

8/17/75

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Date:10/05/93

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IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : SSCIA
RECORD NUMBER : 157-10005-10258

RECORDS SERIES :

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AGENCY FILE NUMBER : R681

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : SSCIA
FROM :
TO :

TITLE :
TRANSCRIPT/REPORT OF PROCEEDINGS/EXHIBITS

DATE : 08/01/75
PAGES : 86

SUBJECTS :
TESTIMONY AND EXHIBITS BY MR. WEATHERBY
EXHIBITS 1-5

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT/TRANSCRIPT
CLASSIFICATION : T
RESTRICTIONS : REFERRED
CURRENT STATUS : P
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 10/05/93

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS :
BOX 261-1

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

R681

The United States Senate

INVENTORIED:
ON 5/26/77
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
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C O N T E N T S

TESTIMONY OF

Mr. Weatherby

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EXECUTIVE SESSION

- - -

Friday, August 1, 1975

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United States Senate,

Select Committee to Study Governmental

Operations With Respect to

Intelligence Activities,

Washington, D. C.

The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:15 o'clock p.m. in Room 608, The Carroll Arms, Senator Morgan presiding.

Present: Senator Morgan (presiding).

Also present: Frederick Baron, Robert Kelley, and John Bayly, Professional Staff Members.

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P R O C E E D I N G S

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2 Mr. Baron. Mr. Weatherby, before we start there are
3 a few procedural matters that we should discuss.

4 First, is it true that you are testifying here under
5 alias today?

6 Mr. Weatherby. That is correct.

7 Mr. Baron. And is it not also true that we have made an
8 agreement that you have signed to indicate your true identity
9 and to indicate the fact that your true identity will be on
10 file at the CIA available to the Committee if it needs to
11 verify it for some reason or other?

12 Mr. Weatherby. That is also correct.

13 Mr. Baron. And is it your understanding that we also have
14 an agreement that we will refer to agent AMLASH by his cryptonym
15 rather than by his true name to preserve his true identity?

16 Mr. Weatherby. Yes, that is understood.

17 Mr. Baron. Okay.

18 You understand that you have the right to counsel here
19 today?

20 Mr. Weatherby. I do.

21 Mr. Baron. And you are appearing voluntarily without
22 counsel?

23 Mr. Weatherby. I am.

24 Mr. Baron. Are you aware of the fact that you can stop
25 at any point during this examination and request to consult

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1 with counsel?

2 Mr. Weatherby. Yes, I do.

3 Mr. Baron. And are you also aware that you have all of
4 your Constitutional rights intact before this Committee,
5 including your Fifth Amendment right to remain silent in the
6 face of a question that you might find incriminating for some
7 reason?

8 Mr. Weatherby. I am.

9 Mr. Baron. Before we begin with the specifics related to
10 Project AMLASH, I would just like to ask a few general questions
11 about your background in the Agency.

12 Can you explain at what point you joined Project AMLASH?

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1 TESTIMONY OF MR. WEATHERBY

2 Mr. Weatherby. I joined Project AMLASH upon returning
3 from an overseas assignment. It was a directed assignment into
4 the general operation of which AMLASH was a part.

5 Mr. Baron. So --

6 Mr. Weatherby. It was essentially in June, 1962.

7 Mr. Baron. That general assignment was in relation to
8 Cuba?

9 Mr. Weatherby. That is correct.

10 Mr. Baron. And for how long had you been working in the
11 Agency on Cuban affairs?

12 Mr. Weatherby. Never before.

13 Mr. Baron. Since what time, in other words, when did you
14 begin working on Cuban affairs?

15 Mr. Weatherby. In June, 1962.

16 Mr. Baron. I see.

17 So your previous overseas assignment was completely unre-
18 lated to Cuba?

19 Mr. Weatherby. Yes, sir.

20 Mr. Baron. How long had you been in the Agency?

21 Mr. Weatherby. Since 1956.

22 Mr. Baron. Did you have any other assignments that
23 related to Latin American affairs?

24 Mr. Weatherby. None whatsoever.

Mr. Baron. Did you have any assignments in Vietnam?

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1 Mr. Weatherby. I have, yes.

2 Mr. Baron. And did you have any assignments in the Congo?

3 Mr. Weatherby. I did.

4 Mr. Baron. Let us go off the record a second.

5 (Discussion off the record.)

6 Mr. Baron. Let's go back on the record.

7 Could you tell us what time you were assigned to Vietnam
8 and the Congo?

9 Mr. Weatherby. Yes.

10 I was assigned to Vietnam from August, 1970 involved in
11 affairs through August, 1974. I was involved with Congo
12 affairs at the Headquarters level and affairs at the Headquar-
13 ters level and on several TDY's during the period of approxi-
14 mately May, 1965 to the fall of 1968.

15 Mr. Baron. Did you ever work on Dominican Republic
16 affairs?

17 Mr. Weatherby. I have not.

18 Mr. Baron. Drawing your attention now to the period of
19 time when you were working on Cuban affairs, in what office of
20 the CIA were you doing this work?

21 Mr. Weatherby. I was working for the Task Force West,
22 which was the original name of the unit.

23 Mr. Baron. Known as Task Force W?

24 Mr. Weatherby. Yes.

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1 Mr. Weatherby. Desmond FitzGerald and also William
2 Harvey who preceeded Desmond FitzGerald.

3 Mr. Baron. When did FitzGerald take over from Harvey?

4 Mr. Weatherby. I believe it was in the late spring of
5 1963. I am not certain.

6 Mr. Baron. And can you describe the structure of Task
7 Force W at the time that you joined it under Harvey's direction?

8 Mr. Weatherby. I could tell you only about the unit in
9 which I belonged to.

10 Mr. Baron. What unit was that?

11 Mr. Weatherby. That was Third Country operations, which
12 concered obviously operations against Cubans in countries other
13 than Cuba or the United States.

14 Mr. Baron. Did that unit have a cryptonym?

15 Mr. Weatherby. It did not.

16 Mr. Baron. What was it known as in Agency jargon?

17 Mr. Weatherby. I do not remember. It was an operational
18 section, but the exact nomenclature I do not recall.

19 Mr Baron. And its purpose was to work in relation to
20 Cubans or Cuban affairs in countries other than the United
21 States or Cuba?

22 Mr. Weatherby. That is correct.

23 Mr. Baron. Do you know how many such sections there were
24 within Task Force W?

25 Mr. Weatherby. I do not recall.

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1 Mr. Baron. And who was the head of the Third Country
2 Operations section?

3 Mr. Weatherby. During my time it was the late Mr. Maurelius

4 Mr. Baron. And how do you spell that?

5 Mr. Weatherby. M-a-u-r-e-l-i-u-s.

6 Mr. Baron. What was his first name?

7 Mr. Weatherby. Edward.

8 Mr. Baron. Did you work directly under him?

9 Mr. Weatherby. I did.

10 Mr. Baron. So that in your operational capacity as a
11 case officer you would report directly to Mr. Maurelius?

12 Mr. Weatherby. That is correct, or Mr. FitzGerald, or
13 Mr. Harvey upon request.

14 Mr. Baron. Did the Chief of Task Force W; namely FitzGerald
15 or Harvey sit directly above Maurelius in the chain of command
16 within Task Force W?

17 Mr. Weatherby. He had a Deputy, but this particular unit
18 was the -- was a senior echelon operational entity.

19 Mr. Baron. What does that mean?

20 Mr. Weatherby. That means there was no other chain of
21 command between it and the Executive Head of the Task Force.

22 Mr. Baron. So that Mr. Maurelius would have reported
23 directly to the Chief of Task Force W?

24 Mr. Weatherby. Or his Deputy.

Mr. Baron. Or his Deputy.

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1 Who was Deputy Chief of Task Force W under William Harvey?

2 Mr. Weatherby. That was -- go off the record a minute.

3 Mr. Baron. Yes.

4 (Discussion off the record.)

5 Mr. Baron. Go ahead.

6 Mr. Weatherby. Let me say during my period of time there,
7 which was some thirteen years ago, there were a number of
8 Deputies and they have slipped my recall. If I do recall it,
9 I will pass it to the record.

10 Mr. Baron. Have you had a chance to refresh your recol-
11 lection generally about your activities on Task Force W?

12 Mr. Weatherby. I have not. I was informed of this
13 interview yesterday afternoon, late.

14 Mr. Baron. Did you have a chance to read the IG Report
15 before you came here today?

16 Mr. Weatherby. I did read that this morning.

17 Mr. Baron. And what sections of the IG Report did you
18 read?

19 Mr. Weatherby. I read only those portions that concerned
20 my activities with AMLASH.

21 Mr. Baron. About how many pages would that have been?

22 Mr. Weatherby. I think about six to ten.

23 Mr. Baron. And did you discuss your coming here today to
24 answer questions before the Committee with anyone who is not

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1 Mr. Weatherby. I have not.

2 Mr. Baron. And have you discussed it with anyone at the
3 CIA?

4 Mr. Weatherby. I have.

5 Mr. Baron. Could you tell us who that was?

6 Mr. Weatherby. I discussed it with the General Counsel's
7 Office, and I discussed it generally with --

8 Mr. Baron. Off the record a minute.

9 (Discussion off the record.)

10 Mr. Baron. Let's go back on the record.

11 With the AMLASH Case Officer who followed you on Task
12 Force W?

13 Mr. Weatherby. That's correct.

14 Mr. Baron. And can you relate to us the major points that
15 you discussed with the case officer who has testified before
16 us recently?

17 Mr. Weatherby. Yes, I can. I purposefully did not
18 discuss my portion of the operation with him on advice of the
19 Office of General Counsel. I talked to him in general terms
20 about, frankly, you fellows and your personalities, what I
21 could expect, and we related at lunch today old times since we
22 have not seen each other for probably at least six or seven
23 years. But I should like to reiterate we did not discuss each
24 other's part of the operation in order to preserve the integrity

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1 Mr. Baron. At any point, did anyone at the CIA tell you
2 what to say here today?

3 Mr. Weatherby. Absolutely not. In fact, if I might
4 add, they cautioned me, they told me they were not going to
5 say because that is against the rules. They made a very strong
6 point of that.

7 Mr. Baron. So we have then the understanding of the
8 fact that you have been asked to testify on very short notice
9 and that your recollection might not be pinpoint precise as
10 far as names and dates go?

11 Mr. Weatherby. Thanks, that is correct.

12 Mr. Baron. But we will try to do as much as we can to
13 refresh your recollection as we move through the events we are
14 discussing.

15 Mr. Weatherby. Yes.

16 I should like to point out for the record that I have not
17 worked in Latin American Affairs before nor afterwards, and that
18 it has been some thirteen years since I delved into this
19 material, so, therefore, please bear with me, if my answers
20 are not as complete perhaps as you wish. I shall do my best.

21 Mr. Baron. Turning back to the subject of the structure
22 of Task Force W, you were unable to recall the name of the
23 Deputy to work under Harvey. Do you recall who took over as
24 the Deputy under FitzGerald?

25 Mr. Weatherby. No. It was the same man.

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1 Mr. Baron. Would that have been Samuel Halpern?

2 Mr. Weatherby. Samuel Halpern was an Executive Officer,
3 I do believe, who was essentially divorced from operations.

4 Mr. Baron. Would it have been Bruce Cheever?

5 Mr. Weatherby. That is correct.

6 Mr. Baron. And Bruce Cheever was the Deputy Chief of
7 Task Force W during the entire period that you served on Task
8 Force W?

9 Mr. Weatherby. That is correct. I believe he had a
10 short tenure as Chief until Mr. Hart took over, John Hart.

11 Mr. Baron. When did John Hart take over as Chief of
12 Task Force W?

13 Mr. Weatherby. It was quite near the end of my time on
14 it, so I would say approximately in early spring 1965.

15 Mr. Baron. For how much of this time did you work on
16 Project AMLASH?

17 Mr. Weatherby. I worked on that project shortly after I
18 came aboard on the assignment, which would have been June
19 1962, through turning it over to the previously mentioned
20 AMLASH Case Officer in September, 1963.

21 Mr. Baron. This case officer is the man who testified
22 here under the alias of Garmire?

23 Mr. Weatherby. That is correct, sir.

24 Mr. Baron. What were your duties on Task Force W after

YOU left Project AMLASH?

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1 Mr. Weatherby. I continued to handle Third Country
2 Operations, excluding this particular operation, in a support
3 capacity.

4 Mr. Baron. With whom did you work on those operations?

5 Mr. Weatherby. We worked, we were a focal point in a,
6 and a coordination point with, the various desks of the
7 countries involved. I cannot recall the people on the desks
8 at that time.

9 Mr. Baron. Were you responsible for operations, or was
10 this simply support activities?

11 Mr. Weatherby. It was, in the bureaucratic structure
12 that we have I was responsible for providing guidance for
13 operations which were run by the individual country desks in
14 their countries.

15 Mr. Baron. Did you work out of CIA headquarters at
16 Langley?

17 Mr. Weatherby. That is correct.

18 Mr. Baron. Were you at any time stationed in Florida?

19 Mr. Weatherby. I was not.

20 Mr. Baron. During the period of time that you worked on
21 Project AMLASH, were there any other CIA officers who worked
22 closely with you?

23 Mr. Weatherby. Not at that time, with the exception of
24 Mr. Aurelius who provided guidance, and subordinate officers

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1 information of that nature that contributed for a better
2 knowledge of the operation.

3 Mr. Baron. Would you assume generally that Mr.
4 Aurelius would be intimately familiar with any operation that
5 you were running under Project AMLASH?

6 Mr. Weatherby. I do not think I would -- I would ask you
7 to clarify the term "intimate."

8 Mr. Baron. Would he be aware of the major contacts you
9 were making and any significant support to those contacts?

10 Mr. Weatherby. I should say at the time, yes, any major
11 aspect of it. It would be difficult for him to follow every
12 operation of every officer in complete detail.

13 Mr. Baron. But he would generally be aware of any
14 significant development of your activities on Project AMLASH
15 and in your relationships with your contacts inside Cuba?

16 Mr. Weatherby. Yes, sir.

17 Mr. Baron. Would he in turn have made the Chief of Task
18 Force W aware of any such significant developments?

19 Mr. Weatherby. Of significant developments, yes.

20 Mr. Baron. And was it a frequent practice for you to
21 report directly to the Chief of Task Force W and to his
22 Deputy and bypass Mr. Aurelius?

23 Mr. Weatherby. As a matter of course, no. In answer to
24 general questions of a professional interest, how I was doing,
and how the operation was going, I could be called in on an

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1 ad hoc basis to chat about one point or the other.

2 Mr. Baron. Do you remember any occasions in relation to
3 Project AMLASH when either William Harvey or Desmond FitzGerald
4 asked you for a report directly?

5 Mr. Weatherby. No, not -- I cannot remember now.

6 Mr. Baron. Where is Mr. Maurelius now?

7 Mr. Weatherby. Mr. Maurelius is deceased. He died three
8 days ago.

9 Mr. Baron. And do you know where Mr. Cheever is now?

10 Mr. Weatherby. I do not. I think he may be someplace
11 in the Southwest. He is retired.

12 Mr. Baron. I would like to review with you a few events
13 that occurred before you joined Project AMLASH, but about which
14 you may have become knowledgeable after you joined the Project.
15 Starting in March of 1961, the IG report indicates that ~~Jack~~
16 ⁰³ ~~Stewart~~, who was a CIA officer assigned to Mexico City, met
17 agent AMLASH in Mexico City to sound him out generally on his
18 views about the Cuban situation.

19 Do you recall anything that you learned about contacts
20 between ⁰³ ~~Jack Stewart~~ and AMLASH in Mexico City?

21 Mr. Weatherby. No, I do not, other than what appears in
22 the paper which you have just quoted from or referred to.

23 Mr. Baron. Were you aware of the reasons why that contact
24 took place?

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1 Mr. Baron. Do you recall now?

2 Mr. Weatherby. I do not, but I presume it was to discuss
3 defection or dissatisfaction with the Cuban regime.

4 Mr. Baron. Do you remember ever learning about the source
5 of the initiation for that meeting? Did it come, in other
6 words, from ⁰³ (Jack Stewart), or from AMLASH or from an intermediary?

7 Mr. Weatherby. To the best of my recollection, from an
8 intermediary.

9 Mr. Baron. Would that have been a man whose cryptonym
10 became AMWHIP? I am referring now to Carlos Tepedino.

11 Mr. Weatherby. Yes.

12 Mr. Baron. Do you know whether the CIA had contact with
13 Carlos Tepedino prior to the time they came into contact with
14 AMLASH?

15 Mr. Weatherby. I don't -- I do not think it was on a
16 professional basis. He may have known people in Havana Station
17 on a social basis.

18 Mr. Baron. Do you recall being briefed about the state
19 of contacts with agent AMLASH at the time that you took over as
20 operational officer?

21 Mr. Weatherby. Would you repeat the question, please?

22 Mr. Baron. Do you recall being briefed?

23 Mr. Weatherby. Yes.

24 Mr. Baron. At the time you took over?

25 Mr. Weatherby. I read a file rather than being briefed,

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1 as I recall.

2 Mr. Baron. Do you have any recollection of meeting with
3 ~~(Jack Stewart)~~ to be briefed at the time you joined Project
4 AMLASH?

5 Mr. Weatherby. I cannot recall.

6 Mr. Baron. What was the nature of the file that you read
7 at that time?

8 Mr. Weatherby. Well, it was either a file started on
9 AMLASH or a file on an intermediary that began the contact, or
10 the attempted contact, with LASH.

11 Mr. Baron. Would that intermediary have been Tepedino?

12 Mr. Weatherby. I do not think so. I'm sorry. I do not
13 recall accurately at this point.

14 Mr. Baron. Would you assume the name of that intermediary
15 would appear in the AMLASH file today?

16 Mr. Weatherby. Certainly.

17 Mr. Baron. At the point when you reviewed the file to
18 brief yourself on Project AMLASH, do you recall reading a
19 CS information report that referred to AMLASH's expression of
20 disgust with Castro to the point where AMLASH indicated that
21 he would be willing to kill Castro?

22 Mr. Weatherby. I remember reading that in the IG Report.
23 I should -- as I have stated earlier, I have not read the
24 official 201 file on the whole case before appearing before you,

25 sir, but I recall that from the IG Report.

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1 Mr. Baron. Do you have any independent recollection of
2 learning from any source about AMLASH's emotional state at the
3 time that you took over the project?

4 Mr. Weatherby. No, I never knew the man until I actually
5 met him, in sufficient detail for me to form an opinion, and
6 having never worked with Latins before and mostly with
7 Germanic types, I preferred to form my own conclusions.

8 Mr. Baron. Do you recall, however, being made aware by
9 any source before you came in contact with AMLASH that he had
10 a propensity to assassinate Castro or any leanings in that
11 direction.

12 Mr. Weatherby. I recall only that he perhaps had said or
13 made statements that he was totally dissatisfied with Castro
14 and I do not recall from my own memory if he used the word
15 assassinate as you did.

16 Mr. Baron. Whether or not he used the word assassinate,
17 at the time you took over the contact with AMLASH, would you
18 have assumed that this was someone who was at least capable
19 of doing that sort of thing?

20 Mr. Weatherby. I think if I can recall correctly that
21 my impression of the man was that he was quite mercurial and
22 I did not understand him well enough to know whether that was
23 whiskey talk or an expression or a Latin exaggeration. I
24 remember saying that I had got to see the man and talk to him

25 before I formed an opinion.

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1 Mr. Baron. The whiskey talk you are referring to is talk
2 that you picked up from the file?

3 Mr. Weatherby. No, it would be that someone had said that
4 he heard him say that I am mad at Castro and I would like to
5 eliminate him. To me that is hearsay, and I put no stock in
6 that whatsoever.

7 Mr. Baron. And do you recall your initial contact with
8 agent AMLASH?

9 Mr. Weatherby. I do.

10 Mr. Baron. Where was that?

11 Mr. Weatherby. It took place in Helsinki.

12 Mr. Baron. Before we pick up on that contact, I would
13 like to ask a couple of other questions about events prior
14 to that time.

15 Do you have any recollection of the development of
16 project: MHAPRON?

17 Mr. Weatherby. I do.

18 Mr. Baron. What was that program about?

19 Mr. Weatherby. That program was an effort to penetrate
20 the Cuban military to encourage either defections or an attempt
21 to produce information from dissidents, or perhaps even to
22 forming a group which would be capable of replacing the then
23 present government in Cuba.

24 Mr. Baron. Was that operation already mounted at the

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1 Mr. Weatherby. I think the program was in effect, or it
2 was concurrently started. I do not recall honestly.

3 Mr. Baron. Do you recall whether your assignment to work
4 with AMLASH was for the purpose of maintaining his participation
5 in the project MHAPRON, or did it have some independent purpose?

6 Mr. Weatherby. The original purpose, to the best of
7 my recollection, was to oversee his defection, and to monitor
8 him through northern Europe, with which I was familiar, and to
9 help in a planned defection speech, et cetera, in some Western
10 European country.

11 Mr. Kelley. The word "defection", can that have more than
12 one meaning? The meaning, the obvious meaning, is that the
13 person leaves his country and comes to another one. Is there
14 another meaning that he becomes disaffected from the government
15 or the country in which he resides but stays there?

16 Mr. Weatherby. That is correct.

17 There is two, there are two defections, which means he
18 defects from their ranks and becomes overtly an emigre from
19 his country, and the other term would be to defect in place
20 which is in effect means he becomes a recruited agent.

21 Mr. Kelley. And in your later testimony, would you keep
22 those two meanings in mind and tell us if you use the word
23 "defect," which one we are talking about?

24 Mr. Weatherby. Yes, sir.

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1 the original purpose of the AMLASH operation, you used the
2 word defect. What was the meaning at this time?

3 Mr. Weatherby. The original, the original intent when he
4 was sent to Helsinki was to aid in the defection, meaning for
5 the man to leave Cuba and Fidel Castro's ranks and come to the
6 West in the classic sense.

7 Mr. Baron. One more question on project MHAPRON.

8 Do you recall whether one of the goals of that project
9 would have been to support an attempt by high Cuban military
10 officers to initiate a coup against the Castro regime by killing
11 the leadership?

12 Mr. Weatherby. I would say no. The killing of the
13 leadership was never a prerequisite for replacement of the
14 government.

15 Mr. Baron. Whether or not it was a prerequisite, would
16 it have been one acceptable means of initiating a coup?

17 Mr. Weatherby. I would say not.

18 Mr. Baron. Why not?

19 Mr. Weatherby. Because that was not, as far as I know in
20 any paper I had ever read, or any directive I had ever seen.

21 Mr. Baron. What kinds of directives did you have as to
22 the means that should be used by contacts established through
23 MHAPRON for the overthrow of Castro?

24 Mr. Weatherby. I do not recall if there was a -- that a

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1 other words, the means to be used. I think before that is
2 going to be even addressed, you have got to look at the people
3 and assets you have, and determine what course of action might
4 be taken.

side lb 5 Mr. Baron. So that you would tailor a course of action
6 against Castro to the specific characteristics and capabilities
7 of the contacts with whom you were dealing, is that correct?

8 Mr. Weatherby. One could do that.

9 Mr. Baron. Would that have been a normal operating
10 procedure for you at that time?

11 Mr. Weatherby. I would think that, that that follows
12 from my previous statement that any activity would have to be
13 looked at in the context of the people who might be available
14 and willing to do it.

15 Mr. Baron. So that you are saying certainly a major
16 factor in determining what kind of operation to arrange with
17 a Cuban contact would be the character and capability of that
18 contact?

19 Mr. Weatherby. I would think that that is an accurate
20 statement.

21 Mr. Baron. Did you carry on projects MHAPRON at the
22 point when you joined Task Force W, did you have operational
23 responsibility for that project?

24 Mr. Weatherby. I did not. That was an overall project,

25 So I, in my capacity, did not run that program.

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1 Mr. Baron. Was Project AMLASH considered a sub-unit of
2 MHAPRON, a subproject?

3 Mr. Weatherby. It fell into that broad category, but to
4 the best of my knowledge it was not an integral part of that
5 program which in itself was really a mechanism for looking at
6 the problem, and AMLASH was a separate entity at the concept -
7 pardon me, at the inception, of course, it was a defection
8 operation.

9 Mr. Baron. In relation to just one man?

10 Mr. Weatherby. Yes.

11 Mr. Baron. And Project AMLASH throughout related
12 essentially to the use of just one high-ranking Cuban military
13 officer, is that correct?

14 Mr. Weatherby. That's correct, as the principal person
15 involved.

16 Mr. Baron. In your attempts to aid the defection of
17 AMLASH, did you ever come in contact with a man named Juan
18 Orta?

19 Mr. Weatherby. I did not.

20 Mr. Baron. Do you have any recollection of Juan Orta
21 from any connection?

22 Mr. Weatherby. The name is familiar, but I cannot recall
23 the details. I do not know, however, I did not meet him.

24 Mr. Baron. Do you recall working with a CIA officer

named James O'Connell in relation to Cuban affairs at any

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1 point?

2 Mr. Weatherby. I do not recall that name.

3 Mr. Baron. Do you know Jim O'Connell?

4 Mr. Weatherby. I do not.

5 Mr. Baron. Would it refresh your recollection if I tell
6 you that he was in the Office of Security working as a case
7 officer with some special responsibility in late 1960 and into
8 1961 for an operation directed against Fidel Castro?

9 Mr. Weatherby. That was before my time, and it would not
10 refresh my memory.

11 Mr. Baron. Did you have any contact with Robert Maheu in
12 relation to any Cuban affair or operation?

13 Mr. Weatherby. None whatsoever, sir.

14 Mr. Baron. Have you had any direct working relationship
15 with Robert Maheu?

16 Mr. Weatherby. I have not, sir.

17 Mr. Baron. Did you ever have any direct contact or
18 working relationship with John Roselli in relation with Cuban
19 affairs?

20 Mr. Weatherby. No, sir.

21 Mr. Baron. Do you know John Roselli?

22 Mr. Weatherby. I do not.

23 Mr. Baron. Do you know Santos Trafficante?

24 Mr. Weatherby. No, sir.

25 Mr. Baron. Do you recall Mr. Trafficante's role in Cuba

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1 in the early '60's?

2 Mr. Weatherby. I do not, sir.

3 Mr. Baron. Do you have any recollection of Mr. Trafficante
4 business?

5 Mr. Weatherby. No, sir, I don't, because until I
6 returned from Europe, Cuban was a non sequitur to me.

7 Mr. Baron. Let me represent to you that Santos Trafficante
8 to the best of our knowledge, had gambling contacts inside
9 Cuba, and, in fact, ran some casinos in Havana. Does that
10 refresh your recollection at all as to any relation he may
11 have had to any operation of the CIA against Fidel Castro?

12 Mr. Weatherby. No. I think now that you mention it, I
13 have seen something in the papers perhaps.

14 Mr. Baron. Recently?

15 Mr. Weatherby. Yes, sir. But I had absolutely no
16 knowledge of that at the time.

17 Mr. Baron. Did you have any knowledge at the time, at
18 any point in the early 1960's of any connection between Sam
19 Giancana and the CIA?

20 Mr. Weatherby. None whatsoever, sir.

21 Mr. Baron. Did you ever have contact with a Cuban named
22 Tony Varona?

23 Mr. Weatherby. I did not, sir. I did not, sir.

24 Mr. Baron. Do you know of Tony Varona?

Mr. Weatherby. I know of the name, yes.

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1 Mr. Baron. Do you have any recollection of who he was,
2 or any contact between him and the CIA?

3 Mr. Weatherby. No, sir.

4 Mr. Baron. When you joined Task Force W, what was the
5 nature of your relationship to William Harvey?

6 Mr. Weatherby. At the time I was an employee of his.

7 Mr. Baron. Did William Harvey give you orders directly
8 in relation to any operation?

9 Mr. Weatherby. No, sir.

10 Mr. Baron. Any orders from Harvey would have come through
11 Mr. Aurelius to you, is that correct?

12 Mr. Weatherby. Yes, sir.

13 Mr. Baron. Do you have any recollection of an operation
14 to assassinate Fidel Castro that was run by William Harvey?

15 Mr. Weatherby. No, sir.

16 Mr. Baron. Do you recall ever hearing about a plot to
17 assassinate Castro by placing poison in his food?

18 Mr. Weatherby. No, sir.

19 Mr. Baron. This was never mentioned to you by anyone in
20 Task Force W?

21 Mr. Weatherby. Absolutely not. I would like to point
22 out at that time I was GS-11 and GS-11's are not told a great
23 deal.

24 Mr. Baron. For the record, what is a GS-11?

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1 Mr. Baron. Civil Service rank?

2 Mr. Weatherby. Yes, sir.

3 Mr. Baron. How would you have characterized Mr. Harvey's
4 style of leadership and operations at that time?

5 Mr. Weatherby. Mr. Harvey was flamboyant, a hard charger,
6 took care of his troops.

7 Mr. Baron. In what way was he flamboyant?

8 Mr. Weatherby. Well, I think he had a good lifestyle.
9 He was a large man, and perhaps flamboyant is not the correct
10 word. But he was -- colorful might be a better choice of words.

11 Mr. Baron. Was he a man that you would describe as
12 strong-willed and independent minded?

13 Mr. Weatherby. I think we can safely say that, sir.

14 Mr. Baron. Would you say that if William Harvey determined
15 in his own mind that a course of action was the correct one,
16 or the most effective operationally, that he would do everything
17 in his power to carry it out?

18 Mr. Weatherby. I couldn't answer that, sir. It would
19 be pure conjecture on my part.

20 Mr. Baron. Did you ever have any contact with Bruce
21 Cheever in relation to any operation targetted against the
22 life of Fidel Castro?

23 Mr. Weatherby. None whatsoever, sir.

24 Mr. Baron. Did you ever discuss assassination techniques
25 as distinct from means of initiating a coup with Desmond

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1 FitzGerald?

2 Mr. Weatherby. I, did not, sir.

3 Mr. Baron. Did Desmond FitzGerald ever raise with you
4 the idea of placing an exploding sea shell in an area where
5 Fidel Castro might be skin-diving?

6 Mr. Weatherby. No, sir.

7 Mr. Baron. Did he ever raise with you, or did anyone
8 ever raise with you, the idea of sending a diving suit to
9 Fidel Castro as a present which would be contaminated with
10 bacteria?

11 Mr. Weatherby. Absolutely not, sir.

12 This was the first time I have ever heard of it.

13 Mr. Baron. Did anyone in Task Force W or in the Technical
14 Services Division ever discuss with you the development of
15 any poisons that could be used for assassinations?

16 Mr. Weatherby. No, sir.

17 Mr. Baron. Turning now to your first contact with AMLASH,
18 during that period of time would you place that contact?

19 Mr. Weatherby. The first contact, sir, that should have
20 been roughly, roughly about the thirty day period from maybe
21 the 26th of July, 1962 through maybe 18 August 1962.

22 Mr. Baron. Do you remember how you first learned that
23 AMLASH was going to Helsinki?

24 Mr. Weatherby. That was brought to our attention by an
25 asset, I believe, in Miami, and ultimately through AMWHIP in

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1 New York.

2 Mr. Baron. And what was the purpose of your trip to
3 Helsinki?

4 Mr. Weatherby. The purpose of my trip to Helsinki was to
5 ascertain if AMLASH was prepared to defect, and if so, to
6 assist him in doing so and to gain as much mileage for us from
7 information of a defector from a high-level Cuban official as
8 possible.

9 Mr. Baron. This would be a highly publicized defection
10 from the country perhaps having AMLASH come to the United
11 States?

12 Mr. Weatherby. That had not been determined, but a
13 defection announcement in a major city is always useful.

14 Mr. Baron. Were you aware of any contact between Carlos
15 Tepedino, who operated then under the cryptonym of AMWHIP in
16 the FBI?

17 Mr. Weatherby. Yes, sir.

18 Mr. Baron. What was the nature of that contact?

19 Mr. Weatherby. I believe, and again my recollection is
20 hazy, but he had been reporting, I believe, to an FBI asset
21 who turned the information to us through the normal course of
22 events.

23 Mr. Baron. Was he reporting to an FBI employee?

24 Mr. Weatherby. I'm not sure of the background of that
25 contact at this point.

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1 Mr. Baron. Does it refresh your recollection if I
2 represent to you that the IG Report indicates that Tepedino
3 was disgruntled with the CIA over their lack of vigor in
4 providing support to AMLASH in his attempt to defect?

5 Mr. Weatherby. I recall that from the report, sir.

6 Mr. Baron. But you do not have any independent recollection
7 for Tepedino's contact with the FBI?

8 Mr. Weatherby. No, sir. I do not, sir. I have no
9 independent recollection.

10 Mr. Baron. Do you recall receiving reports regularly
11 from the FBI on information regarding AMLASH that was coming
12 to you through Tepedino or to them through Tepedino?

13 Mr. Weatherby. I believe there may have been some
14 initially, but I don't recall, as a matter of fact, today.

15 Mr. Baron. Did you have face to face meetings with the
16 FBI at any point on this project?

17 Mr. Weatherby. I don't recall, sir. I think not.

18 Mr. Baron. Would the FBI have been aware generally of
19 the purpose of Project AMLASH?

20 Mr. Weatherby. No, sir, not to my knowledge.

21 Mr. Baron. Did you meet with Tepedino in New York City
22 in mid-July, approximately July 13, 14 1962 to discuss your
23 trip to Helsinki?

24 Mr. Weatherby. I made initial contact with him either

June or July for that purpose, sir, in New York.

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1 Mr. Baron. And what was Tepedino's occupation at that
2 time?

3 Mr. Weatherby. He had a, he was in a partnership with
4 a brewery manufacturing firm.

5 Mr. Baron. And did he receive money from the CIA at any
6 point during your contact with him?

7 Mr. Weatherby. As a salary, sir?

8 Mr. Baron. Ahy money in any form for any purpose.

9 Mr. Weatherby. He received money, he received money for
10 tickets when he did any missions, if you will, for us, but
11 there was never any compensation in terms of any monthly
12 salary or a bonus.

13 Mr. Kelley. You paid his expenses, in other words?

14 Mr. Weatherby. He would often not take that. He would
15 take a ticket. He was a very well-to-do man, and he was
16 patriotically motivated to freeing Cuba. That was his
17 contribution.

18 Mr. Baron. Did Tepedino ever offer to perform an
19 operation directly in Cuba?

20 Mr. Weatherby. No, sir, not to my knowledge.

21 Mr. Baron. He simply served as an intermediary to AMLASH?

22 Mr. Weatherby. Yes, sir.

23 Mr. Baron. Do you recall the circumstances of your first
24 face-to-face meeting with AMLASH?

Mr. Weatherby. You are going back a long way, sir. I

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1 believe I contacted him in New York and invited him to lunch.

2 Mr. Baron. I am referring now to AMLASH and not to
3 Tepedino.

4 Mr. Weatherby. I'm sorry. Would you please rephrase
5 the question again for me?

6 Mr. Baron. Yes.

7 Do you recall the circumstances of your first face-to-
8 face meeting with AMLASH?

9 Mr. Weatherby. You mean how it was arranged?

10 Mr. Baron. No, the circumstances of the meeting itself;
11 where it took place.

12 Mr. Weatherby. Yes, sir.

13 Mr. Baron. And what transpired and the approximate
14 date?

15 Mr. Weatherby. It took place in Helsinki in a hotel in
16 the latter part of July or during the Helsinki Youth Festival
17 of 1962.

18 Mr. Baron. Do you recall what transpired at that meeting?

19 Mr. Weatherby. Not any longer, sir.

20 Mr. Baron. Do you have any independent recollection of
21 any subject that was discussed at that meeting?

22 Mr. Weatherby. Well, at that meeting it would naturally
23 have been discussed, his desires for defection, his plans,
24 what he wanted to see us about.

Mr. Baron. Do you recall whether he came away from that

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1 meeting as intent on defection as he was when he went into the
2 meeting?

3 Mr. Weatherby. I can't recall that meeting specifically,
4 I could give you a general feeling of the period of time in
5 Helsinki.

6 Mr. Baron. All right. Please do.

7 Mr. Kelley. Could I just ask a question first?

8 Mr. Weatherby. Yes.

9 Mr. Kelley. Did you have other cases that you were
10 working on at this time?

11 Mr. Weatherby. Yes, sir.

12 Mr. Kelley. How many others, more or less?

13 Mr. Weatherby. Maybe thirty.

14 Mr. Kelley. And these all involved individuals, people
15 you would meet like you met AMLASH?

16 Mr. Weatherby. In some cases, yes. In others, I was
17 a supporting officer, meaning I maintained a file, maintained
18 the traffic, offered advice, wrote cables, talked to different
19 officers about handling the different individuals.

20 Mr. Kelley. So this was one of some thirty different
21 cases that you would be involved in?

22 Mr. Weatherby. Yes, sir. At the time, I had a number of
23 countries under my responsibility, and in each country were a
24 number of cases which had many threads not unsimilar to this.

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1 Mr. Kelley. Where would you rank the AMLASH case in terms
2 of time you spent on it among this thirty?

3 Mr. Weatherby. I would think it was certainly one of the
4 most promising and one in which I put the most time, but it
5 was the kind of a case which was on again, off again. When
6 the man was out and we could talk to him, it was a full-time
7 job. And then it would just almost go into abeyance for months
8 at a time.

9 Mr. Baron. Despite the amount of time that you put in
10 on the project, would it have been on the top of your priority
11 list at that time?

12 Mr. Weatherby. If a development took place which required
13 my attention, it would be, if that answers your question, sir.

14 Mr. Kelley. Where would you rank the AMLASH case among
15 these thirty in terms of your own personal interest?

16 Mr. Weatherby. I think it was probably the best case, if
17 it could ever jell.

18 Mr. Baron. Did your superiors in Task Force W feel the
19 same way about it?

20 Mr. Weatherby. I think they thought it was a good case,
21 but it was in the all-over spectrum one of a number. I cannot
22 recall how they would rank it in terms of --

23 Mr. Baron. But was it clearly a case though that
24 Maurelius and Harvey would take a personal interest in, and

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1 Mr. Weatherby. Yes, sir.

2 Mr. Baron. Was it also a case that was important enough
3 to be subject to inquiries from the DDP?

4 Mr. Weatherby. I would think so.

5 Mr. Baron. But you don't have any direct recollection of
6 inquiries by the DDP, or do you?

7 Mr. Weatherby. I do not have any direct -- I am sure
8 there was interest shown because of the potential it showed.
9 After all, the man was probably number four in the government
10 at that time.

11 Mr. Kelley. That's the way you conceived of him, you
12 realized that he was number four?

13 Mr. Weatherby. Yes.

14 Mr. Kelley. You treated him, in other words, you were
15 conscious of the fact that you were dealing with the number
16 four man?

17 Mr. Weatherby. I thought he was. I think most people
18 did.

19 Mr. Kelley. This meant that after Fidel, Raul and Che,
20 then came AMLASH.

21 Mr. Weatherby. I believe so, in terms of personalities
22 that you would focus upon. You have the Prime Minister, you
23 have the Foreign Minister, you have a number of others in there
24 but they weren't of prime concern to us.

Mr. Baron. Do you recall any specific instances where you

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1 discussed the AMLASH project with Richard Helms?

2 Mr. Weatherby. No, I did not.

3 Mr. Baron. Or with anyone else in the DDP above the
4 Chief of Task Force W?

5 Mr. Weatherby. I may have gone -- again, I don't recall
6 myself, but I certainly may have gone along with Desmond
7 Fitzgerald -- well, but I don't recall specifically now.

8 Mr. Baron. Do you recall being asked by Mr. Maurelius
9 or the Chief of Task Force W to prepare a report, reports
10 that were specifically to go up to the DDP?

11 Mr. Weatherby. I don't honestly recall.

12 Mr. Kelley. We are on the verge of talking about what
13 transpired at the first meeting. As you told us, this meeting
14 is with a person that you conceived of as the fourth most
15 important or prominent personality in the Cuban regime?

16 Mr. Weatherby. To us.

17 Mr. Kelley. All right.

18 Mr. Weatherby. As an operational target, perhaps.

19 Mr. Kelley. To the CIA?

20 Mr. Weatherby. Or operational interest.

21 Mr. Kelley. But at any rate, a very important person
22 even in Cuba, in Castro's -- a prominent member of Castro's
23 entourage?

24 Mr. Weatherby. I can't speak for Castro. He was an

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1 of Batista, but he certainly didn't figure prominently in
2 Castro's cabinet. Obviously, he didn't hold much of a position,
3 but he was kind of an old boy who had gone a little astray and
4 a dissident, unhappy, but a member of the contributing guerrilla
5 movement which eventually overthrew Batista and, therefore, was
6 always welcomed in most of their circles.

7 Mr. Kelley. My question is, then, when you would meet him
8 in Helsinki or wherever, did you take any precautions to insure
9 that your meeting was not observed by members of Castro's
10 intelligence force who might be following this man?

11 Mr. Weatherby. We would have countersurveillance.

12 Mr. Kelley. And did that ever indicate that you were
13 followed or being observed?

14 Mr. Weatherby. No, sir.

15 Mr. Kelley. Did you meet in out of the way places, or --

16 Mr. Weatherby. Hotel rooms, sometimes in a car.

17 Mr. Kelley. These would be safe house-type hotel rooms,
18 or would he come to your room?

19 Mr. Weatherby. Probably go to Tepedino's. I don't recall
20 the exact details of that. It would not be in the parlance of
21 a safe house.

22 Mr. Kelley. Uh-huh. Okay.

23 Mr. Baron. You were going to describe the general
24 impression you had of the series of meetings that took place
25 between yourself and AMLASH in late July and early August of

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1 1962 in Helsinki?

2 Mr. Weatherby. Yes.

3 The purpose, the initial purpose of my going over, as has
4 been pointed out, was to arrange for the defection of a
5 prominent Cuban revolutionary with maximum publicity for the
6 West.

7 In talking to him -- and again, we are stretching back
8 over thirteen years from memory -- he was still very much
9 interested in that. He was fed up with the sale of the
10 revolution by Castro to the Russians, and it didn't represent
11 what he thought he had been fighting for with the old DR at
12 the time they overthrew Batista.

13 He had a thread throughout his thinking though that he
14 would, he would rather, if there was a reason, he would rather
15 stay and change events in Cuba, if he possibly, if this
16 possibly could be done. In other words, to put the revolution
17 back in its proportions as he had contributed to it and he
18 imagined it should have been. But he didn't have a real plan
19 and he didn't, he wasn't sure how to accomplish this. The
20 purpose became then to keep him in place rather than defect
21 him, because an agent in place is always worth a great deal
22 more than one who defects.

23 As you probably have heard, you get a debriefing of what
24 he knows, you get a little Press play, and that's the end of
25 it with the man normally except the contacts he might have and

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1 so forth, but an agent in place is worth a great deal more.

2 This then became my assignment, was to convince him to
3 stay in place and to report to us.

4 Mr. Baron. Do you recall what kind of proposals he may
5 have made or prospects he may have raised about operations
6 that would have been significant enough to merit his staying
7 inside Cuba instead of defecting?

8 Mr. Weatherby. Well, he wanted to overthrow Castro, he
9 wanted to change the regime, or at the very least bring Castro
10 around to his concept of the revolution.

11 Mr. Baron. Did he ever mention that as a realistic
12 possibility, bringing Castro around to his concept?

13 Mr. Weatherby. Not really. He discussed it, but I don't
14 think he really believed it.

15 Mr. Baron. And how likely did he feel at the time the
16 prospect was of leading a widespread coup against Castro?

17 Mr. Weatherby. You know, I don't think he even thought
18 that far. He was -- it was interesting. He was mercurial
19 at times, thoughtful, and methodical in turn. He had a great
20 many things evolving in his mind, none of which were practical,
21 none of which he could tie down. One of the interesting parts
22 of meeting him was to attempt to sort out what the man really
23 wanted and what he wanted to do, what he could do, and possibly
24 what his friends could do. And this was the thrust of the
25 balance of the time that I was with him.

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Mr. Baron. Do you recall his expressing such a vehement intention to overthrow Castro that it involved a willingness to kill Castro if the opportunity arose?

Mr. Weatherby. He mentioned, or he talked about this in generalities, but my impression was that it was a manifestation of intensity of feeling rather than really ever doing anything to that degree.

Mr. Baron. But he did in one way or other discuss his willingness to do something like assassinate Castro?

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1 Mr. Weatherby. He never used that term. He didn't like
2 it.

3 Mr. Baron. The term "assassinate"?

4 Mr. Weatherby. Yes.

5 Mr. Baron. What terms would he use?

6 Mr. Weatherby. "Eliminate."

7 Mr. Baron. Or other euphemisms that clearly had the
8 same import?

9 Mr. Weatherby. I like to think he meant to get rid of
10 in one way or another, either exile or in a coup in which
11 obviously blood will be shed on both sides.

12 Mr. Baron. Was it not clear that whether or not he at
13 that time had a specific plan or a specific intention to
14 proceed to eliminate Castro by taking his life, he was interested
15 in the prospect of having support for such an operation if
16 it could be mounted?

17 Mr. Weatherby. He was interested in, as he put it, and
18 again we are talking over 13 years, in getting rid of the man's
19 regime, and he didn't limit himself to any particular method,
20 nor did he dwell on assassination as such.

21 Mr. Baron. But was assassination, though perhaps mentioned
22 by other names, one means that was acceptable to him of
23 getting rid of Castro?

24 Mr. Weatherby. I never took him seriously. I think in
25 a fire-fight, in other words, if you are storming the palace

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1 and the man loses his life, so be it. I mean, I might lose
2 mine was his attitude.

3 Mr. Baron. Whether or not you took him seriously, was
4 he meaning the prospect of assassinating Castro --

5 Mr. Weatherby. I think --

6 Mr. Baron. Or the desirability to assassinate Castro?

7 Mr. Weatherby. To eliminate him in theory, I think, or
8 he might have discussed it. I don't recall today precisely
9 the exact terms or the exact seriousness of the man to do an
10 act like that.

11 Mr. Baron. But the way that you recall that series of
12 meetings, is it likely that he did express the desirability
13 of eliminating Castro by assassination?

14 Mr. Weatherby. I think as a possibility, not as a
15 desirability.

16 Mr. Bayly. Perhaps you have been asked this, but I
17 would like to ask you myself if you have not been to offer what
18 you understand to be the meaning of the term "assassinate," or
19 "assassination"?

20 Mr. Weatherby. I'm sorry. Would you --

21 Mr. Bayly. What is the meaning, what is your interpretation
22 of it, or what do you understand the term "assassinate" to
23 mean?

24 Mr. Weatherby. Well, I take that to mean deliberate taking
25 of one's life with the intent --

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Mr. Bayly.. Well, is it --

Mr. Baron. Off the record.

(Discussion off the record.)

Senator Morgan. Do you solemnly swear that the testimony you have given this afternoon to this Committee and the testimony that you will give is the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. Weatherby. I do, sir.

Senator Morgan. I will sit in for a little while, if you don't mind.

Mr. Baron. Off the record.

(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. Bayly.. I had one question pending, Senator.

Mr. Baron. Mr. Weatherby, isn't it true that we have been talking for awhile now using your alias, Weatherby, and that we have an agreement that we mentioned before that your true identity will be on file at the CIA?

Mr. Weatherby. That's correct, sir.

Mr. Baron. And I would like to introduce as Weatherby Exhibit 1 a statement regarding testimony in alias and ask you if this is an accurate statement of your true identity?

(The document referred to was marked Weatherby Exhibit No. 1 for identification.)

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Mr. Weatherby. It is, sir.

Mr. Baron. And you have signed that statement and I have signed it as a witness, is that correct?

Mr. Weatherby. That is correct, sir.

Mr. Baron. And it is your understanding that we will attach this statement as an exhibit to your transcript in sanitized form, leaving out your true identity?

Mr. Weatherby. That is my understanding, sir.

Mr. Baron. Is it also true that all of the answers to questions that you have given up until this point in our examination are true to the best of your knowledge, and you are willing to swear to the truth under oath now?

Mr. Weatherby. Absolutely, sir.

Mr. Baron. Thank you.

Why don't you proceed with your question?

Mr. Bayly. You have already dealt with the matter of counsel?

Mr. Baron. We have.

You understand now that you are under oath and you still have the right to counsel and can stop at any point to request counsel if you desire?

Mr. Weatherby. Yes, sir.

Mr. Baron. And you are voluntarily appearing here today without counsel?

Mr. Weatherby. That is correct, sir.

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Mr. Baron. And you understand that your Fifth Amendment rights are intact before this Committee?

Mr. Weatherby. Yes, sir.

Mr. Bayly. My question, sir, if you recall is what you understood assassination to mean, the term?

Mr. Weatherby. I said the deliberate taking of another man's life.

Mr. Bayly. Well, then, how would you distinguish it from murder?

Mr. Weatherby. Usually it has a political connotation.

Mr. Bayly. In other words, it is a singling out of a political leader for a political purpose?

Mr. Weatherby. Yes, with the intent of eliminating that particular person.

Mr. Bayly. So as to alter or effect a political change?

Mr. Weatherby. Possibly. Maybe vengeance. It could be a number of reasons.

Mr. Bayly. But it is the purpose in the act, is that not correct, I mean shooting Mr. Castro? To steal his wallet or avenge yourself on him because of some suspected adultery is not really the same thing, is it?

Mr. Weatherby. No. I think you are describing murder perhaps more closely there. I am not a lawyer, sir, so I cannot get into these fine points.

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the Committee would have a better understanding of what went through your mind when you spoke about, for instance, AMLASH. What did you understand him to mean when he used the term assassination when an infrequent --

Mr. Weatherby. He didn't use the term, as I recall.

Mr. Bayly.. He never did.

Mr. Weatherby. No, sir. He abhorred that and preferred, as I believe I said, and I think I recall whether it was eliminate or to get rid of.

Mr. Bayly.. And did you yourself in your dealing with him ever use the word "assassinate"?

Mr. Weatherby. I discussed that with him when I was trying to find out what he meant.

Mr. Bayly.. And did you explain to him what you meant?

Mr. Weatherby. He knew. I mean, I think it may have been a question of languages or a question of semantics at the time, but I think he understood that.

Mr. Bayly.. Did you ever use the word "kill"?

Mr. Weatherby. I do not recall, sir. It has been 13 years.

Mr. Bayly.. I understand that. How about the word "murder" or any similar word?

Mr. Weatherby. No, sir.

Mr. Bayly.. So your understanding of those terms is drawn from the sense of what occurred rather than from the

precise language used?

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Mr. Weatherby. Yes, sir.

Mr. Bayly. Thank you. That's all I have.

Mr. Kelley. Did you speak through an interpreter with
AMLASH?

Mr. Weatherby. Sometimes yes, sometimes no. He had
limited English.

Mr. Kelley. Do you speak Spanish?

Mr. Weatherby. I do not.

Mr. Kelley. And he had limited English?

Mr. Weatherby. Correct, sir.

Mr. Kelley. Who would serve as the interpreter in
Helsinki?

Mr. Weatherby. AMWHIP did.

Mr. Baron. Mr. Weatherby, I would like to show you a
piece of paper that we will mark Weatherby Exhibit 2, which
is an excerpt from the I.G. report that includes remarks said
to have been in your contact report of your first meeting with
AMLASH during the period of July 30 to August 6, 1962.

(The document referred to
was marked Weatherby
Exhibit No. 2 for
identification.)

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1 (Discussion off the record.)

2 Mr. Baron. Does this document refresh your recollection
3 enough so that you recall whether or not you wrote it or
4 whether you wrote those excerpts?

5 Mr. Weatherby. If it came from the file, sir, I am
6 sure I did.

7 Mr. Baron. And do you have any independent recollection
8 of writing this document or of the events referred to in it?

9 Mr. Weatherby. I don't have a personal recollection of
10 these subjects in a discussion with him until I have seen
11 the paper again.

12 Mr. Baron. Now that you are looking at this excerpt
13 from your contact report, do you recall that AMLASH felt that
14 he would be interested in returning to Cuba and in risking his
15 life by doing so, "if he could be given a really large part
16 to play"?

17 Mr. Weatherby. Yes.

18 Mr. Baron. Do you recall --

19 Mr. Weatherby. May I interrupt, sir?

20 Mr. Baron. Yes.

21 Mr. Weatherby. I don't remember the precise language,
22 but the thought, I certainly, I certainly do.

23 Mr. Baron. And do you recall AMLASH expressing generally
24 to you the feeling that "he wanted to plan the execution of
25 Carlos Rodriguez (a top ranking Castro subordinate) and the

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Soviet Ambassador, and also to eliminate Fidel by execution, if necessary."

Do you recall his expressing that feeling to you?

Mr. Weatherby. I do not recall today his expressing the feeling in the words in the exhibit. However, I believe that that represents at least a portion of his thoughts at the time, only as an idea or an expression of the degree to which he felt he wanted to do something and was totally frustrated in doing it. I mean, just look at the large list he has, and --

Mr. Baron. What large list are you referring to?

Mr. Weatherby. The one there in which he talks about Rodriguez and the Ambassador and Fidel. I mean there is no -- as I say, I believe that represented a feeling he had that he has to get rid of these people in some manner.

Mr. Baron. Do you really characterize this list of three people that appear to be carefully selected as a large list of targets, or doesn't it appear to be, as I said, a fairly careful selection of key people whose elimination would seriously affect the stability of the Cuban government?

Mr. Weatherby. No, I don't feel that way. If I may digress a little for the record, I think it is an expression of his frustration simply because it isn't a diabolical scheme the man is talking about if, in fact, he talked about these people because he's probably upset with the Soviets there. Therefore,

of the Soviet Ambassador. Well, they put a new

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1 one in, and that doesn't do anything to the stability there.
2 And if you get rid of Carlos Rodriguez, Rodriguez didn't have
3 a great following of his own, he was somebody that was probably
4 a principal that came to his mind and, of course, Fidel as
5 the head of state represents something to him that he would
6 like to have changed.

7 In other words, I'm trying to say that when you deal with
8 a man like this and you have not met him very much, you have
9 to let the man express himself, you have got to find out
10 by questioning what he really means, what's really bothering
11 him, what does he really want to do. Does he have any plans,
12 how deep is his thinking, is he just an emotional type?

13 Mr. Baron. But isn't it significant in some way that --
14 strike that.

15 Wouldn't his desire to plan the execution of Fidel Castro
16 have appeared to you at that time significant in light of the
17 fact that you included it in your contact report?

18 Mr. Weatherby. His statement there represents to me again
19 as I have said before, the degree of emotion that he felt
20 about the problem in Cuba and the Cuban situation politically
21 as it turned out. A contact report, which is a piece of paper
22 basically to refresh the case officer's mind about what took
23 place, I wouldn't, I wouldn't read into it too much.

24 Mr. Baron. Nonetheless, didn't you see his expression of
25 this desire to eliminate Fidel by execution, if necessary,

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significant enough so that there should be some record of it?

Mr. Weatherby. I thought that it certainly should be a matter of record to indicate his degree of concern, certainly. And it also became a point for me to dissuade him of at that time.

Mr. Baron. In the same contact report you indicated that you were "making no commitments or plans," but that you were pointing out to AMLASH "that schemes like he envisions certainly had their place, but that a lot of coordination, planning, information collection, etcetera were necessary prerequisites to ensure the value and success of such plans."

Doesn't that indicate that his mention of eliminating Fidel and other key figures in Cuba at that time were at least considered by you to have had a place in future contacts with AMLASH?

Mr. Weatherby. Absolutely not, in that case. What you have got to do with a man like this who may have thoughts of that intensity, or even register thoughts of that intensity is not disabuse him immediately of his thinking because if I want him for something else I can't make a -- I would be -- it would be poor planning to alienate the man right away if I immediately turn off the idea he has. And this is all in one meeting, don't forget, as best as I recall. I have got to attempt to blunt that and eventually change his thinking,

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like that it takes, if someone is going to do anything it takes coordination and planning and etcetera. And you have got to gradually take the man from an intense thought and perhaps mold it into something that can work, or something that is acceptable.

In other words, I wouldn't.

Mr. Baron. Doesn't the language here, though, indicate that although you may have wanted to mold his desires into a workable plan, the fact that he had mentioned desire to eliminate Castro by execution, if necessary, wasn't something that was rejected out of hand, that it might be something that you would want to work into a usable plan.

Mr. Weatherby. Well, I think we are a little out of context by looking at just this excerpt. I think you have to look at Castro to see how it develops and what is said in a few words in a contact report, which is not verbatim, you would acknowledge should not be taken absolutely literally.

Mr. Baron. You have mentioned that these events were a long time ago.

Mr. Weatherby. Uh huh.

Mr. Baron. And that your recollection is not crystal clear about them.

Do you have a very clear recollection of the context in which this contact report was written?

Mr. Weatherby. No, I don't remember every, you know

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every point of conversation and every place we visited during this period of time.

Mr. Baron. Do you recall with great clarity what you may have said in response to AMLASH when he expressed this desire to assassinate Castro?

Mr. Weatherby. I would not remember verbatim what I had said 13 years ago, sir.

Mr. Baron. What would the purpose of a contact report have been?

Mr. Weatherby. Contact or contact reports in general, sir?

Mr. Baron. Yes.

Mr. Weatherby. Contact reports are reports produced by operations officers for the record to remind them of what transpired at some future date and for other officers who may assume a case in the future, so that memorandum for the record is what it is.

Mr. Baron. To whom would a contact report be submitted?

Mr. Weatherby. Depending on it, depending on the nature of the case and the level of the officer, it would probably go to his immediate superior, or could remain in the file.

Mr. Baron. Would your contact reports on your meetings in Helsinki have been reviewed by Mr. Maurelius?

Mr. Weatherby. I would hope they would have been when I got back from the trip. These are not transmitted electrically

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1 as you may know. These are hand-written or type-written and
2 entered in the file as a matter or record.

3 Mr. Baron. Would they have been reviewed by William
4 Harvey?

5 Mr. Weatherby. I doubt --

6 Mr. Baron. Or his deputy?

7 Mr. Weatherby. I doubt that.

8 Mr. Baron. And Harvey was Chief of Task Force W at that
9 time.

10 Is that correct?

11 Mr. Weatherby. Yes, sir.

12 Mr. Baron. Do you recall relaying to Mr. Aurelius
13 or to William Harvey or his Deputy at this time any sense
14 of the importance of these sentiments that AMLASH had expressed
15 to you in Helsinki upon your return from that trip?

16 Mr. Weatherby. I am sure I did. I don't recall precisely,
17 but I do recall a cable which I wrote in which I expressed
18 some concern about the man's mercurial temperament and
19 disposition, and then asked for, I believe, a Spanish-speaking
20 case officer because I thought that that would be -- there
21 was more accuracy to be relayed in communicating than communi-
22 cating directly with someone.

23 Mr. Baron. And so you asked for a Spanish-speaking case
24 officer to take over the operation from you?

25 Mr. Weatherby. No. I asked for his assistance.

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Mr. Baron. Did you receive that assistance?

Mr. Weatherby. I did.

Mr. Baron. And was that the man who testified here the other day?

Mr. Weatherby. No, sir. Oh --

Mr. Baron. Under the alias of Garmeyer, being referred to generally as AMLASH case officer?

Mr. Weatherby. No, sir. That was another gentleman whom I met in Paris.

Mr. Baron. And what was his name, or was he the Spanish-speaking case officer from Madrid?

Mr. Weatherby. Yes, sir. I believe you have that in the excerpt there.

Mr. Baron. Whose name is mentioned in the I.G. report?

Mr. Weatherby. Yes, correct, sir.

Mr. Baron. As a participant in meetings that you held with AMLASH and Tepedino in Paris in mid-August of '62?

Mr. Weatherby. That would be correct, sir.

Mr. Baron. You did return to headquarters in Langley from your meeting in Helsinki.

Is that correct?

Mr. Weatherby. No. I went directly to Paris. I did not directly. I went through Stockholm and I believe Copenhagen and then down to Paris.

Mr. Baron. Did you communicate to headquarters anything

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other than the mercurial temperament of AMLASH, anything else in relation to your meetings with him in Helsinki?

Mr. Weatherby. I don't remember precisely, but I would have sent some type electrical transmission summarizing the meeting and how it went, and any problems of security that might have occurred, and probably some initial impressions.

Mr. Baron. And that would be a cable that we should find in the AMLASH file?

Mr. Weatherby. Yes, sir.

Mr. Baron. Do you recall meeting with AMLASH in Copenhagen around August 10 or 11, 1962, for further discussions with him?

Mr. Weatherby. I met him at approximately that date.

Mr. Baron. Do you recall what transpired in those discussions?

Mr. Weatherby. I do not, sir, but I would think nothing of great substance.

Mr. Baron. Do you recall any discussions involving the word "assassination"?

Mr. Weatherby. I do not, sir. That's in Copenhagen?

Mr. Baron. Correct. Was Carlos Tepedino present at that meeting?

Mr. Weatherby. Yes, he should have been.

Mr. Baron. I am showing to you now a document marked Weatherby Exhibit 3, which refers to a contact report that you

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wrote on your meeting in Copenhagen on August 10 and 11, 1962,
and it is excerpted from the I.G. report at page 58.

(The document referred to
was marked Weatherby Exhibit
No. 3 for identification.)

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(Pause)

Mr. Weatherby. Okay, I read it.

Mr. Baron. Does this document refresh your recollection about the substance of your meeting with AMLASH in Copenhagen?

Mr. Weatherby. It is not enough to refresh my recollection of the meeting in Copenhagen per se, but I think in earlier testimony I discussed the use of the term in talking to him, "assassinate," and indicated that he was opposed to a term of that nature.

I think it would show that I perhaps was not sure where that particular discussion took place, Stockholm or Copenhagen or in Helsinki.

Mr. Baron. In referring to the portion of this excerpt from your contact report that says "We used the term 'assassinate'. The use of this term we later learned from Tepedino and from AMLASH himself was most objectionable to the latter, and he was visibly upset. It was not the act he objected to, but rather merely the choice of the word used to describe it. 'Eliminate' was acceptable."

Does that generally describe your recollection of AMLASH's attitude toward the use of the word "assassinate"?

Mr. Weatherby. To the best of my recollection, yes.

Mr. Baron. Do you recall reporting directly to anyone in Task Force W about AMLASH's attitude toward assassination?

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19 1 but I would wager I must have.

2 Mr. Baron. Do you recall a subsequent meeting in Paris
3 between yourself and AMLASH and AMLASH and Tepedino and
4 a Spanish-speaking case officer from Madrid?

5 Mr. Weatherby. Yes, sir.

6 Mr. Baron. Do you recall this involved actually a series
7 of meetings between August 24th and August 23, 1962, as
8 indicated by the I.G. report?

9 Mr. Weatherby. That's correct.

10 Mr. Baron. Was AMLASH given secret writing training
11 and issued secret writing supplies shortly after that meeting?

12 Mr. Weatherby. Yes, sir.

13 Mr. Baron. Was he also taken to the south of France for
14 a demolition demonstration?

15 Mr. Weatherby. Yes, sir.

16 Mr. Baron. Why was this done?

17 Mr. Weatherby. That was done to show him we were willing
18 to give consideration to his desire for some sort of support
19 from us if he went back and undertook to establish a net, if
20 you will, of dissidents.

21 Mr. Baron. Was this training more than a mere gesture
22 of support, but actually intended as preparation for AMLASH
23 to enable him to perform an operation inside Cuba?

24 Mr. Weatherby. Quite to the contrary, sir. It was given

25 to him only to assuage him to the degree that we could. In

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the use of explosives it takes a great deal of knowledge, and as I recall he prepared one small charge himself, which does not entitle a man to do anything, and was allowed to set it off. And the several charges which, if I recall correctly, we demonstrated to him were done by a technician who was accomplished in the use of explosives. But he was, he could not possibly have used that, at least safely, had he returned to Cuba, because that was not the intent.

Mr. Baron. Was there any intention of assessing his suitability for performing operations of this sort during this period of time?

Mr. Weatherby. No, sir, not in the use of explosives.

Mr. Baron. So it was merely a gesture of support for him and a means of encouraging him to return to Cuba and continue with other operations?

Mr. Weatherby. That's correct, sir.

Mr. Baron. What was his primary mission as far as you were concerned at that point?

Mr. Weatherby. His mission primarily was to go back and report to us any ability he might have to get into contact with his old friends from the D.R. movement or other dissidents to Castro and attempt to unite them and to build some sort of a workable net with them. We also wanted any kind of general information that we could get which would constitute intelligence information for us.

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Mr. Baron. Was it clear to you at that time that AMLASH had direct personal access to Castro?

Mr. Weatherby. He had direct personal access to him as far as we knew in the company of others.

Mr. Baron. Did he clearly have no access to Castro in any one-on-one setting?

Mr. Weatherby. I have no idea of that, sir. I might say that Castro was constantly surrounded by an entourage and you would have to be awfully friendly with Castro to ever get into that situation with him.

Mr. Baron. It was true, though, was it not, that AMLASH was personally friendly with Castro and had a long history of personal relationship with him?

Mr. Weatherby. He was no longer friendly with him since his movement was eased out of control of Cuba. They had a relationship probably as one conspirator against Batista to another. He had a degree of accessibility and was still, I am sure, held in some respect by Castro, but the degree of friendship, I don't think you could say it was very deep.

Mr. Baron. Do you recall anything that occurred in these meetings in mid-August in Paris that would have contributed further to the belief that AMLASH had a propensity to carry out an assassination mission?

Mr. Weatherby. He may have discussed it again. I don't recall precisely there. To the best of my recollection, he

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still maintained an intensity of feelings against the Castro regime, but we had hoped by that time that he was prepared to go back and become a reporting asset and perhaps an organizer of a collection of an INTEL network and not pursue or even attempt to pursue any other activities.

Mr. Baron. Let me show you the document that we will mark Weatherby Exhibit 4, which is an excerpt from a cable from the Spanish-speaking case officer located in Madrid, whose name appears in the I.G. report at page 85, presumably back to headquarters issued on August 17, 1962.

(The document referred to was marked Weatherby Exhibit No. 4 for identification.)

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1 (Pause)

2 Mr. Weatherby. I have read that.

3 Mr. Baron. Do you recall learning from this CIA case
4 officer that such a cable was sent?

5 Mr. Weatherby. I am sure I knew at that time, or was
6 informed about the content of that cable, and perhaps the
7 discussions that the Spanish-speaking case officer had with
8 AMLASH. I may have not been at the meeting as they conducted
9 it in Spanish, and I do believe they had several meetings in
10 which I was not in attendance. Of that I am not certain.

11 Mr. Baron. Do you have a general recollection of AMLASH
12 making statements or behaving in such a way to indicate that
13 he "could or might try to carry out on his own initiative"
14 a "physical elimination mission"?

15 Mr. Weatherby. He may have continued to discuss it, but
16 I didn't feel that he really meant what he said.

17 Mr. Baron. Would he have been discussing a physical
18 elimination mission against Castro?

19 Mr. Weatherby. With this Spanish-speaking case officer?

20 Mr. Baron. Yes, or in the content of these general
21 meetings?

22 Mr. Weatherby. He could have been. That I don't recall
23 precisely. It is one thing to have a man perhaps thinking or
24 expressing feelings in these terms, and you are never sure
25 when you have put that aside.

1 Mr. Baron. Was AMLASH being assessed during this period
2 of time as a potential asset for involvement in any way in
3 any kind of an assassination mission against Castro?

4 Mr. Weatherby. Absolutely not by us.

5 Mr. Baron. Would you consider the initiation of a coup
6 by means of eliminating the leadership of Cuba an assassination
7 attempt?

8 (Pause)

9 Mr. Weatherby. I would think that anytime you attempted --
10 well, would you state the question again, please?

11 Mr. Baron. Would you read the question back, please?

12 (The reporter read back prior question.)

13 Mr. Weatherby. By the elimination of the --

14 Mr. Baron. In other words, do you draw a distinction
15 in your mind when you use the word "assassination" between
16 killing an individual political leader out of any motive on
17 the one hand, and on the other hand attempting to kill a
18 political leader or a circle of political leaders as a means
19 of initiating a coup to overthrow an entire governmental
20 regime?

21 Mr. Weatherby. I think that would be assassination in
22 any case if you target it against the individuals.

23 That's something that bears thought. I mean, if you blew
24 up a building, for example, to cause a distraction, and people
25 were lost there, I don't consider that an assassination.

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Mr. Baron. Was any thought given during the period of your involvement with Project AMLASH to utilizing AMLASH to initiate a coup by any means?

Mr. Weatherby. Well, certainly not by assassination. But if he could overthrow the government, or take power, or divide it, that of course was an objective.

Mr. Baron. If he could have done, if he could have accomplished that objective by means of physical elimination of leadership of Cuba, that would not have been objectionable to you and to others in Task Force W involved in Project AMLASH at that point, would it?

Mr. Weatherby. I really can't answer that question. I don't know what they think and I --

Mr. Baron. Speaking for yourself then, would it have been an objectionable means --

Mr. Weatherby. To me it would have been.

Mr. Baron. -- to overthrow the government?

Mr. Weatherby. To me it would have been.

Mr. Baron. Are you personally opposed as a matter of morality to assassinations?

Mr. Weatherby. Absolutely.

Mr. Baron. Why?

Mr. Weatherby. I don't believe in taking human life, period in that manner. If you are in a fire fight, or somebody

1 a different story. In other words, I draw a distinction between
2 assassination of an individual, individuals, and those who
3 lose their life in a battlefield, whether it is in a building
4 or on a battlefield.

5 Mr. Baron. What about killing the sentry who is guarding
6 the door to the palace?

7 Mr. Weatherby. Well, that's --

8 Mr. Baron. As a means of initiating an attack.

9 Mr. Weatherby. That's sort of like asking me when I
10 stopped beating my wife, sir. I would rather not comment on
11 that.

12 Mr. Baron. I am simply trying to point out that or to
13 ask you whether there is not some middle ground between a
14 combat situation and an individual murder where it might have
15 been acceptable to you at the time for our government to be
16 involved in targeted elimination of political leaders in
17 a regime that we found unacceptable.

18 Mr. Weatherby. I had not really thought about that, and
19 it is a rather philosophical question, sir.

20 Mr. Baron. All right. Enough philosophy.

21 Let me show you an excerpt from a cable of August 18th
22 from CIA headquarters to presumably the Spanish-speaking case
23 officer that sent a cable to headquarters on August 17th.

24 We will mark this Weatherby Exhibit 5 and reflect that

25
NW 50955 DocId:32202418 Page 68
This appears at page 85 in the I.G. report.

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(The document referred to
 was marked Weatherby Exhibit
 No. 5 for identification.)

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1 Mr. Baron. Can you tell me first whether you have an
2 independent recollection of such a directive reaching you
3 in Paris; namely, a directly "strongly concur that no physical
4 elimination missions be given AMLASH"?

5 Mr. Weatherby. Well, I can believe this as an exhibit.

6 Mr. Baron. In other words it is credible to you but
7 you don't have any independent recollection of receiving such
8 a directive?

9 Mr. Weatherby. No. But it is within keeping with my
10 directions at all times, so, therefore, it seems to be
11 perfectly logical.

12 Mr. Baron. Why would such a directive have been sent at
13 that point?

14 Mr. Weatherby. Probably only to reinforce a case officer's
15 judgement in the field that he's not about to condone such
16 activity, and they are going on record, as in the bureaucracy,
17 saying you are absolutely right.

18 Mr. Baron. Can you tell me of any significant developments
19 in Project AMLASH that occurred between the time of these
20 meetings in August of 1962 and your departure from Project
21 AMLASH in late 1963?

22 Mr. Weatherby. Well, we had attempted on a number of
23 occasions to get him to come out again and talk to him and
24 see what he had accomplished. He had a S.W. system, as I

25 recall, that wasn't very successful in communications, and then

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1 we learned that he was coming out to Porto Alegre in Brazil,
2 and we made arrangements to visit with him.

3 That's the other AMLASH case officer and myself.

4 Mr. Baron. What transpired when you met with AMLASH in
5 Porto Alegre?

6 Mr. Weatherby. That was essentially a turnover meeting.
7 We met him and he was debriefed in a safe house by the other
8 case officer in Spanish, and I was posted as a lookout, and
9 did not actually participate in the substance of the discussions.

10 Mr. Baron. Do you recall that AMLASH was told to assist
11 a Cuban military officer who operated under the cryptonym of
12 AMTRUNK 10 in intelligence assignments for the CIA?

13 Mr. Weatherby. I do not recall that. That may be after
14 the turnover. I am not sure.

15 Mr. Baron. Do you recall --

16 Mr. Weatherby. I certainly didn't.

17 Mr. Baron. -- the nature of any assignments given to
18 AMTRUNK 10?

19 Mr. Weatherby. No, I don't.

20 Mr. Baron. How soon after this meeting in Porto Alegre
21 did you leave Project AMLASH?

22 Mr. Weatherby. Well, normally when you turn the case over
23 you leave it immediately, for compartmentation's sake. I
24 believe I may have heard or seen Tepedino once or twice after
25 that, and that would be the termination of my portion of the

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1 Mr. Baron. Were you present at any further meetings in
2 Paris with AMLASH?

3 Mr. Weatherby. No, sir.

4 Mr. Baron. Do you recall briefing the succeeding AMLASH
5 case officer at the time that he took over?

6 Mr. Weatherby. I had to have.

7 Mr. Baron. Do you recall briefing him on AMLASH's
8 propensity for assassination?

9 Mr. Weatherby. His propensity to discuss it, I am sure,
10 was common knowledge.

11 Mr. Baron. But not his propensity for carrying out the
12 act itself?

13 Mr. Weatherby. Correct.

14 Mr. Baron. Did you mention to the new case officer
15 AMLASH's, AMLASH's willingness to carry out such an act?

16 Mr. Weatherby. I would never -- I don't recall having
17 mentioned that precisely, but I would not have said his
18 willingness, but his tendency to talk about it, because I
19 personally didn't believe that the man ever really meant to
20 do that physically.

21 Mr. Baron. Were you aware of any meetings that took place
22 in October of 1963 at which Desmond FitzGerald met AMLASH
23 in Paris at Red Stent's house and discussed the kind of
24 support that AMLASH could expect from the United States
25 government?

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1 Mr. Weatherby. I knew he went because it was very
2 soon after, I think, I had last seen him but I wasn't invited
3 for any operational guidance bu then.

4 Mr. Baron. You weren't invited to brief FitzGerald at
5 that point?

6 Mr. Weatherby. I don't recall. I may have briefed him
7 or talked to him with the other AMLASH case officer about the
8 man, what kind of an animal he was -- can we strike that?
9 What kind of a man he was, and maybe so. And of course his
10 idiosyncrasies, that's normal procedure.

11 Mr. Baron. Do you recall any discussion with anyone at
12 CIA at that point about the need to meet AMLASH's request
13 for assurances that a high U.S. official was willing to
14 stand behind his operations in Cuba, preferably Robert F.
15 Kennedy?

16 Mr. Weatherby. I heard, probably without invitation,
17 or by the by that FitzGerald would go over there, but I didn't
18 know the details. I knew --

19 Mr. Baron. Did you know that FitzGerald would go over
20 there to make a representation to AMLASH that people higher
21 in the government than FitzGerald would stand behind AMLASH?

22 Mr. Weatherby. Yes, I remember that. To the best of
23 my knowledge -- I don't remember who he represented, but during
24 the trip obviously he was preparing for it and --

25 Mr. Baron. Do you remember Richard Helms being involved

1 in any of those discussions prior to FitzGerald's trip to
2 Paris?

3 Mr. Weatherby. Not specifically. He may have been.

4 Mr. Baron. And do you recall any contact with Robert
5 Kennedy between the time that this assurance was requested
6 by AMLASH and the time that FitzGerald went to Paris?

7 Mr. Weatherby. I have no direct knowledge of that.

8 Mr. Baron. Do you have any recollection of any contact
9 between anyone and Task Force W and Robert Kennedy?

10 Mr. Weatherby. Oh, I think Mr. Harvey had seen him. I
11 am sure they did. I simply don't know for a fact.

12 Mr. Baron. You don't remember any specific instances
13 where Robert Kennedy met face to face with members of Task
14 Force W or called them on the phone or received phone calls
15 from them in relation to Project AMLASH?

16 Mr. Weatherby. Not in direct relation to that, no. I
17 knew they were obviously interested in the whole program,
18 but again, I wasn't at that level.

19 Mr. Baron. Did you have any sense of the closeness of
20 the relationship between Robert Kennedy and Desmond FitzGerald?

21 Mr. Weatherby. No, sir.

22 Mr. Baron. Did you have a sense of the kind of relationship
23 that existed between Robert Kennedy and William Harvey?

24 Mr. Weatherby. No, except I think it was common knowledge
25 that it wasn't the best.

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Mr. Baron. Did you have any sense of the relationship that existed between Robert Kennedy and Richard Helms?

Mr. Weatherby. No, sir.

Mr. Baron. Do you have any recollection of drops into Cuba of caches of arms intended for AMLASH?

Mr. Weatherby. No, sir.

Mr. Baron. Do you recall any planning for such drops or even the discussion of such drops?

Mr. Weatherby. I may have heard it. I didn't participate and I don't know any details.

Mr. Baron. Do you recall any discussion of dropping arms to AMLASH or people associated with him during your period of operational control of the AMLASH Project?

Mr. Weatherby. No. It may well have been discussed at that point, but nothing during my tenure was ever done like that. The man didn't communicate. It would be pretty hard to drop anything to him at that point.

Mr. Baron. What do you mean by the fact that he wasn't communicating?

Mr. Weatherby. Well, as I said earlier, there were great periods when the man, we didn't know really what he was doing. We heard second-hand or they had seen him here or there, and he was well and healthy and so forth, but he wouldn't communicate with us. It's just simply not, it's not

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1 assistance to a person with whom we can't communicate, during
2 my time. Remember, after we saw him in Paris it was essentially
3 nothing of significance until we finally found out the man
4 was going to come out.

5 That was one of the frustrations of the case, that the
6 man wouldn't communicate.

7 Mr. Baron. Going to come out to where?

8 Mr. Weatherby. To Porto Alegre.

9 Mr. Baron. Do you have any knowledge from any source
10 about the development of a pin containing a hypodermic syringe
11 capable of administering poison?

12 Mr. Weatherby. No, sir.

13 Mr. Baron. You don't recall the development of such a
14 device in relation to the AMLASH case?

15 Mr. Weatherby. No, I don't.

16 Mr. Baron. Do you recall discussions with the Technical
17 Services Division or the Office of Medical Services about
18 developing any devices capable of, you know, eliminating an
19 individual Cuban leader?

20 Mr. Weatherby. No.

21 Mr. Baron. If I told you that a ballpoint pen was developed
22 at the CIA which contained a hypodermic syringe and was capable
23 of administering a lethal poison, and that such a device was
24 offered to AMLASH at a point subsequent to your involvement

25 with him, what would you make of it?

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Mr. Weatherby. I wouldn't think it was accurate. I really don't know.

Mr. Baron. Would it strike you that either the story is inaccurate, or if it is accurate, that such device would clearly be designed for offensive use against some individual?

Mr. Weatherby. May I have that question again?

(The reporter read back the prior question.)

Mr. Weatherby. Well, I have no knowledge of it. I think it is probably inaccurate. However, if it were accurate, use the conjectural, then obviously it must be used perhaps in the manner which you describe.

Mr. Baron. Wouldn't it seem unlikely to you that that kind of device would be designed as a self-defense weapon?

Mr. Weatherby. I don't know. I really, I don't, I am not getting the train of your questioning now.

Mr. Baron. I am simply asking in the abstract your opinion as, in effect, an expert, as a case officer with some operational experience, wouldn't such a device be next to useless as a self-defense weapon?

Mr. Weatherby. No, I don't think so. No different than mace.

Mr. Baron. Except that this device obviously can only be used --

Mr. Weatherby. Once.

Mr. Baron. Once.

1 Mr. Weatherby. So can mace.

2 Mr. Baron. In a tight spot.

3 Mr. Weatherby. Yeah.

4 Mr. Baron. Where there could be more than one, you know,
5 person involved.

6 Mr. Weatherby. Yeah. That's such a hypothetical question
7 that it's difficult to answer. You know, if I were talking
8 to you and you were a Russian case officer, and I said I
9 am not going to do something, and you decided that you were
10 going to turn me in, all I can do is get rid of you and leave.
11 If, on the other hand, in a cast of thousands it would not
12 be worth a whole hell of a lot.

13 Mr. Baron. If somebody were asking you for a self-defense
14 weapon, would you supply them with this kind of a device that
15 I have described?

16 Mr. Weatherby. Oh, I would have to think about that.
17 That's fairly -- that would depend entirely on the circumstances.

18 Mr. Baron. After you left Project AMLASH, what was
19 the nature of the other projects that your pursued on Task
20 Force W?

21 Mr. Weatherby. I would have to go back on the record on
22 that but I would say it was classical FI defections, counter-
23 intelligence basically.

24 Mr. Baron. Were you associated with any aspect, other
25 than intelligence collection, of planning for a coup against

1 Castro?

2 Mr. Weatherby. No, sir.

3 Mr. Baron. Do you recall from your experience on Task
4 Force W plans for or discussions of the supply of weapons
5 to Cuban dissidents at that point?

6 Mr. Weatherby. Well, it's a matter of record that it
7 was done or attempted, but I had nothing to do with the
8 direct planning, and I have no knowledge of the planning or
9 execution as such.

10 Mr. Baron. Did you have any contact with a man named
11 Arttime?

12 Mr. Weatherby. No, sir.

13 Mr. Baron. Did you know him?

14 Mr. Weatherby. I knew who he was but I did not know
15 him.

16 Mr. Baron. Who was he?

17 Mr. Weatherby. He was a Cuban exile leader.

18 Mr. Baron. Do you know Howard Hunt?

19 Mr. Weatherby. I know of Howard Hunt. I never met Howard
20 Hunt.

21 Mr. Baron. Did you have any contact in any way with Howard
22 Hunt in relation to your service on Task Force W?

23 Mr. Weatherby. No, sir.

24 Mr. Baron. Throughout the course of this discussion,

25 when we have been referring to Task Force W, it is clear in

TOP SECRET

1 your mind that that would also cover any references to SAS,
2 which was the same organization as Task Force W?

3 Mr. Weatherby. Absolutely. I am not interested in
4 subterfuge.

5 Mr. Baron. Okay. In your intelligence collection
6 operations on Task Force W or the SAS staff, did you make
7 any use of members of the gambling syndicate in Havana?

8 Mr. Weatherby. No, sir.

9 Mr. Baron. Were you ever made aware of CIA contact with
10 members of the gambling syndicate that ran gambling operations
11 in Cuba for the purpose of intelligence gathering?

12 Mr. Weatherby. No, sir.

13 Mr. Baron. Were you aware of any contact with gambling
14 syndicate members?

15 Mr. Weatherby. No, sir.

16 Mr. Baron. And does that include gambling syndicate
17 figures in the United States who may have had an interest in
18 Cuba?

19 Mr. Weatherby. Yes, sir.

20 Mr. Baron. Did you visit the J.M. WAVE station in
21 Miami as a part of your activities on Task Force W or SAS?

22 Mr. Weatherby. No, sir.

23 Mr. Baron. You never visited the J.M. WAVE station?

24 Mr. Weatherby. Yes, sir.

25 Mr. Baron. That's correct?

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Mr. Weatherby. No.

Mr. Baron. Are you saying that --

Mr. Weatherby. That's two separate questions you asked me. The answer on the first one was no, sir, and the answer to the second one was no, sir.

Mr. Baron. All of which goes to indicate that you never visited the J.M. WAVE station at any point?

Mr. Weatherby. During my attachment to the Cuban Task Force, that is correct.

Mr. Baron. Did you visit it at some other point, that is?

Mr. Weatherby. That is correct.

Mr. Baron. Is that correct?

Mr. Weatherby. Yes, sir.

Mr. Baron. When was that?

Mr. Weatherby. That was about 1967.

Mr. Baron. In connection with what kind of operation?

Mr. Weatherby. That was procurement of an aircraft.

Mr. Baron. For use where?

Mr. Weatherby. For use -- are we on the record?

Mr. Baron. Yes.

Mr. Weatherby. For use in the Congo.

Mr. Baron. I simply have one more procedural matter to mention to you.

Are you aware that since the time Senator Morgan left

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1 the room that you were under no obligation to stay here and
2 continue your testimony?

3 Mr. Weatherby. Absolutely.

4 Mr. Baron. But did you voluntarily stay and continue
5 to testify?

6 Mr. Weatherby. Yes, sir. Absolutely. I will stay as
7 long as you wish.

8 Mr. Baron. Okay. I think I have no further questions.

9 Is there anything else that you would like to say or
10 to add to the record to put our discussion here today into
11 context?

12 Mr. Weatherby. I think not.

13 Mr. Baron. All right. Thank you very much. You have
14 been extremely cooperative and informative.

15 Mr. Weatherby. Pleasure.

16 (Whereupon, at 4:45 o'clock p.m., the hearing in the above-
17 mentioned matter was adjourned.)

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Weatherby - Exhibit 1

STATEMENT REGARDING TESTIMONY IN ALIAS

I, _____, hereby certify that on
1 August, 1975 I testified before Senator _____
and members of the Senate Select Committee Staff after being duly sworn
under the alias of William E. Weatherby.

True Name

Frederick P. Baron
Witness

This statement, marked Exhibit Weatherby 1, will be retained in the custody
of the Review Staff, Central Intelligence Agency.

Weatherby - Exhibit 2

~~AMLASH Ex 1~~

~~7/29/75~~
~~AMW~~

03

WAINWRIGHT'S CONTACT REPORT OF THE FIRST MEETING WITH CUBELA
(30 July - 6 August 1962)

He said he was considering not going back to Cuba, but after talking to Tepedino, he felt that if he could do something really significant for the creation of a new Cuba, ~~he was~~ he was interested in returning to carry on the fight there.

He said he was not interested in risking his life for any small undertaking, but that if he could be given a really large part to play, he would use himself and several others in Cuba whom he could rely upon.

He said he had plans to blow up an oil refinery, as he felt that the continuing existence of a semblance of normal functioning in Cuba depended upon a continuing supply of petroleum, supplies of which, as we know, are at a critical stage today.

He also wanted to plan the execution of Carlos Rodriguez (a top-ranking Castro subordinate) and the Soviet Ambassador, and also to eliminate Fidel, by execution if necessary.

While we were making no commitments or plans, we pointed out to Cubela that schemes like he envisioned certainly had their place, but that a lot of coordination, planning, information-collection, etc., were necessary prerequisites to ensure the value and success of such plans.

Cubela stated many times during the course of this and subsequent meetings that he was only interested in involving himself in a plan of significant action, and which was truly designed to achieve rapidly his desire to help Cuba.

Weatherby - Exhibit 3 AMLASH Ex 2

7/29/75

ARW

⁰³
WAINWRIGHT WROTE IN HIS CONTACT REPORT:
(10-11 August 1962)

" . . . at one time when we ⁰³ WAINWRIGHT always wrote of himself as 'we' were discussing the various aspects of Cubela's future role in Cuba, we used the term 'assassinate.' The use of this term, we later learned from Tepedino and from Cubela himself, was most objectionable to the latter, and he was visibly upset. It was not the act he objected to, but rather merely the choice of the word used to describe it. 'Eliminate was acceptable.'"

Weatherby - Exhibit 4 AMLASH Ex 3

7/29/75
AKW

⁰³
~~WILLIAMSON~~ CABLED on 17 AUGUST:
(14-23 August 1962)

"Have no intention give Cubela physical elimination mission
as requirement but recognize this something he could or
might try to carry out on his own initiative."



Weatherby - Exhibit 5

HEADQUARTERS REPLIED BY CABLE ON 18 AUGUST:

"Strongly concur that no physical elimination missions be given Cubaia."