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JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

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Mr. Phillips. I did not.

Mr. Schwarz. Did you know Jack Ruby?

Mr. Phillips. No, I did not.

Mr. Schwarz. Do you know him under the name of Rubenstein?

Mr. Phillips. I did not.

Mr. Schwarz. What did you do between your work in Cuba and the Chile matter which you were going to spend most of your time on?

Mr. Phillips. After the Bay of Pigs business I went to Mexico in late in 1961, and remained in Mexico until the very early part of 1965, when I was assigned to the Dominican Republic as Chief of Station.

Mr. Schwarz. And then --

Mr. Phillips. I stayed in the Dominican Republic until the summer of 1967.

Mr. Schwarz. And after that I returned to Washington and became the Chief of Cuban Operations through 1969.

In 1970 I went to Rio de Janeiro as Station Chief. And in 1971, I suffered the traumatic shock of being moved to Brasilia from Rio de Janeiro.

In 1972 I went to Venezuela as the Chief of Station. And in the summer of 1973 I was asked to return as Chief of the then Western Hemisphere Division.

Mr. Schwarz. And is that the position you held until

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1 or the other which would enable you to form a judgment as  
2 to his attitude toward either the subject of assassination or  
3 the question as to what kind of an explicit order would be  
4 necessary in order to justify Agency actions to actually  
5 assassinate some one.

6 Mr. Phillips. No, because I never heard Mr. Helms even  
7 get that close to the edge of such talk about such and such an  
8 option or possibility, I never heard him talk that way.

9 Mr. Schwarz. Did you ever hear anybody in the Agency  
10 talk that way?

11 Mr. Phillips. Under traumatic conditions I have heard  
12 human beings maybe with a few drinks or something like that  
13 saying, my God, we would be better off if so and so were  
14 bumped off or something.

15 But I have never heard two officers sit down and  
16 seriously talk about such an option. And if anyone has ever  
17 said that, it is the same way some people might get out of line  
18 and say almost anything.

19 Mr. Schwarz. Did you ever hear, in connection with  
20 the Chile operation, that certain Chilean officers, specifi-  
21 cally a Major Marshall, [redacted] that they intended  
22 to assassinate Allende?

23 Mr. Phillips. It was five years ago. But as I recall,  
24 Major Marshall said a number of things. He was what I think  
25 of as a wild man. I seem to recall something about, yes, a

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1 Mr. Schwarz. And you offered through Colonel Wimert,  
2 whom we will come to in a moment, \$50,000 if they could  
3 accomplish it, didn't you?

4 Mr. Phillips. I think that was the correct sum, yes.

5 mr. Schwarz. And you gave them prior to their attempt  
6 on the 19th of October some tear gas and some gas masks to  
7 help accomplish the kidnapping?

8 Mr. Phillips. That is true.

9 Mr. Schwarz. And subsequently you provided to the Val-  
10 enzuela group some machine guns, didn't you?

11 Mr. Phillips. That is ture.

12 Mr. Schwarz. And those were going to be used in a  
13 kidnapping effort by the Valenzuela group, and you knew that,  
14 didn't you?

15 Mr. Phillips. I recall that they were going to be  
16 used by the group, and that kidnapping was a part of their  
17 plans. I can't recall that they said they needed them spe-  
18 cifically for the kidnapping. I do recall that the reason was --  
19 the automatic reaction from Latin America is, why do people  
20 need arms when they have got arms everywhere all over Latin  
21 America.

22 And they said something about, their own arms could be  
23 identified, and they needed some that couldn't be identified.  
24 I don't recall if it was specifically mentioned that it was  
25 just for that. It was certainly understood that they might

1           Consequently, I personally made this proposal, that we  
2 establish what I called a false flag base of people that would  
3 go from outside, and should there be any sort of flap, the  
4 chances of linking it to the U.S. Government would be much  
5 less, because they would appear to be from another nationality.

6           Mr. Schwarz. I would like to read to you a cable -- is  
7 this cable of 27 September in the Senator's book? I know that  
8 he asked for it after I came over.

9           Mr. Treverton. It is not.

10          Mr. Schwarz. I am going to read from a cable which  
11 unfortunately is not in your book, but the key part is  
12 relatively simple.

13          This is a cable, Mr. Phillips, dated September 27, 1970,  
14 and it is signed by yourself and Mr. Broe. And it is sent to  
15 the Station in Chile, and it contains the following about the  
16 purposes of setting up the false flag office --

17          Mr. Phillips. We call it a base.

18          Mr. Schwarz. False flag bases: "Each member of base  
19 will enter and leave Chile with false documents and operate as  
20 a representative of his country rather than as an American".

21          That is right, isn't it?

22          Mr. Phillips. That is true.

23          Mr. Schwarz. Continue:

24          "Having at least one key  and one key   
25 would be vital, and we have candidates."

1 And you did that.

2 Mr. Phillips. Yes.

3 Mr. Schwarz. And then it goes on as follows: "These  
4 officers will perform the delicate shows with great flap  
5 potential which cannot be done by Station personnel or any  
6 Chilean."

7 That is right, isn't it?

8 Mr. Phillips. That is true.

9 Mr. Schwarz. And by flap potential you meant exposure?

10 Mr. Phillips. Contacting screwballs such as Marshall,  
11 that sort of thing.

12 Mr. Schwarz. But generally pursuing the Track II  
13 activities?

14 Mr. Phillips. That is right.

15 Mr. Schwarz. Continuing: "An example. We have can-  
16 didates who can successfully pose as [redacted] intelligence  
17 officers." You did that, didn't you?

18 Mr. Phillips. Yes.

19 Mr. Schwarz. And this goes on: "If he approached, funded  
20 and ran a Chilean General, any flap would be a [redacted]

21 Mr. Phillips. Yes.

22 Mr. Schwarz. So the scheme was that not only would  
23 the U.S. not be blamed, but other countries like [redacted] would  
24 be blamed if something went wrong.

25 Mr. Phillips. Yes, this is particularly sensitive to me,

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However, that was it. It was a devious move. It was the final result -- the idea being that if such a flap did occur, someone would think it was someone other than the U.S. The idea of false flag operations is not a new one. The idea I had of going to someone and saying, why don't you be a spy for us, I don't work for the Soviets, is not true.

But this is sort of new, the fact that action agents should pose as others. And yes, it is devious, but that was the idea.

Senator Hart of Colorado. Mr. Phillips, what were their instructions if they were to be caught? Were they to go to their death swearing they were [redacted] or whatever?

Mr. Phillips. I don't think it was quite that dramatic, Senator. They came to Washington before they went down. And I briefed them, and I think what I said to them was, this is going to be a tough and sensitive one, and you don't have to go if you don't want to, because you could get in real trouble.

And if you get in trouble, I am not sure we can help you.

So, they shrugged their shoulders and went.

Mr. Schwarz. Did you tell the [redacted] that you were sending someone down to pose as a [redacted] and his instructions were that if he were caught he was to continue to pose

1 as [redacted] were approached?

2 Mr. Phillips. It never occurred to us in our wildest  
3 dreams to do that.

4 Mr. Schwarz. I suppose the relationships between con-  
5 tinuing intelligence services were things that were  
6 very important to preserve, and that we had very close and  
7 delicate relationships with the other intelligence services.

8 Mr. Phillips. We do. And if there had been such a  
9 man [redacted] would be quite unhappy with us. But I  
10 thought that was better than letting the world know that was  
11 a U.S. Citizen down there.

12 Mr. Schwarz. You go on in the cable of September 27  
13 to say this:

14 "Headquarters believes this false flag was manned by  
15 officers who have repeatedly proved their ability to operate  
16 and recruit under false colors, will give Station great flexi-  
17 bility in handling delicate and fast-moving situations secure-  
18 ly."

19 So, the use of false flag persons, at least judging  
20 from this cable, is something [redacted]

21 Mr. Phillips. Yes, and by all intelligence services --  
22 not all, but all major intelligence services. If you are living  
23 overseas and a man comes up to you and says, hey, I see you  
24 are a Marxist, and a man comes up and says, I am from Havana  
25 and we would like you to work with the Cuban intelligence

1 service, he might not be from Havana, he might be from the  
2 Soviets, from us, or ~~from the Brazilians.~~

3 So, it is not an unusual practice.

4 Mr. Schwarz. Incidentally, you just let drop one thing  
5 in your testimony a moment ago. You said that in your 25-year  
6 involvement with intelligence matters you had been bothered  
7 by your activities on only two occasions, one of which was  
8 Chile.

9 And then you said what the other one was. What was that?

10 Mr. Phillips. I was in Washington attending the Chiefs  
11 of Station course, which is a training course for people who  
12 are going out on their first assignment as Chief of Station.

13 When President Johnson decided to send 22,000 Marines  
14 to the Dominican Republic, it occurred to me that in order to  
15 protect and evacuate American citizens, that that job might  
16 have been done with 400 Marines. I was scheduled to go there

17 ~~as the Chief of Station.~~ And I just wasn't sure that I

18 wanted to be associated with something like that. But I de-  
19 cided, well, I suppose President Johnson knows what he is  
20 doing, I will go -- I am going to go along. So, I did go  
21 along.

22 Senator Schweiker. One question on your differentiation  
23 between where you drew a personal commitment line on assassin-  
24 ations, but not overthrow. I have trouble quite understanding  
25 it, because as I understand Chile, the plot was to overthrow

1 Mr. Phillips. There is no question that I could under-  
2 stand why anyone concerned with world affairs, looking at  
3 Chile and what was happening there, would be concerned.

4 Salvadore Allende made his first statement saying that  
5 he was a Socialist and wanted to change the order some 32  
6 years before he was elected.

7 Over the years he made it quite clear that he was an ar-  
8 dent socialist. Before this decision was made I believe that  
9 we had a visit from a man who had the code name of   
10 was a Cuban intelligence officer. The Cubans were moving in  
11 rapidly. The influence was great. I think that they saw a lot  
12 at stake, another Cuba in Latin America type of thing, the  
13 same thing perhaps that motivated President Johnson to send  
14 22,000 rather than 400.

15 So, I can understand why they thought this was going,  
16 in the long strategic sense, in the long range against our  
17 interests. But that is an assumption.

18 It is true that Allende very definitely made it clear  
19 that he wanted to turn Chile into a Marxist state. The differ-  
20 ence was that Allende refused to take Fidel Castro's advice  
21 and use violence. As I understand it, Fidel Castro went to  
22 Chile and said, if you want your revolution to last you are  
23 going to have to use violence.

24 I found it interesting to read in this morning's paper  
25 where someone from Portugal came back from Cuba and said,

1 activities?

2 Mr. Phillips. No, sir. I was the Station Chief in  
3 Rio de Janeiro in Brazil, and was called back in 1970 for  
4 six or seven weeks for what we are referring to as Track II.

5 Senator Mondale. Now, in that position you familiarized  
6 yourself with the Chilean government, Allende and so on,  
7 and tried to become as expert as you could in the political  
8 forces and so on?

9 Mr. Phillips. Yes. And in addition to that, Senator,  
10 one of the reasons I was called back was that I had lived  
11 for many years in Chile, so I knew something about it.

12 Senator Mondale. And it is your judgment as I think I  
13 just heard, that although Allende was a Marxist, and espoused  
14 Marxism, he also said he wanted to achieve this through the  
15 democratic process, and although there was some rough stuff  
16 on the press, and so on, essentially that was the course he  
17 was pursuing, is that correct?

18 Mr. Phillips. I don't recall that he said it, but  
19 he indeed acted that way.

20 Senator Mondale. But in fact the course he was pur-  
21 suing was an attempt to achieve the Marxist philosophy with  
22 the population support under constitutional system?

23 Mr. Phillips. Yes, essentially that is true, sir.

24 Senator Mondale. Thank you.

25 Mr. Schwarz. I would like to read to you in connection

1 assignment by the President and by the White House?

2 Mr. Phillips. Senator, it doesn't make any difference  
3 today. On the contrary, since Watergate the people say, why  
4 should we? Before Watergate it was another ball game.  
5 The President was the Commander in Chief in every sense of the  
6 word.

7 And you said, who am I, a GS-15 bureaucrat, to say that  
8 we shouldn't do this? But that has changed since Watergate.

9 Senator Hart of Colorado. One other question.

10 I call your attention in our briefing books to what is  
11 Tab C, a cable which has your name at the end of it dated 21  
12 September 1970, page 3 of 7. Are you an author or co-author  
13 of that cable?

14 Mr. Phillips. I believe I was the authenticating  
15 officer, yes.

16 Senator Hart of Colorado. What does that mean?

17 Mr. Phillips. That meant that the signature on the  
18 right of those cables is someone that is the authenticating  
19 officer in a sense, here is a fellow that is supposed to know  
20 the situation.

21 Senator Hart of Colorado. But who wrote it, I guess  
22 is what I am after.

23 Mr. Phillips. I would guess that this cable was probably  
24 written by Mr. Poinzio, and perhaps myself, perhaps it was  
25 joint. But Mr. Poinzio wrote an awful lot of them. But by

1 putting my signature on the authenticating part I said I was  
2 a part of it. And then, of course, the releasing officer is  
3 the one that accepts the responsibility.

4 Senator Hart of Colorado. Page 3 of 7 which has  
5 the paragraph identified as the paragraph F contains the follow-  
6 ing sentence or part of a sentence: You suggest sending  
7 us cables outlining objectives and course of events, et  
8 cetera, and he said, always conditioned by the fact that we have  
9 to keep our feet in the mud of practicality, and our eyes  
10 on the stars.

11 What does that mean in Agency talk?

12 Mr. Phillips. Senator, I want to assure you with real  
13 seriousness that I am not the author of that phrase.

14 Senator Hart of Colorado. It must have caught your eye,  
15 however.

16 Mr. Phillips. It did catch my eye. If this was indeed  
17 a joint venture, I can promise that that was **Dino Poinzio's**  
18 contribution, and if you ever meet him you will understand  
19 why. He was addicted to picturesque speech. And looking  
20 back, all I can say is that it probably went out at four  
21 o'clock in the morning, and we were very tired, and I just  
22 didn't want to argue about that phrase, and I let it go. I  
23 am not sure what it means even now.

24 SENator Hart of Colorado. Neither am I. But it seems  
25 to describe a lot of what we have heard around here for the

1 Now, I read that as Helms' position being that the  
2 assassination of Schneider was something which presented the  
3 opportunity for the very thing that the U.S. wished to have  
4 done.

5 Do you agree with me?

6 Mr. Phillips. No, I can't agree with you on that. I am  
7 not sure about the suggestion from the language. But I will  
8 tell you the immediate reaction in our little task force when  
9 the word came that Schneider was dead, that is it, it is finished.  
10 Knowing Chileans, the moment that that violence occurred,  
11 Chileans, with the possible exception of a nut such as  
12 Marshall, immediately said, this is it, that is enough. There  
13 was still that tradition over the years. And I think that the  
14 moment we heard of it and we discussed it we said, that is  
15 it, there will be no more. In many countries in Latin America  
16 that would have been the signal for further action, weakness,  
17 and so forth. But in this case it was the end of the  
18 business.

19 Mr. Schwarz. I want to run through with you the activi-  
20 ties which were being undertaken with the Valenzuela group  
21 and with the Viaux group. In the case of Viaux, was that one  
22 of the assignments that the false flag officers had?

23 Mr. Phillips. Yes.

24 Mr. Schwarz. And in the case of Valenzuela, was that  
25 one of the assignments that Colonel Wimer had?

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1 Mr. Phillips. [Wilmert] Yes, I believe it was [Colonel]  
2 [Wilmert] that was in touch with that group.

3 Mr. Schwarz. And the two teams worked in tandem,  
4 didn't they?

5 Mr. Phillips. Are you referring to Chilean teams?

6 Mr. Schwarz. No, the false flag team [and Colonel]  
7 [Wilmert].

8 Mr. Phillips. Only in the sense that there might have  
9 been some central direction from the office or from headquar-  
10 ters. I don't believe that anyone of the false flaggers had  
11 the slightest idea that [Colonel Wilmert] was working with us.  
12 And I don't believe that [Colonel Wilmert] -- I don't know that  
13 [Colonel Wilmert] knew about them.

14 So, no, they didn't work in tandem, except in sense of  
15 direction from the Station.

16 Mr. Schwarz. Headquarters down there, and you in  
17 Washington, were working with both the Valenzuela group and  
18 the Viaux group?

19 Mr. Phillips. Yes, sir.

20 Senator Hart of Colorado. Are you in a chain here,  
21 counsel?

22 Mr. Schwarz. I am in a chain, but it is easily interrup-  
23 tible.

24 Senator Hart of Colorado. Mr. Phillips, did we  
25 chronologically -- maybe the staff can answer that, I am just

1 Viaux group was really acting in order to carry out step one  
2 of the Valenzuela group's plan?

3 Mr. Phillips. Yes, to address this point specifically.  
4 Obviously when the guns were passed ~~through Colonel Wimert~~  
5 and the death occurred so soon after, immediately we  
6 thought they probably used those guns. It was then when we  
7 read the press reports that General Schneider died from hand-  
8 gun wounds. And that was the first time we thought we could  
9 really be sure in our own mind that it wasn't directly  
10 the Valenzuela group using those guns.

11 Mr. Schwarz. What about the gas masks that had  
12 been furnished earlier? Wasn't there evidence that there  
13 were gas masks in the care of the persons who attempted to  
14 abduct General Schneider?

15 Mr. PHillips. I don't recall. There may very well have  
16 been, but I am not real sure about that.

17 Mr. Schwarz. I am going to go to another area, which  
18 is the relationship ~~with Colonel Wimert~~. If there are any  
19 questions on the relationship between the two groups.

20 Senator Hart of Colorado. Concerning the October 19  
21 attempts, under Tab 4 on page 7 of the longer memorandum  
22 by Dianne LaVoy under October 18 there is reference to a cable  
23 A66 dated October 19. And concerning the connection of  
24 these various conspirators, it says: "Valenzuela meets with  
25 ~~U.S. Army attache~~ and gives him a 15 point plan for coup to be

1 carried out on October 19. [redacted] who was head of the  
2 [redacted] Carabineros, witting of the above plan, has promised to keep  
3 the Carabineros away from the Schneier house to assure that the  
4 abduction will not be interfered with. General Viaux is  
5 knowledgeable of the above operation, but is not directly  
6 involved."

7 What do you think "not directly involved" refers to?  
8 Why not just not involved?

9 Mr. Phillips. I think that probably referred to what  
10 I was saying before, that in these situations it is not very  
11 unusual that there is not some talk that everybody has a cousin  
12 that works with some group type of thing.

13 And I believe that it must refer to that.

14 Mr. Schwarz. Taking the actual cable, is the actual  
15 cable in the Senator's books?

16 Mr. Inderfurther. No.

17 Mr. Schwarz. Let me read the full text of that para-  
18 graph from the cable. It is a cable apparently dated 19  
19 October on the subject of General Viaux:

20 "General Viaux, knowledgeable of above operation, but not  
21 directly involved. He has been sent to Vina to stay with  
22 prominent physician. Will be seen in public places during 19  
23 and 20 October to demonstrate fact that above operation is  
24 not his doing. Will be allowed to return to Santiago at end of  
25 week."

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Now, I can't read that language any way other than meaning that the Valenzuela group and the Viaux group were in close cooperation, that was part of the abduction plan, it was agreed between the two that Viaux would appear -- would be out of town so that he would not appear to be involved. And you have to read that, do you not, as meaning that there was a close cooperation on this effort between the two groups.

Mr. Phillips. Yes, I think you do have to read it that way.

Miss Culbreth. Would you identify that paper more than just the statement?

Mr. Phillips. Cable sent to headquarters A66.

Mr. Schwarz. No. A66, eyes only to --

Mr. Inderfurth. DCOS, which was ~~Hooksher.~~

Mr. Treverton. It is Tab M, it is in the book.

Mr. Schwarz. I think we ought to mark that as an exhibit.

(The document referred to was marked Phillips Exhibit No. 2 for identification.)

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1 As for the narrow part of your question, by all means  
2 it is a bad way to do business.

3 Senator Schweiker. Go ahead.

4 Mr. Schwarz. Picking up on Senator Schweiker's line  
5 of questioning, would you show the witness Tab A, the docu-  
6 ment Tab A.

7 It is a memorandum for the record by Mr. Broe dated 17  
8 September, and then that is crossed out and it says 16 Sep-  
9 tember, "Subject, Genesis of Project".

10 Incidentally, what was the code name for this project?  
11 Was it FU Belt?

12 Mr. Phillips. Beltway or FU Belt, one of the two.

13 Mr. Schwarz. Does FU stand for anything in particular?

14 Mr. Phillips. Chile. So it would be FU. The first two  
15 letters there indicate a geographical area. So it would be a  
16 lot of different ones, but that would mean Chile. FU Belt  
17 means Chile. Belt means nothing.

18 Mr. Schwarz. Everybody keeps saying that so many of  
19 these things mean nothing. Who is responsible for these  
20 names?

21 Mr. Phillips. There is somebody who is supposed to have  
22 a big list to make sure that they were not duplicated.  
23 And I think sometimes there is a pixie-like quality that comes  
24 out in those things.

25 Senator Schweiker. That is an understatement, to call

1 it pixie-like.

2 Mr. Phillips. But many times the cryptonums mean ab-  
3 solutely nothing, they have no meaning at all.

4 Senator Schweiker. SRRIFLE, ROGUE ELEPHANT --

5 Mr. Phillips. I am sorry, sir.

6 Senator Schweiker. We have come across a few other good  
7 ones.

8 Mr. Schwarz. I don't know if you have ever seen that  
9 document, and it doesn't matter. But the end of paragraph 2  
10 indicates that the instructions from the President concluded:

11 "The Agency is to carry out this mission without  
12 coordination with the Department of State or Defense".

13 Mr. Phillips. Yes.

14 Mr. Schwarz. And that was your instruction?

15 Mr. Phillips. That is correct.

16 Mr. Schwarz. Now, in fact, of course, you did use in  
17 Chile a man called Colonel Wimert.

18 Mr. Phillips. Yes.

19 Mr. Schwarz. And he was in the Defense Department?

20 Mr. Phillips. That is correct.

21 Mr. Schwarz. And he was assigned -- he was instructed  
22 to take his instructions only from the CIA in Chile, is that  
23 right?

24 Mr. Phillips. Yes.

25 Mr. Schwarz. And he was instructed indeed not to tell

1 his superior in Chile, the man who was in charge of the  
2 defense attache system down there?

3 Mr. Phillips. That is true, sir.

4 Mr. Schwarz. Wimert was the man from the Army, and then  
5 there was someone else in the Air Force, the Navy, and there  
6 was a boss?

7 Mr. Phillips. That is right.

8 Mr. Schwarz. And Wimert was told not to tell that boss?

9 Mr. Phillips. I believe that is true, yes.

10 Mr. Schwarz. Now, how did it happen that Colonel Wimert  
11 came to work for and under the direction of the CIA?

12 Mr. Phillips. I believe the explanation for that was  
13 the fact that Colonel Wimert had been around Latin America,  
14 spoke perfect Spanish, his hobby was riding horses, and he  
15 developed really marvelous relationships with the military of  
16 officers that he had contact with. And I think it was just  
17 that someone recognized the fact that if we had been given the  
18 task of getting a coup going using the military, why not take  
19 advantage of the one man in Chile that they liked the most,  
20 trusted the most, and saw the most? It was perfectly natural  
21 for him to spend his weekends with these people.

22 Mr. Schwarz. And so he was a natural and helpful asset.  
23 But how was it arranged that he would work for the CIA, and  
24 lay that question against the instruction from President  
25 Nixon that the Defense Department was not to know, how did

1 you accomplish it?

2 Mr. Phillips. I don't know. I have had my memory  
3 refreshed by looking at some documents now, and I know  
4 that someone came and gave me the piece of paper in this book  
5 that has been signed by General Philpott. which was a message  
6 to **Wimert** saying, cooperate with the CIA. What the process  
7 was for getting that approval, or who went to see Philpott,  
8 I wasn't involved with that, I just don't recall.

9 Mr. Schwarz. Did you ever see Philpott ?

10 Mr. Phillips. I never did.

11 Mr. Schwarz. Did you ever see --

12 Mr. Phillips. I may have seen Philpott in some large  
13 meeting or something like that, but I don't recall any  
14 meeting with any of the generals. I was relatively too junior  
15 to have attended these meetings. This would have been Mr.  
16 Broe, Mr. Karamessines, and so forth. And I would have been  
17 left back in the shop, sort of, I think.

18 Mr. Schwarz. And did you ever see or talk to Bennett?

19 Mr. Phillips. Not to my recollection. I think not.

20 Mr. Schwarz. I asked you if you ever saw General Phil-  
21 pott, or did you ever talk to General Philpott?

22 Mr. Phillips. I don't recall such a talk. During this  
23 entire period, for instance, I never went outside of our build-  
24 ing. I was there sort of in the shop. And other people would do  
25 that sort of thing.

1 Mr. Schwarz. Is that the form in which you sent the  
2 message which is contained in Exhibit 3 to Chile?

3 Mr. Phillips. It is.

4 Mr. Schwarz. Now, apparently Exhibit 4, which you  
5 drafted initially, said that it was from General Bennett, and  
6 then it was changed to say it was from General Philpott.

7 Did you make that change?

8 Mr. Phillips. That is my handwriting above that said  
9 Philpott, and someone else's handwriting below that said  
10 Bennett. I think the signature on the original document  
11 was from Philpott. But that is my change there.

12 Mr. Schwarz. And is the change on the second page --  
13 the sentence reads:

14 "Do not allow Colonel Wimert to retain copy of this  
15 message", and then in handwriting it is asserted "Note that  
16 General Bennett is out of the country".

17 Mr. Phillips. Yes, that is my handwriting.

18 Mr. Schwarz. Having seen that, and these changes, what  
19 do you recall about the circumstances that led you to make  
20 those changes?

21 Mr. Phillips. It is possible that this message is one  
22 of the rare messages that sometimes occur, that you are handed  
23 something that is written out, and there is no secretary,  
24 and it is two o'clock in the morning or something like that.  
25 On some occasions you will take a very rough draft and ask

1 the communicators to send that, and you will then later write  
2 for the record, and have typed for the record the formal cable.  
3 I am not sure about that.

4 Mr. Schwarz. You think what you sent used General Ben-  
5 nett's name and not General Philpott's name?

6 Mr. Phillips. I don't recall. But I believe if that had  
7 been the case that not only would the change have been made,  
8 but there would have been some sort of note on the side or  
9 something. So, I believe that the original must have said  
10 Philpott. But I can't be absolutely positive.

11 Mr. Schwarz. But the original typed version on the  
12 first page used Bennett's name, right?

13 Mr. Phillips. Yes.

14 Mr. Schwarz. Now, I am puzzled, because if you had  
15 previously obtained the document which is Exhibit 3, the  
16 "suggested message to be sent to Army attache from General  
17 Bennett", and which is in fact signed with a name that  
18 purports to be General Philpott's, if you had obtained that  
19 before drafting the typed message, I take it you would have used  
20 Philpott's name in the typed message and not Bennetts'.

21 Mr. Phillips. Yes.

22 Mr. Schwarz. So that suggests that you typed the typed  
23 message before you obtained the document which is Exhibit 3  
24 that has Mr. Philpott's signature?

25 Mr. Phillips. No, I would not have done that. I would

1 wasn't aware of this.

2 Mr. Schwarz. After that initial occasion involving  
3 the use of Philpott's name in order to instruct **Wimert** to  
4 work for the CIA, was anybody from the Defense Intelligence  
5 Agency further brought into the operation which we have been  
6 calling Track II?

7 Mr. PHillips. My answer to that until a few minutes  
8 ago would have been, I don't recall that. I have seen a document  
9 since then that indicates that someone else was talked to  
10 later. If I knew that I had forgotten it, or perhaps never  
11 knew it -- I must have known it if I saw the message. But  
12 until I saw this thing, to refresh my memory I would have  
13 said, I think that Philpott was the man.

14 Mr. Schwarz. Was the man, and was only contacted on  
15 that one occasion? ✓

16 Mr. Phillips. As far as I know, that one occasion.  
17 But I didn't necessarily know what was outside of my little  
18 room with windows, and so there were other people doing other  
19 things.

20 Mr. Schwarz. Let's then look at the other documents.

21 Would you mark Tab G as Exhibit 5.

22 (The document referred to was  
23 marked Phillips Exhibit No. 5  
24 for identification.)

25

1 Mr. Schwarz. And this is a cable releasing officer William  
2 Broe, authenticating officer David A Phillips, dated Octo-  
3 ber 14, 1970, from CIA headquarters to Santiago, CIA.

4 And it says:

5 "Please deliver the following message ('destroy immedi-  
6 ately') ~~to Colonel Wimert~~ eyes only from Lieutenant General  
7 Bennett. "

8 Now, on what basis did you authenticate that message  
9 which purports to be ~~to Colonel Wimert~~ from Lieutenant General  
10 Bennett?

11 Mr. Phillips. Obviously -- not obviously, but because  
12 I presume in this case -- I am sure in this case once again  
13 there was a document that was handed to me and I was told,  
14 send this down. In order to make this point, I was in there,  
15 and it was sort of a direct operational thing, and when I  
16 authenticated them I did it because I knew what was going on.  
17 If Bill Broe, my boss, came in and said, here is a document  
18 that we want to send, or if Tom Karamessines said, I worked on  
19 the assumption that they were passing on to me the authority  
20 to authenticate, and I didn't necessarily turn to them and say,  
21 hey --

22 Mr Schwarz. Prove that --

23 Mr. Phillips. Prove that you have been talking with  
24 General Bennett -- I obviously didn't do that.

25 Mr. Schwarz. Then mark as Exhibit 6 an undated docu-

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ment headed "Destroy immediately" from LTG Bennett ~~to Colonel~~  
~~Wimert~~ "Eyes only".

(The document referred to was  
Marked Phillips Exhibit No. 6  
for identification.)

1 Mr. Schwarz. Now, that purports to be from LTG Bennett  
2 to Colonel Wimer, and has the text in it which you sent on  
3 to Colonel Wimer.

4 Mr. Phillips. Yes.

5 Mr. Schwarz. And what is your best recollection as to  
6 who handed you that document?

7 Mr. Phillips. I cannot say definitely who did that.  
8 There were many occasions when Bill Broe would walk into the  
9 office and say, here is something to send. There were others  
10 which would come in a manila envelope with a yellow  
11 forwarding slip on it. There are times, I am sure, when I  
12 would go into Bill Broe's office, and he would say, by the  
13 way, send this.

14 I simply cannot recall the circumstances in which some-  
15 one handed me that and said, send it to Chile. And I was paying  
16 less attention to those things, because I was in effect the  
17 postman for people doing other things.

18 Mr. Schwarz. Do you have any recollection at all  
19 about this document?

20 Mr. Phillips. No, I am afraid I don't.

21 Mr. Schwarz. What is your reading of the signature on  
22 that document?

23 Mr. PHillips. Well, it certainly looks like the sig-  
24 nature which was on the other document which was said to be  
25 Philpott's. But I am not an authority on these things.

1 military attache. And those instructions went down. Apparently  
2 it would appear that there might be something here where they  
3 are going to bring in more people, as is known to several per-  
4 sons, it says down here.

5 And it may have been because there was an attempt there  
6 not to say to these new people, by the way, we want to talk  
7 to you about something we are doing that we have kind of  
8 already done. That is the only thing I can come up with. I  
9 can't give you a better explanation than that.

10 Mr. Schwarz. This you characterize also as a puzzling  
11 and strange document?

12 Mr. Phillips. Yes. And I am sorry that I can't be  
13 more helpful on this. But I was treating these -- these things  
14 were coming through my mail shoot, and I was putting headings  
15 on them. Even though I signed them and so forth, I wasn't  
16 paying the attention to things that I did to my own job.

17 Mr. Schwarz. That is an explanation that deals with  
18 some of the earlier documents. But here in the first place  
19 you were both the releasing officer and the authenticating  
20 officer.

21 And second, this is not simply taking some other message  
22 and putting a heading on it, is it? This is a substantive  
23 document purporting to explain a problem to your CIA Station  
24 Chief in Santiago, right, do you agree with that?

25 Mr. Phillips. I do. And I agree that it is puzzling,

1 and there are some holes here. Perhaps I can be helpful when  
2 you have further testimony on this to help me job my memory.  
3 I can't remember the rationale for this.

4 Mr. Schwarz. Let's take some of the statements that  
5 are in the telegram and deal with them specifically.

6 Paragraph 2: "There seems little doubt this will  
7 confuse ~~Colonel Wimer~~".

8 It has confused all of us here, so I suppose it would  
9 have confused him.

10 "Background for his information: both Generals Bennett  
11 and Philpott have been briefed by Broe".

12 Who told you that?

13 Mr. PHillips. I don't know for sure, but I presume  
14 this must have been Bill Broe.

15 Mr. Schwarz. Do you have any recollection of his telling  
16 you that?

17 Mr. Phillips. I do not. But I don't think that I --  
18 I don't see myself releasing that cable without being sure that  
19 Broe knew what was going out in that cable. In other words,  
20 that is hthe kind of cable that I wouldn't have released  
21 just because someone else came in and said that sort of thing.  
22 This cable I think must have originated either with a dis-  
23 cussion with Broe that said, look, send the following word,  
24 write up something like this, or perhaps some notes, and say,  
25 do a cable from it, or just as possible -- and I can't read it

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1 here -- is the fact that it was actually drafted by someone  
 2 else that was working in my shop, ~~Mr. Plonizio~~, or someone  
 3 else, that went in and talked to Broe. Maybe I was doing some-  
 4 thing else, and they came to me with a typed thing and said,  
 5 here, I cleared this with Broe, and so he signed both things.  
 6 So I really can't remember.

7 Mr. Schwarz. Under either assumption, either that Broe  
 8 spoke to you directly or that someone on your staff  
 9 spoke to Broe, you had Broe around at the time this cable goes  
 10 out?

11 Mr. Phillips. Yes.

12 Mr. Schwarz. Then why wouldn't he sign it?

13 Mr. Phillips. Here is one thing. At the time the cable  
 14 went out -- I can't remember well enough if it was late at  
 15 night.

16 Mr. Schwarz. Does the time up above indicate 11:59?

17 Mr. Phillips. Where do you see that?

18 Mr. Schwarz. In the upper lefthand corner. It has  
 19 a date 14 October 17, and right above that is 11:59 --

20 Mr. Phillips. Right.

21 Mr. Schwarz. -- in the customary place for the time.

22 Mr. Phillips. I don't see that on this copy.

23 The point I am trying to make is, if Mr. Broe were  
 24 leaving the office and we had gone through this exchange, and  
 25 he had done it with someone else in my office, he might well

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1 and saying, look, we want you to go along with this and use  
2 Colonel Wimert down there, he is really important to us, and  
3 that sort of thing, and was perhaps slightly embarrassed  
4 by the fact that they had been doing that before. That is the  
5 only explanation I can give.

6 Mr. Schwarz. So you would assume that these new  
7 interested parties and the several persons referred to in  
8 the two sentences are persons who were in higher authority  
9 than Bennett and Philpott?

10 Mr. Phillips. I assume that, but do not know. I just --  
11 this thing was being so closely held, it just doesn't seem  
12 logical to me that they would start going outside and down,  
13 I thought that they would go outside and up. But I say, I  
14 only assume that.

15 Mr. Schwarz. You have characterized Exhibit 7 as itself  
16 being sort of puzzling. And the situation it deals with, as  
17 you now describe it, is one that is kind of ticklish, isn't it?

18 Mr. Phillips. I understand.

19 Mr. Schwarz. The CIA had been using Wimert and knew  
20 some people in higher authority than General Bennett, which  
21 would mean very senior in the Defense Department, right?

22 Mr. Phillips. Yes.

23 Mr. Schwarz. Or outside the Defense Department, but  
24 very senior persons. They apparently are expressing an in-  
25 terest, and according to this telegram, or your reconstruction

1 of it, General Bennett and General Philpott feel that they are  
2 embarrassed to refute the fact that they had already been doing  
3 the work for the CIA ~~through Colonel Wimert.~~

4 Now, all those things were not ordinary garden variety  
5 daily events, were they?

6 Mr. Phillips. They were not.

7 Mr. Schwarz. You don't remember this at all?

8 Mr. Phillips. No, and I didn't want to imply that it  
9 was necessarily because General Philpott would have been  
10 embarrassed, it could have been within CIA as well.

11 But this rather unusual step was made because of the  
12 talents of the military men, to bring him into a program  
13 that you weren't even talking with the State Department about.  
14 And so that indeed was unusual to a great degree. And I am  
15 really very sorry to appear to be so vague about these things  
16 that I obviously had something to do with.

17 But my explanation is that I was doing a certain job,  
18 and that other people were outside, and Mr. Karamessines would  
19 be talking with Mr. Helms about something, and this, that and  
20 the other, and I was on the day-by-day operation side, and when  
21 someone would come in and say, we want something to go down  
22 to Wimert, and it has something to do with General Philpott,  
23 I didn't pay the kind of attention I would to it if it had  
24 been one of our operations.

25 Mr. Schwarz. Go back up to the beginning at paragraph 2

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1 there were it says, "There is no doubt that this will confuse  
2 ~~Colonel Wamert.~~ Background for his information".

3 Now, there are two ways in which those words "for his  
4 information" can be read. One is that it is the genuine  
5 background.

6 The other is that it is a story to be given ~~Wamert~~ for  
7 his information, which is the fact, if you know, and which way  
8 do you read it if you do not know what the facts are?

9 Mr. Phillips. I assume that it is the true story, because  
10 nowhere during this period did I encounter anything, nor do  
11 I remember anything that I thought was devious to the extent  
12 of falsehood in putting something down like that.

13 So, I assume that it is really for his background of  
14 what happened.

15 Mr. Schwarz. And you don't remember from where you got  
16 the information which you provided in this cable?

17 Mr. Phillips. I do not. Perhaps I can be more helpful  
18 after you talk to others. But I simply do not.

19 Mr. Schwarz. The last paragraphs make the notation  
20 "that we must advise General Bennett time when ~~Wamert~~ shown"  
21 the telegram which is Exhibit 3.

22 Did you advise General Bennett?

23 Mr. Phillips. I did not. If it was done -- and I  
24 presume it was -- I was not involved, and wouldn't have been  
25 involved. And they would not have sent me over to see General

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Bennett, who was the head of DIA at the time. So, I don't know that it was.

Mr. Schwarz. Which is the tab at which the reply from Wimert is located? Is it K?

Mr. Treverton. K, yes.

Mr. Schwarz. Would you mark as the next exhibit, Exhibit 8, another cable to headquarters, "Eyes only for Lieutenant General Bennett ~~from Colonel Wimert~~".

(The document referred to was marked Phillips Exhibit No. 8 for identification.)

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1 Mr. Schwarz. Can you tell from the face of it, are we  
2 correct that this is a document that was sent from the CIA  
3 station in Santiago to CIA headquarters purporting to come  
4 from **Colonel Wilmert** and purporting to be directed to Lieutenant  
5 General Bennett?

6 Mr. Phillips. That is true.

7 Mr. Schwarz. In the ordinary course to whom would  
8 such a cable go? And the second question, who would have the  
9 responsibility of passing information on to General Bennett?

10 Mr. Phillips. In the ordinary course of events this cable  
11 would have come to me where I was working in the sense of an  
12 info copy and this, that and the other.

13 The action on this cable would have certainly have gone  
14 at least to Mr. Broe, and possibly higher, because it says,  
15 this is his message to the head of another government  
16 service. And so it would have gone to that level.

17 Mr. Schwarz. And in the ordinary course it would have  
18 come to you first, and then it would have been passed on to  
19 either Mr. Broe or someone higher to take action?

20 Mr. Phillips. For action -- not always. Sometimes a  
21 cable will come in and there will be more than one copy.  
22 And right away the action copy will go to the other fellow, and  
23 then you get the information copy, and so forth.

24 Mr. Schwarz. Can you tell from the face of this cable  
25 whether there would have been more than one copy?

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1 Mr. Phillips. There is no indicator to say who it went  
2 to.

3 Mr. Schwarz. Does the "eyes only" have any significance  
4 to you in the third line?

5 Mr. Phillips. Only in the sense that what **Colonel**  
6 **Wilmert** was saying was, this may go over to the Defense Depart-  
7 ment, but not through regular channels, and not to anyone else  
8 other than General Bennett.

9 Mr. Schwarz. Did it go to General Bennett?

10 Mr. Phillips. I do not know.

11 Mr. Schwarz. And did you pass it to someone?

12 Mr. Phillips. If it did not go it would have been  
13 highly unusual for a message to come in from overseas saying,  
14 give this to the head of another Agency, and for it not to  
15 be delivered it would have been extremely unusual.

16 Mr. Schwarz. What would be the normal form of its  
17 delivery? Would there be a cover note put on it?

18 Mr. Phillips. It would have probably been folded  
19 into an envelope and delivered by hand. Because if it is  
20 really an "eyes only" message of such import, if it goes  
21 through a communications channel, it means that they are going  
22 to be operators of machinery to see it, and so forth. If  
23 an American Ambassador overseas wants to get a very sensitive  
24 message up he has the option of sending it to us and saying,  
25 will you please hand carry this over to the Secretary of State?

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No DoD objection to public disclosure pursuant to P.L. 102-526, except for 5/12/94

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Mr. Schwarz. This message states:

"Please deliver the following message, ('destroy immediately') ~~to Colonel Wamert~~ eyes only from Lieutenant General Bennett." And the message was: "For your information suspension temporarily imposed on MAP and FMS has been rescinded".

What are MAP and FMS.

Mr. Phillips. Military Assistance of some kind or another, Military Arms Procurement, or something like that.

Mr. Schwarz. Military Assistance Program?

Mr. Phillips. That is probably it.

Mr. Schwarz. And what is FMS?

Mr. Inderfurther. Foreign Military Sales.

Mr. Schwarz. Continuing: "This action does not, repeat not, imply change in our estimated situation. On the contrary, it is intended to place us in a posture in which we can formally cut off assistance if Allende elected and situation develops as we anticipate. Request up date of situation".

Now, Bennett's job at that time was what?

Mr. Phillips. I believe he was the Chief of DIA.

Mr. Schwarz. Defense Intelligence Agency?

Mr. Phillips. Yes.

Mr. Schwarz. Is the Defense Intelligence Agency responsible for decisions to military assistance programs?

Mr. Phillips. My opinion is that they are not.

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1 Mr. Schwarz. And they don't really have anything to  
2 do with that, do they?

3 Mr. Phillips. I would gather from this message that  
4 it is simply an explanation from -- it says General Bennett  
5 to Wilmert, to explain something. As a part of Track I, and the  
6 whole business, all of these different options were being  
7 looked at and people were saying, let's don't help them with  
8 military things because it looks like Allende is going to get  
9 in. And the decision was made, well, let's go ahead  
10 and do it. And this was apparently sort of a request for

11 Colonel Wilmert to give him some rationale behind it when he  
12 was down there running away trying to foment the coup,  
13 saying, why is the U.S. Government still helping this govern-  
14 ment?

15 I am speculating. But this was another one of those  
16 messages quote unquote which went in our channels.

17 Mr. Schwarz. Who gave you this message?

18 Mr. Phillips. I do not remember.

19 Mr. Schwarz. You have no recollection whatsoever?

20 Mr. Phillips. Sir, it is five years ago, and there are  
21 a lot of messages, and as I said, these were the ones that  
22 I was the least interested in in the sense of being involved,  
23 and so forth, and I just can't remember who handed it to me  
24 or how it arrived.

25 Mr. Schwarz. Would you expect that there should be  
another document which contains the purported message from

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1 Mr. Fenn. Yes.

2 Mr. Schwarz. Talking about telephones, incidentally,  
3 was there a secure telephone between Washington and Santiago  
4 which was used for messages, or did you use the cable always?

5 Mr. Phillips. We never used the telephone, unless it is  
6 a personal message like your aunt died and you have to get on  
7 the next plane for the funeral. Otherwise you use those  
8 absolutely marvelous communications facilities that get it  
9 down there --a flash cable will get there in 20 minutes.

10 In the recess I have been thinking about this, and I re-  
11 alize that I have not been very helpful in what obviously is  
12 a contradictory situation here. As I read it, either General  
13 Bennett does not recall this, or else there was some sort of  
14 endeavor within CIA headquarters to use his name. Is that  
15 the approach we are making to this?

16 Mr. Schwarz. I don't think we are trying any approach.  
17 He has denied any knowledge of this.

18 Senator Schweiker. We are just confused.

19 Mr. Phillips. Maybe I am confused, too.

20 Senator Schweiker. Can you enlighten us at all?

21 Mr. PHillips. If it were someone in CIA headquarters  
22 saying, we are going to use Bennett's name without his  
23 knowledge because it has a lot of clout, I don't understand  
24 why. Because the messages went from Philpott to Colonel Wimer.  
25 And Colonel Wimer said, I am with you 100 percent, and from

1 that moment began cooperating with the Chief of Station. I don't  
2 recall any instance where there was any indication of hesitancy  
3 on his part about doing what he was doing.

4 And I certainly can't comment about General Bennett's  
5 side, not having been involved with him.

6 From the CIA side I suppose it is conceivable that some-  
7 one is using that business that I referred to in dispatches,  
8 General Bennett says, when they are really talking about  
9 what a subordinate of General Bennett says, and they figure  
10 he is acting for them, or something like that. I guess that  
11 is conceivable.

12 But I would find it very unusual to see some sort of  
13 little plot hatched here, because there was no need to.

14 Mr. Schwarz. What you are saying is that you can't see  
15 a motive?

16 Mr. Phillips. Precisely.

17 I can't see the motive for fooling Colonel Wimer, be-  
18 cause Colonel Wimer had already started working when he re-  
19 ceived the instructions from the number two man in his Agency,  
20 which is indeed pretty high up.

21 So, I am afraid the reasons that I am not being helpful  
22 is that I, too, am confused.

23 Mr. Schwarz. I just received a note indicating that  
24 Mr. Bolten of the Agency has told us that both of the October  
25 14 cables were authored by you. I don't know if that adds

1 Senator Schweiker. Let me ask counsel this.  
2 Can we establish that Philpott did communicate --  
3 Mr. Schwarz. Philpott is going to testify on Tuesday.  
4 We have talked to him. He accepts at least one message. There  
5 are two which purport to be signed by him, and he is not  
6 sure if he accepted two.

7 Senator Schweiker. So, he has accepted one message?

8 Mr. Schwarz. He accepted one message, yes.

9 Mr. Phillips. You wanted to ask about a meeting.

10 Mr. Schwarz. It was a final meeting you had with Helms?

11 Mr. Phillips. Yes.

12 The death of General Schneider had occurred. And while,  
13 as we said previously, things had fallen into place according  
14 to "plan", an egregious plan, it was absolutely my conviction  
15 that those orders that I had been predicting, which were very,  
16 very slim, were now completely unacceptable, one reason being  
17 that the inauguration was going to be in 48 hours -- not the  
18 inauguration, but the confirmation, and so forth.

19 And so as I recall, there was a meeting of quite a few  
20 of us, probably myself and Mr. Pionzio and Mr. Broe and Mr.  
21 Karamessines, and maybe Mr. Flannery, -- no, I guess not, but  
22 I do remember that meeting going up there and saying, if there  
23 ever was a chance, it is now finished, and somebody has got to  
24 say that it is finished. And so that is what I meant by that  
25 meeting.

1 what happens, it is all right with me. There was an inlet inside  
2 of Domingo which was dubbed, the Pasino, the swimming pool,  
3 and that is where Trujillo threw his friends and enemies  
4 to the sharks. And he used to hang people on meat hooks in  
5 refrigerated vaults. And it sometimes took them several days  
6 to die.

7 Miss Culbreth. You had served ~~as Chief of Station~~ in  
8 the Dominican Republic prior to the time that you served in  
9 this position on the Track II party?

10 Mr. Phillips. I have, after the assassination of  
11 Trujillo. But as a student of Latin America, I was very much  
12 aware of this. So, there is another aspect of involvement.  
13 U.S. policy has been to retreat from Trujillo. We cut off our  
14 arms aid, we brought our Ambassador out of there. So, while  
15 those plans were going on we weren't "dealing with a friendly  
16 nation", relations were very bad.

17 Miss Culbreth. Let me ask you this. After General  
18 Schneider's death was his death characterized by you or by  
19 your colleagues in the CIA as having been an assassination?

20 Mr. Phillips. It certainly was not. And I do not do  
21 that now.

22 Miss Culbreth. You would not this day characterize  
23 his death as having been an assassination?

24 Mr. Phillips. No. I think it was an accident that  
25 occurred because he turned out to be such a brave man that

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1 when he looked up and he saw a bunch of people standing  
2 around his car he drew his gun.

3 Miss Culbreth. Thank you.

4 I would like to direct your attention to this cable  
5 that you were questioned about. It is the one that is dated  
6 September 27, 1970. And Mr. Schwarz read from that cable in  
7 talking with you earlier. This was the cable which said "A  
8 false flag base of staff would be established in Santiago by  
9 10 October".

10 And you were questioned about this part: "These  
11 officers will perform the delicate chores with great flap  
12 potential which cannot be done by station personnel or any  
13 Chilean. An example: We have a [redacted] who can pose as  
14 [redacted] intelligence officer. If he approached, funded and  
15 ran a Chilean general, any flap would be a [redacted]

16 In the second paragraph which was not read earlier,  
17 I would like to read this and then put a question to you:

18 "Headquarters believes this false flag base, manned by  
19 officers who have repeatedly proved their ability to operate  
20 and recruit under false colors, will give station great  
21 flexibility in handling delicate and fast-moving situations  
22 securely".

23 To me this second paragraph indicates that these false  
24 flag officers were people that had experience in this very  
25 kind of intelligence operations, is that correct?

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1 Mr. Phillips. Every one of them was known to me per-  
2 sonally and had worked for me.

3 Miss Culbreth. And had been in this kind of capacity  
4 as a false flag officer?

5 Mr. Phillips. Yes.

6 Miss Culbreth. So, this was not some unique and unusual,  
7 devious approach or mechanism that was being employed in this  
8 instance?

9 Mr. Phillips. The purpose of that explanation, es-  
10 pecially the second paragraph that you read, was -- the imme-  
11 diate reaction, as I recall, from the station when they first  
12 heard that we were given their assignment, was, come on,  
13 that flap potential is great, it is not going to work, what  
14 are you talking about, this, that and the other.

15 As a matter of fact, as I recall, **Henry Hecksher, the**  
16 **Chief of Station,** was terribly upset, because he is a sort of  
17 an old pro, and he wanted to get into position, in other words,  
18 to plan for the future, and all of a sudden this new thing  
19 came in. The purpose of that cable was to explain to the  
20 station that we had been given this job to do and that we  
21 at headquarters saw that as the safest way for them to  
22 accomplish the job that they had been given with the least  
23 possibility of embarrassing the American Ambassador, and that  
24 sort of thing.

25 Senator Schweiker. You said earlier, Mr. Phillips, I think

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1 in contact, but we didn't see it as such a sure thing; even  
2 though this says, probably by General Viaux and so forth.

3 Miss Culbreth. Was there any question in your mind  
4 as principal operating officer here in the states that there  
5 was a delineation or a demarcation of function between the  
6 Viaux group and the Valenzuela group, or did you regard them  
7 as one big group down there accomplishing this, or did you really  
8 regard them as separate groups?

9 Mr. Phillips. I very definitely regarded them as two  
10 separate groups, always with the caveat that in Latin America  
11 some one always has a cousin who talks to someone else.  
12 But I very definitely regarded them as two separate groups,  
13 and when General Viaux was called off earlier in October, I  
14 thought that General Viaux was out of the thing, and I thought  
15 that without support that he wasn't going to try anything.

16 And then we had the other group which seemed to be  
17 more serious people, and with more capabilities. And I  
18 very definitely regarded them as two separate groups.

19 Miss Culbreth. Let me ask just a few questions that  
20 might sort of help us a little bit in our housekeeping opera-  
21 tions when we get to the point of trying to tie everything up  
22 on these.

23 With regard to the information that was given to you,  
24 the specific instructions on these cables that were sent to the  
25 Chief of Station and were directed to Colonel Wimer, who can

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Senator Hart of Michigan. Anyone else?

Mr. Johnston. Mr. Phillips, just one last question. How large was the room you were operating out of? You described it as a small windowless room.

Mr. Phillips. About from here to your wall back there -- no, not that big.

Mr. Johnston. This was the entire control area for the Task Force?

Mr. Phillips. That is right.

Mr. Johnston. How many people were on the Task Force besides you?

Mr. Phillips. Of course we had two shifts of secretaries, there was someone there all night, and that sort of thing. There were two or three secretaries, myself, Mr. ~~Poinzio~~, six, eight, something like that.

Mr. Johnston. And that included the secretaries?

Mr. Phillips. Yes.

Mr. Johnston. How many action officers were in the room?

Mr. Phillips. It was pretty much ~~Mr. Poinzio~~ and myself, as the real action officers. And then there were two junior officers that were assisting at the time. I think I have given Mr. O'Flaherty their names previously. So that was four. And there was someone from the CIA shop, the Counterintelligence ship, whose name I can't remember today. So that is five officers that I recall. And I think that there was a 6th that

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