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Page:1

## JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

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TESTIMONY BY LANSDALE CONCERNING ALLEGED ASSASSINATION PLOTS  
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Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

1 Mr. Schwarz. These are minutes of the Special Group which  
 2 you attended, and it states: "Mr. Harvey gave a rundown on  
 3 progress to date with agent teams and in the general field of  
 4 intelligence, including the Opa-locka interrogation center and  
 5 the  clandestine interrogation center. He outlined  
 6 various difficulties encountered and said that three agent teams  
 7 had been infiltrated."

8 Now did Mr. Harvey, at that meeting, state anything -- do  
 9 you recollect Mr. Harvey making that report?

10 General Lansdale. In general terms, yes.

11 Mr. Schwarz. Did he state anything relating to the  
 12 passage of pills to persons to accomplish the assassination of  
 13 Fidel Castro in the week prior to this meeting?

14 General Lansdale. No. As a matter of fact, we were very  
 15 proud that he had gotten these teams in, that they had been  
 16 infiltrated, and so forth, and collecting intelligence.

17 Mr. Schwarz. Were they the first teams?

18 General Lansdale. Yes.

19 Mr. Schwarz. Did he say anything at that meeting that  
 20 you recall about the subject of assassinations?

21 General Lansdale. Nothing.

22 Mr. Schwarz. Would you give the witness the May 7th '62  
 23 memorandum of General Taylor, Subject, Report of Progress to  
 24 Higher Authority?

25 Now, Senators, that is supposedly slipped in your notebooks

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

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FILE  
N. B.

Program Review by  
Brig. Gen. E. G. Lansdale,  
Chief of Operations

SENSITIVE

18 January 1962

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THE CUBA PROJECT

FILE  
N. B.

I. OBJECTIVE

The U.S. objective is to help the Cubans overthrow the Communist regime from within Cuba and institute a new government with which the United States can live in peace.

II. CONCEPT OF OPERATION

Basically, the operation is to bring about the revolt of the Cuban people. The revolt will overthrow the Communist regime and institute a new government with which the United States can live in peace.

The revolt requires a strongly motivated political action movement established within Cuba, to generate the revolt, to give it direction towards the objective, and to capitalize on the climactic moment. The political actions will be assisted by economic warfare to induce failure of the Communist regime to supply Cuba's economic needs, psychological operations to turn the peoples' resentment increasingly against the regime, and military-type groups to give the popular movement an action arm for sabotage and armed resistance in support of political objectives.

The failure of the U.S. -sponsored operation in April 1961 so shook the faith of Cuban patriots in U.S. competence and intentions in supporting a revolt against Castro that a new effort to generate a revolt against the regime in Cuba must have active support from key Latin American countries. Further, the foreignness (Soviet Union and Bloc) of the tyranny imposed on the Cuban people must be made clear to the people of the Western Hemisphere to the point of their deep anger and open actions to defend the Western Hemisphere against such foreign invasion. Such an anger will be generated, in part, by appeals from the popular movement within Cuba to other Latin Americans especially.

The preparation phase must result in a political action organization in being in key localities inside Cuba, with its own means for internal communications, its own voice for psychological operations, and its own action arm (small guerrilla bands, sabotage squads, etc.). It must have the sympathetic support of the majority of the Cuban people, and make this fact known to the outside world. (It is reported that the majority of Cubans are not for the present regime, but are growing apathetic towards what appears to be a hopeless future or the futility of their status.)

The climactic moment of revolt will come from an angry reaction of the people to a government action (sparked by an incident), or from a fracturing of the leadership cadre within the regime, or both. (A major goal of the Project must be to bring this about.) The popular movement

FILE  
N. B.

44-103-19-14	
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22 MAY 15 1962	
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1 (C)  
1 (K)  
of March 30  
(9 pages)

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## H. TV intrusion

Status: Equipment to enable TV intrusion of Havana TV broadcasts has been reactivated on a small vessel under CIA control. CIA plans to attempt intrusion on 22 January during Castro's forthcoming speech and parade demonstrations.

## I. Special sabotage support

Status: State has explored, with negative results, the feasibility of pre-emptive action with respect to tanker charters (most Bloc shipments to Cuba are carried in Western bottoms). CIA has initiated action to contaminate POL supplies for Cuba, although visible results (stoppage of some Cuban transport) is not expected until mid-1962. CIA is introducing ~~"Lubzol,"~~ a corrosive additive, to Cuban locomotive diesel fuel oil through commercial suppliers in Belgium. ~~It will be 4-6 months before the first locomotives break down.~~ CIA expects to be able to have at least one agent recruited by 28 February to attempt introduction of a corrosive additive to jet fuel storage tanks in Cuba.

## J. Military actions

Status: Defense has been tasked with preparing a contingency plan for U.S. military action, in case the Cuban people request U.S. help when their revolt starts making headway. This contingency plan will permit obtaining a policy decision on the major point of U.S. intentions, and is looked upon as a positive political-psychological factor in a people's revolt, even more than as a possible military action. Defense also has been tasked with fully assisting State and CIA, as commitments of Defense men, money, and materiel are required.

## K. Major elements of the population

Status: Both State and CIA are continuing to explore their capabilities (with results largely negative to date) for mounting special group operations inside Cuba focused upon dynamic elements of the population, particularly operations through the Church to reach the women and families, and through Labor contacts to reach the workers. Other elements include enlistment of the youth and professional groupings. Special consideration is to be given to doing this through Latin American operational contacts. This is vital to the success of our political action nucleus when CIA can put it into place.

## L. Outlook

Status: As reported to the Special Group last week, there has been a period of a realistic second look at CIA capabilities to mount the required clandestine operations against Cuba, and a subsequent start in "tooling up." After this second look, CIA has concluded that its realistic role should be to create at least the illusion of a popular movement, to win external support for it, to improve CIA operational capability, and to help create a climate which will permit provocative actions in support of a shift to overt action. This outlook, although arrived at thoughtfully within CIA, is far short of the Cuba project's goals. CIA must take yet another hard look at its potential capabilities, in the light of the following tasking, to determine if it cannot make the greater effort required.

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SENSITIVE

V. TARGET SCHEDULE

A. Intelligence

Task 1: NIE 85-62 on Cuba due 7 February (CIA).

Task 2: By 15 February, Opa Locka Interrogation Center to be made an effective operation for collection and processing of intelligence (CIA with support of Defense, State, I&NS, FBI).

Task 3: Intelligence collection from Cuban refugees elsewhere than Miami area. CIA to survey other refugee points (Puerto Rico, [redacted] etc.) and on a priority basis to ensure maximum coverage of all such source points. 15 February target date.

Task 4: CIA to continue its re-examination of intelligence assets, with priority on agents inside Cuba, and report on capability by 15 February. Also included is coverage of intelligence through third country sources, particularly those having diplomatic relations with Cuba.

B. Political

Task 5: CIA to submit plan by 1 February for defection of top Cuban government officials, to fracture the regime from within. This effort must be imaginative and bold enough to consider a "name" defector to be worth at least a million U. S. dollars. This can be the key to our political action goal and must be mounted without delay as a major CIA project.

Task 6: CIA to complete plans by 1 February for Cover and Deception actions, to help fracture the Communist regime in Cuba. Defense, State and FBI are to collaborate on this.

Task 7: By 1 February, CIA to submit operations schedule for initiating popular movement within Cuba. This must include localities selected inside Cuba, assessment of selected Cubans, their infiltration, activity assignments, and political platform. One section must deal with the "underground," assess its true status and plans to use it.

Task 8: State to follow up the OAS meeting by having U. S. Embassies in Latin America exploit all opportunities to enlist local sympathy for the Cuban people and to increase hostility towards the Communist regime in Cuba. State to submit report on results of this assignment by 13 February, so further planning can be programmed.

Task 9: By 15 February, State to submit an inventory of operational assets in the Caribbean area, including capabilities of local governments or groups to mount operations on their own, to help achieve the Project's goals. Plans for early use of such capabilities are due by 19 February.

Task 10: CIA to submit operational schedule for using assets in the Caribbean area to achieve the Project's political action goals. The objective of working on dynamic elements of the Cuban population (such as workers, farmers) is underscored. Due 19 February.

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OFFICE OF THE RECEIVED  
JAN 29 1962  
ATTORNEY GENERAL  
27 JAN 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

FILE  
N. B.

Handwritten: *File N.B. #4*

From: Brig. Gen. Lansdale *Ed*

FILE  
N. B.

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Noting that you will be away from the country most of the month of February, there are some matters vital to our Project for which we should provide. Certain proposals should have evidence of your support. Some strong decisions may have to be made if our Project is to win its goal -- and the bureaucratic machine has too many people captive to it, one way or another.

It is my hope that you will make someone specifically responsible to speak for your determined course and have the role of being your "presence" as far as possible. This demands a personal conviction, freedom from bureaucratic instincts, and reasonably direct access to the President. Perhaps Dick Goodwin could fulfill this role. Secretary McNamara is an alternate suggestion; he has so many irons in the fire that I hesitated mentioning him. You might be considering General Taylor, but I do not believe he can quite play this role; he is still too much a fine military bureaucrat at heart.

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N. B.

As you know, I remain convinced that our goal can be won. Perhaps, if we can keep forcing U. S. agencies to work hard at it, the goal can be won through their efforts. Yet, their efforts haven't been impressive to date, and I still feel that we might uncork the touchdown play independently of the institutional program we are spurring.

It may be a special effort which professional labor operators can launch to stir up workers in Latin America and Cuba. It may be through ethnic-language groups [redacted] has an untapped action potential. It could be a warming-up of the always lively youth element in Latin America and Cuba, through some contacts specially used. It could be with the families through the Church, with families

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*(2 pages)  
By March 22 94  
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FILE  
N. B.

44-03-19-14  
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
22 JUN 6 1962  
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ATTORNEY GENERAL

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F. SABOTAGE SUPPORT PLAN

ACTIVITY

1. Sabotage Cuban supply of nickel to Soviets.
2. Sabotage fuel supply.
3. Sabotage communications.
4. Sabotage power supply.

PURPOSE

- To deny supply to Soviets and to hinder Cuba's ability to pay for Bloc imports.
- To cripple transportation.
- To dramatize and encourage the spirit of resistance.
- To increase strain on regime and bring daily business to a standstill, by dramatic action all people will note.

CONSIDERATIONS

This can be an early sabotage action on the Nicaro Plant by a hit-and-run team based outside Cuba. Destruction of transformers, coolant pumps and towers seems more feasible than blocking the channel. Effect can be supported later by denial of [redacted] spare parts.

Effects of CIA program of lubricating oil additive is expected on locomotives ~~in June-July~~. Much more can be done with fuel contaminants, particularly on jet and diesel fuels. Crews aboard Western tankers offer real opportunity for more vigorous program.

Prime targets for hit-and-run teams based outside Cuba are CMQ TV and the Czech radio transmitter (believed now used to jam U. S. broadcasts). Attacks mounted only when operationally feasible. The G-2 micro-wave net should be dealt with when there are sufficient assets inside to make sabotage coincide with a critical need, in August-September.

This should be a concerted attack, as feasible in July-August, on power plants at Havana, Santiago, Cinfuegas, Vicente, Santa Clara, Cuatro Caminos, Matanzas. It is of a type requiring detailed planning and special equipment, and can be mounted from outside Cuba.

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TOP SECRET SENSITIVE

1 - 15 March 1962 (cont)

ACTIVITY

PURPOSE

CONSIDERATIONS

4. \* Caribbean Admission Center, Opa-Locka, Florida, fully activated by 15 March 1962.

To collect intelligence required for the operations, to identify and earmark intelligence assets as refugees arrive, and to provide security against Communist agent operations.

This operation, in response to early recommendation as essential by the Chief of Operations, is moving at utmost speed to become fully active by 15 March, with a new building completed and occupied, and with a staff of 43 at work. Operations commenced 15 February and, as of 9 March, 33 people were active at the Center. (CIA responsibility, with support by Defense, Justice, State, USIA.)

5. \* Periodic intelligence estimates, as required by progress of operations.

To up-date NIE 85-62, so that current estimates can be considered at national policy levels.

As the operations develop, there will be both increased intelligence collection and a need for as current an Intelligence Estimate as the U. S. can produce meaningfully. It is likely that a more informal method of producing an Intelligence Estimate for use at the national level (than now governing the issuance of NIE's) may have to be followed. CIA is now publishing daily intelligence summaries on Cuba and is planning a bi-monthly or weekly report summing up intelligence for this purpose. (CIA responsibility, with support of others as required.)

OTHER OPERATIONS

6. \* Continue negotiating for British help in contaminating locomotive lubricants.

To cripple Cuba's rail transportation.

British assistance is required to undertake a successful sabotage of Cuban locomotives, through contaminating lubricants. It is expected that a minimum of 3 months is required before locomotives in Cuba start breaking down, once the contaminant is introduced.

16 - 31 March 1962

00208

INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS

7. \* Two teams of agents dispatched to Cuba.

To collect intelligence.

One team of 4 and one team of 3 agents. Both teams include personnel who have had resistance training and some past experience.

\* Items marked by asterisk were approved by Special Group (Augmented), 5 March 1962

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16 - 31 March 1962 (cont.)

ACTIVITY

PURPOSE

CONSIDERATIONS

8. Establish 2 additional third-country resident agents in Cuba.
9. By 31 March, have 105 agents selected and 50 agents trained.
- 10.\* Develop intelligence potential of Cuban "colonies" in U. S.
- 11.\* Develop additional interrogation centers in other areas by 31 March 1962.

To collect intelligence.

To ready agent operations.

To exploit the intelligence possibilities of former residents of Cuba (including U. S. citizens) now in the United States.

To collect intelligence in a Latin atmosphere, at different levels than now seem possible in the continental U. S., to spot additional intelligence assets and to provide security against Communist agent operations.

Possible future use in communications and support.

Effectiveness and numbers are dependent upon purpose of recruitment, nature of training, and policy decisions controlling these factors. If the recruitment and training are for resistance activities, the task of recruitment and training will be much less difficult than if they are limited to intelligence-collection purposes only.

There are "colonies" in Washington, D. C., and other U. S. cities which are "little Cubas." Family, Church, and business interests provoke unusual personal ties inside Cuba for some of these residents; a real potential exists for collection of intelligence not otherwise available. (FBI support and coordination is basic in this effort.)

As Opa-Locka becomes fully activated, CIA will activate other interrogation centers as promptly as feasible. A center is being activated in ~~Spain~~. Negotiations with local authorities are being undertaken to activate centers, if possible, in ~~Mexico City, Caracas, and Asaba~~. San Juan, Puerto Rico, ~~and Santiago, Chile~~ are being surveyed for possible centers. (CIA responsibility with support by others as necessary.)

OTHER OPERATIONS

None.

\* Items marked by asterisk were approved by Special Group (Augmented), 5 March 1962.

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TOP SECRET

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

12 March 1962

A-33  
EXA #12

SENSITIVE

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SPECIAL GROUP (AUGMENTED)

From: Brig. Gen. Lansdale SL

Subject: Policy Questions, Operation Mongoose

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of 3/24/94

(C), declassified

As Operation Mongoose goes into the approved activities of Phase I, a number of policy questions have started to arise. Current problems, needing resolution, are listed below. It is requested that the Special Group (Augmented) provide guidance, as a matter of some urgency.

1. Use of U.S. military installations. CIA desires to train small groups of Cuban nationals ~~on the U.S. Air Force Bombing Range, Avon Park, Florida,~~ immediately. Defense reports that the proposed area is adequate for this training, but that such training of covert agents who will be introduced ultimately into Cuba represents a security problem and a departure from past security procedures, due to the fact that U.S. Government sponsorship will be apparent to trainees. Capture and interrogation of any of these covert agents could result in exposure (in international news media) of U.S. official involvement in efforts to unseat the present Communist Cuban regime. A policy determination is needed as to whether or not agents to be infiltrated into Cuba should be trained on U.S. Government installations.

There are other U.S. military installations and properties, in the Southeastern U.S. and Caribbean areas, which CIA would like to use for similar training and operational purposes in the future. The same policy determination could cover all uses of identifiable U.S. Government properties for training and deployment of Cuban nationals for covert infiltration into Cuba.

2. Arming of Cuban guerrillas. CIA needs a policy determination on the supplying of arms and equipment to deserving Cuban guerrillas, as they are located, assessed, and request help. Such requests are starting to surface, as the intelligence-collection effort is increased, and it is

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EX-4-#13

3 May 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Minutes of Meeting of Special Group (Augmented) on Project Mongoose, 3 May 1962

PRESENT: General Taylor; Mr. Kennedy; Mr. Johnson; Mr. Gilpatric, General Decker, General Lansdale and General Craig; Mr. McCone, and Mr. Harvey

1. General Lansdale gave an interim report on the progress of stepping up recruitment of Cubans into the U. S. Army. He said the consensus is that there are not more than a thousand suitable individuals from whom additional recruits could be selected. The Attorney General commented that the President wishes to have a large number. General Lansdale said that various alternatives for training of such Cubans are being looked into.

It was agreed that such a cadre of Cubans would be an asset to the U.S., which might be used in a number of ways. General Lansdale, supported by General Taylor, pointed out that in this connection the matter of holding the individuals and giving them useful employment after they are trained is an important and a difficult one.

2. Mr. Harvey gave a rundown on progress to date with agent teams and in the general field of intelligence, including the Opa-locka interrogation center and the ~~Madrid~~ clandestine interrogation center. He outlined various difficulties encountered, and said that three agent teams have been infiltrated and that five W/T sets are in place. Approximately 72 actual or potential reporting sources are also in place. A significant development is that Major Duque has refused to allow agents responsive to him to be dispatched on purely intelligence-gathering missions. (This sort of attitude had been forecast earlier as a possibility, but it now assumes particular importance in view of Duque's stature.)

3. Mr. Harvey also commented on the two attempts made to intrude into Havana TV programs. The Group asked that a check be made, as soon as possible, on how effective these operations were. They also asked that a copy of the scripts used be made available. The Group felt that it is worthwhile to check this capability out, as is now being done, but questioned whether once proved effective it should not perhaps be kept in reserve for a more meaningful time.

*Th. Parrott*  
Thomas A. Parrott

cc: General Lansdale

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