

UNCLASSIFIED  
 CIA's JFK Transparency Plan  
 08 December 2022 FINAL

Key	Description of Information	Transparency Event	Conditions
1	<p><b>Intelligence Agents and Employees.</b> The names or aliases of living intelligence agents, officers, or employees who are still active or who retired under cover may generally be considered for postponement of release.</p>	<p>The names of such individuals will be released in accordance with the process described herein, when the individual is deceased, unless there is unambiguous information that the subject is still alive, unless the individual would be 100 years old, or unless the individual's connection to CIA has already been officially acknowledged. Names in the public domain that were not declassified and released through official channels will be evaluated for release by CIA in consultation with NARA. As part of the consultation, CIA may conduct a risk assessment to inform a release decision. Such risk assessments will include determinations of the degree and likelihood of harm to the sources or assets and their family members, consideration of the public interest in declassification and release, and whether or not harm would have most likely already occurred.</p>	<p>Job titles, when they do not identify a particular individual, are generally not appropriate for postponement.          If NARA and CIA reviewers cannot find sufficient identifying information to determine whether the employee is likely still living, the employee will be assumed deceased at 100 years old.</p>
	<p><b>PII of Intelligence Agents and Employees.</b> Personally identifiable information of confirmed living CIA employees, including but not limited to SSN, telephone number, address, DOB, tax ID number, and passport number, etc., will be withheld under Section 5(g)(2)(D) of the Act. If identifying information is proven to have been publically released it will be released. Telephone numbers or addresses may be considered for continued postponement only if the specific information is current.</p>	<p>This category is also tied to life status, which is reviewed every two years until all PII, such as SSN, telephone number, address, DOB, tax ID numbers, and passport number, etc., are released. Accordingly, a review and potential release of this category will occur on December 16, 2024, and every two years thereafter, and if necessary, a final release of remaining SSNs will occur on December 16, 2042, when all such individuals could reasonably be presumed deceased as the individuals will be assumed deceased at 100 years old.</p>	

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2	<p><b>Human Intelligence Sources or Assets.</b> The release of a name or other specific identifying information, to include information provided by the source or asset, would place a living human intelligence source at risk of life, or when the disclosure would expose ongoing intelligence operations, this information may generally be considered for postponement.</p>	<p>The names of such individuals will be released in accordance with the process described herein, when the individual is deceased, when 100 years old, or whose connection to the CIA has been previously officially acknowledged through declassification and release. Names in the public domain that were not declassified and released through official channels will be evaluated for release by CIA in consultation with NARA. As part of the consultation, CIA may conduct a risk assessment to inform a release decision. Such risk assessments will include determinations of the degree and likelihood of harm to the sources or assets and their family members, consideration of the public interest in declassification and release, and whether or not harm would have most likely already occurred. The risk assessment will also consider national security priorities when breaching any confidentiality of such relationships.</p>	<p>If the information pertains to a deceased source or a source whose association with the CIA has previously been officially acknowledged through declassification and release, the information may be considered only for continued postponement based on particularized information regarding the identifiable harm. However, for human intelligence sources who lived abroad, exceptions may be proposed if reviewers, despite due diligence, cannot find enough identifying information to determine whether the source is likely still living, the source will be assumed deceased at 100 years old.</p>
	<p><b>Pill of Human Intelligence Sources or Assets.</b> Personally identifiable information of confirmed human intelligence sources or assets, including but not limited to SSN, telephone number, address, DOB, tax ID number, and passport ID number, etc., will be withheld under Section 5(g)(2)(D) of the Act. If identifying information is proven to have been publically released it will be released.</p>	<p>This category is also tied to life status, which is reviewed every two years until all Pills released, or until December 16, 2042, whichever occurs first. Accordingly, a review and potential release of this category will occur on December 16, 2024, and every two years thereafter, and if necessary, a final release of remaining Pill will occur on December 16, 2042, when all such individuals could reasonably be presumed deceased at 100 years old.</p>	



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3	<p><b>Other human sources or informants—counterintelligence, law enforcement, etc.</b></p> <p>Human sources that supported the counterintelligence or other activities of the Central Intelligence Agency may be considered for postponement if they are living and the release of a name or other specific identifying information would place the source or their family at high risk of harm.</p>	<p>The names of such individuals will be released in accordance with the process described herein, when the individual is deceased, unless there is unambiguous information that the subject is still alive, unless the individual would be 100 years old, or unless the individual's connection to the CIA has previously been officially acknowledged through declassification and release. Names in the public domain that were not declassified and released through official channels will be evaluated for release by CIA in consultation with NARA. CIA may conduct a risk assessment to inform a release decision. Such risk assessments will include determinations of the degree and likelihood of harm to the sources or assets and their family members, consideration of the public interest in declassification and release, and whether or not harm would have most likely already occurred. The risk assessment will also consider national security priorities when breaching any confidentiality of such relationships.</p>	<p>If the information pertains to a deceased source or a source whose cooperation with a U.S. agency has already become public knowledge, the information may be considered for continued postponement only based on particularized information regarding the identifiable harm. If their cooperation with the U.S. Government is otherwise already known, either in this collection or in other declassified and released documents, the name or identifying information shall be released. If NARA and agency reviewers cannot find enough identifying information to determine whether the source is likely still living, the source will be assumed deceased when the source is estimated to be at 100 years old.</p>

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4	<p><b>Intelligence Installations or facilities.</b> Information that would identify the specific location of an intelligence installation/facility generally may be considered for continued postponement when the facility has not been previously officially acknowledged and when the specific facility remains in-use or when the revelation of the location would place an individual or entity at high risk due to their current support of U.S. intelligence interests or would significantly harm ongoing intelligence operations.</p>	<p>Location information will be released in accordance with the process described herein, when the facility connection to the agency has previously been officially acknowledged by CIA. Location information found in the public domain that is connected to the agency, but that has not been officially acknowledged by the CIA, will be evaluated for release by CIA in consultation with NARA. Specific details of an installation or facility will be reviewed for official release only after consultation with a foreign government and relevant Departments or Agencies. Agreement with the foreign government would be ideal, but not required, so long as coordination has occurred between the foreign government and relevant U.S. Departments or Agencies. Postponement of specific details can be considered only to the extent the gravity of the harm outweighs the public interest in disclosure. In each of the above, CIA may conduct a risk assessment to inform a release decision. Such risk assessments will include determinations of the degree and likelihood of harm, consideration of the public interest in declassification and release, and whether or not harm would have most likely already occurred.</p>	<p>If a location has previously been officially acknowledged by the CIA for a defined period of time, then it shall generally be presumed to be releasable for the period of time covered by the documents in the JFK Assassination Records Collection up to the latest period of time it was officially acknowledged. Intelligence installations or facilities include those used for counterintelligence.</p>



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5	<p><b>Intelligence Operational Details.</b> Information that would reveal specific details of CIA Intelligence Operations, to include targeting and recruitment information; details regarding handling of assets/sources; travel details; and operational methodology may generally be considered for postponement if revelation would place an individual or entity at high risk due to their current support of U.S. intelligence interests or would significantly harm ongoing intelligence operations.</p>	<p>Operational details will be released when CIA completes a risk assessment that determines the degree and likelihood of harm to CIA sources, methods, and liaison relationships related to the specific operation, and considers whether or not any harm would have most likely already occurred. The risk assessment will consider national security priorities when releasing such operational details.</p>	<p>The "fact of" certain intelligence operational details will be released when the details are generally known by the public and CIA completes a risk assessment that determines a high risk of harm to CIA sources, methods, and liaison relationships does not exist if released.</p>
6	<p><b>Intelligence and Counterintelligence Methods.</b> An intelligence method may be considered for continued postponement when it has not been previously officially acknowledged and the method remains under active use or remains viable for continued use.</p>	<p>The specific application of Intelligence and Counterintelligence Methods will be released when the release is determined to not have a high degree of harm to the use for current intelligence operations or viability for use, OR when CIA Chief Data Officer approves official release in support of national security priorities.</p>	<p>The "fact of" certain intelligence and counterintelligence methods will be released when the methodology is generally known by the public and CIA completes a risk assessment that determines a high risk of harm to CIA sources, methods, and liaison relationships does not exist if released.</p>
7	<p><b>Cover arrangements.</b> Information regarding the use of official cover arrangements in specific instances may be considered for continued postponement when the official cover arrangement has not been officially acknowledged by the CIA and the official cover arrangement remains in active use or is available for future use.</p>	<p>Details of cover arrangements will be released when the specific application of cover mechanism is no longer in use OR when CIA Chief Data Officer approves official release in support of national security priorities.</p>	<p>The "fact of" certain cover arrangements will be released when the arrangement is generally known by the public and CIA completes a risk assessment that determines a high risk of harm to CIA sources, methods, and liaison relationships does not exist if released.</p>

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8	<p><b>Covert Action.</b> Information related to the fact of specific unacknowledged covert operations, or sensitive details associated with the planning or execution of covert action.</p>	<p>The President, via the National Security Council (NSC), approves the declassification of the covert action program.</p>	<p>This action will take place via the existing High Level Panel (HLP) activities, of which CIA is a member. If the HLP is not active, then the members would consist of WH, CIA, NSC, NARA and any agency involved in said Covert Action, with WH as the lead. The "Fact of" covert activity will be assessed separately from operational details. Specific CIA equities will be released when minimal risk exists to intelligence sources and methods, as determined through the White House-led process for assessing covert action. Relationships with foreign partners will be assessed in the same manner, via the above Panel process.</p>
9	<p><b>Foreign Government Cooperation (intelligence, counterintelligence, law enforcement, military defense, etc.).</b> Foreign governments must be engaged to seek their input in the release of information concerning the specifics of cooperation that has to date been postponed under the Act.</p>	<p>Specific details regarding cooperation will be released in accordance with the process described herein, after consultation with the foreign government and relevant Departments or Agencies. If CIA cannot obtain agreement after consultation, then release will be determined through an NSC-led interagency process. Specific agreement for release is ideal, but not required, so long as coordination has occurred between the foreign government and relevant Departments or Agencies. Postponement of remaining details can only be considered to the extent the harm outweighs the public interest in disclosure. The agency will revisit and review relevant agreements and harm statements every 3 years.</p>	<p>Distinctions need to be made between the fact of cooperation and the specifics of the cooperation. The fact of cooperation should generally not be considered for postponement.</p>
10	<p><b>Other Government Agency (OGA) Information.</b> CIA cannot unilaterally approve the release of OGA equities.</p>	<p>All OGA information will be coordinated for release with NARA.</p>	