

Date : 08/06/95  
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JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM  
IDENTIFICATION FORM

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AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : SSCIA  
RECORD NUMBER : 157-10014-10093  
RECORDS SERIES : HEARINGS  
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : 13-H-02

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DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : SSCIA  
FROM : BISSELL, RICHARD  
TO :  
TITLE : R-1097  
DATE : 09/10/75  
PAGES : 84  
SUBJECTS : BISSELL, RICHARD  
  
LUMUMBA, PATRICE  
  
DOCUMENT TYPE : TRANSCRIPT  
CLASSIFICATION : UNCLASSIFIED  
RESTRICTIONS : 1A, 1B  
CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS  
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 09/25/98  
OPENING CRITERIA :  
COMMENTS :

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[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

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ORIGINAL  
Vol. 1 OF 3

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION  
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject  
to Criminal Sanctions

R 1097

**The United States Senate**

**Report of Proceedings**

INVENTORIED  
DN 2/14/77  
BY BC

**Hearing held before**

Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental  
Operations With respect to Intelligence Activities

The Department of State has no objection to the  
release or declassification of this document in full  
under the provisions of the JFK Assassination Records  
Collection Act of 1992 (PL102-526)  
Reviewed on 8/12/98 mjr

Wednesday, September 10, 1975

Washington, D. C.

(Stenotype Tape and Waste turned over  
to the Committee for destruction)

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TESTIMONY OF

PAGE

Richard N. Bissell

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EXHIBITS

NUMBER

Bissell Exhibit No. 1

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Bissell Exhibit No. 2

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Bissell Exhibit No. 5

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(Exhibits were retained by counsel.)

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1 Senator Hart of Colorado. Mr. Bissell, will you  
2 stand and be sworn.

3 Do you swear that the testimony you are about to give  
4 is the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth, so  
5 help you God?

6 Mr Bissell. I do.

7 Senator Hart of Colorado. The same circumstances  
8 apply as applied under your previous experiences before the  
9 Committee. You have the right under our rules to have a  
10 member of the Committee present at all times if you choose.  
11 And you have also your Constitutional right to counsel if you  
12 so choose. You do understand?

13 Mr. Bissell. I understand.

14 Senator Hart of Colorado. We will be under way now.

15 Mr. Baron. You are appearing here voluntarily today  
16 without counsel?

17 Mr. Bissell. I am.

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TESTIMONY OF RICHARD N. BISSELL

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Mr. Baron. Mr. Bissell, since we have talked with you last about the subject of the Congo we have taken testimony from a number of witnesses. The first that we would like to turn to is Bronson Tweedy, who in 1960 and 1961, as I am sure you will recall, was the Chief of the African Division. He indicated to us in his testimony that he had a number of talks with you, probably in the summer or fall of 1960, where the prospect of assassinating Lumumba was raised.

What can you tell us about those discussions?

Mr. Bissell. I am afraid I can't tell you anything. I don't remember the specific discussions with him. It seems to me, however, entirely to be expected that such conversations took place. I think I testified previously, but in any case, I remember assigning Justin O'Donnell to study the possibilities and to make plans for the assassination or elimination of Lumumba. And since that was in the Africa area, I think it most unlikely that I would have done that without saying something to the Division Chief about it.

Mr. Baron. Mr. Tweedy's testimony was to the effect that he was in fact not being informed of some on-going operation or some instruction that was contemplated, but rather that you and he were discussing the feasibility of assassinating Lumumba.

Did such discussions take place?

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1 only clear recollection I have is of what I think was  
2 the initial discussion on this matter that I had with Justin  
3 O'Donnell. And I believe that he and I had that alone, in  
4 other words, that Mr. Tweedy was not present in the dis-  
5 cussion I had with O'Donnell.

6 Mr. Baron. We will turn later to filling out the  
7 details of your conversation with Justin O'Donnell.

8 For the moment, sticking with Mr. Tweedy's testimony,  
9 he also testified that during this same period of time he  
10 composed cables that went to the Chief of Station in Leopold-  
11 ville inquiring as to if the Chief of Station could gain access  
12 to Lumumba for the purpose of assassinating him.

13 Did you send such cable?

14 Mr. Bissell. I would think the record would show  
15 whether they were sent. If they were sent the record would  
16 presumably also show if I signed them. And I expect that  
17 if they were sent I would have signed them. But I don't  
18 happen at this distance in time to remember the specific  
19 cables.

20 Mr. Wides. If you had sent cables of that kind,  
21 Mr. Bissell, would they have gone in the normal channels out  
22 from the African Division, or might they more likely have  
23 gone on a restricted basis from yourself to the Station  
24 Chief without --

25 Mr. Bissell. I think it is very probable that it would

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part of it.

Mr. Wides. Do you recall that being so?

Mr. Bissell. I don't specifically recall it. But since I am clear that at least in the case of O'Donnell, and I now presume in the case of Mr. Tweedy, I authorized and indeed directed this planning and preparatory activity. A major part of this would have been a search for ways in which access could be gained.

Mr. Baron. And what kind of access were you looking for at that time?

Mr. Bissell. Obviously I would say the access of an individual who for one reason or another could get close to Lumumba.

Mr. Baron. In the summer and very early fall of 1960 this would have been access to Lumumba for the purpose of assassinating him rather than snatching him from U.N. custody?

Mr. Bissell. Well, it could have been for the purpose really of eliminating him from his then political activities. And that could have been assassination, or it could have involved some form of incapacitation, or it could possibly have been, in your words, snatching him so that he could be put into the custody of what we regarded as friendly authorities.

Mr. Baron. Would you have sought information from the Chief of Station on whether he could gain access to

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1 or the very first days in September, he received a cable from  
2 CIA headquarters to the effect that a messenger will come  
3 to the Congo who you will recognize, and who will bring in-  
4 structions which you are to carry out.

5 Did you send such a cable to the Chief of Station?  
6 Mr. Bissell. I could have.

7 But I have perhaps a peculiar reason for questioning  
8 whether in this particular case I did. And my reason is  
9 the following.

10 You will notice that the cable you have just shown me  
11 that was sent out by the Director of Central Intelligence in  
12 late August, the cable was released by his initials. And  
13 it bears the notification that the only other distribution  
14 was to be to Mr. Helms, who was then, you will remember,  
15 Deputy -- my deputy.

16 Now, it is virtually inconceivable to me, given my  
17 knowledge of and involvement in this operation, that the  
18 Director would have sent a cable, denied circulation to me  
19 and had it circulated to Mr. Helms, if I had been in  
20 Washington. And I suspect that we could establish on the  
21 record that I was on vacation when the message you have shown  
22 me was sent.

23 Mr. Wides. That was in early August?

24 Mr. Baron. Let's introduce as Exhibit No. 1 for  
25 this session the document that you are referring to, which

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is a cable dated August 26, 1960, from Allen W. Dulles to Leopoldville. And this cable includes the paragraph:

"In high quarters here it is the clear-cut conclusion that if LLL continues to hold high office inevitable result will at best be chaos and at worst pave the way for Communist takeover of the Congo with disastrous consequences for the prestige of the U.N. and for the interest of the free world generally. Consequently, we conclude that his removal must be an urgent and prime objective, and that under existing conditions this should be a high priority of our covert action."

(The document referred to was marked Bissell Exhibit No. 1 for identification.)

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1 Mr. Baron. Mr. Bissell, would LLL refer to Lumumba  
2 in this cable?

3 Mr. Bissell. I believe so.

4 Mr. Baron. And isn't it unusual that this cable  
5 bears the designation Allen W. Dulles as opposed to Director?

6 Mr. Bissell. That is unusual.

7 Mr. Baron. What does that signify?

8 Mr. Bissell. I believe this cable was drafted by the  
9 Director himself. That would be my inference from the format.

10 Mr. Baron. And does this appear to be Mr. Dulles' initials  
11 which are blurred in the copy we have?

12 Mr. Bissell. They may be there, but in any event, the  
13 releasing signiature is definitely his.

14 If I may complete the answer to your question, for the  
15 reason I have given you, my surmise is that I was not  
16 in Washington, and probably on vacation, when this was  
17 sent. I suspect that I might be able to dig out calendars  
18 and establish that if it became very germane.

19 If that is the case, it is quite possible that the  
20 cable you asked me about stating that a messenger would  
21 soon arrive in Leopoldville was sent also in my absence.

22 Mr. Baron. If such a cable was sent in your absence  
23 would you be apprised of it upon your return to headquarters?

24 Mr. Bissell. I suspect so, yes. In this case I would  
25 be almost certain that I would.

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1 had such discussions with him I would have been asking him to  
2 give thought to ways and means.

3 Mr. Baron. And you were asking Mr. Gottlieb, then,  
4 to think about the technical means by which an assassination  
5 could be carried out?

6 Mr. Bissell. Correct.

7 Mr. Wides. That is an assumption that you were, or  
8 can you recall now?

9 Mr. Bissell. No, it is an assumption -- it is an in-  
10 ference, if you like, from the circumstances. I think it is  
11 quite likely that I would have had such discussions with him  
12 assuming, as I believe to be true, that he was the science  
13 advisor at that time.

14 Mr. Wides. But you have no recollection?

15 Mr. Bissell. No.

16 Senator Hart of Colorado. Excuse me, Mr. Baron.

17 I am going to have to go to vote, and I would just  
18 like the record to reflect your acquiescence that there is  
19 no committee member here if in fact that is the case.

20 Mr. Bissell. I do so acquiesce, and I am happy to  
21 continue.

22 Senator Hart of Colorado. With that understanding  
23 you are willing to continue?

24 Mr. Bissell. Yes.

25 Senator Hart of Colorado. Thank you very much.

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1 advisor, did he take frequent trips abroad?

2 Mr. Bissell. I would say infrequent. It seemed to me  
3 there were one or two others.

4 Mr. Wides. Would these trips be involved with  
5 highly sensitive operations as distinct from scientific  
6 evaluation?

7 Mr. Bissell. I believe that for the most part they  
8 would not have been involved with highly sensitive specific  
9 operations, but rather would have involved consultation with  
10 people in the field on the effectiveness of devices, tech-  
11 niques, procedures, underdevelopment in the Technical  
12 Services Division.

13 Mr. Wides. And given the unusual of his going to the  
14 Congo if he did in connection with clandestine operations  
15 there, you would have no recollection of that today?

16 Mr. Bissell. I don't have any recollection of that  
17 today, no. This is the first time I realized, since many  
18 years ago, that he had made such a trip.

19 Mr. Baron. Would he also have been aware that he  
20 had made such a trip?

21 Mr. Bissell. Well, the Chief of Station obviously,  
22 Bronson Tweedy, obviously. Quite probably the Director,  
23 but not certainly. And several others. I assume that Mr.  
24 Helms would have known about it at the time, because there  
25 would have been some kind of cable traffic, and I strongly

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1 suspect that Cornelius Roosevelt would have known  
2 about it.

3 Mr. Baron. Did Mr. Gottlieb's trip have anything to do  
4 with the assassination of Lumumba?

5 Mr. Bissell. I don't know, since I don't remember the  
6 circumstances, I really can't say.

7 Mr. Baron. Would you assume that Mr. Gottlieb's trip  
8 have had something to do with the assassination of Lumumba?

9 Mr. Bissell. I think it might very well.

10 Mr. Baron. And again we are talking about the plot  
11 to assassinate Lumumba rather than Lumumba's ultimate demise?

12 Mr. Bissell. Correct.

13 Mr. Baron. If Mr. Gottlieb's visit related to the plot  
14 to assassinate Lumumba, would such a sensitive operation  
15 have been made known to Bronson Tweedy?

16 Mr. Bissell. I believe so, specially in the light  
17 of the fact that apparently this possibility had been dis-  
18 cussed with Bronson Tweedy more than once.

19 Mr. Baron. Is it possible that Bronson Tweedy would  
20 have been cut out of the actual mounting of an assassination  
21 operation despite the fact that the feasibility of an  
22 assassination had been discussed with him?

23 Mr. Bissell. Yes, it is possible.

24 Mr. Baron. Was that the case?

25 Mr. Bissell. I don't remember. But if you ask me to

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1 not only as terminating the assignment for him, but also  
2 as reason for at least postponing anything further along that  
3 line.

4 Mr. Schwarz. Who had knowledge within the Agency of your  
5 assignment to O'Donnell and its true purpose.

6 Mr. Bissell. I would guess that --

7 Mr. Schwarz. Not guess, who did?

8 Mr. Bissell. I don't know. What I was going to say is  
9 that I think the Director did.

10 Mr. Schwarz. Guess, think, don't know. You have got to  
11 have a basis, Mr. Bissell, for testifying to something.

12 Mr. Bissell. All right.

13 The basis is, as has been in so much of my testimony,  
14 how business was conducted within the Agency at that time.  
15 There had been, as the Exhibit 1 cable suggests, there had  
16 already been consideration at high levels in the Agency and  
17 elsewhere of the elimination of Lumumba. Obviously I had  
18 been involved in conversations with the Director on that sub-  
19 ject. Given the way business was conducted, I would infer that  
20 I would have told the Director of my assignment to O'Donnell.

21 Mr. diGenova. Mr. Bissell, you are telling us that  
22 you don't remember this, is that correct?

23 Mr. Bissell. That is right.

24 Mr. diGenova. You have seen this Exhibit No. 1 which  
25 says:

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1 "In high quarters here it is the clearcut conclusion  
2 that if LLL continues to hold high office inevitable result  
3 will be chaos".

4 And then it goes on and says:

5 "Consequently we conclude that his removal must be an  
6 urgent prime objective and that under existing conditions  
7 this could be a high priority covert action".

8 That is dated August 26, 1960, signed, according to your  
9 identification of his signature, by Mr. Dulles personally.  
10 And it follows by one day a meeting in the White House of the  
11 Special Group attended by the President of the U.S., where  
12 Dulles said he would proceed --

13 Mr. Baron. I don't think this meeting was attended by  
14 the President.

15 Mr. diGenova. Excuse me, attended by Mr. Dulles --  
16 where he said he would proceed as vigorously as the situation  
17 permitted. And it was agreed that the planning for the  
18 Congo would not necessarily rule out consideration of any  
19 particular kind of activity which might contribute to getting  
20 rid of Lumumba.

21 Does that in any way refresh your recollection about  
22 what was happening at that time?

23 Do you remember anything independently of what Mr.  
24 Dulles was talking to you about? We had trouble areas in the  
25 world, including Cuba, and the African Continent in particular.

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even roughly what was said of it.

Mr. diGenova. Mr. Bissell, that is somewhat important, obviously, because the idea is to try, if possible, to establish what the precise facts were.

Now, I am sure you don't mean to say that the assassination of a foreign leader blurs into the everyday activity of the Agency because it was so commonplace -- or is that what you mean to say?

Mr. Bissell. No, I don't. But I do mean to say that, the Agency had put a top priority, probably, on a range of different methods of getting rid of Lumumba in the sense of either destroying him physically, incapacitating him, or eliminating his political influence. And a conversation about this particular facet of what was a many-sided attack on the problem doesn't stand out in my mind.

Mr. diGenova. What you are saying, then, is the details of any specific day or meeting or cable you don't recollect, but you don't have any trouble recollecting the fact that the assassination of Lumumba, among others, was part of a strategy at that time, if needed?

Mr. Bissell. Yes.

Mr. Baron. And that was part of a strategy at the level of the National Security Council as well as within the Agency?

Mr. Bissell. I believe that the language quoted would





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1 Mr. Bissell. Correct.

2 Mr. Baron. "Mr. Gray commented that his associates  
3 had expressed extremely strong feelings on the necessity for  
4 very straightforward action in this situation, and he wondered  
5 whether the plans as outlined were sufficient to accomplish  
6 this.

7 "Mr. Dulles replied that he had taken the comments re-  
8 ferred to seriously, and had every intention of proceeding as  
9 vigorously as the situation permits or requires, but added that  
10 he must necessarily put himself in a position of interpret-  
11 ing instructions of this kind within the bounds of necessity  
12 and capability. It was finally agreed that planning for the  
13 Congo would not necessarily rule out 'consideration' of any  
14 particular kind of activity which might contribute to  
15 getting rid of Lumumba".

16 Then the next day after this meeting Mr. Dulles  
17 sends out the telegram or the cable that we have already  
18 discussed.

19 Mr. Bissell. Right.

20 Mr. Baron. Would you assume that Mr. Dulles' cable,  
21 which was sent to Leopoldville, was a direct outgrowth of  
22 this meeting that he had attended the previous day?

23 Mr. Bissell. Obviously, sir.

24 Mr. Dawson. Do you know?

25 Mr. Bissell. I think there is no question on the

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basis of the documents.

Mr. Baron. Do you assume that assassination was one of the means of removing Lumumba from the scene that is contemplated within the language of Mr. Dulles' cable?

Mr. Bissell. Correct -- and also the language reported in the minutes of the Special Group.

Mr. Baron. And that would be in essence language--

Mr. Bissell. Could I just interrupt to say in elaboration of that point, you may remember that I perhaps unfortunately used the word "circumlocutious" in earlier testimony to describe the way this kind of topic was discussed. This is a prime example of it. When you use the language that no particular means were ruled out, that is obviously what it meant, and it meant that to everybody in the room.

Mr. Wides. Meant what?

Mr. Bissell. Meant that if it had to be assassination, that that was a permissible means.

Mr. Baron. And that this was permissible in the eyes of the President, whose sentiments -- who was being represented at the meeting by Gordon Gray?

Mr. Bissell. At least permissible by his representatives sitting in the room. You don't use language of that kind except to mean in effect, the Director is being told, get rid of the guy, and if you have to use extreme means up to and including assassination, go ahead.

1 Mr. Baron. And in effect the Director is being told  
2 that by the President?

3 Mr. Bissell. Right.

4 Mr. Baron. Through his representative?

5 Mr. Bissell. Right.

6 Mr. Schwarz. Did Mr. Dulles tell you that President  
7 Eisenhower wanted Lumumba killed?

8 Mr. Bissell. I am sure he didn't.

9 Mr. Smothers. Did he ever tell you even circum-  
10 locutiously through this kind of cable?

11 Mr. Bissell. Yes, I think his cable says it in effect.

12 Mr. Smothers. Was this a thing that was clearly under-  
13 stood here by everyone? What was that in your experience with  
14 the Agency that had prepared you to understand this kind of  
15 coded dialogue, if you will? Was assassination something  
16 that was discussed fairly often?

17 Mr. Bissell. No, I would say really very infrequently,  
18 very infrequently even discussed, let alone attempted.  
19 But I submit that the language just quoted from the minutes  
20 of the Special Group was not language internal to the Agency,  
21 it was language from a Cabinet level committee.

22 You may remember another document that was offered earlier  
23 in my testimony which was again minutes of a Special Group  
24 meeting, and it quoted Livingston Merchant, the State Depart-  
25 ment representative, again asking if there was no way to get

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rid of the Castro leadership in that case. I am sure you remember that document.

Now, when senior political officers meet in a Cabinet Committee, especially when some kind of a record is being kept, they do talk around a subject of that kind. But it doesn't mean that it is obscure or not understood by anyone there. I believe in both of these cases it is perfectly clear -- in the first Livingston Merchant case it is clear that he was raising a question as to whether physically getting rid of these people was possible, and in the second case, the one just quoted here, it seems to me that -- if you like to call it that -- the consensus of the Special Group was that "no means should be excluded in the effort to get rid of Lumumba".

And that, I repeat, is not CIA language. If it is gobbledegook it is on a good high level.

Mr. Dawson. Is Mr. Gray in this cable or memorandum for the Special Group on August 25, 1960, conveying the feeling of his associate, which we have identified clearly as President Eisenhower?

Mr. Baron. Moving back now to the testimony of the Chief of Station who was in Leopoldville in 1960, he said that shortly after he received this cable that a messenger would come whom he would recognize and who would give him instructions to carry out. He received a visit from Mr.



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1 Gottlieb. And we have discussed that visit. He then goes  
2 on to testify that Dr. Gottlieb gave to him, or told him that  
3 he would very shortly thereafter receive, some lethal biologi-  
4 cal substances, and the tools for administering those sub-  
5 stances, namely, a syringe, gauze masks, and rubber gloves.  
6 Were such lethal biological substances sent down to the  
7 Congo?

8 Mr. Bissell. I don't know. I assume the record shows  
9 one way or the other. I don't have a recollection of that.  
10 I was really rather surprised on the occasion of  
11 the earlier testimony to have it reported that they had been  
12 sent.

13 Mr. Baron. Would you assume now, hearing this testimony,  
14 that indeed such substances were sent to the Congo?

15 Mr. Bissell. I think what you have told me, repeating  
16 the evidence of the Station Chief, that Dr. Gottlieb told  
17 him to expect that, is that correct?

18 Mr. Wides. The testimony is that the materials were  
19 brought by Dr. Gottlieb or essentially arrived while he was  
20 there, and that he went over their use with the Station Chief.  
21 That doesn't refresh your recollection at all with regard --

22 Mr. Bissell. No, it doesn't. But I am sure if the  
23 Station Chief so testified it is correct, there is nothing  
24 in mind that I remember that would be in conflict with that.

25 Mr. Baron. It would not have been against the policy

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1 to the city where they were to be used, and there was re-  
2 conaissance, and every step necessary to actually carry out  
3 the execution, that the implementation as far as your use  
4 of the material would not start until someone actually picked  
5 up the rifle and pointed it at him?

6 Mr. Bissell. Let me try to sharpen it by reference,  
7 if my memory serves, to the Dominican Republic. It is there,  
8 if I remember, that submachine guns were sent down to the  
9 Station by CIA. The State Department never authorized the  
10 release of those to the anti-Trujillo plotters. And I  
11 believe they never were released.

12 Now, in that case, to take that example, I would say  
13 that implementation would have started at the moment that you  
14 turned those over and they passed out of our control. I  
15 would say that as long as any weapon of any kind remained  
16 securely within the Agency's control, that you were still  
17 short of what I would call --

18 Mr. Schwarz. Doesn't that turn on the nature  
19 of the order to the Agency personnel who has them?

20 Mr. Bissell. It does, right.

21 Mr. Schwarz. In the Lumumba case, was the AGENCY  
22 person who had the lethal agents authorized to use them to  
23 kill Lumumba?

24 Mr. Bissell. To that question I do not know the answer.  
25 Clearly the Station Chief had been not only authorized but

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1 encouraged, as we have developed -- as you have developed --  
2 in this testimony to seek out individuals who might have  
3 close access to Lumumba for the purpose of hostile action  
4 against him. Clearly the Station Chief was then sent, or  
5 a kit was then brought out to him and put in his possession,  
6 presumably so that if and when an individual with suitable  
7 access and other appropriate circumstances materialized and  
8 authorization was given, if it was still required, the  
9 operation could proceed.

10 Mr. Baron. Let me see if I can refresh your recollec-  
11 tion on that one point, whether authorization had been given.  
12 The Chief of Station testified that when Sidney Gottlieb  
13 gave him poison or instructions in the use of poison, he  
14 also made it very clear that these were for the purpose of  
15 assassinating Lumumba, and that he should proceed to carry  
16 out the assassination of Lumumba if it were possible, that the  
17 use of poison was not a sine qua non to the assassination,  
18 if he could find another way to do it, that would be fine,  
19 but that it was clear that he was to proceed with an assassin-  
20 ation operation if he could find a way to do it successfully.

21 Mr. Bissell. Accepting that testimony, then, the  
22 authorization was given.

23 Mr. Schwarz. But we are dealing with your testimony,  
24 Mr. Bissell. WE have his testimony, and your comments on his  
25 testimony doesn't add much to the record.

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1 setting it forth in as many words, with you this would have  
2 been identified with a project name by this time, and it is  
3 most unusual that even with a highly sensitive project that  
4 the nature is known to very few, probably only to the Station  
5 Chief itself.

6 What I would have expected is an authorizing cable saying,  
7 implement project such and such.

8 Mr. Schwarz. But in the normal course of CIA  
9 assassination activity, if I may use that term --

10 Mr. Bissell. In the abnormal course.

11 Mr. Schwarz. -- you would have been instructed by  
12 Mr. Dulles to do something?

13 Mr. Bissell. Instructed or authorized.

14 Mr. Schwarz. And then you would have spoken to or  
15 cabled some other officer?

16 Mr. Bissell. Correct. And knowing Mr. Gottlieb,  
17 it is literally inconceivable to me that he would have acted  
18 beyond his instructions.

19 Mr. Baron. The Chief of Station, to be fair to his  
20 testimony, indicated that he was greatly surprised when he  
21 received such instructions, and he was doubtful about the  
22 practicality of pulling off such an operation, at the  
23 least he was convinced it would be difficult. But he did  
24 say -- he added that as a fairly junior Chief of Station he  
25 might have checked back before he could have mounted such an

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1 operation. But he added that he believed the assassination  
2 was expected of him, and he left Mr. Gottlieb with the im-  
3 pression that he would proceed to try to perform such a mission.

4 Mr. Wides. He also cabled.

5 Mr. Baron. Now, the next step that the Chief of  
6 Station took after Mr. Gottlieb departed from the Congo,  
7 according to his testimony, was to cable to headquarters  
8 for confirmation of such an extraordinary mission.

9 Did you receive such a cable from Leopoldville?

10 Mr. Bissell. The record would have to show that. I  
11 don't remember it.

12 Mr. Baron. The Chief of Station also testified that  
13 he shortly thereafter received confirmation back in cryptic  
14 fashion to the effect that he was to proceed with the in-  
15 structions to carry out the instructions he had been given.

16 Did you sent such confirmation to him?

17 Mr. Bissell. I assume so, if the cable went out.

18 Mr. Baron. And that confirmation would have come  
19 from yourself directly as opposed to Bronson Tweedy or anyone  
20 else in the African Division?

21 Mr. Bissell. Probably.

22 But again, if you have that cable, the initials would  
23 show who signed off on it, and so on.

24 Mr. Schwarz. These cables have not been found.

25 Mr. diGenova. The Committee is making an effort to find

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1 them, and the Agency has not been able to produce them yet.

2 Mr. Bissell. If it is any help for me to say, this  
3 sounds highly likely as an account if it is established, as  
4 evidence seems to have established, that Dr. Gottlieb brought  
5 such instructions, I would expect the Station to seek con-  
6 firmation. And I would expect, given the background, that  
7 that confirmation would have been forthcoming. And I would  
8 also be almost certain that I would have signed off on such  
9 a cable, or signed such a cable, initialled it, even if it  
10 had been going to Mr. Dulles for final approval.

11 Mr. Baron. These events occurred in early September,  
12 which was prior to your conversations with Justin O'Donnell  
13 about the assassination of Lumumba?

14 Mr. Bissell. Yes.

15 Mr. Baron. So at that point an assassination mission  
16 had in effect been mounted in the Congo?

17 Mr. Bissell. Right.

18 Mr. Baron. After you spoke with Justin O'Donnell,  
19 did you send a cable to Leopoldville to stand down the  
20 assassination mission?

21 Mr. Bissell. Again, I would have to go back to the  
22 record.

23 Mr. Wides. Was it your testimony earlier that you  
24 have no recollection of discussing with Mr. Gottlieb the  
25 possible assassination of Lumumba?

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1 Mr. Bissell. I thought I testified earlier this  
2 afternoon that I might well have discussed it with him, but  
3 I don't have a specific recollection.

4 Mr. Wides. Let me read you an excerpt from your testi-  
5 mony on June 11, where Mr. Schwarz was asking you about your  
6 conversation with Mr. O'Donnell, and your request that he  
7 investigate, in your words, the possibility of assassinating  
8 Lumumba. And then on page 54 -- we should mark this --

9 Mr. Schwarz. Just read it in.

10 Mr. Wides. "Did you tell him this in connection with  
11 making plans to go see the passer of the poison, Mr. Gottlieb?"

12 "Mr. Bissell. I think I probably did."

13 Was that a recollection at that time that you had  
14 sent O'Donnell to see Dr. Gottlieb?

15 Mr. Bissell. No, I think that comes in the category  
16 of inference rather than recollection, because I don't re-  
17 member specifically telling Dr. Gottlieb.

18 Mr. Wides. Or speaking to Dr. Gottlieb, explaining  
19 the possible means to O'Donnell?

20 Mr. Bissell. I don't recollect it.

21 Mr. Baron. In the testimony of the Chief of Station  
22 in Leopoldville he said that during his visit with Dr.  
23 Gottlieb, as I have related, he was extremely surprised when  
24 he received these instructions. And the instructions were  
25 so specific that he wanted to be very sure that the authoriza-

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1 a representation that the President of the U.S. had authorized  
2 the assassination of Lumumba?

3 Mr. Bissell. I can't answer that question. But what  
4 probably occurred was --

5 Mr. Dawson. Wait a minute. Let's not do it that way.  
6 Is there any doubt that you would have undertaken --  
7 assuming that you did so instruct Mr. Gottlieb to carry this  
8 poison into the Congo -- that you would have done this with-  
9 out Mr. Dulles' authority?

10 Mr. Bissell. There was no possibility.

11 Mr. Dawson. Is there any doubt in your mind that you  
12 would have then assumed that Dulles had received the  
13 President's okay to do so?

14 Mr. Bissell. Well, I might well have believed that the  
15 Director was proceeding under the mandate of the Special  
16 Group as reported in the minutes of the meeting.

17 Mr. Schwarz. Did you tell Gottlieb anything about  
18 President Eisenhower?

19 Mr. Bissell. I probably did, but I don't remember.

20 Mr. Schwarz. Did Dulles tell you anything about  
21 President Eisenhower?

22 Mr. Bissell. He almost certainly would have told  
23 me a good deal about that meeting.

24 Mr. Schwarz. By that meeting --

25 Mr. Bissell. The Special Group meeting.

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1 I think it is probably unlikely that Allen Dulles would have  
2 said either the President or President Eisenhower even to me.  
3 I think he would have said, this is authorized in the highest  
4 quarters, and I would have known what he meant.

5 Mr. Baron. And you have communicated that to Mr.  
6 Gottlieb?

7 Mr. Bissell. I could very easily.

8 Mr. Schwarz. Is all of that line that we have just  
9 went through could and would and might, and inference, or  
10 is any of that recollection?

11 Mr. Bissell. I am afraid it has to be described as  
12 inference.

13 Mr. diGenova. But you didn't make up the minutes of  
14 the Special Group meeting on August 25 and you didn't make up  
15 the cable which Mr. Dulles signed either, did you?

16 Mr. Bissell. No.

17 Mr. diGenova. So that was actually sent out, wasn't  
18 it?

19 Mr. Bissell. Yes.

20 Mr. diGenova. And Mr. Dulles wasn't one who used  
21 highest quarters, was he?

22 Mr. Bissell. Yes -- and also the minutes of the  
23 Special Group referred to Mr. Gray's associate.

24 Mr. Wides. And your testimony a moment ago in response  
25 to Mr. dawson's question was, even though this fell within

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what you regarded as the planning stage, this meaning if it occurred, Dr. Gottlieb taking the poison to the Congo, that you would not have taken that step without the approval of the Director, was that your testimony?

Mr. Bissell. What I will now say at any rate is that the mere act of taking the kit to the Congo I would classify as still in the planning stage. But if it be taken as established that Mr. Gottlieb took specific instructions "to implement", I would say that we had then passed into an implementation phase.

Mr. Wides. Let me read to you from your testimony on June 11, and then ask you a question based on that.

On page 54 Mr. Schwarz said:

"Who authorized you to tell Mr. O'Donnell to take steps to move toward assassinating Mr. Lumumba?"

And you said: "No one".

And then Mr. Schwarz:

"Did you inform the White House of that?"

"No."

"To the best of your knowledge did anybody inform the White House of that?"

"Mr. Bissell. To the best of my knowledge, no.

"Mr. Schwarz. Why did you seek to assassinate Mr. Lumumba?"

"Mr. Bissell. I didn't seek to assassinate him. I

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1 to Mr. O'Donnell?

2 Mr. Bissell. That is correct.

3 And it is my recollection, as I have testified in  
4 part earlier this afternoon, that when O'Donnell came later  
5 and declined the assignment and expressed the view that this  
6 was not the way to solve the problem, that I shut off the  
7 O'Donnell operation completely.

8 Mr. Wides. Let me go back to that if I can. Mr.  
9 O'Donnell's testimony, which I believe we went over with you  
10 when you testified, we might ask you to see now if you have  
11 any different recollection.

12 In essence it is the following: that you called  
13 him in and asked him to go to the Congo for the purposes  
14 of trying to see if Lumumba could be assassinated, that  
15 very evening you asked him, right at that moment, and it was  
16 toward the end of the day, as he recalled it, you asked him  
17 to see Dr. Gottlieb; that he expressed reservation about  
18 assassination, but did go down to see Dr. Gottlieb. And  
19 Dr. Gottlieb discussed with him several lethal means, and he  
20 immediately came back to your office and said, I won't  
21 do it, and raised legal questions, moral questions --

22 Mr. Dawson. I don't think he testified that he imme-  
23 diately came back.

24 Mr. Schwarz. The same day.

25 Mr. Wides. Same day -- and that he then went next

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door, as I say, and discussed it with Mr. Helms.

This is Mr. O'Donnell's testimony.

Mr. O'Donnell further testified that he told you he would be willing to go to the Congo to explore the possibility of neutralizing him in other ways, and that shortly thereafter in the space of a few days went to the Congo. And I believe the record suggests that he was there from October through December, and that while he was looking into the possibility of trying to get Lumumba out of the property away from effective custody of the U.N. with the thought that if the Central Congolese Government obtain control of him, they might try him for capital crimes, and this might result in his physical removal. And this was mooted by Lumumba's escape and recapture and death, and he then came back.

Is it still your recollection that there was a period of several weeks between the time you broached the subject of an assassination and the time that Mr. O'Donnell expressed his opposition to it?

Mr. Bissell. I shouldn't be firm on the several weeks. But my recollection of the course of events differs in, I think, only one -- or is inconsistent with his recollection as you reported it in only the one respect, that the impression I carried away was that at a minimum some days -- and I had thought a period of at least a week elapsed between my giving him the assignment and his coming back to decline

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1 the assignment and recommend a different approach. What  
2 you further quote from his testimony I had not remembered, but  
3 it does now seem to me that I do remember -- part of my  
4 original recollection was that when he came back to me I have  
5 several times used the phrase, this was not the way to deal  
6 with the problem of Lumumba. And that is wholly consistent  
7 with his having proposed other means of neutralizing Lumumba  
8 short of using physical violence on him directly. I do seem  
9 to recollect that.

10 And although I had not remembered it, I do now seem to  
11 recollect that he went out there and with the assignment,  
12 most of it in his recollection rather than mine, of looking  
13 at other ways of neutralizing Lumumba. But my recollection  
14 simply differs from his on the matters of the timing and how  
15 soon he came back.

16 Mr. Wides. Do you recall when you proposed to Mr.  
17 Harvey, in what I think we concluded was most probably very  
18 early 1961, that he explore executive action capability,  
19 and that two people who had been cut in in some way on earlier  
20 considerations or explorations of assassination, and two  
21 people whom therefore he might discuss this with, were Mr.

22 <sup>03</sup>  
~~Arnold Silver~~ and Sidney Gottlieb?

23 Mr. Bissell. I can't say honestly that I recollect  
24 that. But especially with respect to Gottlieb, this would  
25 have been absolutely -- I am reasonably sure that is what

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I would have done.

Mr. Wides. But you don't recall suggesting -- or if he brought it up, approving -- his discussing it with them, in part from a security angle, because Mr. Gottlieb had already been cut in, so to speak, with regard to prior considerations of assassination possibilities?

Mr. Bissell. Well, I am sorry to have to retreat the inference. I think I would have encouraged him to talk to them myself. And I don't think I would have particularly worried at that point about the security implications.

Mr. Wides. Do you recall why you would have encouraged him or suggested that he speak to Arnold Silver OS

Mr. Bissell. No, unless Arnold Silver had had some connection with this operation. And I don't remember what the circumstances were.

Mr. Baron. Do you recall an agent who went by the cryptonym of QJWINN that I believe we discussed in your earlier testimony?

Mr. Bissell. I dimly remember that there was such, yes.

Mr. Baron. Do you recall that he worked for O'Donnell in the Congo and was sent there by Arnold Silver who had recruited him in Europe? OS

Mr. Bissell. I didn't recollect that.

Mr. Wides. Does it ring a bell of any sort?

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1 Mr. Bissell. Well, there was an agent recruited in  
2 Europe who was used against the Lumumba faction in the  
3 Congo.

4 Now, the agent I have in mind, he was extremely success-  
5 ful. He made a deep penetration of not only the Lumumba  
6 sympathizers, but also of those individuals physically lo-  
7 cated in Europe who were supplying Lumumba with money, and in  
8 some cases giving him logistic support. This agent was ob-  
9 viously engaged in an extremely hazardous business, because  
10 if his cover had been blown he certainly would have been,  
11 I think, killed.

12 Now, this may be the agent in question. I do not  
13 remember that agent ever being put under O'Donnell's control.  
14 But if O'Donnell was given the assignment to find ways of  
15 neutralizing Lumumba, given that assignment to O'Donnell  
16 when he went out there, it is very possible that this  
17 agent would have been put in touch with him.

18 Mr. Schwarz. Why did you pick O'Donnell, incidentally,  
19 for the initial assignment, the part that was killing him,  
20 as opposed to other methods of neutralizing him?

21 Mr. Bissell. My recollection is that I regarded him  
22 as highly competent in the craft, I think correctly. I  
23 regarded him, I think incorrectly as the events turned out,  
24 as a very tough guy in the sense this guy Harvey had, that  
25 such reputation, and I think with hindsight deserved it.

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1 And I suspect -- I have some recollection that about that  
2 time, in the fall of 1960, O'Donnell became available from  
3 some previous assignment.

4 Mr. Wides. And you had had contact with him in regard  
5 to his being Station Chief in Turkey during the U-2 program?

6 Mr. Bissell. Yes, I guess so. And other contacts. I  
7 had known him in the agency.

8 Mr. Baron. Let's see if this refreshes your recollec-  
9 tion on the use of QJWINN. He subsequently became the  
10 principal asset in the ZRRIFLE program under Harvey's  
11 direction?

12 Mr. Bissell. Yes.

13 Mr. Baron. And Harry apparently arranged with Arnold  
14 Silver, who was supervising QJWINN in Europe, to have QJWINN  
15 spot potential assets for the ZRRIFLE program in Europe.

16 Does that refresh your recollection as to QJWINN's  
17 mission in the Congo?

18 Mr. Bissell. It suggests to me that the man I had  
19 in mind was not QJWINN, but a different agent. And I don't  
20 remember, I don't remember a thing about it.

21 Mr. Baron. What was QJWINN's mission in the Congo?

22 Mr. Bissell. I can only surmise that he had some  
23 connection -- that either he had the means of "getting close  
24 to Lumumba", or that he had connections that might provide --

25 Mr. Baron. I will represent to you that there is a

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1 memo on November 2, 1960, sent by William Harvey in his  
2 capacity as Chief of Staff D to Arnold Silver with a copy  
3 going to Bronson Tweedy that describes QJWINN, and talks at  
4 great length about his mission in the Congo, without pin-  
5 pointing it. The memo talks about the fact that it is an  
6 extremely sensitive operation, and that QJWINN himself wouldn't  
7 be told the purpose of it before he is sent down there.

8 Does that refresh your recollection about his mission?

9 Mr. Bissell. I am afraid not.

10 Mr. Baron. If there were a mission in the Congo at  
11 that point for Staff D purposes, what would that mission have  
12 been?

13 Mr. Bissell. The Staff D was concerned with communications  
14 intelligence, as you know. And I would surmise that a Staff  
15 D connected mission in the Congo would have involved  
16 planting means of listening to conversation or traffic or in  
17 some other way intercepting communications. That is the  
18 competence of Staff D and its responsibility.

19 Mr. Baron. Planting by means of surreptitious entry  
20 or by other means?

21 Mr. Bissell. Yes, although Staff D wasn't concerned  
22 with bugging people's rooms or this kind of thing. It is  
23 concerned with true communications intelligence, or it was  
24 at that time.

25 Mr. Baron. If you had informed William Harvey at the

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1 point when executive action was being sent up that ~~Arnold~~ ~~Stu-~~  
2 ~~Veri~~ was already cut in on the discussions of an assassination  
3 capability, would you assume that that referred to ~~Arnold~~  
4 ~~Silver's~~ supervision of QJWINN.

5 Mr. Bissell. Well, it could have. It sounds that  
6 way.

7 Mr. Baron: When you told Harvey that Gottlieb had  
8 already been cut in on the discussions of an assassination  
9 capability, fit that refer back to Gottlieb's activities in  
10 reference to the Congo?

11 Mr. Bissell. Well, it probably referred to those -- and  
12 perhaps to earlier discussions or more generalized discussions  
13 with Gottlieb in his capacity as science advisor, and there-  
14 fore someone who would be knowledgeable of weapons of various  
15 kinds.

16 Mr. Schwarz. Did you have such discussions with him?

17 Mr. Bissell. I believe so.

18 Mr. Schwarz. And that, now, is a recollection, I  
19 take it from the way you are speaking?

20 Mr. Bissell. It is closer to that than most  
21 of what I have to say.

22 Mr. Schwarz. What is your recollection of the dis-  
23 cussion with Gottlieb?

24 Mr. Bissell. Over a considerable period of months  
25 when he was in that capacity --

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Mr. Schwarz. Which started when?

Mr. Bissell. I don't remember.

Mr. Schwarz. 1960?

Mr. Bissell. I think it was 1960. And the background, as I am sure the record shows, was that Dr. Gottlieb had been in TSD, and he had then gone for a tour of duty, I believe, to <sup>15-21</sup> Munich, where he continued in the same kind of work. But he had a much closer connection with espionage operations and counter espionage in the field. When I brought him back his mission in effect was a very broad one, it really was to find ways and means -- to concentrate on technical ways and means, meaning by technical within the general area of the physical and biological sciences, of improving the effectiveness of all kinds of covert operations.

Now, in a sense that was the mission of the Technical Services Division itself. But Gottlieb's role was to pay special attention to the interconnections between the technical people in TSD and the operators in the rest of the clandestine service, and to find out whether the technical requirements that TSD was striving to meet were appropriate, in other words, did they really know what the operators needed and wanted, and also to find out if the operators knew what TSD had available. It was that kind of a thing.

Now, I had many conversations with him on that, because this was a success that interested me a great deal. And I

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1 had great respect for his judgment. And especially given  
2 this Congo involvement, I certainly would have discussed with  
3 him, probably on a number of occasions, the availability of  
4 means of incapacitation, including assassination.

5 .Mr. Schwarz. And those discussions are prior to your  
6 Harvey assignment?

7 Mr. Bissell. Yes, I believe so -- yes, they would  
8 have.

9 Mr. Schwarz. Would have been or were?

10 Mr. Bissell. Well, Harvey's assignment wasn't until  
11 January of 1961, so they obviously were.

12 Mr. Wides. Mr. Bissell, with regard to the earlier  
13 discussion with your sense of authorization, you said that  
14 you do recall the discussions with O'Donnell, and that although  
15 you can't remember specific discussions with Tweedy, in  
16 general you recall that you were looking into the possibility  
17 of exploring and planning the possible assassination of  
18 Lumumba?

19 Mr. Bissell. Right.

20 Mr. Wides. In the light of the documents from the  
21 group and Mr. Dulles' cable that have been read, do you have  
22 any recollection now wheher you thought at your level you  
23 had sufficient authority that even though you had not done  
24 so you could direct people below you to carry from the  
25 planning stage into the implementation stage an assassination

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1 of Lumumba at that time?

2 Mr. Bissell. I probably so believed. I think, how-  
3 ever, given the context, it is very unlikely that I would  
4 have taken such a step without clearing it with Allen Dulles.

5 Mr. Wides. You say you probably so believe. Is  
6 that based at all on a recollection, or simply inference?

7 Mr. Bissell. It is the way my mind worked then, and  
8 probably still does. You are asking me a question about whe-  
9 ther I believed I had authority?

10 Mr. Wides. Yes.

11 Mr. Bissell. A good many years ago, and I am saying  
12 that given the evidence here and the background as it has  
13 been developed here this afternoon, it is my recollection that  
14 given the way my mind works, I probably did think I had  
15 authority.

16 But it is also very unlikely.

17 Mr. Schwarz. There are two parts of your answer which  
18 were at war with each other. On the one hand you say, based  
19 upon having seen some Special Group minutes and a cable,  
20 both of which say in effect that killing should not be ruled  
21 out as a matter of consideration --

22 Mr. Bissell. Right.

23 Mr. Schwarz. On the one hand you say that based upon  
24 those two items, you probably believe you had authority to  
25 order action?

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1 Mr. Bissell. Right.

2 Mr. Schwarz. Move from contemplation to action or  
3 consideration of action?

4 Mr. Bissell. Right.

5 Mr. Schwarz. On the other hand you say, well, yes,  
6 although I probably believed that, on the other hand I  
7 probably spoke to Mr. Dulles about it, or would have spoken  
8 to Mr. Dulles about it.

9 Mr. Bissell. You will recognize that here again I am  
10 talking about the pattern of my relationship with him and the  
11 way the Agency worked.

12 Now, here was a matter in which the authorization, such  
13 as it was, had come down clearly from the Special Group to  
14 Mr. Dulles personally.

15 Mr. Schwarz. Now, we are talking about the exhibits  
16 which show an authorization -- assuming you read the words  
17 as meaning killing --

18 Mr. Bissell. Not excluding, yes.

19 Mr. Schwarz. -- an authorization to consider that.

20 Mr. Bissell. Right.

21 Mr. Schwarz. And that had come down?

22 Mr. Bissell. It had come down to me via Allen  
23 Dulles, and in terms that Allen was in effect being strongly  
24 encouraged to pursue the course of action outlined in the  
25 exhibit. I think under these circumstances that I would have

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1 gone back to him with, for instance, any cable of authoriza-  
2 tion or other instruction before sending it out even if I  
3 did believe him.

4 But let us say in his absence from Washington I had the  
5 authority to send.

6 Mr. Dawson. You say unlike the case of the White House  
7 where you would not take details back, in the case of Mr.  
8 Dulles you would discuss the details of a specific operation?

9 Mr. Bissell. Yes.

10 Mr. Schwarz. But it is not really a matter of details,  
11 Mr. Bissell. That is an important distinction. We have  
12 been talking about a chain that starts with two memos, or three  
13 memos. We have talked about contemplation or consideration,  
14 don't rule out killing, it doesn't use the word killing, but  
15 it could be read to mean killing, don't rule out killing from  
16 the items to be considered.

17 Now, moving from doing it is not a detail, is it?

18 Mr. Bissell. No, I wouldn't call it a detail by any  
19 manner of means, but I would read that language as authorizing  
20 any decision by the Director or the Director's authority.

21 Mr. Schwarz. You would read the language of the two  
22 exhibits, one of which comes from the Administration  
23 and one of which is the Director cable --

24 Mr. Bissell. Right.

25 Mr. Schwarz. You would read the language of the Special

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1 Group minutes --

2 Mr. Baron. Of August 25, 1960.

3 Mr. Bissell. Right.

4 Mr. Schwarz. May I see that?

5 After talking about extremely strong feelings, straight-  
6 forward action, and Dulles commenting on taking this ser-  
7 iously, proceeding vigorously, the agreement is:

8 "It was finally agreed that planning for the Congo  
9 would not necessarily rule out 'consideration' of any  
10 particular kind of activity which might contribute to  
11 getting rid of Lumumba".

12 Now, the first point, you read that to mean not  
13 ruling out killing?

14 Mr. Bissell. Correct.

15 Mr. Schwarz. Now, was it just your testimony that  
16 you believe that the agreement that planning for the Congo  
17 would not necessarily rule out possible consideration of --  
18 and now I will substitute the word killing -- is authority  
19 to actually order the killing -- sufficient authority?

20 Mr. Bissell. May I look again at the other exhibit,  
21 Mr. Dulles' cable of the next day.

22 (Discussion off the record.)

23 Mr. Schwarz. Back on the record.

24 There is a pending question.

25 Mr. Bissell. It is my belief on the basis of the cable

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1 drafted by Allen Dulles that he regarded the action of the  
2 Special Group as authorizing implementation if favorable  
3 circumstances presented themselves, if it could be done  
4 covertly. He speaks of targets of opportunity. He authorized,  
5 as I remember the words of the cable "even more aggressive  
6 action".

7 And the tone of the cable clearly gives the Station  
8 Chief a lot of latitude and conveys a sense of very great  
9 urgency.

10 Mr. Schwarz. And whether or not that is a proper con-  
11 struction of the Special Group is not really something we need  
12 to discuss.

13 Finish the Congo, then.

14 Mr. Baron. I have one more question on Mr. Gottlieb's  
15 visist. And that is, in the light of the entire atmosphere  
16 at the Agency and the policy at the Agency at that time,  
17 Mr. Gottlieb's representation to the Chief of Station that  
18 the President had instructed the DCI to carry out this  
19 mission would not have been beyond the pale of Mr. Gottlieb's  
20 authority at that point?

21 Mr. Bissell. No, it would not.

22 Mr. Baron. For the sake of the record, let's intro-  
23 duce as an exhibit the memo that I referred to earlier as  
24 November 1960. And I will ask you one question about it.  
25 This is a memo going from the Chief of KUTUBE/D. And that

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1 is the Foreign Intelligence Division, which would have been  
2 William Harvey at that time.

3 Mr. Bissell. I believe so.

4 (The document referred to was  
5 marked Bissell Exhibit No. 3  
6 for identification.)  
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1 Mr. Baron. This is a cable that we reviewed, Mr.  
2 Bissell, before we began your testimony today. And I will  
3 turn your attention to the paragraph that says:

4 "It is still difficult to determine whether Mobutu  
5 had sufficient control army to enforce decisions announced  
6 night 14 September. Station advised" --

7 And then there is a sanitized paragraph --

8 "Station advised two moderate Congolese politicians  
9 'try work with key Congolese contact' in effort eliminate  
10 Lumumba. Fear UN protection will give Lumumba opportunity  
11 organization counterattack. Only solution is remove him  
12 from scene soonest".

13 Now, the night of September 14 was the night of a coup  
14 in the Congo where Mobutu took power, is that correct?

15 Mr. Bissell. Correct.

16 Mr. Baron. And does this cable refresh your recollec-  
17 tion as to the attitude at the Agency toward Lumumba even  
18 after he was in U.N. custody?

19 Mr. Bissell. Yes. It seems to say rather clearly  
20 that it was still desirable to eliminate him.

21 Mr. Baron. Was it still your recollection, then, that  
22 there was a continued sense of urgency about eliminating  
23 Lumumba after he was in U.N. custody?

24 Mr. Bissell. Yes.

25 Mr. Baron. And this would account in part for the fact

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1 Mr. Baron. You are not listed as a participant at the  
2 meeting, although Mr. Dulles is present, and the following  
3 paragraph relates a remark of Mr. Dulles:

4 "Nobutu appeared to be the effective power in the  
5 Congo for the moment, but Lumumba was not yet disposed of  
6 and remained a grave danger as long as he was not disposed of".

7 Does that accord with your understanding of the policy  
8 of the National Security Council toward Lumumba even after  
9 he was in U.N. custody?

10 Mr. Bissell. It does.

11 Mr. Baron. And the language "disposed of" would contem-  
12 plate assassination at least as one means of disposing of  
13 him?

14 Mr. Bissell. As one means, as one possible means, if  
15 necessary.

16 Mr. Baron. I have one further exhibit which we  
17 will mark Exhibit 6, that is, a cable dated December 17, 1960  
18 sent to the Director from Leopoldville.

19 (The document referred to was  
20 marked Bissell Exhibit No. 6  
21 for identification.)  
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1 Mr. diGenova. Mr. Bissell, I want to switch, unfortunately,  
2 from the Continent of Africa and go to Cuba. This is the same  
3 time period, however, it is July of 1960.

4 I had a conversation with you on August 6 over the  
5 telephone. You may recall the conversation. I have in front  
6 of me a cable which we will mark as Exhibit No. 7.

7 (The document referred to was  
8 marked Bissell Exhibit No. 7  
9 for identification.)

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1 Mr. diGenova. Now, the duty officer who had issued the  
2 first cable about serious consideration, he had no personal  
3 knowledge, but he had heard that Mr. Dulles had countermanded  
4 the original cable, talking about the possible removal,  
5 and authorizing the approach to the asset, the Cuban pilot,  
6 who actually attempted the crash of the plane which would  
7 carry Raol Castro from Prague to Havana.

8 Do you have any personal knowledge as to why Mr. Dulles  
9 would have countermanded, assuming that he did?

10 Mr. Bissell. I don't have any recollection. I could  
11 surmise lots of things.

12 Mr. diGenova. What I want to ask you is this: do  
13 you have an independent recollection that any assassination  
14 efforts against the Cuban leaders which were being considered  
15 contemplated simultaneous action against all three, other-  
16 wise it would be useless action?

17 Mr. Bissell. The only evidence I know of, hard evidence  
18 is the Special Group minute to which I referred earlier,  
19 which was an exhibit in earlier testimony.

20 Mr. diGenova. You are referring to the Merchant cable  
21 exchange of November 3, 1960?

22 Mr. Bissell. That is correct.

23 Mr. diGenova. Now, Mr. Hinkle, the duty officer,  
24 has no personal knowledge about the rescission of that cable.

25 Does it seem to you upon reflection, knowing what you

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1 know -- for example, Mr. Dulles cable to the Congo personally  
2 authorizing, apparently, the assassination of Mr. Lumumba,  
3 and \$100,000 to do it -- is it inconsistent to your way of  
4 thinking that he would have authorized that assassination and  
5 would have rescinded this cable that would have apparently  
6 authorized the assassination of Raol<sup>u</sup> Castro.

7 Mr. Bissell. Not inconsistent at all. I think it may  
8 well have embodied a judgment on Mr. Dulles part that this  
9 effort concerning Raol<sup>u</sup> Castro was altogether too risky, and  
10 technically not sufficiently likely of success.

11 Mr. diGenova. During our initial telephone conversa-  
12 tion on August 6 you speculated, and you clearly identified it  
13 as mere speculation, that one of the reasons that Mr. Dulles,  
14 assuming he did, ordered that initial cable countermanded was,  
15 first, too many innocent persons on the plane would have  
16 been killed, and second, that it was so risky because there  
17 had been just an initial approach of the asset and it wasn't  
18 known whether or not he was a double agent, and thirdly, it  
19 appeared that the contemplation of all three, the assassina-  
20 tion of all three was being considered, and, therefore, since  
21 only Raol would be on this plane that it would have resulted  
22 in the dilemma that they sought to avoid, that is, if  
23 he had been killed there would have been two left over, and  
24 there may have been a reason that he ordered the countermand.

25 Would you take by that as a form of speculation at this

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1 point as one of the reasons that he would have countermanded  
2 that cable?

3 Mr. Bissell. I would.

4 Mr. Schwarz. Could I follow up on the Congo, Exhibit  
5 2, the Dulles cable to Leopoldville.

6 Now, we apparently read to you when I was out of the  
7 room the first paragraph at least, which talks about the clear-  
8 cut conclusion:

9 "If he continues to hold high office the inevitable  
10 result would be chaos and at worst pave the way for Communist  
11 takeover. Consequently, we conclude that his removal must  
12 be an urgent and prime objective, and under existing conditions  
13 this must be a high priority of your covert action".

14 And you have read that language as meaning killing, right?

15 Mr. Bissell. Yes.

16 Mr. Schwarz. I want to ask you if you continue to  
17 read it as killing in the light of the third paragraph of  
18 the cable which reads as follows:

19 "To the extent that Ambassador may desire to be con-  
20 sulted you should seek his concurrence. If in any particular  
21 case he does not wish to be consulted you can act on your  
22 own authority where time does not permit reference here.

23 "Paragraph 4, this message has been seen and approved  
24 at competent level of the Department of State".

25 Do you still believe in the light of the authorization

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1 also he made an effective penetration of Lumumba's supporters  
2 both in the Congo, and as it were, in the line of funding  
3 and supply in Europe.

4 Mr. Dawson. So, he was in place, so to speak?

5 Mr. Bissell. Yes.

6 In other words, he was a dual agent.

7 Mr. Dawson. Did he have access directly to Lumumba?

8 Mr. Bissell. I think he did, yes.

9 Mr. Dawson. Do you remember having been told that he  
10 sometime in November or December went to Stanleyville?

11 Mr. Bissell. I don't remember the specific case, but  
12 it fits the pattern very well. What I do remember is one  
13 operation. But he knew of, he was close enough to -- he  
14 was used as a courier from Lumumba, I think, first in the  
15 capitol, and then later from Stanleyville to Europe. And  
16 on one occasion, because he had penetrated so effectively, he  
17 was aware that a large amount of cash was being taken by two  
18 other couriers down to the Congo, and as a result of his  
19 awareness of that, and all the details of that trip, that  
20 shipment was intercepted.

21 Mr. Dawson. The Chief of Station testified about  
22 having an agent that had access.

23 Would this have been the agent that he believed he  
24 would have access to?

25 Mr. Bissell. I believe he would have, yes.

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1 commercial, I will take that back, on a flight that might  
2 be chartered, for Sukarno.

3 Mr. Wides. Either when you became DDP or before,  
4 whether or not you were personally involved, did you ever hear  
5 anything regarding any efforts by the CIA to assassinate Nasser  
6 and to send teams, assassination teams into Egypt for that  
7 purpose?

8 Mr. Bissell. No, I never did. I could almost go so far  
9 as to say that that was one that was never even thought of.

10 Mr. Schwarz. We forgot to ask you a question which we  
11 ask almost all the other high people who come down here to  
12 testify.

13 Looking back on things, now, -- and I hate to use the  
14 word get rid of, but let me --do you think the U.S. should get  
15 rid of assassination as a tool?

16 Mr. Bissell. I think in today's atmosphere the answer  
17 is yes.

18 Mr. Wides. Why do you think that?

19 Mr. Bissell. I think that to use means for the  
20 advancement of policy of such a sort that in the pre-  
21 vailing climate these days would be almost certainly dis-  
22 approved of by a large majority of the legislative arm, and  
23 the public at large, and everybody else, is unwise unless  
24 you can have absolute confidence of total security. And by  
25 security I mean that outside of the two or three people who

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