

Date:09/30/93
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JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATIONAGENCY : SSCIA
RECORD NUMBER : 157-10002-10106RECORDS SERIES :
TRANSCRIPTAGENCY FILE NUMBER : R-398

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : SSCIA
FROM :
TO :TITLE :
TESTIMONY OF WILLIAM K. HARVEYDATE : 06/25/75
PAGES : ~~96~~ 104SUBJECTS :
OPERATION MONGOOSE
ROSELLI, JOHNNY
CASTRO
ASSASSINATION
POISON PILLS
CUBA
MCCONE, JOHN
CIA
BISSELL, RICHARD
WHITE HOUSE
MAFIA
ROWAN, DAN
GIANCANA, SAMDOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : T
RESTRICTIONS : REFERRED
CURRENT STATUS : P
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 09/30/93

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS :
Box 245
Folder 14-----
[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

6/25/75

gyp

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21 JUN 74 Project ZRRIFLE

1. Identification: The purpose of Project ZRRIFLE is to spot, develop, and use ~~foreign~~ agent assets for Division D ~~for~~ operations. Agents will be spotted in several areas, including the United States, but ~~with~~ ~~out~~ for operational security reasons will probably not be used in their countries of residence. Present developmental activity is being conducted in the WE and EE areas, but it is anticipated that this will be extended to other division areas. The project will be operated against third-country installations and personnel.

2. Objective: The objective of this project is ~~the procurement of foreign and other assets in accordance with requirements levied on the clandestine services, ~~primarily by the National Security Agency.~~~~ since these requirements are subject to frequent revision, no listing of targets would be valid for the duration of the project. Specific operations will be mounted on the basis of need and opportunity. The project will be conducted by Division D with assistance from area divisions and stations as needed.

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3. Background: In response to the increasing requirements ~~of the operational requirements of foreign and other assets,~~ Division D in 1960 began the spotting of agent assets as a developmental activity. During the same

period requirements of [redacted] NSA became more refined and in many respects more sensitive. Because most stations are not equipped to conduct this type of operation and because of the desirability of completely centralized control over this entire effort, it was determined that Division D, [redacted] could best conduct the activity. The ~~first~~ spotting activity has now advanced far enough to justify removing from the OSA category.

4. Operational assets:

(1) Personnel: QJWIN is under written contract as a principal agent, with the primary task of spotting agent candidates. QJwin was first contacted in 1958 through the Chief of the [redacted] the Chief of Station, [redacted], in connection with an illegal narcotics operation into the United States. For a period of a year and a half he was contacted ~~in~~ & sporadically by [redacted], in behalf of the Bureau of Narcotics. Files of this Bureau reflect an excellent performance by QJwin. On ~~September~~ ^{October} 1960,

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SECRET

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Q Jwin annual salary : 7,200
Travel + ops expenses for
Q Jwin + other agents & agent candidates : 2,000
Fees for services by and
standby of agents and
agent candidates : 2,000
Travel of staff employees
engaged in Zorife activity : 2,500
Hire of safehouses, automobiles
and other operational expenses : 1,000
\$ 14,700

Pay for agents on completion of jobs?

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1) Legal, ethical → morals, operational problems; political: non-attaché-
titles.

2) Our own experience (~~English~~) (+ effect on DDP) and experience
w/ KGB (~~British, French, German, Italian~~) → require most
professional, proven operationally competent, ruthless, stable,
CE-experienced ops officers (few available), able to conduct patient
search + adjust to pull back if instinct or knowledge tells him
he should, ^{with high regard for operational security} assessments are all-important.

3) Maximum security:

a. Kuba only (e.g., what does ~~the Kuba~~ know?); no approach to other Govt. agencies

b. Within Kuba, one focal point for control,
search, training, case officing, etc. - DDP authority
in this focal point mandatory. DCI officially advised?

c. Max. security cable commo for innocuous
cables only; no restrictions on travel; possibility
of one-man overseas (Europe) control base with
own (non-station) commo. Word of mouth +
no backchannel re trips

d. No PA's, ^(except for search) or intermediaries; rigid case-officing,
from start to finish.

e. No approach to officials of foreign
govts.

f. No use of anyone ^{JUN 24 1975} who
ever worked for a G. S. Govt. agency. ^{IA} Training
by opposition would need.

g. Use of already tested assets (e.g.,

Marshall) in the search.

h. Stand-by list of Kubaers who can

pass as foreigners.

- i. Pretect: ~~Not to be used~~ search; this established by ~~law~~
 j. No discussions in stations. k. No "team" until ready to go, if at all.

4. Blackmail:

a. No American citizens or residents or people who were obtained U.S. visas.

b. No chain of connections: strictly person to person; singleton ops.

c. No meeting any candidate in home territory.

d. Exclude organization criminals, those w/ record of arrests, those w/ instability of purpose as criminals.

e. Staffers mixed - selection.

5. Cover: planning should include provision for planning houses or lodges in case of blow.

6. Testing of nominees essential: re following directions, security, blackmail.

7. Former resistance personnel a possibility.

8. Use nobody who has never dealt w/ criminals; otherwise will not be aware of pitfalls or consider factors such as freedom to travel, wanted lists, etc.

9. ~~Should have plan, 20 min to backstop them, all~~

~~document to them, keep it, backstop them, all~~

~~and file~~

10. Possible use of staffers for the action.

11. ~~to be done.~~

Keeping of files.

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10) ~~Confidential~~ recommended. ~~Asst. Dir. / CIA / Dept. of State~~

~~Mafia~~

11) Former resistance personnel offer possibilities. (ARS archives)

12) Period of testing, surveillance, etc. for each selectee.

13) ~~Any~~ ^{all} Subsec personnel involved should have some CE experience.

14) ~~Subsec~~ + stable in ~~person~~

15) What are limits on team or individuals sub selected? No "team" until ready to go.

16) For Danger of standbys.

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ied of - 25/1 - eye station
"The Magic Button"

8

Narcotics Büro ~~Handwritten scribble~~
"for a living" - RIS 201 cover

Button - Blueprint - no star
eyes - Jim A. / Contract structure
not a TSD problem from U-2

Apply brakes

Last report beyond last report &
a comparison of measures -
- El Benefactor - assumption -

~~Handwritten scribble~~ Example 3 "magic"

Framework of ~~Handwritten scribble~~ job. ~~Handwritten scribble~~
Memo. ~~Handwritten scribble~~

~~Large blacked-out redacted area~~

Year

REC-111
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Anesthesia -

26/1 - ~~Handwritten scribble~~ Foreign DCI - Matter -
no file Review - ~~Handwritten scribble~~

1. Select proper open to run -
2. ~~Handwritten scribble~~
3. Security Rules
4. ~~Handwritten scribble~~ levels

May 1972
B-WITH-AS-3
- Review

- 6. No [REDACTED]
- 7. No projects or papers except per cases.
- 8. Principal Agent - [REDACTED] -
[REDACTED] Program Chief LCH -
Ticket 1500 - from MB -
mark spot regm. Staff at
project - deo Diako
- 9. Disposal -
- 10. Targets who's names -
Must know before
we can spot -

11. Case officering

12. [REDACTED]

13. [REDACTED]

Fd I list - Remember

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