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Background

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0002173

(SSC)

In April 1935, the Senate Select Committee to Study Government Operations with respect to Intelligence Activities published their Final Report (Part II) which in essence faulted the CIA and to some extent for its error of omission in not informing the Warren Commission of the Agency's ongoing plots against the Cuban government in Cuba and its ~~financial~~ <sup>life</sup> attempts on the life of ~~the~~ <sup>the</sup> former, Fidel Castro. The Committee's ~~report~~ <sup>report</sup> is ~~defined~~ <sup>defined</sup> on pages 6-7 of its ~~findings~~ <sup>findings</sup> but one paragraph succinctly sums up their position.

P 7  
Part II  
have

"Senior CIA officials also should have realized that their agency was not utilizing its full capability to investigate Oswald's pro-Castro and anti-Castro connections. They should have realized that CIA operations against Cuba, particularly operations involving the assassination of Castro, needed to be considered in the investigation. Yet, they duped their subordinates to conduct an investigation without telling them of these vital facts. These officials, whom the Warren Commission relied upon for expertise, advised the Warren Commission that the CIA had no

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P 10  
1977 ~~Final~~  
Report

taken broader in its view, than,  
as well."

Conflicting

to the work of  
the ~~United~~  
Committee

It is not the purpose of  
this analysis to detail ~~and~~ the  
viewpoints of the SSC and CPTA  
with regard to the significance  
of the CIA's Castro ~~unsuccessful~~  
attempts and to resolve <sup>the parties</sup> ~~their~~  
controversy as to <sup>the operations</sup> ~~their~~ importance.

~~Rather~~ Instead this paper seeks  
to present a comprehensive  
review of all the facts, drawn from  
a variety of sources, of organized  
Cubans' involvement or potential  
involvement in CPTA operations  
against Cuba during 1960-63.

Certain influences and conclusions  
~~to~~ will then be drawn upon  
the nature, scope, and motivation  
~~of the operations~~ of the syndicate  
participants in the operations.

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Enrollment of Raymond Payne in  
CIA Plots to Assassinate Fidel Castro

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The genesis of the <sup>utilization</sup> ~~use~~ of the United States ~~ground~~ <sup>ground</sup> syndicate of the CIA ~~to~~ <sup>attempt</sup> to assassinate Castro is of the 1967 Inspectors General's Report as occurring during a conversation between the Deputy Director of Plans, ~~was~~ Richard Bissell, and the Director of the Office of Security, Colonel Sheffell Edwards.<sup>+</sup>

[1967 IG Rpt. p. 74; Intern Rpt p. 74; Sec. 1.1]

Edwards assigned the specific task of locating the right party to "eliminate or assassinate" Castro, to James "Big Jim" O'Connell, who was the Chief of the Operational Support Division of the Office of Security. Both men agreed that Robert H. Mahon <sup>who</sup> ~~has~~ had been previously utilized by the Agency in several sensitive cover operations, would be contacted to recruit the necessary personnel.

<sup>+</sup> [Mahon's CIA history and relationship to O'Connell are detailed on pp 74-75, Intern Rpt.]

0002181 Although Mahon and O'Connell differ as to who initially brought up John Rosselli's name for consideration there was a meeting between Mahon and Rosselli at the Brown Duty Restaurant in Los Angeles in early September 1968 [Intern Rpt. p. 75]

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[Comment: Mahon seems the

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logical person to have thought of and contacted Roselli for several reasons. In an office of security file on SA Morgan, Mahan's attorney, there is a memo to the DCP dated 19 November 1970 which reviews the mafia operation. Paragraph 5 states that "Mr. Mahan advised that he had met one John Roselli on several occasions while visiting Las Vegas. He only knew him casually through other clients, but was given to understand that he was a high ranking member of the syndicate and controlled all the ice-making machines on the Strip! Mahan advised that, if Roselli was in fact a member of the Club, he undoubtedly had connections leading into the Cuban gambling interests."

quotes?

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Comment

Confirmation of <sup>the</sup> Mahan-Roselli contact is found in Roselli's FBI file and consists of an alleged telephone call in 1959. [See Roselli write-up] from Mahan to Roselli

Comment

date

Mahan and Roselli had mutual contacts in Las Vegas prior to 1950. Mahan's contact was Sam, editor of the Las Vegas Sun.

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Rosselli, although apparently skeptical at first, agreed to a meeting in New York City with Mahon and Council to discuss further details.

[Fitzham Report p 76; Office of Secret memo from Morgan file, dated 19 Nov. 1970]

Although the Dujean's personal Report places the meeting at the Playa Station on 14 September 1960, Rosselli recalled that the ~~event~~ discussion took place during Castro's visit to the United Nations which began on September 18, 1960.

### Comment

Tony de Varona admits going to NY at the time of Castro's visit, but it is unlikely that he was in contact with Rosselli at this time or [Fitzham] of de Varona, that his visit had an assassination motivation.

According to a 19 Nov. 1970 memo to the D.C.I., it was at this September meeting in New York City, that Rosselli "agreed to introduce him (Mahon) to a friend, 'Sam Ford', who knew the Cuban crowd."

### Comment:

The timing of the introduction of both ~~Frank~~ (Ford) and Trappena ("Joe") is ~~an~~ important to the analysis of the "true" role of the mob in the Castro assassination plots. Kennedy

to the 1967 I. G. Report, the ~~entry~~ <sup>entry</sup> of biancana took place <sup>(a)</sup> during the week of 25 September 1960: . . . .  
[ 1967 I. G. Report, p 18 ]

date certain  
is although

In contrast, the SSC Interm Report at p. 76, does not ~~state~~ <sup>state</sup> ~~that~~ <sup>that</sup> biancana's initial appearance ~~was~~ <sup>was</sup> ~~it~~ <sup>it</sup> was ~~it~~ <sup>it</sup> "certainly prior to October 18." (p 76) because of conflicting ~~testimony~~ evidence between the 1967 I. G. September date and Mahon's Senate testimony which set the interde in ~~at~~ November 1960. As a compromise, the Interm Report reasoned that biancana had been introduced to ~~the~~ Mahon "prior to October 18" because the Las Vegas wiretap occurred on October 30, 1960, and ~~at~~ <sup>the</sup> DDP Bissell had received an FBI memo dated 15 October 1960 which revealed an FBI FLSAR quoting biancana as discussing his involvement in an assassination plot against Castro <sup>(b)</sup> FBI memo, dated 15 Oct 1960 from Horro to Bissell, Interm Report, p 79 ]

is  
is  
is

[ Comment: 0002184  
Each ~~of~~ <sup>of</sup> dual reasons listed on the Interm Report on p 77 are subject to critical analysis which will be dealt with separately ~~in~~ <sup>in</sup> the below. ]

[ Comment: ~~SECRET~~  
Although the 1967 I. G. Report ~~stated~~

That "Mahan pointed out "bold" to O'Connell from a distance but O'Connell never met either "bold" or Joe", the Intern Report disputes this observation by apparently quoting from O'Connell's Senate testimony and stating that "The Support Chief, who was using the name 'Tom J. J.', said he had met 'Sam' and Joe, once, and then very briefly S.O.C. 5/30/75, pp 26-29; Intern Report 70

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Comment  
~~Comment~~

Conflicts appear also on ~~a number of~~ several related minor points surrounding the September 1965 meeting in N.Y.C. and Miami. For instance:

- 1) Did Roselli learn from the report that ~~that~~ the operation was CIA?
- a) O'Connell stated that Mahan told Roselli that they were representing international business interests whereas Roselli testified that Mahan told him that O'Connell was CIA (Intern Report 70 Abs, footnote 1 on p. 26 indicates that Roselli told O'Connell "about 3 weeks after the New York meeting", which is during the Miami involvement of Bourne, that "I am not kidding, I know what you work for".

The importance of Roselli's recognition of CIA ~~is~~ ~~in~~ ~~that~~ ~~it~~ is that it is doubtful if ~~anyone~~ ~~had~~ ~~known~~ ~~of~~ ~~its~~ ~~existence~~ ~~at~~ ~~that~~ ~~time~~

could have been enlisted unless they could be sure of government protection. This theme will be developed more fully below.

2) Roselli told his Cuban contacts that he was an "agent of some summer interests of Wall Street that had... nicht interests and properties around Cuba..." (Roselli, 6/24/75 pp 9, 17)

CF. Jack Anderson column of Jan. 19, 1971, which stated that (4) "Could the plot against Castro have backfired against President Kennedy? ... None of the assassination teams, however, had direct knowledge of the CIA involvement. The CIA instigators had represented themselves as oilmen seeking revenge against Castro for his seizure of oil holdings."

If Anderson's source for this article were Roselli and ~~William~~ William Henry, who was not privy to the details of Phase F, it is another ~~example~~ <sup>instance</sup> of serious discrepancies between the CIA, Senate, and Anderson versions which all purport to depend, in varying degrees, upon Roselli.

3) The alleged ~~discovery~~ "surprise discovery" by Mahon and O'Connell as to the ~~presence~~ identification of "Sambo" and "Joe" is really suspect. First, ~~all~~ although it is



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Quoted  
p. 15

(Mahan, 7/29/75, p. 34) and discussed his job as "to locate someone in Castro's entourage who could accomplish the mission"; Roselli downplayed Brancosi's part to that of a "back-up" man. (Roselli 6/24/75, p. 15)

~~All of the information also~~  
Whether Roselli received a message from Brancosi's murder four days before Roselli's Senate appearance is open for question. J. Roselli's characterization of Brancosi's role as minor is in contrast to his alleged <sup>recruitment of</sup> ~~description of~~ Brancosi's "knowledge of the Cuban word" used in the 19 Nov. 1970 memo recorded.

Senitt  
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due to his

Trafficante's involvement in Phase I is even more justified by the available evidence. The 1967 Feb. Report and Senate Intern Report ~~also~~ state that "bold" identified "Joe" to Mahan as a man who would serve as a courier to Cuba and make arrangements there. (Feb Report p. 19; Intern Report, p. 775. To support the description of Trafficante as a courier, the ~~1967 Feb. Report~~ Intern Report quotes p. 19 of the 1967 Feb. Report in stating that, "At that time, the gambling casinos were still operating in Cuba and Trafficante was making regular trips between Miami and Havana in syndicate business."

0062150 Comment <sup>partially</sup>

This unsupported assertion runs contrary to the evidence available through official government records <sup>of other agencies</sup>. As an example, State Department files reflect that Traffante applied for a passport <sup>in Havana</sup> on October 4, 1959 and received that document in Havana on February 2, 1960.

(See Traffante file, State Dept). ~~None~~ ~~is~~ ~~recorded~~. No records available to the Committee from DNS, State Department or FBI record any later 1960 travels even though the Bureau ~~and~~ maintained decent surveillance on Traffante during the period. In

recalled

his Committee testimony, Traffante ~~repeatedly~~ stated that he made two trips to Cuba after his release from prison in August 1959 and placed those sojourns within two or three months after his release. <sup>from prison</sup> Testimony, pp 4-53, Oct 2, 1978

in Havana

His testimony has some logical credibility in that all of the casinos were either closed or operating in the area by mid-1960, and law enforcement reports placed him in the Tampa-Miami area consistently ~~in~~ during the pre-Bay of Pigs period.

By the time of the Senate testimony of Roselli, however, Traffante's role had diminished to a joint

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even below Biancanis. He had been reduced <sup>from "courier"</sup> to a mere "translator" and was needed only to facilitate ~~communications~~ <sup>communications</sup> between Rosselli and the Cubans who had been recruited for the actual assassination. Intensely Trafficante and Rosselli 1975 and 1977 Congressional appearances dove tail well but remain in contradiction to the ~~my~~ facts as reported in 1973 of the journals.

they were being

### Comment:

The Senate testimony of Rosselli and Trafficante needs to be outlined ~~separately~~ with a view to contrasting the "courier is interpreter" role. My memory is that the Senate did not vigorously cross examine either man on this discrepancy nor did ~~they~~ the Interim Report "hint" at the problem.]

Once the actors had been assembled for the launching of the enterprise, a discussion began as to the method ~~of~~ to be employed to accomplish the goal. The Agency took the simpler, straight forward approach of shooting Castro but this ~~plan~~ <sup>SECRET</sup> was rejected

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 by Bincaera. In a Comment  
 to its 1967 Report, the Inspector  
 General noted that Bincaera  
 was flatly opposed to the use  
 of firearms. He said that no one  
 could be recruited to do the job  
 because the chance of survival  
 and escape would be negligible.  
 Bincaera stated a preference for  
 lethal pill that could be put  
 into Castro's food and drink.  
 Tappan (Joe; the owner) was  
~~in touch~~ in touch with a ~~high level~~  
 Cuban official with access to  
 Castro's back passively of a sort  
 that would enable him to  
 surreptitiously poison Castro. The  
 gangster named their man  
 inside as Juan Ota, who was  
 then office chief and Director General  
 of the office of the Prime Minister  
 Castro. The gangster said that  
 Ota had once been in a position  
 to receive feedback from the  
 gangster's interests but had since  
 lost that source of income and  
 needed the money. [F.B. Report, p 25]

### Comment

The observations of the 1967 F.B.  
 Report ~~are~~ are ~~of~~ extremely significant  
 in several respects. First, the poison  
 pill ~~is~~ ~~not~~ ~~of~~ ~~any~~ ~~kind~~ ~~at~~ ~~all~~  
 with Bincaera, not the Report; a print  
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which is crucial to the final  
conclusion presented below.

Secondly, Trappante is identified  
as ~~providing~~ having access to, and  
providing the <sup>mutual</sup> assassin in Cuba  
which is in consistent with  
his "self-saving" role depicted  
of "in the paper". His ability to  
recruit Cuba apparently ~~is~~ was  
directly tied to his former  
gambling empire associations  
which formed a constant gathering  
for all his ~~illegal~~ <sup>conduct</sup> for Trappante both  
during and after his Cuban days.  
[ see Trappante profile ]

Comment

note

Speculation concerning Oates  
arose during the Agency's 1977  
Report when it was faced to  
address a problem raised by  
an April 23, 1975 article, concerning  
Frank Stupis, written by Paul  
Merkell of the New York Daily News.  
Stupis was quoted as saying,  
"The third (assassination) scheme  
involved planting a bomb in Castro's  
office. I had access to the Prime  
Minister's office," Stupis said. "I knew  
Fidel's private secretary, Juan Ota.  
I recruited him to work with the  
Embassy. I ~~recruited~~ <sup>recruited</sup> Embassy in Havana.  
What was his <sup>purpose</sup> to the

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writings of the 1977 Report was the fact that Onta's name had surfaced in connection with a Castro assassination plot, before revelation of the CIA-Mafia connection by the Senate Intelligence Committee. The Report references news stories linking Stuyvesant with Treppe and with a "gamby partner" of Treppe, Norman Rothman. (See Rothman's profile). Coupled with Stuyvesant's ~~past~~ relationships, is the allegation that Stuyvesant had a role in ~~an~~ inspecting the gamby casinos in Cuba on behalf of the Castro government and could have developed an contact with Onta in seeing gamby "high roller".

A second aspect of Maschil's ~~the~~ news series concerned a claim by Maitha Jorony that she had acted on behalf of Stuyvesant in 1960 in attempt to poison Castro when derailed with the 18 October 1960 FBI memorandum on Dominican electronically surveilled curriculum in which he stated that "the assassin had arranged with a girl, not further described, to drop a 'pill' <sup>SECRET</sup> some drink or food of Castro" (Miami, Havana to DCI, SA, D.D. 10/19/60).

The tentative conclusions advanced in the 1977 Report are as follows:

It is obvious that many lines of speculation can be developed, not the least of which is that the Agency did not know the full extent of syndicate activities...

Additional considerations:

1. Current syndicate may well have had some independent activities of its own activity prior to CPTA involvement in late 1960. Also, could have been Agency run CPTA activity prior in 1962 April
2. Syndicate operators could have had contacts such as those in New York City New Spain in 1975 and 1976.
3. Frank Stupis seems to have had contacts with, but not a member of syndicate. Could well have been used by the syndicate.
4. Stupis has not been a reliable source. He professed to know Osta in Cuba but he was outside Cuba when Osta assumed role of assassin.

If there was an earlier operator in Osta, it was not CPTA; it could have been earlier operation of syndicate.

Stupis could have been or been involved in syndicate operation, or picked up gossip from FOREIGN in 1965 after Cuba with them

Neither the 1967 I-C Report  
 or the SSC Interim Report can  
 pinpoint the precise date on which  
 the Agency processed the poison pills  
 which O'Connell delivered to Rosselli  
 { Interim Report, p 80. The chain of  
 custody, according to the 1967 I-C  
 Report ~~was~~ was for the lethal  
 pills to be delivered from Rosselli  
 to Truffante. Although the next  
 intervening steps remain a  
 mystery, Rosselli reports to O'Connell  
 that the pills had been delivered to  
 Sata in Cuba in late February - early  
 March 1961 { Interim Rpt, p 27; Interim Rpt p 80

Comment:

The Senate Interim Report reported  
 the version of Joe Shimon ~~whose~~  
~~story~~ whose memory was that the  
 money and pills for the operation were  
 delivered at a meeting at the Fontainebleau  
 Hotel on March 12, 1961 attended by  
 "Mahan, Rosselli, Truffante, and the  
 Cubans" { Interim Rpt p 15. Shimon's  
~~memory~~ story is filled with  
~~many~~ details which are documented  
 on p 2 of the report, but his credibility  
 is subject to serious question as  
 his account is not shared by  
 anyone else connected with the plan  
 and nor is his relationship with

verid

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0002198 Roselli, banana, or Trafficante appear as "copy" as he would lead me to believe.

It is also apparent that Shimon was a source for ~~John~~ <sup>John</sup> Williams' column of January 9, 1961, which fixed the date of the passage of the person at the Fourtanblet <sup>by Roselli</sup> as March 13, 1961, and contained the report that Castro became ill a few ~~days~~ weeks later.

The real problem with Shimon's stay is that the pills were returned to the CIA for a few weeks because Ota could or would not attempt the poisoning, a fact apparently unknown to Shimon before his "leak" to Truman and his Senate testimony.]

### Comment

One additional fact concerning Ota's inability to carry out the mission ties in with the final thesis of this report. Ota lost his position in Castro's office on 26 January 1961, while the planning for the operation was still going on in Miami and Washington.

It would seem though, that the generals did know that Ota had already lost his access to Castro [ ~~in~~ 1967 ~~to~~ Report p. 27 ]

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With the failure of Onto  
 to produce the desired results,  
 the project was at a standstill  
 until, once again, Santos Trujillo  
 assumed command. Roselli has  
 stated that "Trujillo believed  
 a certain leading figure in  
 the Cuban exile movement ~~etc~~ might  
 be able to accomplish the mission."  
 [File 1967 DC Lpt, p 29; Parker Rpt p 80.]

Comment:

The well known leader was, of course  
 Tony de Varona, ~~the~~  
 who was the subject of speculation  
 in an FBI memorandum of 18 January 1961  
 connecting him with receiving financial  
 aid from American gangsters for  
 anti-Castro activities which were  
 the CIA operation.

At the time of his introduction  
 into the CIA mob jobs, de Varona was already  
 being funded by the Agency through  
 the Revolutionary Front and was already  
 involved in CIA planning for the  
 Bay of Pigs invasion which was  
 imminent.

De Varona was also <sup>being</sup> funded  
 by Mike McRaney whose ~~agency~~  
 agency was ~~engaged~~ engaged in  
 promoting Varona's image in  
 collaboration with McRaney from

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"Chirri" or "Chillo" Mendez Mendez is described in Tupper's FBI files as a close Cuban associate.

Completing the picture of support for Varona is the promotion efforts of the Dins and Eddie Cullini, Mehony and Ramsey Brusnic, associates, who were reportedly working through a Washington DC, public relations firm, Edward K Moss and Associates. Moss had previous CPA associations and was supposed acting as a conduit for funds supplied by the Cullini benefactors with the understanding that their group would have "privileged treatment" in the Cuba of the future. Attempts to refute these reports were unsuccessful. [1967 FBI Report p. 30]

The Danish influence using the Cullini brothers as a "front" is particularly interesting in light of Varona's admission that Jorge Pujol arranged a meeting in Miami in ~~the summer~~ 1960 wherein <sup>my</sup> Danish offered to financially "back" Varona's efforts to ~~assist~~ "educate" the American people about Castro, which may be a euphemism for anti-Castro plots. [See Varona transcript

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The logical inference to be drawn is that both the Agency ~~and~~ <sup>and</sup> other persons interested in removing the Castro regime, had settled upon de Varna, <sup>proving independent</sup> as an individual who had the potential of uniting the ~~various~~ <sup>various</sup> multitudes of exile groups who were in a continual internecine feud. de Varna was understandably pleased to permit both the U.S. government and criminal syndicate

to offer him support and asked no questions as to the source of the funds or the motives of his benefactors  
 [ See Varna testimony - ]

Although de Varna has no <sup>specific</sup> memory of meeting Truffante, the Tampa court has admitted that he acted as an "interceptor" in several meetings attended by de Varna, Roselli, Benvenia, and other exiles. These meetings were arranged by Rafael, "Macho" Jener, a Truffante family partner from Havana who continued to serve Truffante in Miami during the 1960s. Truffante claimed that Roselli had primary contact with Jener but this appears unlikely in view of Truffante's long-standing <sup>SECRET</sup> friendship with Jener on Cuba. And Roselli's admission to

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O'Connell that ~~Trappanese~~ Trappanese would provide the replacement for the ill-fated Juan Orta who had escaped to the Venezuelan Embassy in April 1961.

Comment: Paralleling ~~the~~ the situation at the Senate hearings July 1975 when Roselli's depiction of Trappanese role ~~changed~~ changed from ~~his~~ his "counsel" character ~~in 1960 as reported by~~ in 1960 as reported by the Agency to conform to Trappanese' "interpreter" state ment, in the recent interview with ~~the~~ ~~man~~ who spoke with Trappanese' ~~Committee~~ testimony ~~that~~ ~~he~~ he was an ~~interpreter~~ ~~with~~ ~~de~~ ~~la~~ ~~Barra~~ ~~and~~ ~~for~~ ~~Roselli~~ ~~and~~ ~~the~~ ~~not~~ ~~well~~ ~~in~~ ~~both~~ instances to minimize Trappanese' exposure (See CF. Fonzi interview with Cener, May? 1978 and Trappanese testimony, Oct 7, 1977)

~~Hagerman, who met with~~  
~~Vanna came to~~  
~~the~~

Jeopardies of the ~~ambiguity~~ If ~~ambiguity~~ ~~exists~~ exists as to the introduction of de Vanna into phase one of the Castro assassination plots, more ~~clear~~ ~~ambiguity~~ confusion surrounds de Vanna's ~~as~~ actual participation prior to the Bay of Pigs invasion. The I & Report indicates that de Vanna attempted a second ~~run~~ ~~run~~ before the ~~Castro~~ ~~invasion~~ that Roselli was positive that only one

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attempt, (Orta) was made. He was also positive that he delivered both pills, money and supplies to de Vanna which is corroborated by O'Connell ~~reports~~ during 1961. The conflict is resolved by the Senate in speculation that only one pre-Pray of Pigs attempt was made, and that de Vanna was the contact in the United States who arranged for [Orta] to abandon the poison.

Comment

There appears to be no factual way to resolve de Vanna's initial contribution to the poison attempts especially since Vanna denies ever having received poison pills from Roselli or being involved in any attempt on Castro's life at any time [See Vanna transcript]

Comment

The Agency was aware of the possible dangers inherent in having de Vanna participate in the mob's plot while ~~in~~ employing his part on the Peruvian Canal. However, "Steps were taken to end his participation in the syndicate plan but [they] were apparently ineffective" [M.I.C. Report, p 325]

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Phase II

The debacle which marked the mid-April 1961 Bay of Pigs effort, curtailed CIA efforts with the mob to assassinate Castro, but it was not until April 1962, when Bill Harvey assumed Agency responsibility for the task, were efforts made to re-establish contact with Roselli.

However, the fact that the Agency was squeamish during the Bay of Pigs aftermath to condemn the mob to kill Castro, does not mean that the mob shared their shyness. Indeed, both Harvey and Council swore that Harvey "took over a going operation". I.E.O. Rept p 33. The exact details of what that operation might have been ~~cannot be determined~~ has not been uncovered, but Roselli's ability to regenerate his forces ~~was~~ in response to Harvey's contact in April 1962 was immediate. Once again the ubiquitous *de l'homme* was to provide the ~~individuals~~ who would carry the lethal poison into Cuba.

However, there were some significant ~~important~~ differences between Phase One and Phase Two of the operation which bear upon the ultimate question of the mob's motivation and

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superiority in carrying out their part of the bargain struck in 1960 with the Agency.

Fact. In Phase One, Roselli et al had demonstrated their ability to execute the contract on Castro by naming their source who was, in fact, in a position close to Castro to succeed. In contrast, the details of the matter operated and the ability of the ~~source~~ <sup>operator</sup> was deliberately vague. After ~~Harry~~ Harry contacted Roselli in Miami in April 1962, Harry reported that "the plan in which the material was to be introduced to Castro's Ford (which involved) an asset of someone who had access to someone in a <sup>restaurant</sup> frequented by Castro." By June 1962 after the Vienna had received money and instructions from the JMWAVE station and had personally sent the gold into Cuba, ~~the~~ "Roselli" reported to Harry on 21 June that Vienna had dispatched a team of three men to Cuba. Just what they were supposed to do is pretty vague. Harry said that they appeared to have no specific plan for helping Castro. They were to recruit others who might be used in such a scheme. If an opportunity to help Castro presented itself, they or the persons they recruited will to make the attempt -- perhaps using the bills. Harry never heard

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work for Pearson and did know  
that Anderson had more than a  
passing acquaintance with Morgan.  
- Morgan also fought with  
Pat Coyne of N 82

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their names or anything about them"  
 [1967 DO Report p 57]

### Comment

As the 1967 DO author correctly observed, Harvey's tale of the "favorite restaurant" personifying opportunity ~~was the same plan that Edwards~~ was familiar in that Edwards had decided precisely the same plan. The fact that Vauma related the exact modes operandi to Harvey as he had discussed with Edwards in Phase One (circa 1960-mid 1961) leads to the possibilities that:

- (1) Harvey was correct in assuming that he was taking over an ongoing operation in April 1962 or
- (2) he had not had been using di Vauma before, during, and after the Bayou Pige and permitted the CDA to provide logistical support and future protection against the Justice Department; or
- (3) di Vauma was simply making up a story for the Agency to gain their financial backing or in response to directives from organized crime.

Second

The cast of underworld



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? "mafia <sup>was</sup> ~~plots~~ <sup>termination</sup> of the CPA -  
 Roselli, in May 1962, reported to  
 Hany that the plots and guns which  
 had been delivered to Varma in Miami  
 in April had arrived in Cuba, and a  
 three-man team had been reported  
 in June to execute the plan [Interim Report  
 p845]

unidentified

? During September 1962, ~~and~~ Roselli  
 related to Hany that de Varma ~~crossed~~  
 making a second three-man team  
 who were "supposedly military men  
 whose assignment was to penetrate  
 Castro's body guard. During this period  
 the 'medicines' was reported as still in  
 place and the three men of the first  
 team safe [1967 Int. Report, p51]  
 However, the second team never  
 made Cuba and a series of clinics  
 were constructed during December and  
 January 1963. Nevertheless, de Varma  
 supposedly collected \$200 for the maintenance  
 of these individuals from Roselli  
 who had received the payment from  
 Hany. [1967 Int. Report p52]

supposedly

In mid-July 1963 both  
 Hany and Roselli agreed that "nothing  
 was happening and that there was  
 not much chance that anything would  
 happen in the future" [1967 Int. Report p52]  
 Roselli was instructed to ease  
 his way out of touch with  
 Varma which ~~he~~ <sup>he</sup> presumably did.  
 The last meeting between Hany

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and Rosselli occurred in Washington  
D.C. in June 1963. When he was  
Harvey's ~~host~~ overnight guest. Hence  
their meeting ostensibly was not directly  
related to any assassination plots.

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CONCLUSION

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in part,

The available evidence suggests that ~~the~~ the thesis which is tacitly assumed by the Agency in its 1977 internal Directorate General Report wherein it states that, "It is possible that CFA singly found itself involved in providing additional resources for independent operations that the syndicate already had under way. ... In a ~~some~~ <sup>sense</sup>, CFA may have been piggy-backing on the syndicate, and, in addition to its material contributions, was also supplying an aura of official sanction." [1977 FB Rpt p 100]

7.

The relevant evidence is as follows:  
 1. FBI memo 18 Oct 1960 re Biarcana ET SUR:

Biarcana reportedly assured those present that Castro's announcement would occur in November. Moreover, he allegedly indicated that he had already met with the woman to be on three occasions. ... Biarcana claimed that everything has been perfected for the benefit of Castro, and that the woman had arranged with a girl, not further named, to drop a 'gill' in some hut or food of Castro. [1977 FB Rpt p 195]

Comment

SECRET

Although the reported meetings between Mahon, Donald, and Panama

SECRET

are subject to different interpretations,

it is clear that no plans were formulated between the parties ~~by~~ until some time after October 5, 1961. The date of the <sup>FRS</sup> intercepted conversation of Biancana.

The grim pills prepared by the CPTA at Biancana's request were not ready for delivery until late July - early March 1961, so that it is difficult to see how Biancana's November 1960 assassination plot could be a part of the CPTA operation. Rather, it appears that the mob had its own plan in progress, using a mixture of Castro's ~~and~~ <sup>and</sup> ~~the~~ <sup>the</sup> ~~idea~~ <sup>idea</sup>, when the CPTA fortuitously happened along to offer its support.

The mob was then in a perfect position. If their ~~private~~ <sup>private</sup> ~~plot~~ <sup>plot</sup> actually worked and Castro died, then the Syndicate had enormous blackmail potential against the CPTA which it could exercise at the opportune moment. However, if their ~~plot~~ <sup>plot</sup> back-fired, then their position ~~was~~ <sup>would</sup> be that they were only attempting to execute the wishes of their Government.

intrigue

Additional Comment

The notion of Biancana's "hired hand", Richard Cain ~~was~~ <sup>is</sup> not to raise some interesting possibilities. Brian Cain's admission

0002212

to the FBI that he had ~~been~~ joined the Chicago Police Department and Sheriff's office while on permanent payroll. Cain's approach to ~~the~~ the OIA Chicago office in the fall of 1960 to volunteer ~~his services~~ information on the Cuban community appears ~~as a little more than~~ coincidental, then when FBI files disclose that he is planning to go to Cuba for Life magazine (and me stay), and to "buy" influential Cubans in Havana ostensibly for ex-pedite Prio (second stay) the coincidence becomes more suspect. The suspicion is that Cain was being sent by someone to supervise the prisoning attempt on Fidel Castro. Cain called me the "arranger to be" when someone referred to in the ~~report~~ <sup>report</sup> OIA, 1960 or he could be the contact man for the operation.

[ Tie in memo on Cain with Salomon's view, which is strongly supported by the evidence, that Cain was the "missing second man" in the ~~for~~ <sup>for</sup> ~~the~~ <sup>the</sup> ~~writing~~ <sup>writing</sup> of Oct 30, 1960. Make note to be quoted on this point ]

Cain continued to "volunteer" information and assistance to the OIA during 1961-1963. In August 1963, he offered information on the OIA Student Directory in Chicago to that office of the Agency. In ~~Chicago~~ Cuba

0002213

was the former head of the Directorate  
in Cuba when he was a major  
power in deposing Batista.

In September 1963, Cain reported  
to the Chicago office of the CIA that  
DRB was in a deal to purchase  
a large arms shipment. He was  
told by the Agency to "get out  
of the picture" with a dispatch  
which is subject to several interpretations  
including the fact that the CIA  
was a willing participant in the deal.

Again on November 27, 1963, Cain  
now the chief investigator for Cook  
County Sheriff's office, gave the Agency  
some information that Oswald was  
in ~~Cuba~~ Chicago in April 1963 with  
the Fair Play for Cuba Committee and  
had purchased the ~~massacre~~  
rifle in March 1963.

## 2. Recruitment of ~~potential~~ <sup>the potential</sup> Assassins

In ~~recruiting~~ <sup>the potential</sup> ~~poisoner,~~

Beaucana spoke of a "guy" who  
was close to Castro while the  
individual recruited for the CIA pills  
was Juan Dorta, a secretary in  
Castro's Prime Ministry.

The identity of the "guy" referred  
to by Beaucana can never be ascertained  
but Traffucante was clearly in the  
best position to recruit ~~at least one~~  
one of Castro's Cuban ministers due to  
his multitudinous contacts in the  
Cuban government and pentagon circles

000221A

It was common for American gangsters to have Cuban mistresses and Traffucante, Rottoman, and Truine were typical examples. Also, one witness told the Committee that Castro was accustomed to dining at the Macina Hotel (owned by Mike McKay) several times on a regular basis to visit one of his paramours. Thus, it would have been relatively easy for Traffucante to have arranged for a young woman to serve Castro and to attempt to poison him.

L. Maria Torony is a unassuming woman, to say the least, and her potential as an assassin recruited by Frank Stupis has been proved illusory. However, one interesting point is that she was also Thelma Torony's mistress and, there could have been solicited to activate the poison plot. Unfortunately, Torony is totally uncooperative but Torony was not asked about her relationship with Torony in Cuba so that we do not know the dated match.

Comment

Juan Orta, the man identified to the Agency as the gangster's contact in Castro's inner circle, was presumably enlisted by Traffucante, but to date former receipt of grand "hookups".

One fact is extremely bothersome however, in attempting to gauge the depth of the mob's solidarity in using Orta to execute the assassination plan. According to the ~~SECRET~~ FBI Report L-1022

Ota "lost his position in the Puerto Rican Office on 26 Jan 1961, which planning for the operation was still going on in Miami and in Wash DC." According to the official version Ota accepted the pills in late Feb - early March 1961 and kept the pills for a couple of weeks before returning them" [1967 FBI Rpt p 275]

7.7. If the mob was close enough to Ota to have pills smuggled in and out of Cuba, then they had to know that Ota had lost his position of necessity. The other possibility was that the pills were left in the US and then were available to him at Havana when he was brought into the plot.

The question arises then, as to whether the mob was pursuing their own assassination plot and the CIA operation or, what appears more likely, simply using the Bay for its ulterior motives previously outlined.

Turning to Phase II of the operation which began in April 1962, ~~there is~~ the same possibilities exist. If Hany and O'Connell are correct in assuming that Hany had walked into an "ongoing operation, then ~~it is~~ <sup>it can</sup> be assumed that the mob's relationship with de Verna, which predated the CIA participation according to the FBI summary of 21 Dec 1960, and 18 Jan 1961 had continued uninterrupted after the Bay of Pigs ~~with~~ <sup>the receipt of</sup>

0002216

of the CIA's participation, funding and material support could, once again, be returned to the Agency although de Vanna would continue to deal through his not contacts, Russell and "Mac".

lack of intent or

True to the loose structure of Phase II in terms of the ambiguous nature of the operational means of attack, the lack of identity of the potential assassins, the complete reliance of Harry upon Russell and not that not was actually being used out, the Agency's inability to corroborate Russell's information, the ~~of~~ speculation arises that the syndicate was not serious trying to assassinate Castro after the Bay of Pigs fiasco and the solidification of Soviet influence on Castro's Cuba. Being <sup>from Cuba based groups</sup> ~~settled~~ <sup>summoned</sup> Trappanito, <sup>and</sup> ~~other~~ <sup>must</sup> have advised that the "golden goose" of America had laid its last egg, and that fortune was to be made elsewhere. Certainly, the evidence shows <sup>growing</sup> rapidly influence in the Bahamas, Las Vegas, and Trappanito projects in the Panama Republic, and a new opportunity for Castro's operations in Florida with the influence of Cuban whites. It was also abundantly clear that the new Justice Department program on organized crime would never permit the "wide-open" Cuba of the pre-Tennet era ~~of~~ even if Castro and all his Communist associates could be eliminated. SECRET

7?

~~Secret~~ Despite the subtlety

0092217 business sense in  
 continuing the paramilitary attempts  
 against Castro in a substantive way.  
 There still was a percentage in  
 "stringing the Agency along." First, there  
 was no upside to the syndicate  
 because the Agency was providing full  
 logistical support for Urova. Second,  
 there was the mounting pressure  
 from the ~~State~~ FBI and Justice Department  
 which had to be blunted, if possible.  
 No better weapon to accomplish this  
 goal could be found than to use  
 one agency (CIA) against another (FBI).

A brief look at the record shows the  
 employment of ~~the~~ strategy ~~at~~ at moments  
 of crisis for those who published on  
 the file.

1. Robert Mahan

- Quarterly Long Committee subpoena  
 in 1966 [ Intern Report, p 79, note 3; Intern <sup>Edward</sup> <sub>P Morgan</sub>
- solidification of position with  
 CIA and with Hughes Department  
 [ Hughes was definitely told of the project of Mahan  
 in Nov. 1960, and was himself involved in an  
 alliance with the CIA which in fact, occurred  
 later when Mahan was Hughes' principal agent ]  
 [ Intern Report, p 75, note 2; Mahan Suite, Turkey ? ]  
 - Dispute with Hughes; See memo 20 May 1971  
 in office of Sec'y <sup>file</sup> on Edward P Morgan

2. John Rosselli

- evading criminal prosecution [ Intern  
 Report, p 55, note 4 ]
- use in ~~legal~~ memos in March 1971 to  
 attempt to reduce sentence
- ~~was~~ attempts to delay deportation  
 through with JNS which included

0002218

Jack Anderson's personal intervention  
with PRS (See Anderson interview, and  
CFA Roselli file; ~~re~~ CFA office  
of Security file re Edward P. Morgan)

### 3. Sam Giancana

- October 1960 wiretap in Las Vegas  
where Giancana got Malin to take the heat  
for him by dumping the tap was a  
result of the CFA plots.

- Early 1962, intervention with FNU  
Farrell of DNS re possible deportation  
[See Tab C, Roselli CFA file,  
stating that Maj. Swab, Osborn, Peyton  
Rocca, & Houston know]

- attempts to ward off FBI surveillance  
in 1963 & 1967 [DC Report p 129]

- Conversation with Sam Pupich  
on 3 May 1967. Sam comments that  
Roselli and Giancana have CFA  
'over a barrel' because of "that operation".  
He said that he doubted that the FBI  
would be able to do anything about either  
Roselli or Giancana because of their  
previous activities with your people. 11  
(1967 F.B. Rpt p 137)

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Notes re Jack Anderson  
"Castro Retaliation" theory

0002219

March 3, 1967 }  
March 7, 1967 } Drew Pearson Office

Source:

1967 I.B. Report:

1) It is quite likely that Roselli is the source, Morgan the channel, and Anderson and Pearson the recipients

(P 120)

- We may now assume that Pearson's story is not patched together from bits and pieces picked up here and there. His ultimate source Roselli, knows more about certain details than we do, and he evidently has talked

(P 120)

- Impact

The Roselli boom contact in Las Vegas in March is particularly disturbing. It lends substance to reports that Castro had something to do with the Kennedy assassination in retaliation for US attempts on Castro's life. We do not know that Castro actually tried to retaliate, but we do (CIA emphasis) know that there were such plots against Castro. Unhappily, it now appears that boom may also have been this (P 122)

- Mahan

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does have good reasons not wanting the story aired further. Unfortunate publicity might cause him to lose his leverage

002221

Client, Hughes. There might be some value to be gained from endorsing his suggestion that he approach Morgan and perhaps Roselli and vice versa.

- The Pearson story, which is now causing so much distress, includes one detail that is not found in Phase Two: the three-man team  
Comment

Not necessary since Pearson was involved in Phase One also, he may have begun the 3-man team initially and may have used Roselli on the concept in Phase Two or Roselli just didn't mention the 3-man team to Mahan or O'Connell during Phase I  
Comment

- In figuring out "ulterior motives" for a leak to Pearson, Agency makes the following point:

If protection was what the source was seeking, he could be better assured of getting it by a direct approach to CIA for help. Since Agency can figure an ulterior motive, they decide that Roselli is doubly too much and ~~too~~ <sup>too</sup> ~~close~~ <sup>close</sup> to Morgan who is also doubly and fully to be ~~be~~ <sup>be</sup> ~~re~~ <sup>re</sup> ~~con~~ <sup>con</sup> ~~cerned~~ <sup>cerned</sup> of Pearson's

Comment

Even Pearson has not yet, as far as we know, used two of his best gordies in the story of the job

Comment

See p 112 wherein "Drew Pearson claims to have a report that there was a high-level meeting at the Dept of State at which plans for the assassination were discussed."

I-6 speculates that Pearson is falling about the 10 August meeting of the Special Group (Signal) which was attended by Harvey. (p 112)  
E R F K was not present

2. Other Sources

a) Memo re 15 Feb 1972

DCI aware that Russell's were going to expose plots. He "decided to ignore his threats and take a calculated risk as to the consequences that may occur with the disclosure of his story. This was subsequently done by Russell or someone in his office furnishing Jack Braden details of the incident"

(Memo in office of security file re Major)

3. Memo: 20 May 1971

Subject: Exposed

Mr. <sup>Ho</sup> Peace (former CIA & now with Exposed) said Mahon & Braden together on some oil mix deal. ... Recent exposure of Braden re Mahon's role in the Carter Revolution was a deliberate exposure instigated by Robert Mahon using his son Peter, as an intermediary.

Please' theory is that Mahan probably thought that such publicity would "scare them off" (re. Felt's in re new CIA stuff to influence Hughes)

-Magan makes noises to certain Hughes officials that they had better take it easy on Mahan because of his past involvement with CIA  
 2 Memo in Security File re Magan

4. Memo 19 Nov 1970

7  
 ?  
 - Haney had contacts with Roselli in November - December 1967 and January 1968 following Roselli conviction -  
 - 17 Nov 1970

Magan had received a call from Tom Wadden who requested Roselli that Roselli faced deportation and would blow story. DCF decided to ignore threat and Mahan agreed.

"Mahan further advised that he was not concerned about any publicity as it reflected him generally.

5. 19 Dec. 1967

- Summary conversation instigated by Haney on Roselli's behalf to get CIA interested. directly or at least involve how good court case against Roselli was.

- Calls from Roselli began on October 6 Haney. Roselli knew what Agency had done for Mahan with Sen. Long because SA Magan told

Roselli:

- Also, the Director Belmont had sent Harry a news clipping re Agency use of Binmore (primarily the August 1963 Chicago story of Sandy Smith)

Roselli said the leak came from Senator Kennedy's office when Kennedy was still Attorney General.

6. Memo 28 April 1967

- J. Connell sent to Las Vegas to find out source of Binmore story

- Mahan admitted telling Morgan some of the Phase 7 operation but to Agency delaying on long committed subpoenas

- Mahan visibly upset over Morgan going to Pearson and asked if he (Mahan) had been identified as the "client" by Morgan because he was afraid of the publicity effort his relationship with Hughes, with Roselli:

- Mahan denied document letter from inman & said he had no knowledge of operation after April 1962

- Roselli met Morgan through Hunt newspaper in the 1950s

- Mahan recalled that Morgan and Roselli met with Binmore in Las Vegas during March 1967. Under the ~~impression~~ impression that Roselli sought legal advice from Morgan but did not know the circumstances

- Roselli under pressure from FBI during hearings had a 99 yr old gov.

- Belvid Morgan had done some

January 6<sup>th</sup>

15 Jan 1977

0002225

Memo re request of Dade City  
investigator for information on  
B Sabani:

1. a. Ramon Don Pestervey
- b. Rolando Masferrer Rojas
- c. Luciano Nueves
- d. Jose de la Torre
- e. Jose Quintana
- f. Joaquin Heriberto Cortez
- g. Manolo Artime
- h. M.L.H.

2. Two of the 3 Cubans mentioned in  
Roselli (SSCP) testimony.

Two names mentioned in a Dec  
1970 office of Security memo

v. No background investigation done on  
Roselli or Brancura

vi. Sporadic contacts, direct and indirect  
between Roselli's Agency opponents reported  
approx. 1971.

vii. O'Connell has already been interviewed  
by Dade City.

viii. Office of Security has no such  
evidence that Cuban Fulbrighter Sabani may have  
been involved or Cuban agents in Miami area  
during time of his death.

0002225

Nieves

- c. Released in March 1965 after serving approx 16 months of a 20 yr sentence for anti-Castro job; went to Spain briefly where he was of interest to Madrid Station
- August 1965 entered US
  - Nov 1965 to Jan 1966 of operational interest to DDO

Shirwin

He is mentioned in the John Roselli file as a personal friend of Roselli. It is further noted that Shirwin knew Roselli but nature & extent of their official/social relationship is unknown

30 August 1976 report by S/A Edward C. Rudiger, Alexandria FPD office.

- Cuban contacts of Roselli

1. Juan Ota

was an official of the Castro Govt circa 1960-61 and was a contact of Santos Trafficante. Ota was reportedly selected by Trafficante to make the assassination attempt against Castro.

2. Tony Vanna

When Juan Ota was not successful in carrying out the mission against Castro, Trafficante suggested Vanna be used. Roselli contacted Vanna. Vanna was to use

SECRET

assets of his son to carry out the mission. Varona also reportedly used his son's initials to assist him in this effort but there is no identifying info in regard to the mission.

3. Roselli had a man, also presumably in Miami, known to Harvey as "Macco", who also used the names Garcia Gomez and Godoy. Harvey was unable to identify Macco, who was described as Cuban who spoke Italian.

517-339-3523  
 F. No info in regard to death or welfare of agents Roselli or Cuban in G1 or Mexico, Venezuela, Togo, Somalia, or Myanmar in C/

3. Memo 15 Feb 1972

4. This Agency was aware that Roselli intended to expose his participation in the plot should we not intervene on his behalf. The DCP decided to ignore his threats and take a calculated risk as to the consequences that may occur w/ the disclosure of his story. It was subsequently done by Roselli or someone on his behalf furnishing Jack # volume details of the incident.

0002229

Memo 20 May 1971

Subject: Futer Tel

005 - Magon had been engaged by Hughes  
Tore getting thru Makin's efforts. (H. Pearce  
from Army and Interfel new, said Magon  
made noises to certain Hughes officials, that  
they had better take it easy on Makin because  
of his past involvement w/ LIT.

L. John Southard - in 1942-44 was in touch  
w/ Makin & simultaneously wrote out details  
of a [redacted] arrangement w/  
Aircraft Div of Hughes Tool.

For past several Magon had been paid money.

In May 10, 1971 Mr. Pearce said Makin  
& Androm are involved together in some oil well  
deal. I would look into this and other  
such similar matters to trace the source & disposition  
of funds. Recent exposure by Pearce  
Makin's role in the Cuban Revolution was a  
deliberate exposure instigated by Col. Makin  
using his son Peter as an intermediary.  
Pearce's theory is that Makin prob. that  
such publicity would 'score heavily'.  
The Futerfel staff is aware of a number  
contacts & meetings between Peter Makin  
and Jack Anderson or a number of his staff.

SECRET

19 Nov 1970

For: D C I  
 Subj: Roselli, Johnny

2. In August 1960, Mr. Richard M. Bissell approached Col. Sheffeld Edwards to inform of the office of Security had assets that may assist in a sensitive mission requiring espionage-type action. The mission target was Fidel Castro.

5. Mr. Mahan advised that he had met one J R on several occasions while working for the CIA. He did not know him casually for, clearly, but was given to understand that he was a high ranking member of the 'squad' and controlled all of the old money matters in the shop.

Mahan would have, if R was in fact a member of the Club, he undoubtedly had connections leading into the Cuban family interests.

6. Mahan to approach R who knew M as a per-  
 mitted. heavily financed & frequent visitor.

7. Pitch made on 14 Sept 1960 at Hilda Place. His initial reaction was to avoid getting involved but, thru M's persuasion, he agreed to introduce him to a friend Sam Gold who knew the Cuban crowd." No money required or paid.

8. During the week of 25 Sept, Mahan introduced to Sam Stagg at the Fort Belknap. It was several weeks after Sam meeting w/ Sam and Joe, who was identified

SECRET

0002232

- to him as a courier operating between Havana & Miami that he saw photos in Sunday "Supplement" of Parade
9. In discussing the possible methods of accomplishing this mission Sam suggested that they not resort to ferreting but if he could be furnished some type of potent pill that could be placed in Castro's food or drink, it would be a much more effective operation. Sam indicated that he had a prospective nominee in the person of Juan Orta, a Cuban official who had been receiving high level payments from the guerrilla units, who still had access to Castro and was in a financial bind.
  11. Joe delivered the pills to Orta. After several weeks of repeated attempts, Orta apparently got cold feet & was kicked out of the assignment. He suggested another candidate who made several attempts w/out success.
  12. Joe then indicated that Dr. Gregory Shuman ... had become disinterested w/ the apparent ineffectual progress of the Orta and was willing to handle the mission thru his own resources.
  13. He asked, as a prerequisite to the deal, that he may be given \$10,000 for organizational expenses & \$100 per commission

secret says R. K. in memorandum saying up  
to make it in report in report. At our report possibly  
17. May 1962 Harry told me as Case  
officer & it is not known by this office  
whether R. was used equidistant from  
plus point on

0002233

17. Illegal entry Nov. 1967  
18. 2 Dec 1968 R. arrested by F. U. S. A.  
19. Harry reported to office of security his  
contacts w/ R. in Nov - Dec 1967 & Jan 1968.  
It was his belief that Johnny was in contact  
the Agency for assistance in deportation  
unless he actually forced deportation.  
R. expressed confidence that he would win  
an appeal.

20. 17 Nov 1970.  
Mahn called O'Connell to advise  
that Mahan attorney, Ed Morgan, had  
received a call from Tom Wadden who stated  
appeal exhausted & R. forced deportation.  
If someone did interfere on R's  
behalf, he would make a complete  
expose of his activities in Agency

21. 18 Nov 1970. D. C. F. Lynch's demand  
not to arrest R. Mahan was so  
pleased by Agency's position & he was in  
complete agreement w/ our stand. He further  
advised that he was not concerned about  
any publicity as it appeared quickly.

Anders McCall June 18, 1971  
by attorney's initial letter; last letter on a

stop; last of Feb or first of March 1963  
March 13, 1961 R delivered expects to see  
contact at Fontainebleau

0602255

- a few weeks later contact

Feb 23, 1971

Once he called on the racket boss  
Sam Giancana to line up a contact.  
The confidential files report that he had  
"gambly interest and an interest in the  
shrimp business in Cuba". However, the  
Chi gangster took no direct part in the  
massive plot.

19 Dec 1967

Memo For Record

Telephone conversation Harry & Howard Osborn

2. The fact revealed Dir of Security  
the subject of our last broken conversation  
re. J.R. the validity of the Justice Dept case  
against him; & whether or not the Agency plans  
to consider any possible intervention on  
his behalf

3. Harry indicated that he thought the  
policy of "sitting tight" might be alright,  
but that he felt it would be a simple  
matter for the Dir to see Howard personally  
& determine on an individual case by case basis  
what action case the Justice Dept had.

Osborn - speculates Harry might  
find out validity of case for purpose of  
Harry to work for. Major

11 Dec 1967

1. Harry reported luncheon meetings w/ Pajich on 8th Dec. & Osborn on Dec 9th
2. 26 Nov. 1947. R calls Harry. who met him at Madison Hotel for 3 hrs.

27 Nov, they "bumped" into Tom Anglin & Harry called R as "Mr. Ralston."

28 Nov spent 11 hours at Pittsburg

4. Harry to Harry, County Club.

R in town to see Morgan re a radio station in San Jose. Not worked re until when he brought.

- R said he had not seen someone since 1965 (Papich checking & may respond to Harry)

- R & I/n state or imply that he wanted help from Agency.

9. Jolley told Harry re luncheon meeting w/ Col. Edwards in 1944 & long meeting of 'Council' had w/ Miller & R in Cal when he returned from duty in Far East.

7. Harry insists that he must know status of case. If it is a good case, Harry feels the Agency must exert influence to have the matter "handled". If it is not a good case, Carl Harry will tell Jolley & he will walk it out.

10. Harry independent as reputation his contact was more than to protect Agency.

SECRET

0002237

He had my the highest regard for ~~Harry~~  
and the way we had handled his problem.

8 Nov 1967

R. Harry is source

R called on Oct 22nd & 27th. but  
Harry refused to serve as R's attorney

- R wondered why ~~Harry~~ would not  
do as much for him as it did for ~~Mahon~~.  
Ed Morgan knew what ~~Harry~~ did for ~~Mahon~~  
w/ Sen. Long & had told ~~Harry~~ about this.

4 Oct 67

Osborn & Harry at lunch.

- R quote vehemently better re  
Mahon indirectly Mahon would "sell anyone  
down the river to protect his interest."

- Dor had sent Harry news clipping  
re use of banana. R said leak came  
from Sen. Kennedy's office when he was still ~~to~~

Eye on Mahon

28 April 67

O'Connell - Morgan allegedly contacted some high level  
officials in govt indirectly he had a client  
who had been involved in an operation against ~~the~~  
~~Mahon~~ records & said he had told Morgan  
when ~~Harry~~ delays on Harry subpoena.

2. Mahon surely upset to find if he  
had been identified as client source

SECRET

publicity on his relationship w/ Hayes.

5. No knowledge of mission after April 1946 & never discussed latter phases w/ R. Mahon - R met Magon thru Pearson in 1950's when Magon was legal work for Lai Vang Sun.

R & Magon in Vegas sometime in March. Jim Cannon in town "it was Mahon's recollection that these individuals spent some time together. He was under the impression that they sought legal advice from Magon but did not know nature of their conversation.

7. Claimed R had detour w/ rapidly developing; 11 yr old girl & account of <sup>Shirley</sup> ~~James~~ for father to register. R pretty promise for Mahon to hire his friends.

8. Believed Magon had done some work for Pearson & did know that Pearson had more than a passing acquaintance w/ Magon.

Magon fight w/ Pat Coyne for NSA.

9. Knows only heavy problem w/ the FBI but don't know details.

10. It is evident that Mahon is deeply concerned about possibility of being identified w/ Castro project. but placed cooperation in a heavy context.

SECRET

1002239

Sen Long Mahu

S. Shonker, Long's personal atty, told here  
that Mahu worked at Agency.

7 June 66

Mahu reported by Morgan as being  
w/ St Louis atty, a personal friend of Long,  
re Mahu's appearance -

3. Fensterwald. had identified some  
names, etc by name to O'Connell &  
Col. Edwards.

In the case of Sam, Ed Dubois  
& a couple of his technicians now aware  
of Mahu's tie-in w/ Hancock.

31 May 1966

Mahu asked if "Sam grant" was in  
the mind

12. Morgan had advised Mahu that he  
knew Long's personal atty who exerts great  
influence on Long. They flew to St Louis  
& then the 3 men flew to D.C. & met  
w/ Long & Fensterwald. Fensterwald  
wanted Mahu as his "man in the field"  
so that Mahu's contacts were good approval  
for T.V. Also that Mahu was not just  
enough to hold behind. When Long saw  
M, Fensterwald would proceed

13. Mahu claims name of [unclear]

SECRET

Sam thru a series of circumstances  
that were planned at our request.  
The Hon. R.D. RFX was orally  
briefed on the background that led up  
to Miami involvement & a Top Secret  
document furnished to Justice Dept  
which served as a backup of the  
supply

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p3

Each phase is a reflection of the then prevailing Gov't attitude toward the Cuban regime.

a. Prior to August 1960

All of the identifiable schemes prior to Aug. 1960, w/ one possible exception, were carried out at discredibly limited success. by influencing his behavior or by altering his appearance.

b. August 1960 to April 1961

Plots aggressively pursued; views of at least some of participants as one aspect of effort to overthrow regime ultimately in BOP.

c. April 1961 to late 1961

Major scheme begun by Bay of Pigs was called off after BOP & removed dormant for several months.

d. Late 1961 to late 1962

Particular scheme reactivated in early 1962 & pushed vigorously in era of Monrovia.

e. Late 1962 until well into 1963

After numerous & collapse of Project MONROVIA, aggressive scheme begun by Bay of Pigs; revised in April 1962; were finally terminated in early 1963.

p6 Drew Pearson column of 2 March 1967 refers to a reported CIA plan in 1963 to assassinate Castro.

He also has info:

- a) State Dept meeting at which assassination discussed
- b) team actually landed in Cuba w/ pills

SECRET

5. If ~~syndicate~~<sup>SECRET</sup> ~~activity~~ is an  
operation, tends to reinforce thought  
that details would have been  
characterized by discretion or security despite  
FBI Oct 1942 report.

pas Ford Report requires that prob  
plots bore no relation in a practical  
sense

---

### Ruby - Trafficking

#### Other Reported Assassination Proposals

5 agent messages were identified that  
made reference to plans to kill Castro or  
proposing such action. Three of the  
messages related to the same operator  
the other two relating to separate  
proposals; there is no indication  
that any of these proposals was the  
result of CIPA initiative.

WABRMC/5. Suspect 29 May 1942  
and was identified 30 August 42. He has  
been reported as never admitting that  
he was a CIPA agent. His name not  
given to me. Three other were

0002243

SECRET

AMKASH

0002244

SECRET

SSC

1) inferre that AMKASH a custo agent  
with the mission of providing a plot agent Castro  
so that Castro had justification for retaliation;

or

2) AMKASH so in detail the details would have  
been known since providing Castro

what he should have been reported to W.C.

Agony - The character of the relationship  
between CIA and AMKASH (I), prior to Oswald  
murder of President Kennedy, was so insubstantial  
and inconclusive that it provided no basis for  
AMKASH (I) to feel that he had any tangible  
CIA support for plotting against Castro.

..... there was little for him to  
report or leak!

Comment p 5

Over a year passed between August  
1962 and Sept 1963 when he was next  
contacted by CIA. In terms of the  
relationship that he had with CIA the  
critical period, since is therefore between  
5 Sept and 22 Nov 1963

Reason for hiatus is clear.  
CF 13  
Solid report AMKASH In Havana Cuba; he was  
recontacted due to his potential.

SECRET



14 Nov from WHIP reported that [redacted] satisfied w/ policy considerations but unhappy over fact he had not been given technical assistance. He can understand why he had not been given "Cuban small piece of equipment which provided a final solution to the problem".

### Comment

In essence he [redacted] was told there would be no U.S. support until after the fact, and then only if he was successful. While that may not seem a very realistic way in which to bring about the overthrow of a govt, it is directly relevant to the question of what [redacted] was told and what he understood. It is contrary to the statement in the SSC Final Report (p. 18) to the effect that it was not clear how [redacted] interpreted the part of a [redacted].

Notes: July 1964 FBI Report states that [redacted] unhappy with CIA program and [redacted] had refused to support [redacted].

19 Nov 63 Fitzgerald "approved" telling [redacted] he would be given a cache inside Cuba. The cache

could, if he requested it, include...  
high power refer w/ sec... ..

19 Nov. Mark ASH tells CIA he is  
returning to Cuba.

Request by headquarters to ask him  
to delay for 1 more meeting.

Mark ASH agrees "if it is smug  
intensity"

As a SSC speculator that the is fact  
indicates he might receive specific support  
Agency - at best a piece of highly  
speculative analysis, not supported by  
the evidence.

[ Fails to mention per w/ collecting  
Opinion

M HU [redacted]

p 26

"A"

"unaware of MARK ASH 1963 association  
with CIA"

No info at least 1 1/2 years after  
after death of JFK; no idea of 1963  
CIA ties w/ Mark ASH what was  
my involvement

c. CIA trace (sent in early 1961 & again in early 1962) supplied lethal pills to US gambling syndicate members. . . . The 1961 plot aborted & pills were recovered.

These furnished in April 1962 passed of gambling rep. to a Cuban wife leader in Fla who in turn, had them sent to Cuba about May 1962. In June 1962, the wife leader reported that a team of 3 men had been dispatched to Cuba to recruit for the operation.

of . . . "While the events described of the Cuban did occur & are subject to being patched together as the one complete story, the implication of a direct, causative relationship among them is unproven."

Q 18: During the week of 25 Sept 1960, O'Connell's Makin went to Miami where Roselli introduced my Makin to "Sam Gold" at a meeting in the Fontainebleau Hotel. "Gold" said he had a man whom he identified only as "Joe", who would serve as a courier to Cuba & make arrangements there. Makin pointed out "Gold" to O'Connell from a distance but O'Connell never met either "Gold" or "Joe".

Q 19: At that time the gambling casinos were still operating in Cuba. Trafficking was making regular trips between Miami & Havana as syndicate members.

SECRET

p. 24 Despite the decision that a poison in liquid form would be most desirable, what was actually prepared and delivered was a solid in the form of small pills about the size of saccharine tablets.

0002252

Comment - Binamon was fully opposed to the use of furans. He said that no one could be recruited to do the job because the chance of survival's escape would be negligible. Binamon stated a preference for a lethal pill that could be put into Castro's food and drink. Truj. (love; the courier was on track with a disguised Cuban official with access to Castro and personally of a sort that would enable him to smuggle any poison Castro. The gangster named them man inside as Juan Ota who was then Office Chief and Director of the office of the Puma Mountain. The gangster said that Ota had once been in a position to receive mail parcels from the gangster contacts, had some lost that source of income and needed the money)

p. 27. Late Feb - March 1961

As passed the pills to Truj. Roselli reported to O'Connell that the pills had been delivered to Ota in Cuba. Ota is understood to have kept the pills for a couple of weeks before returning them. According to the gangster, Ota got cold feet.

Comment Ota lost his position in B.M.I

SECRET

SECRET

officer on 26 Jan. 1961, while getting for the  
operation was still going on in Miami & Wash DC.

000

He took refuge in the Singapore Embassy

0002254

April, 1961 ...

... It would seem that, that the  
gangster did know that Vita had already  
set his name to Castro.

p 30. The Cuban brothers were believed to be  
in touch with Vanna. Vanna Moss and were  
reported to have offered Vanna large sums  
of money for his operations against Castro with  
the understanding that they would receive  
privileged treatment "in the Cuba of the future".  
Attempts to verify these reports were unsuccessful.

p 31. Traff appeared Vanna and told her  
that he had clients who wanted to do work with  
Castro & that they would pay big money for the  
commit.

Rosselli said as a loyal person he would  
interview he could & would never divulge  
the operation.]

p 31. R wrote deliver money to Vanna for expenses.  
- O'Connell recalls 50,000; Edwards recalls  
25,000; Pennington recalls 25,000

p 32 Rosselli gave the jills and money to Vanna. Rosselli  
dealt with ~~under~~ a pseudonym. Little  
is known of the delivery channels beyond Vanna

SECRET

p. 32 <sup>200</sup> Edwards recalls something about a contact who worked in a restaurant frequented by Castro.

0002255

p. 33 (O'Connell) believes that there was something going on between April 1961 and April 1962, but he cannot now recall what. He agrees with Bill Harry that when the operation was over in April 1962, Harry took over a "going operation".

p. 34. O'Connell believes he must have passed the pills, but he has no specific recollection of doing so.

p. 49. Roselle needed Brian & Troff in the first phase as a means of establishing contacts inside Cuba. He did not need them in the second phase because he had Vernon. However, it would be naive to assume that Roselle did not take the precaution of informing Hughes up in the syndicate that he was working in a territory considered to be the private domain of someone else in the syndicate.

p. ~~47~~<sup>51</sup> June 1962 Harry said they appeared to have no specific plan for killing Castro. They were to recruit others who might be used in such a scheme. If an opportunity to kill Castro presented itself, they or the persons they recruited were to make the attempt. <sup>perhaps using the pills.</sup>

Harry never named their names or anything about them.

p. 52 Harry says Roselli wasn't kidding him. He agreed with Harry that nothing was happening and that there was not much chance that anything would happen in the future.

p. 201 RFK - I trust that if you ever ~~try~~<sup>try</sup> to do business with regard to ~~some~~ - with ~~you~~ ~~you~~ ~~you~~ you will let the Attorney General know before you do it. Houston quotes Edwards as replying that this was a reasonable request.

p. 64. The Attorney General's copy of the memo for the record of that meeting (May 62 by Edwards & Houston) is in possession of the AG's office.

p. 67. Major Sam-Toner's article of 16 August 1963 cites Justice Dept belief that Oswald never did any spying - merely pretended to go along "in the hope that the Justice Dept done to put him behind bars might be slowed or at least affected - by his use of co-operation w/ ~~unsub~~ ~~got~~ ~~agency~~."

Article puts his cooperation from 1959 to some time in 1960 - long before the abortive rebel invasion at the Bay of Pigs in April 1961. Reports McBain's bugging incident.

p69 20 August 1963 Chicago Daily News

FBI agent talking to man who allegedly says:

Why don't you fellows leave me alone?  
I'm one of you.

Person pictured as being approached by CIA but denying

0002258

AMLABSH

- 079 - DR took Presidential Oath which they refused to surrender to Che; later did to Fidel
- Cuba believed to be in participation in assassination of Gen Antonio Blanco Rico, head of Batista's military in Havana
- DR quite apart from 20th of July but signed a unity pact

⇒ ... Agency was primarily oriented in helping Cuba's actions in ~~Latin~~ PRON program directed against Cuban military leaders, while receiving his plan for technical assistance in an assassination attempt. The voluminous project files and info furnished us by Nestor Sanchez, Cuban case officer, do not wholly support these recollections. The Agency offered both direct and indirect support for Cuba's operations.

087 10 Sept 1963

Cuba wrote Tuzeduro - "I don't intend to see (be interrogated by) your friend again!" whom you should tell them, "so they don't

make the top: I want to get away from politics completely?

1992 Sancy says that, while Cuba was anxious to do away with Castro, Cuba was not willing to sacrifice his own life in exchange for Castro. What Cuba really wanted was high-powered, silenced rifle w/ an effective range of hundreds or thousands of yards. Cuba finally said that, as a doctor of medicine (which he was) he was quite sure that we could devise some technical means of doing the job that would not automatically cause him to lose his own life in the try.

The Drew Pearson Story

a) Published Details | The Facts as we know them  
Robert Kennedy may have ~~or~~ not been in Phase 1. He was briefed on Phase 1 after it was over - He was not ~~briefed~~ briefed on Phase 2

b) Three (3) ~~men~~ ~~misses~~ were caught on Havana; one still in prison  
R tells Hany on 21 June 67, that ~~Wanna~~ says 3 men ~~valued~~. We do not know their identities or what may have happened to them. We have no proof that they were actually ~~disputed~~ ~~disputed~~. Most of the unnamed ~~captives~~ and ~~specimens~~ during this period - 67 this year

could have enough at ~~that~~ this report has come out  
to believe that (P.F. was really killed) in the balloon investigation. It  
was also stated by Castello was  
in the Philippines under secret  
investigation. We have no  
independent corroboration of any sort. (No  
that Garrison met w/ Resales  
in Las Vegas March 1965)

0002260

SECRET

1977

SECRET

9 May 1967

Beamborough apparently to be used as a proxy  
by Garrison to show Oswald a CIA agent  
& was to be used to incriminate Castro. Garrison  
alleges he has letters signed by CIA reps  
or by Sen. RFK authorizing certain persons  
to work with Cubans for arms. of Castro.  
This memo is intended to record that  
such letters were used & therefore could  
not be in Garrison's possession.

0002261

SECRET

Request

SECRET

0002265

- Richard Cain aka Robert Scully Cain  
Richard Scalyette  
DOB OCT 1931 Chicago

FBI memo

- 21 Dec 1960 not finally set
- 18 Jan 1961 identified individuals
- Identity of W1 ROCAF
- April 61 to April 62 <sup>000 100</sup> matters  
- ~~some~~ "something going on"  
independent of Agency
- RFT security called on 4 March 67  
to obtain memo; already saw article  
of 7 March 67
- 15 March 65  
Bango in Madrid & claims group  
in Cuba ready.  
- Jailed in July 62
- 1 March 66 arrests in Cuba  
Trial refused up to late fall 64 & early 65  
w/ Airline meetings

SECRET

10 Jan 64 "Paper" Brubaker memo approach The White

SECRET

0002266

O'Connell's interview of Malone in May 1960

- Additional info on S.T. JR & SB contained in material previously shared for review on Sturgis

- Chicago Trib

Dec 28, 31, 1973

- Cain

- Fall 1960, contact in Chicago

- Summer 1961 Mexico City

- April 1962 Mexico City

- 4 June 62 departed

- 19 Aug 63 Chicago

- 26-30 Aug 63 Info - re Student Directory, Miami

- 12 Sept 63 DRF arms purchase

- toll to get out of picture

- 1 May 1972 disappear.

27 NW 63

- Fair Play met in Feb 63 at 907

~~S. S.~~ S. Spaulding under direction Michael Criley

- LHO purchased rifle March 63

- Sturgis suspect LHO in Chicago 1963 April

SECRET

SECRET

6002267

1. Ramon Don Pesterey Dominguez  
DOB 2 May or 5 Feb 1934
  2. Rolando Magferrer Rojas  
DOB 12 Jan 1918
  3. Lucrindo Nevés
  4. Jose de la Tormenta
  5. Jose Quintana  
DOB 3 Oct 45 *replac by name*
  6. Joaquin Antonio Cortez DOB 10 Jan 45
- Edward Percipit Morgan DOB 28 May 1913 St Louis

SECRET

SECRET

0002268

Morgan

Covert Security Clearance on 2 Feb 1951 for use as "cut out" re negotiations for school of Howard Ditt Studios & John Hopton Lines.

Amended & Approved March 1951 to include Morgan's use in providing covert legal support for operations in the form of a "cut out"; legal advice transmission of funds in connection with DDO projects.  
 ∴ DDO should make decision whether to release info.

Resort

Resorts Int. #591 727  
 Walker Bros OS file # 473 865  
 - assoc w/ Meyer Lansky  
 - Corp. Grand Bahama Development Corp  
 w/ Robert Whisart (#633 974) and  
 John P. Roulett (#639 997)

Cain

According to De Mar, Cain in  
 Mexico 1961 into 1962  
 -1964-65

SECRET

**SECRET**

0002269

7-Mar-35  
St Paul, Minn  
36 yr

Bradley Earl Ayers  
Eglin AFB Fla.

April 12, 1971 Post

April 27, 1971 Post

Sunday April 18 1971

Comm name? David B. Williams  
Paragon Air Service

Zenith Technical Publications - south  
Campus of MMU

Room; Harry, Robinson (Wp) Big Paper

Tracing sites

Orlando Hts. Key

Upper Key Camp

Card found in edge of P. [unclear]

Security Approval

Date 10 Aug 1964

Refined 23826 (DDP / WTT / SH)

Case No. 366085

Request For Recusal Action

Serial No  
366085

Nature

Separation Return to Parent SUC 12-15-64

Organizational Designations:  
DDP / SHS  
US Field Office  
Forward operation Station - JMWAVE  
Paramilitary Branch Section 117  
Reinstated C.R.C. Indiv Pol groups

**SECRET**

ZR/RIFLE

All (cable) traffic bearing ZR/RIFLE to be delivered in sealed envelope to Chief FI/Div. D, 15024 Bldg only

- Personally approved of DD Plans

Harry  
Chief FI/Div. D

19 Feb 1962

To Harry re authorization of ATAIN for ZR/RIFLE activities thru Dec 1962.

Because of sensitive nature of this activity, accounts for funds will be of general category & by your certificate

2. Salary \$500 per yr; \$750 in addition to salary
3. Money to be considered in lieu of project & constitute authorization for all travel per diem; operational & other expenses
4. Eyes only

Rich. D Helms.

Hand written notes

Morgan - Roselli - Mahan - Gannon  
- Mackin bar Ugar

Morgan & Jack Hudson

- 1) Prior to Aug 60
- 2) Aug 60 to April 61 (BOP)
- 3) April 61 to Sept 61
- 4) Sept 61 to Sept 62 (Customs & other)
- 5) Sept 62 to March 63

SECRET

Roselli of started in Sept 66  
(Mahn to Roselli to Oranena)

to brief 7 May 67

Taylor became chairman of FCS  
on 9 Aug 67

Push, McNamee, Taylor, Bundy,  
O'Dowen, Gilpatrick, Lambell,  
Murray, McClure

Memo For Record

Rept at request of DCF; conveyed  
to FO on 23 March 67

The one stayback from copy (FO)  
all notes, & other derived source material  
destroyed 23 May 67.

Memo: Chuy Witt (Dorcom)

From: Dir of Security

Subject: Witt (Security Project)

Final account of memo reported on  
a separate page of volume of DD/P; Chuy Witt  
& Dir of Security

Dissemination

25 Sept 1960 thru  
6 Feb 1961

SECRET

TO Contact

0900.

11 Feb 1961 To Penney April 1960  
 31 Jan 1961  
 14 Feb 61 Communist Symposium 1,043  
 26 Sept 1961  
 12 Feb 1961 993

Page 3  
IO Rpt

e. Late 1962 until well into 1963

After missile crisis Oct 62 & collapse of MONROE, aggressive scheme that was begun in Aug 1960; worked in April 1962, was finally smashed May 1963  
 Two other plots were disrupted in 1963 but were impracticable & nothing came of them

P 9

b. 10 August 1962

Meeting of Special Group (Keynote) wherein McNamara brooded subject of liquidation of Cuban leaders.

Result - Project MONROE memo by Lansdale

31 Jul 64

Discussion at Special Group of a clandestine Service memo of exile plot to kill Castro. CIA had refused to fund. Mike had no word.

See (c)

and Section

P 2 Gonzalez Callanetta

Press Release  
7 March 1966

Missing page

- program of contact for intelligence; not  
 fourth to form puppet  
 - Jose ROBERTO, Alberto Blanco Ramon, Luis Tapedo

SECRET

Late Sept 1960

Edwards, O'Connell, Bessell of James  
Browneville; Edwards then brief  
Allen Dulles & General Cabell.

Mahon called O'Connell & pointed out  
Paradise room staying Gold & Joe  
(Presumably in time, Mahon & O'Connell  
know names)

Joe a courier to Castro make  
arrangements there re entry to Gold

- Traff making regular trips to Havana
- 7 Jan 59 - casino closed
- 13 Jan 59 - Castro announces re opening
- 17 Feb 59 - Casino announces opening
- 30 Sept 61 - last casino closed

P23

Technical Copy TSD

- 4 approaches: (1) highly toxic like shellfish  
poison to be admitted via pin (Wheeler Committee  
Roosevelt's suit was supplied to Gary Powers)
- (2) bacterial material in liquid or (3) cigar
- (4) handkerchief

P29. March April 1961

Roselli told O'Connell that Tracy knew a  
man high up in evil movement. (Vanna  
Rpt from ~~SECRET~~ suggest him Tracy)

known values:

- a) 21 Dec 1960 FBI memo re gangster financing Cuban activities to maintain Castro.
- b) 18 Jan 1961 memo to [unclear] with [unclear] Scherer. Had hired Moss as a front man.

CIA had contact in Miami but no indication of any involvement in Cuba.

March (1959) for use in (A/R) [unclear] or [unclear] to Indian Embassy

- Nov 62 by CIA Staff under [unclear] MAJOR a program for exploitation of political consultants.

Roselli to deliver \$400k. Estimate vary but [unclear] says 10,000 + 100k of communication as per [unclear] memo.

Comment - V one of 5 key figures in [unclear].  
 From a heavy involvement in [unclear]. Steps taken to end his participation in [unclear] plan but apparently ineffective.

People who knew:

1. J. J. - original man to go in
2. A. V. -
3. son-in-law of H.V.

Phase 2

SECRET

6002275

Harry briefed by authority of Bissell  
in Feb 1961 in connection with a general  
stand-by capability for Executive action

Harry had already discussed problem  
w/ <sup>05</sup>Arnold Silver & Sidney both who  
both parties probably cut in to Cuba  
project

Helm's brief on general concept but  
not on ongoing Cuba plot <sup>05</sup>

AS will account of <sup>(murd)</sup> Silver's use  
in Congo; Justin O'Donnell summit with  
ZR RIFLE covered as a FID operation  
(ostensibly to develop a capability to enter sugar  
& kidnap carriers)

15 Nov 61 - Harry discusses application of  
ZR RIFLE to Cuba; instructed by Bissell  
to run syndicate operation

Unrelated - Helms puts Harry in  
charge of Agency's Cuba task force

Late 1961 - Early 1962 Harry busy

Early March 62

- Much later Harry takes over Castro
- Harry view

came to threat of Castro operations &  
ZR RIFLE so being symmetrical.

- Exec Action is symmetrical w/ AS/AS
- ZR RIFLE ~~SECRET~~ is used to Exec Action  
ZR RIFLE alone meant Castro

*Handwritten note:*  
Harry's  
in operation

A review of his correspondence was unrevealing

(Permitt handled Castro operation & L/n use any of assets being developed in ZR RIFLE)

- Memo of Harry after he left Task Force W & going to Rome on 22 June 1963 to Chief FI / Staff that ~~the~~ <sup>the</sup> case to keep AT was no longer worth & support ~~worth~~.

- Records (OLLA-1974, 24 April 64) show termination of a working status on 21 April 64.  
<sup>There is no indication in the file that the Exec Adm</sup>  
<sup>Copy of 2R/RIFLE / ATWIN ever used</sup>  
 Edwards -

- No activity after B of P until Harry met Rosell & recontacted April 62.

- Edwards not contact w/ RIFLE over McBuire wiretap

- 14 May 62 - Harry called Edwards & indicated he was bringing Rosell from further west

743  
 Harry - took out a "gring" operation since he described plan for getting possession to a favorite Castro restaurant. The mechanics were identical to those described by Edwards and as reported in Phase one's

- O'Connell thinks "something going on" before April 61 & April 62 but can't remember

0002277

April 8<sup>th</sup> approx

- Harry met w/ Russell & O'Connell
- O'Connell pointed Mahan there
- ! Harry says he would have recognized Mahan; saw him socially once or twice after 1947 when Harry came to Agony; not since '52 when Harry went to Berlin.
- <sup>Edwards, deliberately</sup> <sup>by</sup> <sup>Harry</sup> did not mention Mahan when he first

p45

O'Connell out of June 62 when he was assigned PCS to Okinawa

p47

18 April 62  
O'Connell gets calls for Russell weekly w/ Harry in Miami

O'Connell says operation going on when Harry took it over altho he could remember when it was started

Harry specified that bean not to be brought in for 2nd phase & further Roubli bound upon.

Roubli right that bean asked him what was going on; R replied "nothing" bean - "too bad"

p48

Macco - whether a Vasocato record known MACEO Mackle who Harry probably would have known. Also, 15' clear Macco was "Roubli man"

Roubli essential to 2nd phase as a contact to Vasoca.

p 49. When the jobs were given to ...  
Vanna reported arms and equipment needed for  
his end of the operation.

0002278

SECRET

April 1962

- a) explosives
- b) detonators
- c) 20.30 caliber rifles
- d) 20.45 cal. handguns
- e) 2 radios
- f) 1 boat radio

V reported names & support of Roubil  
present next to Harry. With help  
of Shaddy, chief of TMDWTS,  
about 5M of weapon & equipment.

Harry & Shaddy went U-Haul  
& put truck in pickup lot for  
delivery to Miami, V, or via San Juan.  
Harry & Shaddy set up watch on  
do Roubil & Connell.

p 50

May 62 - Roubil reported that the job was in Cuba at the  
restaurant reported used regularly by Castro.  
June 62

V had ~~sent~~ <sup>dispatched</sup> 3 men team to Cuba  
Sept 1962

Harry saw Roubil in Miami on  
7-11 Sept. Another 3 man team  
of military men assigned to penetrate  
Castro's body guard but never happened.  
"Medicine" reported safe still in place and first team safe

Sept 62 - Jan 63

Harry in Miami. 22 Dec - a team  
saw Roubil & Macco several times. Gave  
Roubil 2700 to V for return of 3 military  
men who never left (in Fla keys)

Feb 63

Harry left word for Macco in  
Miami 11-14 Feb that nothing new & looked  
as if dead off. (Just how Harry left this  
word for Macco is not clear)

p 51  
Military men  
needed to  
take off

Delay due to  
of conditions  
of not much success

SECRET

April May 63

Helms approved a last meeting  
w/ Harry & Roselli before Harry left  
for Rome.

People who knew  
Q55 Bruce Cheever (Harry defied 1962)  
knew Harry meeting w/ gangster in  
Reno in winter of '62

May 62

Shuf Edwards & Lawrence Houston brief  
RFK "all the way". RFK agreed not to  
prosecute writing case but wanted to be  
informed of Agency's deal w/ "gangster" again.  
RFK asked for a memo of  
the meeting via a "formal" memo  
prepared on 14 May 1962 by Edwards & Houston.  
NO briefing of McLean, <sup>General</sup> Carter, or Helms.

RFK not told that Phase II had  
begun; that V had pitted & arrived late.

On 14 May 62 Harry briefs Helms;  
advises against briefing McLean & General  
Carter. Writes Edwards that Roselli  
is not going to be used.

Comment

RFK's secretary called on 4 March 67  
to obtain Edwards memo. He knew

of Pearson article of 7 March 62 & apparently wanted to check his recollection of what he had been briefed upon.

Helms had talked w/ RFK & allowed him to read memo. He did not have a copy.

1954-55 Mahon served by Neardness to offset Onassis control of Saudi oil shipments. Worked at top levels of U.S. & British govt & met at least once w/ Neeson.

O'Connell rept'd that during negotiations w/ Long Committee, Mahon stated he might buy his attorney's bill through a trust as a gift.

10-11 Sept 62 <sup>03</sup> SECRET

(Wainwright) Tegulano & Cubela in  
Copenhagen & (Wainwright) used "massacre"  
& Cubela inserted "element"

14-23 Sept 62

<sup>03</sup> Cubela, Tegulano, (Wainwright) &  
(Earle Williams) from Madrid; met in Paris.  
Cubela given S/W training &  
supplies; shown a handwritten document.  
Refused to be photographed.

(Williams)<sup>03</sup> cubela that no physical  
elementary missions be given as a  
requirement but he might do it on his  
own initiative. Headquarters strongly comm. that  
no physical elementary missions be given Cubela.

5-8 Sept 63

Brayel - met by (Wainwright)  
Tegulano & Nestor Sanchez who became  
case officer.

Cubela showed 2 S/W manuals but  
only 1 record. afraid of postal censorship.

That night of Ramon Guin Diego  
AMTRUNK-10 who was being moved  
DIAZ Isalqui (MICE-14) who had  
been sent to recruit BRAYEL

SECRET

14 Sept 63

From Brayel Cubela flew to Paris  
& was going to tell Castro after the fact

0002281

9 March 61 03 - Mexico City Station

P28

(Jack Stewart) met w/ Cubela in Mexico City, arranged by Carlos Tepedeno Hernandez, a long-time friend. Cubela was (Stewart) from Havana where he was once assigned.

Cubela and leader of DR are like group of leftist students signed in 1956 to fight Batista; Nestor Sanchez - case officer.

28 March 61

Both Cubela & Cole wanted to defect; according to asset of Miami Station.

Ex-filtration called off on report that Cuban police aware of Cubela's desire to defect & his departure plans.

Comment:  
First of 3 rumormongers within MIA; but unknown if Cubela asset of Miami Station. Other two links are even more nebulous.

~~15 Jan 61~~ 14 August 61

Message from aviation station (god friend) Tepedeno that Cubela going to Paris & wanted to talk to <sup>under friend of Stewart</sup> No indication of any money.

SECRET

15 Jan 62

Lucia Echevarria Bianchi told an asset (HM contact-1) that Cubela going to Helsinki & wanted to defect.

SECRET

Would stop in Paris to see Tepedino

0002283

27 June 1962

Tepedino approached FBI in Miami on 11 June with idea that Cabelo wanted to defect. FBI sent a detailed memo to CIA since they knew Tepedino to be a CIA asset.

8 July 62

Tepedino dissatisfied w/ CIA handling of Cabelo's "defection" in Paris in 61, so he contacted FBI. Stated his source of info on memo for defection were w/ Chivarrias.

30 July - a August 62 '63

Wm Wainwright met w/ Tepedino a jeweler in NYC & both went to Helsinki, Cuba. Talked into being recruited in place of not defecting.

Cabelo wanted to blow up oil refineries, kill Castro, Carlos Rodriguez, & Soviet presence.

7-a August 62

Meeting in Stockholm because Helsinki far away. Cabelo stated that he told 4 of his Cuban associates that he met Tepedino in Helsinki.

SECRET

SECRET

that he was taking a vacation.

0002286

3 Oct 63

Sandy arrives in Paris to meet w/ Cuba who had written Tapedo on NY sheet he did not want to continue.

CIA had to tell [French Govt] 24 [that contacts were for purposes of defense, French unilaterally keeping Cuba under surveillance.]

11 Oct 63 Sandy cables that Cuba insist on meeting w/ RFT; advised Cuba going to try an attempt on Castro even w/out US support.

29 Oct 63

Fitzguald, very SAT, goes to Paris & got approval from Helms.

Fitz states he told Cuba that US would have no part in attempt on Castro's life.

Winton went from Sandy in company

14 Nov 63

19 Nov 63

Sandy memo states Fitz assumes that Cuba would get cache of rifles w/ scopes inside Cuba, on request

22 Nov 63

SECRET

Sandy arrives in Paris on Nov 22 after getting run w/ ~~Robert Kennedy~~

Sandy says Cuba accepted gear but stated he would not take it to

Cuba with him. SECRET

0002287

Cubela asked for a cache of arms to be placed at AMTRUNK is L2 high-power rifle w/ telescopic sights; 20 grenades; 2000 <sup>C-4 sticks</sup> fam. As they left meeting, heard JFK shot.

Sandy stated he rec'd an OP in cable from Fitzgerald that Sneydy is "off" but nothing in AMTRUNK file.

Cubela w/ a take S/W with him to Prague  
1 Dec 63

Cubela returns from Prague to Cuba  
19 Feb 1964

JMWAVE to have 2 caches in place in March.

Done on 17-21 March 64 on AMTRUNK VIII

24 April 1964

Tegedino had been brief to meet Carlos Jorge ROBERTO many who has message from Cubela.

097 3 May 64 - Roberto says Cubela wanted a silencer  
30 August 64

Arturo record info thru Madrid that a group of doubtful members of Castro regime would to ~~be~~ establish direct contact. 7 Oct 64, Arturo sees

Alberto BLANCO Romariz.

13 Nov. 64. SECRET

Arturo agrees to talk to AMTRUNK-1 if it turns out he is contact man for internal dissent group. Arturo

Think if ~~ARMAS#1~~ is chief of ~~insider~~  
group we can forget about operation  
4 Dec 64

Sanchez prepares a memo for 6570 for  
Arteme to maintain contacts w/ ~~insider~~  
group's reps in Prague. Arteme does  
6-5 Dec 64

Sanchez meets Cubela in Paris & was  
~~not~~ going to continue his plans  
Told US. could not be involved.  
10 Dec 64.

Arteme did not know nor Cubela  
that CIA in direct contact with each.  
Rather SAs continued to put both  
men together.

CIA did want to put select  
weapons on ~~the~~ Cubela's hands directly  
but could do it. Thus Arteme  
27 Dec; 30 Dec (initial)

Cubela & Arteme meet in <sup>Madrid</sup> Madrid.  
Arteme reports to Sanchez that Cubela  
had requested a select for FAT rifle  
but Americans w/n give him one.

Arteme to come up w/ select or  
different rifle in Cuba.

11 Feb 65

Cubela to receive pistol w/ select  
& Belgian FAT rifle w/ select from  
Arteme's secy ~~SECRET~~ <sup>SECRET</sup> weapons come  
from ~~the~~ US. & are now in Madrid.

Congress

12 Feb 65

SECRET

0002289

Artemio has never talked to Cubela in Madrid.

4 March 65 - Cubela in Havana; source is friend of Tepedino's who telephoned him

15 March 65

Rafael Garcia-Bango Director moves in Madrid from Cuba & introduced to a state officer.

Probably close friends of Cubela; & claims to be in touch w/ group of military leaders planning to overthrow Castro.

Dad in July 62 for exp. Traff. as lawyer for Capi Hotel. Traff. - ex manager  
| Another name - link

June 1965

Letter ESPINOSA Hernandez, a former PM turned now was arrested as a militant on 20 March 1961, contacted FIA's new lawyer FBY on 3 June 65.

Esquivel stated he had received letter from a friend in Paris urging him to meet w/ Albert Polanco who had a message from Cubela who wanted it delivered to CIA.

Monge - Cubela in a position to help Castro & would CIA & US Gov be willing to support them if "yes"; for details on what he needed.

SECRET

Cubela had wanted money in Paris on 1 Feb 65. Travel down & urgent - \$10,000

16 Feb 65 Sandy gave hints.

0002290 Tepehu 7,00 in NY C.

SECRET

23 June 1965 Headquarters sent cable Kennedy contact. 'convincing proof that evidence from [redacted] group measure', Fernando AGAS

1 March 66 - Cuba's bin arrested for activities w/ CIA

Jose Luis Gonzalez Ballarín, Alberto Blanco Romany, Juan Alena Navarro. captured

Also appearing - Guillermo Cuenca Alvarez, Royal Herminio Udey

Gonzalez Ballarín<sup>03</sup> - attests in Spanish contact of (James Noel ~~with "reiner" official~~) at US Embassy in Madrid. 32

Cuba met w/ Artemi in Spain in Feb. 1965.

Artemi sent Ballego to US to get Helicop's signt & silencer. Delivered to Blanco Romany who delivered it to Gonzalez Ballarín then to Cuba the day before he left Madrid.

Tasco

Said in Cuba's residence were Helicop's signt, F&H rifle + a machine gun

Castro sent personal letter that death sentence not be asked. 10 March 66

Cuba testimony:

Silencer did not break; I threw it away because it was burning my hands

SECRET

0002291 I spoke to Fidel in January. He opened  
the door to me <sup>SECRET</sup> but I did not have  
the courage to tell him

(Comment)

Trial evidence confined to trip to  
Europe in Feb 64 & Aug 65 to meet  
w/ Atoms. No mention of Madri at the  
Nov 65 contact w/ Agency.

No hint of poison pen Nov 63.

Speculate

If full details would have come out,  
Castro would have little to except to deny.  
& probably impudently repeat some in own words.

2 high-level  
embassy meetings  
where Castro  
was usually  
discouraged

Special Group (August)  
18 August 62 (probably one described by Pearson)  
State: Dean Rusk, Alexis Johnson, Edwin  
Martin, Richard Goodwin, Robt Hurwath  
which have

Maxwell Taylor, McGeorge Bundy (RFT absent)  
Deputy:

McNamara, Belmont, Tenet, Tamm  
CIA - McCone Harry

USIA - Edward Murrow, Donald Wilson

Secy - Thomas Parrott

Parrott's notes & a number of  
but Madri & King would have ~~mentioned~~  
raising it & Munson's comment.

No one raised except McNamara  
'highly agree' <sup>SECRET</sup>

Lansdale wrote memo on 13 August  
to Harry, Hurwath, Tamm, & Wilson which

Probab Pearson's info wa high level  
mety was 10 Sept 62

O'Connell interviewed Mahan in May 67  
& wrote a report:

- 1 - Mahan taught Morgan in Phoenix
- 2 - Never heard of Chase H from Roselli  
or anyone

G002293

- 3. Roselli started to Morgan by Greenbaum
  - 4 - Mahan suspects Roselli in contact of Morgan
  - 5 - Roselli definitely heard; Morgan in Vegas recently "in contact"
  - 6 - Garrison, Morgan, Roselli in Vegas in March. <sup>been with</sup> In truck w/ Roselli; so was Morgan
- It is our impression that Greenbaum also involved in the conversation.

Point finger to Roselli as source of info  
Morgan as Pearson's source.

Summer of 62 - Edwards, Mahan, & Roselli  
had lunch & Edwards said he told Roselli  
he in front RFK of Roselli's contribution.

Pearson's story seems to rely on ref  
above. Could be Harry if ref; source  
Probably from 2 sources:  
State Dept meeting + met. of course  
so Roselli chief suspect.

Inference: Roselli definitely had lunch &  
Morgan definitely talking to a newspaperman friend (Greenbaum)

Es Robt Mahan  
reducing non  
DA intelligence  
with immediate  
knowledge of the  
subject Kennedy  
agent

SECRET

Lansdale memo covered drafting papers for various subjects related to Cuban operation. A portion of case found CIA copy of memo was "concluding elimination of leader". Lansdale repeated tried to raise assumption of Castro w/ Hany over next several weeks but Hany did not.

0002292

It must 5 people in Lansdale's office know MIA took to Lansdale information in memorandum as part of it.

30 July 1964

303 Committee met in Situation Room of White House.

McBryne Bundy, Vance, Malone, Thomas Hughes & Des. Fitzgerald for a discussion of Cuba.

~~Thomas~~ Peter Jensen as secy.

10 June 64 memo from DDJP to Don re Mafia plot to assassinate Castro.

Price was 150,000 w/ 10,000 of pass. Cuban exile: Jose Mario "Pepin" Bosch, Basadre Rume, to contribute 50,000. He approved JM WARD for US participation. Refused outright.

19 August 64

DCI (McCrall) to Bundy - re FBI interest w/ all participants

SECRET

SECRET

0002294

Publicity has not been its course:

- a) Pearson has not yet used the pills & fact of State Dept meeting
- b) Baum has not revealed full case; CIA should be promptly displayed when he does
- c) P wants Pearson in custody & will be deported

Pearson stay in custody & detail found only in C here the 3 man team.

p 126. Put in it but slight - that there is no other motive in Speedy's stay.

p 127. We do not know that Carter actually tried to retaliate, but we do know that there were such plots against Carter. Unhappily, it now appears that Baum may also know this.

p 129. Wilson reports that Taylor is in Tampa. Powell is persona non grata in San Diego, being refused register <sup>with police</sup> and he is in town. None of them would have connections about disapp in his CIA connections when he was pulled by law enforcement author. Evidence has already shown it when the FBI was working him in 1963, Powell appears to deny it in his conversation with Meyer & Baum.

P. 131. Search - 3 May 1967

Commented Red base CIA over a barrel

Tab A

SECRET

0002295

241 July 75 memo

Sarita Tropp

4. ST desired person full to agent who had access to Castro

When this attempt failed, T supported another candidate (cancelled re BGP)

- Mahan former contact supervisor w/ Office of Security
- Roselli conviction

Nov 1967 - illegal entry

Dec 68 - Fugitive

Senate Staff 7-8-June 1975

Ad Hoc Staff

No 838-75

9 June 75

4. Report to Maxwell Taylor made by Dick Bissell on 8-Dec 1971 DDO

(maybe on continuing the active capability)

5. Who is Torrella (yet another alleged Castro assassin) DDO

6. - WIRROU's operational aliases?

- who was (WIZARD 14) John Stein's memo

- 2 young officers who contacted WIRROU DDO

- want to know John Stein's all WIRROU file by Walt P. Lee

SECRET

1/1

Memorandum

SECRET

5 May 1967

Subj: Wm K. Harvey

0002296

Missing

1. ~~Harvey~~ <sup>Bill</sup> Harvey contacted Payson to report to Payson some contact he had w/ "gangster" and offer his copy to FBI. He expressed to Payson ---

16 May 67

Tab B Attention Edward Cohen  
Finn Bambero 7 April 77  
cc Dade City

Morgan associated w/ Agency circa 1951 as a lawyer "cut out" in matters of contact to DDO.

Edward Pierpont Morgan

DOB 28 May 1913 St Louis

Richard Scully Cain

MKA - Richard Scalpette SS 357-22-333

1969 Texarkana Tex (Reg No. 17169-TT)

In May 1964 Bolden refused to testify before Warren Com. in absence of counsel George Howard.

SECRET

Chicago American for 26 Nov. 1963 in column Daily Day by Maggie Daly - rumor that assassination planned w/ FBI of Chicago 9/7/63

SECRET

1 Sept 27 name of wife

Garrison a guest of Mario Marini,  
a henchman of Marcella, at her 1944  
banquet denied knowledge of Marini's contact  
to Marcella.

TO Chief SRS  
Sulge. Carr

9 Oct 1947

TAB  
B

Info re meeting of Fair Play  
under Richard Criley (# 346 116)

Source of info on Guillermo WSCOBAR  
who was 'int' of Horace Speeds (SAS)  
leads obtained from Ralph PEREZ (44426  
Speed #C199499)

WSCOBAR recruiting Cubans for Communist  
Party in Chicago.

0002297

SECRET

File

7 Dec 1978 VCT for Doc of Secy

Ruselli, Jolny

9 Aug 1976

SECRET

Brief mem't 'Sally' Jolny Rossi

0002298

Tab B o c

Additional info re Traff, Ruselli, & Brewer contained in material previously released for review re Sturgis.

21 May 1975 Memo by Balchukidze re Arthur Ballitto & Fred Hanu

1. 12 Jan 1961 memo told FBI he recommended DuBois for an A atty whom he w/n disclose

2. A Hanu is James Confield per a 13 March 1961 report.

3. 22 May 61 FBI memo re interview w/ Col. F Swain who said he contacted Mahan in fall of 1960 for use as a "cut-out" for Havana. Swain gave my impression to Mahan he would attempt to accomplish several clandestine efforts in Cuba.

10 Jan 1974

Memo: Chief Warden Hampton Downer

Subj: Salvatore Bramanna & Richard Cain

Re Chicago Tribune Articles of 28 and 31

Dec. 1973

Richard S. Cain # 272141

DDB Oct 1931 in Chicago.

Left Vice Squad in 1960; Acquired  
Lohman.  
a F.I. form

CIA contacts

SECRET

0002299

A. Fall 1960

Cain initiated contact w/ Chicago office  
& volunteered info on Cuban led groups in  
Chicago area.

B. June 61

Contacted Lohman of Chicago Field office  
re a Mr. Krougansky who was met w/  
President of Panama's Investigative Commission.

C. Summer 61

Cain met in Mexico City by CIA staff  
identity & purpose unknown.

D. Oct 1961

Cain wrote to Lohman from Panama  
offering his services

E. April 1962

Cain makes unannounced visit to Hong  
Kong. Warden Scott & Warden Dean in Mexico City  
says he had an investigative agency w/  
branches in Chicago & LA which he used to  
provide training to Mexican Coast Agents

F. 4 June 62

Reported from Mexico for small number  
has books & information on Mexican officials  
& writing

G. 19 August 63

met in Chicago at Lake Shore Drive Athletic  
Club & Dolphin Club by Grace Speed w/ a  
Dev. Staff officer & Chief of Chicago DCI office.

He would like to work overseas  
for CIA

Cain worked for Croft by Shuff  
& ~~was~~ in contact with Cubans in Chicago  
area & would provide info on undercover  
activities of Cubans particularly Pablo's Sierra  
H. 26-38 Aug 1963

Cain informed the Student Directory,  
a Cuban exile group in Miami

- Miro Cordoy's interest in  
purchasing arms

2 Sept 63 J. DRE people who had purchased  
arms. (Goran Speed) via Washington Chicago  
told Cain to get out of the picture  
H. 1967.

FBI investigating Cain's arms work  
& recommended CIA sever contact

L. 15 April 1972

Cain returned to Chicago from Mexico  
City; then disappeared. May 1972 says he  
was going to Latin America. Involved  
in illegal arms deals (international) &  
on various occasions stated he was CIA

M. 16 May 1972

FBI agent in Mexico City asked  
Mexico City Station for traces on Cain

Eastern Airlines got info. Cain at  
Seymour would find him at Honduras. 5 May 1972

27 Nov 63

By ROBT B. P. Lohman

1. Fair Play for Cuba Committee in Feb 63 met at 987 S. Spaulding Chicago under direction of Michael Bailey, Secy of Chicago Chapter. Assassination of Rev. Dr. King
3. LHO provided info in March 1963 Shuff's office had not established LHO at Feb meeting but strong suspicion he was in Chicago in April 1963 & responsible for firing the officer of UPT
4. Shuff believed in like FBI so had "officially" asked FBI for info on Fair Play for Cuba. If they developed anything definite they would notify inform FBI

~~Could not read!~~ "that emp in 1963 the Chicago info over again in US for Fair Play"

15 August 63

Sandy Smith Chicago Sun Times following up a lead that he call CIA re report Bureau would get info from Cuba but no info of value.

Said he did not show info to Ed Butman but to someone in Butman's office (justified)

## Breckenridge memo to Dept of requests

1. Persons in Sec H of paragraph 3 is contained in one 50 volume of material
2. Section B lists 3 American citizens. Contact is minimal
3. Quarter in Section C B 1 is Arteme; Also used by Mafia in custo operation

Detectives have already interviewed several who is related.

TAD C

1. Ramon Don Estevan Dimonquez (shortly) DOB 2 May or 5 Feb 1936
2. Rolando Masferrer Rojas family DOB 12 Jun 1948
3. Luciana Nieves (shortly)
4. Jose de la Tormenta (shortly)
5. Jose Quintana DOB 3 Oct 48  
reported by name to Roubel
6. Joaquin Antonio Cortijo DOB 10 Jan 48
7. Manuel Arteme

TAB C

SECRET

0002303

14 March 1974

Mulroy vs Terry Sawyer

Frank O'Malley referred Hunt to Bob Mullen of the Mullen Corp.

- O'Malley knew Hughes a client of Mullen's; this information picked up in course of a casual relationship between O'Malley & Mullen in early 60's in connection with Full Cuba Committee.

Hunt & Mullen met in Paris during Marshall Plan

- when Mullen doubted if Hunt possible insight on some placements caused consternation.

- Hunt approached O'Malley for an individual having access & information only details.

- Thomas C. Amato apparently refused job.

- Houston

- Paul or intervention w/ Farrell of ISNS re possible departure of Branciani.

- only people who knew were F. Inwood, Osborn, Angleton, Rocca, & Houston

SECRET

1977 Report

SECRET

0002304

AmTRUNK

Designated to identify & later use suspected  
personnel in current forces in Cuba.

Bay 63, Nestor Antonio Moreno Lopez  
& Enrique Cayardo Robera developed Fernando  
Plan to overthrow Castro.

Moreno defects in April 1961 & assoc. w/  
George Volsky; Cuban citizen of Polish origin.  
Presumably USSR <sup>(440)</sup> & then in Polish Ar Force under  
British Command. Married Cuban & arrived in  
Miami May 61.

Bay 63

Volsky contacts Ted Sygula & met w/ w/ w/  
Gardner & Herwicz (State). CIA assigns plan  
to Miami Station out is known as AmTRUNK

Nerve program run for & by Sgt 63  
had 3 sources including Guin

Moreno in Oct 63 was removed from  
AmTRUNK due to indiscretion. He was judge  
appeal to JFK thru Volsky & Sygula.

Had some contacts but no real action  
capability; In '65 Guin & Piny arrested.

Sygula & Volsky both Polish & met in Cuba  
in 195-60

SECRET

Joe Ricardo RABEL Nurey  
suspected agent who defected Dec 60  
joined AmTRUNK; returned to Cuba on her own

X in 65 to infiltrate his family. Arrested & given 30 yrs. but freed in 67.

Accusation RHPRT a Cuban agent as early as July 1963.

Possibility -

It MTRUNK might have been an important Cuban plan from the beginning. Inf action was buying cables & some info's & infiltration.

M to

NY Daily News 20-25 April 1975 by Paul Mackell, - quotes Sturgis on assassination attempts including using Juan data to bomb Castro. I recruited him to work w/ the embassy (US).

Sturgis' id of RHPRT, prior to its disclosure by external investigators, raises question as to what he knew.

Office of Security memo 1975 noting connection between Sturgis & RHPRT in 1960 citing FBI reports.

(made in conjunction w/ Daily News story)

Biancane in FBI memo 18 Oct 1960 indicated he had met w/ assassin-to-be. & pills in Castro's food or drink.

Since CIA pills not until Feb 1961, seems that not had their own plan.

SECRET

- Lorenzo claims Sturgis recruited her in 1960

Verna

0002307

FBI 21 Dec 1960

- MRO support for Mike

FBI 18 Jan 1961

V. receiving some of that support

Stungis could have learned of Mike's  
role after Mike settled in Miami in 1965

FBI report

14 August 1964 would a statement by a  
person jailed in Cuba by Troops.

### Other Proposals

1. May 1975

Cuban exile who came to be a  
contract employee stated that in Feb 1961 he  
was given a rifle & a memo to kill Castro.  
Tried to enter Cuba 3 times & failed

2. May 1977 Anderson column re  
Antonio Veciana

On 3 occasions (Dec 1960, July 62, Havana)  
he proposed to CIA. He was assisting Castro

In 1970 report he made a proposal to  
an AID employee at an overseas post.

5 Agent Messages in 1961

SECRET

1. 3 of messages involved some group of agents

so probably same plan

1. 27 March 1961 AMBROSE 15

Plan to sabotage electric company in Havana & hit Castro at Sports Palace

2. 29 March 1961

same idea with effort to arrive on 30 March but no commitment as assassin

3. 5 April 61

only room for 50 men; would try 9 April but need military aid.

a) AMBROSE infiltrated several times & finally executed 30 August 62 after May 62 arrest. Reported as some identity he was CIA; & not mentioned in McBrown Book

b) AMCOAX 11 <sup>the</sup> ~~both~~ persons in

c) AMPUB 11 touch w/ AMBROSE

d) AMPANIC 17 & mentioned in McBrown book, Drey 30 yr sentence

All 3 people sentenced prior to Bay P-8 none had assassination mission. Only AMBROSE mentioned that!

06, 24

4. 4 June 61 [Moratori of Italian Embassy]

claimed he had plans for program within 30 days after killing Fiedl.

Reply was that info was untrue & (Moratori) confession

SECRET

5. 3 May 61

0002309

- from a member of Revolutionary  
Recovery Movement saying they would try to  
kill Fidel today"

- Reply was "Lay low"  
- Maybe HRM Pub 1

Tab D

AMLASH

- Rejects notion that AMLASH a Cuban agent.
- No contact between August 1962 and Sept 1963
- 7 Sept & 9 Sept cables indicate that AMLASH is a "spoiled brat"; hopeless as an intelligence performer; but approach in chief com speaker allowed to recruit his own cohorts."

Book V leaves inference that Castro's  
speech to Dan Barker after AMLASH leak  
lit CIA had not probed anything at that  
time. & CIA met until 3 Oct 63

p 3-4  
Summary of Findings

Nov 19, 63 AMLASH told CIA officer  
he was returning to Cuba. On 20 Nov  
he was reported as being under Federal  
"of something untoward" AMLASH

p 26 SSC Final Rpt.

SECRET

On 24 Nov Mexico Station responded to a  
Headquarters request for names of known  
contacts of certain Soviet personnel in Mexico,

Purpose was to determine significance  
LHO's contact w/ Soviets

But AMLAH/1 name was included,  
in reference to contact between a member  
of the Soviet embassy & a Cuban cultural  
attache. NOT a report of a contact between  
AMLAH/1 and the Soviet

"H" role - Clearf did not know of  
AMLAH 1963 association w/ CIA

---

Table E

- 24 Nov 63 Subj: Cuban Recenter following  
Assassination of Pen Kennedy
- 28 Nov 1963 DIR 85657 (C/WH/3)  
John Wilson - Hudson
- 29 Nov 63  
Action on FDP report, Agency reports Almeida  
be turned over to Mexican authorities.
- 12 Dec 1963 CSCT-3/779,048 (C/WH/3)  
Subj: Wilson, Carlos Golen
- 30 Jan 1964 CSCT-3/779,814 (CI/Sec,  
Subj: Jack Ruby - LHO
- 20 March 1964 CSCT-3/780/612 (SR/CF/R)  
Photos of individual Clearf resupply LHO

SECRET

10 June 1964 CSCI - 31781,841 (CJ/R&A)  
Info re Ruby

6 Oct 64 CSCI - 316101446-64  
VIA DUCT interview on 9 Sept 1964  
His comments on 7 Photos Forwarded ~~to~~

W C Doc. 1054 Ruby & Associates.

0002311

SECRET

June 21/1975

1977 D.C. Report

SECRET

0002312

1. Comments on Final

The contents of the CFT are more a series of questions of how various investigations should be handled, and on the non-reporting of various Agency operations. However, that the SSC Final Report judge to have been allowed to the Warren Commission inquiry.

2. A stated thesis of the SSC Final Report is that the creators of the intelligence system against Cuba should have a negative influence on the quality of their support for the U.S. coverage.

"If your personnel ... investigated p 2 they should have ... facts ... p 7 Certainly ... information, p 7

A central feature of the rationale in the concept that of Castro had allowed by these activities it would have provided some information against Cuba. Surely, the SSC Final Report makes it clear that if these facts they should have been pursued and accepted at the time of the intelligence system (not to mention the U.S. subject a review of the government's Castro program to see what it might reveal.

Agency views the provisions they in the Final Report & part form of "the



Red Control learned of it. The SSC, in its Final Report, fell into this very trap, trying to make the AMTASH operation actually fit the theory for which the SSC's penetration seemed to be tailored!

### Two C

AMTASH

The Agency had not a tentative relationship with this man during Pan Kennedy's life, altho the SSC Final Report - in trying to prove its thesis -- has attempted to present it differently. Because the case is discussed so extensively in the SSC Final Report, it is treated in a separate column in the paper at Tab D. The key point is that prior to Pan Kennedy's death the relationship ~~to~~ with AMTASH was ambiguous and without substance. Had Castro heard of it he could ~~not~~ claim only that there was a contact that had not developed to the point of an understanding.

### p 14 New Consideration on the Supplicants Operation

In a column of stories by Paul Mitchell in the New York Daily News, of April 20-25, 1975 it quoted sources as follows:

"The Cuban Consulate in Havana involved in planting a bomb in Castro's office. I had

across to the Prime Minister's office, Stueger said. F. Bruno Felli's parents security guard Orta. F recruited him to work with the Embassy (Russian Embassy in Havana).

"He (Stueger) has claimed on a number of occasions to have been an employee of CIA, although there is no record of any such relationship. He was in contact with some of the CIA Cuban employees in the Miami area, but had no direct relationships with the Agency.

Orta was the director of the office of the Prime Minister, which gave him <sup>access</sup> ~~access~~ that would make it possible for him to pass customs. The plan failed because Orta lost his position, and with it his access, in late June 1961. This was prior to delivery of the poison pills to him in late Feb or early March 1961. Orta's escape in this manner was over when he took refuge in the Venezuelan Embassy in Havana in April 1961. He was allowed to leave Cuba in October 1964 and settled in Miami in Feb. 1965.

and on 13 June 1974  
 Same news source discuss a possible relationship between Stueger and Trappanese, also mentioning a former Robinson as a former partner of Trappanese. Office of Sec. of State memorandum in 1975; not by

a connection between Sturgis and Portman in 1960, citing FBI reports.

Reference that Sturgis reports to have had a role in gambling and. In this availability due to his "lost papers," One could deduce that Sturgis and Carter could have known one another because of their connection with the gambling activities as well as having contacts with the men heading the gambling operations.

From 1976 Sturgis also reports claim by Maria (Mamie) Lorenz that she acted on behalf of Sturgis in 1960 re pain pills in jar of face cream.

Quotes - FBI memo on "Vanna"  
"This seems to confirm some part involving a woman to kill Carter with poison known, the timing of events does not fit the time frame known to CIA. While consolidation had been given to various schemes, there were no CIA pills for delivery until February 1961. It suggests that the syndicate may have been running ahead of its man!"

In fact, it is possible that Vanna already was involved in independent

agitation with the ~~current~~ ~~syndicate~~  
 when first appeared prior to 1941  
 in ~~Madrid~~ to ~~contact~~ the ~~United~~  
~~States~~. The 1947 DO Report refers  
 to ~~two~~ FBI reports that bear on this.  
 One of them, on 21 Dec. 1940, indicates  
 support by the ~~current~~ ~~syndicate~~  
 for some of the Cuban exiles. The  
 other report, on 18 Jan. 1941,  
 suggests that Vanna was one of these  
 giving that support, altho' this was  
 not confirmed.

... to late in June 64 another group  
 plot in ~~Madrid~~ for 150,000.

Speculation that when ~~started~~  
 in April 1942 can appear just "blue  
 over & smelly" already "ongoing".

It is possible that CFA simply  
 found itself involved in providing  
 additional resources for independent  
 operations that the syndicate already  
 had under way.

In a sense CFA may have been  
 "piggy-backing" on the syndicate and  
 in addition to its material contribution  
 was also supplying an aura of official  
 sanction.