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SUB-COMMITTEE ON CUBA SUBVERSION

13 March 1963

TO SERVICE, OSD, AND JOINT STAFF CONTACT POINTS:

This is the first draft on the exchange of intelligence. Section II on the Nature and Scope of the Problem possibly should be shortened.

Your comments are requested by 0900, 14 March 1963.

V. H. KRULAK
Major General, USMC

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FIRST DRAFT

CUBA

THE EXCHANGE OF INTELLIGENCE
CONCERNING COMMUNIST SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES

I. Introduction

In combatting the many forms of Castro-Communist subversion now pursued throughout Latin America from the Communist base of operations in Cuba, there is a fundamental requirement for intelligence -- a requirement which involves not only the timely acquisition and processing of information, but also its rapid dissemination, on a selective basis, to those who need to know. Efforts are now being made by CIA, AID, and the U.S. Military Services to improve Latin American intelligence systems. Success thus far has been limited. This effort must be vigorously continued. It is not with this problem, however, that this paper is primarily concerned, but rather with that of exchanging essential information among those who need to know it. A greater degree of Inter-American cooperation is required in this regard than has hitherto been achieved.

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II. The Nature and Scope of the Problem

1. Limiting Factors

There are many legitimate inhibitions which tend to discourage the exchange of intelligence on an international basis, even among allies. National privacy with regard to the inner workings of an intelligence system must be preserved. Further compounding the problem insofar as Latin America is concerned is the divisive influence of the long history of rivalries, wars, jealousies and disputes which have characterized relations among the many nations concerned. The wounds of past conflicts among pairs and groupings of nations are by no means completely healed. For example, there is lingering hostility between Peru and Ecuador deriving from their boundary war in which Ecuador lost a vast area of its territory. Chile and Bolivia continue at odds over their ^{Ylio} ~~border~~ ^{Sanca} ~~border~~ dispute, and, even now, Nicaraguan insurgents are harbored within the borders of Costa Rica. It

could hardly be expected that these countries would be ^{eager} ~~prone~~ to exchange intelligence. *in any significant amount*

to the sea

Latin America is not a homogeneous entity in ethnic, social, political, and economic background, and there is a great variety of attitudes toward the Castro-Communist subversive menace. A completely unified approach toward exchange or intelligence concerning this menace, therefore, cannot be regarded as practicable.

The realities outlined above indicate that multilateral intelligence exchange must be approached on a strictly limited basis. It should not be concluded, however, that nothing of value can be done multilaterally. With proper definition limiting the problem of exchange to matters directly related to communist subversive activities, such as the movement to and from Cuba of subversives, the production and movement of propaganda materials, and the movement of arms, it should be possible to encourage a greater degree of cooperation. It is important, in this regard, to draw a sharp distinction between intelligence gained by covert means and information obtained openly. The former involves the requirement to protect national secrets as to sources and methods employed. The latter, which can be of great value, can be exchanged without fear of compromise.

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An additional impediment to intelligence exchange is the low level of competence of most Latin American intelligence services, their lack of rapid, secure means of communication, and the complete absence of adequate security systems. [Security consciousness ← is not a Latin American characteristic.] The lack of security safeguards must necessarily limit the exchange of intelligence obtained covertly by any of the nations involved, and particularly the United States, which has the most sophisticated system and hence the greatest need for protection.

The governments of some countries, of which Guatemala is a good example, have little desire to develop a competent career security service. There is a fear that the existence of an efficient service would constitute a threat to further activities of members of the existing governments at such time as they might find themselves out of power. Moreover, many Latin American intelligence services display a tendency to yield to the temptation to label as "subversives" those of their own nationals resident in other countries who are opposed to the existing

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government. These considerations limit the possibilities of large-scale multilateral cooperation in the intelligence field.

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page 3*

2. Current Exchange Arrangements

At present there is little or no organized exchange of intelligence among the Latin American nations. There is a limited amount of informal exchange, often on a basis of personal relationships of government officials having a community of interest with respect to a particular matter.

The Central Intelligence Agency has established working liaison arrangements in some Latin American countries where such relations have been considered to be in the best interest of the United States. Most of the intelligence concerning subversion in Latin America available to the CIA is derived from covert operations or through contacts with another intelligence or security service. This inhibits the passage of such information to agencies of a third country. There is, however, a substantial amount of intelligence available from overt or non-sensitive sources which can be provided to other countries.

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In 1962, for example, CIA received information reports from [] services with which liaison is maintained in Latin America and released reports to [] recipients. Intelligence items exchanged included collated studies, weekly intelligence reviews, name traces and travel reports.

The U.S. Army, through its attaches, currently has an informal arrangement involving bilateral exchanges of intelligence with Argentina, Colombia, Ecuador, Uruguay, Peru, Paraguay and Venezuela. Information provided by the Army has been concerned with subversive personalities, communist infiltration, weapons movements and related matters. Reciprocal intelligence received has been of minimal value. The Army also provides selected information on subversive activities to Brazil, Chile, Guatemala and Mexico, although there is no reciprocal arrangement. The attaches of other U.S. Services practice limited exchange on a selective basis.

Some information has been released from time to time to Latin American countries by the Commander-in-Chief, Caribbean Command, operating through the Military Groups.

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As yet, however, the program for the provision by United States agencies of information on subversion to Latin American governments has not been developed to an adequate degree. Since the United States possesses the ~~greatest~~ ^{most extensive} acquisition capabilities, as well as the only secure and reliable means of rapid communication throughout Latin America (currently in process of improvement), the development of an integrated United States system for bilateral exchange offers the greatest possibility of achieving the results desired. United States experience in the matter of intelligence exchange in Latin America and in other areas of the world has led to the conclusion that bilateral arrangements are more fruitful than multilateral arrangements such as those established within the framework of NATO, CENTO and SEATO. Nevertheless, this experience has shown also that multilateral arrangements can be of some use, particularly in creating an awareness of the need for intelligence exchange.

The concept of an exchange of information among members of the OAS with regard to subversive activities has been put forward on numerous occasions at OAS

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Inter-American meetings, but has not been implemented, largely for the reasons set forth in section II.1.

Under the Punta del Este decisions the OAS members were urged to cooperate in strengthening their capacity to counteract threats or acts of aggression, subversion or other dangers to peace and security. The Council of the OAS is charged with maintaining vigilance over Castro-communist subversion and a "Special Consultative Committee on Security (SCCS)" is established to give technical advice to governments and the Council on request on matters relating to subversion. All American governments have been asked to furnish information on Castro-Communist activities to serve as the basis for studies and recommendations by the Council of the OAS on how to counteract them. Since the Punta del Este meeting the OAS has been making slow, but steady, progress in ^{the counter-subversion} ~~this~~ field which the Latin American countries continue to regard as primarily one of domestic jurisdiction.

This brief summary serves to illustrate that there is such room for expansion of bilateral intelligence exchange arrangements among the Latin

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and other Inter-American meetings, commencing with the Inter-American Conference at Bogota in 1948. At Punta del Este in 1962, OAS members were urged to cooperate in strengthening their capacity to counteract threats or acts of aggression, subversion or other dangers to peace and security. More recently, the Council of the OAS established the "Special Consultative Committee on Security (SCCS)" to consider the specific resolutions on security problems adopted at Punta del Este. The SCCS has requested all American governments to furnish information on Castro-Communist activities to serve as the basis for studies and recommendations by the OAS on the nature of the threat and means of dealing with it.

These actions by the OAS have yielded little or nothing in terms of concrete results. The individual Latin American countries have shown little inclination to proceed with implementing actions pursuant to the resolutions adopted.

This brief summary serves to illustrate that there is much room for expansion of bilateral intelligence exchange arrangements among the Latin

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American nations themselves, which is now minimal at best, as well as a need to create an expanded program for bilateral intelligence exchange between the United States and individual countries, and finally, a requirement to ^{develop} ~~exploit~~ the possibilities of a multilateral approach within the recognized limitations involved.

III. Actions Recommended

1. Increase the existing bilateral exchange of intelligence conducted by CIA, DOD, and other US Agencies where it is found possible to establish appropriate arrangements for the exchange of selected information consistent with security requirements.

2. Establish intelligence centers at Caribbean Command and Caribbean Sea Frontier headquarters for further dissemination of intelligence as appropriate in conjunction with the Military Alerting System, for rapid processing and dissemination ^{where appropriate} of intelligence on subversive activity directly to the countries concerned through the American embassies therein.

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3. Increase and expedite the existing flow of intelligence on subversion from CIA and the other elements of the American Embassies in Latin America to Caribbean Command as well as to CIA headquarters for further dissemination as appropriate.

4. Increase the dissemination to Latin American governments, by all US agencies concerned, of unclassified studies, reports and other non-sensitive information concerning Communist subversion.

5. Encourage Latin American countries to engage in bilateral exchange of intelligence on ^{Castro} Communist subversive activities. *recast*

6. Continue the development at high priority of U.S. communications in Latin America.

7. Increase emphasis on the provision of U.S. intelligence advisors to Latin American countries. *←*

8. Intensify and increase existing AID, CIA, and Military programs for the training and equipping of Latin American internal security and intelligence services. Establish such programs in additional countries where it is found to be in the best interests of the United States and acceptable to the country concerned.

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9. Undertake action in the OAS to stimulate governments to keep the Council and the SCCS fully informed on a continuing basis of the nature and incidence of subversive activities in their respective countries.

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9. Undertake action in the OAS to establish a standing committee of representatives of intelligence and security services for the purpose of receiving, processing, and disseminating information on Cuban-Communist subversive activities. (It is visualized that this committee would perform, on a continuing basis, functions similar to those undertaken by the Special Consultative Committee on Security (SCCS), but would not serve as an intelligence center for the immediate processing and dissemination of intelligence).

*Invite Pres
Intell & Secur
Chiefs to meet*

*Introduce -
IAOB in to internal security problem
~~Exclude other intell advisors in CIA~~*

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