
Unauthorized Disclosure  
Subject to Criminal Sanctions

CONTINUED - OVER

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SECRET

Memorandum Mr. W.C. Sullivan to Mr. C.D. DeLoach  
RE: RELATIONSHIPS WITH CIA

DISPOSAL OF PROBLEM:

On June 19, 1956, then NAME AND POSITION and SA Papich met with NAME AND POSITION, and NAME of CIA. NAME asked if the Bureau would talk to a representative of the Dutch if he came over and, in lieu of that, would the Bureau accept from CIA information and leads furnished by the Dutch. (S)

NAME pointed out the Bureau's position was very simple in that the Dutch had been caught short in the NAME case when their representatives had been obtaining highly classified information from a friendly government and, before the FBI even requested to interview the Dutch representatives involved, the NAME notified State Department that if Dutch representatives were to be interviewed, it should be done by State Department and not by the FBI. NAME was told that in view of this, the Bureau notified State Department that any requests for information from the Dutch to be handled by the Bureau must be channeled through the State Department.

(S) NAME said that this was a situation created by the Dutch and the Bureau had no intention of altering its position and we would not talk to a Dutch representative and did not desire to receive any leads in the NAME case through CIA. (S)  
NAME advised that CIA respected the Bureau's position and had attempted to guide itself accordingly in dealing with the Dutch. (S) He said he understood the Bureau's position, which in essence was that the Dutch had made their bed and could now lie in it. (S)

LIKELIHOOD OF PROBLEM ARISING NOW:

It would appear remote that this problem would arise at this time.

RECOMMENDED ACTION:

None. We do not believe, in light of the facts set forth, that CIA will make an issue of this matter. (S)

SECRET

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

~~SECRET~~

TO : Mr. C. D. DeLoach

DATE: March 6, 1970

FROM : W. C. Sullivan

#MDR16  
DECLASSIFIED BY SP7ALM/TC  
ON 1-12-07

SUBJECT: RELATIONS WITH CIA  
NAME

Background: Item number eight in the material submitted to the Director by SA Sam Papich in his memorandum 3/5/70 discusses relations between Bureau and CIA with NAME, head of private intelligence network (NAME was NAME's aide who had liaison with Bureau).

Problem: Papich states we never informed CIA we were receiving information from NAME which was also of interest to CIA; and that while it is possible NAME had given same data to CIA, we do not know.

Analysis: NAME was financed by CIA during early 1950s (e.g., CIA budgeted \$650,000 for NAME in 1952). (FILE #) There is ample evidence CIA knew we were receiving information from NAME. We do know some information was given by NAME to CIA and Bureau jointly. NAME, for example, told us of conference in early 1951 between CIA officials and NAME when it was agreed information might be furnished directly to FBI by NAME. NAME provided CIA was advised by NAME of what was given. FILE # Moreover, on 5/7/52 a CIA official requested Bureau's views regarding validity of information we were receiving from NAME and asked for our views regarding method to be employed in channeling information from NAME to Bureau. Significantly, under procedure then, NAME directed communications to CIA with copies to Bureau. CIA was told that as it appeared NAME was an appendage of CIA, Bureau was not recommending any method of dissemination and it was up to CIA to handle problem.

In the ensuing period, dispute arose between CIA and NAME over channeling of information and Bureau made every effort to stay out of dispute. In late 1952, for example, CIA inquired if Bureau's views regarding dissemination had changed. He was told they certainly had not and again informed that Bureau's desire was to receive all information of interest no matter how received. (FILE #) Our position of not becoming involved in NAME -CIA dispute reiterated on other occasions.

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION

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CONTINUED - OVER

Memorandum W.C. Sullivan to Mr. C.D. DeLoach  
RE: RELATIONS WITH CIA

On the other hand, there were instances where we received information from NAME which was of either an administrative or intelligence interest to CIA and we did not inform CIA. These instances covered period both prior and subsequent to the contractual relationship between CIA and NAME which was from 4/51 to 7/54 FILE NUMBER AND REFERENCE. For example, NAME wrote a confidential letter dated 7/30/48 to former NAME AND POSITION which contained information of interest to CIA. This letter contains a penciled notation: "This info. not to be given to CIA. per INITIALS FILE NUMBER. Memorandum 10/11/50 from NAME to NAME contains information from NAME concerning NAME intentions to plant microphones in Finland to cover meetings attended by Russian high staff. It was observed in the memorandum that at that time NAME and NAME had no relations with CIA and that NAME intended operation was under primary responsibility of CIA. No indication this information given to CIA by Bureau

NAME furnished Bureau a memorandum dated 6/29/54 entitled "Termination Memorandum to FBI" which informed of the termination of contract between NAME and CIA. In the memorandum it is pointed out that NAME will continue to receive raw material from the field and that while he will no longer be in a position to translate, evaluate, publish, etc., NAME desires to forward such material to Bureau as NAME would not trust any other agency. The memorandum also states that NAME has continued the flow to the Bureau of all reports he felt Bureau would be interested in even though NAME received a written order specifically directing him to not give Bureau anything.

RECOMMENDED ACTION:

None. We do not believe, in light of the facts set forth, that CIA will make an issue of this matter.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

~~SECRET~~

TO : Mr. C. D. DeLoach

DATE: 3/7/70

FROM : W. C. Sullivan

SUBJECT: RELATIONSHIPS WITH CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE  
AGENCY (CIA)  
COMMISSION ON THE ORGANIZATION OF THE  
EXECUTIVE BRANCH OF THE GOVERNMENT  
(HERBERT HOOVER COMMISSION - 1954)

#MDR/6  
DECLASSIFIED BY SP2 ALM/ETG  
ON 1-10-01

Item number nine in the material submitted to the Director by SA Sam Papich in his memorandum 3/5/70 discusses the Hoover Commission survey of CIA operations in 1954. According to Papich, there was talk within CIA that the Bureau had furnished the names of subversives within CIA to Senator *NAME* AND IDENTIFYING DATA

*NAME* headed the Task Force which surveyed CIA operations between 9/54 and 6/55. In 10/54, CIA alleged that the *NAME* was attempting to develop information regarding CIA operations. According to the Washington Star, *DATE* /54, *NAME* said CIA was "one of the worst situations we have as far as communist infiltration is concerned." He said he would give his data relative to this matter to *NAME* Task Force. According to the Washington Star, *DATE* /55, *NAME* said he had given *NAME* information relative to alleged communist infiltration of CIA. As of *DATE* /55, CIA had not received from *NAME* the names of those considered security risks but CIA believed it had done a good job of removing security risks and believed that it was in good shape.

On *DATE* /55, the Task Force requested name checks on security risks named by *NAME*. Memoranda containing the results of those checks were given to the Task Force on *DATE* /55. On *DATE* /55, the Bureau received a letter from *NAME* asking for investigations relative to character, reputation, and loyalty of individuals mentioned as security risks. CIA was aware of the names as we asked it for identifying data concerning them. *NAME* was later advised that the investigations would entail interviews at CIA, review of its programs, inquiries in foreign countries, and the like and he withdrew his request.

## NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION

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CONTINUED - OVER

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~~SECRET~~

Memorandum to Mr. C. D. DeLoach  
RE: RELATIONSHIPS WITH CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE  
AGENCY (CIA)

The talk at CIA that the Bureau had furnished  
*NAME* the names of subversives at CIA has not been  
recorded in FBI files nor is there any complaint in the  
matter recorded. Neither is there recorded any complaint  
by CIA to this effect.

RECOMMENDED ACTION:

None. We do not believe, in light of the facts  
set forth, that CIA will make an issue of this matter.

~~SECRET~~

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

~~SECRET~~

TO : Mr. C. D. DeLoach

DATE: 3/6/70

FROM : W. C. Sullivan

DECLASSIFIED BY *AMDR/K*  
ON 1-10-01 BY *SP2ALM/JTG*

SUBJECT: RELATIONSHIPS WITH CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
INTERNAL SECURITY LEADS IN FOREIGN COUNTRIES

Item number 10 in the material submitted to the Director by Special Agent Sam Papich in his memorandum of 3/5/70 discussed our furnishing leads to our Legal Attaches (Legats) without advising Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) or requesting the Agency to handle the lead.

The observations of Special Agent Papich in this matter are broad and general in nature. His presentation is hinged upon the premise advanced by the Agency that "internal security" cannot be separated from "counterintelligence," thereby necessitating our advising CIA of requests to our Legats to have leads covered in foreign countries. The Manual of Instructions, Section 102, page 23, states CIA's responsibilities include collection, collation, evaluation, coordination and dissemination of intelligence information. CIA does not have, among other things, responsibility for "internal security functions."

In the absence of unusual situations, we forward investigative leads pertaining to our cases in countries where we have liaison coverage to the particular Legal Attache concerned. Through his contacts the Legat arranges for the necessary investigation and submits the desired information according to our reporting needs. The Legat coordinates this activity on a local level.

It is more desirable to have our representatives request investigation abroad in order to achieve maximum coverage, and to maintain tight control so we can insure that we fulfill our responsibilities.

RECOMMENDED ACTION:

None. We do not believe, in light of the facts set forth, that CIA will make an issue of this matter.

**NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION**

Unauthorized Disclosure  
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UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

DECLASSIFIED BY SP2 RLM/ATG  
ON 1-12-01  
PER CIA AND MAJ GOLD RELEASE  
CR# 88-1826/3PK-4/2/98

~~SECRET~~

TO : Mr. C. D. DeLoach

DATE: 3/7/70

FROM : W. C. Sullivan

SUBJECT: RELATIONSHIPS WITH CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE  
AGENCY (CIA)

[BUREAU OPERATIONS IN CUBA] (S) (U)

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO  
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR  
RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION  
IN THIS DOCUMENT, AS SANITIZED  
GMB 5-31-94 (SP8 MAC/GCL)  
6-2-94

(S) (U)  
Item number eleven in the material submitted to the Director by SA Sam Papich in his memorandum 3/5/70 states that we operated informants in Cuba during the period we had a Legat Office in Havana and did not coordinate our operations with CIA or advise it we had sources there. It was noted that after Castro came on the scene, approval was granted to turn certain informants over to CIA. Papich also refers to a memorandum NAME to NAME, 2/5/60, regarding the Communist Party of Cuba (CPC) which dealt with the problem of whether a Havana source [used in an intercept operation between the Communist Party of Venezuela and the CPC] should be turned over to CIA to obtain complete coverage. We, of course, had no coverage [of Venezuela]. Bureau had not advised other agencies of this source since we did not want Castro to uncover any operational activities which might embarrass the Bureau. The entire operation was later turned over to CIA. (S) (U)

CIA began its operations in Havana in 4/47 and in a letter to the Bureau, 4/28/53, [regarding Havana informants] NAME noted that CIA was not overly cooperative and that, in fact, it was not developing pertinent information. At that time NAME met with the CIA representative in Havana who admitted he was not getting any information [concerning the CPC] and had no plans for any aggressive action in that field. [For this reason it was necessary for us to develop our own coverage.] We instructed NAME to ascertain from the Havana CIA representative information available to him concerning matters of interest to the Bureau; however, he was to continue [through informant sources] to obtain needed information regarding security matters which could not be supplied by CIA. Subsequently, our relations with CIA improved to the point of being described as excellent in 1958. We think our overall position to be sound. (S) (U)

RECOMMENDED ACTION:

None. We do not believe, in light of the facts set forth, that CIA will make an issue of this matter.

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION

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UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

(SECRET)

TO : Mr. C.D. DeLoach

DATE: March 6, 1970

FROM : W.C. Sullivan

1-16-01 #m DE/6  
CLASSIFIED BY SP-2 ALM/ZTG  
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X/1,6

SUBJECT: RELATIONSHIPS WITH CIA  
BUREAU OPERATIONS IN BRAZIL (S) - DATE

Item #12 in the material submitted to the Director by SA Sam Papich in his memorandum dated March 5, 1970, discusses situation in Rio de Janeiro (Rio) (S) in DATE concerning strained relations which had developed between former Legal Attache (Legat) NAME and former U.S. Ambassador NAME

According to Papich the Ambassador alleged that Legat had engaged in uncoordinated intelligence activity and that CIA was unhappy with Legat's activities and had told the Ambassador that Legat had disseminated information from a source who was either a fabricator or a provocator.

NAME was assigned as Legat in Rio (S) on DATE and was transferred PLACE AND DATE after Bureau concluded that he lacked sufficient administrative experience to function as Legat. Rio (S) In early DATE he began to receive information from NAME an employee of UNIT, Federal District Police. NAME furnished derogatory information concerning one NAME of the Brazilian Army who was a possible Brazilian presidential candidate in DATE, indicating that NAME had questionable contacts with FOREIGN Embassy in Brazil. (S) This information was disseminated to CIA attributed to a source who had not been contacted sufficiently to determine his reliability. CIA advised Bureau that the information concerning NAME caused considerable consternation within CIA which had been unable to evaluate reliability of the information. CIA suggested possibility that the information had been fabricated or was part of a communist deception operation. CIA requested that we identify our source but we declined to do so because source did not want his identity disclosed.

By letter dated DATE, the new Legat, Rio, recommended that NAME be discontinued as a potential source based on his admissions to Legat that he had no sources in FOREIGN Embassy and could not provide identities of his sources or additional details concerning information he had reported. Legat concluded that (S)

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(SECRET)

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SECRET

Memorandum to Mr. D. J. Brennan, Jr.  
RE: RELATIONSHIPS WITH CIA  
BUREAU OPERATIONS IN BRAZIL - 1959

information NAME had furnished was of such a nature that it could have come from public sources, the political police or could have been invented and attributed to his alleged contacts. Legat also concluded that NAME could not have been a provocator used by FOREIGN to pass deceptive information. Contacts with NAME were discontinued in DATE (S)

In our dissemination of information from NAME to CIA we were careful to state that our contacts with the source were insufficient to establish his reliability. Although subsequent events established that it was likely that CIA was correct in speculating that the information was fabricated, there was no indication that the source was a FOREIGN CONTROLLED provocator. (S)

RECOMMENDED ACTION:

None. We do not believe, in light of the facts set forth, that CIA will make an issue of this matter.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

~~SECRET~~

TO : Mr. C. D. DeLoach

DATE: 3/6/70

FROM : W. C. Sullivan

*MDR 16*  
DECLASSIFIED BY *SP2 ALM/JTG*  
ON *1-10-01*

SUBJECT: RELATIONSHIPS WITH CIA  
BORDER COVERAGE

Item number (13) in the material submitted to the Director by SA Sam Papich in his memorandum 3/5/70 discusses a problem presented by the Phoenix Office in June, 1957, concerning the Bureau's handling of informants on the Mexican border. These informants were operated inside Mexico. The problem was predicated on situations, which might arise as the result of CIA endeavoring to develop informants who were already being handled by the Bureau.

SENSITIVE METHODS AND TECHNIQUES

PROBLEM:

By airtel 6/8/57, Phoenix advised that the CIA representative had endeavored to develop 3 Bureau sources in Mexico and stated that it was discontinuing these sources unless advised to the contrary by the Bureau.

SOLUTION:

This situation was analyzed in Bureau memorandum dated 6/14/57 wherein it was recommended that safeguards be established to continue operating already established valuable sources even though CIA also began using them; however, the information we

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NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION  
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Memorandum to Mr. C. D. DeLoach  
RE: RELATIONSHIPS WITH CIA  
BORDER COVERAGE

received from these sources was to be broken down and paraphrased in reports in such manner as to conceal as far as possible the fact that these individuals were assisting us. The Director approved these safeguards which were successfully placed into effect by Phoenix.

A review of our files since June 14, 1957, fails to reveal that this problem has been raised subsequently by CIA activity in the Phoenix ~~CODE NAME~~ area. In addition, the CIA representative was transferred PLACE on 7/6/59. He was not replaced by CIA and the border territory he had covered was subsequently handled by CIA on a road trip basis out of PLACE. Furthermore, the participation of the Phoenix Office in ~~CODE NAME~~ was discontinued with the Director's approval by letter dated 12/10/69..

RECOMMENDED ACTION:

None. We do not believe, in light of the facts set forth, that CIA will make an issue of this matter.

~~SECRET~~

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

TO : Mr. C. D. DeLoach

DATE: 3/6/70

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

FROM : W. C. Sullivan

#MDE16 1-10-01  
CLASSIFIED BY SP2 ALM/RTG  
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 1,6

SUBJECT: RELATIONSHIPS WITH CIA  
CODE NAME

Item number 14 in material submitted to Director by SA Sam Papich in his memorandum 3/5/70 discusses CODE NAME case. CODE NAME is code name for case on our double agent, NAME who was recruited by Soviets while on TYPE OF trip to PLACE in YEAR. Until discontinued in YEAR he delivered extensive material, cleared by APPROPRIATE BODY to the Soviets in PLACE and PLACE.

Mr. Papich's memorandum states case was being highlighted since we cannot exclude possibility Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) has evidence to demonstrate we were operational in PLACE and did not co-ordinate with CIA. The fact is CIA did know NAME was meeting the Soviets in PLACE and Mr. Papich's memorandum does not disclose CIA raised any objection to date. We recognized at the time there could be a jurisdictional problem. We permitted CIA to interview NAME in DATE, shortly after his recruitment at which time CIA learned from him he had a scheduled espionage meeting in PLACE AND DATE, CIA agreed handling of NAME was solely within jurisdiction of Bureau. On DATE, CIA was orally informed NAME would meet Soviets in PLACE AND DATE that we desired CIA to take no action which would interfere with our operation and that results would be furnished CIA (approved by memorandum NAME to NAME. Memorandum NAME to NAME recommended we not advise CIA of a later meeting between NAME and Soviets scheduled for PLACE AND DATE in interest of security. This was approved and this policy was followed thereafter.

All information from NAME was disseminated to CIA and it disclosed our source was meeting Soviets at various points in PLACE. In DATE CIA was advised it could in future contact NAME for data he acquired in his world-wide travels providing it did not use him in operational capacity; NAME was instructed not to disclose to CIA information on his

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION

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**SECRET**

Memorandum to Mr. C. D. DeLoach .  
RE: RELATIONSHIPS WITH CIA

(S) relationship with Bureau. It is a fact, however, we did permit *NAME*, under our supervision, to meet [Soviet principals outside] the United States without clearing with CIA. We discontinued him as an informant in *DATE*

RECOMMENDED ACTION:

None. - We do not believe, in light of the facts set forth, that CIA will make an issue of this matter.

**SECRET**

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

~~SECRET~~

TO : Mr. C. D. DeLoach

DATE: 3/6/70

FROM : W. C. Sullivan

SUBJECT: RELATIONSHIPS WITH CENTRAL  
INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA)  
CIA REQUEST FOR BUREAU LECTURE  
ON COMMUNISM IN THE U. S.

#moe/6  
DECLASSIFIED BY SP-2ALM/JTG  
ON 1-01-01

Item Number 15 in the material submitted to the Director by SA Sam Papich in his memorandum 3/5/70 discusses the Director's refusal of a 1958 CIA request for NAME to lecture on communism before a CIA group. Papich stated that CIA accepted this as an affront and a blatant refusal to cooperate on a most important subject of interest to both agencies.

The files disclose that by letter 9/25/58 signed by NAME, CIA requested NAME to address a selected group of CIA personnel on the communist movement in the U. S. CIA suggested dates of 12/9, 10, or 11/58. The Director by routing slip attached to NAME letter commented, "It seems strange that CIA should seek this when its top representative in Japan considers FBI as a bunch of mere 'flat-feet' and the dangers of communism as something conjured up in the minds of the FBI. But then again I note request doesn't come from the Director nor even the Deputy Director of CIA."

Memorandum NAME to NAME dated 10/1/58 made reference to CIA's request and the Director's comments. It recommended that the best interests of the Bureau would be served by giving this lecture, not because of the information which could be conveyed to CIA on communism in the U. S., but because it would give NAME an opportunity to raise a number of questions himself of the group concerning CIA's own activities in the field of communism. It was pointed out that it could be considered a bit of a challenge to see how much the FBI could learn about the operation of CIA during the course of the lecture and discussion rather than the converse. NAME recommended that the request be declined and the Director concurred commenting, "We cannot make NAME available to this outfit."

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Unauthorized Disclosure  
Subject to Criminal Sanctions

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CONTINUED OVER

Memorandum to Mr. C. D. DeLoach

RE: RELATIONSHIPS WITH CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA)  
CIA REQUEST FOR BUREAU LECTURE ON COMMUNISM IN THE U. S.

Pursuant to the Director's decision, a letter was directed to CIA under date of 10/7/58 advising that it was not possible to grant CIA's request for this lecture because of *NAME* other commitments.

Nothing could be located in Bureau files to indicate CIA's reaction to this letter.

ACTION RECOMMENDED:

None. We do not believe, in light of the facts set forth, that CIA will make an issue of this matter.

~~SECRET~~

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UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

TO : Mr. C. D. DeLoach

DATE: 3/6/70

FROM : Mr. W. C. Sullivan

SUBJECT: RELATIONSHIPS WITH CIA  
*NAME*

Item Number 16 in the material submitted to the Director by Special Agent (SA) Sam Papich in his memorandum 3/5/70 discusses the case of *NAME* that CIA might criticize our not identifying our source.

BACKGROUND OF CASE *NAME* was the CIA employee assigned to the *PLACE AND DATE*. He became involved with a *FOREIGN* girl, and the *FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SERVICE* approached him for recruitment, using the affair with the girl and compromising photographs as leverage to carry out the approach. *NAME* reported the approach to his superiors and was returned to U. S. and ultimately removed from CIA.

PROBLEM WITH CIA We first learned of this case on 7/9/56 from *NAME AND POSITION*, who furnished the information in confidence and who indicated *NAME* might have been involved in espionage. On 7/16/56 *NAME AND POSITION*, CIA, advised SA Papich that CIA was considering requesting in writing that the Bureau identify our source. On 7/17/56 SA Papich was advised by *NAME*, CIA, that Allen Dulles had instructed that the request not be made.

DISPOSAL OF PROBLEM WITH CIA . This problem never officially arose in view of the instructions of Mr. Dulles. Bureau files contain no indication as to whether or not CIA documented this.

RECOMMENDED ACTION:

None. We do not believe, in light of the facts set forth, that CIA will make an issue of this matter.

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION  
Unauthorized Disclosure  
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UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

~~SECRET~~

TO : Mr. C. D. DeLoach

DATE: 3/6/70

FROM : Mr. W. C. Sullivan

SUBJECT: RELATIONSHIPS WITH  
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
*NAME*

#mDP16  
DECLASSIFIED BY SP-2440 JTG  
ON 1-11-01

Item Number 17 in the material submitted to the Director by SA Sam Papich in his memorandum of 3/5/70 discusses the possible belief of Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) that the Legal Attache, *PLACE*, had leaked sensitive information concerning *NAME*. SA Papich noted that perhaps CIA might question whether FBI had pursued investigation in the case vigorously enough. Memorandum is to review circumstances under which information was furnished by CIA to FBI, Legal Attache inquiries of CIA, *PLACE*, and the effect of CIA restrictions on FBI investigations in this case.

In February, 1963, CIA made available information from *NAME AND IDENTIFYING DATA*

to the effect that the FOREIGN Government was planning to engage in clandestine collection of scientific and technical information in the United States. CIA insisted information not be made available to other government agencies and no investigation be conducted which might jeopardize its source. CIA then made available extensive information from *SENSITIVE SOURCE*. Analysis of the *SOURCE MATERIAL* revealed several discrepancies which would have made interview by FBI of *NAME* desirable. CIA refused this request. We made numerous requests to obtain clarifying data to explain items mentioned in *SOURCE MATERIAL* and CIA failed to respond.

In March, 1963, CIA furnished information concerning *NAME* interest in American personnel and installations in *PLACE*. This information was made available to Legal Attache, *PLACE*. On 4/11/63 CIA advised that its CIA station *PLACE*, which had not heretofore been apprised of *NAME* case had made inquiry concerning the case. Our inquiry of Legal Attache, *PLACE*, disclosed that

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OBSERVATIONS - OVER

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Memorandum to Mr. C. D. DeLoach  
RE: RELATIONSHIPS WITH  
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

inquiry of CIA personnel in *PLACE* had been made concerning one of the individuals previously identified as *FOREIGN* agent and also requests had been made for certain biographical data concerning other individuals. Legal Attache noted that CIA personnel in *PLACE* had indicated they were previously aware of the *NAME* case and were impressed with the extreme sensitivity of the case. We furnished this information to CIA headquarters and on 5/7/63 CIA referred to the incident and stated that it was a matter of serious concern to it, requesting that any future dissemination outside Bureau or to the Legal Attache be coordinated in advance with that Agency. This practice was closely followed. The Director observed in January, 1964, that he thought the whole thing had been imaginary on the part of CIA which had been played as a sucker by *NAME*. The Director added that no more time should be wasted on it, at least until CIA restrictions were removed. We continued to attempt to get the restrictions removed without success and covered outstanding leads.

In September, 1964, an analysis of the case disclosed that although thirty-eight separate investigations were opened only three *FOREIGN* agents were uncovered. Original allegations of *FOREIGN* intent to mount an espionage mission in the United States could not be substantiated. This information, coupled with the fact that CIA refused to make *NAME* available to us for the purpose of resolving discrepancies, prompted a decision transmitted by us to CIA on 9/30/64 that we were closing our investigation in this case.

Mr. Papich commented in his memorandum of 3/5/70 CIA never has been satisfied with the efforts made by the Bureau in this case. Our review indicates our efforts in the matter were as full and complete as possible under circumstances where CIA refused to grant us access to the source, did not respond to request for clarifying data and declined to remove restrictions making it impossible to take necessary investigative steps. Should any question be raised in the future, we are in a position to document our difficulties experienced with CIA.

RECOMMENDED ACTION:

None. We do not believe, in light of the facts set forth, that CIA will make an issue of this matter.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

~~SECRET~~

TO : Mr. C. D. DeLoach

DATE: 3/6/70

FROM : W. C. Sullivan

SUBJECT: RELATIONSHIPS WITH CIA  
LEAKS TO THE "NATIONAL REVIEW" - 1959

WMDR16  
DECLASSIFIED BY SP-2ALM/ER  
ON 1-10-01

## BACKGROUND:

Item number 18 in the material submitted to the Director by Special Agent Sam Papich in his memorandum 3/5/70 cites a Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) investigation of leaks to the "National Review" which identified *NAME*, former CIA employee, as the leak and referred to former Assistant to the Director *NAME* as among his contacts.

## PROBLEM:

Papich implies that CIA may have further information regarding *NAME* involvement.

## ANALYSIS:

This situation was set forth in memorandum *NAME* to *NAME*, 4/21/59. We do not know if CIA has additional information as to the suggested relationship between *NAME* and *NAME*. We do know that they have not made an issue of this matter to date.

## RECOMMENDED ACTION:

None. We do not believe, in light of the facts set forth, that CIA will make an issue of this matter.

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION  
Unauthorized Disclosure  
Subject to Criminal Sanctions

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UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

SECRET

TO : Mr. C.D. DeLoach

DATE: March 6, 1970

FROM : W.C. Sullivan

SUBJECT: RELATIONSHIPS WITH CIA - TRAVEL OF  
BUREAU INFORMANTS TO CUBA

Item Number 19 in the material submitted to the Director by SA Sam Papich in his memorandum 3/5/70 discusses the possible travel of one of our Mexican border informants to Cuba and whether our not advising CIA of this made us potentially vulnerable to charges we were operating outside the U.S. without coordinating with CIA.

## BACKGROUND:

This involved our plans to send CODE -  
NAME informant to a guerrilla training camp in Cuba. The trip never materialized.

In October, 1965, we were vitally interested in determining the location and extent of Cuban guerrilla training sites being used to prepare Latin American subversives to carry out revolutions in their home countries. NAME, a Mexican national residing in PLACE, Mexico, which is within the area covered by CODE NAME, had infiltrated FOREIGN and FOREIGN intelligence operations in Mexico City and had made himself attractive to Mexican communist leaders who were planning to pay expenses of sending guerrilla trainees to Cuba.

## CIA CONSIDERATIONS:

NAME was an integral part of CODE -  
NAME which is handled on a need-to-know basis. We had previously obtained material from CIA showing its primary targets inside Cuba which allowed us to fully brief the informant as to overall U.S. Government objectives and a procedure was established for use in disseminating data to CIA if the trip materialized which would fully protect our informant and not jeopardize CODE NAME.

## OUTCOME:

During period informant was striving to arrange the trip to Cuba his wife IDENTIFYING  
DATA This strained family relationship caused us to order NAME to have informant cancel efforts to make the trip to Cuba and thus no trip was ever made.

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION

Unauthorized Disclosure

CONTINUED - OVER

SECRET

Subject to Criminal Sanctions



SECRET

Memorandum to Mr. C. D. DeLoach  
RE: RELATIONSHIPS WITH CIA - TRAVEL OF  
BUREAU INFORMANTS TO CUBA

ADDITIONAL CONSIDERATIONS:

After *NAME* had moved to *PLACE*, Mexico, which is outside *CODENAME*, in *MONTH*, 1966, we advised CIA of his past cooperation with us and interposed no objection to his use by CIA in areas outside our jurisdiction. On 1/22/66 CIA stated it would consult us should it initiate contacts with the informant. There is no indication that CIA did use the informant and on 1/24/68 we discontinued *NAME* as he was of no further value to us. The trip never materialized.

RECOMMENDED ACTION:

None. We do not believe, in light of the facts set forth, that CIA will make an issue of this matter.

SECRET

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

TO : Mr. C. D. DeLoach

DATE: 3/6/70

FROM : Mr. W. C. Sullivan

SUBJECT: RELATIONSHIP WITH CENTRAL  
INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA)  
DISSEMINATION OF CIA INFORMATION  
IN A BUREAU MONOGRAPH

~~SECRET~~  
# MDR 16  
DECLASSIFIED BY SP2 ALM/STG  
ON 1-10-01

Item 20 submitted to the Director by Sam Papich in his memorandum 3/5/70 mentions the dissemination of a Bureau monograph dated 5/5/65 and entitled "Communism in the Dominican Republic." Special Agent (SA) Papich stated that due to the urgency of the document Bureau did not obtain CIA clearance to include CIA information in the monograph which was disseminated to interested agencies, including CIA. According to SA Papich, CIA never made any protest although it considered our action a violation of the "third agency rule."

Although the monograph referred to by SA Papich did contain CIA data, it also set forth highly significant data obtained by Bureau through our own informants. The CIA data was biographical in nature and was used in the monograph to characterize the past, including communist contacts, of key figures in the Dominican Republic. It was taken from the 1963 CIA Biographical Handbook and CIA telegrams dating back to 1961, all of which were previously disseminated to the U. S. intelligence community by CIA. No attempt was made in the monograph to characterize CIA data as Bureau information and, in fact, this information was attributed to "another Government agency," in accordance with established procedures.

The so-called "third agency rule" provides that classified information originating in a department or agency will not be disseminated outside the receiving agency without the permission of the originating agency. However, an exception to this rule provides that the receiving agency may disseminate such data to other members of the U. S. Intelligence Board (USIB), of which Bureau is a member, unless the originating agency uses appropriate control markings limiting its data to the use of the receiving agency only. The CIA data used in the Bureau monograph had no such control markings and our monograph was disseminated to the President, the Attorney General and USIB members only.

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION  
Unauthorized Disclosure  
Subject to Criminal Sanctions

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~~SECRET~~

Memorandum to Mr. C. D. DeLoach  
RE: RELATIONSHIP WITH CENTRAL  
INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA)

The Bureau's monograph was a compendium of our own data, CIA data, and that received from other members of the intelligence community. It was prepared under emergency conditions for the President and had a significant bearing on the understanding and handling by the intelligence community of a serious crisis which confronted this country.

RECOMMENDED ACTION:

None. We do not believe, in light of the facts set forth, that CIA will make an issue of this matter.

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UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

~~SECRET~~

TO : Mr. C.D. DeLoach

DATE: March 6, 1970

FROM : W.C. Sullivan

#MOR16  
DECLASSIFIED BY SP2 ALM/116  
ON 1-10-01

SUBJECT: RELATIONSHIPS WITH CIA - BUREAU INFORMANTS  
IN PLACE

Item Number 21 in the material submitted to the Director by SA Sam Papich in his memorandum 3/5/70 discusses Bureau operation of informants in PLACE and comments on our potential vulnerability for not having informed CIA at the inception of the operation of these informants.

SA Papich has cited two situations. The first concerns NAME, an attorney residing in PLACE. Our Legat, PLACE, in the Fall of 1966, identified NAME as a potential source of intelligence information of importance to U.S. security; conducted appropriate background inquiry regarding him and determined his excellent potential and willingness to furnish intelligence information to U.S. Government. By memorandum 11/23/66 it was approved that we contact CIA headquarters through liaison channels to inform CIA that we planned to maintain contact with NAME; that CIA would be furnished the information obtained and that we would service CIA requests provided they could be handled with complete security. SA Papich so informed NAME of CIA on 11/25/66. NAME - CIA stated he saw no reason why FBI could not proceed as we desired and that CIA headquarters would so inform its representatives in PLACE and PLACE, instructing them to give FBI all necessary support in this operation. Since that date we have operated NAME as a valuable and productive unpaid confidential source. Since this matter was coordinated with CIA at the outset, there appears to be no problem.

The second situation cited by SA Papich concerned Legat, PLACE, informant NAME. This individual has cooperated with the Bureau for some 25 years. As a PLACE police official in 1945-47, he was most helpful to our representative assigned in PLACE. We had no contact with him thereafter until 1954 when he IDENTIFYING DATA. For 11 years thereafter, NAME was operated by our Legat, PLACE.

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION  
Unauthorized Disclosure  
Subject to Criminal Sanctions

CONTINUED - OVER

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~~SECRET~~

Memorandum to Mr. C. D. DeLoach  
RE: RELATIONSHIPS WITH CIA - BUREAU INFORMANTS  
IN PLACE

In April, 1965, NAME returned to PLACE and by memorandum 6/7/65 it was approved that contacts with him be continued in PLACE by our NAME Agent. He proved to be an extremely valuable informant on criminal matters as well as those of interest to U.S. security in PLACE.

Upon NAME's designation as a highly placed police official in PLACE in 1967, we promptly advised CIA headquarters through liaison channels of informant's identity. We advised CIA that we had utilized NAME for handling criminal leads and that he periodically volunteered information concerning political developments in PLACE. At that time, 10/6/67, it was agreed that Bureau would continue control of informant and that after each contact with informant by our road trip Agent, the latter would confer with NAME Head of CIA operations in PLACE (who was present at CIA headquarters at the meeting) concerning political information furnished by the informant. We were assured of complete CIA cooperation in this matter. On the occasion of our road trip Agent's next contact with NAME in PLACE, however, NAME-CIA bitterly accused our Agent of having lied to him and of having operated a source in PLACE without CIA's knowledge. He stated that responsibility for the development of security information outside the U. S. is solely CIA's. It is noted that NAME has been a difficult person with whom to deal and has been inclined to "pop off." Matter has been closely followed by Legat, PLACE, and there have been no further indications of difficulty with him. CIA, PLACE, has afforded us complete cooperation in our handling of NAME as we were assured it would in the 10/6/67 meeting. Accordingly, no issue was made of this matter with CIA.

NAME continues as a very valuable paid informant of our Legat, PLACE. CIA has made favorable comments regarding the excellent quality of the information obtained by NAME. This arrangement has worked smoothly for two and one-half years and there appears to be little likelihood of CIA raising an issue regarding this matter.

RECOMMENDED ACTION:

None. We do not believe, in light of the fact set forth, that CIA will make an issue of this matter.

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UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

TO : Mr. C. D. DeLoach

DATE: 3/6/70

FROM : W. C. Sullivan

DECLASSIFIED BY *SP2 ALM/ATG*  
ON *1/10/01*

SUBJECT: RELATIONSHIPS WITH CIA  
ITEM (22) CODENAME

Item (22),  
by Special Agent Sam Papich in his memorandum 3/5/70  
mentions

CURRENT SENSITIVE OPERATION

~~SECRET~~

CONTINUED - OVER

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION  
Unauthorized Disclosure  
Subject to Criminal Sanctions

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Memorandum to Mr. C. D. DeLoach  
RE: RELATIONSHIPS WITH CIA  
ITEM (22) CODENAME

CURRENT SENSITIVE OPERATION

(Continued from page 1)

ACTION RECOMMENDED:

None.

~~SECRET~~

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

TO : Mr. C. D. DeLoach

DATE: March 6, 1970

FROM : W. C. Sullivan

#MDR16  
DECLASSIFIED BY SP2 ALM/LTG  
ON 1-10-01

SUBJECT: RELATIONSHIPS WITH CIA  
HARASSMENT OF CIA

Item #23 in the material submitted to the Director by SA Sam Papich in his memorandum of March 5, 1970, discusses a letter dated November 15, 1967, from CIA which requested that the Bureau check telephone toll calls from the home of one NAME who was allegedly harassing CIA in the Miami area. NAME was supposedly seeking information concerning CIA's covert operations. SA Papich states that we told CIA that we would not check the toll calls on the basis that the information received was not sufficient to justify investigation within the Bureau's jurisdiction. SA Papich also states that "CIA accepted our response but there is no doubt that the Agency characterized our position as a concrete example of refusal to help a sister agency with a problem relating to the security of U.S. intelligence operations."

A review of Bureau files disclosed that a memorandum, NAME, to NAME dated November 17, 1967, was prepared. This memorandum encompassed the above facts and recommended that CIA Liaison Agent advise CIA that we would not check the toll calls as requested. This memorandum and recommendation was prepared by SA Papich. The Director noted "OK H."

In addition to the above, on December 9, 1967, NAME contacted our Miami Office and stated that he was writing a book about CIA and offered to make the material available to the Miami Office. Our Miami Office was advised that this information was of interest to CIA headquarters and instructions were furnished that if NAME did furnish Miami with the information, it would be given to CIA. Brown did not follow through with his offer.

## RECOMMENDED ACTION:

None. We do not believe, in light of the facts set forth, that CIA will make an issue of this matter.

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION  
Unauthorized Disclosure  
Subject to Criminal Sanctions

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UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

~~SECRET~~

TO : Mr. C. D. DeLoach

DATE: 3/6/70

FROM : W. C. Sullivan

#MDR/16  
DECLASSIFIED BY SP-2ALM/JTG  
ON 11-01

SUBJECT: RELATIONSHIP WITH THE CENTRAL  
INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA)  
SENSITIVE DOCUMENT

Item number 24 in the material submitted to the Director by SA Sam Papich in his memorandum dated 3/5/70 discusses the restriction of dissemination of the SENSITIVE DOCUMENT to Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Prior to 10/67, some of the Government agencies on the distribution list for CODEWORD received multiple copies. The Director of CIA was then receiving 19 copies of CODEWORD as a result of requests from CIA on 3/30/62 and 10/23/62 for additional copies to expedite reading by key CIA officials and to facilitate rapid utilization of the information within CIA.

The Director made a notation on the 10/4/67 CODEWORD "Please look over list of distribution. I have marked with a dot those I question as to why they should receive copies and I do not think more than 1 copy should be sent anyone. Let me have your views. H." By memorandum NAME to NAME 10/6/67, it was stated that although security of the classified document CODEWORD had been maintained, if the Director so desired, we would tell recipients that they would receive only one copy each in the future. NAME noted on this memorandum, "Yes. NAME also noted, "We could never run down a leak." The Director noted, "Send only 1 copy & if any inquiry, then indicate we have had to cut costs. H."

Since 10/67 the Director's instructions have been followed and only one copy of CODEWORD has been furnished to those, including CIA, on the CODEWORD distribution list.

RECOMMENDED ACTION:

None. We do not believe, in light of the facts set forth, that CIA will make an issue of this matter.

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION  
Unauthorized Disclosure  
Subject to Criminal Sanctions

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UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

~~SECRET~~

TO : Mr. C. D. DeLoach

DATE: March 7, 1970

FROM : W. C. Sullivan

SUBJECT: RELATIONSHIPS WITH CIA  
ESTABLISHMENT OF BUREAU LIAISON  
WITH DUTCH INTERNAL SECURITY  
SERVICE (BVD) - 1960

1-11-01 #mde/b  
CLASSIFIED BY SP-2 ALM/JTG  
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 1, 5

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

(S) Item number 25 in the material submitted to the Director by SA Sam Papich in his memorandum of 3/5/70, discusses a trip to Holland by Legat, PLACE, in 1960 to explore arrangements for liaison with appropriate Dutch authorities. It is given as an instance CIA could cite as an FBI failure to coordinate with them in line with National Security Council Directives.

NAME reportedly raised questions, indicating FBI should first reach agreement with CIA, which he said had previously handled all relations with Dutch authorities. (S) Papich says CIA Director, Allen Dulles, later expressed disappointment that we did not contact CIA beforehand but that an agreement satisfactory to all concerned was eventually worked out. Papich also says that in late 1959 we gave consideration to establishing a Legat in Denmark but did not inform CIA of our intentions.

In contemplation of the stationing of a Legat in Denmark, Bulet of 12/7/59 instructed Legat, PLACE, to broaden liaison contacts in Scandinavian countries and told LEGAT, PLACE, to make exploratory contacts with appropriate authorities in Holland (S) for the same purpose. Since we had told State by letter of 3/10/55 that we would handle requests for investigations and name checks for the Dutch (S) only when received through formal State channels, we advised State of our intention to make exploratory contacts with the Dutch (S) regarding regular liaison arrangements, and State approved. State sent a letter to the U. S. Embassy in Holland (S) on 12/17/59, advising of the Bureau's intention, but it apparently did not get to NAME prior to Legat's trip to Holland. (S)

On 1/4/60 Legat, PLACE, called the BVD (S) from PLACE and arranged to call on them on 1/7/60. The BVD reported the call to NAME (CIA) (S) who told STATE DEPARTMENT

NAME On 1/7/60 the Director received a letter of 1/5/60 from NAME in which he said he was disturbed about the manner in which he had learned of the Legat's proposed visit. While offering to assist the Bureau, NAME spoke of the long standing Contractual and financial arrangements CIA had with BVD and suggested the Director and Allen Dulles discuss the matter if permanent Bureau liaison with BVD was planned. (S)

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION (S)

Unauthorized Disclosure

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SECRET

Memorandum to Mr. C. D. DeLoach  
RE: RELATIONSHIPS WITH CIA  
ESTABLISHMENT OF BUREAU LIAISON  
WITH DUTCH INTERNAL SECURITY  
SERVICE (BVD) - 1960

On 1/7/60, Legat met with NAME prior to visiting BVD. He explained that he was to explore the possibility of direct contact with (S) BVD concerning exchange of information bearing on U.S. internal security matters. He said he would not be operational and that the contemplated liaison could not reasonably cause interference with the existing CIA arrangement. (S) While NAME expressed misgivings that the Dutch might be confused, no request was made to refrain from contacting BVD. (S) The CIA representative said he had requested his headquarters for comment on learning of the proposed visit of Legat but had not received a reply. Legat later briefed NAME on the results of his visit to BVD who were friendly but deferred a final commitment, referring to the existing "American arrangement."

By letter of 1/13/60 the Director thanked NAME for his offer to assist, and said Bureau interests in Scandinavian countries and Holland were under discussion with Allen Dulles. NAME was also assured our proposed contacts with the Dutch were purely liaison in nature; that while we would keep CIA advised of items of interest to it in connection with its responsibilities abroad, it was not believed necessary to go beyond the U.S. Intelligence Board Directive of 12/8/59 in coordinating with CIA matters taken up with the Dutch. (S) That Directive says CIA shall be responsible for coordination of all U.S. liaison which concerns clandestine intelligence activities or which involve foreign clandestine services. Paragraph 10, however, says the Directive does not apply to any liaison relationship concerned with U.S. internal security functions, or with criminal or disciplinary matters which are not directly related to foreign espionage or clandestine counterintelligence.

On 1/13/60 Papich explained to Allen Dulles and NAME the reasons for our contacts in Scandinavian countries and (S) Holland exploring possible establishment of a Legat in Denmark. When Papich challenged them to cite any Bureau failure to comply with the Directive for coordination of U.S. liaison activities abroad, NAME immediately stated there were no such instances. In answer to specific invitation by Papich to air any complaints or problems, Dulles stated that neither he nor his representatives had any complaints; that he was personally unhappy about not being contacted in the beginning; but that he and CIA would give all possible assistance. (Dulles did assist by writing a personal letter to NAME which resulted in a joint FBI-BVD-CIA meeting on 4/8/60, at which direct FBI-BVD liaison was agreed upon).

SECRET

Memorandum to Mr. C. D. DeLoach  
RE: RELATIONSHIPS WITH CIA  
ESTABLISHMENT OF BUREAU LIAISON  
WITH DUTCH INTERNAL SECURITY  
SERVICE (BVD) - 1960

SECRET

On memorandum *NAME* to *NAME* of 1/14/60,  
concerning the 1/13/60 meeting of Papich, Dulles and *NAME*  
Director noted: "1. Well handled by Papich. 2. All of  
the turmoiI developing in this situation could have been  
avoided if we had properly contacted Dulles and also  
followed through with State. H."

RECOMMENDED ACTION:

None. We do not believe, in light of the facts set  
forth, that CIA will make an issue of this matter.

SECRET

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

~~SECRET~~

TO : Mr. C. D. DeLoach

DATE: 3-6-70

#MDR/IS  
DECLASSIFIED BY SP2ALM/TG  
ON 1-10-01

FROM : W. C. Sullivan

SUBJECT: RELATIONSHIPS WITH THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA)  
BUREAU DISSEMINATION OF COUNTERINTELLIGENCE INFORMATION  
TO FOREIGN SERVICE - DATE

Item No. 26 in the material submitted to the Director by SA Sam Papich in his memorandum 3-5-70 states that CIA by letter DATE raised questions concerning the propriety of our dissemination of information through our Legal Attache to the FOREIGN Intelligence Service. This concerned certain SENSITIVE METHODS which was obtained from our sensitive FOREIGN defector in place, Bureau code name NAME CIA letter DATE stated that a representative of FOREIGN Intelligence Service informed CIA it received aforementioned information from our Legal Attache. CIA claimed such dissemination abroad should have been coordinated with CIA because of Director of Central Intelligence Directive (DCID) 5/2 which indicates that CIA shall be responsible for all U.S. liaison concerning clandestine intelligence activities abroad or involving foreign clandestine services. CIA claimed that pursuant above we were obligated to coordinate with CIA prior to dissemination.

Memorandum NAME to NAME under NAME caption reviewed this situation and indicates that on 7-13 and 8-1 DATE, NAME provided information concerning several types of SENSITIVE METHODS. Dissemination of above was made to State Department. CIA and military intelligence agencies by letter on DATE. Information was also furnished to Legal Attaches, London, Bern, Bonn, Paris, Rome and Madrid, with instructions to disseminate only to contacts in foreign intelligence agencies known to be reliable and cooperative and with

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NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION  
Unauthorized Disclosure  
Subject to Criminal Sanctions

CONTINUED - OVER

~~SECRET~~

Memorandum to Mr. C. D. DeLoach

the instructions that it be given limited distribution and handled in a manner so it would not be apparent it emanated from the Bureau or a source within the U.S. Above memorandum points out that DCID 5/2 has been controversial since its inception (12-8-59) and the subject of differences of interpretation. We recognized CIA's coordination responsibilities but, in this instance, were of the opinion there was no operational angle and no necessity for coordinating dissemination of above since we had previously given the information to CIA. This memorandum recommended approval of a letter to CIA answering CIA's inquiry according to above. Director indicated "O.K." and "It looks like CIA is throwing its weight around." On DATE we directed a letter to CIA accordingly. As indicated in memorandum of SA Papich, CIA "surrendered" and did not further contest this issue.

RECOMMENDED ACTION:

None. We do not believe, in light of the facts set forth, that CIA will make an issue of this matter.

~~SECRET~~

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

TO : Mr. C. D. DeLoach

DATE: 3/6/70

FROM : W. C. Sullivan

#MDR16  
DECLASSIFIED BY SP-2 HLM/TSC  
ON 1-11-01

SUBJECT: RELATIONSHIPS WITH CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA)

TITLE  
NAME

BOOK AUTHORED BY

Item 27 of the material submitted to the Director by SA Sam Papich in his memorandum 3/5/70 indicates that NAME had visited the Bureau in 1963 to gather material for a book regarding U. S. intelligence agencies. It was suggested that CIA be advised of this, and the Director noted, "I see no reason for doing so."

NAME memorandum to NAME 8/28/63, reports this visit and notes that NAME had asked for data concerning the Bureau's internal security procedures and had asked concerning other FBI operations, making no reference to CIA, with one exception. He did inquire as to whether there was friction between the two agencies and was told that we cooperated closely and maintained daily liaison with CIA. It was on this memorandum that the Director said he saw no reason for informing CIA concerning the visit of NAME.

We later learned that their book, TITLE was furnished in the form of advance proofs to CIA prior to its publication. We also received such proofs from CIA through Liaison.

RECOMMENDED ACTION:

None. We do not believe, in light of the facts set forth, that CIA will make an issue of this matter.

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION  
Unauthorized Disclosure  
Subject to Criminal Sanctions

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UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

~~SECRET~~

TO : Mr. C. D. DeLoach

DATE: March 6, 1970

FROM : W. C. Sullivan

SUBJECT: RELATIONSHIPS WITH CIA  
COMMUNIST ACTIVITIES - AFRICA

*NO R/G*  
~~DECLASSIFIED BY SP-2 AEM/JTG~~  
~~ON 1-11-01~~

Item number 28 in memorandum of 3/5/70 from SA Sam Papich to the Director, captioned "Cases and/or Situations Involving Conflict With CIA," states that in April, 1960, CIA inquired if the Bureau would give any consideration to assisting that agency toward developing coverage in Africa by providing a Negro informant or placing a Negro in the Communist Party, USA for the purpose of eventually using him in Africa. His memorandum added that we told that agency the FBI had no informants available because they were necessary for our own operations. He claims we took the position since we saw no benefit to be gained by loaning an informant on a short or long term basis. He states that CIA could argue that as early as 1960 it had foresight to recognize the need for additional coverage and when it appealed to the Bureau for assistance, we did not cooperate. He refers to his memorandum dated 4/7/60 concerning this matter captioned "Communist Activities in Africa."

The memorandum referred to discloses that on 4/5/60 *NAME AND POSITION* CIA, stated that communist organizations were rapidly increasing in strength on the continent of Africa and that his agency found it most difficult to establish effective penetration. *NAME* noted that in this connection it was almost impossible for a white man to move about Africa and establish a relationship which would enable him to develop worthwhile sources. He asked if the Bureau would consider furnishing one of its Negro informants or developing an informant in the Communist Party, USA for eventual use by CIA in Africa. Papich told *NAME* that if the Bureau had a good Negro informant, we certainly were not interested in having his future jeopardized nor did we want to lose his production. Papich added that it undoubtedly would be most difficult to take a Bureau informant, have him travel to Africa under some cover and still be able to satisfactorily explain such activities to his communist colleagues without becoming a target of suspicion. *NAME* said he recognized all this but asked if the Bureau would give consideration.

**NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION**  
Unauthorized Disclosure  
Subject to Criminal Sanctions

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Memorandum to Mr. C. D. DeLoach  
RE: RELATIONSHIPS WITH CIA

Addendum to Papich's memorandum dated 4/8/60 by the Internal Security Section pointed out that all of our informants were necessary for our own operations, particularly in the communist field, and it recommended and was approved that CIA be orally informed that it is not possible to provide an informant on a loan basis to be used in Africa.

Regrettably, the Bureau was not in a position to assist CIA. CIA's problem was an administrative one within that Agency.

RECOMMENDED ACTION:

None. We do not believe, in light of the facts set forth, that CIA will make an issue of this matter. —

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UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

~~SECRET~~

TO : Mr. C. D. DeLoach

DATE: March 6, 1970

FROM : W. C. Sullivan

#NDRI6  
DECLASSIFIED BY SP2ALM/RTG  
ON 1-11-01

SUBJECT: RELATIONSHIPS WITH CIA  
U.S. INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS - PLACE

Item #29 in the material submitted to the Director by SA Sam Papich in memorandum of 3/5/70, states that by Bureau letter dated 10/23/64 we provided the White House information received by our Legat from U.S. Ambassador PLACE wherein the latter was critical of intelligence operations, particularly the overstaffing of personnel. SA Papich comments that we do not know if CIA became knowledgeable regarding this letter but could construe same as relating to its operations.

Our Legat, PLACE, in a letter to the Director dated 10/19/64, set forth the results of a conversation with Ambassador NAME AND PLACE IDENTIFYING DATA

### THE AMBASSADOR

remarked that the results were appalling, there being 23,000 military personnel in SIX COUNTRIES engaged in intelligence operations and numerous CIA personnel. He described the lack of coordination between the military and CIA as "scandalous." He stated the Offices of the Military Attaches were grossly overstaffed and he was recommending drastic cuts and that duplicate administrative services be combined with those of the embassies. He made no mention of specific intelligence operations nor did he elaborate on the lack of coordination. SOURCE commented that on his return to the U.S., he intended to see the President personally to bring this matter forcefully to his attention.

SOURCE's comments were incorporated in a letter to NAME, Special Assistant to the President, dated DATE /64, in accordance with the Director's noted instructions. Our files disclose no indication that CIA cognizant of Bureau letter.

RECOMMENDED ACTION: None. We do not believe, in light of the facts set forth, that CIA will make an issue of this matter.

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION

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UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

~~SECRET~~

TO : Mr. C. D. DeLoach

DATE: March 7, 1970

FROM : W. C. Sullivan

SUBJECT: RELATIONSHIPS WITH CIA  
THE PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE  
ADVISORY BOARD AND JOHN MC CONE

#MDR16  
DECLASSIFIED BY SP-2ALM/ATG  
ON 1-11-01

Item number 30 in the material submitted to the Director by SA Sam Papich in his memorandum of March 5, 1970, discusses a dispute we had with CIA in May, 1963, as a result of a communication the Bureau sent to the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB). It was pointed out that in our communication to PFIAB we attributed certain information to McCone, then Director of CIA, concerning the matter of increasing wire taps on diplomatic establishments. McCone charged that the information attributed to him was not so because he had never made any such statement and he could prove it. The fact was that the information relating to McCone had been given us by one of his subordinates who had indicated the information originated with McCone. McCone maintained that we should have checked with him before going on record that any information had originated with him.

A review of the file in this matter discloses that in April, 1963, NAME along with Papich had discussed with NAME and NAME of CIA McCone's alleged position with the PFIAB; that he was in favor of across the board telephone taps on diplomatic establishments. The Bureau, of course, was opposed to this and advised NAME that we would request to make our position known before the board. At the conclusion of the meeting in April, 1963, NAME specifically asked what he should tell McCone and NAME told him he should tell McCone exactly what had occurred at the meeting; that the Bureau was opposed to across the board wire taps and the Bureau intended to so advise PFIAB.

RECOMMENDED ACTION:

None. We do not believe, in light of the facts set forth, that CIA will make an issue of this matter.

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION  
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UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

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# Memorandum

TO Mr. C. D. DeLoach

DATE: March 6, 1970

FROM Mr. W. C. Sullivan

#MDR 16

DECLASSIFIED BY SP2 ALM/7TG  
ON 1-11-01

SUBJECT: RELATIONSHIPS WITH CIA  
ALLEGED PENETRATIONS OF CIA

Item number 31, "alleged penetration of CIA," in the material submitted to the Director by SA Sam Papich in his memorandum of 3/5/70 discusses allegations made by **NAME** regarding recruitment of four CIA employees by the Soviet Committee for State Security (KGB), that CIA requested full investigation which we declined.

BACKGROUND OF CASE **NAME AND IDENTIFYING DATA** alleged that the KGB had penetrated CIA through an individual having the code name **NAME**. In an effort to identify this penetration CIA provided **NAME** with information regarding many individuals who had worked for CIA in Germany.

**NAME** identified two individuals at various times as **NAME** and in each instance investigation "washed out" the identification. **NAME** finally identified **NAME** as one **NAME** a former employee of CIA. During the course of extensive document reviews **NAME** became acquainted with background of various individuals who had worked in Germany at the time **NAME** did. **NAME** identified four present employees of CIA with unknown subjects who had come to his attention while he was active in the KGB.

PROBLEM WITH CIA CIA wanted the Bureau to undertake full-scale investigation of its four employees based solely on **NAME**'s allegations.

DISPOSAL OF PROBLEM WITH CIA By letter of February 26, 1965, CIA was informed there appeared to be no basis at that time for a full-scale investigation of these men by the FBI on the basis of allegations by **NAME**. With regard to any investigation in the United States concerning two of the men, a conclusion would be made following completion of the investigation of **NAME** and interviews of **NAME**. Based upon the investigation of **NAME** and the interviews of **NAME**, CIA was informed by letter of July 20, 1965, that nothing had been developed

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Memorandum to Mr. C. D. DeLoach  
RE: RELATIONSHIPS WITH CIA  
ALLEGED PENETRATIONS OF CIA

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which supported *NAME* speculation that *NAME* was instrumental in the recruitment by the Soviets of either *NAME* or *NAME* and nothing was developed which would support *NAME* allegations against the other two suspects, *NAME* and *NAME*. Furthermore, CIA had furnished no documentary material regarding *NAME* or *NAME* which would in any way support *NAME*. The Bureau added "Accordingly, this Bureau is conducting no investigation of *NAME, NAME, NAME* or *NAME*. We will interpose no objection, since they are all employees of your agency, if you wish to pursue *NAME* allegations concerning them, including interviews of the individuals concerned.

"This Bureau would, of course, be interested in receiving the results of any investigation which would tend to confirm *NAME*'s conclusions that one or more of these employees of your agency had actually been recruited by the Soviets."

RECOMMENDED ACTION:

None. We do not believe, in light of the facts set forth, that CIA will make an issue of this matter.

*[Handwritten mark]*

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UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum



TO : Mr. C. D. DeLoach

DATE: 3/7/70

FROM : W. C. Sullivan

SUBJECT: RELATIONSHIPS WITH  
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA)

VICE PRESIDENT NIXON'S TRIP TO  
SOUTH AMERICA - 1958

#MDR16  
DECLASSIFIED BY SP2 Alml/JTG  
1-11-01

Item number 32 in material submitted to the Director by SA Sam J. Papich in his memorandum 3/5/70 mentions Bureau letter 5/16/58 sent to the then Vice President Nixon and containing a summary of CIA information concerning events in Latin America relating to Mr. Nixon's trip there during 5/58.

According to SA Papich, most of the information in above letter came from CIA. He commented that this letter could be interpreted as raising question concerning quality of CIA's coverage in Latin America. Papich noted it is not known if CIA ever became aware of the letter. Papich stated that *NAME AND POSITION*

CIA, was attached to the then Vice President Nixon's staff. SA Papich pointed out that CIA, if aware of above letter, could raise question as to violation of Third Agency Rule.

## Results of Review of Bureau Files

The letter to the then Vice President Nixon is located in *FILE NUMBER*. It contains summary of information relating to riots and attacks against Mr. Nixon and his party during their 5/58 Latin American trip. Letter identifies CIA as the

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Memorandum W.C. Sullivan to  
Mr. C. D. DeLoach  
Re: RELATIONSHIPS WITH  
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA)

source of the information set forth in our letter. The last paragraph of this letter includes a statement that the impression gained from a review of CIA reports indicates that CIA had some coverage reflecting there were to be troubles concerning Mr. Nixon's Latin American travels. This letter also stated as follows:

"It is significant that information in the individual countries came to CIA's attention shortly before your arrival in a particular country. Therefore, there is a question as to whether or not CIA had coverage in communist organizations which would have led to the development of information concerning communist plans days or weeks ahead of your visit."

There is no indication in this file regarding instructions given to prepare our letter of May 16, 1958. The first paragraph of this letter indicates that the Director had a discussion with Mr. Nixon on May 16, 1958, inasmuch as the first sentence of the above letter reads as follows:

"Apropos of our discussion today, there is set forth information contained in Central Intelligence Agency reports received from them on May 14, 1958."

The data set forth in our May 16, 1958, letter to Mr. Nixon is contained in a memorandum *NAME* to *NAME* dated May 15, 1958, which was prepared for the Director's information. The Director noted on this memorandum, "Send summary to A. G. H." In accordance with instructions, a letter was sent to the then Attorney General under date of May 16, 1958, and this letter contained a summary of CIA information in the same manner as had been sent to Mr. Nixon on May 16, 1958. Our letter to the Attorney General, however, did not contain any observations regarding CIA coverage in Latin American countries visited by Mr. Nixon and his party.

Our file in this matter *FILE NUMBER* indicates that on June 9, 1958, *NAME* in the office of the then Vice President Nixon contacted the Bureau at the request

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Memorandum W. C. Sullivan to  
Mr. C. D. DeLoach  
Re: RELATIONSHIPS WITH  
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA)

of Mr. Nixon to determine if the contents of a letter from the Director to Mr. Nixon dated May 16, 1958, regarding Mr. Nixon's trip to South America could be leaked to the press. *NAME* request was set forth in memorandum *NAME* to *NAME* June 9, 1958, with the recommendation that *NAME* be advised that if the information were to be given to the press, it would undoubtedly create a serious problem as the FBI would then have violated CIA's confidence since CIA was aware that SA Papich had reviewed CIA's classified reports and, therefore, this information should not be given to the press. Both *NAME* and the Director agreed with the recommendation, and *NAME* was advised of our decision. It is noted that *NAME* is identical with the individual who is now *POSITION*.

Comments on Re: ks in SA Papich Memo 3/5/70

1. That most of the information in our letter to Mr. Nixon dated May 16, 1958, came from CIA and that this letter could be interpreted as raising the question concerning the quality of CIA's coverage in Latin America.

There is no dispute as to the source of the information which was summarized in our letter to Mr. Nixon, and we clearly indicated in our letter that the source was CIA. With regard to any question being raised as to the quality of CIA's coverage in Latin America, we merely pointed out to Mr. Nixon something that was readily discernible to any reader of the CIA reports - - that is, that the information from CIA popped up rather suddenly as related to the country and Mr. Nixon's arrival. Certainly Mr. Nixon himself, since he was personally involved in demonstrations directed against him during his Latin American trip, must have been aware that advance information from our responsible intelligence agency (CIA) may have been lacking.

2. We are not aware if CIA became knowledgeable of our letter to Mr. Nixon dated May 16, 1958. Under ordinary conditions, we are not aware nor do we seek to identify any CIA

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Memorandum W. C. Sullivan to  
Mr. C. D. DeLoach  
RE: RELATIONSHIPS WITH  
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA)

personnel who might be assigned to the White House staff. As indicated above, *NAME* who was a member of Mr. Nixon's staff in *YEAR* and who is now *POSITION* was aware of our 5/16/58 letter and its contents. We have no information that CIA ever registered any type of protest in this matter.

3. That CIA technically could raise a question as to violation of the Third Agency Rule as regards our 5/16/58 letter to Mr. Nixon.

The Third Agency Rule is intended to prohibit a Government agency from disseminating information originating with another Government agency in the absence of specific authority to do so, and we follow this rule unless there are overriding reasons. With regard to our letter to Mr. Nixon dated 5/16/58, we set forth information clearly identified as having originated with CIA. This letter was apparently prepared at the specific request of then Vice President Nixon after conferring with the Director.

RECOMMENDED ACTION:

None. We do not believe, in light of the facts set forth, that CIA will make an issue of this matter.

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UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

TO : Mr. C. D. DeLoach

DATE: 3/6/70

FROM : W. C. Sullivan

SUBJECT: RELATIONSHIPS WITH CIA

*#MOR16*  
DECLASSIFIED BY *SP-2 ALM/2TG*  
ON *1-11-07*

Item number 33 in the material submitted to the Director by Special Agent (SA) Sam J. Papich in his memorandum 3/5/70 discusses *NAME* an individual who was operated as a criminal informant by the Bureau who furnished valuable information and who has been a key witness in the prosecution of cases being handled by the Bureau. Mr. Papich states that the Bureau acquired access to *NAME* through the CIA and that although the CIA has never officially made any statements to the Bureau, it has been bitterly disappointed that the Bureau never acknowledged CIA's assistance which the agency considered extremely valuable.

Memorandum dated 2/20/63 from *NAME* to *NAME* captioned *NAME* set out that *NAME* of CIA advised SA Papich that CIA had briefed the Attorney General concerning a source whom *NAME* had used since World War II and who subsequently has developed a close association with a lawyer who does considerable work for *NAME*. *NAME* source was confident that the lawyer could be developed as a penetration which could "sink" *NAME* and all of his cohorts. The Attorney General agreed with the CIA representatives that the matter should be referred to the Bureau for handling.

*NAME* set up the first contact with the individual who had the contact with the attorney and at that time *NAME* stated that he did not want to get involved in any investigative aspects and wanted to step out of the matter as soon as possible. As a result, eventual contact was made with *NAME* who developed into a very productive source. *NAME* has been publicly identified as both a source of the FBI and CIA as a result of his testimony.

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Memorandum to Mr. C. D. DeLoach  
RE: RELATIONSHIPS WITH CIA

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The Bureau's success in handling *NAME* can be attributed to the know-how of the SAs of the New York Office because *NAME* is a highly emotional individual and he had aggravated marital problems, severe pressures from his many business associates; therefore, it took a high degree of skill in dealing with this source in order to achieve the success that we did.

While it is acknowledged that CIA put us originally in touch with this source, it was not believed that it is essential that we go back to CIA and explain to them our success or to thank them for giving us this original lead. It is also noted that there is an obligation upon Government agencies to cooperate in the fullest and CIA's cooperation in this matter was in accordance with the long standing policy among all Government agencies.

Review of *NAME* file does not reflect any instance where CIA indicated a displeasure in the Bureau not acknowledging CIA's assistance in placing us in touch with *NAME*. This is in line with *NAME* statement in 1963 that he did not want to get involved in any investigative aspects of this matter and wanted to step out as soon as possible. In view of the above, it is not believed that CIA would have any basis to complain that the Bureau never acknowledged CIA's assistance.

RECOMMENDED ACTION:

None. We do not believe, in light of the facts set forth, that CIA will make an issue of this matter.

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UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

~~SECRET~~

TO : Mr. C. D. DeLoach

DATE: March 7, 1970

FROM : W. C. Sullivan

SUBJECT: RELATIONSHIPS WITH CIA  
EXCHANGE OF TECHNICAL INFORMATION

#MDR/6  
DECLASSIFIED BY SA 2ALM/ETG  
ON 1-11-01

Item number 34 in the material submitted to the Director by SA Sam Papich in his memorandum 3/5/70 concerns exchange of technical information with CIA, particularly as it related to the technical surveillance field. Papich states CIA exhibited its equipment to us, but for many years we declined to show any of our devices, with some exceptions. He states that CIA never made an official protest but informally indicated from time to time that the lack of exchange was prejudicial to overall intelligence and internal security interests and implied we were more open with the British in this area than with CIA. Papich states this situation does not exist today as there is a good exchange by the Bureau and CIA.

Our files reveal that through the years CIA has furnished the Bureau a number of technical devices for our use or inspection. They have also furnished technical manuals obtained abroad and briefed us on operational and technical aspects of some of their operations abroad. Laboratory personnel have been afforded tours and briefings concerning CIA facilities and equipment and in two instances Bureau personnel have been afforded training at CIA schools. As recently as October, 1969, CIA afforded a briefing to Bureau personnel concerning SENSITIVE METHOD, developed by their technical people and offered to loan us one of these units as well as afford our personnel training in the operation of the equipment.

### COMMENTS OF THE LABORATORY

Similarly, Bureau records show substantial reciprocity on the part of the FBI in developing and furnishing important technical information to CIA over a period of many years. Representative examples are cited below:

Prior to YEAR an important unsolved technical intelligence problem involved desired access to enemy intelligence and other security information

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Memorandum for Mr. DeLoach  
RE: RELATIONSHIPS WITH CIA  
EXCHANGE OF TECHNICAL INFORMATION

protected by *SENSITIVE - IDENTIFYING DATA*  
Scientists in the FBI Laboratory were  
able to solve this problem by

### *SENSITIVE METHOD*

This was a scientific breakthrough of tremendous intelligence potential and, with Bureau approval, our results and techniques were made known to the appropriate CIA representatives. CIA advised that they had theretofore spent thousands of dollars in an intensive, but unsuccessful effort to solve the same problem. The impact of this scientific discovery in permitting access to previously unavailable intelligence had tremendous value for both the FBI and CIA.

In approximately the late *YEAR* and early *YEAR* both CIA and FBI encountered a new, highly sophisticated type

### *SENSITIVE METHOD*

In spite of a massive technical effort mounted by CIA, scientists of the FBI Laboratory were successful in first unraveling the basic principles and techniques underlying this new *SENSITIVE* system. This important breakthrough thus permitted for the first time a successful attack against the new

*SENSITIVE METHOD* Because of its extreme intelligence potential, with prior Bureau approval, this development was made known to CIA, and its importance to CIA is reflected in part by a letter addressed to the Director of FBI by Allen W. Dulles, then Director of CIA, under date of August 19, 1961, in which Dulles said, in part, "For the past several years there has been increasingly effective technical liaison between the Technical Services Division of this Agency and corresponding components of your Bureau. . ." Dulles further commented that Bureau technical personnel had " . . . made an outstanding technical contribution for which they are to be highly commended. Their work not only has an important impact in one sensitive area, but also has revealed a

### *SENSITIVE METHOD*

The discovery will have an

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Memorandum for Mr. DeLoach  
RE: RELATIONSHIPS WITH CIA  
EXCHANGE OF TECHNICAL INFORMATION

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important influence on the discharge of responsibilities assigned both to this Agency and the FBI. I consider access to these findings to be further evidence of the value of close technical liaison between our two organizations. . ."

Subsequently, again with prior Bureau approval, whenever it could be done without jeopardizing FBI operational interests, the FBI on a continuing basis made available to CIA

*SENSITIVE METHOD*

A recent example involved the espionage case of *NAME* wherein on 2/12/69 a *SENSITIVE METHOD* used by was furnished to CIA by a representative of the FBI Laboratory.

The above items are representative outstanding examples of FBI cooperation in developing and sharing highly important technical information, and certainly the letter from CIA reflects the satisfaction and importance which CIA attached to such information received from the Bureau. Within general Bureau policy guidelines, there were, of course, on a continuing basis numerous other items of technical information shared with CIA over the years, including briefings and exchange of visits.

RECOMMENDED ACTION:

None. We do not believe, in light of the facts set forth, that CIA will make an issue of this matter.

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UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

~~SECRET~~

TO : Mr. C. D. DeLoach

DATE: March 6, 1970

FROM : Mr. W. C. Sullivan

#MP216  
DECLASSIFIED BY SP-2ALM/ZK  
ON 1-19-01

SUBJECT: RELATIONSHIPS WITH CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA)  
CIA LECTURERS AT BUREAU TRAINING SCHOOLS  
EXCHANGE IN THE TRAINING FIELD

Items number 35 and 36 in the material submitted to the Director by SA Sam Papich in his memorandum March 5, 1970, indicated CIA has never understood why Bureau will not permit CIA personnel to lecture at our schools and CIA was unhappy regarding our attitude concerning exchange of information in the training field.

CIA by letter May 19, 1950, requested it be permitted to discuss training problems with FBI training staff in view of necessity of its maintaining relations with foreign police and security agencies. Following recommendations by the Executives Conference, Bureau advised CIA by letter May 25, 1950, that we did not believe FBI training staff could intelligently discuss training methods with CIA since our staff was not knowledgeable concerning conditions encountered by CIA in various foreign countries.

**SENSITIVE METHOD  
IDENTIFYING DATA**

In 1966, the Director approved a request of CIA to have one of its men attend the National Academy for purpose "to improve capabilities of CIA personnel engaged in overseas police training programs." As a result, a CIA Security Officer graduated from the \* **SESSION** of the FBI National Academy

At the specific request of CIA, Bureau representatives have addressed CIA intelligence personnel attending refresher-type training courses on 31 occasions between June, 1962, and December, 1969.

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Memorandum to Mr. C. D. DeLoach

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We loaned CIA four Bureau training films in February, 1966, one was eventually returned, but CIA continues to utilize the other three films entitled "On The Record," "Interviews," and "Burglary Investigations." We continue to use foreign language films from CIA which were loaned to us as a supplement to the Bureau's Language Training Program.

Representatives of CIA have not lectured at Bureau training schools and there is no indication in Bureau files that this has been advocated by CIA.

This memorandum has been coordinated with the Training Division.

RECOMMENDED ACTION:

None. We do not believe, in light of the facts set forth, that CIA will make an issue of this matter.

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UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

**SECRET**

TO : Mr. C. D. DeLoach

DATE: 3/6/70

FROM : Mr. W. C. Sullivan

SUBJECT: RELATIONSHIPS WITH  
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
(POSITIVE INTELLIGENCE)

Item Number 37 in the material submitted to the Director by Special Agent Sam Papich in his memorandum 3/5/70 discusses CIA criticism which could generate from Agency belief that Bureau has failed to cooperate and offer necessary assistance in collection of positive intelligence in the United States. Memorandum is to deal with specific cases believed by Papich to evidence lack of cooperation and to briefly comment on policy of cooperation we have adopted with CIA.

## SYNOPSIS:

Mentioned Item by Papich points out CIA belief that more aggressive action should have been taken in field of collecting positive intelligence in the United States. Papich notes Bureau's action in this field, for the most part, has been restricted to compliance with requests by State Department when political crises occur in some country. He points out CIA belief that acquiring needed data would mean increased technical surveillance coverage, development of informants and collection of cryptographic material. Papich cites two specific cases occurring in 1969 where Bureau declined CIA's request for technical coverage, suggesting to Agency that it make its request directly to the Attorney General. Review of specific cases mentioned set forth with Director's comments relative thereto being noted. Our policy of cooperation with CIA most recently delineated to field by SAC Letter 66-10 (B) - copy attached. SAC letter calls for guarding our jurisdiction but shows our willingness to cooperate with CIA.

OBSERVATIONS AND ACTION - OVER

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Memorandum to Mr. C. D. DeLoach  
RE: RELATIONSHIPS WITH  
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

CIA has repeatedly raised the issue in the past of our coverage in the positive intelligence collection area and we can reasonably expect similar issues to be raised in the future.

RECOMMENDED ACTION:

That we prepare a carefully worded letter to CIA outlining policy and the basic elements of intelligence and counterintelligence work affecting the United States and forthrightly ask CIA if it is satisfied with the status quo and if not what do they have to suggest as changes.

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Memorandum to Mr. C. D. DeLoach  
RE: RELATIONSHIPS WITH  
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DETAILS:

Papich points out CIA feels there is unexplored field for acquiring positive intelligence in the United States but he notes that there has been no law, directive, or executive order which fixes responsibility for clandestine collection of such information. He notes we investigate subversives, spies, and develop penetrations of foreign intelligence services and that facets of these investigations of violations of United States laws serve to fulfill a counterintelligence objective referred to by us as investigations of internal security matters. Papich notes, however, that most of our work in the positive intelligence field has been restricted to the compliance with requests by State Department prompted usually by a political crisis occurring in some foreign country.

Papich points out CIA feels there is unexplored field for acquiring positive intelligence requiring use of vastly increased technical surveillances, informant development and collection of cryptographic material. According to Papich, CIA does not feel Bureau has moved aggressively in this area and CIA has been thwarted in attempts to do much about the problem. Papich cites two cases *NAME* and *NAME* where CIA requests for technical surveillance were declined by us with the suggestion to CIA that these matters should be taken up by that Agency directly with the Attorney General.

Specific Cases

CIA advised that *NAME AND POSITION* had been under development by *FOREIGN* intelligence service partly as a result of his weakness for women when assigned *PLACE* from *YEAR* to *YEAR*. *NAME* was to participate in bilateral talks with United States officials in *DATE* by letter *DATE* CIA requested telephone and microphone surveillances on *NAME*. The Director commented "Let CIA seek the authority of the AG. I don't want them utilizing FBI as their channel."

*NAME* was originally investigated by us in *YEAR* as a possible unregistered agent of *FOREIGN* Government due to negotiations by him with *FOREIGN* designed to set up a semiprivate nuclear processing company in *FOREIGN COUNTRY*.

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Memorandum to Mr D. DeLoach  
RE: RELATIONSHIPS WITH  
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Our investigation showed close contact by *NAME* with *FOREIGN* officials, *NAME* and details of activity by that subject to create the firm mentioned. *NAME* headed a *PLACE* firm involved in Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) work requiring "Top Secret" clearance by AEC. Our initial investigation was closed when Assistant Attorney General - Internal Security Division found that facts did not justify soliciting *NAME*'s registration as a foreign agent.

In Spring of *YEAR* sixty-one kilograms of nuclear material were found to be unaccounted for by the firm headed by *NAME* but subsequent inventories and checking by AEC revealed this shortage was probably the result of cumulative process of wasteful production methods over a period of eight years and did not justify an unqualified determination of a diversion of nuclear material on the part of *NAME* to unauthorized persons or government.

CIA, in *YEAR* became alarmed on receipt of information of loss of mentioned nuclear material and despite AEC findings felt it may indicate illegal diversion or at least justification for reopening investigation. *NAME*, CIA contacted the Attorney General directly with his thoughts regarding the need for additional investigation. Attorney General contacted Bureau requesting it discuss matter with CIA and determine advisability of additional investigation. The Director, in approving conference with CIA, noted "OK but I doubt advisability of getting into this. It looks like *NAME* is going around us to AG as he suspects we would say no."

An intensive investigation of *NAME* conducted during late *YEAR* and into Fall of *YEAR* revealed no positive intelligence activity on his part or verifiable diversion of AEC material to *FOREIGN*. Our investigation included technical surveillances installed *DATE* and discontinued, *DATE*. *NAME* was interviewed by AEC *DATE* and disclaimed passing any classified data to *FOREIGN*. Facts of case were reviewed by Department of Justice which found no evidence of prosecutable violation by *NAME*. AEC felt the additional investigation produced no data upon which could be based a legitimate withdrawal of clearance for AEC contracts or information. In view of this, we closed our investigation and CIA was so advised. A *DATE* letter from *NAME* acknowledged additional investigation

Memorandum to Mr. C. D. DeLoach  
RE: RELATIONSHIPS WITH  
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

would produce no legal evidence pertinent to the issue which prompted CIA's original request but noted he felt reinstated audio surveillances of *NAME* would produce positive intelligence information. He therefore requested reinstatement of this coverage. The Director's letter to *NAME* noted that after careful review it was felt that CIA should take this matter to the Attorney General.

On October 21, 1969, a CIA official was told by Special Agent Papich that in the future CIA should transmit its requests for technical surveillance coverage in the United States to the Attorney General. This specifically covered the cases of *NAME* and *NAME*. The Director commented "Right."

#### Bureau Policy of Cooperation

In 1965 and 1966, recognizing overlapping interests, changes inherent in faster communication, hysteria to facilitate international travel and in response to requests from CIA, the Director approved Bureau attendance at conferences with CIA regarding that Agency's operational activities in the United States. On a memorandum reporting the results of the conferences with CIA, the Director commented "I hope we still don't let our guard down as CIA has always outsmarted us because of our gullibility."

SAC Letter 66-10 (B) dated 2/15/66 furnished to the field and Bureau officials results of the conferences with CIA and emphasized necessity for protecting Bureau jurisdiction in the counterintelligence field. This SAC letter (copy attached) emphasized there is to be no interference with or infringement upon our jurisdiction but clearly shows our willingness to cooperate with CIA in developing positive intelligence in the United States. In approving this SAC letter, the Director noted "I hope there is no 'sneaker' in this. Time will tell."

There has been no renewed request from CIA for technical coverage in the cases mentioned above, nor has there been any indication that such requests have been sent by CIA to the Attorney General as we suggested. Due to CIA interest in the past in these matters, we cannot rule out the possibility the Agency may approach Attorney General for the desired coverage at some time in the future.

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(B) CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY - OPERATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES -- The Bureau recently completed discussions with the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) regarding that agency's operational activities in the United States. These discussions essentially dealt with CIA's assessment and recruitment of foreign intelligence sources in the United States. Enclosed for your use is a list of the ground rules which both agencies have accepted as guidelines for effecting the necessary coordination. In order that you may be adequately oriented in this matter, the following background is set forth. The need for the ground rules is related to CIA's interest in developing positive intelligence sources in the United States and the necessity for protecting the Bureau's jurisdiction in the counterintelligence field. The latter is essential to the adequate discharge of our responsibilities to national security.

Positive intelligence may be described as a comprehensive product resulting from collection, evaluation, collation, analysis, and interpretation of all available information relating to national security and concerning other countries where such information is significant to our Government's development and execution of plans, policies, and courses of action. Such intelligence can be divided into various categories, such as economic, military, scientific, political, geographic, et cetera. The collection of positive intelligence is distinguished from counterintelligence which is primarily designed to penetrate, monitor, neutralize and/or disrupt the foreign intelligence and security services. Counterintelligence further includes other functions of an internal security nature directed against subversive groups, organizations, and individuals. By law CIA does not have any law enforcement or internal security functions. CIA's authorization for collecting positive intelligence is predicated on the National Security Act of 1947 and subsequent issuance of National Security Council Directives. There is no law, directive, or charter which authorizes CIA to engage in the clandestine development of positive intelligence sources in the United States. Therefore, in the absence of any statutory prerogative to conduct such activity in the United States, it has been mutually agreed by FBI and CIA that the Agency can only engage in the clandestine development and handling of positive intelligence sources in this country by coordinating with the Bureau. The Bureau in turn legally has the primary counterintelligence responsibility in the U. S. and is continually developing positive intelligence. It, however, must be regarded an incidental product to our main objective. The Bureau does not have a primary responsibility to collect positive intelligence, but we do have numerous and very significant obligations in this field. In actual practice the Bureau is required by the President and other agencies to develop information

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SAC LETTER 66-10

- 2 -

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ON 1-11-01 SP-2 ALM/JTG

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of a positive intelligence nature. This requires Bureau action designed to bring about the necessary coverage. A good example is our involvement in the development of information relating to the crisis in the Dominican Republic. From the above you will recognize that there can be "gray areas" of interest to the Bureau and CIA. It, therefore, has been necessary to effect adequate coordinating machinery.

The potential for the development of positive intelligence in this country is vast and varied. Voluminous positive intelligence is collected overtly through the review of foreign and domestic publications, interviews of travelers, arriving aliens, contacts with scientists, et cetera. In this area there have been no serious issues between the Bureau and CIA.

However, in the field of clandestine development of positive intelligence both agencies have an interest, and there is a necessity for a clear-cut understanding of jurisdiction and coordination. Particularly is this true in the development of positive intelligence sources who are employees or officials of foreign governments stationed in the United States or who are visiting this country on a temporary basis.

For many years the Bureau has had a continuing program of developing sources in diplomatic installations for the purpose of discharging our counterintelligence responsibilities and incidentally for developing positive intelligence information which might assist the Government in formulating policy. The Bureau, recognizing CIA's need for sources in the positive intelligence field, has permitted CIA to assess and recruit sources in the United States in a limited manner with the understanding that such activities are fully coordinated with the Bureau. In January, 1964, CIA established their Domestic Operations Division (DOD) to conduct such operations in the United States, and certain Bureau field offices were alerted and furnished the necessary guidance and instructions. The recent discussions with CIA resulted in a refinement of the understanding of the ground rules established in January, 1964.

The enclosed ground rules will be applied by the Bureau and CIA as cases arise. The Bureau position in each matter will be decided at the Seat of Government. As a general rule, Bureau Headquarters will be informed by CIA regarding its interest in an individual or a target. Prior to notification of CIA regarding our position, the situation will be carefully reviewed at the Seat of Government. This may often include a request to the field for

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SAC LETTER 66-10

- 3 -

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observations and recommendations before notice is transmitted to CIA. At the same time, it is possible that you may be contacted in the field by a representative of DOD, CIA. If so, you should be guided by the enclosed ground rules in any discussions, bearing in mind that the approval for any particular operational activity is to be made at Bureau Headquarters.

You should hold to the concept that the protection of the internal security of the United States involves very basic clear-cut responsibilities of the FBI. This should be kept in mind in each case and in any contacts which you may have with CIA representatives. There is to be no interference with or infringement upon our jurisdiction. It is recognized that unforeseen developments may create situations not adequately covered by the ground rules. You, therefore, should report such matters to the Bureau setting forth complete details with your recommendations. Although we have been informed by CIA that the Bureau's jurisdiction and operational interests will not be interfered with, we cannot discount the results of past experiences stemming from CIA's operational and organizational deficiencies. We have no reason to believe that there will be a revolutionary change of these conditions. It is, therefore, incumbent upon you to be extremely alert for any breakdown of the adherence to the ground rules. I emphasize that this is an area of activity which must be closely monitored by each Special Agent in Charge. You should be certain that your personnel is adequately oriented so that the Bureau can have the full benefit of any constructive suggestions pertaining to this entire matter.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director

Enclosure for (B)

2-15-66  
SAC LETTER 66-10

- 4 -

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UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535

In Reply, Please Refer to  
File No.

February 7, 1966

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
OPERATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES

(1) CIA will not initiate an investigation of any foreign official in the United States without the concurrence and coordination of the FBI. In this context, the term "investigation" means systematic and direct inquiries or procedures (such as physical or technical surveillances or neighborhood inquiries) aiming at developing information concerning an individual's activities or background; "investigation" does not include the acceptance or the development of information through social contacts or contacts normally made by CIA agents in discharging their cover functions.

(2) CIA will seek concurrence and coordination of the FBI before approaching for recruitment any foreign official or communist-bloc visitor in the United States. The FBI will concur and coordinate if the proposed action does not conflict with any operation, current or planned, including active investigation of the FBI.

(3) CIA will advise the FBI prior to any planned meeting between a CIA asset and a foreign official or communist-bloc visitor of known or presumed interest to the FBI (this would include all communist-bloc officials and visitors) for purposes of assessment and social development.

(4) Clandestine CIA staff operatives, domestic American agents of CIA, and foreign agents of CIA recruited abroad who come to the United States will be identified to the FBI by name or appropriate description depending on the national security interest involved.

(5) Pursuant to paragraph 4 above, when a CIA agent arrives in the United States for a visit or for an

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GROUP 1  
Excluded from automatic  
downgrading and  
declassification

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Central Intelligence Agency  
Operations in the United States

assignment, the Bureau will be advised and the two agencies will confer regarding the handling of the agent in the United States. It is recognized that each case will have its individual peculiarities. The governing principle will be positive intelligence interest as weighed against internal security factors. CIA will continue its contractual relationship for the purpose of handling the training, the procurement of positive foreign intelligence, the fulfillment of CIA commitments to the agent, and the preparation of the agent for his next assignment abroad.

(6) In those cases where CIA will be handling its agent in the United States, CIA will service FBI security or counterintelligence requirements and will provide the FBI all agent information bearing on counterintelligence or internal security matters, including the scope and nature of the agent's access to information and the identities of the agent's significant contacts, particularly in the communist-bloc field. In such cases where CIA servicing has been inadequate to FBI internal security interests, the FBI will have direct access to the agent.

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UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

TO : Mr. C. D. DeLoach

DATE: 3/7/70

FROM : W. C. Sullivan

SUBJECT: RELATIONSHIPS WITH CIA  
MISCELLANEOUS ITEMS

#MOR16  
DECLASSIFIED BY SP-2 ALM/216  
ON 1-11-01

Item Number 38 in the material submitted to the Director by SA Sam Papich in his memorandum of 3/5/70 serves as a sort of summary in which SA Papich indicates that he cannot recall the names of other cases which resulted in CIA displeasure or criticism, but does cite one instance "early in the 1950's" in which we disseminated data from a source of unknown reliability charging Allen Dulles as having been a communist and a spy while in Europe.

By letter 3/22/52, we informed State and CIA that a source of unknown reliability had alleged that IDENTIFYING DATA had been arrested in Hungary in 1947 or 1948 and forced to write a letter to his wife which brought her to Hungary where she was also arrested. We asked for an evaluation of the information. NAME memorandum, 4/5/52, states he received a call from Allen Dulles during which Dulles referred to the letter and said he was not concerned about it but wanted NAME to look it over. We were subsequently informed by CIA that Allen Dulles IDENTIFYING DATA ON OTHER INDIVIDUAL had said that the information concerning Dulles and his wife was without foundation and we promptly told State of this by letter 4/15/52, a copy of which was directed to Allen Dulles. NAME memorandum 5/10/52 written by SA Papich reports his discussion with Dulles concerning this matter. Mr. Dulles asked if the original letter could be withdrawn and was told that it appeared that the FBI had already set the records straight but that if he wished to make an official request, Papich would refer the matter to the Bureau for consideration. Dulles immediately replied that he definitely did not want to make "a big thing" of the letter, that it was not that important, and that maybe it would be better to drop the matter. General Smith (then Director of Central Intelligence) later told Papich that he considered the matter closed.

SA Papich also alludes to other instances in which CIA alleged that we had mishandled its information. He has no specifics, however, and states he cannot recall the cases.

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION

Unauthorized Disclosure  
Subject to Criminal Sanctions

ACTION - Page 2

~~SECRET~~

Memorandum to Mr. C. D. DeLoach  
RE: RELATIONSHIPS WITH CIA

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RECOMMENDED ACTION:

None. We do not believe, in light of the facts set forth, that CIA will make an issue of this matter.

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UNEXCISED VERSION OF 38 MEMORANDA BEING  
HELD AT FBIHQ FOR REVIEW BY SSC.

#moe16  
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 1/11/01 BY SP-2 ALM/ztg

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

TO : Mr. DeLoach

~~SECRET~~

DATE: March 9, 1970

FROM : W. C. Sullivan

SUBJECT: RELATIONSHIPS WITH CIA

DECLASSIFIED BY 5668 SLD/GCL  
ON 216198 (JFK)

Reference is made to the memorandum W. C. Sullivan to C. D. DeLoach dated 3/5/70, captioned as above. At that time the Director was advised this Division would make an analysis of each situation cited in the memorandum of Special Agent Sam J. Papich relative to grievances which CIA might hold in connection with relations with the FBI.

Enclosed will be found an analysis of 38 items (2 are contained in one memorandum, making a total of 37 memoranda). In substance our analysis does not show any real reason why CIA would raise any issue in connection with 37 out of the 38 items. The recommended action in each of these cases would logically close the matter. In one memorandum, the 37th item, ~~inserted~~, it is recommended that a carefully worded letter to CIA outlining policy and the basic elements of intelligence and counterintelligence work affecting the United States be sent to that Agency. The purpose of this is to protect the Bureau by giving CIA a chance to make any comments, if it has any, in regard to the current utilization of sources and facilities affecting both CIA and the Bureau. If CIA replies that it is satisfied with the current intelligence conditions in this area, we will put this particular matter to rest and we will have their letter in the file.

This Division will take any and all steps to comply with the Director's wishes in this matter and in any other concerning which this Division is involved.

RECOMMENDATION:

For the information of the Director.

Classified by C. J. S. 2  
Exempt from GDS, Category 2 & 3  
Date of Declassification Indefinite

*Prepared same  
by [unclear]*

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UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

- Tolson \_\_\_\_\_
- DeLoach \_\_\_\_\_
- Walters \_\_\_\_\_
- Mohr \_\_\_\_\_
- Bishop \_\_\_\_\_
- Casper \_\_\_\_\_
- Callahan \_\_\_\_\_
- Conrad \_\_\_\_\_
- Felt \_\_\_\_\_
- Gale \_\_\_\_\_
- Rosen \_\_\_\_\_
- Sullivan \_\_\_\_\_
- Tavel \_\_\_\_\_
- Soyars \_\_\_\_\_
- Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_
- Holmes \_\_\_\_\_
- Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

TO : Mr. C. D. DeLoach

**SECRET**

DATE: March 6, 1970

FROM : Mr. W. C. Sullivan

SUBJECT: RELATIONSHIPS WITH CIA  
MOCASE (THE BORIS MORROS CASE)

Item number one in the material submitted to the Director by Special Agent (SA) Sam Papich in his memorandum 3/5/70 discusses the case of Boris Morros. (Mocase).

### BACKGROUND OF CASE

Boris Morros, a Hollywood motion picture producer, was recruited by Soviet intelligence in 1935. From 1947 to 1957 he was operated as a double agent by the FBI. This was an extremely sensitive counterintelligence operation involving Soviet intelligence activities in the United States in which Morros traveled behind the Iron Curtain for meetings with his Soviet principals.

Information obtained by Morros from his Soviet contacts was disseminated to interested agencies, including the Central Intelligence Agency. On January 25, 1957, Jack Soble, Myra Soble, and Jacob Albam were arrested in New York on charges of conspiracy to commit espionage against the United States.

### PROBLEM WITH CIA

On March 16, 1954, the Bureau disseminated information received from Boris Morros to heads of the various intelligence agencies, including CIA. By letter of March 27, 1954, Lieutenant General C. P. Cabell, Acting Director of CIA, criticized the information and, in effect, characterized it as "fabrication or the product of a paper mill," which conclusion Cabell stated had been applied to many similar disseminations in the past from apparently the same source. By letter of April 5, 1954, the Bureau informed CIA that it was believed that no useful purpose would be served in making any future dissemination to CIA of information received from this source.

On April 9, 1954, Mr. Allen Dulles, then Director of CIA, advised Liaison Agent Papich that he had been looking into the matter and there was no question in his mind but that his agency had acted stupidly in transmitting such a letter to the Bureau.

62-80750

- 1 - 100-352385 (Mocase - The Boris Morros Case)
- 1 - Mr. C. D. DeLoach
- 1 - Mr. W. C. Sullivan
- 1 - Mr. W. A. Branigan
- 1 - Mr. D. J. Brennan
- 1 - Mr. L. Whitson

LW:as (7)

**SECRET**

Classified by 6283  
 Exempt from GDS, Category 2 & 3  
 Date of Declassification Indefinite

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1-10-01  
 CLASSIFIED BY SP-2 ALM/STG  
 DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 6

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
 HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
 WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

Memorandum to Mr. C. D. DeLoach  
RE: RELATIONSHIPS WITH CIA  
62-80750

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By letter of April 21, 1954, Mr. Dulles stated that CIA would appreciate it if the Bureau would kindly continue to send reports from the source (Morros) which relate to matters of foreign intelligence. By letter of April 29, 1954, the Director expressed the opinion that no useful purpose would be served by disseminating to CIA information received from the source in the future.

Nevertheless, memorandum Branigan to Belmont dated April 28, 1954, pointed out that when and if the Bureau receives information in the Mocase in the future of a type required by National Security Council Directive to be furnished to CIA, it should be carefully evaluated and a decision made at that time as to the officials and agencies of the Government to whom it should be disseminated. The Director noted "OK but before anything goes to CIA from this source I want to pass on it. This restriction does not apply to dissemination to other agencies. H"

Subsequent to the foregoing three disseminations were made to interested agencies, including CIA, based on information from Morros during October and December, 1954, and appropriate dissemination was made thereafter with the Director's approval.

As the time grew near for prosecutive action, the Department requested the Bureau to check with CIA to see if Department attorneys could interview a Soviet intelligence defector then in custody of CIA named Peter Derjabin. Accordingly, the Director authorized an oral briefing of Mr. Dulles and on 1/8/57 he and James Angleton of his staff were generally briefed on the Mocase and the contemplated prosecution. They were furnished with background data concerning subjects residing in France, Jane and George Zlatovski. CIA was requested to search the names of individuals involved in the case and was asked regarding identities of CIA employees who might have information of pertinence concerning the Zlatovskis.

On March 4, 1957, Mr. James Angleton informed the liaison agent of resentment on the part of CIA employees and officials based upon the following:

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Memorandum to Mr. C. D. DeLoach  
RE: RELATIONSHIPS WITH CIA  
62-80750

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(1) CIA feels it should have been advised much earlier concerning those aspects of the case relating to CIA employees.

(2) Leads were given to CIA at the same time the case was publicized and, therefore, CIA was handicapped.

(3) The failure to coordinate the French aspects of the case with CIA permitted the French intelligence agencies to play a dominant role in the European investigation.

(4) CIA fears the Bureau had not told it all there was to know about the case that CIA should have known.

DISPOSAL OF PROBLEM WITH CIA      The Bureau took the position that any necessary investigation looking toward prosecution in countries where Bureau had a Legal Attache would be referred by the Legal Attache to the appropriate investigative agency of that country. In those countries where the Bureau did not have a Legal Attache, request for investigation would be channelled through CIA. Because the Zlatovskis were in France, the interrogation of the Zlatovskis was handled by request from the Legal Attache to the French.

Jane Zlatovski during World War II had been with the Office of Strategic Services and had contacts later with CIA personnel. Prior to decision on prosecution we did not disseminate information regarding the Zlatovskis because we feared the effects of compromise from possible leaks would endanger the life of our source. This was particularly true in view of CIA's expressed attitude in 1954. Some leads had been given to CIA over two weeks before the arrests of the subjects in the United States. Leads were not given earlier because of the fear of possible compromise. As far as coordinating the French aspects of the case were concerned, it is doubted that CIA could have exerted any control over the French investigation after the French had the information. There was a distinct difference in this case between intelligence information and evidence in support of prosecutive action.

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Memorandum to Mr. C. D. DeLoach  
RE: RELATIONSHIPS WITH CIA  
62-80750

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Recently the [British MI-5] <sup>(S)</sup> representative in Washington has made some inquiries relating to Boris Morros indicating the [British] <sup>(S)</sup> may now believe Morros was either known to the Soviets as our agent or was under their control. It is not known if the [British] <sup>(S)</sup> have discussed this matter with CIA.

RECOMMENDED ACTION:

None. We do not believe, in light of the facts set forth, that CIA will make an issue of this matter.

*[Handwritten initials and marks: "B", "J", "WEL", "K", "DIP", "10/22"]*

**SECRET**

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

1 - Mr. DeLoach  
1 - Mr. Sullivan

Tolson	_____
DeLoach	_____
Felters	_____
Mohr	_____
Rishop	_____
Casper	_____
Callahan	_____
Conrad	_____
Felt	_____
Gale	_____
Rosen	_____
Sullivan	_____
Tavel	_____
Soyars	_____
Tele. Room	_____
Holmes	_____
Gandy	_____

TO : Mr. C. D. DeLoach

~~SECRET~~

DATE: 3/9/70

FROM : W. C. Sullivan

1 - Liaison  
1 - Mr. Bermingham

SUBJECT: RELATIONSHIPS WITH CIA  
BUREAU OPERATIONS IN MEXICO

#A0R16  
DECLASSIFIED BY SP-2 ALM/ETG  
ON 1-10-01

Item number two in the material submitted to the Director by SA Sam Papich in his memorandum dated 3/5/70 states that during the 1950's, CIA periodically complained that the operations of our office in Mexico and specifically those involving the operating of informants and the penetration of the Communist Party of Mexico violated the understanding that this office was to act only as a liaison post. He also states CIA has informally raised questions on our running informants in Mexico and still being able to comply with Directives requiring coordination of overseas clandestine counterintelligence operations under CIA. He states comments by CIA officials along above lines have been casual and informal and indicate the situation has been a potential issue rather than an actual conflict or disagreement. The essence of his remarks in this item is that the Bureau is vulnerable to criticism by CIA because of our operations in Mexico.

Review of our files fail to reveal receipt of any formal protest by CIA concerning these matters. We have been operating alongside CIA in Mexico City since 1947. In 1951, Inspector V. P. Keay, after visiting Mexico City, reported that CIA was not adequately investigating matters in Mexico affecting the internal security of the U.S. and recommended that after properly advising CIA, Legat, Mexico, be instructed to undertake such investigations. The Executive Conference considered this problem on 4/19/51 and decided we should extend our coverage in Mexico but should not reach any understanding with CIA regarding these increased activities. It was decided, however, to advise CIA in writing of this problem in Mexico in order to fix responsibility on that Agency and such a letter was sent on 5/1/51. A copy is attached.

Enclosure

RAB:bsf/wmk *wmk*  
(5)

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~~SECRET~~

Memorandum to Mr. C. D. DeLoach  
RE: RELATIONSHIPS WITH CIA  
BUREAU OPERATIONS IN MEXICO

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In 10/51, almost simultaneously, our Legats in Mexico City, Madrid, and Paris, reported instances of CIA field officials openly challenging our operations, generally on the grounds that we were violating CIA overseas jurisdiction. Inspectors V. P. Key and DeLoach personally and forcefully brought these instances to the attention of General Walter B. Smith, Director of CIA, in a heated exchange on 10/24/51. Out of this meeting developed a luncheon on 11/7/51 attended by the Director, Bureau officials and General Smith, who was accompanied by several officers of his Agency. According to a memorandum, D. M. Ladd to the Director, dated 11/7/51, CIA recognized our presence abroad and both agencies pledged cooperation and coordination through greater liaison so as to prevent conflict and competition in these closely associated operations. During the ensuing 19 years, the Bureau continued to operate in Mexico and on occasions moderately expanded its activities in order to meet its needs. During this lengthy period, there were no serious problems with CIA, with reference to our Mexico City office.

RECOMMENDED ACTION:

None. We do not believe, in light of the facts set forth, that CIA will make an issue of this matter.

*[Handwritten signatures and initials: a large scribble, WES, RAB, and HZ]*

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**SECRET**

**CONFIDENTIAL  
BY SPECIAL MESSENGER**

**Date: May 1, 1951**

**To: Director  
Central Intelligence Agency  
2430 E Street, Northwest  
Washington, D. C.**

**Attention: Major General W. G. Wyman  
Office of Special Operations**

**From: John Edgar Hoover, Director  
Federal Bureau of Investigation**

**Subject: COVERAGE OF ACTIVITIES OF  
AMERICAN COMMUNISTS IN MEXICO**

Reference is made to recent discussions between representatives of the Office of Special Operations-CIA and Special Agent C. D. DeLoach of the Federal Bureau of Investigation regarding the captioned matter. It is understood that your representatives pointed out that the Mexico City station of CIA, with its limited personnel, attempted to follow movements of American Communists as well as possible, however, it would be impossible to guarantee an advance report in each individual case when the Communist member in question is about to return to the United States.

You will recall that the following suggestions were offered by your representatives in connection with this matter:

- (1) Utilization of the Immigration and Naturalization Service Watch List.
- (2) Advice from FBI as to whether the Mexican Police could be used in handling cases.
- (3) Advice from the FBI to CIA indicating which cases are most important so that those cases could be given preferred attention.

It was indicated by the CIA representatives that possibly the adoption of these suggestions would in some manner assist them in handling Communist cases in Mexico.

cc: Legal Attache, Mexico City, Mexico  
cc: Foreign Service Desk (detached)

**SECRET  
AIR COURIER**

**SECRET**

Tolson \_\_\_\_\_  
DeLoach \_\_\_\_\_  
Walters \_\_\_\_\_  
Mohr \_\_\_\_\_  
Bishop \_\_\_\_\_  
Casper \_\_\_\_\_  
Callahan \_\_\_\_\_  
Conrad \_\_\_\_\_  
Felt \_\_\_\_\_  
Gale \_\_\_\_\_  
Rosen \_\_\_\_\_  
Sullivan \_\_\_\_\_  
Tavel \_\_\_\_\_  
Soyars \_\_\_\_\_  
Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_  
Holmes \_\_\_\_\_  
Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

**CDD:pjb**

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**SECRET**

The FBI, of course, fully realizes the difficult problems involved in surveilling American Communists in foreign countries. At the same time, however, it must be pointed out that in the present emergency each individual Communist investigation, routine or otherwise, should receive proper attention when the subject concerned travels to foreign countries. As you no doubt realize, the Communist Party, U.S.A., represents a potential force as far as espionage and sabotage operations are concerned. Therefore, even minor members of the Party could become involved in delicate operations. As pointed out in the discussions between Mr. DeLoach and representatives of your agency, the travels of Communists from the United States to Mexico are very likely to become much greater, thereby proposing a more serious problem than is now faced.

The FBI has for some time utilized the Immigration and Naturalization Service Watch List as a source of information concerning the travel of Communists. Although representing an excellent method of ascertaining this type of information, at the same time the FBI is not afforded any advance warning from this source as to the return of the Communist Party member to the United States. Therefore, the investigation of that member becomes delinquent in view of the fact active investigation is not initiated at the time of his re-entry. It is, therefore, believed that this particular source of information would not be satisfactory in lieu of information from your agency which would notify us in advance of the return to the United States of the Communist Party member in question.

With respect to the FBI advising your agency when the services of the Mexican Police may be utilized in individual cases, this Bureau will be most happy to advise you of those "sensitive cases" which are considered too delicate for referral to the Mexican Police, or foreign factions. With regard to the remainder of investigations, however, we shall defer to your judgment as to whether you wish to utilize the Mexican Police or not. The jurisdiction of the Office of Special Operations in foreign intelligence matters allows for a more over-all knowledge of the Mexican Police than this Bureau presently possesses. Therefore, we suggest that you weigh the facts in each individual case and consider whether the Mexican Police should be called in or not.

Concerning the ranking importance of cases, it is the opinion of this Bureau that the facts provided your agency in each individual case will determine the methods of investigation you wish to apply. It is not, therefore, considered necessary for the FBI to point out the importance of each matter referred to your agency.

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As suggested by your representatives, we will be most happy to hold a conference with your Mexican supervisory personnel at any time concerning discussions of investigations in Mexico. It is additionally suggested, however, that you advise your field representatives in Mexico City to contact the FBI's Legal Attache regarding coordination of the same matters in that locality.

- 3 -

**SECRET**

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

- 1 - Mr. C.D. DeLoach
- 1 - Mr. W.C. Sullivan

- Tolson \_\_\_\_\_
- DeLoach \_\_\_\_\_
- Mohr \_\_\_\_\_
- Bishop \_\_\_\_\_
- Casper \_\_\_\_\_
- Callahan \_\_\_\_\_
- Conrad \_\_\_\_\_
- Felt \_\_\_\_\_
- Gale \_\_\_\_\_
- Rosen \_\_\_\_\_
- Sullivan \_\_\_\_\_
- Tavel \_\_\_\_\_
- Soyars \_\_\_\_\_
- Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_
- Holmes \_\_\_\_\_
- Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

TO : Mr. C. D. DeLoach

DATE: March 6, 1970

FROM : Mr. W. C. Sullivan

~~SECRET~~

- 1 - Mr. W.A. Branigan
- 1 - Mr. A.P. Litrento
- 1 - Liaison

SUBJECT: RELATIONSHIPS WITH CIA  
THE ABEL CASE

Item #3 in the material submitted to the Director by SA Sam Papich in his memorandum of March 5, 1970, discusses the Abel case.

According to Papich, CIA felt it was not given proper recognition for its contribution in the case, in that it took the risk and responsibility of transporting Hayhanen from Paris to the U. S. in 1957 after the Bureau declined to become involved in this transportation; that after a short handling period in the U. S. the Bureau dropped Hayhanen, an alcoholic, because he became a problem and CIA took the responsibility of safeguarding him, giving the Bureau free access to him and time to develop leads leading to the apprehension of Abel; that CIA was responsible for making Hayhanen mentally and physically capable to testify at the Abel trial; also, CIA incurred heavy expenses, all for the benefit of the Bureau; further, the Bureau never thanked CIA for its cooperation nor did it see fit to inform the Attorney General or the White House of the role played by CIA.

BACKGROUND OF THE SITUATION:

Abel is the Soviet intelligence officer who was uncovered in the U. S. in 1957 through the defection of Reino Hayhanen, Abel's assistant.

On the night of May 7, 1957, James Angleton of CIA advised Mr. Belmont that Hayhanen had walked into the American Embassy in Paris about three days ago and was referred to CIA. He claimed he was a Soviet agent in New York since 1952 and gave certain details to back up his story. He claimed he was ordered back to Moscow and got "cold feet" in Paris and wanted to cooperate with American officials. He was in a highly emotional state which led CIA to question his mental stability. It was the opinion of Mr. Belmont that no steps should be taken to return Hayhanen to the U. S. until the story was substantiated or demolished to reflect his actual status. Our New York Office immediately instituted investigation,

62-80750

APL:tdp (7)

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~~SECRET~~

# mde/6  
DECLASSIFIED BY SP-2 ALM/STG  
ON 1-10-01



Memorandum Mr. W. C. Sullivan to Mr. C. D. DeLoach  
RE: RELATIONSHIPS WITH CIA  
62-80750

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based on Hayhanen's disclosures and was not able to prove or disprove his story. On May 8, 1957, CIA was informed of the facts developed by our investigation and asked what action it intended to take regarding Hayhanen's return to the U.S. On May 9, 1957, Angleton advised of a report received from CIA, Paris, revealing that Hayhanen had suffered almost a complete mental breakdown and that in view of his condition, arrangements were made by CIA for him to be returned to the U.S. by plane. On May 10, 1957, Hayhanen was returned to the U.S. in the company of a CIA agent. On arrival our New York Agents were at the airport to take him over, but because of his emotional state, he was confined at the U.S. Marine Hospital in Staten Island until May 15, 1957, when he was released to the custody of our Agents. Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) authorities arranged for his confinement in the U.S. Marine Hospital, Staten Island, for psychiatric examination through the U.S. Public Health Service. (Liaison Agent Papich had previously conferred with an INS official who had stated that if Hayhanen's condition warranted confinement upon his arrival in the U.S., an order would have to be issued by the U.S. Public Health Service).

Hayhanen and his wife were placed in a midtown hotel by New York Agents and were under Bureau control from May 15, 1957, until June 20, 1957, when they were taken to their residence in Peekskill, New York, at their request. All expenses for their maintenance were paid by the Bureau. During this period Hayhanen and his wife were becoming a problem because of heavy drinking and irrational behavior.

On June 13, 1957, Abel was located by Bureau Agents when visiting his studio in Brooklyn, New York. Efforts by Bureau Agents and the Department to have Hayhanen testify against Abel in a criminal prosecution were unavailing. With the Department's concurrence, we arranged for INS authorities to arrest Abel on June 21, 1957, on an alien warrant. After Abel's arrest, the Department continued to raise questions concerning Hayhanen's willingness to testify in an espionage prosecution against Abel and requested the Bureau to press Hayhanen in that regard. We took the position that any efforts to induce Hayhanen to testify should be made by the Department, as we realized that Hayhanen would undoubtedly want assurances, such as remaining in this country and financial assistance, and the Department was so advised. The Department was also advised that the Bureau would no longer pay Hayhanen's subsistence and that other arrangements would have to be made. In an effort to solicit Hayhanen's cooperation, the Department conferred with Allen Dulles of CIA to determine if CIA would be willing to sponsor the entry of Hayhanen into the U.S. under the authority granted the Director of CIA by law. Dulles indicated a willingness not only to sponsor Hayhanen but also to assist in his rehabilitation

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Memorandum Mr. W. C. Sullivan to Mr. C. D. DeLoach  
RE: RELATIONSHIPS WITH CIA  
62-30750

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in the U.S., such as assisting him in obtaining a job and furnishing financial assistance for an extended period of time. On July 21, 1957 a CIA representative was placed in touch with Hayhanen by New York Agents for this purpose. Our Agents also arranged for FBI's access to Hayhanen whenever necessary. Subsequently, Hayhanen agreed to testify and appeared before a Federal grand jury on August 5 and August 6, 1957.

As indicated above, we located Abel on June 13 and he was taken into custody by INS on June 21, 1957. On July 21, 1957, over a month later, CIA instituted arrangements for Hayhanen's rehabilitation.

While CIA undoubtedly incurred heavy expenses on behalf of Hayhanen, it was not at the request of the Bureau but at the request of the Department.

Regarding CIA's complaint that the Bureau never thanked it for its cooperation, it is pointed out that a letter from the Director was sent to Mr. Dulles on November 19, 1957, shortly after Abel's conviction. It pointed out the excellent cooperation of James Angleton and his staff with the Bureau since the inception of this case and that the Director wished to express his personal appreciation to Angleton and his staff for their valuable assistance.

RECOMMENDED ACTION:

None, we do not believe, in light of the facts set forth, that CIA will make an issue of this matter.

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UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

- 1 - Mr. DeLoach
- 1 - Mr. Sullivan
- 1 - Mr. Cotter

TO : Mr. C. D. DeLoach

~~SECRET~~

DATE: 3/6/70

FROM : W. C. Sullivan

1 - Liaison

- Tolson \_\_\_\_\_
- DeLoach \_\_\_\_\_
- Walters \_\_\_\_\_
- Mohr \_\_\_\_\_
- Bishop \_\_\_\_\_
- Casper \_\_\_\_\_
- Callahan \_\_\_\_\_
- Conrad \_\_\_\_\_
- Felt \_\_\_\_\_
- Gale \_\_\_\_\_
- Rosen \_\_\_\_\_
- Sullivan \_\_\_\_\_
- Tavel \_\_\_\_\_
- Soyars \_\_\_\_\_
- Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_
- Holmes \_\_\_\_\_
- Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

SUBJECT: RELATIONSHIP WITH THE  
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA)  
WILLIAM P. BUNDY CASE

#MDR16  
DECLASSIFIED BY SP2ALM/RTG  
ON 1-10-01

Item No. 4 in the material submitted to the Director by SA Sam Papich in his memorandum dated 3/5/70 discusses belief by CIA officials that damaging publicity regarding William P. Bundy emanated from a Bureau report. Bundy was a CIA official at the time and the publicity was felt to be damaging to CIA. CIA apparently was of the belief that the Bureau leaked the information to Senator Joseph McCarthy who then released the information to the press.

Bureau files reveal that in a discussion between SA Papich and Allen W. Dulles, then head of CIA, on 7/10/53 Dulles inquired of Papich as to where McCarthy could get information such as that released concerning Bundy. Papich immediately informed Dulles that if Dulles was under any suspicion that the Bureau might be disseminating such information to Senator McCarthy he was definitely wrong and off base. Papich also told Dulles that the results of the Bureau investigation concerning Bundy had also been made available to the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) as well as other interested agencies. Dulles told Papich that he definitely did not feel that the Bureau was involved in the McCarthy releases to the press and that he was sorry if there had been an impression he suspected the Bureau.

There is nothing in Bureau files concerning Bundy which would indicate that the Bureau did, in fact, supply any information concerning Bundy to Senator McCarthy or the news media. There was considerable publicity concerning Bundy at the time and it is noted that due to the fact that Bundy was the son-in-law of former Secretary of State Dean Acheson

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CONTINUED - OVER

Memorandum for Mr. DeLoach  
RE: RELATIONSHIP WITH THE  
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
WILLIAM P. BUNDY CASE

~~SECRET~~

there was possibly an element of potential embarrassment to the Democratic Party attendant to publicity afforded the matter by Republican Senator McCarthy. It is also noted that copies of reports of Bureau investigation concerning Bundy had been disseminated, in addition to CIA, to Civil Service Commission, National Security Agency, Atomic Energy Commission, Army and the Attorney General. A conflict broke out between CIA and Senator Joseph McCarthy after McCarthy publicly quoted from a document, not identified, which spelled out Bundy's contribution to the Alger Hiss fund. The files indicate that CIA alleged that the AEC had leaked the information in question to Senator McCarthy.

RECOMMENDED ACTION:

None. We do not believe, in light of the facts set forth, that CIA will make an issue of this matter.

*TO* ✓ *Wes* *John* *DJR* *st*

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UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

1 - Mr. DeLoach  
1 - Mr. Sullivan

Tolson	_____
DeLoach	_____
Walters	_____
Mohr	_____
Bishop	_____
Casper	_____
Callahan	_____
Conrad	_____
Felt	_____
Gale	_____
Rosen	_____
Sullivan	_____
Tavel	_____
Soyars	_____
Tele. Room	_____
Holmes	_____
Gandy	_____

TO : Mr. DeLoach

~~SECRET~~

DATE: March 6, 1970

FROM : W. C. Sullivan

1 - Mr. D. J. Brennan

1 - Mr. Wannall

1 - Mr. Harrell

SUBJECT: RELATIONSHIPS WITH CIA  
BUREAU DISSEMINATION OF INFORMATION  
CONCERNING JAY LOVESTONE

DECLASSIFIED BY SP2 am/116  
ON 1-10-01

Item number five in the material submitted to the Director by SA Sam Papich with his memorandum 3/5/70 discusses a question raised by former CIA Director Allen Dulles concerning the propriety of FBI dissemination of information concerning Jay Lovestone, who in the late 1920's headed the U. S. Communist Party, thereafter became completely disillusioned with the Party, and subsequently occupied an executive position with American Federation of Labor.

The particular information referred to by Mr. Dulles had been furnished FBI by Spencer Miller, Jr., former Assistant Secretary of Labor. Miller made several accusations against CIA. Mr. Dulles took the position that dissemination of the allegations to the White House, Attorney General and Department of State had placed Dulles on the spot because the Miller data was not a complete story.

### BACKGROUND:

CIA advised that on 12/4/53 Miller had informed CIA representatives abroad that he had evidence pointing toward Jay Lovestone's being a communist and active agent, and that Lovestone might shortly be exposed by the McCarthy Subcommittee of the Senate as the chief of the third great Soviet ring after Alger Hiss and Harry Dexter White. When interviewed by Bureau 1/7/54 he furnished no information indicating that Lovestone was engaged in espionage activity and appeared to have an axe to grind insofar as Lovestone was concerned. He acknowledged everything he had come to him secondhand. Results of interview were furnished CIA by letter.

On 1/22/54 Attorney General advised the Director that Dr. Milton Eisenhower had told him of a conversation he had with Spencer Miller. The Attorney General said he told Dr. Eisenhower he would have Miller interviewed to get the whole story and asked that we conduct the interview.

On 1/25/54 we wrote the Attorney General about the previous interview with Miller and advised we would have him interviewed again to

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(6)

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CONTINUED - OVER

Memorandum for Mr. DeLoach  
RE: RELATIONSHIPS WITH CIA

~~SECRET~~

secure any additional data he might have. Miller was reinterviewed the same day and results were sent to Attorney General 1/27/54.

Subsequently, on 2/19/54, Governor Sherman Adams called the Director from White House about the Miller situation. The Director advised Governor Adams that he had personally talked to Miller for two hours the previous day and had concluded that Miller was obsessed with the charges he was making and while he appeared to be a brilliant and well educated man he did not appear to have specific details.

On the day the Director spoke with Miller, 2/18/54, he referred Miller to Domestic Intelligence Division where a detailed interview was conducted and results incorporated in a 20-page memorandum, copies of which were furnished Attorney General, Governor Adams, CIA and State Department.

We interviewed Miller at the specific instructions of the Attorney General based upon a White House request and dissemination of interview results to Attorney General and White House was not only proper but required under the circumstances. CIA and State Department received results since allegations concerned officials and operations of those agencies. Miller furnished names of persons who he said could support his allegations and we interviewed them and disseminated results. Mr. James Angleton of CIA commented on 3/13/54 that when the Miller information was first received at that Agency some officials gained the impression FBI was deliberately collecting and disseminating data solely for the purpose of "hurting" CIA. Angleton said results of interviews and investigation conducted by Bureau had clearly demonstrated to CIA officials that FBI was living by its well-known tradition and reputation of developing facts and reporting information in an impartial manner. He said on the previous day all officials, including Dulles, commented the Bureau was following the Lovestone case in conformity with its well established reputation of getting all the facts. In view of this, there is no basis for believing that at this time CIA would raise any charges of unfair conduct on the part of Bureau in its handling of the Miller matter.

RECOMMENDED ACTION:

None. We do not believe, in light of the facts set forth, that CIA will make an issue of this matter.

~~SECRET~~

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

TO : Mr. C. D. DeLoach

**SECRET**

- 1 - Mr. DeLoach
- 1 - Mr. Sullivan
- 1 - Mr. Cotter

DATE: 3/6/70

FROM : Mr. W. C. Sullivan

- 1 - Liaison
- 1 - Mr. Ryan

- Tolson \_\_\_\_\_
- DeLoach \_\_\_\_\_
- Walters \_\_\_\_\_
- Mohr \_\_\_\_\_
- Bishop \_\_\_\_\_
- Casper \_\_\_\_\_
- Callahan \_\_\_\_\_
- Conrad \_\_\_\_\_
- Felt \_\_\_\_\_
- Gale \_\_\_\_\_
- Rosen \_\_\_\_\_
- Sullivan \_\_\_\_\_
- Tavel \_\_\_\_\_
- Soyars \_\_\_\_\_
- Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_
- Holmes \_\_\_\_\_
- Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

SUBJECT: RELATIONSHIP WITH CENTRAL  
INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA)  
BUREAU HANDLING OF CIA REQUESTS  
FOR TOURS FOR FOREIGN OFFICIALS

*#MDR16*  
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 1-16-01 BY SP7 ALM/ATG

Item six in material submitted to the Director by Sam Papich in his memorandum 3/5/70 mentions occasions in the 1950's when CIA complained that officials visiting the United States under CIA sponsorship were disappointed because they had no contact with Bureau officials. CIA felt contact with Bureau officials had significant benefits, left lasting favorable impressions because of the FBI's world-wide reputation, and when foreign visitors had no contact with Bureau officials they were left with suspicions there was friction between the FBI and CIA. In 1956, we had a clear-cut policy to the effect that tours for such visitors would be of a restrictive nature and they would be afforded the same treatment as the public and nothing more.

Memorandum 5/31/56 from Mr. Roach to Mr. Belmont, captioned "Visit at Bureau by Foreign Police and Intelligence Officials," (Bureau file 94-2-32781) recommended for Director's approval that Liaison would (1) inform CIA tours afforded to foreign police officials and security officials would continue to be of a restricted nature and the visitors will only view facilities normally seen by the public, and (2) that such foreign officials would not be interviewed unless it appeared to the Bureau's advantage. In regard to 1, the Director noted, "I thoroughly agree. I am not too keen anyway about such tours. We were 'burned' in the Johns matter." The Director noted in regard to 2, "I see no need of interviews."

Doctor Otto John was an official of the West German security service who was closely associated with CIA and who was alleged to have defected to the East Germans.

In his memorandum, Papich emphasized that for the past several years there was no basis for complaints with regard to Bureau treatment of foreign officials coming to U.S. under CIA sponsorship.

RECOMMENDED ACTION:

**SECRET**

None. We do not believe, in light of the facts set forth, that CIA will make an issue of this matter.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

- 1 - Mr. C.D. DeLoach
- 1 - Mr. W.C. Sullivan

- Tolson \_\_\_\_\_
- DeLoach \_\_\_\_\_
- Walters \_\_\_\_\_
- Mohr \_\_\_\_\_
- Bishop \_\_\_\_\_
- Casper \_\_\_\_\_
- Callahan \_\_\_\_\_
- Conrad \_\_\_\_\_
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- Gale \_\_\_\_\_
- Rosen \_\_\_\_\_
- Sullivan \_\_\_\_\_
- Tavel \_\_\_\_\_
- Soyars \_\_\_\_\_
- Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_
- Holmes \_\_\_\_\_
- Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

TO : Mr. C. D. DeLoach

DATE: March 6, 1970

**SECRET**

- 1 - Mr. W.A. Branigan
- 1 - Liaison
- 1 - Mr. J.P. Lee

FROM : Mr. W. C. Sullivan

SUBJECT: RELATIONSHIPS WITH CIA  
CIA - Dutch INTERESTS IN SOVIET ESPIONAGE ACTIVITY

Item #7 in the material submitted to the Director by SA Sam Papich in his memorandum of March 5, 1970, discusses CIA - Dutch Interests in Soviet Espionage Activity. SA Papich notes that in 1956 the Dutch Internal Security Service (BVD) wanted to have certain individuals in the U. S. interviewed and approached CIA to make inquiry at the Bureau. When CIA approached us, we told them to have the Dutch submit the request through diplomatic channels and we subsequently told CIA we would not handle the interviews for the Dutch. Although CIA accepted this, they felt it hurt efforts to gather Soviet espionage information in Europe. Our position was based on failure of the Dutch to deal honestly with us in the case of Joseph Petersen, who was involved in collecting intelligence information at the National Security Agency for a Dutch official.

BACKGROUND OF THE SITUATION:

This question first arose when a Dutch official approached our representatives at the NATO Special Committee conference in Paris in May, 1956, and requested Bureau assistance in interviewing Mrs. Antonina Thomas in the U. S. and to have a Dutch representative present during the interview. Mrs. Thomas is the widow of General Walter Krivitsky, who operated an espionage network in Europe prior to his defection in 1937. The Dutch representative said CIA had interviewed her, but the results were unsatisfactory. He was told to submit his request through diplomatic channels. In June, a CIA representative advised SA Papich they were receiving pressure from the Dutch to have a Dutch representative bring all the material on the case to the U. S. for the Bureau's use in interviewing Mrs. Thomas and two others in the U. S., but not to participate in the interview. In accordance with instructions, SA Papich told CIA to have the Dutch submit their request through diplomatic channels and to include all information in writing, and that the Bureau would not deal personally with a Dutch representative. By memorandum of June 15, 1956, it was reported that James Angleton of CIA told SA Papich he was of the very strong opinion that the Bureau's position made good sense, but other CIA officials felt the Dutch should be helped in every possible way.

62-80750

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**SECRET**

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

APR 16 10:01  
CLASSIFIED BY SP 2 AM/ATG  
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 16



Memorandum Mr. W.C. Sullivan to Mr. C.D. DeLoach  
RE: RELATIONSHIPS WITH CIA  
62-80750

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DISPOSAL OF PROBLEM:

On June 19, 1956, then Assistant Director A. H. Belmont and SA Papich met with [Richard Helms, then Deputy Director of Plans, and James Angleton of CIA]. Helms asked if the Bureau would talk to a representative of the Dutch if he came over and, in lieu of that, would the Bureau accept from CIA information and leads furnished by the Dutch. (S)

Belmont pointed out the Bureau's position was very simple in that the [Dutch] had been caught short in the [Petersen] case when their representatives had been obtaining highly classified information from a friendly government and, before the FBI even requested to interview the [Dutch] representatives involved, the [Dutch Ambassador] notified State Department (S) that if [Dutch] representatives were to be interviewed, it should be done by State Department and not by the FBI. [Helms] was told that in view of this, the Bureau notified State Department that any requests for information from the [Dutch] to be handled by the Bureau must be channeled through the State Department. (S) Mr. Belmont said that this was a situation created by the (S) [Dutch] and the Bureau had no intention of altering its position and we would not talk to a [Dutch] representative and did not desire to receive any leads in the Krivitsky case through [CIA]. (S) (S) Mr. Helms advised that CIA respected the Bureau's position and had attempted to guide itself accordingly in dealing with the [Dutch]. He said he understood the Bureau's position, which in essence was that the [Dutch] had made their bed and could now lie in it. (S)

LIKELIHOOD OF PROBLEM ARISING NOW:

It would appear remote that this problem would arise at this time.

RECOMMENDED ACTION:

None. We do not believe, in light of the facts set forth, that [CIA] will make an issue of this matter. (S)

SECRET

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

TO : Mr. C. D. DeLoach

- 1 - Mr. C. D. DeLoach
- 1 - Mr. W. C. Sullivan
- 1 - Liaison

DATE: March 6, 1970

FROM : W. C. Sullivan

**SECRET**

- 1 - Mr. A. W. Gray
- 1 - Mr. S. F. Phillips

- Tolson \_\_\_\_\_
- DeLoach \_\_\_\_\_
- Walters \_\_\_\_\_
- Mohr \_\_\_\_\_
- Bishop \_\_\_\_\_
- Casper \_\_\_\_\_
- Callahan \_\_\_\_\_
- Conrad \_\_\_\_\_
- Felt \_\_\_\_\_
- Gale \_\_\_\_\_
- Rosen \_\_\_\_\_
- Sullivan \_\_\_\_\_
- Tavel \_\_\_\_\_
- Soyars \_\_\_\_\_
- Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_
- Holmes \_\_\_\_\_
- Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

SUBJECT: RELATIONS WITH CIA  
COL. JOHN GROMBACH (PAT O'BRIEN)

Background: Item number eight in the material submitted to the Director by SA Sam Papich in his memorandum 3/5/70 discusses relations between Bureau and CIA with Grombach, head of private intelligence network (O'Brien was Grombach's aide who had liaison with Bureau).

Problem: Papich states we never informed CIA we were receiving information from Grombach which was also of interest to CIA; and that while it is possible Grombach had given same data to CIA, we do not know.

Analysis: Grombach was financed by CIA during early 1950s (e.g., CIA budgeted \$650,000 for Grombach in 1952). (62-77306-60) There is ample evidence CIA knew we were receiving information from Grombach. We do know some information was given by Grombach to CIA and Bureau jointly. O'Brien, for example, told us of conference in early 1951 between CIA officials and Grombach when it was agreed information might be furnished directly to FBI by Grombach, provided CIA was advised by Grombach of what was given. (62-77306-23) Moreover, on 5/7/52 a CIA official requested Bureau's views regarding validity of information we were receiving from Grombach and asked for our views regarding method to be employed in channeling information from Grombach to Bureau. Significantly, under procedure then, Grombach directed communications to CIA with copies to Bureau. CIA was told that as it appeared Grombach was an appendage of CIA, Bureau was not recommending any method of dissemination and it was up to CIA to handle problem. (62-77306-25)

In the ensuing period, dispute arose between CIA and Grombach over channeling of information and Bureau made every effort to stay out of dispute. In late 1952, for example, Helms inquired if Bureau's views regarding dissemination had changed. He was told they certainly had not and again informed that Bureau's desire was to receive all information of interest no matter how received. (62-77306-27) Our position of not becoming involved in Grombach-CIA dispute reiterated on other occasions. (62-77306-36, 69, 81; 65-58725-56)

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SFP:lis  
(6)

Memorandum W.C. Sullivan to Mr. C.D. DeLoach  
RE: RELATIONS WITH CIA  
COL. JOHN GROMBACH (PAT O'BRIEN)

(SECRET)

On the other hand, there were instances where we received information from Grombach which was of either an administrative or intelligence interest to CIA and we did not inform CIA. These instances covered period both prior and subsequent to the contractual relationship between CIA and Grombach which was from 4/51 to 7/54 (62-77306, unrecorded memo 11/29/55, Belmont to Boardman re Grombach). For example, Grombach wrote a confidential letter dated 7/30/48 to former Assistant to the Director D. M. Ladd which contained information of interest to CIA. This letter contains a penciled notation: "This info. not to be given to CIA. per DML--OHB" (62-77306-7). Memorandum 10/11/50 from A. H. Belmont to Mr. Ladd contains information from O'Brien concerning Grombach's intentions to plant microphones in Finland to cover meetings attended by Russian high staff. It was observed in the memorandum that at that time O'Brien and Grombach had no relations with CIA and that Grombach's intended operation was under primary responsibility of CIA. No indication this information given to CIA by Bureau (65-58725-10).

O'Brien furnished Bureau a memorandum dated 6/29/54 entitled "Termination Memorandum to FBI" which informed of the termination of contract between Grombach and CIA. In the memorandum it is pointed out that Grombach will continue to receive raw material from the field and that while he will no longer be in a position to translate, evaluate, publish, etc., Grombach desires to forward such material to Bureau as Grombach would not trust any other agency. The memorandum also states that Grombach has continued the flow to the Bureau of all reports he felt Bureau would be interested in even though Grombach received a written order specifically directing him to not give Bureau anything. (62-77306-70).

RECOMMENDED ACTION:

None. We do not believe, in light of the facts set forth, that CIA will make an issue of this matter.

*S* *R* *W* *W* *K*

SECRET

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

1 - Mr. DeLoach  
1 - Mr. Sullivan

Tolson	_____
DeLoach	_____
Walters	_____
Mohr	_____
Bishop	_____
Casper	_____
Callahan	_____
Conrad	_____
Felt	_____
Gale	_____
Rosen	_____
Sullivan	_____
Tavel	_____
Coyars	_____
Tele. Room	_____
Holmes	_____
Gandy	_____

TO : Mr. C. D. DeLoach

DATE: 3/7/70

FROM : W. C. Sullivan

~~SECRET~~

1 - Liaison  
1 - Mr. Dix

SUBJECT: RELATIONSHIPS WITH CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE  
AGENCY (CIA)  
COMMISSION ON THE ORGANIZATION OF THE  
EXECUTIVE BRANCH OF THE GOVERNMENT  
(HERBERT HOOVER COMMISSION - 1954)

*WMDRIG*  
DECLASSIFIED BY *SP-2 ALM/JTG*  
ON *1-10-01*

Item number nine in the material submitted to the Director by SA Sam Papich in his memorandum 3/5/70 discusses the Hoover Commission survey of CIA operations in 1954. According to Papich, there was talk within CIA that the Bureau had furnished the names of subversives within CIA to Senator McCarthy. Senator Joseph R. McCarthy (R-Wisc) was Chairman of the Senate Investigations Subcommittee.

General Mark Clark headed the Task Force which surveyed CIA operations between 9/54 and 6/55. In 10/54, CIA alleged that the McCarthy Committee was attempting to develop information regarding CIA operations. According to the Washington Star, 10/1/54, McCarthy said CIA was "one of the worst situations we have as far as communist infiltration is concerned." He said he would give his data relative to this matter to Clark's Task Force. According to the Washington Star, 1/15/55, McCarthy said he had given Clark information relative to alleged communist infiltration of CIA. As of 1/17/55, CIA had not received from Clark the names of those considered security risks but CIA believed it had done a good job of removing security risks and believed that it was in good shape.

On 1/21/55, the Task Force requested name checks on security risks named by McCarthy. Memoranda containing the results of those checks were given to the Task Force on 2/8/55. On 5/13/55, the Bureau received a letter from Clark asking for investigations relative to character, reputation, and loyalty of individuals mentioned as security risks. CIA was aware of the names as we asked it for identifying data concerning them. Clark was later advised that the investigations would entail interviews at CIA, review of its programs, inquiries in foreign countries, and the like and he withdrew his request.

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Memorandum to Mr. C. D. DeLoach  
RE: RELATIONSHIPS WITH CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE  
AGENCY (CIA)

~~SECRET~~

The talk at CIA that the Bureau had furnished McCarthy the names of subversives at CIA has not been recorded in FBI files nor is there any complaint in the matter recorded. Neither is there recorded any complaint by CIA to this effect.

RECOMMENDED ACTION:

None. We do not believe, in light of the facts set forth, that CIA will make an issue of this matter.

*b* ✓ *John* *JTB*  
*WEL* *A*

~~SECRET~~

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

- 1 - Mr. C. D. DeLoach
- 1 - Mr. W. C. Sullivan
- 1 - Mr. D. J. Brennan

- Tolson \_\_\_\_\_
- Felt \_\_\_\_\_
- Walters \_\_\_\_\_
- Mohr \_\_\_\_\_
- Bishop \_\_\_\_\_
- Casper \_\_\_\_\_
- Callahan \_\_\_\_\_
- Conrad \_\_\_\_\_
- Felt \_\_\_\_\_
- Gale \_\_\_\_\_
- Rosen \_\_\_\_\_
- Sullivan \_\_\_\_\_
- Tavel \_\_\_\_\_
- Soyars \_\_\_\_\_
- Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_
- Holmes \_\_\_\_\_
- Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

TO : Mr. C. D. DeLoach

DATE: 3/6/70

FROM : W. C. Sullivan

~~SECRET~~

- 1 - Liaison
- 1 - Mr. C. D. Brennan
- 1 - Mr. F. B. Griffith

SUBJECT: RELATIONSHIPS WITH CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
INTERNAL SECURITY LEADS IN FOREIGN COUNTRIES

DECLASSIFIED BY *SP2ALM/16*  
ON *11/10/01*

Item number 10 in the material submitted to the Director by Special Agent Sam Papich in his memorandum of 3/5/70 discussed our furnishing leads to our Legal Attaches (Legats) without advising Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) or requesting the Agency to handle the lead.

The observations of Special Agent Papich in this matter are broad and general in nature. His presentation is hinged upon the premise advanced by the Agency that "internal security" cannot be separated from "counterintelligence," thereby necessitating our advising CIA of requests to our Legats to have leads covered in foreign countries. The Manual of Instructions, Section 102, page 23, states CIA's responsibilities include collection, collation, evaluation, coordination and dissemination of intelligence information. CIA does not have, among other things, responsibility for "internal security functions."

In the absence of unusual situations, we forward investigative leads pertaining to our cases in countries where we have liaison coverage to the particular Legal Attache concerned. Through his contacts the Legat arranges for the necessary investigation and submits the desired information according to our reporting needs. The Legat coordinates this activity on a local level.

It is more desirable to have our representatives request investigation abroad in order to achieve maximum coverage, and to maintain tight control so we can insure that we fulfill our responsibilities.

RECOMMENDED ACTION:

None. We do not believe, in light of the facts set forth, that CIA will make an issue of this matter.

FBG:ser:ekn *ekn*  
(7)

*V.*  
*H.*  
~~SECRET~~  
*[Handwritten signatures]*

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

- Tolson \_\_\_\_\_
- Belmont \_\_\_\_\_
- Mohr \_\_\_\_\_
- Bishop \_\_\_\_\_
- Casper \_\_\_\_\_
- Callahan \_\_\_\_\_
- Conrad \_\_\_\_\_
- Felt \_\_\_\_\_
- Gale \_\_\_\_\_
- Rosen \_\_\_\_\_
- Sullivan \_\_\_\_\_
- Tavel \_\_\_\_\_
- Soyars \_\_\_\_\_
- Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_
- Holmes \_\_\_\_\_
- Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

1 - Mr. DeLoach  
1 - Mr. Sullivan

TO : Mr. C. D. DeLoach

DATE: 3/7/70

FROM : W. C. Sullivan

1 - Liaison  
1 - Mr. Flemister

~~SECRET~~

SUBJECT: RELATIONSHIPS WITH CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE  
AGENCY (CIA)  
[BUREAU OPERATIONS IN CUBA] (S)(U)

~~CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO  
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR  
RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION  
IN THIS DOCUMENT AS SANITIZED  
GMB 5/1/94 (SP8 MAC/KOL-6474-JFK)~~

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN  
OTHERWISE

Item number eleven in the material submitted to the Director by SA Sam Papich in his memorandum 3/5/70 states that we operated informants in Cuba during the period we had a Legat Office in Havana and did not coordinate our operations with CIA or advise it we had sources there. It was noted that after Castro came on the scene, approval was granted to turn certain informants over to CIA. Papich also refers to a memorandum Donahoe to Mr. Belmont, 2/5/60, regarding the Communist Party of Cuba (CPC) which dealt with the problem of whether a Havana source [used in an intercept operation between the Communist Party of Venezuela and the CPC] should be turned over to CIA to obtain complete coverage. We, of course, had no coverage [of Venezuela]. [The] Bureau had not advised other agencies of this source since we did not want Castro to uncover any operational activities which might embarrass the Bureau. The entire operation was later turned over to CIA.

CIA began its operations in Havana in 4/47 and in a letter to the Bureau, 4/28/53, [regarding Havana informants] the Legat noted that CIA was not overly cooperative and that, in fact, it was not developing pertinent information. At that time Legat met with the CIA representative in Havana who admitted he was not getting any information [concerning the CPC] and had no plans for any aggressive action in that field. [For this reason it was necessary for us to develop our own coverage.] We instructed the Legat to ascertain from the Havana CIA representative information available to him concerning matters of interest to the Bureau; however, he was to continue [through informant sources] to obtain needed information regarding security matters which could not be supplied by CIA. Subsequently, our relations with CIA improved to the point of being described as excellent in 1958. We think our overall position to be sound.

RECOMMENDED ACTION:

None. We do not believe, in light of the facts set forth that CIA will make an issue of this matter.

HCF:bsf/mst  
(5) mst.

~~SECRET~~

#MOR 16  
DECLASSIFIED BY SP2 RUM/2126  
ON 1-12-01  
PER CIA AND MINGOLD RELEASE  
88-1026/DFX 4/2/98  
Classified by SP10 JGL  
Declassify on: OADR, JFK

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

Tolson	_____
DeLoach	_____
Walters	_____
Mohr	_____
Bishop	_____
Casper	_____
Callahan	_____
Conrad	_____
Felt	_____
Gale	_____
Rosen	_____
Sullivan	_____
Tavel	_____
Soyars	_____
Tele. Room	_____
Holmes	_____
Gandy	_____

TO : Mr. C.D. DeLoach

DATE: March 6, 1970

FROM : W.C. Sullivan

**SECRET**

#MDR16 1-10-01  
CLASSIFIED BY SP2ALM/316  
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X, 6

SUBJECT: RELATIONSHIPS WITH CIA  
BUREAU OPERATIONS IN BRAZIL (S) - 1959

Item #12 in the material submitted to the Director by SA Sam Papich in his memorandum dated March 5, 1970, discusses situation in Rio de Janeiro (Rio) (S) in 1959 concerning strained relations which had developed between former Legal Attache (Legat) William G. Friedemann (now retired) and former U.S. Ambassador Ellis O. Briggs. According to Papich the Ambassador alleged that Legat had engaged in uncoordinated intelligence activity and that CIA was unhappy with Legat's activities and had told the Ambassador that Legat had disseminated information from a source who was either a fabricator or a provocator.

Friedemann was assigned as Legat in Rio (S) on October 25, 1958, and was transferred as Assistant Legat in Havana on August 22, 1959, after Bureau concluded that he lacked sufficient administrative experience to function as Legat, Rio. (S) In early 1959 he began to receive information from Antonio Martinez De Santos, an employee of the Political Section, Federal District Police. Martinez furnished derogatory information concerning one General Lott of the Brazilian Army who was a possible Brazilian presidential candidate in 1960, indicating that Lott had questionable contacts with the Czech Embassy in Brazil. (S) This information was disseminated to CIA attributed to a source who had not been contacted sufficiently to determine his reliability. CIA advised Bureau that the information concerning Lott (S) caused considerable consternation within CIA which had been unable to evaluate reliability of the information. CIA suggested possibility that the information had been fabricated or was part of a communist deception operation. CIA requested that we identify our source but we declined to do so because source did not want his identity disclosed.

By letter dated October 1, 1959, the new Legat, Rio, recommended that Martinez be discontinued as a potential source based on his admissions to Legat that he had no sources in Czech Embassy and could not provide identities of his sources or additional details concerning information he had reported. Legat concluded that (S)

- 1 - Mr. C.D. DeLoach
- 1 - Mr. W.C. Sullivan
- 1 - Liaison
- 1 - Mr. L.F. Schwartz

LFS:bcw (5)

*bcw*

**SECRET**

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ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
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 EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE  
 DATE 05-11-2001 BY SP2ALM/316



Memorandum to Mr. D. J. Brennan, Jr.  
RE: RELATIONSHIPS WITH CIA  
BUREAU OPERATIONS IN BRAZIL - 1959

~~SECRET~~

information Martinez had furnished was of such a nature that it could have come from public sources, the political police or could have been invented and attributed to his alleged contacts. Legat also concluded that Martinez could not have been a provocator used by Czechs to pass deceptive information. Contacts with Martinez were discontinued in November, 1959. (S)

In our dissemination of information from Martinez to CIA we were careful to state that our contacts with the source were insufficient to establish his reliability. Although subsequent events established that it was likely that CIA was correct in speculating that the information was fabricated, there was no indication that the source was a Czech-controlled provocator. (S)

RECOMMENDED ACTION:

None. We do not believe, in light of the facts set forth, that CIA will make an issue of this matter.

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UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

- 1 - Mr. C. D. DeLoach
- 1 - Mr. W. C. Sullivan
- 1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall

DATE: 3/6/70

- Tolson \_\_\_\_\_
- DeLoach \_\_\_\_\_
- Walters \_\_\_\_\_
- Mohr \_\_\_\_\_
- Bishop \_\_\_\_\_
- Casper \_\_\_\_\_
- Callahan \_\_\_\_\_
- Conrad \_\_\_\_\_
- Felt \_\_\_\_\_
- Gale \_\_\_\_\_
- Rosen \_\_\_\_\_
- Sullivan \_\_\_\_\_
- Tavel \_\_\_\_\_
- Soyars \_\_\_\_\_
- Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_
- Holmes \_\_\_\_\_
- Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

TO : Mr. C. D. DeLoach

FROM : W. C. Sullivan

SUBJECT: RELATIONSHIPS WITH CIA  
BORDER COVERAGE (BOCOV).

~~SECRET~~

- 1 - Liaison
- 1 - Mr. H. W. Little
- 1 - Mr. J. E. Gauzens

#MDR 16  
DECLASSIFIED BY SP2ALM/ITG  
ON 1-10-01

Item number (13) in the material submitted to the Director by SA Sam Papich in his memorandum 3/5/70 discusses a problem presented by the Phoenix Office in June, 1957, concerning the Bureau's handling of informants on the Mexican border. These informants were operated inside Mexico. The problem was predicated on situations which might arise as the result of CIA endeavoring to develop informants who were already being handled by the Bureau.

BACKGROUND:

The Director initiated BOCOV in 1948 to fill a void in the lack of coverage in the 25-mile zone south of the U.S.-Mexican border on the part of CIA and Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS). The program, which at first involved 3 and subsequently 5 of our border offices including Phoenix, was designed to detect and neutralize anti-U.S. activities by subversives in that zone.

In June, 1956, CIA assigned a representative to the American Consulate, Nogales, Sonora, Mexico, which is in the border zone then covered by Phoenix.

PROBLEM:

By airtel 6/8/57, Phoenix advised that the CIA representative had endeavored to develop 3 Bureau sources in Mexico and stated that it was discontinuing these sources unless advised to the contrary by the Bureau.

SOLUTION:

This situation was analyzed in Bureau memorandum dated 6/14/57 wherein it was recommended that safeguards be established to continue operating already established valuable sources even though CIA also began using them; however, the information we

62-80750

CONTINUED - OVER

- 1 - 100-356015 (BOCOV)
- 1 - 100-356015 Sub 38 (BOCOV-PX)

JEG:HWL:d1m  
(9)

~~SECRET~~

Memorandum to Mr. C. D. DeLoach  
RE: RELATIONSHIPS WITH CIA  
BORDER COVERAGE (BOCOV)

~~SECRET~~

received from these sources was to be broken down and paraphrased in reports in such manner as to conceal as far as possible the fact that these individuals were assisting us. The Director approved these safeguards which were successfully placed into effect by Phoenix.

A review of our files since June 14, 1957, fails to reveal that this problem has been raised subsequently by CIA activity in the Phoenix BOCOV area. In addition, the CIA representative was transferred from Nogales on 7/6/59. He was not replaced by CIA and the border territory he had covered was subsequently handled by CIA on a road trip basis out of Mexico City. Furthermore, the participation of the Phoenix Office in BOCOV was discontinued with the Director's approval by letter dated 12/10/69.

RECOMMENDED ACTION:

None. We do not believe, in light of the facts set forth, that CIA will make an issue of this matter.

*[Handwritten initials and marks: a checkmark, a signature, a large scribble, and the letter 'A']*

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UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

Tolson	_____
DeLoach	_____
Walters	_____
Mohr	_____
Bishop	_____
Casper	_____
Callahan	_____
Conrad	_____
Felt	_____
Gale	_____
Rosen	_____
Sullivan	_____
Tavel	_____
Soyars	_____
Tele. Room	_____
Holmes	_____
Gandy	_____

1 - Mr. C. D. DeLoach  
1 - Mr. W. C. Sullivan

TO : Mr. C. D. DeLoach

**SECRET**

DATE: 3/6/70

FROM : W. C. Sullivan

1 - Mr. D. J. Brennan  
1 - Mr. W. A. Branigan  
1 - Mr. L. H. Martin

SUBJECT: RELATIONSHIPS WITH CIA  
CARPORT (S)

#MDM6 1-10-01  
CLASSIFIED BY SP-2 ALM/STB  
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X16

(S) Item number 14 in material submitted to Director by SA Sam Papich in his memorandum 3/5/70 discusses Carpport case. Carpport is code name for case on our double agent, Andre Deglon, who was recruited by Soviets while on business trip to Moscow in 1954. Until discontinued in 1964 he delivered extensive material, cleared by United States Evaluation Board, to the Soviets in United States and Europe. (S)

(S) Mr. Papich's memorandum states case was being highlighted since we cannot exclude possibility Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) has evidence to demonstrate we were operational in Europe and did not co-ordinate with CIA. The fact is CIA did know Deglon was meeting the Soviets in Europe and Mr. Papich's memorandum does not disclose CIA raised any objection to date. We recognized at the time there could be a jurisdictional problem. We permitted CIA to interview Deglon in December, 1954, shortly after his recruitment at which time CIA learned from him he had a scheduled espionage meeting in Switzerland in March, 1955. On 12/15/54 CIA agreed handling of Deglon was solely within jurisdiction of Bureau. On 3/2/55, CIA was orally informed Deglon would meet Soviets in Switzerland in March, 1955; that we desired CIA to take no action which would interfere with our operation and that results would be furnished CIA (approved by memorandum Belmont to Boardman, 2/25/55). Memorandum Belmont to Boardman, 6/10/57, recommended we not advise CIA of a later meeting between Deglon and Soviets scheduled for 6/10-13/57 in Switzerland in interest of security. This was approved and this policy was followed thereafter. (S)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

(S) All information from Deglon was disseminated to CIA and it disclosed our source was meeting Soviets at various points in Europe. In December, 1968, CIA was advised it could in future contact Deglon for data he acquired in his world-wide travels providing it did not use him in operational capacity; Deglon was instructed not to disclose to CIA information on his (S)

1 - 105-25453 (Carpport) (S)  
LHM:cgc cgc  
(7)

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**SECRET**

Memorandum to Mr. C. D. DeLoach  
RE: RELATIONSHIPS WITH CIA

**SECRET**

(S) relationship with Bureau. It is a fact, however, we did  
(S) permit [Deglon] under our supervision, to meet [Soviet  
principals] outside the United States without clearing  
with CIA. We discontinued him as an informant in 1964.

RECOMMENDED ACTION:

None. We do not believe, in light of the facts  
set forth, that CIA will make an issue of this matter.

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**SECRET**

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

Tolson	_____
DeLoach	_____
Walters	_____
Mohr	_____
Bishop	_____
Casper	_____
Callahan	_____
Conrad	_____
Felt	_____
Gale	_____
Rosen	_____
Sullivan	_____
Tavel	_____
Soyars	_____
Tele. Room	_____
Holmes	_____
Gandy	_____

TO : Mr. C. D. DeLoach

DATE: 3/6/70

FROM : W. C. Sullivan

~~SECRET~~

SUBJECT: RELATIONSHIPS WITH CENTRAL  
INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA)  
CIA REQUEST FOR BUREAU LECTURE  
ON COMMUNISM IN THE U. S.

#MOR16  
DECLASSIFIED BY SP-2ALM/HAG  
ON 1-10-01

Item Number 15 in the material submitted to the Director by SA Sam Papich in his memorandum 3/5/70 discusses the Director's refusal of a 1958 CIA request for Mr. W. C. Sullivan to lecture on communism before a CIA group. Papich stated that CIA accepted this as an affront and a blatant refusal to cooperate on a most important subject of interest to both agencies.

The files disclose that by letter 9/25/58 signed by James Angleton, CIA requested Mr. Sullivan to address a selected group of CIA personnel on the communist movement in the U. S. CIA suggested dates of 12/9,10, or 11/58. The Director by routing slip attached to Angleton's letter commented, "It seems strange that CIA should seek this when its top representative in Japan considers FBI as a bunch of mere 'flat-feet' and the dangers of communism as something conjured up in the minds of the FBI. But then again I note request doesn't come from the Director nor even the Deputy Director of CIA."

Memorandum W. C. Sullivan to A. Belmont dated 10/1/58 made reference to CIA's request and the Director's comments. It recommended that the best interests of the Bureau would be served by giving this lecture, not because of the information which could be conveyed to CIA on communism in the U. S., but because it would give Sullivan an opportunity to raise a number of questions himself of the group concerning CIA's own activities in the field of communism. It was pointed out that it could be considered a bit of a challenge to see how much the FBI could learn about the operation of CIA during the course of the lecture and discussion rather than the converse. Mr. Tolson recommended that the request be declined and the Director concurred commenting, "We cannot make Sullivan available to this outfit."

*BCR*  
BCR:hc  
(5) *hc*  
1-Mr. DeLoach  
1-Mr. Sullivan  
1-Liaison  
1-Mr. Rachner

~~SECRET~~

CONTINUED \_ OVER

Memorandum to Mr. C. D. DeLoach

~~SECRET~~

RE: RELATIONSHIPS WITH CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA)  
CIA REQUEST FOR BUREAU LECTURE ON COMMUNISM IN THE U. S.

Pursuant to the Director's decision, a letter was directed to CIA under date of 10/7/58 advising that it was not possible to grant CIA's request for this lecture because of Mr. Sullivan's other commitments.

Nothing could be located in Bureau files to indicate CIA's reaction to this letter.

ACTION RECOMMENDED:

None. We do not believe, in light of the facts set forth, that CIA will make an issue of this matter.

*[Handwritten initials and signatures]*

~~SECRET~~

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

- Tolson \_\_\_\_\_
- DeLoach \_\_\_\_\_
- Walters \_\_\_\_\_
- Mohr \_\_\_\_\_
- Bishop \_\_\_\_\_
- Casper \_\_\_\_\_
- Callahan \_\_\_\_\_
- Conrad \_\_\_\_\_
- Felt \_\_\_\_\_
- Gale \_\_\_\_\_
- Rosen \_\_\_\_\_
- Sullivan \_\_\_\_\_
- Tavel \_\_\_\_\_
- Soyars \_\_\_\_\_
- Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_
- Holmes \_\_\_\_\_
- Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

TO : Mr. C. D. DeLoach

**SECRET**

DATE: 3/6/70

FROM : Mr. W. C. Sullivan

SUBJECT: RELATIONSHIPS WITH CIA  
CASE OF EDWARD ELLIS SMITH

Item Number 16 in the material submitted to the Director by Special Agent (SA) Sam Papich in his memorandum 3/5/70 discusses the case of Edward Ellis Smith, that CIA might criticize our not identifying our source.

BACKGROUND OF CASE Smith was the CIA employee assigned to the American Embassy, Moscow, in 1956, under State Department cover. He became involved with a Russian girl, and the Committee for State Security (KGB) approached him for recruitment, using the affair with the girl and compromising photographs as leverage to carry out the approach. Smith reported the approach to his superiors and was returned to U. S. and ultimately removed from CIA.

PROBLEM WITH CIA We first learned of this case on 7/9/56 from David Teeple, a consultant to Scott McLeod of State Department, who furnished the information in confidence and who indicated Smith might have been involved in espionage. On 7/16/56 Robert Bannerman, Office of Security, CIA, advised SA Papich that CIA was considering requesting in writing that the Bureau identify our source. On 7/17/56 SA Papich was advised by Director of Security, CIA, that Allen Dulles had instructed that the request not be made.

DISPOSAL OF PROBLEM WITH CIA . This problem never officially arose in view of the instructions of Mr. Dulles. Bureau files contain no indication as to whether or not CIA documented this.

RECOMMENDED ACTION:

None. We do not believe, in light of the facts set forth, that CIA will make an issue of this matter.

62-80750

1 - 65-64084 (Edward Ellis Smith)

- 1 - Mr. C. D. DeLoach
  - 1 - Mr. W. C. Sullivan
  - 1 - Mr. D. J. Brennan
  - 1 - Mr. W. A. Branigan
  - 1 - Mr. T. N. Goble
- TNG:as:bjp hjp (7)

DJF  
2/27/70

WES

J

**SECRET**



UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

TO : Mr. C. D. DeLoach

**SECRET**

- 1 - Mr. C. D. DeLoach
- 1 - Mr. W. C. Sullivan
- 1 - Liaison

DATE: 3/6/70

FROM : Mr. W. C. Sullivan

- 1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
- 1 - Mr. J. R. Wagoner

- Tolson \_\_\_\_\_
- DeLoach \_\_\_\_\_
- Walters \_\_\_\_\_
- Mohr \_\_\_\_\_
- Bishop \_\_\_\_\_
- Casper \_\_\_\_\_
- Callahan \_\_\_\_\_
- Conrad \_\_\_\_\_
- Felt \_\_\_\_\_
- Gale \_\_\_\_\_
- Rosen \_\_\_\_\_
- Sullivan \_\_\_\_\_
- Tavel \_\_\_\_\_
- Soyars \_\_\_\_\_
- Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_
- Holmes \_\_\_\_\_
- Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

SUBJECT: RELATIONSHIPS WITH  
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
(THE [SLIVA] OPERATION)

#MDP16 1-10-01  
CLASSIFIED BY SP-2 A/m/ JLG  
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 1,6

Item Number 17 in the material submitted to the Director by SA Sam Papich in his memorandum of 3/5/70 discusses the possible belief of Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) that the Legal Attache, [Paris], had leaked sensitive information concerning the [SLIVA] case. SA Papich noted that perhaps CIA might question whether FBI had pursued investigation in the case vigorously enough. Memorandum is to review circumstances under which information was furnished by CIA to FBI, Legal Attache inquiries of CIA, [Paris], and the effect of CIA restrictions on FBI investigations in this case.

(S) In February, 1963, CIA made available information from [Philippe de Vosjoli, the Washington, D. C., representative of the French intelligence service (SDECE)] to the effect that the [French] Government was planning to engage in clandestine collection of scientific and technical information in the United States. CIA insisted information not be made available to other government agencies and no investigation be conducted which might jeopardize its source. CIA then made available extensive information from [coded communications from SDECE in Washington]. (S) Analysis of the (S) [communications] revealed several discrepancies which would have made interview by FBI of [de Vosjoli] desirable. CIA refused this request. We made numerous requests to obtain clarifying data to explain items mentioned in [SDECE communications] and CIA failed to respond. (S)

(S) In March, 1963, CIA furnished information concerning [SDECE] interest in American personnel and installations in [Paris]. (S) This information was made available to Legal Attache, [Paris]. (S) On 4/11/63 CIA advised that its CIA station [in Paris], which had not heretofore been apprised of [SLIVA] case had made inquiry concerning the case. Our inquiry of Legal Attache, [Paris], disclosed that (S)

1 - 105-109053 [SLIVA] (S)

LEB:bjpbj (7)

OBSERVATIONS - OVER

**SECRET**

Memorandum to Mr. C. D. DeLoach  
RE: RELATIONSHIPS WITH  
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

SECRET

(S) Inquiry of CIA personnel in [Paris] (S) had been made concerning (S) one of the individuals previously identified as an [SDECE] agent and also requests had been made for certain biographical data concerning other individuals. Legal Attache noted that CIA (S) personnel in [Paris] had indicated they were previously aware of the [SLIVA] case and were impressed with the extreme sensitivity of the case. We furnished this information to CIA headquarters and on 5/7/63 CIA referred to the incident and stated that it was a matter of serious concern to it, requesting that any future dissemination outside Bureau or to the Legal Attache be coordinated in advance with that Agency. This practice was closely followed. The Director observed in January, 1964, that he thought the whole thing had been imaginary on the part of CIA which had been played as a sucker by [de Vosjoli]. The Director added that no more time should be wasted on it, at least until CIA restrictions were removed. We continued to attempt to get the restrictions removed without success and covered outstanding leads. (S)

(S) In September, 1964, an analysis of the case disclosed (S) that although thirty-eight separate investigations were opened only three [SDECE] agents were uncovered. Original allegations of [French] intent to mount an espionage mission in the United States could not be substantiated. This information, coupled with the fact that CIA refused to make [deVosjoli] available to us for the purpose of resolving discrepancies, prompted a decision transmitted by us to CIA on 9/30/64 that we were closing our investigation in this case. (S)

Mr. Papich commented in his memorandum of 3/5/70 CIA never has been satisfied with the efforts made by the Bureau in this case. Our review indicates our efforts in the matter were as full and complete as possible under circumstances where CIA refused to grant us access to the source, did not respond to request for clarifying data and declined to remove restrictions making it impossible to take necessary investigative steps. Should any question be raised in the future, we are in a position to document our difficulties experienced with CIA.

RECOMMENDED ACTION:

None. We do not believe, in light of the facts set forth, that CIA will make an issue of this matter.

SECRET

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

Tolson	_____
DeLoach	_____
Walters	_____
Mohr	_____
Bishop	_____
Casper	_____
Callahan	_____
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Gale	_____
Rosen	_____
Sullivan	_____
Tavel	_____
Soyars	_____
Tele. Room	_____
Holmes	_____
Gandy	_____

TO : Mr. C. D. DeLoach

DATE: 3/6/70

~~SECRET~~

FROM : W. C. Sullivan

SUBJECT: RELATIONSHIPS WITH CIA  
LEAKS TO THE "NATIONAL REVIEW" - 1959

#MDR 16  
DECLASSIFIED BY SP-2 ALM/STG  
ON 1-10-01

BACKGROUND:

Item number 18 in the material submitted to the Director by Special Agent Sam Papich in his memorandum 3/5/70 cites a Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) investigation of leaks to the "National Review" which identified Lyle Hugh Munson, former CIA employee, as the leak and referred to former Assistant to the Director Lou Nichols as among his contacts.

PROBLEM:

Papich implies that CIA may have further information regarding Nichols' involvement.

ANALYSIS:

This situation was set forth in memorandum R. R. Roach to A. H. Belmont, 4/21/59. We do not know if CIA has additional information as to the suggested relationship between Munson and Nichols. We do know that they have not made an issue of this matter to date.

RECOMMENDED ACTION:

None. We do not believe, in light of the facts set forth, that CIA will make an issue of this matter.

HHW:kml/mst  
(6)

- 1 - Mr. DeLoach
- 1 - Mr. W. C. Sullivan
- 1 - Mr. A. W. Gray
- 1 - Liaison
- 1 - Mr. H. H. Wallace

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~~SECRET~~

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

Tavel	_____
Walters	_____
Mohr	_____
Fisher	_____
Casper	_____
Callahan	_____
Conrad	_____
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Gale	_____
Rosen	_____
Sullivan	_____
Tavel	_____
Soyars	_____
Tele. Room	_____
Holmes	_____
Gandy	_____

- 1 - Mr. C.D. DeLoach
- 1 - Mr. W.C. Sullivan

TO : Mr. C.D. DeLoach

**SECRET**

DATE: March 6, 1970

FROM : W.C. Sullivan

- 1 - Mr. D.J. Brennan
- 1 - Mr. W.R. Wannall
- 1 - Mr. E.R. Harrell
- 1 - Mr. R.A. Mullins

SUBJECT: RELATIONSHIPS WITH CIA - TRAVEL OF BUREAU INFORMANTS TO CUBA

Item Number 19 in the material submitted to the Director by SA Sam Papich in his memorandum 3/5/70 discusses the possible travel of one of our Mexican border informants to Cuba and whether our not advising CIA of this made us potentially vulnerable to charges we were operating outside the U.S. without coordinating with CIA.

BACKGROUND:

This involved our plans to send a Border Coverage Program (BOCOV) informant to a guerrilla training camp in Cuba. The trip never materialized.

In October, 1965, we were vitally interested in determining the location and extent of Cuban guerrilla training sites being used to prepare Latin American subversives to carry out revolutions in their home countries. EP 572-S, a Mexican national residing in Juarez, Mexico, which is within the area covered by the BOCOV Program, had infiltrated Cuban and Chinese intelligence operations in Mexico City and had made himself attractive to Mexican communist leaders who were planning to pay expenses of sending guerrilla trainees to Cuba.

CIA CONSIDERATIONS:

EP 572-S was an integral part of our top secret BOCOV Program which is handled on a need-to-know basis. We had previously obtained material from CIA showing its primary targets inside Cuba which allowed us to fully brief the informant as to overall U.S. Government objectives and a procedure was established for use in disseminating data to CIA if the trip materialized which would fully protect our informant and not jeopardize the BOCOV operation.

OUTCOME:

During period informant was striving to arrange the trip to Cuba his wife became mentally ill, extremely emotional and temporarily deserted the informant. This strained family relationship caused us to order El Paso to have informant cancel efforts to make the trip to Cuba and thus no trip was ever made.

RAM:drl (7)

CONTINUED - OVER

*drl*

**SECRET**

Memorandum to Mr. C. D. DeLoach  
RE: RELATIONSHIPS WITH CIA - TRAVEL OF  
BUREAU INFORMANTS TO CUBA

**SECRET**

ADDITIONAL CONSIDERATIONS:

After EP 572-S had moved to Guadalajara, Mexico, which is outside our BOCOV area, in November, 1966, we advised CIA of his past cooperation with us and interposed no objection to his use by CIA in areas outside our jurisdiction. On 11/22/66 CIA stated it would consult us should it initiate contacts with the informant. There is no indication that CIA did use the informant and on 6/24/68 we discontinued EP 572-S as he was of no further value to us. The trip never materialized.

RECOMMENDED ACTION:

None. We do not believe, in light of the facts set forth, that CIA will make an issue of this matter.

*[Handwritten signatures and initials: a large flourish on the left, 'WJ' in the center, a checkmark and 'J' below it, 'J' on the right, and 'D.L.' in the top right corner.]*

**SECRET**

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

- 1 - Mr. C. D. DeLoach
- 1 - Mr. W. C. Sullivan
- 1 - Mr. D. J. Brennan

TO : Mr. C. D. DeLoach

~~SECRET~~

DATE: 3/6/70

FROM : Mr. W. C. Sullivan

- 1 - Mr. R. D. Cotter
- 1 - Liaison
- 1 - Mr. E. J. O'Malley

SUBJECT: RELATIONSHIP WITH CENTRAL  
INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA)  
DISSEMINATION OF CIA INFORMATION  
IN A BUREAU MONOGRAPH

- Tolson \_\_\_\_\_
- DeLoach \_\_\_\_\_
- Walters \_\_\_\_\_
- Mohr \_\_\_\_\_
- Bishop \_\_\_\_\_
- Casper \_\_\_\_\_
- Callahan \_\_\_\_\_
- Conrad \_\_\_\_\_
- Felt \_\_\_\_\_
- Gale \_\_\_\_\_
- Rosen \_\_\_\_\_
- Sullivan \_\_\_\_\_
- Tavel \_\_\_\_\_
- Soyars \_\_\_\_\_
- Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_
- Holmes \_\_\_\_\_
- Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

#MDR 16  
DECLASSIFIED BY SP-2 ALM/JMG  
ON 1-10-01

Item 20 submitted to the Director by Sam Papich in his memorandum 3/5/70 mentions the dissemination of a Bureau monograph dated 5/5/65 and entitled "Communism in the Dominican Republic." Special Agent (SA) Papich stated that due to the urgency of the document Bureau did not obtain CIA clearance to include CIA information in the monograph which was disseminated to interested agencies, including CIA. According to SA Papich, CIA never made any protest although it considered our action a violation of the "third agency rule."

Although the monograph referred to by SA Papich did contain CIA data, it also set forth highly significant data obtained by Bureau through our own informants. The CIA data was biographical in nature and was used in the monograph to characterize the past, including communist contacts, of key figures in the Dominican Republic. It was taken from the 1963 CIA Biographical Handbook and CIA telegrams dating back to 1961, all of which were previously disseminated to the U. S. intelligence community by CIA. No attempt was made in the monograph to characterize CIA data as Bureau information and, in fact, this information was attributed to "another Government agency," in accordance with established procedures.

The so-called "third agency rule" provides that classified information originating in a department or agency will not be disseminated outside the receiving agency without the permission of the originating agency. However, an exception to this rule provides that the receiving agency may disseminate such data to other members of the U. S. Intelligence Board (USIB), of which Bureau is a member, unless the originating agency uses appropriate control markings limiting its data to the use of the receiving agency only. The CIA data used in the Bureau monograph had no such control markings and our monograph was disseminated to the President, the Attorney General and USIB members only.

EJO:ekn etu  
(7)

~~SECRET~~

Memorandum to Mr. C. D. DeLoach  
RE: RELATIONSHIP WITH CENTRAL  
INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA)

~~SECRET~~

The Bureau's monograph was a compendium of our own data, CIA data, and that received from other members of the intelligence community. It was prepared under emergency conditions for the President and had a significant bearing on the understanding and handling by the intelligence community of a serious crisis which confronted this country.

RECOMMENDED ACTION:

None. We do not believe, in light of the facts set forth, that CIA will make an issue of this matter.

EP

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WLD

g

11/7/70

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~~SECRET~~

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

TO : Mr. C.D. DeLoach

**SECRET**

- 1 - Mr. C.D. DeLoach
  - 1 - Mr. W.C. Sullivan
  - 1 - Mr. D.J. Brennan
- DATE: March 6, 1970

FROM : W.C. Sullivan

- 1 - Mr. W.R. Wannall
- 1 - Mr. J.E. Gauzens
- 1 - Mr. A.H. Solomon

SUBJECT: RELATIONSHIPS WITH CIA - BUREAU INFORMANTS IN GUATEMALA (S)

11/10/01 #MD/16  
CLASSIFIED BY SP-2ALM/JTG  
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X/6

- Tolson \_\_\_\_\_
- DeLoach \_\_\_\_\_
- Walters \_\_\_\_\_
- Mohr \_\_\_\_\_
- Bishop \_\_\_\_\_
- Casper \_\_\_\_\_
- Callahan \_\_\_\_\_
- Conrad \_\_\_\_\_
- Felt \_\_\_\_\_
- Gale \_\_\_\_\_
- Rosen \_\_\_\_\_
- Sullivan \_\_\_\_\_
- Tavel \_\_\_\_\_
- Soyars \_\_\_\_\_
- Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_
- Holmes \_\_\_\_\_
- Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

Item Number 21 in the material submitted to the Director by SA Sam Papich in his memorandum 3/5/70 discusses Bureau operation of informants in Guatemala and comments on our potential vulnerability for not having informed CIA at the inception of the operation of these informants. (S)

SA Papich has cited two situations. The first concerns Roberto Francisco Castaneda Felice, an attorney residing in Guatemala City. (S) Our Legat, Mexico, in the Fall of 1966, identified Castaneda as a potential source of intelligence information of importance to U.S. security; conducted appropriate background inquiry regarding him and determined his excellent potential and willingness to furnish intelligence information to U.S. Government. By memorandum 11/23/66 it was approved that we contact CIA headquarters through liaison channels to inform CIA that we planned to maintain contact with Castaneda; that CIA would be furnished the information obtained and that we would service CIA requests provided they could be handled with complete security. (S) SA Papich so informed Jake Esterline of CIA on 11/25/66. (S) Esterline stated he saw no reason why FBI could not proceed as we desired and that CIA headquarters would so inform its representatives in Guatemala and Mexico, instructing them to give FBI all necessary support in this operation. (S) Since that date we have operated Castaneda as a valuable and productive unpaid confidential source. Since this matter was coordinated with CIA at the outset, there appears to be no problem. (S)

The second situation cited by SA Papich concerned Legat, Mexico, informant MEX-65. This individual has cooperated with the Bureau for some 25 years. As a Guatemalan police official in 1945-47, he was most helpful to our representative assigned in Guatemala. (S) We had no contact with him thereafter until 1954 when he appeared in Mexico City as a political refugee from Guatemala. (S) For 11 years thereafter, MEX-65 was operated by our Legat, Mexico, in Mexico. (S)

AHS:dr1 (7)

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**SECRET**

**SECRET**

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE



Memorandum to Mr. C. D. DeLoach  
RE: RELATIONSHIPS WITH CIA - BUREAU INFORMANTS  
IN [GUATEMALA] (S)

SECRET

(S) In April, 1965, MEX-65 returned to [Guatemala] (S) and by memorandum 6/7/65 it was approved that contacts with him be continued in [Guatemala] by our Central American road trip Agent. He proved to be an extremely valuable informant on criminal matters as well as those of interest to U.S. security in [Guatemala.] (S)

(S) Upon MEX-65's designation as a highly placed police official in [Guatemala] in 1967, we promptly advised CIA headquarters through liaison channels of informant's identity. We advised CIA that we had utilized MEX-65 for handling criminal leads and that he periodically volunteered information concerning political developments in [Guatemala.] (S) At that time, 10/6/67, it was agreed that Bureau would continue control of informant and that after each contact with informant by our road trip Agent, the latter would confer with [Nestor Sanchez, Head of CIA operations in Guatemala] (who was present at CIA headquarters at the meeting) concerning political information furnished by the informant. We were assured of complete CIA cooperation in this matter. On the occasion of our road trip Agent's next contact with [Sanchez] in Guatemala, however, [Sanchez] (S) bitterly accused our Agent of having lied to him and of having operated a source in [Guatemala] without CIA's knowledge. He stated that responsibility for the development of security information outside the U. S. is solely CIA's. It is noted that (S) [Sanchez] has been a difficult person with whom to deal and has been inclined to "pop off." Matter has been closely followed by Legat, Mexico, and there have been no further indications of difficulty with him. (S) [CIA, Guatemala] has afforded us complete cooperation in our handling of MEX-65 as we were assured it would in the 10/6/67 meeting. Accordingly, no issue was made of this matter with CIA.

MEX-65 continues as a very valuable paid informant of our Legat, Mexico. CIA has made favorable comments regarding the excellent quality of the information obtained by MEX-65. This arrangement has worked smoothly for two and one-half years and there appears to be little likelihood of CIA raising an issue regarding this matter.

RECOMMENDED ACTION:

None. We do not believe, in light of the fact set forth, that CIA will make an issue of this matter.

V-2-  
SECRET

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

TO : Mr. C. D. DeLoach

FROM : W. C. Sullivan

SUBJECT: RELATIONSHIPS WITH CIA  
ITEM (22) SOLO

1 - Liaison  
1 - Mr. C. D. DeLoach

1 - Mr. W. C. Sullivan  
1 - Mr. C. D. Brennan  
1 - Mr. R. Strain

DATE: 3/6/70

~~SECRET~~

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DeLoach	_____
Walters	_____
Mohr	_____
Bishop	_____
Casper	_____
Callahan	_____
Conrad	_____
Felt	_____
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Sullivan	_____
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Tele. Room	_____
Holmes	_____
Gandy	_____

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DECLASSIFIED BY SP-2 ALM/17G  
ON 1-11-01

Item (22), SOLO, in the material submitted to the Director by Special Agent Sam Papich in his memorandum 3/5/70 mentions that the Bureau could be vulnerable and charged with failure to identify the source and coordinate with them on this matter if they were to become cognizant of the high-level foreign ramifications of this operation.

SOLO is the code word used to refer to the liaison operation performed by our informants between the Communist Party, USA, (CPUSA), and other communist parties of the world.

This operation basically is performed to gain high-level intelligence concerning the Soviet Union's financial support, domination and control of the CPUSA. Attendant to this objective, our informants have met with and discussed mutual problems with leaders of the various international departments within the Soviet Government. They have also held discussions with CP leaders from other nations.

All information received as a result of this operation which has foreign ramifications has been promptly disseminated to CIA at the highest level.

It has not been considered desirable to identify our sources in this case in view of the sensitivity of the case and the physical danger to the informants.

Considerable security precautions have been carefully built into the SOLO operation both in the field and at the Seat of Government to insure the fullest protection to its security and to the safety of the informants involved. Exposure of the identity of these sources might jeopardize the entire operation.

RS: *[Signature]* /lmj  
(6)

CONTINUED - OVER

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~~SECRET~~

Memorandum to Mr. C. D. DeLoach  
RE: RELATIONSHIPS WITH CIA  
ITEM (22) SOLO

While former Bureau Agents have gone to work for CIA, there is no information available indicating they have compromised this operation. Of course, they could have done this unknown to us.

The prompt dissemination, to CIA, of information developed through SOLO, which is of interest to that agency, completely fulfills this Bureau's responsibility without needless jeopardy. The mechanics of the operation itself are of no essential significance to CIA.

ACTION RECOMMENDED:

None.

*D*

*Wef*

*f*

~~SECRET~~

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

TO : Mr. C. D. DeLoach

FROM : W. C. Sullivan

SUBJECT: RELATIONSHIPS WITH CIA  
HARASSMENT OF CIA

- 1 - Mr. C. D. DeLoach
- 1 - Mr. W. C. Sullivan
- 1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall

DATE: March 6, 1970

- 1 - Mr. R. D. Cotter
- 1 - Liaison

Tolson \_\_\_\_\_  
 DeLoach \_\_\_\_\_  
 Walters \_\_\_\_\_  
 Mohr \_\_\_\_\_  
 Bishop \_\_\_\_\_  
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 Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_  
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*Handwritten:* In DR16  
 DECLASSIFIED BY SP-2 ALM/116  
 ON 1-11-01

Item #23 in the material submitted to the Director by SA Sam Papich in his memorandum of March 5, 1970, discusses a letter dated November 15, 1967, from CIA which requested that the Bureau check telephone toll calls from the home of one Robert Kenneth Brown who was allegedly harassing CIA in the Miami area. Brown was supposedly seeking information concerning CIA's covert operations. SA Papich states that we told CIA that we would not check the toll calls on the basis that the information received was not sufficient to justify investigation within the Bureau's jurisdiction. SA Papich also states that "CIA accepted our response but there is no doubt that the Agency characterized our position as a concrete example of refusal to help a sister agency with a problem relating to the security of U.S. intelligence operations."

A review of Bureau files disclosed that a memorandum, D. J. Brennan, Jr., to Mr. W. C. Sullivan, dated November 17, 1967, was prepared. This memorandum encompassed the above facts and recommended that CIA Liaison Agent advise CIA that we would not check the toll calls as requested. This memorandum and recommendation was prepared by SA Papich. The Director noted "OK H."

In addition to the above, on December 9, 1967, Brown contacted our Miami Office and stated that he was writing a book about CIA and offered to make the material available to the Miami Office. Our Miami Office was advised that this information was of interest to CIA headquarters and instructions were furnished that if Brown did furnish Miami with the information, it would be given to CIA. Brown did not follow through with his offer.

RECOMMENDED ACTION:

None. We do not believe, in light of the facts set forth, that CIA will make an issue of this matter.

JAM:bcw/bad (6)

*Handwritten:* [initials], [checkmark], [signature]

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UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

- 1 - Mr. C. D. DeLoach
- 1 - Mr. W. C. Sullivan
- 1 - Mr. R. D. Cotter

- Tolson \_\_\_\_\_
- DeLoach \_\_\_\_\_
- Walters \_\_\_\_\_
- Mohr \_\_\_\_\_
- Bishop \_\_\_\_\_
- Casper \_\_\_\_\_
- Callahan \_\_\_\_\_
- Conrad \_\_\_\_\_
- Felt \_\_\_\_\_
- Gale \_\_\_\_\_
- Rosen \_\_\_\_\_
- Sullivan \_\_\_\_\_
- Tavel \_\_\_\_\_
- Soyars \_\_\_\_\_
- Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_
- Holmes \_\_\_\_\_
- Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

TO : Mr. C. D. DeLoach

DATE: 3/6/70

**SECRET**

FROM : W. C. Sullivan

- 1 - Liaison
- 1 - Mr. R. S. Garner
- 1 - Mr. J. E. Keating (CINAL-Administrative File)

SUBJECT: RELATIONSHIP WITH THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA)  
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS

DECLASSIFIED BY SP-2 ALM/JTG  
ON 1-11-01

Item number 24 in the material submitted to the Director by SA Sam Papich in his memorandum dated 3/5/70 discusses the restriction of dissemination of the Current Intelligence Analysis (CINAL) to Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Prior to 10/67, some of the Government agencies on the distribution list for CINAL received multiple copies. The Director of CIA was then receiving 19 copies of CINAL as a result of requests from CIA on 3/30/62 and 10/23/62 for additional copies to expedite reading by key CIA officials and to facilitate rapid utilization of the information within CIA.

The Director made a notation on the 10/4/67 CINAL: "Please look over list of distribution. I have marked with a dot those I question as to why they should receive copies and I do not think more than 1 copy should be sent anyone. Let me have your views. H." By memorandum R. W. Smith to W. C. Sullivan 10/6/67, it was stated that although security of the classified document CINAL had been maintained, if the Director so desired, we would tell recipients that they would receive only one copy each in the future. Mr. Tolson noted on this memorandum, "Yes. T 10/9." Mr. Tolson also noted, "We could never run down a leak." The Director noted, "Send only 1 copy & if any inquiry, then indicate we have had to cut costs. H."

Since 10/67 the Director's instructions have been followed and only one copy of CINAL has been furnished to those, including CIA, on the CINAL distribution list.

RECOMMENDED ACTION:

None. We do not believe, in light of the facts set forth, that CIA will make an issue of this matter.

RSG:ekn/bad (7)

*[Handwritten signatures and initials: "W.C.", "J.E.K.", "R.S.G.", "H."]*

**SECRET**

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

- 1 - Mr. C. D. DeLoach
- 1 - Mr. W. C. Sullivan
- 1 - Liaison
- 1 - Mr. J. M. Fitzgerald

- Tolson \_\_\_\_\_
- DeLoach \_\_\_\_\_
- Walters \_\_\_\_\_
- Mohr \_\_\_\_\_
- Bishop \_\_\_\_\_
- Casper \_\_\_\_\_
- Callahan \_\_\_\_\_
- Conrad \_\_\_\_\_
- Felt \_\_\_\_\_
- Gale \_\_\_\_\_
- Rosen \_\_\_\_\_
- Sullivan \_\_\_\_\_
- Tavel \_\_\_\_\_
- Soyars \_\_\_\_\_
- Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_
- Holmes \_\_\_\_\_
- Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

TO : Mr. C. D. DeLoach

**SECRET**

DATE: March 7, 1970

FROM : W. C. Sullivan

SUBJECT: RELATIONSHIPS WITH CIA  
ESTABLISHMENT OF BUREAU LIAISON  
WITH DUTCH INTERNAL SECURITY  
SERVICE (BVD) - 1960

1-11-01 #m0216  
CLASSIFIED BY SP-2 ALM/7TG  
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X1, 6

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

(S) Item number 25 in the material submitted to the Director by SA Sam Papich in his memorandum of 3/5/70, discusses a trip to (S) Holland by Legal Attache (Legat), Bonn, in 1960 to explore arrangements for liaison with appropriate Dutch authorities. It is given as an instance CIA could cite as an FBI failure to coordinate with them in line with National Security Council Directives. The U.S. Ambassador to (S) Holland reportedly raised questions, indicating FBI should first reach agreement with CIA, which he said had previously handled all relations with Dutch authorities. (S) Papich says CIA Director, Allen Dulles, later expressed disappointment that we did not contact CIA beforehand but that an agreement satisfactory to all concerned was eventually worked out. Papich also says that in late 1959 we gave consideration to establishing a Legat in Denmark but did not inform CIA of our intentions.

In contemplation of the stationing of a Legat in Denmark, Bulet of 12/7/59 instructed Legat, London, to broaden liaison contacts in Scandinavian countries and told Legat, Bonn, to make exploratory contacts with appropriate authorities in (S) Holland for the same purpose. Since we had told State by letter of 3/10/55 that we would handle requests for investigations and name checks for the (S) Dutch only when received through formal State channels, we advised State of our intention to make exploratory contacts with (S) the Dutch regarding regular liaison arrangements, and State approved. State sent a letter to the U. S. Embassy in (S) Holland on 12/17/59, advising of the Bureau's intention, but it apparently did not get to the Ambassador prior to Legat's trip to (S) Holland.

(S) On 1/4/60 Legat, Bonn, called the (S) BVD from Germany and arranged to call on them on 1/7/60. The (S) BVD reported the call to the (S) CIA representative in Holland who told U. S. Ambassador Philip Young. On 1/7/60 the Director received a letter of 1/5/60 from Young in which he said he was disturbed about the manner in which he had learned of the Legat's proposed visit. While offering to assist the Bureau, young spoke of the long standing (S) contractual and financial arrangements CIA had with BVD and suggested the Director and Allen Dulles discuss the matter if permanent Bureau liaison with (S) BVD was planned.

JMF:jan (5)

**SECRET**

Memorandum to Mr. C. D. DeLoach  
RE: RELATIONSHIPS WITH CIA  
ESTABLISHMENT OF BUREAU LIAISON  
WITH [DUTCH INTERNAL SECURITY  
SERVICE (BVD)] - 1960

SECRET

(s) On 1/7/60, Legat met with Ambassador Young and the  
(s) [CIA Chief of Mission prior to visiting BVD.] He explained  
that he was to explore the possibility of direct contact with  
(s) [BVD] concerning exchange of information bearing on U.S. internal  
security matters. He said he would not be operational and that  
the contemplated liaison could not reasonably cause interference  
with the existing CIA arrangement. (s) While the Embassy officials  
expressed misgivings that the [Dutch] might be confused, no request  
was made to refrain from contacting [BVD.] (s) The CIA representative  
said he had requested his headquarters for comment on learning  
of the proposed visit of Legat but had not received a reply.  
(s) Legat later briefed both Embassy officials on the results of  
his visit to [BVD.] who were friendly but deferred a final  
commitment, referring to the existing "American arrangement."

(s) By letter of 1/13/60 the Director thanked Ambassador  
Young for his offer to assist, and said Bureau interests in  
Scandinavian countries and [Holland] were under discussion with  
Allen Dulles. Young was also assured our proposed contacts with  
(s) the [Dutch] were purely liaison in nature; that while we would  
keep CIA advised of items of interest to it in connection with  
its responsibilities abroad, it was not believed necessary to  
go beyond the U.S. Intelligence Board Directive of 12/8/59 in  
coordinating with CIA matters taken up with [the Dutch.] (s) That  
Directive says CIA shall be responsible for coordination of all  
U.S. liaison which concerns clandestine intelligence activities  
or which involve foreign clandestine services. Paragraph 10,  
however, says the Directive does not apply to any liaison  
relationship concerned with U.S. internal security functions,  
or with criminal or disciplinary matters which are not directly  
related to foreign espionage or clandestine counterintelligence.

(s) On 1/13/60 Papich explained to Allen Dulles and Richard  
Helms the reasons for our contacts in Scandinavian countries and  
[Holland] exploring possible establishment of a Legat in Denmark.  
When Papich challenged them to cite any Bureau failure to comply  
with the Directive for coordination of U.S. liaison activities  
abroad, Helms immediately stated there were no such instances.  
In answer to specific invitation by Papich to air any complaints  
or problems, Dulles stated that neither he nor his representatives  
had any complaints; that he was personally unhappy about not  
being contacted in the beginning; but that he and CIA would give  
all possible assistance. (Dulles did assist by writing a personal  
letter to Ambassador Young which resulted in a joint FBI-[BVD]-CIA  
meeting on 4/8/60, at which direct FBI-[BVD] liaison was agreed upon).

Memorandum to Mr. C. D. DeLoach  
RE: RELATIONSHIPS WITH CIA  
ESTABLISHMENT OF BUREAU LIAISON  
WITH [DUTCH INTERNAL SECURITY  
SERVICE (BVD)] - 1960

(S)

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On memorandum Frohbose to Belmont of 1/14/60, concerning the 1/13/60 meeting of Papich, Dulles and Helms, Director noted: "1. Well handled by Papich. 2. All of the turmoil developing in this situation could have been avoided if we had properly contacted Dulles and also followed through with State. H."

RECOMMENDED ACTION:

None. We do not believe, in light of the facts set forth, that CIA will make an issue of this matter.

*[Handwritten initials and signatures: a checkmark, 'Wes', 'Jen', 'DJF', and 'H']*

SECRET



UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

Tolson	_____
DeLoach	_____
Mohr	_____
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Sullivan	_____
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Tele. Room	_____
Holmes	_____
Gandy	_____

TO : Mr. C. D. DeLoach

DATE: 3-6-70

**SECRET**

FROM : W. C. Sullivan

SUBJECT: RELATIONSHIPS WITH THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA)  
BUREAU DISSEMINATION OF COUNTERINTELLIGENCE INFORMATION  
TO FOREIGN SERVICE - 1962

Item No. 26 in the material submitted to the Director by SA Sam Papich in his memorandum 3-5-70 states that CIA by letter 11-7-62 raised questions concerning the propriety of our dissemination of information through our Legal Attache to the

(S) [Greek] Intelligence Service. This concerned certain Committee for State Security (KGB) technical equipment which was obtained from our sensitive Soviet defector in place, Bureau code name Fedora. CIA letter 11-7-62 stated that a representative of

(S) [Greek] Intelligence Service informed CIA it received aforementioned information from our Legal Attache. CIA claimed such dissemination abroad should have been coordinated with CIA because of Director of Central Intelligence Directive (DCID) 5/2 which indicates that CIA shall be responsible for all U.S. liaison concerning clandestine intelligence activities abroad or involving foreign clandestine services. CIA claimed that pursuant above we were obligated to coordinate with CIA prior to dissemination.

Memorandum Branigan to Sullivan 11-9-62 under Fedora caption reviewed this situation and indicates that on 7-13 and 8-1-62 Fedora provided information concerning several types of technical paraphernalia used by KGB. Dissemination of above was made to State Department, CIA and military intelligence agencies by letter on 7-24 and 8-16-62. Information was also furnished to Legal Attaches, London, Bern, Bonn, Paris, Rome and Madrid, with instructions to disseminate only to contacts in foreign intelligence agencies known to be reliable and cooperative and with

- 62-80750
- 1 - 105-104811
- 1 - Mr. C. D. DeLoach
- 1 - Mr. W. C. Sullivan
- 1 - Mr. D. J. Brennan
- 1 - Mr. W. A. Branigan
- 1 - Mr. J. F. Mabey

111101 #MOR16  
 CLASSIFIED BY SP-2 ALM/3TG  
 DECLASSIFY ON: 25X6

JFM:plm  
(7)

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*JFM*  
*W.C.S.*  
*W.C.S.*

**SECRET**

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
 HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
 WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

Memorandum to Mr. C. D. DeLoach

~~SECRET~~

the instructions that it be given limited distribution and handled in a manner so it would not be apparent it emanated from the Bureau or a source within the U.S. Above memorandum points out that DCID 5/2 has been controversial since its inception (12-8-59) and the subject of differences of interpretation. We recognized CIA's coordination responsibilities but, in this instance, were of the opinion there was no operational angle and no necessity for coordinating dissemination of above since we had previously given the information to CIA. This memorandum recommended approval of a letter to CIA answering CIA's inquiry according to above. Director indicated "O.K." and "It looks like CIA is throwing its weight around." On 11-13-62 we directed a letter to CIA accordingly. As indicated in memorandum of SA Papich, CIA "surrendered" and did not further contest this issue.

RECOMMENDED ACTION:

None. We do not believe, in light of the facts set forth, that CIA will make an issue of this matter.

DTE

~~13~~ V. W. J. K.

~~SECRET~~

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

- Tolson \_\_\_\_\_
- DeLoach \_\_\_\_\_
- Walters \_\_\_\_\_
- Mohr \_\_\_\_\_
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- Holmes \_\_\_\_\_
- Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

TO : Mr. C. D. DeLoach

~~SECRET~~

DATE: 3/6/70

FROM : W. C. Sullivan

#MDR16  
DECLASSIFIED BY SP2/ALM/TK  
ON 1-11-01

SUBJECT: RELATIONSHIPS WITH CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA)  
"THE INVISIBLE GOVERNMENT," A BOOK AUTHORED BY  
DAVID WISE AND THOMAS ROSS

Item 27 of the material submitted to the Director by SA Sam Papich in his memorandum 3/5/70 indicates that Wise and Ross had visited the Bureau in 1963 to gather material for a book regarding U. S. intelligence agencies. It was suggested that CIA be advised of this, and the Director noted, "I see no reason for doing so."

Mr. Jones' memorandum to Mr. DeLoach, 8/28/63, reports this visit and notes that Wise had asked for data concerning the Bureau's internal security procedures and had asked concerning other FBI operations, making no reference to CIA, with one exception. He did inquire as to whether there was friction between the two agencies and was told that we cooperated closely and maintained daily liaison with CIA. It was on this memorandum that the Director said he saw no reason for informing CIA concerning the visit of Wise and Ross.

We later learned that their book, "The Invisible Government," was furnished in the form of advance proofs to CIA prior to its publication. We also received such proofs from CIA through Liaison.

RECOMMENDED ACTION:

None. We do not believe, in light of the facts set forth, that CIA will make an issue of this matter.

- 1 - Mr. C. D. DeLoach
- 1 - Mr. T. E. Bishop
- 1 - Mr. W. C. Sullivan
- 1 - Liaison
- 1 - Mr. Rose

✓  
WCS  
DJB

BFR:mlm/mkl  
(6)

~~SECRET~~

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

TO : Mr. C. D. DeLoach

FROM : W. C. Sullivan

SUBJECT: RELATIONSHIPS WITH CIA  
COMMUNIST ACTIVITIES - AFRICA

1 - Mr. DeLoach  
1 - Mr. Sullivan  
1 - Liaison  
DATE: March 6, 1970

1 - Mr. C.D. Brennan  
1 - Mr. Rozamus

Tolson	_____
DeLoach	_____
Walters	_____
Mohr	_____
Bishop	_____
Casper	_____
Callahan	_____
Conrad	_____
Felt	_____
Gale	_____
Rosen	_____
Sullivan	_____
Tavel	_____
Soyars	_____
Tele. Room	_____
Holmes	_____
Gandy	_____

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#MOR16  
DECLASSIFIED BY SP2 ALM JIG  
ON 1-11-01

Item number 28 in memorandum of 3/5/70 from SA Sam Papich to the Director, captioned "Cases and/or Situations Involving Conflict With CIA," states that in April, 1960, CIA inquired if the Bureau would give any consideration to assisting that agency toward developing coverage in Africa by providing a Negro informant or placing a Negro in the Communist Party, USA for the purpose of eventually using him in Africa. His memorandum added that we told that agency the FBI had no informants available because they were necessary for our own operations. He claims we took the position since we saw no benefit to be gained by loaning an informant on a short or long term basis. He states that CIA could argue that as early as 1960 it had foresight to recognize the need for additional coverage and when it appealed to the Bureau for assistance, we did not cooperate. He refers to his memorandum dated 4/7/60 concerning this matter captioned "Communist Activities in Africa."

The memorandum referred to discloses that on 4/5/60 Herman Horton, Deputy Chief, Counterintelligence, CIA, stated that communist organizations were rapidly increasing in strength on the continent of Africa and that his agency found it most difficult to establish effective penetration. Horton noted that in this connection it was almost impossible for a white man to move about Africa and establish a relationship which would enable him to develop worthwhile sources. He asked if the Bureau would consider furnishing one of its Negro informants or developing an informant in the Communist Party, USA for eventual use by CIA in Africa. Papich told Horton that if the Bureau had a good Negro informant, we certainly were not interested in having his future jeopardized nor did we want to lose his production. Papich added that it undoubtedly would be most difficult to take a Bureau informant, have him travel to Africa under some cover and still be able to satisfactorily explain such activities to his communist colleagues without becoming a target of suspicion. Horton said he recognized all this but asked if the Bureau would give consideration.

MJR:ssr  
(6)

CONTINUED - OVER

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Memorandum to Mr. C. D. DeLoach  
RE: RELATIONSHIPS WITH CIA

~~SECRET~~

Addendum to Papich's memorandum dated 4/8/60 by the Internal Security Section pointed out that all of our informants were necessary for our own operations, particularly in the communist field, and it recommended and was approved that CIA be orally informed that it is not possible to provide an informant on a loan basis to be used in Africa.

Regrettably, the Bureau was not in a position to assist CIA. CIA's problem was an administrative one within that Agency.

RECOMMENDED ACTION:

None. We do not believe, in light of the facts set forth, that CIA will make an issue of this matter.

~~S~~ ✓ WLL JG  
2075  
JK

~~SECRET~~

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

- Tolson \_\_\_\_\_
- DeLoach \_\_\_\_\_
- Walters \_\_\_\_\_
- Mohr \_\_\_\_\_
- Bishop \_\_\_\_\_
- Casper \_\_\_\_\_
- Callahan \_\_\_\_\_
- Conrad \_\_\_\_\_
- Felt \_\_\_\_\_
- Gale \_\_\_\_\_
- Rosen \_\_\_\_\_
- Sullivan \_\_\_\_\_
- Tavel \_\_\_\_\_
- Soyars \_\_\_\_\_
- Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_
- Holmes \_\_\_\_\_
- Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

TO : Mr. C. D. DeLoach

DATE: March 6, 1970

~~SECRET~~

FROM : W. C. Sullivan

- 1 - Mr. C. D. DeLoach
- 1 - Mr. W. C. Sullivan
- 1 - Liaison
- 1 - Mr. W. J. McDonnell

SUBJECT: RELATIONSHIPS WITH CIA  
U.S. INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS - EUROPE

#m DRIG  
DECLASSIFIED BY SP2 ALM/STB  
ON 1-11-01

Item #29 in the material submitted to the Director by SA Sam Papich in memorandum of 3/5/70, states that by Bureau letter dated 10/23/64 we provided the White House information received by our Legat from U.S. Ambassador to Luxembourg wherein the latter was critical of intelligence operations, particularly the overstaffing of personnel. SA Papich comments that we do not know if CIA became knowledgeable regarding this letter but could construe same as relating to its operations.

Our Legat, Paris, in a letter to the Director dated 10/19/64, set forth the results of a conversation with Ambassador William R. Rivkin at Luxembourg. The latter was assigned by the State Department to conduct a survey of the U.S. intelligence operations in six European countries, assisted by representatives of Defense, State Department, and Bureau of the Budget. Rivkin remarked that the results of the survey were appalling, there being 23,000 military personnel in the six countries engaged in intelligence operations and numerous CIA personnel. He described the lack of coordination between the military and CIA as "scandalous." He stated the Offices of the Military Attaches were grossly overstaffed and he was recommending drastic cuts and that duplicate administrative services be combined with those of the embassies. He made no mention of specific intelligence operations nor did he elaborate on the lack of coordination. Rivkin commented that on his return to the U.S., he intended to see the President personally to bring this matter forcefully to his attention.

Rivkin's comments were incorporated in a letter to William D. Moyers, Special Assistant to the President, dated 10/23/64, in accordance with the Director's noted instructions. Our files disclose no indication that CIA cognizant of Bureau letter.

RECOMMENDED ACTION: None. We do not believe, in light of the facts set forth, that CIA will make an issue of this matter.

WJM:bcw/mkl (5)  
*mkl*

~~SECRET~~  
*WJM*  
*g*  
*DJM*

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

- T. Len \_\_\_\_\_
- DeLoach \_\_\_\_\_
- Walters \_\_\_\_\_
- Mohr \_\_\_\_\_
- Bishop \_\_\_\_\_
- Casper \_\_\_\_\_
- Callahan \_\_\_\_\_
- Conrad \_\_\_\_\_
- Felt \_\_\_\_\_
- Gale \_\_\_\_\_
- Rosen \_\_\_\_\_
- Sullivan \_\_\_\_\_
- Tavel \_\_\_\_\_
- Soyars \_\_\_\_\_
- Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_
- Holmes \_\_\_\_\_
- Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

TO : Mr. C. D. DeLoach

~~SECRET~~

DATE: March 7, 1970

FROM : W. C. Sullivan

- 1 - Mr. DeLoach
- 1 - Mr. Sullivan
- 1 - Liaison
- 1 - Mr. Haynes

SUBJECT: RELATIONSHIPS WITH CIA  
THE PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE  
ADVISORY BOARD AND JOHN MC CONE

#mDR16  
DECLASSIFIED BY SP2ALM/JTG  
ON 1-11-01

Item number 30 in the material submitted to the Director by SA Sam Papich in his memorandum of March 5, 1970, discusses a dispute we had with CIA in May, 1963, as a result of a communication the Bureau sent to the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB). It was pointed out that in our communication to PFIAB we attributed certain information to McCone, then Director of CIA, concerning the matter of increasing wire taps on diplomatic establishments. McCone charged that the information attributed to him was not so because he had never made any such statement and he could prove it. The fact was that the information relating to McCone had been given us by one of his subordinates who had indicated the information originated with McCone. McCone maintained that we should have checked with him before going on record that any information had originated with him.

A review of the file in this matter discloses that in April, 1963, Mr. Belmont along with Papich had discussed with Richard Helms and James Angleton of CIA McCone's alleged position with the PFIAB; that he was in favor of across the board telephone taps on diplomatic establishments. The Bureau, of course, was opposed to this and advised Helms that we would request to make our position known before the board. At the conclusion of the meeting in April, 1963, Helms specifically asked what he should tell McCone and Mr. Belmont told him he should tell McCone exactly what had occurred at the meeting; that the Bureau was opposed to across the board wire taps and the Bureau intended to so advise PFIAB.

RECOMMENDED ACTION:

None. We do not believe, in light of the facts set forth, that CIA will make an issue of this matter.

RHH:wmk/sef  
(5)

*sef*  
*W*  
*W*  
*W*

~~SECRET~~

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

TO : Mr. C. D. DeLoach

FROM : Mr. W. C. Sullivan

SUBJECT: RELATIONSHIPS WITH CIA  
ALLEGED PENETRATIONS OF CIA

- 1 - Mr. C. D. DeLoach
- 1 - Mr. W. C. Sullivan
- 1 - Mr. D. J. Brennan

DATE: March 6, 1970

- 1 - Mr. W. A. Branigan
- 1 - Mr. L. Whitson

**SECRET**

- Tolson \_\_\_\_\_
- DeLoach \_\_\_\_\_
- Walters \_\_\_\_\_
- Mohr \_\_\_\_\_
- Bishop \_\_\_\_\_
- Casper \_\_\_\_\_
- Callahan \_\_\_\_\_
- Conrad \_\_\_\_\_
- Felt \_\_\_\_\_
- Gale \_\_\_\_\_
- Rosen \_\_\_\_\_
- Sullivan \_\_\_\_\_
- Tavel \_\_\_\_\_
- Soyars \_\_\_\_\_
- Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_
- Holmes \_\_\_\_\_
- Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

Item number 31, "alleged penetration of CIA," in the material submitted to the Director by SA Sam Papich in his memorandum of 3/5/70 discusses allegations made by Anatoliy Mikhailovich Golitzyn regarding recruitment of four CIA employees by the Soviet Committee for State Security (KGB), that CIA requested full investigation which we declined.

BACKGROUND OF CASE Golitzyn, an intelligence officer of the KGB who defected to CIA in 1961, alleged that the KGB had penetrated CIA through an individual having the code name "Sasha." In an effort to identify this penetration CIA provided Golitzyn with information regarding many individuals who had worked for CIA in Germany.

Golitzyn identified two individuals at various times as "Sasha" and in each instance investigation "washed out" the identification. Golitzyn finally identified "Sasha" as one Igor Orlov, a former employee of CIA. During the course of extensive document reviews Golitzyn became acquainted with background of various individuals who had worked in Germany at the time Orlov did. Golitzyn identified four present employees of CIA with unknown subjects who had come to his attention while he was active in the KGB.

PROBLEM WITH CIA CIA wanted the Bureau to undertake full-scale investigation of its four employees based solely on Golitzyn's allegations.

DISPOSAL OF PROBLEM WITH CIA By letter of February 26, 1965, CIA was informed there appeared to be no basis at that time for a full-scale investigation of these men by the FBI on the basis of allegations by Golitzyn. With regard to any investigation in the United States concerning two of the men, a conclusion would be made following completion of the investigation of Igor Orlov and interviews of Orlov and his wife. Based upon the investigation of Orlov and the interviews of Orlov and his wife, CIA was informed by letter of July 20, 1965, that nothing had been developed

62-80750

1 - 105-105608 (Golitzyn)

LW:as:bjpbje (7)

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Memorandum to Mr. C. D. DeLoach  
RE: RELATIONSHIPS WITH CIA  
ALLEGED PENETRATIONS OF CIA  
62-80750

**SECRET**

which supported Golitzyn's speculation that Orlov was instrumental in the recruitment by the Soviets of either Rafael Goldfarb or Andrew Hanfman and nothing was developed which would support Golitzyn's allegations against the other two suspects, Richard Kovich and David Murphy. Furthermore, CIA had furnished no documentary material regarding Kovich or Murphy which would in any way support Golitzyn. The Bureau added "Accordingly, this Bureau is conducting no investigation of Goldfarb, Hanfman, Kovich or Murphy. We will interpose no objection, since they are all employees of your agency, if you wish to pursue Anatoliy Golitzyn's allegations concerning them, including interviews of the individuals concerned.

"This Bureau would, of course, be interested in receiving the results of any investigation which would tend to confirm Golitzyn's conclusions that one or more of these employees of your agency had actually been recruited by the Soviets."

RECOMMENDED ACTION:

None. We do not believe, in light of the facts set forth, that CIA will make an issue of this matter.

*[Handwritten initials and signatures]*

*DJE*

**SECRET**

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

TO : Mr. C. D. DeLoach

FROM : W. C. Sullivan

SUBJECT: RELATIONSHIPS WITH  
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA)

VICE PRESIDENT NIXON'S TRIP TO  
SOUTH AMERICA - 1958

1 - Mr. C. D. DeLoach  
1 - Mr. W. C. Sullivan  
1 - Liaison

DATE: 3/7/70

1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall  
1 - Mr. F. X. O'Brien

Tolson	_____
DeLoach	_____
Walters	_____
Mohr	_____
Bishop	_____
Casper	_____
Callahan	_____
Conrad	_____
Felt	_____
Gale	_____
Rosen	_____
Sullivan	_____
Tavel	_____
Soyars	_____
Tele. Room	_____
Holmes	_____
Gandy	_____

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#MOR 16  
DECLASSIFIED BY SP 2 A-M/716  
ON 1-1-01

Item number 32 in material submitted to the Director by SA Sam J. Papich in his memorandum 3/5/70 mentions Bureau letter 5/16/58 sent to the then Vice President Nixon and containing a summary of CIA information concerning events in Latin America relating to Mr. Nixon's trip there during 5/58.

According to SA Papich, most of the information in above letter came from CIA. He commented that this letter could be interpreted as raising question concerning quality of CIA's coverage in Latin America. Papich noted it is not known if CIA ever became aware of the letter. Papich stated that General Robert Cushman, currently Deputy Director of CIA, was attached to the then Vice President Nixon's staff. SA Papich pointed out that CIA, if aware of above letter, could raise question as to violation of Third Agency Rule.

## Results of Review of Bureau Files

The letter to the then Vice President Nixon is located in Bureau file 62-88461-117. It contains summary of information relating to riots and attacks against Mr. Nixon and his party during their 5/58 Latin American trip. Letter identifies CIA as the

62-80750

FXO:dgo/sef (6)

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CONTINUED - OVER

Memorandum W.C. Sullivan to  
Mr. C. D. DeLoach  
Re: RELATIONSHIPS WITH  
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA)  
62-80750

~~SECRET~~

#MOR 16  
DECLASSIFIED BY SP-2 ALM/JTG  
ON 1-11-01

source of the information set forth in our letter. The last paragraph of this letter includes a statement that the impression gained from a review of CIA reports indicates that CIA had some coverage reflecting there were to be troubles concerning Mr. Nixon's Latin American travels. This letter also stated as follows:

"It is significant that information in the individual countries came to CIA's attention shortly before your arrival in a particular country. Therefore, there is a question as to whether or not CIA had coverage in communist organizations which would have led to the development of information concerning communist plans days or weeks ahead of your visit."

There is no indication in this file regarding instructions given to prepare our letter of May 16, 1958. The first paragraph of this letter indicates that the Director had a discussion with Mr. Nixon on May 16, 1958, inasmuch as the first sentence of the above letter reads as follows:

"Apropos of our discussion today, there is set forth information contained in Central Intelligence Agency reports received from them on May 14, 1958."

The data set forth in our May 16, 1958, letter to Mr. Nixon is contained in a memorandum Mr. R. R. Roach to Mr. A. H. Belmont dated May 15, 1958, which was prepared for the Director's information. The Director noted on this memorandum, "Send summary to A. G. H." In accordance with instructions, a letter was sent to the then Attorney General under date of May 16, 1958, and this letter contained a summary of CIA information in the same manner as had been sent to Mr. Nixon on May 16, 1958. Our letter to the Attorney General, however, did not contain any observations regarding CIA coverage in Latin American countries visited by Mr. Nixon and his party.

Our file in this matter (62-88461-150) indicates that on June 9, 1958, Colonel Robert Cushman in the office of the then Vice President Nixon contacted the Bureau at the request

- 2 -  
~~SECRET~~

Memorandum W. C. Sullivan to  
Mr. C. D. DeLoach  
Re: RELATIONSHIPS WITH  
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA)  
62-80750

~~SECRET~~

of Mr. Nixon to determine if the contents of a letter from the Director to Mr. Nixon dated May 16, 1958, regarding Mr. Nixon's trip to South America could be leaked to the press. Colonel Cushman's request was set forth in memorandum G. A. Nease to Mr. Tolson June 9, 1958, with the recommendation that Colonel Cushman be advised that if the information were to be given to the press, it would undoubtedly create a serious problem as the FBI would then have violated CIA's confidence since CIA was aware that SA Papich had reviewed CIA's classified reports and, therefore, this information should not be given to the press. Both Mr. Tolson and the Director agreed with the recommendation, and Colonel Cushman was advised of our decision. It is noted that Colonel Cushman is identical with the individual who is now Deputy Director of CIA.

Comments on Remarks in SA Papich Memo 3/5/70

1. That most of the information in our letter to Mr. Nixon dated May 16, 1958, came from CIA and that this letter could be interpreted as raising the question concerning the quality of CIA's coverage in Latin America.

There is no dispute as to the source of the information which was summarized in our letter to Mr. Nixon, and we clearly indicated in our letter that the source was CIA. With regard to any question being raised as to the quality of CIA's coverage in Latin America, we merely pointed out to Mr. Nixon something that was readily discernible to any reader of the CIA reports - - that is, that the information from CIA popped up rather suddenly as related to the country and Mr. Nixon's arrival. Certainly Mr. Nixon himself, since he was personally involved in demonstrations directed against him during his Latin American trip, must have been aware that advance information from our responsible intelligence agency (CIA) may have been lacking.

2. We are not aware if CIA became knowledgeable of our letter to Mr. Nixon dated May 16, 1958. Under ordinary conditions, we are not aware nor do we seek to identify any CIA

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Memorandum W. C. Sullivan to  
Mr. C. D. DeLoach  
RE: RELATIONSHIPS WITH  
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA)  
62-80750

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personnel who might be assigned to the White House staff. As indicated above, Colonel Cushman, who was a member of Mr. Nixon's staff in 1958 and who is now a Deputy Director of CIA, was aware of our 5/16/58 letter and its contents. We have no information that CIA ever registered any type of protest in this matter.

3. That CIA technically could raise a question as to violation of the Third Agency Rule as regards our 5/16/58 letter to Mr. Nixon.

The Third Agency Rule is intended to prohibit a Government agency from disseminating information originating with another Government agency in the absence of specific authority to do so, and we follow this rule unless there are overriding reasons. With regard to our letter to Mr. Nixon dated 5/16/58, we set forth information clearly identified as having originated with CIA. This letter was apparently prepared at the specific request of then Vice President Nixon after conferring with the Director.

RECOMMENDED ACTION:

None. We do not believe, in light of the facts set forth, that CIA will make an issue of this matter.

~~SECRET~~

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

- 1 - Mr. C. D. DeLoach
- 1 - Mr. W. C. Sullivan

- Tolson \_\_\_\_\_
- DeLoach \_\_\_\_\_
- Walters \_\_\_\_\_
- Mohr \_\_\_\_\_
- Bishop \_\_\_\_\_
- Casper \_\_\_\_\_
- Callahan \_\_\_\_\_
- Conrad \_\_\_\_\_
- Felt \_\_\_\_\_
- Gale \_\_\_\_\_
- Rosen \_\_\_\_\_
- Sullivan \_\_\_\_\_
- Tavel \_\_\_\_\_
- Soyars \_\_\_\_\_
- Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_
- Holmes \_\_\_\_\_
- Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

TO : Mr. C. D. DeLoach

**SECRET**

DATE: 3/6/70

FROM : W. C. Sullivan

- 1 - Mr. A. Rosen
- 1 - Mr. J. H. Gale
- 1 - Mr. D. J. Brennan
- 1 - Mr. J. G. Deegan

SUBJECT: RELATIONSHIPS WITH CIA  
HERBERT ITKIN

Item number 33 in the material submitted to the Director by Special Agent (SA) Sam J. Papich in his memorandum 3/5/70 discusses Herbert Itkin as an individual who was operated as a criminal informant by the Bureau who furnished valuable information and who has been a key witness in the prosecution of cases being handled by the Bureau. Mr. Papich states that the Bureau acquired access to Itkin through the CIA and that although the CIA has never officially made any statements to the Bureau, it has been bitterly disappointed that the Bureau never acknowledged CIA's assistance which the agency considered extremely valuable.

Memorandum dated 2/20/63 from W. C. Sullivan to Mr. Belmont captioned "James Hoffa" set out that James Angleton of CIA advised SA Papich that CIA had briefed the Attorney General concerning a source whom Mr. Angleton had used since World War II and who subsequently has developed a close association with a lawyer who does considerable work for the Teamsters Unions. Angleton's source was confident that the lawyer could be developed as a penetration which could "sink" Hoffa and all of his cohorts. The Attorney General agreed with the CIA representatives that the matter should be referred to the Bureau for handling.

Mr. Angleton set up the first contact with the individual who had the contact with the attorney and at that time Angleton stated that he did not want to get involved in any investigative aspects and wanted to step out of the matter as soon as possible. As a result, eventual contact was made with Herbert Itkin who developed into a very productive source. Itkin has been publicly identified as both a source of the FBI and CIA as a result of his testimony.

JGD:rmm (7)

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Memorandum to Mr. C. D. DeLoach  
RE: RELATIONSHIPS WITH CIA  
HERBERT ITKIN

**SECRET**

The Bureau's success in handling Itkin can be attributed to the know-how of the SAs of the New York Office because Itkin is a highly emotional individual and he had aggravated marital problems, severe pressures from his many business associates; therefore, it took a high degree of skill in dealing with this source in order to achieve the success that we did.

While it is acknowledged that CIA put us originally in touch with this source, it was not believed that it is essential that we go back to CIA and explain to them our success or to thank them for giving us this original lead. It is also noted that there is an obligation upon Government agencies to cooperate in the fullest and CIA's cooperation in this matter was in accordance with the long standing policy among all Government agencies.

Review of Itkin's file does not reflect any instance where CIA indicated a displeasure in the Bureau not acknowledging CIA's assistance in placing us in touch with Itkin. This is in line with Mr. Angleton's statement in 1963 that he did not want to get involved in any investigative aspects of this matter and wanted to step out as soon as possible. In view of the above, it is not believed that CIA would have any basis to complain that the Bureau never acknowledged CIA's assistance.

RECOMMENDED ACTION:

None. We do not believe, in light of the facts set forth, that CIA will make an issue of this matter.

*[Handwritten signatures and initials]*

**SECRET**

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

**SECRET**

TO : Mr. C. D. DeLoach

FROM : W. C. Sullivan

SUBJECT: RELATIONSHIPS WITH CIA  
EXCHANGE OF TECHNICAL INFORMATION

- 1 - Mr. C. D. DeLoach
- 1 - Mr. J. P. Mohr
- 1 - Mr. I. W. Conrad

DATE: March 7, 1970

- 1 - Mr. W. C. Sullivan
- 1 - Liaison
- 1 - Mr. F. J. Cassidy

- Tolson \_\_\_\_\_
- DeLoach \_\_\_\_\_
- Walter \_\_\_\_\_
- Mohr \_\_\_\_\_
- Bishop \_\_\_\_\_
- Casper \_\_\_\_\_
- Callahan \_\_\_\_\_
- Conrad \_\_\_\_\_
- Felt \_\_\_\_\_
- Gale \_\_\_\_\_
- Rosen \_\_\_\_\_
- Sullivan \_\_\_\_\_
- Tavel \_\_\_\_\_
- Soyars \_\_\_\_\_
- Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_
- Holmes \_\_\_\_\_
- Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

Item number 34 in the material submitted to the Director by SA Sam Papich in his memorandum 3/5/70 concerns exchange of technical information with CIA, particularly as it related to the technical surveillance field. Papich states CIA exhibited its equipment to us, but for many years we declined to show any of our devices, with some exceptions. He states that CIA never made an official protest but informally indicated from time to time that the lack of exchange was prejudicial to overall intelligence and internal security interests and implied we were more open with the British in this area than with CIA. Papich states this situation does not exist today as there is a good exchange by the Bureau and CIA.

Our files reveal that through the years CIA has furnished the Bureau a number of technical devices for our use or inspection. They have also furnished technical manuals obtained abroad and briefed us on operational and technical aspects of some of their operations abroad. Laboratory personnel have been afforded tours and briefings concerning CIA facilities and equipment and in two instances Bureau personnel have been afforded training at CIA schools. As recently as October, 1969, CIA afforded a briefing to Bureau personnel concerning a Clandestine Transmitter Activator, developed by their technical people and offered to loan us one of these units as well as afford our personnel training in the operation of the equipment.

## COMMENTS OF THE LABORATORY

Similarly, Bureau records show substantial reciprocity on the part of the FBI in developing and furnishing important technical information to CIA over a period of many years. Representative examples are cited below:

Prior to 1955 an important unsolved technical intelligence problem involved desired access to enemy intelligence and other security information

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Memorandum for Mr. DeLoach  
RE: RELATIONSHIPS WITH CIA  
EXCHANGE OF TECHNICAL INFORMATION

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protected by combination-type locks (safe doors, and the like). Scientists in the FBI Laboratory were able to solve this problem by using X-rays from radioactive materials to "see" into the interior of a combination lock and thus recover the combination, without trace of tampering or other indication that the lock had been compromised. This was a scientific breakthrough of tremendous intelligence potential and, with Bureau approval, our results and techniques were made known to the appropriate CIA representatives. CIA advised that they had theretofore spent thousands of dollars in an intensive, but unsuccessful effort to solve the same problem. The impact of this scientific discovery in permitting access to previously unavailable intelligence had tremendous value for both the FBI and CIA.

In approximately the late 50's and early 60's, both CIA and FBI encountered a new, highly sophisticated type of secret writing placed into use by the Russians for communicating with espionage agents. In spite of a massive technical effort mounted by CIA, scientists of the FBI Laboratory were successful in first unraveling the basic principles and techniques underlying this new Russian system. This important breakthrough thus permitted for the first time a successful attack against the new Russian secret ink communication system. Because of its extreme intelligence potential, with prior Bureau approval, this development was made known to CIA, and its importance to CIA is reflected in part by a letter addressed to the Director of FBI by Allen W. Dulles, then Director of CIA, under date of August 19, 1961, in which Dulles said, in part, "For the past several years there has been increasingly effective technical liaison between the Technical Services Division of this Agency and corresponding components of your Bureau. . ." Dulles further commented that Bureau technical personnel had " . . . made an outstanding technical contribution for which they are to be highly commended. Their work not only has an important impact in one sensitive area, but also has revealed a chemical mechanism from which may well stem new high-level secret writing systems. The discovery will have an

- 2 -

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**SECRET**

Memorandum for Mr. DeLoach  
RE: RELATIONSHIPS WITH CIA  
EXCHANGE OF TECHNICAL INFORMATION

**SECRET**

important influence on the discharge of responsibilities assigned both to this Agency and the FBI. I consider access to these findings to be further evidence of the value of close technical liaison between our two organizations. . ."

Subsequently, again with prior Bureau approval, whenever it could be done without jeopardizing FBI operational interests, the FBI on a continuing basis made available to CIA actual Soviet secret writing chemicals and methods of development which had come into the possession of the Bureau through investigative activity and through high-level informants. A recent example involved the Russian espionage case of Herbert William Boeckenhaupt wherein on 2/12/69 a sample of secret writing material used by Boeckenhaupt to communicate with the Russians was furnished to CIA by a representative of the FBI Laboratory.

The above items are representative outstanding examples of FBI cooperation in developing and sharing highly important technical information, and certainly the letter from CIA reflects the satisfaction and importance which CIA attached to such information received from the Bureau. Within general Bureau policy guidelines, there were, of course, on a continuing basis numerous other items of technical information shared with CIA over the years, including briefings and exchange of visits.

RECOMMENDED ACTION:

None. We do not believe, in light of the facts set forth, that CIA will make an issue of this matter.

*JK*

*[Signature]*

*V*

*Wes*

*K*

**SECRET**

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

- 1 - Mr. C. D. DeLoach
- 1 - Mr. J. P. Mohr
- 1 - Mr. J. J. Casper
- 1 - Mr. W. C. Sullivan

- Tolson \_\_\_\_\_
- DeLoach \_\_\_\_\_
- Walters \_\_\_\_\_
- Mohr \_\_\_\_\_
- Bishop \_\_\_\_\_
- Casper \_\_\_\_\_
- Callahan \_\_\_\_\_
- Conrad \_\_\_\_\_
- Felt \_\_\_\_\_
- Gale \_\_\_\_\_
- Rosen \_\_\_\_\_
- Sullivan \_\_\_\_\_
- Tavel \_\_\_\_\_
- Soyars \_\_\_\_\_
- Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_
- Holmes \_\_\_\_\_
- Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

TO : Mr. C. D. DeLoach

~~SECRET~~

DATE: March 6, 1970

FROM : Mr. W. C. Sullivan

- 1 - Mr. D. J. Brennan
- 1 - Mr. W. H. Atkinson

SUBJECT: RELATIONSHIPS WITH CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA)  
CIA LECTURERS AT BUREAU TRAINING SCHOOLS  
EXCHANGE IN THE TRAINING FIELD

#MVR16  
DECLASSIFIED BY SP-2 ALM/JTG  
ON 1-11-01

Items number 35 and 36 in the material submitted to the Director by SA Sam Papich in his memorandum March 5, 1970, indicated CIA has never understood why Bureau will not permit CIA personnel to lecture at our schools and CIA was unhappy regarding our attitude concerning exchange of information in the training field.

CIA by letter May 19, 1950, requested it be permitted to discuss training problems with FBI training staff in view of necessity of its maintaining relations with foreign police and security agencies. Following recommendations by the Executives Conference, Bureau advised CIA by letter May 25, 1950, that we did not believe FBI training staff could intelligently discuss training methods with CIA since our staff was not knowledgeable concerning conditions encountered by CIA in various foreign countries.

Since 1962, we have taken foreign police officers into the National Academy through the Agency for International Development (AID). These officers spent two weeks of orientation with AID and after graduation certain selective officers have been in touch with CIA through AID. We are aware that CIA has used many of these graduates as sources of information.

In 1966, the Director approved a request of CIA to have one of its men attend the National Academy for purpose "to improve capabilities of CIA personnel engaged in overseas police training programs." As a result, a CIA Security Officer graduated from the 77th Session of the FBI National Academy (March 7 - May 25, 1966).

At the specific request of CIA, Bureau representatives have addressed CIA intelligence personnel attending refresher-type training courses on 31 occasions between June, 1962, and December, 1969.

WHA:mbm  
(7)  
*mbm*

CONTINUED - OVER

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Memorandum to Mr. C. D. DeLoach

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We loaned CIA four Bureau training films in February, 1966, one was eventually returned, but CIA continues to utilize the other three films entitled "On The Record," "Interviews," and "Burglary Investigations." We continue to use foreign language films from CIA which were loaned to us as a supplement to the Bureau's Language Training Program.

Representatives of CIA have not lectured at Bureau training schools and there is no indication in Bureau files that this has been advocated by CIA.

This memorandum has been coordinated with the Training Division.

RECOMMENDED ACTION:

None. We do not believe, in light of the facts set forth, that CIA will make an issue of this matter.

*[Handwritten initials and signatures]*

~~SECRET~~

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

TO : Mr. C. D. DeLoach

**SECRET**

DATE: 3/6/70

FROM : Mr. W. C. Sullivan

- 1 - Mr. C. D. DeLoach
- 1 - Mr. W. C. Sullivan
- 1 - Mr. W. A. Branigan
- 1 - Liaison
- 1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
- 1 - Mr. L. M. Linton
- 1 - Mr. E. R. Harrell

- Tolson \_\_\_\_\_
- DeLoach \_\_\_\_\_
- Mohr \_\_\_\_\_
- Bishop \_\_\_\_\_
- Casper \_\_\_\_\_
- Callahan \_\_\_\_\_
- Conrad \_\_\_\_\_
- Felt \_\_\_\_\_
- Gale \_\_\_\_\_
- Rosen \_\_\_\_\_
- Sullivan \_\_\_\_\_
- Tavel \_\_\_\_\_
- Soyars \_\_\_\_\_
- Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_
- Holmes \_\_\_\_\_
- Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

SUBJECT: RELATIONSHIPS WITH  
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
(POSITIVE INTELLIGENCE)

#MOE16 1-11-01  
CLASSIFIED BY SP-2 ALM/JTG  
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X16

Item Number 37 in the material submitted to the Director by Special Agent Sam Papich in his memorandum 3/5/70 discusses CIA criticism which could generate from Agency belief that Bureau has failed to cooperate and offer necessary assistance in collection of positive intelligence in the United States. Memorandum is to deal with specific cases believed by Papich to evidence lack of cooperation and to briefly comment on policy of cooperation we have adopted with CIA.

SYNOPSIS:

Mentioned Item by Papich points out CIA belief that more aggressive action should have been taken in field of collecting positive intelligence in the United States. Papich notes Bureau's action in this field, for the most part, has been restricted to compliance with requests by State Department when political crises occur in some country. He points out CIA belief that acquiring needed data would mean increased technical surveillance coverage, development of informants and collection of cryptographic material. Papich cites two specific cases occurring in 1969 where Bureau declined CIA's request for technical coverage, suggesting to Agency that it make its request directly to the Attorney General. Review of specific cases mentioned set forth with Director's comments relative thereto being noted. Our policy of cooperation with CIA most recently delineated to field by SAC Letter 66-10 (B) - copy attached. SAC letter calls for guarding our jurisdiction but shows our willingness to cooperate with CIA.

Enclosure

ERH:bjp  
(7)

OBSERVATIONS AND ACTION - OVER

**SECRET**

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

Memorandum to Mr. C. D. DeLoach  
RE: RELATIONSHIPS WITH  
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

**SECRET**

CIA has repeatedly raised the issue in the past of our coverage in the positive intelligence collection area and we can reasonably expect similar issues to be raised in the future.

RECOMMENDED ACTION:

That we prepare a carefully worded letter to CIA outlining policy and the basic elements of intelligence and counterintelligence work affecting the United States and forthrightly ask CIA if it is satisfied with the status quo and if not what do they have to suggest as changes.

*Our position is strong  
enough to try such an  
exchange*

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**SECRET**

Memorandum to Mr. C. D. DeLoach  
RE: RELATIONSHIPS WITH  
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

DETAILS:

**SECRET**

Papich points out CIA feels there is unexplored field for acquiring positive intelligence in the United States but he notes that there has been no law, directive, or executive order which fixes responsibility for clandestine collection of such information. He notes we investigate subversives, spies, and develop penetrations of foreign intelligence services and that facets of these investigations of violations of United States laws serve to fulfill a counterintelligence objective referred to by us as investigations of internal security matters. Papich notes, however, that most of our work in the positive intelligence field has been restricted to the compliance with requests by State Department prompted usually by a political crisis occurring in some foreign country.

Papich points out CIA feels there is unexplored field for acquiring positive intelligence requiring use of vastly increased technical surveillances, informant development and collection of cryptographic material. According to Papich, CIA does not feel Bureau has moved aggressively in this area and CIA has been thwarted in attempts to do much about the problem. Papich cites two cases (Alfred S. Gonsalves] 10/69 and (s) [Zalman Shapiro] 10/69) where CIA requests for technical surveillance were declined by us with the suggestion to CIA that these matters should be taken up by that Agency directly with the Attorney General. (s)

Specific Cases

CIA advised that (s) [Alfred S. Gonsalves, Deputy Permanent Representative of the Indian United Nations Delegation] had been (s) under development by [a Soviet] intelligence service partly as a result of his weakness for women when assigned in [Moscow] (s) from [1957 to 1961] (s) [Gonsalves] was to participate, in bilateral talks with United States officials in [October, 1969] (s) By letter (s) [9/26/69] CIA requested telephone and microphone surveillances on (s) [Gonsalves.] The Director commented "Let CIA seek the authority of the AG. I don't want them utilizing FBI as their channel." (s)

(s) [Zalman M. Shapiro] was originally investigated by us in [1965] as a possible unregistered agent of the [Israeli] Government due to negotiations by him with [Israeli officials] designed to set up a semiprivate nuclear processing company in [Israel]. (s) (s)

**SECRET**

Memorandum to Mr. C. D. DeLoach  
RE: RELATIONSHIPS WITH  
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

**SECRET**

Our investigation showed close contact by [Shapiro] with [Israeli] officials, [strong pro-Israel sentiments by Shapiro] and details of activity by that subject to create the firm mentioned. (S)  
(S) [Shapiro] headed a [Pittsburgh] firm involved in Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) work requiring "Top Secret" clearance by AEC. Our initial investigation was closed when Assistant Attorney General - Internal Security Division found that facts did not justify soliciting [Shapiro's] registration as a foreign agent. (S)

(S) In Spring of 1965, sixty-one kilograms of nuclear material were found to be unaccounted for by the firm headed by [Shapiro], but subsequent inventories and checking by AEC revealed this shortage was probably the result of cumulative process of wasteful production methods over a period of eight years and did not justify an unqualified determination of a diversion of nuclear material on the part of [Shapiro] to unauthorized persons or government. (S)

CIA, in 1968, became alarmed on receipt of information of loss of mentioned nuclear material and despite AEC findings felt it may indicate illegal diversion or at least justification for reopening investigation. Richard Helms of CIA contacted the Attorney General directly with his thoughts regarding the need for additional investigation. Attorney General contacted Bureau requesting it discuss matter with CIA and determine advisability of additional investigation. The Director, in approving conference with CIA, noted "OK but I doubt advisability of getting into this. It looks like Helms is going around us to AG as he suspects we would say no."

(S) An intensive investigation of [Shapiro] conducted during late [1968] and into Fall of [1969] revealed no positive intelligence activity on his part or verifiable diversion of AEC material to [Israel]. Our investigation included technical surveillances installed 9/27/68 and discontinued 9/4/69. [Shapiro] was interviewed by AEC 8/14/69 and disclaimed passing any classified data to [Israeli Government]. Facts of case were reviewed by Department of Justice which found no evidence of prosecutable violation by [Shapiro]. AEC felt the additional investigation produced no data upon which could be based a legitimate withdrawal of clearance for AEC contracts or information. In view of this, we closed our investigation and CIA was so advised. A 10/13/69 letter from Helms acknowledged additional investigation. (S)

**SECRET**



Mémorandum to Mr. C. D. DeLoach  
RE: RELATIONSHIPS WITH  
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

**SECRET**

(S) would produce no legal evidence pertinent to the issue which prompted CIA's original request but noted he felt reinstated audio surveillances of (Shapiro) would produce positive intelligence information. He therefore requested reinstatement of this coverage. The Director's letter to Helms 10/17/69 noted that after careful review it was felt that CIA should take this matter to the Attorney General.

On October 21, 1969, a CIA official was told by Special Agent Papich that in the future CIA should transmit its requests for technical surveillance coverage in the United States to the Attorney General. This specifically covered the cases of (Gonsalves and Shapiro) (S) The Director commented "Right."

#### Bureau Policy of Cooperation

In 1965 and 1966, recognizing overlapping interests, changes inherent in faster communication, hysteria to facilitate international travel and in response to requests from CIA, the Director approved Bureau attendance at conferences with CIA regarding that Agency's operational activities in the United States. On a memorandum reporting the results of the conferences with CIA, the Director commented "I hope we still don't let our guard down as CIA has always outsmarted us because of our gullibility."

SAC Letter 66-10 (B) dated 2/15/66 furnished to the field and Bureau officials results of the conferences with CIA and emphasized necessity for protecting Bureau jurisdiction in the counterintelligence field. This SAC letter (copy attached) emphasized there is to be no interference with or infringement upon our jurisdiction but clearly shows our willingness to cooperate with CIA in developing positive intelligence in the United States. In approving this SAC letter, the Director noted "I hope there is no 'sneaker' in this. Time will tell."

There has been no renewed request from CIA for technical coverage in the cases mentioned above, nor has there been any indication that such requests have been sent by CIA to the Attorney General as we suggested. Due to CIA interest in the past in these matters, we cannot rule out the possibility the Agency may approach Attorney General for the desired coverage at some time in the future.

**SECRET**

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(B) CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY - OPERATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES -- The Bureau recently completed discussions with the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) regarding that agency's operational activities in the United States. These discussions essentially dealt with CIA's assessment and recruitment of foreign intelligence sources in the United States. Enclosed for your use is a list of the ground rules which both agencies have accepted as guidelines for effecting the necessary coordination. In order that you may be adequately oriented in this matter, the following background is set forth. The need for the ground rules is related to CIA's interest in developing positive intelligence sources in the United States and the necessity for protecting the Bureau's jurisdiction in the counterintelligence field. The latter is essential to the adequate discharge of our responsibilities to national security.

Positive intelligence may be described as a comprehensive product resulting from collection, evaluation, collation, analysis, and interpretation of all available information relating to national security and concerning other countries where such information is significant to our Government's development and execution of plans, policies, and courses of action. Such intelligence can be divided into various categories, such as economic, military, scientific, political, geographic, et cetera. The collection of positive intelligence is distinguished from counterintelligence which is primarily designed to penetrate, monitor, neutralize and/or disrupt the foreign intelligence and security services. Counterintelligence further includes other functions of an internal security nature directed against subversive groups, organizations, and individuals. By law CIA does not have any law enforcement or internal security functions. CIA's authorization for collecting positive intelligence is predicated on the National Security Act of 1947 and subsequent issuance of National Security Council Directives. There is no law, directive, or charter which authorizes CIA to engage in the clandestine development of positive intelligence sources in the United States. Therefore, in the absence of any statutory prerogative to conduct such activity in the United States, it has been mutually agreed by FBI and CIA that the Agency can only engage in the clandestine development and handling of positive intelligence sources in this country by coordinating with the Bureau. The Bureau in turn legally has the primary counterintelligence responsibility in the U. S. and is continually developing positive intelligence. It, however, must be regarded an incidental product to our main objective. The Bureau does not have a primary responsibility to collect positive intelligence, but we do have numerous and very significant obligations in this field. In actual practice the Bureau is required by the President and other agencies to develop information

2-15-66

SAC LETTER 66-10

- 2 -

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of a positive intelligence nature. This requires Bureau action designed to bring about the necessary coverage. A good example is our involvement in the development of information relating to the crisis in the Dominican Republic. From the above you will recognize that there can be "gray areas" of interest to the Bureau and CIA. It, therefore, has been necessary to effect adequate coordinating machinery.

The potential for the development of positive intelligence in this country is vast and varied. Voluminous positive intelligence is collected overtly through the review of foreign and domestic publications, interviews of travelers, arriving aliens, contacts with scientists, et cetera. In this area there have been no serious issues between the Bureau and CIA.

However, in the field of clandestine development of positive intelligence both agencies have an interest, and there is a necessity for a clear-cut understanding of jurisdiction and coordination. Particularly is this true in the development of positive intelligence sources who are employees or officials of foreign governments stationed in the United States or who are visiting this country on a temporary basis.

For many years the Bureau has had a continuing program of developing sources in diplomatic installations for the purpose of discharging our counterintelligence responsibilities and incidentally for developing positive intelligence information which might assist the Government in formulating policy. The Bureau, recognizing CIA's need for sources in the positive intelligence field, has permitted CIA to assess and recruit sources in the United States in a limited manner with the understanding that such activities are fully coordinated with the Bureau. In January, 1964, CIA established their Domestic Operations Division (DOD) to conduct such operations in the United States, and certain Bureau field offices were alerted and furnished the necessary guidance and instructions. The recent discussions with CIA resulted in a refinement of the understanding of the ground rules established in January, 1964.

The enclosed ground rules will be applied by the Bureau and CIA as cases arise. The Bureau position in each matter will be decided at the Seat of Government. As a general rule, Bureau Headquarters will be informed by CIA regarding its interest in an individual or a target. Prior to notification of CIA regarding our position, the situation will be carefully reviewed at the Seat of Government. This may often include a request to the field for

2-15-66

SAC LETTER 66-10

- 3 -

~~SECRET~~

observations and recommendations before notice is transmitted to CIA. At the same time, it is possible that you may be contacted in the field by a representative of DOD, CIA. If so, you should be guided by the enclosed ground rules in any discussions, bearing in mind that the approval for any particular operational activity is to be made at Bureau Headquarters.

You should hold to the concept that the protection of the internal security of the United States involves very basic clear-cut responsibilities of the FBI. This should be kept in mind in each case and in any contacts which you may have with CIA representatives. There is to be no interference with or infringement upon our jurisdiction. It is recognized that unforeseen developments may create situations not adequately covered by the ground rules. You, therefore, should report such matters to the Bureau setting forth complete details with your recommendations. Although we have been informed by CIA that the Bureau's jurisdiction and operational interests will not be interfered with, we cannot discount the results of past experiences stemming from CIA's operational and organizational deficiencies. We have no reason to believe that there will be a revolutionary change of these conditions. It is, therefore, incumbent upon you to be extremely alert for any breakdown of the adherence to the ground rules. I emphasize that this is an area of activity which must be closely monitored by each Special Agent in Charge. You should be certain that your personnel is adequately oriented so that the Bureau can have the full benefit of any constructive suggestions pertaining to this entire matter.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director

Enclosure for (B)

2-15-66  
SAC LETTER 66-10

- 4 -

**SECRET**



SECRET

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535

In Reply, Please Refer to  
File No.

February 7, 1966

SECRET

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
OPERATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES

(1) CIA will not initiate an investigation of any foreign official in the United States without the concurrence and coordination of the FBI. In this context, the term "investigation" means systematic and direct inquiries or procedures (such as physical or technical surveillances or neighborhood inquiries) aiming at developing information concerning an individual's activities or background; "investigation" does not include the acceptance or the development of information through social contacts or contacts normally made by CIA agents in discharging their cover functions. (S)

(2) CIA will seek concurrence and coordination of the FBI before approaching for recruitment any foreign official or communist-bloc visitor in the United States. The FBI will concur and coordinate if the proposed action does not conflict with any operation, current or planned, including active investigation of the FBI. (S)

(3) CIA will advise the FBI prior to any planned meeting between a CIA asset and a foreign official or communist-bloc visitor of known or presumed interest to the FBI (this would include all communist-bloc officials and visitors) for purposes of assessment and social development. (S)

(4) Clandestine CIA staff operatives, domestic American agents of CIA, and foreign agents of CIA recruited abroad who come to the United States will be identified to the FBI by name or appropriate description depending on the national security interest involved. (S)

(5) Pursuant to paragraph 4 above, when a CIA agent arrives in the United States for a visit or for an (S)

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~~GROUP 1  
Excluded from automatic  
downgrading and  
declassification~~

SECRET

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

1-17-01 #moe/6  
CLASSIFIED BY SP2AM/MLT/6  
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X1

SECRET

Central Intelligence Agency  
Operations in the United States

assignment, the Bureau will be advised and the two agencies will confer regarding the handling of the agent in the United States. It is recognized that each case will have its individual peculiarities. The governing principle will be positive intelligence interest as weighed against internal security factors. CIA will continue its contractual relationship for the purpose of handling the training, the procurement of positive foreign intelligence, the fulfillment of CIA commitments to the agent, and the preparation of the agent for his next assignment abroad. (S)

(6) In those cases where CIA will be handling its agent in the United States, CIA will service FBI security or counterintelligence requirements and will provide the FBI all agent information bearing on counterintelligence or internal security matters, including the scope and nature of the agent's access to information and the identities of the agent's significant contacts, particularly in the communist-bloc field. In such cases where CIA servicing has been inadequate to FBI internal security interests, the FBI will have direct access to the agent. (S)

- 2 -

SECRET

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

TO : Mr. C. D. DeLoach

FROM : W. C. Sullivan

SUBJECT: RELATIONSHIPS WITH CIA  
MISCELLANEOUS ITEMS

- 1 - Mr. DeLoach
- 1 - Mr. Sullivan
- 1 - Liaison

DATE: 3/7/70

- 1 - Mr. Gray
- 1 - Mr. Hengemuhle

- Tolson \_\_\_\_\_
- DeLoach \_\_\_\_\_
- Walters \_\_\_\_\_
- Mohr \_\_\_\_\_
- Bishop \_\_\_\_\_
- Casper \_\_\_\_\_
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- Tavel \_\_\_\_\_
- Soyars \_\_\_\_\_
- Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_
- Holmes \_\_\_\_\_
- Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

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~~SECRET~~

#MCR16  
DECLASSIFIED BY SP2ALM/MS  
ON 1-11-01

Item Number 38 in the material submitted to the Director by SA Sam Papich in his memorandum of 3/5/70 serves as a sort of summary in which SA Papich indicates that he cannot recall the names of other cases which resulted in CIA displeasure or criticism, but does cite one instance "early in the 1950's" in which we disseminated data from a source of unknown reliability charging Allen Dulles as having been a communist and a spy while in Europe.

By letter 3/22/52, we informed State and CIA that a source of unknown reliability had alleged that the brother of John Foster Dulles had been arrested in Hungary in 1947 or 1948 and forced to write a letter to his wife which brought her to Hungary where she was also arrested. We asked for an evaluation of the information. Mr. D. M. Ladd memorandum, 4/5/52, states he received a call from Allen Dulles during which Dulles referred to the letter and said he was not concerned about it but wanted Ladd to look it over. We were subsequently informed by CIA that Allen Dulles (the only brother of John Foster Dulles and then CIA Deputy Director) had said that the information concerning Dulles and his wife was without foundation and we promptly told State of this by letter 4/15/52, a copy of which was directed to Allen Dulles. Mr. Keay's memorandum 5/10/52 written by SA Papich reports his discussion with Dulles concerning this matter. Mr. Dulles asked if the original letter could be withdrawn and was told that it appeared that the FBI had already set the records straight but that if he wished to make an official request, Papich would refer the matter to the Bureau for consideration. Dulles immediately replied that he definitely did not want to make "a big thing" of the letter, that it was not that important, and that maybe it would be better to drop the matter. General Smith (then Director of Central Intelligence) later told Papich that he considered the matter closed.

SA Papich also alludes to other instances in which CIA alleged that we had mishandled its information. He has no specifics, however, and states he cannot recall the cases.

JFH:bsf *bsf*  
(6)

ACTION - Page 2

~~SECRET~~

Memorandum to Mr. C. D. DeLoach  
RE: RELATIONSHIPS WITH CIA

~~SECRET~~

RECOMMENDED ACTION:

None. We do not believe, in light of the facts set forth, that CIA will make an issue of this matter.

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DJR

~~SECRET~~



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- 1 - Mr. DeLoach
- 1 - Mr. Sullivan
- 1 - Mr. J.A. Sizoo
- 1 - Mr. D.E. Moore

March 11, 1970

BY COURIER SERVICE

- 1 - Mr. D. J. Brennan

ST-105

REC-47, 67-80750-4781

Honorable Richard Helms  
 Director  
 Central Intelligence Agency  
 Washington, D. C.

MPR16 5668 SLD/GCL  
 DECLASSIFIED BY SP-1/ML/MLL  
 ON 9/29/98  
 4/2/98 (JFK)

Dear Mr. Helms:

As I am sure you will agree, the need for close coordination of the intelligence-gathering and counter-intelligence efforts of the FBI and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) is self-evident. This matter is one which requires a continuing analysis to assure that both agencies have established working agreements whereby we can most effectively realize positive results with a minimum of duplication, misplaced effort, and jurisdictional problems.

During January, 1966, representatives of this Bureau met with officials of the CIA to consider coordination of our mutual efforts in the collection of positive intelligence in the United States. As a result of these conferences, a set of ground rules was drawn up and agreed to by both agencies. A copy of this agreement was transmitted in my letter of February 7, 1966, to then CIA Director Vice Admiral William F. Raborn, Jr. A copy of the agreement is enclosed for your information. This agreement has proven generally effective and no major problems have been encountered since its adoption in the areas it covers. ✓

MAILED 8  
 MAR 11 1970  
 COMM-FBI

*Rep*

- Tolson \_\_\_\_\_
- DeLoach \_\_\_\_\_
- Walters *Walters*
- Mohr \_\_\_\_\_
- Bishop \_\_\_\_\_
- Casper \_\_\_\_\_
- Callahan \_\_\_\_\_
- Conrad \_\_\_\_\_
- Felt \_\_\_\_\_
- Gale \_\_\_\_\_
- Rosen \_\_\_\_\_
- Sullivan \_\_\_\_\_
- Tavel \_\_\_\_\_
- Soyars \_\_\_\_\_
- Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_
- Holmes \_\_\_\_\_

The FBI has primary responsibility with regard to matters involving the internal security of the United States as well as for conducting counterintelligence operations in

WCS:mea  
 (7) *mea*  
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Group 1

Excluded from automatic  
 downgrading and  
 declassification

see note, page 2

*WCS*

~~SECRET~~

Honorable Richard Helms

this country. While this Bureau does not have any statutory responsibilities with regard to the collection of foreign intelligence, I have always recognized that the potential for the development of such intelligence in this country is considerable. The FBI has, in fact, made a concerted effort to obtain positive intelligence of value to other U. S. intelligence agencies, including the CIA, and policy-making officials of the Government. While these efforts have, of course, been incidental to our main internal security and counterintelligence responsibilities, we have on a selective basis developed sources, both live and technical, providing coverage at key foreign establishments in the United States. The product of this coverage has been furnished on a regular basis to the CIA and other interested agencies and officials of the Government.

I know that you will share my belief that this matter requires a periodic reexamination to assure that the national security interests continue to be served in the most effective and complete manner possible. After reviewing this matter, including the attached 1966 agreement, I would welcome any observations you may desire to make.

Sincerely yours,

J. Edgar Hoover

Enclosure

NOTE:

See memo W. C. Sullivan to DeLoach 3/11/70 re "Relationships with CIA," prepared by WCS:mea.

Classified "~~Secret~~" since disclosure would seriously damage the internal security interests.

~~SECRET~~

185-1004

INSTRUCTIONS

- Type or print clearly in ink.
- Indicate classification of the abstract top and bottom.
- Date the abstract and put on any internal control numbers required.
- "FROM" entry should clearly identify the organization providing the information.
- If additions (as when a copy of document sent to SSC is later sent to HSC) or changes to a previously submitted form are necessary, submit a copy of the original abstract, with the change indicated.

SPECIFIC ITEM NO. 8. SUMMARY - enter brief narrative statement describing substance of information and showing relationship to Intelligence Community matters if appropriate. Any feedback or evidence of investigatory interests should be noted. Commitments made to supply additional information should be noted. Additionally, certain administrative information may be entered here, e.g., restrictions on review of a document, if document was paraphrased, whether interviewee is current or former employee, etc. If actual document or transcript is provided, that fact should be noted and no summary is required. Additional pages may be attached if necessary.